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INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

18/12/2014 11:16

INTRODUCTION
1. The world at large has been busy for some years on the concept of parks that
should be joined across borders to facilitate both bio diversity in the
region and to develop the perceived economic spin offs that such across
border parks would realize.
2. When one has such a wide ranging endeavour spread across the globe inevitably
there is going to a greater or lesser degree of disagreement with regards
to meanings and ultimately definitions. Luckily from the security
perspective this conflict is some what muted as we will tend to follow
the decision reached by the big guns in nature conservation in terms of
definitions decided upon. Despite this there are factions who follow
certain directions and we the security grouping may well stand on some
or other academic toes with regards to a particular leaning. For this we
are in advance sorry but again the security grouping needs to make a
decision in terms of the terminology we need to use in our daily dealings
with both each other and the academic world.
3. The use of the word Transboundary Protected Area, as opposed to Transfrontier
Park is an aspect which seems to depend in one comes from Africa more
specifically South Africa, or Europe. The definition for Transboundary
Protected Area is to me very similar to that of a Transfrontier Park, both
of which are given below. The authors of this manual will follow the
European definition (IUCN) given that the manual is sponsored by DSE
a German Government NGO.
DEFINITIONS
4. Transboundary Protected Area is defined as, an area of land and /or sea that
straddles one or more boundaries between states, subnational units such
as provinces and regions, autonomous areas and / or areas beyond the
limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are
especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological
diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed
co-operatively through legal or other effective means.
5. Transfrontier Park, is defined as-----------------------------------------???

6. Protected Areas, is defined as an area of land and sea/or sea especially dedicated
to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural
and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other
effective means.

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY PLANNING

INTRODUCTION
7. Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) are relatively new phenomena in Africa
never mind the world. In Africa alone there are some 27 potential parks
that could be developed into TBPAs. For a variety of reasons this has
not happened, but the way countries in Africa are developing their parks
and paying ever more attention to the potential encapsulated in these
potential parks, the chances are that over the next couple of years TBPAs
or Conservancy areas will be being developed all over Africa.
8. The RSA has been at the forefront of this developmental process over the past few
years. These processes have been helped on immeasurably by the
dedication and involvement of DSE who have been at the cutting edge of
the learning curve in Africa. Clearly the development of a TBPA
involves an extraordinary degree of dedication from many role players
and disciplines. Once the decision has been taken to develop a TBPA a
complete management structure has to be developed, which has at its
heart the required disciplines encompassing the following:
8.1.

Bio Diversity

8.2.

Tourism

8.3.

Financial management

8.4.

Sourcing of Funds

8.5.

Security

8.6.

Infrastructural Development

8.7.

Community Development/Involvement

8.8.

Legal Matters

8.9.

International Considerations between the countries involved in the park

8.10.

The processes mentioned above, which are not exhaustive, have been
developed in the RSA and have possibly gone some way in determining
some of the possible best practices to be used in future TFP
developments. This is particularly so from the Security side.

8.11.

Security is seen by most institutions and organizations as a rather tiresome

irritation that comprises largely of somewhat useless people needed to
check people and vehicles at the entrance gates, and prevent out right

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theft taking place inside the park confines. The Rangers inside the park
are seen as of greater importance and actually better at the security
business if only there were sufficient time and Rangers available. There
is an element of truth in this and is an aspect that needs to be given more
attention and not treated as a sideshow. While it would be overly
simplistic to label all security organizations in the African Park scenario
as practically useless, full of corruption, nepotism and inefficiencies and
quite overwhelmed by the problem, the reality of course, lies along the
middle ground of some being good others not so good. What is of
course true is that most Park managements fails to see the security
situation in a holistic fashion, shaping or crafting an approach that brings
together the sum of all elements involved, be in it in the most peripheral
way, to solve the pressing security issues facing the Park.
8.12.

Security is generally seen as the preserve of the so called Security

Establishment comprising the military, police and security companies
plus the internal ranger set up insides parks. Security planning in parks
is generally speaking left to one of the above mentioned organizations to
carry out as best they may, without to much cross reference with other
key role players. While the military, in some countries do not enjoy a
high reputation, and probably deservedly so, it is also a truism, that they
are required by the nature of their work to do extensive analyzing of
problems and the planning that flows from that analysis, to deal with
problems that confront them in the field. This must be done with the full
understanding of having in most cases too few resources to easily
manage, or to easily overcome problems encountered. Although all
institutions do plan to combat their security problems, only the military
have actually developed this process into a formalized system. The
military problem solving approach has by definition to be relatively
straight forward and not to complex, due to many constraints not the
least being time and money. One of course realizes that the military
environment with the emphasis on identifying and destroying an enemy
is far removed from the security situation, there are many similarities
which allow for constructive cooperation between the two. An adapted
approach to the international problem solving process will be followed in
this manual due to the fact that there are significant differences between
civilian and security related issues which cover a much wider arena.

AIM
8.13.

The aim of this manual is to assist security officials to arrive at a more secure
environment for TBPAs and this will be achieved by discussing and
developing matters affecting Security issues including how to plan
security operations extending over a wide range of security related
problems.

9. SECURITY ASPECTS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN PLANNING A TBPA

9.1.

One of the curious facets of security planning is that security is involved with
most of the normal planning that goes on in a park. This is even more so

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when confronted with a TBPA. Again many management officials
would tend naturally to kick against any attempt by security officials to,
as they would see it, become involved in matters outside their
jurisdiction. However as an example even the burning of fire breaks
would involve security never mind the culling of animals. There are a
number of aspects that will need to be considered when planning a
TBCA. These will tend to be, and one must understand that this list
cannot be exhaustive as each park will tend to demand additional aspects
to be considered or left out.
9.2.

Fencing. All fencing has at its heart the blocking off and or redirection of
both game and people. When such fences are adjusted in some way then
security must become involved. If an international fence is affected then
not only is the local security within the park involved but also the police,
Immigration and potentially Customs and Excise if there are thoughts of
building a road across the border. Intelligence will need to take
cognizance of the matter to be able to look at the larger implications of
the adjustment to the border. Fencing on the peripheries of the park
especially near a gate into the park is of importance as this would
become a critical area in the plans of the criminal where there is some
damage to the fence. The security element including the rangers would
need to realize that a fence is an obstacle only in so far as it is covered by
observation and there is a force able to get to the relevant spot should a
criminal try to cross over the fence. Clearly it is not possible to observe
an entire length of fence, but one can analyze the fences to determine
most likely crossing points and thus be able to more easily cover those
areas. Intelligence comes into its own in this area and they should be
able to develop an intelligence picture, which would be able to indicate
the likelihood of an attempted crossing in a particular sector or not.

