Administrative and Election Laws (Prelims)

Case Digests
1. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and RODRIGO DE LOS REYES
vs.
HON. ARMANDO ANSALDO, in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, and RAMON MONTILLA PATERNO, JR.
G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994

Nature of the Case

A petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction or issuance of TRO, against jurisdiction of
Insurance Commission.
Facts
Paterno wrote a letter of complaint to Ansaldo (Insurance Commissioner) alleging problems encountered by workers and public
consumers as a result of Philamlifes practices. Ansaldo sought the comment of De Los Reyes [Philamlife President], who in turn
sought a bill of particulars. Paterno responded that his letter was sufficient in form and sought for a hearing. Philamlife countered
that Paternos response did not enable him to answer the letter of complaint. Thereafter, a hearing on the complaint heard the
validity of the Contract of Agency (CoA) complained of, requiring Paterno to supply the specific provisions in the CoA which he
claims to be illegal. Paterno: (1) reiterated his initial letter of complaint; (2) prayed that the (a) provisions on charges and fees in
the CoA; (b) implementing provisions in the agents' handbook, agency bulletins and circulars, be declared null and void; and (3) to
reimburse agents of the amounts deducted from charges and fees already collected with interest. This was furnished by Ansaldo
to Philamlife who thereafter submitted its contentions, to wit: (1) Private respondent's letter of August 11, 1986 does not contain
any of the particular information which Philamlife was seeking from him and which he promised to submit; and (2) [t]hat since the
Commission's quasi-judicial power was being invoked with regard to the complaint, private respondent must file a verified formal
complaint before any further proceedings. Meanwhile, Paterno sought for the resumption of hearing in re his complaint and about
a month later executed his affidavit. Philamlife [through Manuel Ortega, SVP] questioned the jurisdiction of Ansaldo and the locus
standi of Paterno. Ansaldo thereafter notified parties to a hearing. Philamlife [through Ortega] moved for quashal since subpoena
has no legal basis and Insurance Commission has no jurisdiction. The same was however denied by Ansaldo. Hence, this petition.
Issue(s)
(1). Can the Insurance Commission preside over issues assailing the validity of a Contract of Agency?
Held
(1). No. The general authority of the Insurance Commissioner is laid down in the Insurance Code, among others, to regulate the
business of insurance. Since a Contract of Agency is not covered in the authority of the Insurance Commission to regulate
business of insurance, jurisdiction of Ansaldo is wanting. Ansaldo also has no quasi-judicial power to speak of in the Insurance
Code since xxx his power is limited to claims and complaints involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be
answerable under any kind of policy or contract of insurance xxx". This power does not affect the relationship between an
insurance company and its agents. In the same light, although the Insurance Code provides for the subject Insurance Agents and
Brokers, the same only speaks licensing requirements and limitations imposed on insurance agents and brokers. Thus, it is clear
that the Insurance Code does not grant Ansaldo the authority to take cognizance of the case. On the other hand, there are two
classes of insurance agents: (1) salaried employees who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the
company; and (2) registered representatives, who work on commission basis. The former is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter (as it
involves the Contract of Employment and provisions of the Labor Code) and the latter by regular courts (as it involves issues on
the Contract of Agency and the Civil Code provisions on Agency).
FACTS:

Ramon M. Paterno, Jr. sent a letter dated April 17, 1986 to Insurance Commissioner alleging certain problems
encountered by agents, supervisors, managers and public consumers of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company
(Philamlife)

During the hearing Ramon stated that the contract of agency is illegal

Philamlife through its president De los Reyes contended that the Insurance Commissioner as a quasi-judicial body cannot
rule on the matter
2. Chung Ka Bio vs Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) (1988)
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. was incorporated for a term of 25 years. The members of its board of directors
executed a deed of assignment of all of the accounts receivables, properties, obligations and liabilities of the old PBM in favor of
Chung Siong Pek in his capacity as treasurer of the new PBM, then in the process of reincorporation. The new PMB was issued a
certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Chung Ka Bio and the other petitioners herein, all
stockholders of the old PBM, filed with the SEC a petition for liquidation of both the old PBM and the new PBM. The allegation was
that the former had become legally non-existent for failure to extend its corporate life and that the latter had likewise beenipso
facto dissolved for non-use of the charter and continuous failure to operate within 2 years from incorporation.
Issue: WON, The new corporation has not substantially complied with the two-year requirement of Section 22 of the new
Corporation Code on non-user because its stockholders never adopted a set of by-laws.
Held: No. Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. Under Section 6(i) of PD 902-A, the
SEC is empowered to suspend or revoked, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of a
corporation on the ground inter alia of failure to file by-laws within the required period. It is clear from this provision that there
must first of all be a hearing to determine the existence of the ground, and secondly, assuming such finding, the penalty is not
necessarily revocation but may be only suspension of the charter. In fact, under the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file
the by-laws on time may be penalized merely with the imposition of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate
existence of the erring firm.
3. Marcos vs. Manglapus, [G.R. # 88211 September 15, 1989 ]

