Marcelo Boeri - Alejandro de Afrodisias Como Lector de Aristóteles

Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
www.brill.nl/phro
Galen and the Stoics:

Mortal Enemies or Blood Brothers?
Christopher Gill
Department of Classics and Ancient History, School of Humanities
and Social Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
C.J.Gill@exeter.ac.uk
Abstract
Galen is well known as a critic of Stoicism, mainly for his massive attack on Stoic (or at
least, Chrysippean) psychology in On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP) 2-5.
Galen attacks both Chrysippus location of the ruling part of the psyche in the heart and
his unified or monistic picture of human psychology. However, if we consider Galens
thought more broadly, this has a good deal in common with Stoicism, including a
(largely) physicalist conception of psychology and a strongly teleological view of natural
entities, shared features which are acknowledged in several treatises outside PHP. Why,
then, is Galen such a remorseless and negative critic of Stoicism in PHP? Various factors
are relevant, including the shaping influence on Galen of the Platonic-Aristotelian (partbased) psychological framework. But, it is suggested here, an important underlying factor is the contrast between two ways of thinking about the part-whole relationship, a
composition and a structure approach or an atomistic and holistic approach. This
contrast is most evident and explicit in one section of PHP 5, where Galen, criticising
Chrysippus holistic psychology, denies that the Stoic thinker is entitled to use the concept of part at all. But the contrast is also seen as pervading Galens response to Stoic
thought more generally, in PHP and elsewhere, in ways that inform his explicit disagreements with Stoic theory. Stoicism is presented here as having a consistently structure (or
holistic) approach. Galens approach is seen as more mixed, sometimes sharing, or aspiring towards, a holistic picture, and yet sometimes (especially in PHP 5), adopting a
strongly composition or atomistic standpoint. This (partial) contrast in conceptual
frameworks is presented as offering a new perspective on Galens critique of Stoic psychology in PHP and on his relationship to Stoic thought more generally.
Keywords
psychology, Stoicism, Galen, holism, part-whole relationship
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007
PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 88
DOI: 10.1163/156852807X177977
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Introduction
The aim of this discussion is to explore key features of the conceptual
relationship between Galen and Stoicism, starting from Galens explicit
comments on Stoic ideas. In particular, I want to place Galens most
extended and negative critique of Stoic thought (in de Placitis Hippocratis
et Platonis, PHP, Books 2-5) within a larger outline of the relationship between the two systems of thought. The focus of this discussion
is on (embodied) psychology, but this is considered in conjunction with
related aspects of the two theories. The focus here is on leading concepts
or ideas, rather than methodology of enquiry, in so far so the two can be
separated.1
I want especially to bring out certain intriguing, even tantalising, features of the relationship. In spite of Galens hostile treatment of Stoic
psychology in PHP, the theories share a broadly naturalistic approach
with several common features. Both theories combine a (largely) physicalist approach to psychology with a conception of animals, including
humans, as teleologically shaped biological entities. Their shared approach
can be contrasted, for instance, with the non-naturalistic, mind-body
dualism prevalent in Middle Platonism of the first and second centuries
AD. Galen sometimes explicitly recognises this resemblance, which is
also implied even in some of his more critical responses to Stoic ideas.
However, this prompts the question why Galen does not acknowledge
this affinity more fully, and why he does not build on it intellectually, as
he does with some other earlier theories. There are various possible ways
of explaining Galens relatively cool response to Stoicism. The main explanation considered here centres on the contrast between the systematically
unified or holistic approach of Stoicism and Galens (relatively) more
part-based approach, a contrast which bears both on their respective conceptions of psychology and their larger world-views. This contrast emerges
most clearly in PHP 5, and in a more qualified form in comments on
Stoicism in other Galenic works.
1)
In a book in progress I explore both aspects of this question (ideas and methodology
of enquiry).
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Overview
So, Galen and Stoicism mortal enemies or blood brothers? I consider
the question, first in general terms, and then in connection with a number
of passages in which Galen responds to Stoic ideas.
If we confine our attention to PHP, the question answers itself. There,
Galen is remorsely negative about Stoic ideas, particularly as stated by
Chrysippus, for two particular reasons. One, examined especially in
Books 2-3, is the Stoic failure to give (what Galen sees as) the right answer
to the question of the location of the ruling or directive part of the psyche.
The right answer, for him, is the brain, as shown by anatomical experiments by the Hellenistic doctor Herophilus and by Galen himself. But
Chrysippus, in particular, despite formulating his theories after Herophilus discoveries, continued to champion the claims of the heart to house
the ruling part. Galens second complaint, in Books 4-5, is that Chrysippus coupled his mistake about the workings of the body with a misguided
account of human psychology. Chrysippus, according to Galen, only
recognises a single part of the psyche, namely the rational (logikon) part,
which he locates in the heart; and thus rejects the more plausible tripartite psychology, which Galen adopts, following Plato especially.2
Thus, in PHP, the Stoics, especially their main theorist Chrysippus,
appear as Galens principal antagonists and are seen as an obstacle to
Galens project there of combining salient aspects of Platonic and medical
thought on psychology. But how typical of Galens overall thought is this
attitude? In fact, as I bring out shortly, in some other works (written at
various stages of his life),3 Galen embraces aspects of Stoic thought and
regards them as supporting the thesis he is maintaining in the relevant
treatise. Taken together, the Stoic features highlighted as congenial by
Galen add up to a largely coherent, and broadly naturalistic, picture of
embodied psychology. Also, Galens use of Stoic theory as a foil or target
in PHP can be taken as part of a recurrent pattern in his treatises. Galen,
repeatedly, draws on the ideas of earlier thinkers, medical or philosophical,
2)
See two very important studies, Tieleman 1996 (on PHP 2-3) and 2003a (on
PHP 4-5); also von Staden 2000 (on Stoic, medical and Galenic psychology). Tieleman
1996 examines contrasting Galenic and Stoic methods of enquiry into psychology, which
I do not consider here.
3)
On the dating of Galens treatises, see, in outline, Singer 1997: l-lii.
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for support in framing and maintaining a specific claim or line of thought,

and takes other thinkers as targets for criticism. The role allocated to any
given thinker varies in different works, and the Stoics, including Chrysippus, figure in some cases as allies rather than opponents. Also, being taken
as an opponent by Galen in a given work does not mean that the thinker
concerned is seen as completely alien in approach. Rather, Galen fastens
on some aspect of the opponents ideas or method as a way of defining his
own approach. Thus, Galens use of Stoicism as an intellectual target in
PHP and sometimes elsewhere should not be taken as reflecting the view
that Stoic ideas are wholly or consistently incompatible with his own
unfolding medico-philosophical project.
For instance, in de Usu Partium (UP), of which Book 1 was written at
the same time as PHP 1-6, Galen advances a strongly teleological account
of the functions and structure of the bodily parts. Plato and Aristotle
are powerful and explicit influences; although the Stoics are not mentioned as such, Galens overall approach is very similar to theirs. On the
other side, Galen takes as his main targets thinkers who are presented as
exponents of a non-teleological (or incompletely teleological) and mechanistic version of materialism, including Epicurus, Erasistratus and Asclepiades of Bithynia. In de Facultatibus Naturalibus (Nat. Fac.), written
slightly later than PHP 1-6, Galen refers to Stoic thinking on physiology
(alongside Hippocratic and Aristotelian ideas), seen as reflecting an
organic or biological conception of the processes and capacities of living
things. This is again constrasted with the allegedly mechanistic materialism of Erasistratus and Asclepiades.4 In a late work, Quod Animi Mores
(QAM), Galen cites the Stoics, alongside Aristotle and the more physicalist strands in Platos thought, in support of his thesis that the capacities
(or faculties, dunameis) of the psyche follow the mixtures (kraseis) of the
body. The role of intellectual foil is taken in this case by Platonic psychebody dualism, either as formulated by Plato himself or by some Middle
Platonic followers. In another late work, de Foetuum Formatione (Foet.
Form.), Galen is critical of Stoic (and Aristotelian) heart-centred thinking about the development of the embryo. But it is also clear that this
disagreement figures within a largely shared view of the embryo as a
4)
On Galens use of other theories to define his own position in these works, see
Vegetti 1997.
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precursor of the animal as a coherent psychophysical organic entity and

teleological structure.5 This survey indicates, first, that Galen does not
have a wholly fixed set of friends and enemies; to some extent at least, he
constructs shifting patterns of intellectual alliance and hostility according
to the specific thesis maintained in each treatise. But, more specifically,
the survey shows that, on some quite major and recurrent themes in his
work, Galen sees himself as sharing common ground with the Stoics on
physiology and psychology. This in turn suggests that his conflict with
the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, in PHP, at least in Books 2-3, is a
localised disagreement conducted from within a partly common conceptual framework.
How far can we give a general analysis of this shared outlook? In broad
terms at least, the two theories have several important ideas in common,
which distinguish them from some other approaches in the period. In
psychology, both theories operate with what amounts to a type of physicalism. For Galen, the study of psychology within the framework of medical (in modern terms, empirical and scientific) enquiry is, in effect,
physicalist in approach. This is so even though Galen repeatedly refrains
from pronouncing on the question, which he sees as belonging to purely
speculative philosophical enquiry, whether or not the psyche is material
(or mortal) in its essence or substance (ousia).6 The Stoics argue explicitly
for the corporeality of the psyche and often characterise psychological
processes such as perception or passions in physical terms.7 There is a
sharp contrast, underlined in Galens QAM, between this shared physicalist approach and the kind of psyche-body dualism we find in Platos Phaedo
or some roughly contemporary Platonists such as Plutarch.8 Secondly,
5)
On the works noted briefly here, see the next section.