9.3.

Roads. As with fences roads tend to guide and direct the motorist and
criminal within the confines of the park. Park management in
conjunction with the security elements will have in the course of normal
park planning, determined which roads they would like the public to use
or not. Generally the public are kept away from the international borders
in terms of a national park on an international border. When a TBPA is
involved then by definition there is no border per se. While on the one
hand this is technically true, in reality it would not be necessary to drop
all the borderline fences because the chances are, and a terrain study will
prove, that not all the border area is suitable for game movement.
Consequently tourists would not wish to go there, and therefore that area
of fencing could remain up, saving vast costs to the park management
who would otherwise have to pay for the removal of the excess fence.
Any motorist found in these areas would automatically become suspect
as these roads would fall outside the normal tourist routes.

9.4.

Training. While the aspect training will be discussed at greater length

elsewhere it will be necessary to briefly discuss the aspect here for
completeness sake. Training covers a vast field and more specifically
good training standards are necessary within the park confines with

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regards to the rangers and security guards employed at the gates and
elsewhere. The effectiveness of the security element in a park will play a
vast and meaningful role in the combating of both petty and serious
crime. The development of a training academy of sorts will go along
way in ensuring that the correct standards are maintained.
9.5.

Legal Matters. The SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law

Enforcement (1999) must be formalized and implemented.
As
mentioned elsewhere the key laws and regulations pertaining to the
adjoining parks must be harmonised as far as possible to allow the TBPA
an even chance of success. The legal side of security enforcement is
critical and without it being in place, there is little that the security forces
will be able to do about any burgeoning crime levels that may well
transcend the international borders. An international legal team will
need to be established, which will need to liaise closely with the security
work committee, to ensure that all old and new laws and regulations are
properly looked into and streamlined within the TBPA.

9.6.

Access Gates. One of the critical aspects in any park is the measure of
control to be found at the entrance to the park. There is both a financial
and security implication in the job being well done. Few parks are able
to list by vehicle and visitor name, all visitors to the park and if they are
day visitors or where they will overnight by close of play each day. The
implications of not being able to do this, means for instance that a visitor
could get lost, commit suicide inside the park, be attacked by animals or
criminals, and it would be some days before any one was any the wiser
as to the fact that visitor x had not yet left the park. When dealing with
a TBPA this question becomes so much more relevant. The implications
of such possibilities on tourism are very important. From a financial
point of view corruption at the gate will mean lost or at best reduced
revenue. Criminality will of course be able to flourish in such an
environment and obviously will impact on the security communitys
willingness to play ball, with regards to the location of Border Control
Points and related matters.

9.7.

The best scenario for the whole entrance control aspect would be that there is
an electronic linkup between all the Border Control Points and the Park
Access Points, on both sides of the borderline giving as full a detail of
the visitors and their vehicles as possible. This would allow a measure
of control to be maintained over the flow of visitors to the park, and not
only allow security to know timeously that visitor x had or had not left
the park according to schedule, but also allow for a speedy reaction in
the event of a missing visitor or prepare to react to a possibly illegal act.
The degree of IT sophistication at the gate would obviously depend on
funding and trained manpower. The use of radios is of course an
important facet of all deployments. Coupled to this will be the allocation
of compatible radios and frequencies across the borderline between the
security forces involved. This should be the subject of an international
agreement between the countries involved.

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9.8.

Emergency Management. All parks and even more so TBPA are confronted
by the possibility of some sort of disaster occurring from time to time.
This could take the form of a natural or man made fire going out of
control, a aeroplane crash, flooding and even the possibility of a volcano
erupting to name but a few possible scenarios. It is practically a truism
that no park is prepared for such eventualities for many reasons. That
the disasters occur is true and that the park management basically
muddle their way through the problem is unfortunately also generally
true. When dealing with TBPAs one must become much more
professional in the manner of dealing with disasters than is currently the
case. What is proposed is that an Emergency Control Centre (ECC) be
developed at a suitable site and run by officials who would fill common
posts. This ECC would be able to develop into much more than a just a
centre waiting for an unfortunate disaster to happen, but would
increasingly play an active part in the control of the entire security
situation within the TBPA. It would fill a command and control function
for all security aspects including special operations. This headquarter
would also be the one location, management officials could contact to
determine what was going in the area, be it ranger deployments to
aircraft flight plans.

9.9.

Security Forces. Within a state park as well as a TBPA, the role and functions
of the various security elements needs to be determined with great care
or friction will develop and possible worse, vital responses to some or
other situation may not occur, because it was seen as some elses
responsibility not mine. Each of the roles and functions must be
hammered out to alls satisfaction so as to cover all the possible gaps in
the security blanket over the area. See par 2.24 for further details.
Regular security meetings must be arranged between all parties and
copies of such meetings must be circulated to top management. Tied
into these series of meetings must be the intelligence community to
ensure a cross fertilization process also taking place at middle and senior
security levels. Top management must become involved in these
meetings to ensure not only efficiency and a clearer understanding of
what is going on in the park, but also to ensure productivity.

9.10.

Security Bases. The presence of security forces in a park or TBPA will

necessitate the stationing of some of these forces at least in sort of
accommodation within the confines of the park. While it is reasonable to
expect that a foreign country will not allow the permanent stationing of
troops or police on their territory, the TBPA will have to consider the
requirement for some bases for the military/police within the TBPA, but
also within national borders. The guidelines for the regulation of these
bases must be determined so that no needless friction would develop
between the parties involved. Aspects that would need to be regulated
would be things such as use of electricity, water, refuse removal. Other
important restrictions, that are based on the ability to erect bases are, the
movement of forces through the bush and tactical camping while on
patrol. Other important factors would be the use of firearms, noise,
vehicle traffic and approach to animals. In terms of the South African

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Regional Police Chiefs Organization (SARPCO) it is possible for police
to operate inside another countries territory but with that police forces
presence and authority. The regulations affecting these deployments
must be spelt out in terms of the TBPA regulations for the edification of
all officials involved with security matters.
10. THE SECURITY FORCES WITHIN A TBPA
10.1.

