An Objective Approach to

Reliability-Based Risk Assessment

and Mitigation for Coastal
Infrastructure Development
Wen Wu
Sik-Cheung Robert Lo
Xiao Hua Wang
1

1 School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences, University of New

South Wales at Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia
2 School of Engineering and Information Technology, University of New South Wales at
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia

AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO RELIABILITY_BASED RISK ASSESSMENT

AND MITIGATION FOR COASTAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Wen Wu1*, Sik-Cheung Robert Lo2, Xiao Hua Wang1
1. School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences, University of New
South Wales at Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia.
2 School of Engineering and Information Technology, University of New South Wales at
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia
Abstract
There are numerous kinds of uncertainties involved with coastal infrastructure projects,
which may lead to a range of potential risks. The probabilistic approach, which is also
referred to as reliability analysis, is one of the essential ways in evaluating the impacts of
uncertainties involved in coastal infrastructure development. This article proposes an
objective approach incorporating uncertainty; risk assessment; and mitigation measures
in order to facilitate the decision making processes involved with coastal infrastructure
development. Basic probability-related concepts, including reliability index, are firstly
introduced. A stochastic cost-benefit analysis is presented using an example that
illustrates the modelling of uncertain future climate events. The general concept of
quantitative risk assessment, where risk is considered as a product of both the likelihood
of an adverse event and its consequences, are then demonstrated. This is the underpinning
concept for the use of ranking matrix in risk management. The importance of the
consequence analysis is also emphasized. Compared with the conventional deterministic
evaluation method, the probabilistic approach incorporating uncertain type provides an
effective way to examine the feasibility and the reliability of coastal infrastructure
development. The methodology presented in this paper is in line with the United Nations
International Strategy on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) terminology to avoid the mixup between low likelihood and low risk, and to avoid the confusion between extreme
disaster and extreme events. Finally, the paper indicates a potential application of this
method for other fields, such as environmental risk assessment in environmental
protection and management activities.
Keywords: Uncertainty, Probability of failure, Reliability index, Risk assessment,
Coastal infrastructure development

* Corresponding author: Wen Wu

PhD student in Oceanography
School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences (PEMS), University of
New South Wales at Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia
Email: w.wu@student.adfa.edu.au

1. Introduction
Uncertainties are becoming commonly recognized issues in various scientific fields, and
risks in carrying out a project are unavoidable under uncertainty. Since it is not always
possible to guarantee absolute safety and reliability of a project, it is necessary to
consider uncertainties and risks for an upcoming project (Ang & Tang, 1975; Dandy,
1985; Ang & Tang, 1990; Ang & Tang, 2007; Omitaomu & Badiru, 2007). For coastal
infrastructure development, there is also an increasing trend of uncertainties associated
with population growth, economic development, and climate change (e.g., natural
hazards, extreme events, sea-level rise). There is an increasing recognition that the
traditional expert-based decision making process is insufficient for the environmental or
controversial risk context (Kalsnes et al., 2010).
How do uncertainties affect coastal infrastructure design and construction, and what
impact uncertainties have on decision making? As these uncertainties and risks would be
explicitly identified and assessed only in terms of probability, it is essential to involve the
concept and methodology of probability and reliability (Ang & Tang, 1975, 2007). At
present, probabilistic method, which is usually referred to as reliability analysis, is
drawing increasing attention (Tung, 1992; Li & Lo, 2006; Wang & Kulhawy, 2008).
Numerous relevant studies have been conducted, such as Carmichael & Balatbat (2010);
Dandy (1985); Goicoechea et al. (1982); Low & Tang (1997); Nassar & Al-Mohaisen
(2006); Omitaomu & Badiru (2007); Sivakumar Babu & Srivastava (2009); Tung (1992);
Wang & Kulhawy (2008); and Wu & Lee (1988).
Coastal infrastructure is important for coastal zone development especially because
coastal zones are costly to construct or rehabilitate. Coastal infrastructure is risk prone
because it often needs to be built on difficult or weak ground conditions. The
infrastructure loadings become more uncertain under the impact of environmental
pressures arising from factors such as wind, wave, and currents (Wu & Lee, 1988) In
addition, uncertainties and risks might extend beyond the construction project in terms of
time and space, i.e., the uncertainties may relate to future events and with adverse
consequences extending well beyond the project site. Thus a subject assessment may be
questionable, and the reliability of coastal infrastructure can be better assessed by
probabilistic analysis.
This paper proposes an objective method to facilitate reliability analysis and risk
assessment for coastal infrastructure development. The terminology used is in line with
the United Nations International Strategy on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) in order to
avoid confusion and mix-up (UNISDR, 2009). Basic probability and reliability concepts
are introduced in the first instance. A systematic procedure of reliability-based risk
assessment is then provided for calculating the probability of failure (Pf) and the
reliability index (). Consequence analysis is emphasized. The trade-off between project
safety and costs is also considered using an example to describe cost-benefit analysis.
Finally, a possible application of reliability analysis is provided for an environmental risk
assessment used in environmental protection and management activities.
2. Basic Concepts
2.1 Random Variables and Failure