See e.g. PHP 9.9.1.7-9, 793-4K, de Propriis Placitis (Prop. Plac.) 7.1-2, 76.25-78.10
Nutton. (References to Galen works are to book, chapter, paragraph or line divisions in
the most recent editions, e.g. De Lacy for PHP and Nutton for Prop. Plac.; the References below give details of all Galen editions cited. Where the work cited is included in
Khns standard edition, his page ref. is also given, e.g. 793-4K.) See further Hankinson
1991a: 202-6, 2006: 236-9; von Staden 2000: 111, Tieleman 2002b: 134-6.
7)
See Long and Sedley 1987 (=LS) 45 C-D, 53 B(5-9), 65 B-D (refs. to LS sections and
paragraphs); also Long 1996, ch. 10, von Staden 2000: 96-105.
8)
See e.g QAM 3, Marquardt et al. vol. 2, 37.26-38.18, 775K; Galen does not criticise
Platonists by name. On Plutarchs dualism (including psychebody dualism), see Dillon
6)
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bodies, including human ones, are seen in Galenic and Stoic theories as
constituting coherent psychophysical systems or structures, though there
are important differences (underlined shortly) in the kind and degree of
unity seen within these systems. Thirdly, embodied psychology and animal physiology are located in both theories within an overall account of
the core principles or elements of nature. Their respective accounts have
important common features, notably the idea that material objects,
including human beings, constitute mixtures (kraseis) of the basic elements or opposites (hot, cold, dry, wet). In addition, as noted earlier, both
the Stoics and Galen can be seen as sharing both an organic or biological
conception of the properties of living things and a view of the animal
(including human) body as a teleologically shaped structure two ideas
which can themselves be seen as interrelated.9 This is, on the face of it, a
rather large set of shared characteristics, which also adds up to a relatively
coherent (naturalistic) way of thinking about psychology.10
Given these, rather substantial, points of conceptual affinity, the question arises why Galen does not make more of the relationship with Stoicism than he does. Galen makes much it sometimes seems too much
of his closeness to Plato or Hippocrates.11 But, although significant points
of affinity with the Stoics are signalled at various points (especially in
Nat. Fac. and QAM), the most extended treatments of Stoic ideas are
critical ones, in Foet. Form. and, above all, PHP 2-5. Nor does Galen construct his own ideas through interpretative adoption and modification of
Stoic ideas, in the way that he does in the case of Hippocrates, Plato and
Aristotle, for instance. This is so, even though there could have been some
1977: 202-14. In this article, I generally treat psyche as a naturalised English term; as
is often noted, standard English translations (e.g. soul, mind) have partly different
connotations.
9)
The link is, roughly, that living things fulfil their natural telos by expressing their
(biologically grounded) natural faculties.
10)
There is, of course, the general point of contrast that Galens philosophical enquiries
are, ultimately, practical, in that they subserve his medical objectives, a difference I do not
explore here.
11)
On Galens high evaluation and independent or creative interpretation of
the teachings of Hippocrates and Plato, see De Lacy 1972, Hankinson 1992: 3505-8,
Lloyd 1993.
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substantial benefits from an intellectual merger with aspects of Stoic

thought, as I bring out later.12
How should we explain why Galen does not engage more closely than
he does with Stoic ideas, given their partly shared outlook? There are at
least three possible types of explanation, of which I think that the third is
the most suggestive. The first explanation is that Galens typical philosophical affiliation, as a Platonist, makes closer engagement with Stoicism
unlikely. The combination of attitudes we find in Galen (criticising the
Stoics while adopting a consensus view which includes certain Stoic
ideas) can be traced back to Antiochus.13 This factor may explain why
Galen, like Plutarch for instance, presupposes the validity of a PlatonicAristotelian, part-based, approach to human psychology in PHP 4-5,14
rather than the unified approach found in Stoicism though this may
also reflect a larger conceptual difference to be considered shortly. However, in general, explanation by intellectual affiliation is of rather limited
force in Galens case. Galen himself is sometimes dismissive of the importance of this type of allegiance;15 and the preceding survey of his views
brings out the rather fluid character of his affinity and antagonism. In
any case, allegiance to Platonism could be combined with a high degree
of engagement with Stoicism, as we see, for instance, in the case of
Eudorus and Philo of Alexandria.16 Overall, Galen is probably better
seen as an independent thinker, with a unique medico-philosophical
project, though one which is carried forward in part through considered
12)
As indicated in text to n. 1, my focus here is on ideas, rather than methodology of
enquiry: in the latter respect, the influence of Stoic logic is important and explicit.
13)
On Antiochus attitude to Stoicism, see e.g. Cic. Fin. 4.5-26, also Dillon 1977:
58-9, 70-5. On Galen as Platonist, see De Lacy 1972, Dillon 1977: 339-40. (David Sedley has underlined this consideration in commenting on the SAAP paper; on philosophical allegiance in this period, see Sedley 1989.)
14)
Cf. Plutarchs de Virtute Morali (Moralia 440D-452D); see further Gill 2006:
216-38. A further factor, underlining the opposition between Stoic monism in psychology and Platonic-Aristotelian part-based psychology, may be the influence of doxographical accounts, as suggested by Tieleman 2003a: ch. 2, esp. 80-8.
15)
de Ordine Librorum Suorum 1, Marquardt et al. vol. 2, 80.11-81.5, 50K; also De Lacy
1972: 27. Chiaradonna forthcoming brings out clearly that Galens approach is not typical of Middle Platonism in several salient ways.
16)
See Dillon 1977: 121-35, 143-4, 145-52, 163.
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engagement with specific aspects of a broad range of previous theories

and approaches.17
A second line of explanation is that Galens disagreement with the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, over the location of the ruling part of the
psyche was so substantial that it ruled out the possibility of alliance
with Stoicism on other subjects. This disagreement, the main theme of
PHP 2-3, underpins the related critique of Stoic psychology in PHP 4-5.
Coming relatively early in Galens intellectual career, this conflict may
have exercised a continuing influence that made it unlikely that Galen
would build on the other (shared) features of their thought.18 (However,
Galens disagreement with Aristotle on the location of the ruling part did
not have the same result; on the contrary, there is strong and continuing
engagement by Galen with Aristotelian ideas.)19
The third line of explanation relates to certain larger differences, which
can be seen as underlying (or interrelated with) the two previous explanations. These differences can be explained by reference to a broad conceptual contrast between divergent ways of understanding the part-whole
relationship. I outline the contrast first and then discuss where the two
theories stand in this respect. In defining these contrasting patterns, I
draw on terminology used in Verity Hartes recent discussion of Platonic
thinking on this subject. In one pattern, to put it very generally, the focus
is on the parts and in the other on the whole. More precisely, the contrast
is between seeing the whole as identical with, and defined by, the combination of its parts and seeing the whole as the primary locus of identity
and content, to which the parts are subordinate. In one pattern, the parts
are identifiable independently of the whole and, in the other, the parts
are identifiable only in the context of the whole. In one pattern, we can
say that the whole has structure (understood as the combination of the
17)
For this view, see Hankinson 1992: 3519-20.

On the disagreement, see esp. Tieleman 1996: part 1. Tieleman (2003a: 149, n. 44)
notes that Galens quotations suggest that he examined Chrysippus On the Soul and On
Passions intensively while composing PHP 1-6, but then relied on his memory or notes
(or indirect sources) rather than continuing detailed study of Chrysippus works.
19)
See PHP 1.8.1-15, 200-3K, and discussion of Foet. Form. below, for the shared cardiocentric psychology of Aristotle and the Stoics. On Galens engagement with Aristotle,
see Moraux 1984, part 5.
18)
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parts), in the other, the whole is structure (which gives the parts their
identity). Put differently again, the first pattern represents an atomistic or
bottom-up approach to composition, the second a holistic or top-down
approach.20 This contrast can be used in various ways, for instance, in a
metaphysical way, if the focus is on defining categories of being, or in an
epistemological way, if the focus is on knowing how to identify the status
of entities in relation to the part-whole distinction. In Hartes study, the
focus is metaphysical; here, on the other hand, the contrast is mainly
explanatory or analytic. The contrast is used to characterise different
forms of explanation or analysis, which are applied to the psyche or to
natural kinds, though these explanations have metaphysical implications
in so far as they imply different pictures of nature or reality.
Why is this contrast helpful as a way of analysing Galens response to
Stoic thinking, especially on psychology? The relevance of this distinction comes out most clearly in the final section of this article. Here, I
examine a discussion in PHP 5, in which Galen disputes Chrysippus
analysis of psychic health as the proportion or harmony (summetria) of
the parts of the psyche. In fact, Galen denies that Chrysippus is entitled
to use the notion of parts altogether, given his strongly unified view of
the psyche. I suggest that what underlies this debate are the two contrasting conceptions of the part-whole relationship, which we can characterise
(deploying Hartes terminology for this purpose) as composition and structure approaches. Galen responds negatively to or fails to understand
Chrysippus view because he brings to the topic a different way of
understanding the part-whole relationship. I also suggest that a similar
conceptual contrast underlies Galens critique of Stoic psychology more
generally in PHP 2-5. More precisely, there are features of Galens psychological theory, as presented there (notably, his view of embodied
psychic parts as independent and potentially conflicting sources of motivation) that express a composition approach. The presence of these features, and of the correlated approach to the part-whole relationship, as
regards psychology, helps to explain why Galen does not engage more
closely than he does with Stoic ideas, which exhibit a strong version of the
structure approach.
20)
This summary combines various formulations and distinctions discussed in Harte