Introduction. The actual role of the relevant SF elements that might have a
role to play in a park will largely depend on the situation and legal frame
work applicable in those countries involved. As mentioned above the
classic role players will always be at least, the Security company
involved in park security, the Police, Intelligence agencies and of course
the internal park security forces involving the rangers and the CIOs
intelligence officials. The role of the military will vary from not at all to
high profile active presence within the park. The role of Immigration
and Customs and Excise will be restricted to their respective ports and
places of entry with a degree of investigation of potential and actual
crimes away from these areas but with reference to those places. Their
activities in the final analysis will be carried out in the presence of the
police where arrests are needed.

10.2.

Police: Role and Tasks. Traditionally the role of the police is standard
throughout the world, and would involve the investigation of all crimes
that have been committed in the park or have an affect on the park in
some way. Clearly this would involve the arresting of suspects and
investigation and confiscation of evidence where necessary. Cross
border cooperation is vital and would need to take place. The police
could also become involved in operations to catch criminals red handed
on their own or in conjunction with other role players. The police should
be able to operate freely throughout the park and to establish police
stations as required to be best able to do their job. Once again the ability
of the police to do their job effectively and efficiently, they would need
to be seen to be above corruption and to be active in suppressing any
elements of this disease. The interchange of information and intelligence
between role players would play a vital role in the efficient prosecution
of the war on crime. Critically the police would need to play a leading
role between the agencies involved to fulfil their crime combating role.
A potential area for rivalry and conflict is very visible here.

10.3.

Park Intelligence Organization: Role and Tasks. The role of this organization
has been clearly spelt out earlier and need not be repeated here.

10.4.

Intelligence Agencies: Role and Tasks. The role of these agencies will be
laid down in the respective countries laws, but in regards to a TBPA
there are certain parameters that will need to be spelt out between the
countries involved to prevent unfortunate misunderstandings. The role
of the agencies within their own park areas will also need some
clarification with the CIO as in could happen that all or some of the

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agencies involved could conceivably become involved with the same
source who might subsequently play them off against each other.
10.5.

Military: Role and Tasks. The role of the military in a park can vary
enormously based on the prevailing political climate. The military, split
as they are into army, air force and naval components, will have widely
varying yet fairly evident roles to play. The air force could, depending
on its aircraft availability carry out a number of tasks such as; patrolling
of the borders, control of the air space including all aircraft movement,
trooping of SF inside the park, assisting with disasters such as floods and
fires and command and control functions. The navy where suitable
would be able to patrol the water ways and try to prevent smuggling and
poaching. They could also be used to assist with fisheries protection and
assessing of fish stocks. The army would generally have a wide ranging
role to play, which could extend from patrolling the borders to prevent
illegal crossings taking place of people and goods. This would include
vehicles. Anti poaching operations in conjunction with rangers and
police. The army would also be able to help with general movement
control within the park and so prevent the easy movement of criminals.
Other minor tasks can also be developed but these represent the major
tasking possibilities.

10.6.

Training. On the face of it would appear that little or no training would be

needed to for non-park officials to be able to operate within a TBPA.
This viewpoint is however wrong. The single most important difference
between a TBPA and other urban or rural areas is that of the nature of the
people to be found there. This includes the nature conservationists as
well. In a TBPA, the officials and tourists are there because of the game
to be seen and the managing thereof. This requires from them, a totally
different attitude towards both law enforcement and officialdom, to that
found in an area outside such a park. The approach the SF would need to
take must therefore be of a very different nature. The tourists are of
course paying to be there and would prefer to not see any signs of SF
presence at all, commensurate with their safety. Consequently all SF
actions have to have the correct attitude, trained into them, while they
carry out their jobs. All SF must understand the rules and regulations of
the park plus the laws of the land. Yet they must understand that the
criminal will exploit these rules to get by. Training of the Ranger
element, on both sides of the border, is as mentioned before, of great
importance and it must be of a similar high standard. This is of course
only really achievable when training is done together.

11. REQUIREMENT FOR AN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE INSIDE A

TBPA
11.1.

Next to the development of the security force structure in a TBPA is the

development of a secure and efficient intelligence organization. While it
is true that a TBPA or park is not an island nor does it exist separately
from the rest of the countrys involved, there remains a need to have an
intelligence understanding about what is going on in the TBPA and

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adjoining areas. There will be many who can see absolutely no need for
an intelligence organization/structure to be developed within the
TBPA/park. This attitude will be based on a number of excellent yet
groundless reasons.
11.2.

The local police and or intelligence service will feel that their traditional role
is being usurped by an upstart organization and that because they see the
bigger wider picture relating to crime etc no need exists for a park based
intelligence setup.

11.3.

The level of corruption and crime in and around the TBPA is of such a nature
that this new organization could serve as a threat to the national security
organizations illegal activities in the area.

11.4.

Top management in the parks involved, may feel that the development of an
intelligence organization in the park is a step away from their real aim of
nature conservation and will give an unnatural prominence to non ranger
type activities. The possibility of the management involvement in illegal
activities cannot of course also be excluded.

11.5.

Funding may also be offered as a reason to either delay or prevent the

development of an intelligence organization in the park.

11.6.

The aim of such an intelligence organization would be to determine the

current and future scope of criminal activities in the park and area of
influence around the park. In so doing identify the nature of the threat,
establish who the culprits are, and in conjunction with the relevant
security authorities bring them to book before they are able to cause
damage to the park.

11.7.

What this aim in effect means, and it is a mouthful, is that a system of agents
will need to be built up both within and outside the park to enable the
Chief Intelligence Officer, (CIO) for want of a name, to detect criminal
activities affecting the park. The CIO will need to build up effective and
efficient co-operation agreements with the Chief Security Officer (CSO)
of the park, if he is not the same person, plus the various State security
organizations operating in the area. The speed of reaction of the security
organizations in response to the CIOs warning will be an effective
indicator of efficiency. The CIO will further need to have access to
sufficient secure offices, possess vehicles both official and of a
clandestine nature and of course have sufficient personnel working for
him in both overt and covert operations.

11.8.

The CIO will also need to have ready access to the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of the park. The trust and support of the CEO for the CIO will be
of critical importance, without it, security planning and the execution of
operations will be of little value.

11.9.

The actual developmental process of building up an effective and efficient

intelligence structure inside a park, never mind within the confines of a

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TBPA is a difficult task and depends on many factors. Not least of which
are funding, personalities that of the CIO in particular and his top
lieutenants, and willingness of the security environment to be of
assistance. A further publication in this regard should be developed.
12. INTERNATIONAL TREATY ISSUES AFFECTING SECURITY
12.1.

