Conference version of paper published in

Transactions of the ASME. Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, 127(1), P 49-54, Feb. 2005
doi:10.1115/1.1845475

CASE STUDY OF THE USE OF API 581 ON HK AND HP MATERIAL FURNACE TUBES
Soudabeh.A.Noori
Professor John Price,
Mechanical Engineering, Monash University, PO Box 197, Caulfield East, Victoria, 3145
john.price@eng.monash.edu.au.

In the 1990s it became apparent that the lack of

uncomplicated and suitable quantitative guidance for
determining risk was a major problem for any pressure
system user trying to determine the priorities of an
inspection program. Guidance on inspection programming
had to be practical and had to take account of damage
mechanism,
inspection
techniques,
inspection
effectiveness, rate of damage progression, and other
technical factors. In addition an approach to considering
the consequences of a failure had to be developed.

ABSTRACT
Risk-based inspection guidelines have been created
by several technical societies, most notably the ASME and
API. The intention of API Risk Based Inspection (RBI)
is to be a useable and understandable tool at a plant
inspection level by simplification of complex models.
The API Base Resource Document numbered API 581
identifies RBI as an integrated risk management tool,
which provides a methodology for determining the
optimum combination of inspection methods and
frequencies. This study intends to show how API 581
assesses risk and determines inspection intervals of
furnaces tubes. The paper also explains the difficulties of
applying API 581 to furnace tubes of gas generation plant.

The American Petroleum Institute (API) initiated the

Risk Based Inspection (RBI) Project in May 1993. The
intention of API RBI is to be a useable and understandable
tool at a plant inspection level by simplification of
complex models using a practical procedure standardized
for petrochemical plants. The RBI analysis is an attempt
to analyse risk and inspection effectiveness qualitatively
and quantitatively and looks at the factors required to
develop an inspection plan including both the likelihood
and consequence of failure. The technical modules in API
581 the resource document for RBI include thinning,
stress corrosion cracking, high temperature hydrogen
attack, mechanical fatigue (piping only), long- term creep,
short-term over heating, brittle fracture, equipment linings
and external damage.

Key words- Risk based inspection, RBI, furnace tubes, API 581.

INTRODUCTION
Inspection to detect hidden failures has been an
important activity in industry for more than 100 years.
The traditional view of inspection is that it should reduce
the probability of failure of the components being
inspected. Design codes and standards in this area are
written to deal with structural integrity but they were not
as helpful for managing inspections.

This paper is an exploration of the difficulties with

applying API RBI to furnace tubes of gas generation
plant. This study is not intended to be definitive, but to
test the various assumptions in the RBI analysis.
In this study we are examining some typical reformer
tubes. Reformer tubes are generally made from cast creep
resistant austenitic steel HK grade (25 Cr, 20 Ni, 0.4 C) or
HP grade (26 Cr, 35 Ni, 0.4 C). Although the furnace
tubes are usually designed for a normal life of 100,000 h
(11.4 years), their actual service life, however, varies from
30,000 to 180,000 h, which is 5 to 20 years depending on
the service conditions and the quality of materials.[1]

Risk in the formal definition is the product of

consequence and frequency. The failure of pressure
equipment can have several undesirable consequences
such as fires, toxic releases, major environmental damage
and business interruption losses. Given this it should be
the intention that not only the frequency of failure but also
the consequence of failures should be reduced by
inspection/maintenance activities.

Table 1
Process and Design Data of HK and HP Furnace Tubes

Part name

Pipe pos1/3

Return bend180 Pos12/13

Material
Wall Thickness mm
Design Pressure MPa
Inside Diameter mm
Design Temperature C
Actual Tube Metal Temperature C
Allow Strength MPa
Actual Tube Stress MPa