In order to effectively present reliability-based risk assessment for coastal infrastructure

construction using the probabilistic approach, some basic concepts are introduced below.
Uncertain variables and parameters can be modeled as random variables, which are
characterized by a probability density function (pdf) or cumulative distribution function
(cdf) as explained in detail by Ang & Tang (1975). It is important to note that random
variables may be used to model physically random occurrences or the most-objective
mathematical representation of our inadequate knowledge. A stochastic event is a set
defined by a series of equations or inequalities involving random variables. The
occurrence of an event is dependent on the values realized by random values. The
probability of the occurrence of an event E is denoted as Pr(E).
The use of probabilistic methods has been pioneered in many areas of engineering
(Tung, 1992; Xu & Lo, 1999; Phoon et al., 2003; Lo, 2005; Li & Lo, 2006, 2007; Lo et
al., 2008), and particular attention has been paid to assess the probability of failure, Pf. In
probabilistic modeling, failure is simply an occurrence of a hazardous or an unwanted
event. It may represent a range of unwanted events such as collapse of a structure,
excessive settlement of a building, inadequate supply of power (for electricity-grid
design), inadequate liquidity (for financial world), flooding, and investment lost. For a
project or system, the concept of failure (and margin from failure) is represented via a
performance function, G(Xi), which is a function of a number of random variables, Xi;
and that G(Xi) possesses:
G ( X i )= 0 pre-failure

(1)
G ( X i ) > 0 at point of failure
G ( X ) < 0 failed already
i

The performance function can be defined by a variety of ways, with several

examples shown as follows:
=
G Resistance Loading

Resistance
G
=
1
Loading

G = Allowable Limit - Settlement

G = drainage capcity - Inflow

benefit
1
G =
cost

G = benefits - cost

(2)

However, a careful examination of Equation (2) reveals that two common

mathematical forms of G are as:
G = R - S
(3)

G R 1
=
S
where R is the capacity and S is the demand, both being functions of random variables. In
structural engineering the capacity is the strength or resistance and the demand is the
2

loading. In investment, the capacity is the benefit and the demand is the cost. The first
function of Equation (3) is linear, and thus may have lead to a series of desirable
mathematical properties.
Figure 1 provides an intuitive example to describe the concept of failure defined
by a line in the R-S parameter space. The line is referred to as the Limit State Line as it
defines the onset of failure, an unwanted event (Ang & Tang, 1990). Evidently, Pf =
Pr(G0).

Figure 1. An example illustrating the concept of failure.