Security issues flow from a decision to launch a TBPA not the other way
round. That the security issues existed before the Park was decided upon
is true but they were largely seen in isolation and not in the context of a
TBPA.. The political will behind the TBPA and the state departments
who are the main actors in the development of the park make certain
decisions and raise certain expectations with regards to the way and
manner in which the TBPA will function and or look. These decisions
impact directly on the security community, comprising the following
state departments in the main:

12.1.1.

The Police.

12.1.2.

Immigration Service.

12.1.3.

Customs and Excise

12.1.4.

The Military where involved in border protection.

12.1.5.

The Intelligence Service.

12.1.6.

The Security company/ies involved in the parks.

12.1.7.

Once a decision has been made or alternately and obviously better, a

decision proposed, to the involved parties, timeous decisions can be
made or strategies /plans made with regards to the proposals/decisions.
Clearly if a decision/proposal has a negative affect on security concerns
it is the duty of the security community to react and inform the decision
makers of the implications of the decision. This is especially where
there are international implications riding on the decision/proposals.
Often it is possible to easily reach a compromise, although where there
international implications time becomes a factor because of the need to
set up meetings and ones principals become involved with the final
security community proposed solution.

12.1.8.

The type of issues that will need international agreement between the
security community centre largely around the question of crime and the
resultant reaction needed to solve the problem. One should also not
forget that customs and immigration issues form part of the total
problem, and often are directly affected by the political and TBPA
oriented proposed solutions.

12.1.9.

Seen from a purely criminal policing perspective the following issues

will arise:

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12.2.

Extradition. Extradition between the two or more states involved. If there is

no extradition treaty between the countries involved, then it becomes a
matter of extreme urgency for this matter to be addressed. Any crime
committed inside the TBPA, is subject to the sovereign law of the
country wherein the crime was committed. However the original crime
becomes a bigger problem if the criminal manages to escape over the
non existent border. This problem is magnified if the suspect is being
hot pursuited and manages to cross the border line ahead of his pursuers.
No police force will easily allow another force to enter their area of
jurisdiction and remove a suspect. The legal ramifications are also
horrendous.

12.3.

Evidence. The question evidence arises, and more particularly where the said
evidence is in the neighbouring country. Depending on the legal system
in operation in each country the legality of the moving of the evidence
and the question of the continuity of the evidence as a result of the move
becomes an issue.

12.4.

Use of Force. The use of force in affecting arrests by the involved security
force elements needs to be dealt with satisfactorily. The principle of
minimum force is adhered to by some countries while others follow a
more generous approach to the use of force while affecting an arrest.
One really cannot have one TBPA signatorys security forces firing
wildly with automatic weapons while attempting to arrest or apprehend a
suspect, while the other party has the tradition of arrest with weapons
holstered so to speak unless vitally necessary.

12.5.

Jurisdiction. Each country in the world has its own system of Juris Prudence
built up over the years. Common Law based on the requirements of that
country, which may well be unique dictate that certain legal practices
and actions are followed in the event of certain crimes being committed.
No country will allow, nor does any countries legal writ apply in any
other country, unless these countries have so previously agreed. It
therefore follows that a policeman cannot follow, in hot pursuit, a
criminal into another country and after arresting the criminal, bring him
back to the country of origin.

12.6.

The countries involved in the TBPA would need to have signed not only an
extradition treaty to allow for the return of wanted criminals, but also
have gone into the detail of mutual crime investigation on the scene of
the crime plus have developed operational working procedures to cover
all eventualities that could arise during crime investigations.

12.7.

TBPA/Park Officials. Can officials and more specifically rangers of one

park move freely into another and what may they do there with or
without the presence of the other parks rangers/officials? This is a
critical aspect and goes to the very heart of the existence of the TBPA.
No trust or at least suspicion of each others motives will ultimately
destroy or at best cause the TBPA to limp along never really achieving

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the ultimate. The cross fertilization of officials into common TBPA posts
are possibly the only way to overcome this inevitable suspicion that must
at least exist in the beginning.
12.8.

Ranger and Security company Standardization. Every country has

different requirements and standards which have been developed rightly
or wrongly to cope with the situation which exists in that countys parks.
These requirements will quite probably differ from a neighbouring
country. Coupled to this there may well be an element of corruption
endemic to a greater or lesser degree in each of the countries involved.
These factors will necessitate a coming together of the parties concerned
to come to a mutual agreement on what is or is not acceptable in terms of
the TBPA. The agreement on standards must be codified and applied
firmly but with the ability to make allowances for change as this occurs.
The important point is that officials from both sides of the border fence
must understand and know how each other will react in a given situation
as it arises. The development of an inspectorate to ensure standards are
maintained is advisable with cross posting from the countries involved to
ensure mutual understanding. A common training school should be built
to develop common standards at all levels. This will be an excellent way
of ensuring an equitable and acceptable standard of operational practice
on ground level. A code of discipline applicable to all sides should also
be developed, signed off by all the parties concerned, with effective teeth
that must be enforced.

12.9.

Harmonization of Laws and Regulations. This deals with how the laws
and regulations aimed at dealing with such disparate matters as alighting
from a car while game viewing, to the question how the question of
poaching is dealt with. These matters need to be harmonised between
the countries involved, particularly where there are discrepancies in
punishments between similar offences. For example, speeding in the one
country gives rise to a hefty fine, while the other gives a nominal fine.
The poaching of a particular animal gives rise to a relatively small fine in
one country, while in comparison, the neighbouring country prescribes a
jail sentence.