HK40
14
1.73
110
925
905
13.4*0.8(T44)
5.49
1.24

HP
15
1.68
110
1015
905
9.8*0.8(T64)
5.17
1.24

P out MPa

1.17

1.17

T in C

557

557

T out C

860

860

P in MPa

Likelihood analysis starts with calculating tube

current diameter and determining tube elastic temperature
limit and elastic stress limit. If actual tube metal
temperature (TMT) is less than elastic temperature limit
or the actual tube stress, which calculated by considering
operating pressure and tube diameter is less than the
elastic stress limit then, long- term creep is not a concern
Long- term creep is not a concern if the following
conditions are met
TMT < T elas and S < S elas

SEMI_QUANTITATIVE RBI ANALYSIS

FURNACE TUBES
Semi-Quantitative RBI analysis here is done using the
organized methodology developed by API as outlined in
the API Base Resource Document API 581. API RBI
Appendix J considers the furnace tubes failures
because of creep or over-heating. Materials data provided
in API RBI Appendix J are ferritic steel (carbon steel and
low alloy steels up to 12 Cr) and austenitic stainless steel
(Types 304, 316, 321 and 347).

The actual tube metal temperature, which was

determined by direct measuring is TMT=905C. API 581
defines elastic metal temperature limit or critical tube
metal temperature as a Temperature at which a tube
would have 100,000 hr design life using minimum rupture
strength curve per API 530.[2] Elastic temperature limits
for some materials are provided on table J-4 API 581.

In this case study reducing gas furnaces tubes have

designed based on API 530 procedures but the tubes are
made of materials which are not considered in API 581,
namely HK40 and HP. Process and design data are shown
on Table 1.
3.1

Likelihood analysis

Since the materials we are studying are not in API

581, the T elas data of identified materials from table J-4

Likelihood Analysis is the result of a number of

factors but in Semi-Quantitative RBI only the technical
module sub-factor (TMSF) is used to determine the
probability of failure. The TMSF identifies damage
mechanisms and equipment age in current service to
estimate damage rate. The technical module sub-factors
can range as high as 1,000 or more, while the other subfactors are relatively small (< 10).[2]

(API RBI Appendix J) were plotted on Larson-Miller

curves in API 530 to compare and predict the elastic metal
temperature for HP and HK40. (HK40 does appear in API
530 but HP is not mentioned.) It is noticed that LarsonMiller curves show this temperature as a point at which
elastic allowable stress line and rupture allowable stress
line meet each other.

The key to understanding TMSF is found in

paragraph 9.4.3 of API 581. Here it becomes clear that if
TMSF is less than 10 then there is very little damage
going on. Over 10 and the damage rate becomes more
significant and there are increasing demands on
inspections and other preventative measures (see Tables 915 to 9-17). With TMSF above 500 there is a concern that
life time may have been exhausted.

The elastic allowable stress is two thirds the yield

strength at temperature for ferritic steels and 90 percent of
the yield strength at temperature for austenitic steels.[3]
For HK the Larson Miller curves give the elastic
allowable stress greater than 100 MPa.
As a

Table 2
Larson Miller Parameter and Long-Term Failure Probability

Larson Miller Parameter

lm

HK
44.16
0.8

HP
57
0.3

46.02481-1.88469lnS

65.05956-2.17933lnS

HK

HP

FF LT (Failure Factor)

>0

TMSF LT (Technical Module Sub-Factor)

~0.2485

~0.2485

LM delta
LM avg
Long- Term Creep Analysis

result, by considering the Larson-Miller curve of HK and

HP, it was established that elastic metal temperature limit
could be around 600 C. Hence the determination of longterm creep is necessary because T elas is less than TMT.

530.

Here LM delta is calculated by using mean and

minimum Larson-Miller curves in API 530 and also the

manufactures data sheet. To calculate Mean LarsonMiller parameter for HP and HK Microsoft Excel LeastSquare Regression method is used. The results for HK
and HP were approximately same. Analysis of this data
illustrates that HP and HK have TMSF less than one for
different stresses.

The elastic limit (proportional limit) is the greatest

load a material can withstand and still spring back to its
original shape when the load is removed.[4] Table J-5
API 581 contains the elastic stress limit for creep
consideration for specified materials. This table does not
include the tube materials of this case study and the elastic
stress limit for HK and HP materials was calculated by
reference to data published (in advertising literature) by
the manufacturers. Elastic stress limit was estimated to be
4 to 6 MPa at the design temperature limit. Table 1 shows
that tube actual stress could be more than elastic stress
limit. From this it is evident that long-term creep should
be considered for furnace tubes.