2.2 Reliability Index

The complexity of most systems, particularly those involving interacting with nature, makes the
calculation of Pf not feasible. A simpler alternative is to calculate a reliability index, , as
discussed below.
The early (and simplified) definition of reliability index, 0, as proposed by Cornell (1969)
is given by:

0 =

G
(4)
G

where and denote mean and standard deviation of G. Subscript 0 denotes that this is the
simplified definition. G represents a safety margin or safety factor, which is normalized with
respect to variability (as represented by G) to give 0. In general, 0 depends on the choice of G
(which is non-unique). The many drawbacks of 0 are discussed by Lo & Li (1993). However, its
evaluation is relative simple. Techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation with an off-the-shelf
plug-in to a spreadsheet application (such as @Risk) or first order second moment method
Mostyn & Li (1993) are relatively well established. Furthermore, if the same performance
function is used, 0 can rank likelihood of failure.
The most general and invariant definition of as proposed by Hasofer & Lind (1974) is as
follows:

=Min ( X m)T C 1 ( X m) (5)

xF

where X is the vector of random variables, m is mean value vector of the random variables, C is
covariance matrix of the random variables, and F is failure domain. Its values differ from 0 as
proposed by Cornell (1969), but for the particular case of a linear performance function 0 = .
Geometrically, is the shortest distance from the transformed failure surface to the origin of
3

reduced variate space (Li & Lo, 2006). Thus, the calculation of can be treated as solving an
optimization problem implemented using algorithms available within EXCEL or an off-the-shelf
mathematical package (Low & Tang, 1997). A range of methods for calculating and 0 have
also been discussed by Li (1991). It is evident that the calculation of or 0 does not require
complete knowledge of the pdfs. However, the effects of different pdfs can be compensated by
tail approximation techniques (Li et al., 1993).
2.2 Relative Reliability
There are a few challenges in terms of reliability analysis; for example, more input data are
needed (Li & Lo, 2006). Additionally, Pf of most infrastructures is low, and it is rarely possible
to verify a computed Pf or . Another commonly known fact is the scarcity of statistical data,
which is widely recognized. This issue cannot be avoided, and has to be confronted in risk
assessment studies (Henley & Kumamoto, 1992; Tung, 1992). In order to effectively respond to
these challenges, the concept of relative reliability (or relative failure probability) needs to be
applied to facilitate risk assessment for coastal development. The relative reliability is calculated
with the same assumptions, model, and input parameters, using the methods introduced
previously. A simpler approach of calculating or 0 is preferred. Although the absolute values
so computed are not necessarily correct, the relative values can be used for ranking purpose. This
provides an objective basis (as explained in a later section) for evaluating different options,
noting that no action is itself an option.
3. Stochastic Cost-benefit Analysis
We will use an example to illustrate how uncertainties can be modeled in a cost-benefit analysis
for a major coastal infrastructure project. Cost-benefit analysis is a well developed tool, which is
applied to evaluate economic values of a project by determining its costs and benefits (Dandy,
1985; Nassar & Al-Mohaisen, 2006; Omitaomu & Badiru, 2007). As described by Nassar & AlMohaisen (2006), cost-benefit analysis is to convert to the effects of an investment into financial
terms and to account the benefits that usually accrue over a long period of time in contrast to the
capital costs (Nassar & Al-Mohaisen, 2006, p. 13). There has been a growing application of
cost-benefit analysis because of the demand for project efficiency (Nassar & Al-Mohaisen, 2006).
The value of a project can be expressed as:
cost + benefits (6)
Value =
t

where i denotes sources of benefit, t denotes years from a projects start date, and thus
benefits are summed over both sources of benefit and time. Equation (6) intrinsically assumes
that benefits have been discounted to present value (PV). All the costs and benefits converted
into dollars are equivalent as a common measurement. We would like to avoid V 0.
Furthermore in comparing different design and development options, V is an important index to
guide management or policy decision. However, it is difficult to accurately predict the future
benefits because of a range of reasons (Goicoechea et al. 1982; Dandy, 1985; Omitaomu &
Badiru, 2007; Carmichael & Balatbat, 2010). Therefore, variables and parameters in the above
equation should be treated as probabilistic (random variables) rather than deterministic.
In a stochastic cost-benefit analysis, input used to calculate costs and benefits are
considered as random variables (i.e., characterized probabilistically). Therefore, V is also a
random variable. One may define failure as V 0, and thus one can evaluate the investment
worthiness of the project by Pf, defined by P(V0). Different designs or development options
4