12.10. As mentioned before Security involves a wider range of disciplines than

initially meets the eye. The other state departments namely Immigration
Service, Customs and Excise and the Intelligence community have an
intense interest in all matter affecting not only the borderline, but also
those decisions proposed or taken that would have a direct or indirect
affect on their line functions. The question of where and how a foreigner
may cross a border is of intense interest to immigration officials, while
the customs and excise officials would be concerned with the possibility
of the movement of revenue bearing goods across such a border.
12.11. Park Access Points/Border Control Points. A TBPA has at its heart the
concept that there will be free movement of people and animals across
international borders without undue hindrance by officialdom. A
fundamental decision has therefore to be taken early on in the

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development of the TBPA regarding the right to access to the park and to
the TBPA as a whole.
12.12. The question of the location of the Border Control Points is therefore crucial
to the whole ethos of the TBPA. On the one hand are the TBPA
management/conservationists that would want the Border Control Points
on the periphery of the TBPA, while the security element, would prefer it
on the actual borderline. The cutting edge of the argument will rest on
the implications of the location of the Border Control Points. Will there
be an increase in criminality if the Border Control Points were moved to
collocate with a Park Access Points or not? Obviously if a Border
Control Point was located in the TBPA but on the outer park border, only
the law abiding would use them, as criminals would simply use the
normal Park Access Points to enter the TBPA and so gain access to the
neighbouring countries territory by default, and so enabling them to meet
up with criminals from that country to conduct their illegal business.
The role of the CIO and his organization can now be seen to be crucial in
helping to decide, based on experience gained over time, what the
implications will be if the Border Control Points were to change
location. The governments involved would need to pay careful attention
to the various arguments put forward before deciding on a particular
course of action.
12.13. Emergency Management. An agreement would need to be reached between
the governments to develop an Emergency Control Centre (ECC) that
could function over the entire TBPA. This ECC would potentially, based
on agreements reached, be able to form the nerve centre of all activities
within the park and would be manned by personnel from all the countries
involved in the TBPA. The location, manning and functions of this ECC
would need to be determined and be subject to a legal agreement
between the parties.
12.14. Airspace Control. The TBPA management in conjunction with the security
community must apply their minds to the implications of airspace
control over the TBPA area. While is true many parks have existing
minimum flying heights over the parks for non parks aircraft, a general
agreement must be drawn up affecting the TBPA as a whole. This
agreement must cover at least the following aspects to make it worth the
effort and enforceable.
12.14.1.

A minimum flight height must be determined for the whole park area and
if this is applicable to all aircraft or not. Exceptions must be spelt out.

12.14.2.

Rules with regards to the use of official aircraft over the TBPA must be
drawn up in conjunction with the Immigration and also Customs and
Excise officials. These rules must include route notification or flight
plans, to whom the intention to fly must be sent, by whom, and how
much advance notification is needed if any, passport implications,
passenger lists official and ad hoc. Landing fees and other costs must
also be included in the agreement reached.

14

12.14.3.

The use of private aircraft over the TBPA, flying visitors to various
destinations or game viewing, must be regulated, plus the question of
how the required flight plans must be dealt with. The Emergency
Control Centre would be the ideal vehicle to handle the process.

12.14.4.

The question of the advisability of the landing of international aircraft

directly at a landing strip in the TBPA, from a foreign airport must be
dealt with. This would include freight and passenger aircraft.

12.15. Road and Bridges. The right to the free use of roads and bridges by the
security forces needs to be enshrined in the TBPA agreement. The
ability of the security forces to close certain roads and to stop and search
vehicles where justifiable must be discussed and approved. The
implications of the borderline on this matter must also be included.
12.16. Integrated IT Data Exchange. The degree to which the state departments of
the countries involved, are prepared to exchange or allow access to their
databases, by another country in terms of the TBPA must be laid down in
the TBPA agreement. The ideal would be that all immigration and
policing matters affecting people entering the TBPA should be captured
on one data base or linked in some way and available to officials
operating inside the TBPA. The implications are that officials operating
at the Park Access Points, Border Control Points and also security patrols
within the TBPA, should have access to such information, by means of
radio or computer regarding visitors to the park, so as to be able to
identify any wanted criminals who might enter the park without being
subject to administrive delays. An effective IT database on visitors
entering a park could allow the park management to determine when the
daily visitor capacity of a park has been reached, even on an hourly
basis.
12.17. Radio Communications. Agreement must be reached between the countries
involved with regards to the use of radios and frequencies by the security
forces involved, as well as across the borderline. This will have a direct
affect on the effectiveness and efficiency of the security patrols, rangers,
intelligence officials and also the Emergency Control Centre who have
an essential need to stay in close communication with each other at all
times.
13. IMPLICATIONS OF WAR ON A PARK
13.1.

The Transboundary Protected areas for Peace and Co-operation manual put
out by IUCN, contains a chapter on a Draft Code on guidelines for Peace
and Armed Conflict. While it is not the writers intention to either revise
or critically review this chapter within the manual, it is of importance to
firstly, take note of the existence of this early attempt to codify countries
approaches to TBPAs with regards to war situations as they affect these
TBPAs. Secondly one should note that every country in every region in

15
the world has a different approach to nature conservation and even more
so when politics and human survival come into the picture.
13.2.

The draft code as it stands is obviously generic in nature as it has to

effectively cover the world. That a specific code should be drawn up for
the African context is without doubt necessary and indeed vital. One of
the most effective ways of ensuring that momentum is developed and
maintained for such a code, is for the African countries with potential
TBPAs to become motivated to develop their parks fully realizing the
economic potential of these TBPAs. This will mean that a strong
political will, will have to be developed by the affected governments to
begin the TBPA process. This process will demand the identification of
suitably qualified personnel to run the project and this will include the
further identification of at least one security person to manage the
security aspects as further discussed in this manual.

13.3.

Currently none of the African countries have any binding requirements to

either consider or maintain their parks in conflict situations. Should such
a conflict arise or threaten, the result will be large scale degradation of
the affected areas due to neglect brought on by the war situation and
have a severe impact on the game in the areas due to poaching and
further environmental damage will be caused from the illegal haphazard
farming activities that will take place as a result of both uncontrolled
squatting by refugees and simple land grabs by neighbouring
communities.

13.4.

One of the practical problems that will need to be overcome is the question of
armed rangers in the parks. That they should be armed and well armed is
without a doubt necessary, but when confronted by two or more armies
operating into such a park or TBPA, the rangers will inevitably be
viewed with suspicion as potential or actual spies for one or the other
side. Clearly only the most rigidly applied rules and regulations will
possibly satisfy some of the parties and doubtlessly some not at all.
Given the tendency for guerrilla/dissident factions to operate along
border areas with or without some clear political manifesto, the situation
for the effective deployment of rangers in these regions looks bleak.
Reality also indicates that these armed groups will poach all they can to
supplement their probably meagre diet. Luckily these armed conflict
situations do not apply across the whole region and with effort and luck
it will be possible to have a series of codes drawn up to cover the TBPA
regions. Each TBPA will have to draw up its own Code for Conflict and
Peace applicable to that region. In other words the code will form part of
the initial TBPA discussions and developmental process.