2002: 158-67, 267-81.
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I think that this contrast can also be seen as informing other responses
by Galen to Stoic thinking examined in the next section. The main aim of
this section is to show that Galenic and Stoic thought exhibit a shared
naturalism, as outlined earlier; but the conceptual contrast evident in
PHP 2-5 seems also to underlie some of Galens responses. For instance,
the position taken by Galen in Foet. Form. on the order of the development of organs in the embryo seems to reflect, in part at least, the debate
in PHP between unitary and part-based models of the psyche and the
related contrast between structure and composition approaches. More
broadly, the latter contrast can be taken as underlying other differences
between Galen and Stoicism (running alongside their shared naturalism),
which emerge in other works. For instance, in Nat. Fac., QAM and Foet.
Form., at certain points, Galen seems not to register the wide-ranging,
indeed universal, scope of the Stoic theory of active and passive causal
principles and of the associated idea of pneumatic tension (tonos).21 He
also seems not to recognise the radical revision implied in this theory to
the significance of certain longstanding distinctions in ancient thought,
notably those between psyche and body and between living and nonliving entities.
Galens lack of responsiveness can be explained in various ways, including, of course, the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas, which
shaped the understanding of these distinctions for Galen and for many
other ancient thinkers (see text to nn. 13-14 above). But Galens reaction
can also be interpreted as expressing, in another way, the contrast between
composition and structure approaches. This is not because the partwhole relationship appears as an explicit topic of debate in Galens comments in these works (whereas it does appear explicitly in his critique
of Chrysippus account of psychic proportion in PHP 5). Rather, these
distinctions can be seen as giving primacy to certain parts or sub-divisions
of units: namely, to body and psyche within living entities, and to living
and non-living entities within the universe. The Stoic theory, by contrast,
gives a new meaning to these distinctions (and de-emphasises their importance) by locating them in a new, unitary explanatory framework (based
on pneumatic tension), and by reconceiving each unit as a structured whole.22
21)
See text to nn. 29-30, 40-1, 50-1 below.

The contrast between composition and structure approaches explored here in connection with Galen and Stoicism can be linked with the contrast between part-based
22)
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My comments so far may suggest that Galens thought expresses a uniformly composition approach, whereas Stoicism exhibits a consistently
structure approach. As far as Stoicism is concerned, I think this is a correct picture. However, Galenic thought can be seen as displaying a mixed
character. For instance, as I bring out in the last section, his thinking on
psychophysiology contains a combination of a strongly unified (braincentred) anatomical model with an emphasis on parts as independent
sources of motivation. This combination, arguably, generates internal tensions; thus, Galens thought on this subject can be seen as containing an
uneasy mixture of structure and composition approaches. (This is a
topic on which Galen might have done well to adopt the more consistently unified Stoic approach.) Other aspects of Galens thought illustrated here also express at least a partial move towards a structure
approach: for instance, his analysis (shared with Stoicism) of all material
entities by reference to mixtures (kraseis) of fundamental elements.
However, this is qualified, as just noted, by the weight placed in Galens
analysis on the distinction between living and non-living entities as well
as body and psyche (taken as primary parts of the natural world or of living entities). Thus, the relationship between Galenic and Stoic thought,
taken as a whole, might be seen as that between a mixed approach and a
consistently structure-based one, though certain aspects of this relationship express a straightforward confrontation between composition and
structure approaches.23
Examples of Common Ground and Difference (outside PHP)
I now illustrate these two recurrent features of Galens relationship with
Stoicism (their shared naturalism and their partial difference in conceptual approach) by reference to a selection of passages in which Galen
comments explicitly on Stoic ideas, beginning with three passages on the
material composition of entities including human beings.
and holistic approaches in Hellenistic-Roman thought discussed in Gill 2006, esp.
ch. 1.
23)
Other aspects of his thought that express a move towards a structure approach (and
which have close parallels in Stoicism) include his systematic and comprehensive teleological view of the natural world and his application of a unified framework of causal
explanation; on these aspects, see Hankinson 1989 and 2002.
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For it was Hippocrates who first of all introduced the doctrine of the Hot, the Cold,
the Dry, and the Wet; later Aristotle gave a demonstration of it. Chrysippus and
his followers took it over ready-made, and did not indulge in futile strife, but say
that everything is blended (kekrasthai) from these things, and that they act and
react upon each other, and that nature is constructive (technikn phusin); and they
accept all the other Hippocratic doctrines, except in one small matter in which they
differ from Aristotle. (de Methodo Medendi (MM) 1.2.10, 16K, trans. Hankinson
1991b)24
Thus, the well-balanced individual must enjoy a combination of heat and moisture
in his nature, and good balance in fact consists in nothing other than the domination of these two qualities . . . The same appears to be the opinion of the philosopher
Aristotle, of Theophrastus, and subsequently also of the Stoics. (de Temperamentis
(Temp.) 1.3, 523K, trans. Singer 1997: 208)
Hippocrates was the first of all the doctors and philosophers we know who undertook to demonstrate that there are, in all, four mutually interacting qualities (poiottas) and that to the operation of these is due the genesis and destruction of all things
that come into and pass out of being . . . that all these qualities undergo a complete
blending with one another (kerannusthai . . . holas diholn) . . . [Zeno is noted as
holding the view] that the substances (ousias) as well as their qualities (poiottas)
undergo this complete blending. (Nat. Fac. 1.2, 5K, trans. Brock 1916, modified)
These passages bring out several relevant points. First, they highlight features that are, on any interpretation, genuinely shared by the Galenic and
Stoic theories: notably the idea that the four elements or opposites, and
their mixture or blending, krasis, are fundamental principles for understanding the natural universe and specific entities within the universe,
including human beings.25 Second, they show that Galen is prepared to
include the Stoics as part of a broad intellectual alliance supporting his
conception of natural entities.26 Although these passages, taken together,
24)
See also MM 1.2.13, 18K, linking Plato, Aristotle and Chrysippus.

For the relevant Stoic theories, see LS 47, esp. A-E, 48; for Galens thinking see refs in
nn. 26, 28 below.
26)
The last passage cited refers to a partial difference between Aristotelian and Stoic
ways of characterising this idea: followers of Aristotle conceive the blending only as that
of qualities and the Stoics as the complete blending of substances. But Galen, while
sometimes adopting the Aristotelian formulation, does not regard this difference as fundamental, and is ready to recruit the Stoics in support of the approach he advocates here.
See e.g. Nat. Fac. 2.4, 92K; also Moraux 1984: 740-2, Kupreeva 2004: 81-2.
25)
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bring out common ground between Galen and Stoicism, they also indicate the contrast between structure and composition approaches (in
the sense outlined earlier), which is most evident in Nat. Fac. Here, Galen
includes the Stoics on one side of a broad intellectual divide which is constructed to underpin his highly innovative project there (1.12). The
conflict is presented as being, first, between continuist and atomic theories of matter.27 This is linked with a contrast between those who conceive
natural entities in organic or biological, as opposed to mechanistic, terms.
This in turn forms a basis for Galens main aim, of analysing living entities as complexes of natural faculties or capacities (phusikai dunameis)
which constitute the basis of their life as living beings.28
How appropriate is Galens inclusion of Stoicism in this schema? To
some extent, Stoic theory fits rather well. As well as holding (what Galen
sees as) a continuist theory of matter, in their ideas about total blending,
the Stoic distinction between phusis and hexis and their view of animals
as structured psychophysical entities can be seen as forming part of a biological or organic conception of living things. However, in some respects,
the Stoic theory fits uneasily in this context. For one thing, the relevant
features of Stoic theory (the idea of elements and total blending) form
part of an over-arching analysis of principles and causes, the scope of
which goes beyond defining the material basis of living entities, which is
Galens concern here. The two fundamental principles are presented as
being an active cause (sometimes identifed with pneuma) and a passive
one (hul), both of which are conceived as material or bodily in nature.
These principles are used as the basis of an explanatory framework, based
on the type or degree of tension (tonos) in the blending of active and
passive causes. This framework provides the basis for analysing unity or
structure in different kinds of entity: the spectrum of tension runs from
hexis in lifeless objects to phusis in plants, psyche in animals and rationality in adult humans and gods.29 This summary by Philo of Alexandria
encapsulates some of the radical implications of this idea.
27)
The assumption is that, if matter consists of indivisible particles (e.g. atoms), it will
not be capable of the (in modern terms) chemical fusion of qualities that Galen sees as a
prerequisite for living entities.
28)
See Vegetti 1999: 389-95, Kupreeva 2004: 77-84.
29)
See LS 44 B, 45 G-H, 47 passim; also LS vol. 1: 270-1, 286-9.
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101
Intelligence (or mind, nous) has many powers, the tenor kind, the physical, the psychic, the rational, the calculative . . . Tenor (hexis) is also shared by lifeless things,
stones and logs, and our bones, which resemble stones, also participate in it. Phusis
also extends to plants, and in us too there are things like plants nails and hair.
Phusis is hexis in actual motion. Psyche is phusis which has also acquired impression and impulse. This is also shared by irrational animals. (Philo, Allegories of the
Laws 2.22-3, trans. LS 47 P, slightly modified)
One of the implications of the Stoic theory is that all entities, both natural and non-natural, can be understood as manifestations of the complete
blending of god (or the active principle, or fire) with matter (or the passive principle, or the other elements).30 This difference comes out if we
juxtapose Galen MM 1.2.10, 16K (cited in text to n. 24 above) with the
following summary of the Stoic theory.
The Stoics made god out to be intelligent, a designing fire (pur technikon), which
methodically proceeds towards creation of the world, and encompasses all the seminal principles according to which everything comes about according to fate, and a
breath pervading the whole world, which takes on different names owing to the
alterations of the matter through which it passes. (Atius 1.7.33, trans. LS 46 A)
The contrast between the two conceptions can be exemplified by the