have different Pf, which can be compared. As discussed in the previous section, one can also
evaluate the design options by calculating their respective reliability indices, noting that there is
an inverse relationship between Pf and . In the context of a stochastic cost-benefit analysis, the
reliability index can also be considered an index for the upside of V.
The above paradigm is illustrated in Figure 2. The initial cost is represented by the red line,
whereas the projected benefits over time is given by the blue line. Since future return is
intrinsically uncertain, its variability is indicated by a pair of dotted curves, noting that variability
increases with time into future. Evidently, one can then either calculate Pf or using the
methodology presented in Section 2.1, noting that, more likely than not, the calculation of is
more feasible.

Figure 2. Original costs and benefits without consideration of uncertainties.

For coastal infrastructure, there could be more uncertainties caused by climate change,
including increasing temperature, sea-level rise, and extreme weather events (Kalsnes et al.,
2010). As a result of these driving forces, uncertainties and changes in coastal infrastructure will
emerge, such as more severe loading; decreased longevity; more maintenance costs; altered land
use; changed construction location; and higher frequency destruction. A stochastic cost-benefit
analysis can take these factors into account as illustrated by the following example. Consider the
simple case of whether one needs to design for a significantly more severe storm surge/loading
for a proposed coastal infrastructure, one may consider the following three design options:
o [A] Now only: the design is based on present storm surge/loading criteria without
any allowance for a significantly more severe storm in the future.
o [B] Future: the design can cope with a significantly more severe storm
surge/loading criteria that may (or may not) occur in the future.
o [C] Adaptability: although the design can only cope with present storm
surge/loading criteria, but allowance is made to enable future strengthening.
In option A, the infrastructure is only built for current conditions and may have to be
abandoned in the future due to climate change. This means assigning a finite probability of a
more significantly severe storm conditions and the occurrence of such an event will trigger an
abandonment cost and reducing the future benefits after abandonment to zero. In option B, the
initial construction will be increased by a significant amount, but future benefits are kept. In
option C, the initial construction cost will be increased by a modest amount. A finite probability
of a more significantly severe storm condition also needs to be assigned, and the occurrence of
such an event will trigger a future strengthening cost which will then enable benefits be kept.
The three options are illustrated schematically in Figure 3.

[In Figure 3 Reviewer A suggests change to: Abandom & loss of future benefits??]
Figure 3. Schematic diagram for the three options given by the cost-benefit example.
In a more general context, T, the year when more severe storm loading occurs due to
climate change, is uncertain. Thus, it should also be modelled as a random variable. Such a
general formulation [i.e., Equation (6)] can be mathematically expressed as:
Option A: Value =
cost u( L T ). A + [1 u(t T )] benefits (7)
t

where A is the abandonment cost, L = design life of infrastructure, u(x) is a unit-step function
where its value jumps from 0 to 1 at x=0. In the above equation, at t T, the benefits for t > T
will be nullified, and A will be triggered if T < L. Furthermore, if T > L, it is mathematically
equivalent to non-occurrence of significantly more severe storm loading.
Option B: Value =
cost B + benefits (8)
t

where B is the additional capital cost due to designing for a significantly more severe future
loading that may or may not occur.
Option C: Value =
cost C A u( L t ).CS + benefits (9)
t