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into
presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos,
in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences
to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for
mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines. Assuming that she has the
power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have the
requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?
HELD: Petition Dismissed.
The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a matter that
is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing
in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot
be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order
issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the
situation in the country.
Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the
hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many
of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the
surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.
4. Malayan integrated industries corporation vs Court of Appeals
213 SCRA 640 Political Law Control Power Executive Secretary as the Alter Ego of the President
Facts:
In 1977, a reclamation project was sought to be undertaken by the City of Mandaue. It signed a contract with Malayan Integrated
Industries Corporation to actualize the project. The Justice Secretary opined that only the national government can undertake
reclamation projects however the Public Estates Authority (PEA) can delegate such function to Mandaue. The Sanggunian of
Mandaue then authorized its mayor to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with the PEA to validate the contract with
Malayan. The project however remained hanging until after the EDSA Revolution. The contract was re-indorsed to then president
Corazon Aquino who referred the contract back to PEA.
After this, the mayor of Mandaue chose to open a new contract with another company (F.F. Cruz & Co.) since he deemed that the
Office of the President has some reservations against the contract with Malayan. The mayor submitted the new contract before
the PEA which endorsed it to the Office of the President which approved the same and rescinded the earlier contract between
Mandaue and Malayan. The recommendation was however signed by the Executive Secretary and not the president herself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the recommendation was validly approved.
HELD:
Yes. Although the letter to the PEA advising it of the approval of the reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F.
Cruz & Co., Inc. and the disapproval of the earlier agreement between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN, was signed by the
Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, and not by the Presidents own hand, the Executive Secretarys action is
presumed to be valid and to have been regularly performed in behalf of the President and thus should be accorded due respect.
As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary, is an alter ego of the President. One of his myriad functions is to
exercise primary authority to sign papers `By authority of the President, attest executive orders and other presidential issuances
unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials by him or by the President; assist the President in the administration
of special projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct, his personality is in reality but the projection
of that of the President, his acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
The approval by the Office of the President of the reclamation contract in favor of F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the rejection of the
contract with MALAYAN, is not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers which accords coequal status to the three great branches of the government, absent any showing that the President, in doing so, acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

5. Villaluz vs Zaldivar digest

15 SCRA 710 Political Law Control Power Removal Power Appointees
FACTS:
Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces
alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After
investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz
from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President
president.
HELD:

to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the

Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and
remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of
Republic Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines
under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or
remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to
the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but
not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.
6. MACAILING v. ANDRADA
FACTS:
Petitioners claim possession while petitioners claimed a sales application over a bigger parcel of land including the 4
parcels of land occupied by the former. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiffs favor but the Dir. of Lands
reversed. The appeal to the Sec. Of Agri. & natural resources reversed the DoLs decision. An MR was denied saying that it has
become final and executory by the SANR and was appealed to the Office of the Pres. The Office of the Pres. Reversed the decision
granting it again to the defendants. The petitioners instituted an ordinary civil action to have the decision of the SANR declared
final & executory.
ISSUES:
W/n the decision of the Office of the President was valid despite the finality of the decision of the SANR.
RULING:
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such judicial review;
others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review
vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various
administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court
are still available. Therefore, the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
Although in injunctive or prohibitory writs, courts must have jurisdiction over the Corporation, Board, Officer or person
whose acts are in question and not the jurisdiction over the SM of the case, the doctrines invoked in support of the theory of nonjurisdiction are inapplicable. Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally
correct or not, and, without going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be
confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the
courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced."
The provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof provides:
12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.The decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now
Agriculture and Natural Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise
specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of its receipt by the interested parties.
Section 13 following reads:
13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.After a decision or order of the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural
Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands has become final, no motion or petition for reconsideration of such
decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be entertained by the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under
Secretary or the Director of Lands, as the case may be, except as provided in Section 14 hereof.
And Section 14 is to this effect:
"Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the
Director of Lands may relieve a party or his legal representative from a decision, order, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect: Provided, That application therefor be made within
a reasonable time but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision, order or proceeding was taken."
Defendants did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27, 1956 within 30 days from their
receipt thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They merely contend that their appeal was but 9
days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants received the September 12, 1957 ruling of the Secretary denying their second
motion for reconsideration. That ruling, it must be remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary's decision "had long
become final and executory." By reason of which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more jurisdiction to
entertain the said motion."
7. Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
FACTS:
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three
municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.
Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create
municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu
of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such
control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the
President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities referred to.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law;
and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would mean that the
President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed
for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by the
President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not
administrative (not executive).
8. Pimentel vs Aguirre
GR No. 132988 July 19 2000
FACTS
Then President Ramos issued AO 372 Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998 which requires LGUs to
reduce their expenditures by 25% for their authorized regular appropriations of non-personal services. Subsequently, succeeding
President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372 reducing to 5% the amount of the internal revenues allotment
(IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. Contentions arises the directive to withhold 10% of this IRA is in contravention of Section 286
of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing the automatic release of its share in the
national income revenue.
ISSUE
Whether or not, the Presidents power to exercise general supervision over local governments are valid under Section 1 and 4 of
AO 372, stating that it directs LGUs to reduce their expenditures and withholds 10% of their IRA, respectively.
RULING
Yes, the Presidents power to exercise general supervision over LGUs is valid because Section 1 of AO 372 is merely directive and
has been issued by the President in consistent with his power to supervise LGUs; and Section 4 cannot be upheld for this is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code, that it is a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy to automatically
release the shares of the LGUs in the national internal revenue, and the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA will contravenes with
the law and will be considered as unconstitutional.
There are requisites cited by the Local Government Code in which allows the President to interfere in the local fiscal matters,
which are: 1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; 2) consultations with the presiding officers of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the Presidents of the various local leagues; 3) the corresponding recommendations
of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government and Budget and Management; and 4) any
adjustment in the allotment shall be less than 30% of the collection of the national internal revenue taxes of third fiscal year
preceding the current one.
9. Drilon v Lim 235 SCRA 135, GR No. 112497 (04 August 1994)
FACTS:
Then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, pursuant to the authority granted upon him by Section 187 of the LGC and upon
appeal of concerned parties, declared the Manila Revenue Code null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
thge enactment of local tax ordinances and for containing provisions contrary to law and public policy.
Upon appeal to the RTC, the trial judge reversed the order of petitioner and, in addition, declared Section 187 of the LGC
unconstitutional as it gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control over local governments in violation of the principle of local
autonomy mandated by the Constitution. The RTC ruled that the Executive only had the power of supervision and not control.
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
HELD: The SC overruled the trial court insofar as it declared Section 187 unconstitutional. The power of control encompasses the
power to lay down the rules in the accomplishment of an act. If they are not followed, the one in control may order the act done,
re-done, or do it himself. On the other hand, the power to supervise only entails a determination of WON the rules were followed
and to have the work done or re-done in accordance with the prescribed rules.
Contrary to the holding of the lower court, the SC said that the provision only gave the Secretary of Justice the power to
supervise, not control, in that the Secretary of Justice could only determine the constitutionality or legality of the local tax
ordinance and revoke them on such grounds. The provision did not em power the Secretary to substitute his own judgment for the

judgment of the LGU; the Secretary was not authorized by Section 187 to determine whether the law was wise or reasonable or
otherwise a generally bad law. He was given no discretion in the matter.
That notwithstanding, the SC agreed with the trial court in that the procedural requirements for the passage of the
ordinance were fulfilled. The initial decision of the Secretary, it said, was a result of the insufficient time it gave to the respondents
to procure the necessary evidence of such procedural compliance. The Manila Revenue Code was upheld.
(Note: No mention was made in the final decision regarding the provisions contrary to law and public policy earlier cited by the
Secretary as additional grounds.)