API 581 introduces credits based on inspection

effectiveness to adjust TMSF LT . By considering,
inspection category of usually effective which is defined
as Visual inspection, UT thickness measurements of all
tubes and N (number of inspections) equal to 1, TMSF is
adjusted for HP and HK and is about 0.2485. Results of
long- term creep analysis are shown on Table 2 as below.
3.1.2
probability

3.1.1
Determination of Long Term Creep
Failure Probability

Determination of short -term failure

The equations below from API 581 Appendix J are

used for calculating long- term technical module subfactor.

API 581 states that short-term failure is a result of

unpredicted conditions, such as mistakes in operation or
human error and it is difficult to assess quantitatively.
Probability of short-term failure, accordingly TMSF ST is

lm =(TMT+460)*(Log t i +C)/1000 (1)

calculated by considering time of exposure to over-heating

and excess tube metal temperature. To calculate TMSF ST

FF LT = min (1,10

0.6723 X 3

X = (LM avg -lm)/LM delta

TMSF LT =0.55e

13 FF

0.2854 X 2

0.5905 X

0.3001

) (2)

API 581 introduces formulas as cited below:

(3)
T 5% =35.5ln(1029/t oh ) (6)

(4)

FF ST =min (0.05e

TMSF adjusted = TMSF LT *Inspection effectiveness

reduction factor (5)

TMSF ST =0.55e

0.0422 ( Toh

13 FF

T5% )

, 1) (7)

(8)

T 5% = The over-heating temperature,

lm is defined by API 581 as Larson-Miller parameter

in current operational condition. Equation (1) was used to
calculate lm for HP and HK, at the current operating
conditions. LM delta is defined as average difference

corresponds to values of

T oh that result in a 5%

probability of failure in the LM curves.[2]

T oh = over-heating temperature

between mean and minimum Larson-Miller curves in API

t oh =Time exposure to over-heating

T 5%

API 581 states that the temperature factor can be up

to 149C more than design tube metal temperature for 101000 hours and it depends on plant history of overheating, heavy coking, operation or burner control
problems. Table 2 shows failure factor and TMSF ST for

Table 3
Short term over heating Failure Factor and TMSF ST
without considering online monitoring

Overheating
Period
One day

over-heating at 100, 50 and 10C for one day, one week

and one month without considering online monitoring. For
overheating around 10C for one month the TMSF ST is
more than 10. By using on-line monitoring method
consisting of daily visual and burner adjustment by
operators, TMSF ST will be reduced to 0.24.

FF ST

TMSF ST

100
50
10
100
50
10
100

17
0.4
0.019
330
7.40
0.35
2923

Very high
0.82
0.56
Very high
906
0.78
-

50
10

65
3.14

Very high
12

Temperature

One week

In this study, there was not any organized historical

data to provide information on plant over-heating
problems or unpredicted conditions. It is assumed
overheating up to 40C for 20-30 hours might be happen
by operating condition or human error. Short-term
technical module sub-factor (TMSF ST ), in this range is

One
month

To calculate release rate, initially it is identified that

release occurs in gas form. Gas flows through an orifice at
sonic or subsonic velocity. Equation (9) is used to find out
the nature of gas flow. The result from equation (9) shows
P trans =0.17 MPa. As process data shows upstream

less or equal to 1. API 581 states that On-line

Monitoring Factor should be used to adjust TMSF ST .
Table J-9 in Appendix J is used to calculate On-line
Monitoring Factor. If the on-line monitoring method is
daily visual and burner adjustment by operation, TMSF ST

pressure is equal to 1.24 MPa, which is greater than

P trans , so gas discharge at sonic velocity.

is reduced to 0.02.
3.2

Over- heating

Consequence Analysis

Having examined likelihood of failure as represented

by the TMSF and its effects, the other half of risk analysis
is consequence analysis. Consequence analysis starts with
determination of representative fluid and its properties,
calculation of possible release rate, identification release
type and phase after release. Finally, release mass is
determined for each of the hole sizes to calculate
flammable and toxic consequence area.