where CA is the extra initial cost to ensure adaptability, and CS is the strengthening cost, which
will be triggered if T < L. Evidently, the analysis is adequately complicated that simulation using
an off-the-shelf package is the likely calculation tool, with T also being randomly simulated.
In a deterministic cost-benefit analysis, option A evidently gives the highest value.
However, in a stochastic cost-benefit analysis, these three options are compared based on there
respective Pf or calculated in a matter with the same methodology using the same set of
assumptions. Although one may always debate about the probabilistic assumptions made in a
stochastic cost-benefit analysis, these assumptions are common to the calculations for the three
options. Thus, the relative values of Pf and for the three options are much less sensitive to the
assumptions, and an objective comparison can be made. The computed values of are not
necessarily accurate, but they can be used as a quantitative and objective basis of ranking the
reliability of different coastal infrastructure designs and developments.
4. Quantitative Risk Analysis/Assessment (QRA)

In a stochastic cost-benefit analysis, the relative Pf or of different options may provide the
necessary quantitative information for assessing the relative risk of an investment or policy
decision. However, there are other failures, such as flooding or partial failure of a seawall section,
the corresponding Pf or is not adequate for risk assessment or management. It is generally
accepted that uncertainty would involve risk (Ang & Tang, 1975; Ang & Tang, 2007; Kalsnes et
al., 2010). However, the definition of risk may be somewhat elastic. Henley & Kumamoto (1992)
defined risk as the possibility of loss or injury to people and property, which appears to suggest
that risk equate to probability of failure leading to injury or loss of property. However, Henley &
Kumamoto (1992) also suggested that, if there might be failures in the system, risk assessment
would be conducted to determine the consequence of the failure in terms of possible damage to
property or people (Henley & Kumamoto, 1992, p. 8). This implies consequence also needs to
be considered as part of risk assessment. Wu & Lee (1988) stated that an ideal choice of factor of
safety (against collapse of a structure) should be consistent with uncertainties magnitudes and
their consequences. As uncertainties are also associated with Pf, this implies both Pf and
consequence need to be considered. This paper adopts the approach of quantitative risk analysis
(QRA), which defines risk by the following equation:
Risk=likelihood of a hazard consequence of the hazard (10)
Noting that likelihood of a hazard occurring is in fact Pf, and therefore:
Risk =Pf Consequences (11)
This approach is in line with the UNISDR (2009) and avoids many confusing statements about
risk (UNISDR, 2009). For example, if the hazard under consideration is the catastrophic failure
of a deep sea oil drilling platform that may be extremely unlikely, the consequence is so high that
one cannot infer that the risk is negligibly low.
5. Risk Management
The Australian and New Zealand Standard on Risk Management (AS/NZS HB4360:2004), along
with its companion handbook called Risk Management Guidelines - Companion to AS/NZS 4360,
provides a generic framework and guidance for effective risk assessment and management,
which is applicable for any organizations. A systematic risk management process is established
according to this standard (Figure 4). This process includes a series of phases, such as
appropriate definition of context and hazard sources, risk assessment and treatment. There into,
risk assessment is the key part of the process involving risk identification, analysis, and
evaluation. Additionally, auditing means including communication, consultation, monitoring,
and review are penetrated throughout the entire risk management process to ensure effective
operation of the process (Henley & Kumamoto, 1992; Broadleaf Capital International, 2007;
Kalsnes et al., 2010; Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, n.d.).

Figure 4. Risk management process (modified from Broadleaf Capital International, 2007).
5.1 Risk Assessment Matrix

consequence
L

Likelihood

L
1

Consequence

A ranking matrix as illustrated in Figure 5(a) is usually adopted in risk management. The risk, or
more precisely the relative risk, is determined by its position in the matrix. The column position
reflects Pf, whereas the row position reflects consequence. As the situation moves down the
diagonal of the matrix, the risk increases. The off-diagonal positions are neither highest nor
lowest risk, because these positions do not have the most severe combination of Pf and
consequence, as shown in Figure 5(b). This approach, although non-numeric in nature, reflects
the spirit of Equation (10). It avoids the temptation of arbitrarily assigning, or shopping for, a
pre-conceived risk ranking, or of confusing about a highly unlikely hazardous event to low risk,
or emotional debate on risk (or relative risk).