14. LESSONS LEARNT

14.1.

Security should therefore not be seen in a purely negative light of punishment

and retribution by the forces of law and order, but also in a more positive
light involving the proactive involvement of the local communities to
ensure voluntary compliance of necessary measures over and above the

16
normal patrolling of the borders and erection of fences. The requirement
for an integrated security plan involving the community, Security Forces,
Park officials plus other local Departmental officials cannot be
overstressed.
14.2.

It is important that at the earliest possible opportunity, the State Departments

become involved with the initial planning and investigation of the
feasibility of the project. This will hopefully ensure that they will
actually budget for their role and reduce the real possibility of donor
fatigue developing. Otherwise they will stonewall your efforts.

14.3.

The roles of NGOs also have an important influence on the security

environment as if they become alienated they can influence/manipulate
the security environment and thereby form an indirect threat to the park.

14.4.

The local communities, adjacent or indeed in the park confines, who are
themselves also an NGO target group, have their own reasonable or
unreasonable expectations which if brushed off can lead to security
issues developing. The security work group needs to be at least aware of
all negotiations in this regard.

14.5.

The Project manager must realize that the success of a TFCA or indeed any
park must rest on broadly three legs; financial management, wildlife
management and the management of the security threat to the park.
Without a healthy security environment capable of dealing with
criminals and the management of emergencies, few tourists will be
willing to visit such a place.

14.6.

The security threat to the park must be understood in respect of criminality

and possible emergencies that might arise. Hi-jacking of vehicles,
murder, theft, or even a bush fire badly handled, will most likely have
massive consequences for any park if allowed to continue. Security
involves the whole range of disciplines from the military to the private
security company. A holistic approach must be followed.

14.7.

The development of an Incident Management Centre to coordinate the

security issues as they arise is, to my mind essential. Failing this you
will needs must have Park rangers and or officials operating outside their
core functional areas and their comfort zones to manage such situations
for which they will need to be cross trained. This further underlines the
fact that there must be an integrated approach between all the security
disciplines to be encountered in a TFCA. This approach must also be of
a multinational nature.

14.8.

The problem of differing legal approaches/ and systems involved in the

punishment of crime leads one to the realization that the legal
implications of such parks must be thoroughly approached at an early
stage of park development.

17
14.9.

Clear channels of communication and control of the process must be laid

down at the outset to prevent conflict between role players and avoid
unnecessary conflict.

SECURTY PLANNING PROCESS must go into new version diagrams to ADD.

We must keep our minds subtle and active, and never let ourselves be
hypnotized by traditions; we must criticize ourselves, and criticize our
criticisms; we must experiment and explore Maj Gen J.F.C. Fuller.
14.10. Security planning would be superfluous if crime in its various formats did not
exist. To deal with this problem one must needs understand what the
nature of the security problem is, in order to best formulate the answer or
answers to deal with the problem. One can categorise the problem into
various compartments in order to allocate priorities and therefore also
funding. Theft of small items from accommodation is a different order
of magnitude to poaching of big game. But if the pilfering became
wholesale then priorities will change. The confronting of crime in a
TBPA will therefore be an ongoing process, but as with any activity it
must have a beginning and an end, plus being measurable in some
manner to justify the results versus funding. We can thus recognise that
there will be a continual series of campaigns mounted by the authorities
to deal with various outbreaks of crime as they manifest themselves
within the TBPA.
14.11. DEFINITIONS
14.12. The following definitions will be useful at this stage to assist in understanding
the planning approach:
14.12.1.Factor. A factor is any relevant circumstance, fact or influence that can
contribute positively or negatively to the achievement of the desired
result or end state.
14.12.2.Facts. A fact is a reality and is an irrefutable truth. It can be either an object
like a mountain, building, weather and a person or a non-tangible object

18
like a habit or method of operating that is accepted as normal or
standard.
14.12.3.Deductions (argument). A deduction is an reasoned interpretation of a fact
in relation to the aim of the operation. A deduction is the positive or
negative influence that a fact will have on the achievement of the aim. If
the fact concerns for example a criminal gang, the deduction will
describe the influence of this fact on the achievement of our aim or end
state. For example:
14.12.3.1.The local population living outside the park fence are very poor and
depend on poaching for a living. This a fact. The following deductions
can be made from this fact;
14.12.3.2.The people will increase their poaching activities as the number of game
increases,
14.12.3.3.They could easily become involved with syndicates aimed at large scale
poaching and encouraging game to leave the park so that they can be
shot which means they will attempt to damage the park fences.
14.12.3.4.Rangers and park officials will be approached by criminals in attempt to
corrupt them which could also lead to absenteeism, increased sick leave
and discipline problems to name a few issues.
14.12.3.5.As anti-poaching measures become more effective or indeed start up,
poachers will tend to become more aggressive and attack the rangers on
patrol to stop or scare off activities in their areas.
14.12.3.6.General criminal activities in the park will start to increase like petty
pilfering robberies which will have the effect of diffusing the security
effort in the park.
14.12.4.These deductions will have an influence on the achievement of the SF aim.
Clearly possible activities have been identified by that which we have by
no means exhaustively identified above.
14.12.5.Increased intelligence operations will be needed to cope with the problem and
other outside agencies will need to be coopted.
14.12.6.Conclusions. A conclusion is an integration of the relevant deductions which
will lead to a/ many possible actions. It is the who (who will do the job),
what, (what will be done) where, (the location of the action) when (time
of action) and along what route /method of operation, that is needed, to
be able to exploit the positive and to neutralize the negative influences.
Conclusions will in all circumstances be an indication of actions to be
taken along with the support elements necessary to carry out the
task/aim. A conclusion will be an indication of what the SF can or will
do plus what additional supporting elements needed to positively
influence the deductions made of the opponents plans and so achieve our