P trans =P a (

k 1 k
)
2

k
1

(9)

Release rate is calculated for each hole size by using

equation (10)

W g (sonic) = C d AP

Consequence analysis of furnace tube does not

considered vapour cloud explosion (VCE), fireball or
flash fire outcomes because of firebox as a source of
ignition and approval of continuous model for furnaces
release, which decrease the possibility of cloud of vapour
over 10000 lb.

KM g c
2
RT 144 K 1

k 1
k 1

API 581 models all releases as an immediate or

continuous form and has established a simplified method
for modeling release by identifying hole size and amount
of release in 3 minutes. In this study amount of release in
3 minuets was calculated to confirm the type of release
and it was found to be less than 10,000 lb in 3 minutes.
This supports Appendix J the release type for furnace
tubes is in continuous form. We have calculated release
rates and amount of release in 3 minutes for each hole size
for Hydrogen are shown on Table 5.

At first, it should be noted that, it is difficult to find

out all necessary data of a mixture for RBI analysis.
Reducing gas is not a pure material. So it is recommended
by API 581 to choose one material base on materials
properties in mixture. API 581 recommends selecting a
representative fluid with a lower normal boiling point
(NBP) than the fluid being considered. In this case, the
hydrogen has the highest percentage in reducing gas, with
lowest NBP in this mixture, so after elimination of inert
materials as an alternative for modeling. The
representative fluid here is modeled as hydrogen
representative fluid properties are shown on Table 4.

Table 4
Reducing Gas Composition and Properties for Radiant and Convection Section

Density kg/m

*C p

*K

-252

71 kg/m

1.64E+01

1.14E+00

595

59.4

1.81

1.43E+01

1.16E+00

44.01

n/a

-78.5

1.954

-7.38E-01

2.71E-01

28
18
28.02
34.08

620
n/a
n/a
260

-191.6
100
195.7
-59.4

0.961
997.95
1.16
61.993

2.61E-01
1.95E-01
1.69E-01
-

-1.51E-01
-1.09E-02
-9.27E-01
-

11.8533

410.67

1.62 kg/m

3.06E+01

2.22E+00

Reducing gas
Composition

VOL%

H2

52.37

400

CH 4

24.03

16

CO 2
CO
H 2O
N2
H 2S

3.33
9.39
1.53
9.24
25 ppmv

=A+BT+CT +DT , K=C

**Property mix =

**AIT

**NBP

**Property mix
*C

MW

xi

-118.8

/C p -R, R=1.987BTU/(lb mole)(

F)

* Property i , AIT = auto ignition temperature, NBP =normal boiling point

Finally, to determine release, the inventory category

is found from Table B-3 appendix B API 581. The
inventory category is B, so 5,000 lb as an inventory is
used to calculate consequence area. In addition to
inventory data the analyst should be notice to
representative fluid auto ignition temperature to calculate
the consequence area of flammable and toxic
consequence. In this case the release is in continuous form
and auto ignition temperature of Hydrogen is 400C. API
581 states that auto-ignition is not likely if process
temperature is less than auto-ignition temperature plus
27 C . From the process data, it is found that in this case
auto-ignition is likely.

Considering toxic consequences in this case, it was

necessary to consider that Hydrogen Sulphide is very
toxic by inhalation and may cause damaging effects to the
nervous system. Reducing gas includes 25 ppmv H2S.
The exposure limit value for H2S is identified from the
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) to be 10 ppm.
From this it is found that Hydrogen Sulphide may cause
toxic effects after release. Release rate and duration was
used to determine consequence area for this toxic gas. The
results of consequence analysis are shown in Table 7.