1
2

high risk

(a)

low risk

(b)

1/ or (- )

Figure 5. (a): Risk assessment matrix; (b): Corresponding coordinates.

8

Table 1. A quantitative example of risk assessment matrix.

Reliability index ()
$-Consequence

10 Million
100 Million
1 Billion
10 Billion
The ranking matrix can also be used in a quantitative form as illustrated in Table 1. In this
approach, the column position is quantitatively determined by , whereas the column position is
determined by dollar-equivalent of consequence.
5.2 Extreme Events
Quantifying Pf or is particularly important when one deals with allegedly extreme event. An
event may be considered as extreme relative to our experience. But this presents the question of
whether ones experience (of the past) is representative of new challenge. There is also the
possibility of confusion between an extreme event (like 1 in 1000 year storm) and an extreme
disaster. The latter is the realization of extreme risk due to which may be caused by both an
extreme event and poor risk management. Many may consider the 2004 Christmas tsunami in the
Indian Ocean as an extreme event. Kokushu (2005) examined data reported by the Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and arrived at some surprising findings. The
2004 tsunami is an 1 in 100 year tsunami, not really such an extreme event. Even if one looks at
the disaster magnitude of this tsunami in terms of 200,000 deaths, which occurs 1 in 16 years,
which is relatively frequent. Indeed, the same database illustrated that various disasters have led
to more than 50,000 deaths occurred once every five years in the 20th century. Thus, subjective
perception of likelihood is influenced by our exposure (or lack of it) to these extreme disasters.
The above discussion highlights the relevance of adopting a quantitative approach to risk
assessment.
5.3 Consequence Analysis
Consequence analysis is clearly an important issue in risk assessment and management
(Omitaomu& Badiru, 2007), and often expertise from different disciplines is needed in such an
exercise. In a consequence analysis, both the immediate and longer term consequences of
failures need to be considered, and the term of reference in assessing consequences also needs to
be explicitly stated. This aspect is particularly important in assessing environmental
consequences.
Often a failure may not directly equate to loss in property or life. For failure that may lead to
damages to properties, Equation (11) is expanded into:
Risk ($) = Pf Vulnerability Property Value (12)

where consequence depends on the vulnerability of the property, which in turn depends on the
engineering design. Number of deaths often cannot be equated to dollar-equivalent. Thus, one
should expand the basic equation for risk to life as:
Risk (L) = Pf P(S|f) P(T|S) P(L|T) N (13)
where P(S|f) = probability of spatial impact (i.e., having an impact on an asset) conditional upon
the occurrence of failure; P(T|S) = probability of temporal impact (i.e., the asset being occupied)
conditional upon spatial impact; P(L|T) = probability of non-survival of occupants; and N is the
likely number of occupants. An example is the failure of a coastal slope that may (or may not)
impact coastal properties, which may (or may not) be occupied at the time of collapse, which
may (or may not) survive. Thus, consequence analysis may also involve probability evaluation.
An infrastructure system contains various components, and the failures of different components
might lead to different failure modes, thus the system reliability would be affected by these
multiple failure modes. Component failure and failure modes are central to the identification of
system hazards, and therefore it is essential to involve a systematic procedure to identify all
potential failure modes and their possible consequences. The event tree is such an analytical tool
to describe sequence of events leading to failures used in consequence analysis (Ang & Tang,
1990; Henley & Kumamoto, 1992). An event might bring about various forms of failure with
different consequences; all possible paths follow the initiating event, these paths can be traced
through the subsequent events, and every path will lead to a distinct consequence (Ang & Tang,
1990). Figure 6 provides a simple event tree. From the diagram it can be seen that a particular
consequence depends on the subsequent events following the initiating event (Ang & Tang,
1990, p. 498). These multiple consequences of a system failure are often calculated by Equation
(14) below, which in fact is the weighted sum of the final series of failures:
Consequence = Pr( E f ,trigger ). Pr( Ei ,1 | E f ,trigger ) Pr( Ei ,2 | Ei ,1 ).... Pr( Eif | Ei ,ni 1 ).Ci (14)
i