difference between two seemingly similar phrases: Galens constructive
(or craft-like) nature (technikn phusin) and the Stoic designing fire (pur
technikon). Galens concern is with showing how the blending of the four
elements provides the basis for understanding the nature of living things,
especially their in-built teleological (craft-like) functions. The Stoic theory is intended to show how the blending of god or designing fire with
matter provides a unified explanatory framework for all entities, including those which are structured by hexis rather than phusis. This point of
difference exemplifies the conceptual contrast outlined earlier. Although
both these Galenic and Stoic theories aim at a unified or holistic account,
the Stoic analysis is more or more systematically holistic, for instance,
in cutting across the standard distinction between natural and non-natural
entities, which remains important in Galens framework.
A similar combination of features (shared naturalism of viewpoint
coupled with a partial contrast in conceptual approaches) is evident in
30)
See further Long 1996: 227-9 and LS vol. 1: 270-2, 286-9, 292-4.
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
Galens characterisation of Stoic thinking on the psyche-body relationship in QAM.

[The Stoics] hold that the psyche, like nature (phusis), is a kind of breath (pneuma)
but that [ pneuma] of nature is more humid and colder, whereas that of the psyche is
drier and hotter. That is why this pneuma, too, is a kind of matter (hul) appropriate
to the psyche and the form (eidos) of the matter is such-and-such a mixture (krasis),
consisting in a proportion of the airy and fiery substance (ousia) . . . It has, then,
become clear to you now that in the view of the Stoics the substance of the psyche
comes to be (gignetai) according to a particular mixture (krasis) of air and fire. And
Chrysippus has been made intelligent because of the well-tempered mixture of these
two [elements], while the sons of Hippocrates . . . [have been made] swinish because
of the boundless heat. (QAM 4, Marquardt et al. vol. 2, 45.5-11, 21-4, 783-4K (part
of SVF 2.787), trans. Tieleman 2003a: 149-50, slightly modified)
Here, as in the earlier passages, Galen recruits the Stoics, alongside other
thinkers (including Plato and Aristotle) in support of his main thesis. In
QAM, Galen does not only argue, as elsewhere, that medical enquiry can
yield definite conclusions about the physical manifestations of psychological life. He also comes very close at least (despite his customary caution on this point) to maintaining that the psyche is physical or material
in nature or essence (ousia).31 More specifically, he claims that the the
capacities (or faculties, dunameis) of the psyche follow the mixtures (kraseis) of the body, a thesis which is taken in this treatise to have substantive
implications for ethical judgement of human actions.32
How appropriate is Galens inclusion of Stoic ideas in support of this
thesis? Galen certainly highlights a number of themes which are both
genuinely Stoic and relevant to the topic: the role of pneuma and hul
as explanatory principles or causes, the spectrum of types of tension
including psyche and phusis, the idea of the total blending of elements.
These Stoic themes are also included in, for instance, A. A. Longs discus31)
See esp. QAM 4, Marquardt et al. vol. 2, 44.2-45.2, 782-3K, also 4, Marquardt et al.
vol. 2, 2.47.22-48.25, 777-8K. On his caution on this subject, see text to n. 6 above. See
further Hankinson 1991a: 202-3, Tieleman 2002: 150-1, Hankinson 2006 and Donini
forthcoming.
32)
See e.g. QAM 4, Marquardt et al. vol. 2.46.1-7, 784K, and QAM 11 passim. On
Galens thesis, esp. the problem in determining what is implied by follow, see Lloyd
1988: 33-4.
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103
sion of Stoic psychology, though Longs analysis is presented, rather, as

that of a conceptual framework introduced by the Stoics to revise the
standard, Platonic-Aristotelian, psyche-body distinction, rather than
being simply their version or restatement of this distinction.33 There are
also parallels, as Teun Tieleman has underlined, for the Galenic claim
made here that individual long-term characteristics have a physical basis
and that occurrent psychological states manifest themselves as exceptional
degrees of heat or cold.34 However, his presentation also recasts the Stoic
theory in a way that qualifies or distorts its distinctive character.
The process can be illustrated by reference to Galens presentation of
Aristotles theory earlier in the treatise. Galen argues that, if we combine
Aristotles standard definition of psyche as the form (eidos) of the body
with Aristotles view that the physical body comes through the presence
of the four qualities in matter, we are entitled to take bodily form (or
the substance, ousia, of the psyche) as being some mixture of these four
qualities.35 In effect, Galen maintains that Aristotles thinking, in different
contexts, entails Galens view, rather than that Aristotle explicitly argues
for this claim, in de Anima, for instance.36 In his characterisation of Stoic
thinking cited above, Galen builds on this treatment of Aristotle; the
Stoic theory is recast in more Aristotelian terms to show that the Stoics
also subscribe to the Galenic thesis. The form (eidos) of the psyche is
such-and-such a mixture (krasis), namely a proportion of mixed fire and
air. Subsequently, the substance (ousia) of psyche is presented as being (or
occurring, gignetai) according to a particular mixture of air and fire.37
As in his comments on Aristotle, Galens treatment of the Stoics
involves some interpretative reshaping of their thought. For instance,
pneuma is, typically, associated in Stoic theory with the active cause (or
33)
Long 1996: 227-39, esp. 227-8; also von Staden 2000: 100-4.
Tieleman 2003: ch. 4, e.g. 194, referring to Cicero, de Fato 7-9 (environmental
influences on character-formation), and 157-8, referring to Gal. PHP 3.1.25, 291K
(SVF 2.886) (anger as occurrent heat).
35)
QAM 3, 774K, Marquardt et al. vol. 2, 37.16-22, cited phrases trans. Singer 1997: 153.
36)
Galen combines the definition of psyche in Arist. de Anima 2.1, esp. 412a19-21, 27-8
(as Galen interprets this) with Aristotles account of elemental transformation in GC 2.24 (cf. Kupreeva 2004: 81). On Galens reading of Aristotles theory, see Lloyd 1988:
24-8.
37)
QAM 4, Marquardt et al. vol. 2, 45.9-11, 21-4,783-4K.
34)
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
god), by contrast with the passive cause or hul. Here, however, pneuma is
presented as the matter of psyche (with krasis functioning as the form).38
More broadly, Galens report of the Stoic theory fails to bring out the fact
that the psyche-body contrast ceases to be fundamental. This distinction
is, in effect, replaced by a more universal causal and categorical framework, in which each entity is seen as a modality of types of tension, running from hexis to logos, and including phusis and psyche as stages of
complexity.39 Galen, by implication at least, alludes to this revised framework early in the passage cited earlier, in that he refers to the Stoic idea of
phusis and psyche as variant forms of mixture of elements.40 But this
theme is then submerged in the definition of psyche in terms of form and
matter, Aristotelian terms which are given a revised meaning by Galen.
The passage thus illustrates both the general features about Galens
response to Stoicism emphasised here. Galen alludes to aspects of Stoic
theory which support the claim that both theories, broadly speaking,
adopt a physicalist or materialist conception of psyche. But the way that
Galen presents the Stoic theory redescribes it in a way that understates its
systematic or radical holism of approach and assimilates it to the more
familiar (Platonic-Aristotelian) psyche-body duality. This duality gives
greater weight and importance to the two component parts (psyche and
body) of the whole person and is, to this degree, a more compositionbased approach.41
The last work treated in this section is de Foetuum Formatione (Foet.
Form.). Galens response here might seem to be different from that in Nat.
Fac. and QAM, in that Galen, on one key point, disagrees both with the
Stoics and Aristotle, whereas elsewhere his differences from Stoicism tend
to be linked with adoption of an Aristotelian or Platonic-Aristotelian
38)
QAM 4, Marquardt et al. vol. 2, 45.8-11, cf. 5-8, 783-4K. Contrast the presentation
of pneuma as an active principle in 47 F, I, L, and LS vol. 1: 287-9.
39)
See text to nn 30, 33 above. See further Long 1996: 227-34, von Staden 2000:
97-102, Gill 2006: 31-3.
40)
QAM 4, Marquardt et. al. vol. 2, 45.5-8, 783K. Elsewhere, also, Galen refers to the
Stoic theory of tension (e.g. LS 47 K, N), though it is less clear that he recognises the
radical implications of this theory for the revision of standard (Platonic-Aristotelian)
categories.
41)
For the conceptual contrast suggested here, and its application to Galen and
Stoicism, see text to nn. 20-3 above.
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105
approach. The main point of conflict centres on the question which organ
develops first in the embryo and whether or not the organ which emerges
first produces or manages the further development of the embryo, as indicated in this passage:
In the first place . . . they [Peripatetics and Stoics] assume that the heart is generated
before anything else. Secondly, that the heart generates the other parts . . . Thirdly, as
a consequence, they claim that even the deliberative part of our psyche is situated in
the heart. (Foet. Form. 6.27, 102.12-17 Nickel, 698K, trans. LS 53 D, slightly
modified)
However, Galens response to Stoic thought on this question, as on others, reflects the combination of a shared (broadly physicalist) view of psychology with partial differences in conceptual approaches which can be
linked with the composition structure contrast. In considering Galens
response, I focus on these aspects of the relationship with Stoicism, which
do not necessarily also apply to Aristotle. Some of the relevant features
emerge by contrast with Hierocles roughly contemporary account of the
same process, which Galen might, conceivably, have known.42
The similarities between the Galenic and Stoic theories include a view
of animals (for instance, humans) as coherent, organic psychophysical
entities, whose anatomical structure serves as the vehicle of an embodied
psychological system. Embryonic growth in each of the theories represents the early, or preliminary, development of the animal as an organic
unit of this type.43 This process is also understood in both theories as
the progressive realization of a teleological design, though on different
assumptions about the role of specific organs. The Stoics present the
heart (more precisely, the pneuma in the heart) as an active locus of
42)
Galen lived in AD 129- c. 210, and Hierocles flourished c. 120. Galen refers to animals instinctive capacity for self-defence (Foet. Form. 6.13, 692K), which Hierocles cites,
though this theme also appears in Senecas account of development (LS 57 B-C). For a
point on which Galens difference from Stoicism does not apply to Aristotle, see
n. 46 below.
43)
See Foet. Form. 3.8-29, 663-674K, for Galens account of the emergence of embryonic
structure. For Stoics, the embryo is still plant-like, i.e. directed by phusis (see LS 53 B(2-3)
and n. 50 below); whereas for Galen development from the plant-like to the animal stage
begins in the womb (3.17-18, 24, 667, 670-1K).
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
embryological development, anticipating its subsequent role as the seat