Prior to calculating the consequence area, release rate

should be adjusted for mitigation, detection and isolation
systems, which may reduce consequence area. In this case
plant detection systems is designed to detect release by
changes in operating in the system and also shutdown
systems intended to be activated without operator
involvement. The adjusted release rate is introduced as
X correct in table 6. API 581 gives adjusted consequence

Hydrogen
*C d =0.85

Table 5
Release Rates for Each Hole Size for Hydrogen

Hole
1 inch
4 inch
Rupture

area for mitigation system, which in this case, is assumed

to be firewater deluge system and monitors, 20% less than
calculated values. Adjusted consequence area is showed
as A correct in table 6. An event tree is used to determine

W
lbs/sec
0.84
13.44
30.25

Amount of gas
release in 3
minutes
151.2
2419.2
5445

*C d = Discharge coefficient

the probability of out comes for flammable consequence.

By considering the event tree and probabilities from API
581, it is found that probability of jet fire is 0.18.

Time to
Deinventory
(min)
99.15
6.19
2.75

Table 6
Total release mass and consequence area for each hole size
2

X= total release rate or mass, A= area ft Hydrogen

Continuous release Auto ignition likely
Area of Equipment A*=1146X a
X=0.84
X=13.44
X=30.25

X correct =0.21
X correct =3.36
X correct =7.56
Ignition
0.9

A=240.66
A=3850.56
A=8666.62

Area of Fatalities A=3072X a

X=0.84
X=15.5
X=35.25

A correct =48.13
A correct =770.11

A=645.12
A=10321
A=23232

X correct =0.21
X correct =3.36

A correct =1733.3

X correct =7.56

A correct =129.02
A correct =2064.36
A correct =4646.4

Probabilities of outcome Processed above AIT

Jet fire
Flash fire
0.9
Negligible

VCE
Negligible

Table 7
Consequence Analysis for Each hole Size

Consequence analysis for Each Hole Size

Hole size
Generic failure frequency Long term creep

1 in

Fraction contribution for each hole size

Flammable Consequence (Equipment)
Flammable Consequence (Equipment)For each hole Size
Flammable Consequence (Fatalities)
Flammable Consequence (Fatalities) For each hole Size
Toxic consequence
Toxic consequence For each hole Size
Sum of the failure Frequencies

4.62 10
0.7
55.58
38.90
148.92
104.24
~7000
~4900

1.32 10
0.2
891.58
178.31
2390.01
478.00

Rupture
6

~100000
~20000
6

6 10
417.82
1119.99
24900

Flammable consequence area (equipment)

Flammable consequence area (fatalities)
Toxic consequence area

4 in
6

6 10
417.82
1119.99
24900

6.60 10
0.1
2006.07
200.60
5377.53
537.75
6

6 10
417.82
1119.99
24900

Table 9
Summary of RBI Results

Semi-Quantitative Results (Appendix B)

HK

HP

FF LT

>0

TMSF LT

~0.2485

~0.2485

TMSF ST

~0.02

~0.02

Flammable Consequence category (Equipment)

Flammable consequence Category (Fatalities)
Toxic consequence category
Likelihood category
Simple Qualitative Results (Appendix A)
Overall Consequence category
Likelihood category

C
D
E
1

C
D
E
1

D
2

D
2

Table 8
Inspection Methods and Intervals for Furnace Tubes based on TMSF

Inspection Intervals
3.2.1.1.1
Inspection
20 Years
10 Years
5 Years

3.2.1.1.2

Nature of inspection
Highly Effective
Usually Effective
Fairly Effective

RISK CALCULATION

6
6.1

DISCUSSION
How simplified is the method?

API 581 claims to be a simplified method for Furnace

RBI analysis. The document is very useful but has some
gaps.

API 581 provides a semi-quantitative method of

assessing the risk for each component. This analysis uses
a matrix with Frequency on the vertical axis (listed in
categories 1 to 5 with 5 the highest frequency event) and
consequences on the horizontal axis (listed as A to E with
E having the highest consequences. Parts of the matrix is
indicated to have a high, medium high, medium and low
risk, which is shown by the letters H, MH, M, L on risk
matrix. This matrix is a reinterpretation of the Farmer
curve first published as a risk criterion in 1967 [9].