where trigger, Ef, trigger, is the triggering failure (i.e., initiating event), subscript i denotes the i-th
branch of the event tree that leads to the i-th consequence, Ci, Pr(Ej|Ej-1) is the probability of the
occurrence of the subsequent j-th conditional upon the occurrence of the (j-1)-th event, and Eif is
the final subsequent event on the i-th branch thus giving Ci. However, the above equation is
based on the assumption that subsequent events and failures on different branches of the tree
diagram are mutually exclusive.
First
subsequent
events

Initiating
event

p11
p12
p13

Second
subsequent
events

p21
p22

n th
subsequent
events

Consequence

pnk

Cijk

Figure 6. A simple event tree diagram, where pnk is path probability, Cijk is consequences
(modified from Ang & Tang, 1990).
A consequent analysis may also involve developing risk mitigation measures (Kalsnes et al.,
2010). This is particularly important because we in general have no control on the occurrence of
an extreme event, only some control on Pf triggered by an extreme event. As discussed in Section
10

5.2, an extreme disaster may be partly due to extreme consequences. The mitigation measure
may be in the form of better overall planning and design, such as the provision of a buffer zone
for coastal development, provision of flood resistant road pavement (to facilitate evacuation),
readiness of disaster relief team, among others. It may also be in the form of monitoring systems
(Kalsnes et al., 2010).
6. Application of Reliability Analysis into Environmental Risk Assessment
Uncertainty and probability based reliability analysis might also be introduced into
environmental risk assessment (ERA) focusing on environmental protection and management
activities. In this section, we will describe an ERA approach that is applied in environmental
management of military activities using an example of Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA)
in Central Queensland, Australia. An example of potential application of reliability analysis in
ERA will also be introduced.
SWBTA is one of the most significant military training areas in Australia. Specially, SWBTA is
an important protected area due to its integrated marine and terrestrial ecosystem; diverse natural
resources; sensitive environment; and cultural significance (Sharp, 1998; Australian Heritage
Database, 2009; Wu et al., 2010). It is therefore vital and complicated to manage military
activities in such a fragile environment.
Defence environmental managers recognize their responsibilities in maintaining environmental
sustainability while conducting military activities (Cuddy et al., 1990; Scott et al., 2000; Wark &
Verrier, 2002; Department of Defence, 2003; Bioce, 2007; Beeby, 2008; Wu et al., 2010;
Department of Defence, n.d.). ERA is an essential part of their Environmental Management
System (EMS). Potential environmental hazards caused by military training exercises are firstly
identified. In light of Equation (10), risk levels of these hazards are determined according to the
following risk assessment matrix shown in Table 2. This matrix is a ranking system similar to the
risk assessment matrix shown in Figure 5(a).
Table 2. ERA matrix for SWBTA (adapted from Fendl & Sensese, 2007; SKM, 2009).
Likelihood
Almost
certain
Likely
Possible
Unlikely
Rare

Consequence
Moderate
Minor

Severe

Major

Negligible

Very hi gh

Very hi gh

High

Medium

Low

Very hi gh
High
High
High

High
High
Medium
Medium

Medium
Medium
Medium
Low

Medium
Medium
Low
Low

Low
Low
Low
Low

The assessment process is conducted by a special operation panel including military personnel;
environmental experts; consultants; and other stakeholders. The risk identifying criteria relies on
the panel members knowledge and experience. The measured risk levels have derived from
previous risk assessment materials and information on previous military exercises conducted at
11