of the hgemonikon.44 Galen resists that idea strongly, while sharing the
belief in a process of teleological development, which is seen by him as
built into the capacities of the sperm, though reflecting the plan of an
external designer.45
The areas of disagreement regarding embryonic development display
the larger (though partial) conceptual differences stressed here between the
two theories. Stoic thinking on the role of the heart in this process reflects
their strongly unified view of the body as an anatomical and psychophysical structure with a single directing centre.46 This view comes out very
clearly in Hierocles account of the transition from embryo to animal and
of the psychological functions that begin to operate at birth. For instance,
the idea of self-perception (a distinctive theme of Hierocles discussion)
expresses both the idea that the animal, once born, has its own integrity
and coherence and also that the animal is a unified psychophysical entity.47
Galen too, as just noted, sees the embryo as a coherent, teleologically
shaped organism. But, in his critique of the Stoic (and Aristotelian) view
and his affirmation of a rival picture, we also see indications of a composition approach to physiology. Galens assertion that the liver, which has
the most elementary functions, develops before the heart seems to reflect
his general commitment to a three-part psychophysical model, with determinate roles for liver, heart and brain.48 Although Galen criticises his oppo44)
Foet. Form. 5.13-16, 683-4, 5.20-1, 686-7K, 6.27-8, 698K; on the role of pneuma, see
6.29-30, 699-700K. See also Nickel 1989: 77-8, 1993: 81-2.
45)
Foet. Form. 6.1-34, 687-702K, also 5.11, 86.18 Nickel, 682K: the seed must contain
the scheme of the Craftsman (logos dmiourgou), trans. Singer 1997: 191. However,
Galen acknowledges the difficulties in offering a complete explanation of embryonic
development in teleological terms (6.31-4, 700-2K).
46)
Foet. Form. 6.27-8, 698K; also LS 53 B(5-8), G-H. Aristotle also holds a heartcentre theory, but in his case it is less clear that the heart is conceived as the organising
centre of a unified psychophysical system or structure (see further van der Eijk 2000:
68-9).
47)
LS 53 B(5). Although the idea of self-perception (as distinct from self-awareness) is
distinctive to Hierocles, in our sources, his account of the transition to birth and psychophysical cohesion is in line with other evidence. See Tieleman 1991, Long 1996: 252-5.
48)
Foet. Form. 3.27-9, 672-4K. See also 3.17-26, 667-72K on the alleged role of the liver
as the source of an emerging system of veins, and on Galens commitment to a tripartite
psychophysical model, 6.33-4, 701K.
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107
nents for failing to base their claims on proper anatomical investigation

(4.6-9, 676-8K), this is not a subject on which Galens position rests on
secure anatomical foundations either. Galen concedes that the evidence
available to him (human abortions in the first month and the dissection
of non-human animals) does not yield certain information about the precise sequence of embryonic development in humans. He also acknowledges that elsewhere he has argued that the heart comes first in
development, and that he has changed his mind in the light of the general
consensus that the embryos initial life is plant-like, and therefore, as
Galen infers, centred on the work of the liver.49 Thus, it seems that his
theoretical attachment to a part-based psychophysical model, rather than
anatomical evidence, plays the decisive role in his opposition to the Stoic
account. Galens strong opposition to the Stoic heart-centred picture of
embryological development in Foet. Form. seems to reflect the earlier,
intense, debate about embodied psychology in PHP 2-3. It may also
reflect the larger conceptual contrast (between structure and composition approaches) which is embodied in that debate, as I suggest shortly.
A related point arises from Galens response to a further aspect of the
Stoic theory of the embryo. In the Stoic account, embryonic functions
are presented as being shaped, like those of plants, by phusis, and only at
birth are animal functions also informed by psyche. In this respect, as
elsewhere, the Stoics see animal functions as part of a larger spectrum of
types of tension, shaping natural and non-natural entities in general,50 a
view which I take as reflecting their characteristically holistic or structure approach. Galen, while noting this feature of the Stoic theory, seems
not to register its broader significance, and treats phusis simply as a synonym for Platos appetitive or Aristotles vegetative part of the psyche.51 In
this respect, Galen assimilates this idea to the part-based psychological
framework that he adopts from Plato and Aristotle, thus offering a further indication of the larger conceptual difference between his theory
and Stoicism.
49)
Foet. Form. 3.9-10, 663-4K, referring to de Semine 1.8.1-8, 90.7-92.8 De Lacy; also
Prop. Plac. 11.2, 90.22-92.5 Nutton. See further Nickel 1989: 80-2, 2001: 121-3.
50)
See LS 53 B(2-3) (Hierocles); also Inwood 1984: 173-4, Long 1996: 236-9.
51)
Foet. Form. 3.13, 665K, 6.31, 700K; also PHP 6.3.7 (521K); see further Nickel 1993:
81, 84.
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Competing Psychologies: Parts and Wholes

I now turn to PHP 1-6, the scene of Galens most intense engagement
with Stoicism. Although the other works discussed here (apart from UP
Book 1) were written later than PHP, I think that the same general features evident in those works also hold good for PHP. Here, although the
focus in both theories is on body-based psychology (at least in PHP 2-3),
it is differences and disagreements that are most obvious. Here especially,
it is plausible to see Galens response to Stoicism as reflecting their different
positions in relation to the conceptual contrast (between a holistic or
structure approach and a part-based or composition approach) outlined
earlier. This difference comes out most clearly in Galens criticism in
PHP 5 of Chrysippus description of psychic sickness as disharmony
between the parts of the psyche. This criticism, considered shortly, illustrates vividly two divergent ways of understanding the part-whole relationship. But an analogous difference is also indicated in other aspects of
Galens treatment of psychology in PHP 1-6. Notably, this seems to
underlie certain internal tensions in Galens account of embodied psychology. This factor also helps to explain why Galen does not try to combine aspects of Stoic psychology with his own, even though doing so
might have benefited his own theory by helping him to remove these
internal tensions.
In PHP 2-3, the main explicit ground of conflict is the question
whether the ruling part of the psyche is located in the heart, as the
Stoics supposed, or in the brain, as Galen maintained, on the basis of anatomical investigation by Herophilus and Galen himself. But underlying
this conflict is a contrast between two radically different pictures of
embodied psychic functions. According to Galen, the system is a tripartite one, in which three organs, brain, heart and liver serve as the seat and
source (arch) of three communication-systems, those of nerves, arteries
and veins, respectively. These organs also serve as the locations of the three
functions in Galens (Platonic-style) tripartite psyche, namely, reasoning,
anger and other emotions, and appetite or desire. For the Stoics, by contrast, there is a single psychological agency, the hgemonikon, located in
the heart and coordinating all psychic processes.52
52)
On Galens psycho-physiological model and criticisms of Chrysippus theory, see