Many materials are modeled in API 581 but

some are missing
A predefined set of hole sizes is used for the
likelihood analysis
A consequence model of flammable, toxic,
environmental, and business interruption events
is included. This is very helpful for such
modelling is not easily available in open
literature. The consequence model includes:
o A simple method for modeling the
release
o An approach for modeling releases of
mixtures
o A simple procedure to determine the
mass of fluid that is released in the
event
o A method for determining the area that
is effected by each release type
o Standardised event trees are used
o Developing a simplified methodology
for assessing the effectiveness of
various types of mitigation systems
o Providing simple guideline to calculate
the Inventory
Using risk matrix which considers both
consequence and likelihood to assign risk

The risk matrix for this case for four different types of
consequences is shown on Figure 1. The result of this
analysis is not really discussed in enough detail in API
581 though the result has more than just a comparative
importance between different parts of the same plant.
Clearly equipment operating in the H or high risk area
could potentially be dangerous. If we look at the Major
Hazard Regulations for Victoria Guidance Note 19[10]
also gives a similar graph in Appendix 1. Here however
the upper reaches of the graph are identified as not being
acceptable societal risks in the state of Victoria.
Comparison of the API 581 and the Victorian criteria
(which are based on UK criteria) has not yet been done.
The results of the work based on all clauses of API
581 are also shown on Table 9. The simplified method of
Appendix A only is also shown.

INSPECTION INTERVALS
To plan inspection intervals API 581 recommends
inspections intervals for furnace tubes based on TMSF
less or greater than 10. If the current TMSF is less than
10, increment ti (operating hours) by 10000 (-1 year) until
a TMSF of 10 is reached. The number of increments is the
time to the next inspection, T insp .[2] In this case TMSF
5

Some materials such as HP and HK40 have used to

manufacture furnace tubes are not modelled in API 581. A
number of activities such as searching the literature, using
manufacturers data were used in this paper to generate
the necessary data. It is noticeable that RBI analysis in
this way is time-consuming method and the data may not
be accurate.

is less than ten by increasing operating hours the TMSF

was not changed. Considering API RBI Table 9-16 the
inspection plan is shown on Table 8.

The process considered contains H2S and hydrogen at

an operating temperature higher than 200C. API 581
states that general thinning mechanism H2S/H2 for high
temperature should be considered to find out the effect on
wall thickness and accordingly on actual stress.

Likelihood

5
MH

MH

MH

MH

MH

MH

M
(IV)

MH

M
(I)

M
(II)

MH
(III)

4
3
2
1
L

(I) Flammable Consequence (equipment)

(II) Flammable Consequence (facilities)
(III) Toxic Consequence category
(IV) Qualitative RBI Result

Consequence Category
Figure 1 Semi-Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Matrix for
HK and HP tubes

Questions concerning these inspection regimes

immediately present themselves.

This calculation actually turns out to be quite

complicated because it has to be repeated several times
during life. A computer program is available but we have
not included these calculations in the current paper.
6.2

UT thickness measurements are not normally a

measure of creep damage, so the question of
what is being tested for has to be raised.
Strapping is not described in the standard, but if
it means applying mechanical straps; the purpose
and long- term survival of such straps is not
clear.
FMR is not defined in API 581. FMR is used
in a paper by Valbuena et al.[5] to mean Field
Metallographic Replication. This is a method of
detecting creep damage but in one of the authors
(JP) experience it is also highly unreliable unless
used frequently, say at one year interval and also
only if a sample of original, non-creep affected
material is available.
The inspections proposed do not include
diameter measurement, oxide measurement or
crack measurement each of which could be
decisive in detecting creep problems.

Inspections

Risk in API 581 is used to recommend inspection

frequency based on both the consequences and likelihood
of failure. API RBI introduces inspection intervals based
on TMSF or likelihood analysis. The main factor in
finding TMSF is mean Larson-Miller parameter, which
cannot be accurately determined by using manufacturers
data.
In the formulas for calculating TMSF for long term
creep the only factor which changes during time is
operating hours which is used for finding time to next
inspection. In the case studied in this paper the operating
hours up to 100 years was calculated but the TMSF was
approximately constant at less than 1. As a result for
furnace tubes with medium risk highly effective
inspection is recommended only at 20 years. This is a
long period of time and would be attractive to operators.
However the question remains what exactly is being
proposed.