19
aim or end state. An example of a conclusion taken from the above
deductions could be as follows:
14.12.6.1.Given that the population need food and will continue to aggressively poach
game with increasing assistance from outside criminals it will be
necessary to increase the level of ranger patrols along the affected border
in sectors x, y and z., with an increased level of self protection in the
form of more men (at least double the size of the patrols) and better
weapons (equivalent or better quality than poachers) etc. The Park
intelligence structure plus outside agencies will need to be tasked as soon
as possible to identify the markets for the increased level of poached
game and must report back by x date with the required intelligence to
plan a detailed operation. At the same time the population must be
approached by management to develop a strategy to reduce the poverty
level by means of, - commercially viable self help schemes. The anti
corruption drive in the park must be improved by means of the following
steps/actions to prevent corruption expanding. Foot patrols within the
camps to be increased to x number per day, to deter thieves especially
during daylight hours, as indicated when the majority of the thefts take
place. More detail can be developed as the level of the operation goes
down to the tactical level where the names of participants, actual date,
time, route, tasks and vehicle to use will need to be clearly spelled out
the conclusion to a useable level..
14.12.6.2.Note that during the analysis process each factor is analysed and the
conclusions that are reached may often be the same as those covered by
other factors conclusions. This is good as all this does is to emphasise
the validity of the action proposed from different angles. This will
therefore become an important conclusion surrounded by many other
less important conclusions.
14.12.6.3.The summing up of all the conclusions reached at the end so to speak of the
analysis, will, if correctly done, be the broad plan of how to solve the
problem. As no plan of action has only one way of solving a given
problem, we have what are called Options, which give the operational
commander the choice of deciding which operational instrument he
wishes to apply or offer to his seniors for their approval.
14.12.7.Options. An option is a possible method whereby a portion of a plan can be
carried out. It gives the commander the possibility of picking and
choosing between different means, for example of getting his forces to a
deployment area or approaching a particular target, or even which legal
viewpoint to follow. A number of options make up a course of action.
14.12.8.Course of Action. A course of action is comprised of a number of options
selected and put together, after presentations to the operational
commander, to form a possible course of action which itself forms a part
of a plan. There can be a number of courses of action per component of
the over all plan. The Operational commander must select which course
of action he thinks best suits the situation and either decide for him self

20
or ask his superiors. A course of action could apply for example to the
rangers, others could be, if not directly integrated with each other, the
police, military and foreign forces and so forth. The course of action
will indicate how a component of the operation is to carry out their part
of the over all plan. A course of action can therefore exist for each of the
other role players, seen in terms of what has to be done within the over
all plan.
14.12.9.Plan. The plan is the coherent, holistic and detailed integrated method, of
how the mission /problem is to be executed and thereby solved. It
integrates all the courses of action proposed to and selected by the
commander, including the support courses of action, which are those
elements who have to assist the main effort by means of logistics,
blocking forces, aircraft usage and legal actions etc.
14.12.10.Campaign Planning. A campaign can be a series of related operations
designed to achieve either a TBPA crime goal or the TBPA strategic end
state. That is, an acceptable level of crime within the TBPA.
14.12.11.Operation. An operation is a single or series of related anti crime tactical
actions taken over a defined period of time with a clear single aim within
the scope of the planned campaign.
14.12.12.End State. That state achieved at the end of a campaign that has achieved
the desired result.
14.12.13.Centre of Gravity. That aspect, item, or feature which is so vital and so
critical that without which, an organization cannot carry on or succeed in
its purpose.
14.12.14.Decisive Point. This is a tangible event, possibly one of many such decisive
points along a chain of events, called a line of operation, the successful
outcome of which is a precondition to the successful elimination of an
opponents centre of gravity.
14.12.15.Decision Point. This a point in time along a line of operation when a major
decision on the next series of actions needs to be taken, as a result of a
critical point, in a situation being reached, as planned, to carry out one or
another specific action. A decision point can also occur during a decisive
point.
14.12.16.Line of Operation. A Line of Operation comprises a series of decision
points, linked in time and space and in the order of sequence to achieve
an objective, and constitutes a direct path to a defined opponents centre
of gravity, and thereafter leads on to the campaign end state where it
meets up with the other lines of operation. A campaign will most likely
have at least four lines of operation and each line represents a
independent and specific action needed to reach

21
14.12.17.Sequencing. An arrangement of events or decision points that need to be
carried out in a set sequence in order to attain an objective.
14.12.18.Phase. The logical breakdown of an operation into useful segments in order
to make the plan more readily understood.
14.12.19.Focus of Main Effort (FME). The commander having appreciated where
the best and most sensitive point or place of his opponents structure/
organisation/ operation is, decides to concentrate that degree of force
necessary at that point and at that time, in order to successfully conclude
his operation or phase of operation. This is called his focus of main
effort. It is possible to have one FME per line of operation and one main
one for a campaign.
14.13. Campaign Lines of Operation: Characteristics.
14.13.1.The Lines of Operation is a product of a process of analysis of the entire
campaign.
14.13.2.Lines of Operation include not only the planned operations but also any
contingency plans that may have been developed to cover shortfalls in
the main plan.
14.13.3.It allows for a line per operation, linking operations and joint decision points
and centres of gravity together. This is from the commanders planned
intention for the operation to the campaign end state.
14.13.4.Decision points, decisive points, centres of gravity and focus of main effort
are synchronised per line.
14.13.5.Joint links indicate activities directed against joint decisive points en route
to the campaign centre of gravity. See Lines of Operation diagram.
14.13.6.Focus of main effort are linked by a critical path depicting where the
campaign commander focuses his attention and where he is prepared to
exploit success by deploying his reserve forces.

LINES OF OPERATION DIAGRAM

22

PLANNING LEVELS
14.14. At the Campaign level, the SF plus the CEO of the TBPA must determine
what their strategic end state will be over the medium to long term. Tied
into this will of necessity be, political imperatives from the countries
involved. If for example poaching is seen as a number one threat to the
TBPA, which will result in reduced foreign funding as well as tourism,
with a direct effect on state finances, then political involvement is
unavoidable. At the national strategic level the state will demand that
something be done about the problem. This translates into a goal for the
TBPA management. The SF will therefore need to develop a campaign
plan to deal with the problem.
14.15. The operational level links the strategic WHAT (what must be achieved) to
the HOW (it can be achieved), that is the tactical actions on ground level.
The operational level, also requires that the WHO (must), WHEN, (the
timings) WHERE (location of operation) and WHAT THEREAFTER,
(the actions that take place after, or as a result of the operation) aspects
of a plan. be developed. The operational level will give the broad plan
that will need to be refined into the tactical action plan to give affect to
the strategic direction given down from management level.
14.16. The operational level commander could be the CIO or CSO of the park or
even in certain circumstances an outside security official such as a
policeman or military officer. The operational level commander must be
able to develop a plan in the same way that a musician writes a piece of
music, although in this instance the operational level commander must
also play the part of conductor as well. The campaign is the baton in the
hands of the operational level commander and he utilises it to achieve
the strategic results that are required of him by the effective deployment
of the tactical level forces on ground level. A fault many make is to
expect results to be forthcoming within an expected short period of time.
Todays decisions might only bear fruit in a week or months time or
even longer, - because of the uncertain and certainly unpredictable crime
environment the TBPA finds itself in. At the same time the operational
level commander will have to keep his superiors / politicians happy as
both he and they wait for results from his juniors, who are carrying out
the tactical plans derived from the operational plan!
PLANNING PRINCIPLES
14.17. In planning and commanding the campaign, the operational level commander
(as defined in par 3.5) must adhere to a number of guiding principles to
help him give affect to his plans. Needless to say nothing must be