Hankinson 1991a, Tieleman 2002, and, for a detailed analysis, Tieleman 1996.
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109
How does this disagreement relate to the contrast drawn earlier

between structure and composition approaches? Adopting a tripartite
model does not in itself mean that the theory is based on composition;
the parts could be seen as subordinate elements of an inclusive structure,
and the structure could be seen as conceptually or ontologically prior to
the parts. In Galens case, different aspects of his thought indicate different
approaches, and this divergence can be linked with various internal tensions which scholars have recently identified in his thinking on embodied
psychology. Broadly speaking, these tensions derive from the attempt
(fundamental to Galens project in PHP) of combining the unified braincentred model based on medical anatomy with the three-part psychophysiological model derived from Plato.
Jaap Mansfeld, for instance, underlines the difficulty in reconciling in
Galenic thought the idea of the brain as the source of motivation and
action (exercised through the central nervous system) with the view that
all three parts function as sources of internal agency.
Because there are no motor nerves issuing from either the heart (the seat of anger,
according to Galen) or the liver (the seat of desire, according to Galen), the two nonrational parts are in fact precluded from moving any muscle . . . it is reason, and reason alone [situated in the brain] which makes the muscles move by means of the
connecting nerves.53
Teun Tieleman also comments that Galens failure in PHP 1-6 to account
for the anatomical and physiological basis for the necessary interaction
between the three parts . . . seems to subvert his whole enterprise.54 R. J.
Hankinson, while affirming in general the coherence of Galens picture,
also stresses the problem (which Galen himself acknowledges) that there
is no experimental evidence to support the claim that the liver acts as a
source of internal action. He also highlights the tension between Galens
presentation of all three parts, including the liver, as archai (startingpoints or sources) and his emphasis on the role of (quasi-irrigational)
53)
Mansfeld 1991: 141.

Tieleman 2003b: 155. However, Tieleman also points (155-60) to evidence from
works later than PHP 1-6 that Galen attempted to modify his picture to show how communication via the nerves might enable the emotions based in the heart and liver to
influence the brain-based reason, which is the sole initiator of action.
54)
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
systems of circulation in the body.55 Heinrich von Staden suggests that

two aspects of Galens psychophysiology are on a collision course with
each other. These are, on the one hand, the subdivision of functions into
psychic and physical (following earlier medical and Stoic thought) and
Galens attachment to the Platonic tripartite model in which all three
parts serve as sources of psychic (not physical) agency, which account
for the full range of psychophysical activity.56 Although these scholars
are commenting on different features, the cumulative impression is of
tension between the idea of a unified structure or system and the role of
distinct, quasi-independent parts, which serve as origins of motivation
or action.
A striking implication of this tension is that Galen would have done
better in his own terms if he had combined the brain-centred model
revealed by his own anatomical experiments with the more unified picture of embodied psychology advocated by Stoicism. His theory would
have benefited if he had formed a view of the role of the brain as being
more like the Stoic heart; that is, as the seat of reason, emotion and desire,
conceived as functions of a single directing organ and psychological
agency.57 This is a clear case of a missed opportunity, a leap that was conceptually possible, in terms of the thought-world of the period, but which
was not attempted. Why does Galen not even consider this possibility,
which might have been prompted by the other points of connection with
Stoicism, discussed earlier? These features, taken together, add up to a
shared naturalism that brings Galen closer to Stoicism, in many respects,
than to Platonism (at least in its more dualistic versions). The adoption of
Stoic unitary psychology, in conjunction with the brain-centred model,
might have presented itself to him as a logical extension of this shared
naturalism. However, this is, emphatically, not how Galen responds; and
this raises in an acute form the question posed earlier, why Galen does not
make more of the relationship with Stoicism than he does. Although we
55)
Hankinson 1991a: 223-9, referring esp. to PHP 6.3.1-6, 519-21K, 6.3.20-6,
525-7K.
56)
H. von Staden 2000: 107-11, citation from 109.
57)
For a similar suggestion, see Tieleman 2002: 269-70. Tieleman points out that one of
Galens experiments (showing a cow reacting in a panicky way, deprived of its heart but
not its brain) might have supported this conclusion.
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111
can identify specific reasons why Galen might not engage more closely
with Stoic ideas, I think we can also see the influence of the larger conceptual contrast between composition and structure approaches.
As suggested earlier, one factor that might have deterred Galen from
adopting a Stoic-style unitary psychological model is his conviction that
the Stoics are profoundly mistaken about the location of the ruling part
of the psyche. Even so, he could have corrected this error while still adopting their unitary view. But Galen might have been discouraged from
doing so by the way he interprets Stoic (or at least Chrysippean) theory.58
In PHP 4-5 Galen presents himself as responding to another crass error
in Stoic psychology: namely the recognition only of the rational part of
the psyche and the denial of the existence of non-rational parts. Galen
thinks that this makes Chrysippus incapable of explaining passionate
emotions and the internal conflicts these generate, the existence of which
Chrysippus himself acknowledges. Galen believes that passionate emotions and conflicts can only be explained by following Plato and seeing
these as the expression of distinct psychological parts which are also independent sources of motivation.59 Here, in my view, Galen misses the key
point in the Stoic theory. This is their unified or holistic conception of
human psychology, according to which passions, for instance, constitute
an integrated psychophysical response, combining what are, in modern
terms, cognitive, affective and physiological dimensions.60 Galen consistently treats Stoic claims about the unified character of (adult) psychological reactions as amounting to the view that they are wholly rational
in a Platonic sense, that is, functions of an intellectual part of the psyche.61
This reading of Stoic theory is, admittedly, a common one in ancient and
58)
Galen draws a sharp, and influential, distinction between Chrysippus psychological

thinking and that of Posidonius, which he presents as much closer to Plato. However, like
some other scholars, I regard Galens distinction as over-stated and misleading: see Gill
2006: 266-90, also Tieleman 2003a: 198-287.
59)
See e.g. PHP 4.4.16-37, 385-90K, 4.7.12-44, 420-426K; for Galens reading of Platos
account of psychic division in R. 435-41, see PHP 5.7.1-82, 480-501K, and text to n. 70
below.
60)
See further Gill 2005: 453-5, 2006: 247-9; also Tieleman 2003a: 114-22 and Price
2005: 472-81.
61)
See e.g. Gal. PHP 5.2.45, 48, 51 (443-4K). Cf. Antiochus critique of Stoic theory, in
Cicero de Finibus 4.26-39, esp. 26-8, 35 (discussed in Gill 2006: 168-70).
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
modern thinking,62 but it is also one that can be challenged. Underlying

Galens response to Stoic theory, we can see the force of competing conceptual patterns as regards parts and wholes. Galen reads the Stoic theory
in terms of an analysis that is not simply part-based but which also gives
explanatory priority to psychic parts, in so far as they function as independent and potentially conflicting sources of motivation. In this respect,
as in some other aspects of his psychophysiological thinking,63 Galen
adopts a composition approach, even though other sides of his thought
express a structure approach. Put differently, Galens failure to recognise
the full force of the Stoic holistic psychological theory reflects the competing pull of the composition viewpoint.
Of course, it is possible to see Galens response to Stoicism, in this
respect, as a direct consequence of his adoption of the Platonic tripartite
model and, perhaps, of a more general allegiance to Platonism.64 But this
line of explanation is less clear-cut than it might seem; and in Galens
interpretation of Plato too one can see the influence of the same conceptual pattern. I have argued elsewhere that, in Platos account of the embodied tripartite psyche in Timaeus 69-72, and in a different way in the
tripartite theory of the Republic, we can see, alongside the explicitly partbased theory, indications of a more holistic, structure-based, pattern of
thinking. I have also suggested though this is more speculative that
the more holistic aspects of Platonic thinking might have influenced the
formation of Stoic (specifically, Chrysippean) psychology.65 Whether or
not one accepts these suggestions, there are some rather clear signs that
Galen, in his reading of the Platonic theory, accentuates the part-based
dimensions. For instance, in Timaeus 69-72, Plato presents the embodied
tripartite psyche as an integrated system, in which internal communication travels downwards from the rational part in the brain to the heart
and liver.66 Galen, in his comments on Platos account, accentuates the
62)
See e.g. Antiochus critique of Stoic theory, in Cicero de Finibus 4.26-39, esp. 26-8, 35
(discussed in Gill 2006: 168-70); among recent accounts of Chrysippean theory, see esp.
Sorabji 2000: chs. 2-3.
63)
See text to nn. 53-6 above.
64)
On this factor, see text to nn. 13-14 above.
65)
Gill 2006, ch. 5; see also Gill 1998: 130-7.
66)
Pl. Ti. 70a-b, 71b-c: see Gill 2006: 301-4 (also 294-6). On the embodied tripartite
psyche as a coherent structure, see also Johansen 2004, ch. 7.
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113
relative independence of all three parts, in part by importing phrases