Once this detail is considered it is not clear how the

inspection regimes are an effective response to the
different risk categories, especially those in the High or H
area. Clearly other responses are required, such as
operational or process changes, if high risk items were
identified. This would certainly be the implication of the
Victorian Major Hazard Facility Regulations.

The highly effective inspection proposed in API 581

is defined as UT thickness measurements of all tubes, and
strapping at UT measurement locations and FMR at
various locations.

CONCLUSIONS
We have applied API 581 to a furnace tube example.
The furnace tubes considered were not listed in the code
and API 581 was quite difficult to apply. In the case
studied, the main result is that TMSF is less than 10 for a
very long period so that the only inspections required were
Highly Effective inspections every 20 years. Since the
creep life calculations are generally done for 20 years
operation this means that even these moderately high risk
tubes may never be inspected.

NOTATION
2

A = cross-section area (in )

AIT = auto ignition temperature
C= Larson-Miller constant
C d =discharge coefficient (for gas C d = 0.85 to l)
FF= Failure factor
g c = Conversion factor from lb f to lb m =32.2 lb m -ft/
lb f -sec

K = Cp/Cv,= usually 1.4 for air

LMP= Larson-Miller parameter
Lm = Larson Miller Parameter at the current operating
conditions
LM delta = Average difference between mean and

In practice this inspection schedule seems very optimistic,

20 years is a long time not to inspect a furnace operating
in the creep range. The resulting inspections proposed are
not adequately defined so that we may not be confident
that we are conducting Highly Effective inspections.

minimum Larson-Miller curves in API 530

LM avg = Mean Larson-Miller parameter

8
1.

REFERENCES
Ashok Kumar Ray, S.K.S., Yogendra Nath
Tiwari, Jagannathan Swaminathan, Gautam Das,
Satyabrata Chaudhuri, Raghubir Singh, Analysis
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Analysis, 2003. 10: p. 351-362.
2.
American Petroleum Institute, Risk-Based
Inspection, Base Resource Document, API 581,
API Publishing Services, Washington, May
2000.
3.
American Petroleum Institute, Calculation of
Heater-Tube Thickness in Petroleum Refineries.
API 530, S., API Publishing Services,
Washington, October 1996.
4.
E.Neely., Practical metallurgy and materials of
industry. 2003, Prentice Hall. Ohio, p 449.
5.
Valbuena, R.R., L.C.Kaley, and M.L. Wechsler,
Inspection Methodology Designed to Optimize
Budgets. Materials Performance, 1998. 37(2): p.
89.
6.
Robert C. Reid, J.M. and T.K.S. Prausnitz,
Properties of gases and liquids. Third ed. 1977,
New York: McGraw-Hill. 688.
7.
M.Zuo, S.C., Y.Nonaka, Fitting creep-rupture
life distribution using accelerated life testing
data. Transactions of the ASME, 2000. 122: p.
482-487.
8.
LeMay, L., Principles of mechanical metallurgy.
1983, New York: Elsevier
9.
Farmer F R, Reactor safety and siting: a proposed
risk criterion, Nuclear Safety, 8(6), December
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10.
Victorian Work Cover Authority, The
requirements for demonstration under the
Occupational Health and Safety (Major Hazard
Facilities) Regulation, Guidance Note 16,
September 2001.

M = MW=molecular weight (lb/lbmol)

NBP =normal boiling point
P trans = transition pressure (psia)
P = upstream pressure (psia)
Pa = atmospheric pressure (psia),
R = gas constant (10.73 ft3-psia/lb-molR)
T = upstream temperature (R)
TMT = tube metal temperature
TMSF LT = Long term technical module sub-factor
TMSF ST = Short term technical module sub-factor
t oh =Time exposure to over-heating
W g (sonic) = gas discharge rate, sonic flow (lbs/sec)