SWBTA (Collie & Sensese, 2005; Fendl & Sensese, 2007; Wu et al., 2010). Thus, the risk
identification and assessment are based on collective judgement, rather than detailed
calculations (Collie & Sensese, 2005, p. 6). This indicates subjectivity, and is therefore not
sufficient methodology for effective ERA. A quantitative evaluation process is therefore required
(Ramos and de Melo, 2005; Wu et al., 2010).
The reliability analysis method proposed here may be applied in the SWBTA ERA process,
using firebreak establishment in training area as an example. In SWBTA, there are various
uncertainties attributed to fire hazard and making this area fire prone. These uncertainties include
climate change; increasing temperature; decreasing rainfall; dry season; inappropriate training
timing; increasing training frequency; improper operation; and environmental awareness.
Consequently, the probabilistic approach considers that these uncertainties can be used in the
ERA of potential fire hazard. Based on the assumption made in Section 3, there can be also three
options for firebreak establishment: (a) only for now; (b) more fires in future (that may or may
not occur); and (c) adaptability that allows strengthening the firebreak during a long period.
Referring to the cost-benefit analysis given in Section 3, firebreak values for options (a), (b), and
(c) can be obtained in terms of Equation (6), and Figures 2 and 3. Thus, the reliability of
different firebreak establishments can be analysed, which will then provide more objective
decision making for environmental managers of the SWBTA.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
We propose an objective approach incorporating uncertainties for risk assessment of coastal
infrastructure development. Probability-related concepts and the probabilistic approach are
emphasised, and the methods to calculate the reliability index have been introduced. As for
uncertain circumstances, a stochastic cost-benefit analysis is considered to be an effective tool
for assessment. An example of cost-benefit analysis has been used to illustrate the reliability
analysis process.
Uncertainties are inevitable in risk assessment. So far, probability is regarded as the only
sensible description of uncertainty and is adequate for all problems involving uncertainty
(Omitaomu & Badiru, 2007, p. 162). Compared with conventional deterministic analysis,
probabilistic approach incorporating uncertainty and reliability into the future has advantages. As
coastal infrastructure is expected to have a long lifespan and there might be long-term impacts
caused by uncertain events such as climate change, probabilistic analysis method is more
applicable for risk assessment and management.
Consequence analysis is also emphasised in this paper. Besides working on Pf and/or , risks can
be reduced by working on consequences. For coastal infrastructure, natural hazards might be
considered as acts of nature and unpreventable, whereas disasters can be partly preventable
through consequence analysis.
In addition to coastal infrastructure development, the methods proposed in this paper can also be
applied in environmental risk assessments for environmental protection and management. As the
example in Section 6 illustrated, the qualitative approach appears to be subjective, and therefore
the systematic procedures and quantitative approach documented in this paper should guide the

12

ERA in order to make the evaluation more quantitative and objective for more environmentally
resilient and adaptive management.
In summary, no systems will endure forever and nothing is extremely reliable because
uncertainties are inevitable in coastal infrastructure development. Reliability analysis
incorporating uncertainties is an effective method to reduce the probability of failure as low as
possible. However, further studies are required to model, analyse, and update various
uncertainties in coastal engineering. Through hazard identification; reliability-based risk
assessment; and cost-benefit analysis; we can predict potential failures and risks in the coastal
infrastructure system and formulate preventative measures for solutions. These allow responsible
organisations to be able to make educated decisions and establish reliable coastal infrastructure.

Acknowledgments
This paper is developed from a presentation given at the Workshop on Developing an AustraliaChina Research Centre for Coastal Zone Sustainable Development, which was supported by the
University of New South Wales at Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW@ADFA), Ocean
University of China (OUC), and grant (RG103046) from the Australia-China Council, Australia.
The first author has been sponsored by the China Scholarship Council (CSC) since August 2008
for her PhD program in Australia. This is a publication of the Sino-Australian Research Centre
for Coastal Management, paper number 6.
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