drawn from the Republic which are linked with the idea of internal struggle rather than cooperation and integration.67 Also, in drawing on the
psychology of the Republic to criticise the Stoic unified model, Galen
gives maximal prominence to Platos arguments in Book 4 for the role of
the psychic parts as independent and potentially conflicting sources of
motivation.68 There is no equivalent emphasis on Platos theme of psychic
harmony (in 443c-444a, for instance),69 although, as we see shortly, Galen
makes much use of the idea of psychic harmony or proportion (summetria) in his dispute with Chrysippus. These features suggest that the
aspects of Galens picture which accentuate the independence of the psychic parts (and are thus in tension with the idea of a coherent psychophysiological structure) are not simply importations from Plato.70 Rather,
Galen interprets Platos account in a way that stresses or enhances this
dimension of the Republic and Timaeus. Here too, then, we can see the
underlying force of the composition approach to parts and wholes shaping Galens thought even though this only represents one side of Galens
overall pattern of thinking.
The contrast between Stoic and Galenic thinking in this respect comes
out with special clarity in one section of Galens discussion of the Stoic
theory of the passions in PHP 5, where the issue of the relationship
between parts and wholes is the explicit object of debate. The startingpoint is the idea, developed especially by Chrysippus, that there is a close
analogy between physical and psychological sickness and health and their
therapy (5.2.1-34, 432-40K). Galens complaint is that Chrysippus cannot give any real content to the notions of proportion and disproportion
(summetria and asummetria), which are closely linked with those of
67)
Gal. PHP 6.2.14, 518K, using phrases from R. 440c-d (dog-like) and 588c-589b
(many-headed beast) which underline the idea of psychic conflict between quasiindependent parts. Other phrases used in a similar way are fountain-head of blood that
moves violently through the limbs (Ti. 70b1-2) and appetitive of food and drink
(Ti. 70d7); see e.g. PHP 6.8. 40, 49, 69, 74 (573, 575, 580, 582K). See Gill 2006: 296-8.
68)
PHP 5.7.1-82, 480-501K, discussing at length R. 435e-441c; the significance of Platos argument for Galens theory is underlined in PHP 6.2.1-12, 512-18K.
69)
This passage is not listed in De Lacys index locorum to PHP in 1978-84, vol. 3.
70)
Galen emphasises psychic conflict elsewhere in PHP, e.g. in 3.3.1-22, 302-8K. On
this emphasis in Galen, see also Mansfeld 1999: 133-8.
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
health and sickness, because he does not recognise parts of the psyche.
More specifically, Chrysippus does not recognise parts of the relevant
kind, that is, independent sources of motivation which are capable of generating internal conflict (stasis), which for Galen is synonymous with
sickness of the psyche (5.2.35-8, 441K). In Galens characterisation of
psychic health, we can see clear indications of a composition approach.
The parts are given explanatory priority in that they are presented as simplest parts or elements (stoicheia) and in that psychic health (or disease)
depends on establishing a relationship of proportion between these (independent and potentially conflicting) parts.71
Galen makes plain that Chrysippus also characterised psychic health
and sickness in terms of proportion and disproportion of psychic parts.
But Galen denies that Chysippus gave a clear or credible account of this
idea. Indeed, given the Stoic unitary conception of psychology (presented
by Galen as narrowly intellectualist),72 it is not obvious precisely what
kind of parts are involved. Galen cites this comment of Chrysippus:
They are parts (mer) of the psyche through which its reason and the disposition of
its reason are constituted (sunestke). And a psyche is beautiful or ugly by virtue of
its governing part (hgemonikon morion) being in this or that state with respect to its
proper divisions (oikeious merismous).73
Galen adds, in clarification and criticism of this account, that Chrysippus was forced to count the activities (energeiai) of the psyche as its
parts. What set of ideas underlies this comment of Chrysippus, and can
we discern in these ideas a contrasting, holistic (or structure-based) analysis of psychic health and sickness?
Tieleman suggests that the parts of psychic and of physical health and
sickness are, essentially, the same in kind (namely, the hot and cold, wet
and dry), and highlights evidence, including the QAM passage discussed
earlier, which indicate that psychological disease was analysed by Stoics in
71)
See esp. PHP 5.2.38, 444K: For when the three parts are in harmony with each other
and not in conflict at all, they produce psychic harmony, but when in disharmony and
conflict, (they) produce disease, trans. De Lacy, slightly modified.
72)
PHP 5.2.48, 444K, trans. De Lacy: he placed [psychic] health and disease, beauty
and ugliness in one part only, the rational.
73)
PHP 5.2.49, 444K, trans. De Lacy, slightly modified.
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115
terms of imbalance and disorder in these elements.74 I accept fully that

this physical dimension is an integral part of the Stoic theory of the passions; but I do not think these can be quite the kind of parts Chrysippus
intends here at least not on their own.75 Nor can they be the psychic
functions (for instance, vocal and auditory) dismissed from consideration
by Galen as candidates for being parts of the relevant kind.76 But what
are the parts that Chrysippus has in view? Galen maintains that Chrysippus is incapable of giving an answer to the question posed; but Galens
own comments indicate a partial awareness of the answer that Chrysippus might give. Among the suggestive points Galen highlights are these:
Chrysippus description of reason as a collection of notions and concepts
(5.3.1-2, 445K), the idea that passion consists in internal conflict between
judgements (5.4.10-14, 456-8K) and also that disease of the psyche is a
feverish, unstable state (5.3.12-13, 448K). Also suggestive are certain
passages from Platos Sophist introduced by Galen, though with the intention of showing that Chrysippus is unable to answer the question posed.
These Platonic passages stress the link between psychic disease and internal conflict (stasis) and between ignorance or error and disproportion.77
What kind of Stoic ideas are indicated in these comments by Galen
and how far do they explain Chrysippus conception of psychic sickness
as asummetria of psychic parts and thus provide an answer to the question posed by Galen (5.2.48, 444K)? Galen, in citing Chrysippus statement on this, quoted earlier, remarks that the Stoic thinker treats the
(rational) activities (energeiai) of the psyche as its parts, and this point
may also be significant.78 In essence, I think that the proper divisions
74)
Tieleman 2003a: 148-57, referring to QAM 4, Marquardt et al., vol. 2, 45.5-46.1,
783-4K) on 149-50; see also 157-8 on PHP 3.1.25, 291K, and 161-2, on Calcid. in
Timaeum, 165.
75)
Tielemans comments on this point in 2003a: 148-57 do not convey fully the connections between beliefs and physical reactions in passionate states that are discussed below
(or the fact that the beliefs determine the physical reactions). However, these
are features of the Stoic theory that Tieleman, in general, brings out well; see e.g. 2003:
102-22, 170-90.
76)
PHP 5.3.7, 446K, cf. LS 53G-H.
77)
PHP 5.3.24-30, cf. Pl. Sph. 227-8.
78)
The contrast between faculty/part (dunamis/meros) and activity (energeia) is an
important one for Galen; see e.g. PHP 6.3.7, 521K, and Nat. Fac. 1.2, Marquardt et al.,
vol. 3, 105.10-106.1, 107.11-22, 6-7, 9-10K (references I owe to Hankinson 2006: 242-3) .
2/2/07 4:01:14 PM
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
(oikeious merismous) of the hgemonikon in Chrysippus comment are the

standard components of rational (adult human) psychological activity.
These are the rational impressions, assent and the associated impulses by
reference to which Stoic theory explains the motivation to action in adult
humans. They are not, of course, parts in the Galenic sense (independent
sources of motivation); these activities are causally interlocked with each
other, and cannot conflict in the Platonic-Galenic manner.79 How, then,
can they give rise to the contrasting states of proportion and disproportion or health and sickness that Chrysippus explains in this way? How
are these contrasting states explained by reference to the way in which the
governing part (hgemonikon morion) is in this or that state with respect
to its proper divisions (oikeious merismous) (5.2.49, 444K)?
In addressing this question, it is useful to bring out the senses in which
the Stoic theory is holistic or centred on structure (by contrast with
Galens more composition-based approach). There are at least two relevant, and related, senses. One, just noted, is that specific psychological
activities, such as, in adult humans, forming rational impressions or giving assent, only make sense when considered as part of a connected set or
system of such activities. An associated point is that both ideal and defective psychic states are viewed holistically. A person is psychically well or
ill, well or badly proportioned, as a whole, in a way that involves an interconnected set of (in modern terms) beliefs and reasoning, affective
responses and psychophysiological reactions. In this respect, Stoic theory
gives explanatory priority to the whole state, and sees the component
part (for instance, forming this or that type of impression) as secondary.
A salient Stoic term, which expresses this focus on structured wholes, is
sustma, a term used in connection with their conception of techn or
knowledge (as a sustma of concepts or branches of knowledge), and of
the (ideal) city and universe (as a sustma of rational beings).80 A second
79)
See e.g. LS 33 I, 53 Q-S, 62 C; see further Brennan 2003: 260-9, Price 2005:
472-81.
80)
See SVF 2.95-7, 3.112, LS 67 K. Although sustma is not cited in PHP 5.2.49, 444K
(text to n. 73 above), the idea of a structured whole is strongly implied there. The phraseology used, parts of the psyche through which its reason and the disposition of its reason
are constituted (sunestke), also evokes another significant notion, sustasis (constitution),
which has strongly holistic implications Stoicism, see Gill 2006: 37-46.
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
117
sense in which the Stoic theory is structure-centred is this. The wise persons state (of knowledge, character, virtue and so on) is taken as constituting the only complete or fully whole or structured state; all other human
states are regarded as relatively incomplete or unstructured by comparison with wisdom. Hence, summetria (or psychic health) is a property, in
a strong sense, only of the wise. The condition of the non-wise, by contrast, is one of relative conflict, disorder and asummetria. Thus, while the
state of mind of the non-wise person is, in one sense, conceived as a whole
(as a causally interconnected set of psychological activities), judged by the
standard of complete wholeness, it lacks summetria.81 In this respect, the
idea of wholeness has a strong normative role in Stoic thought, though
one which also bears directly on the description and analysis of, for
instance, adult human psychological activities.
How does this point help to explain the significance of the psychic
parts or divisions (mer/merismoi)82 by reference to which the hgemonikon is well or badly proportioned (PHP 5.2.39, 444K)? These parts are, I
suggest, aspects of the psychological activity of, respectively, the wise and
the non-wise. In the wise person, these parts reflect, for instance, a complete belief- (or knowledge-) structure, which is internally consistent.
Similarly, the wise person possesses the virtues, as an interlocked set,
which in turn generate qualities of the whole personality, characterised as
beauty or harmony.83 The occurrent psychological activities of the wise
person reflect this character. In the non-wise person, by contrast, there are
inconsistent and mutually jarring beliefs, such as those which generate
the passions. The passions thus generated constitute disturbed affective
and psychophysiological occurrent experiences. Also, the longer-term
states of the non-wise, though quasi-dispositional, are inherently unstable
and fluctuating or feverish.84 Chrysippus is thus fully entitled to talk
81)
See further refs. in nn. 83-4 below.

I think these two terms are used simply as synonyms here; also Chrysippus phrase,
hgemonikon meros (cf. PHP 3.1.10-15, 288K) does not signify a quasi-independent
part in the Platonic-Galenic sense.
83)
On the wise persons consistency and harmony see e.g. LS 31 B, 61 A, F-G, 63 F, L-M,
Stob. 2.62.18-24, 63.1-5 (5b3-4); on the wise person as a norm for everyone, see LS LS
61 G, I(1). See further Gill 2006: 150-6.
84)
In passions, the basic conflict is between the belief that only virtue is good (a belief
which all humans are constitutively capable of forming and making central to their lives)
82)
2/2/07 4:01:15 PM
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C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120
about parts of the overall nexus of psychological states or activities of the

wise or non-wise person. But these parts can only be characterised properly when viewed, first, as aspects of an interconnected set of psychological processes, and, second, in the context of the overall state of someone
who possesses or who lacks psychic summetria and health. In this pattern
of thinking, the whole is primary in conception and explanation, and the
parts are secondary. By contrast, in the Galenic picture, the whole psychic
state depends on the equilibrium established between parts, which are
seen as independent sources of motivation and as natural, basic units
within the personality.
Hence, although in some other respects, outlined earlier, Galen shares
with the Stoics a broadly holistic (as well as broadly naturalistic) approach,
in this area at least, his thinking displays a strongly contrasting (composition) conception of the part-whole relationship. This difference, I suggest,
underlies the other grounds of dispute regarding psychology between Galen
and the Stoics. It thus helps to explain why Galen responds so negatively to
a theory with which he has in other respects a good deal in common.85
References
Editions/Translations of Galen Works Cited
Brock, A. J. trans. 1916, Galen on the Natural Faculties. Cambridge, Mass.
De Lacy, P. ed. and trans. 1978-1984, Galen: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato,
3 vols. Berlin.
. 1992, de Semine. Berlin.
Hankinson, R. J. 1991b, Galen on the Therapeutic Method, Books I and II, trans. with
introduction and commentary. Oxford.
and the belief that other things (e.g. health or wealth) are good. See further, on occurrent
passions, quasi-dispositional passionate states, and the underlying beliefs, including
conflicting beliefs, LS 65 A-J, R-T; also Brennan 1998: 22-44, 2003: 269-74, Gill 1983,
1998: 115-23, 2006: 249-60.
85)
This revised version of the paper given at the 2005 Meeting of the Southern Association for Ancient Philosophy owes much to comments made at the time or subsequently.
Particular thanks are due to the editors of this Special Issue, Verity Harte and Malcolm
Schofield, and to David Charles, Jim Hankinson and Teun Tieleman. Thanks are due also
to the Leverhulme Trust, for a Major Research Fellowship which enabled the research on
which this article is based.
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Marquardt, I. Mller, I. and Helmreich, G., eds. 1884, Claudii Galeni Pergameni:
Scripta Minora, 3 vols. Leipzig (reprint Amsterdam 1967).
Nickel, D. ed. and trans. 2001, Galen: de Foetuum Formatione. Berlin.
Nutton, V. ed. and trans. 1999, Galen: de Propriis Placitis. Berlin.
Singer, P. N. trans. 1997, Galen: Selected Works. Oxford.
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Barnes, J. and Jouanna, J., eds. 2002, Galien et la philosophie, Fondation Hardt Entretiens
vol. 49. Vanoeuvres-Genve.
Brennan, T. 1998, The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions, in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen,
21-70.
. 2003, Stoic Moral Psychology, in B. Inwood (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to
the Stoics. Cambridge, 257-294.
Chiaradonna, R. Galen and Middle Platonism, in C. Gill, T. Whitmarsh and J. Wilkins (eds.) Galen and the World of Knowledge (forthcoming).
De Lacy, P. ed. and trans. 1972, Galens Platonism. American Journal of Philology 93:
27-39.
Dillon, J. 1977, The Middle Platonists. London.
Donini, P. Psychology, in R. J. Hankinson (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Galen.
(Cambridge, forthcoming).
Gill, C. 1983, Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?. Phronesis 28: 136-149.
. 1998, Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions, in
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. 2005, Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions, in Salles, 445-470.
. 2006, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought. Oxford.
Hankinson, R. J. 1989, Galen and the Best of All Possible Worlds. Classical Quarterly
39: 206-227.
. 1991a, Galens Anatomy of the Soul. Phronesis 36: 197-233.
. 1992, Galens Philosophical Eclectism, in W. Haase (ed.) Aufstieg und Niedergang
der rmischen Welt II.36.5. Berlin, 3505-3522.
. 2002, Causation in Galen, in Barnes and Jouanna, 31-66.
. 2006, Body and Soul in Galen, in R. King (ed.) Common to Body and Soul. Berlin:
232-258.
Harte, V. 2002, Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure. Oxford.
Inwood, B., 1984, Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century AD. Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2: 151-183.
Johansen, T. K. 2004, Platos Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias. Cambridge.
Kollesch, J. and Nickel, D., eds. 1993, Galen und das hellenistische Erbe. Stuttgart.
Kupreeva, I. 2004, Aristotelian Dynamics in the 2nd Century School Debates: Galen
and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Organic Powers and Movements. Bulletin of the
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Lloyd, G. E. R. 1988, Scholarship, Authority and Argument in Galens Quod Animi Mores,
in P. Manuli and M. Vegetti (eds.) Le opere psichologiche di Galeno. Naples, 11-42.
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. 1993, Galen on Hellenistics and Hippocrateans: Contemporary Battles and Past

Authorities, in Kollesch and Nickel, 125-143.
Long, A. A. 1996, Stoic Studies. Cambridge.
Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N. 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Cambridge, 2 vols.
(=LS).
Mansfeld, J. 1991, The Idea of the Will in Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Galen. Boston
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Moraux, P. 1984, Der Aristotelismos bei den Griechen, vol. 2, Der Aristotelismos im I und
II Jh. n. Chr. Berlin.
Nickel, D. 1989, Untersuchungen zur Embryologie Galens. Berlin.
. 1993, Stoa und Stoiker in Galens Schrift De foetuum formatione, in Kollesch
and Nickel, 79-86.
Price, A. W. 2005, Were Zeno and Chrysippus at Odds in Analyzing Emotion?, in
Salles, 471-488.
Salles, R. ed. 2005, Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the
Work of Richard Sorabji. Oxford.
Sedley, D. N. 1989, Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World, in M. T.
Griffin and J. Barnes (eds.) Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society. Oxford, 97-119.
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Sorabji, R. 2000, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. Oxford.
von Staden, H. 2000, Body, Soul, and Nerves: Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the
Stoics, and Galen, in Wright and Potter, 79-116.
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(ed.) Ancient Histories of Medicine. Leiden, 383-395.
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the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment. Oxford.
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Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

Galen and the Stoics:

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

for support in framing and maintaining a specific claim or line of thought,

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

precursor of the animal as a coherent psychophysical organic entity and

On the works noted briefly here, see the next section.

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

substantial benefits from an intellectual merger with aspects of Stoic

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

engagement with specific aspects of a broad range of previous theories

For this view, see Hankinson 1992: 3519-20.

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

This summary combines various formulations and distinctions discussed in Harte

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

See text to nn. 29-30, 40-1, 50-1 below.

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

See also MM 1.2.13, 18K, linking Plato, Aristotle and Chrysippus.

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 100

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

The contrast between the two conceptions can be exemplified by the

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 101

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

Galens characterisation of Stoic thinking on the psyche-body relationship in QAM.

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 102

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

sion of Stoic psychology, though Longs analysis is presented, rather, as

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 103

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 104

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 105

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

embryological development, anticipating its subsequent role as the seat

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 106

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

nents for failing to base their claims on proper anatomical investigation

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 107

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

Competing Psychologies: Parts and Wholes

On Galens psycho-physiological model and criticisms of Chrysippus theory, see

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 108

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

How does this disagreement relate to the contrast drawn earlier

Mansfeld 1991: 141.

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 109

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

systems of circulation in the body.55 Heinrich von Staden suggests that

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 110

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

Galen draws a sharp, and influential, distinction between Chrysippus psychological

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 111

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modern thinking,62 but it is also one that can be challenged. Underlying

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 112

C. Gill / Phronesis 52 (2007) 88-120

relative independence of all three parts, in part by importing phrases

PHRONESIS 52,1_f6_88-120.indd 113