23
slavishly followed but rather applied in an intelligent fashion. These
principles are listed below:
14.17.1.Conformance to Strategic Goals. Ensure that his intentions and campaign end
state are clearly carried over to his subordinates and are also in line with
his received strategic directives.
14.17.2.Correct Application of Subordinates Abilities. The operational level
commander must his ensure that his plan and end state are understood by
his subordinates and within their ability and capability to carry out.
14.17.3.Apply Medium to Long Campaign Vision. The operational level commander
must ensure that he does not become bogged down with the nitty gritty
daily planning and operational problems, rather he must ensure that the
strategic goals are being attained by the tactical activities of the deployed
forces.
14.17.4.Utilize Integrated Tactics to Obtain the Strategic End State. The operational
level commander must learn to use all the SF instruments available to
him to achieve his Strategic End State. These instruments must be
correctly trained, integrated correctly so that they can be employed
despite their origins, concentrated at the correct point to be most
effective against the criminal threat.
14.17.5.Maintenance of the Initiative by Flexible Use of Reserves. The freedom to
operate against any threat will depend on the availability of sufficient
forces to do the job. The judicious application of reserves at the right
time and place can often result in a favourable situation being developed,
and ensures the ability to exploit the situation as the situation develops.
Thus the initiative can be wrested away from the criminal and exploited
to the SF advantage.
14.17.6.Acceptance of Affordable Risks. The operational level commander must
realize that there will never be the perfect moment to carry out his plan.
Every situation carries with it its own inherent risks and if he waits for a
better moment the initiative can be lost and this may indeed result in
those losses he was attempting to avoid. The ability to take calculated
risks will allow the commander to steal a march on his opponent and
mark out the successful leader from the unsuccessful one.
PLANNING GUIDELINES
14.18. Planning is by far the most important responsibility of the operational level
commander. The Planning Process initially aims at conceiving a
campaign plan through a process of analysis with the staff available to
ensure that all facts are available to the commander while he formulates
his concept campaign plan. The campaign plan must address the full
duration of the campaign which could still be weeks or even months
ahead. The plan must give attention to both the WHAT and the HOW at
the strategic level and also analyse down to tactical level how the plan is

24
conceived to work. The operational level commander must know that
his plan is workable at the coal face. He knows this because he has
developed his plans in sufficient detail to realize that his subordinates are
not being given an unworkable plan to carry out, because possibly they
dont have the where withal to do so. He has checked this in a broad
brush way, without becoming involved in his juniors operational
planning responsibilities.
14.19. The operational level commander must not, once the plan has been developed
and put into affect, consider that his operational involvement is at an
end. He has the additional responsibility to not only oversee his
subordinates execution of the plan, but additionally he must develop
contingency plans to counter all manner of possibilities that the criminal
mind could conceive and funding allows. These contingency plans must
also be fully capable of being rapidly developed into executable plans in
a very short space of time. The Strategic Intention of the campaign plan
must also be kept in mind at all times. The contingency plans will to a
certain extent be based on assumptions as to what the criminals might do
under certain circumstances. Clearly experience and good planning will
reduce the margin of error in these plans, and thereby increase the speed
of implementation as the situation demands.
14.20. The operational level commander and his staff once one campaign has been
launched, will busy themselves with the next plan, in so doing,
maintaining the pressure on the criminals and thereby keeping the
initiative.
RESPONSIBILTIES OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMANDER
14.21. The commander must ensure that he has developed a structure that will be
capable of controlling the forces involved in the operations. He must
remember that the possibility of foreign SF being involved is good and
also other own country SF, but from outside the TBPA. All these
disparate forces must be welcomed and made to work together in an
efficient manner. The allocation of functional responsibilities and
reporting and command channels are his responsibility to sort out and
ensure that they work effectively.
14.22. He must ensure that all levels of command understand the campaign end state
and also the various other end states that may arise in subordinate
planning. He must ensure that no clash of interests develop as a result of
the various plans and that the plans are correctly sequenced and priorities
in terms of resources are properly allocated.
14.23. He must analyse the Strategic End State and goal or goals he has been given
by his CEO. The goal/s must be divided into realizable operational and
tactical objectives for his subordinates.
The operational level
commander must however analyse the goal/s given, in order to
understand the context at National and TBPA level within the framework
of the given Strategic End State. As mentioned earlier (par 33) if a goal

25
is set to end poaching in the TBPA, it must be seen within the National
and TBPA context to grasp what the Strategic End State means or should
mean. A clear strategic end state must be given in order for the
campaign planning to be successful. Where the operational level
commander has not been given a Strategic End State because for
instance ignorance or confusion as to how it should look, he should draw
one up himself and present it for acceptance. Any misunderstandings at
this level as to the Strategic End State are going to end up in a
misdirected campaign and a possible failure to achieve any meaningful
results. Once the Strategic End State is grasped, it becomes easier to
develop end states for the operational and tactical levels because together
they will form a pyramid ending at the strategic level. The tactical
objectives must be sequenced; that is not all objectives can be
simultaneously achieved and must therefore be carried out in order of
priority, to achieve the operational end state in the most cost effective
way and so on.
14.24. He must protect his staff and commanders from interference from any source.
He will act as the buffer and relay for any requests and demands from his
seniors.
14.25. He will decide when and how any reserve forces or funding is allocated in
order to maintain the strategic initiative He must however keep in touch
with what is going on, on the ground so as to maintain his feel for the
campaign. Failing this he will be liable to incorrectly allocate resources
according to the loudest voice and so possibly misdirect the whole
campaign.
14.26. The operational level commander must strongly resist the temptation to
become involved in the conducting of tactical activities. Not only is this
the preserve of his subordinates, but he will also lose sight of the big
picture, while chasing the ball and so fail to carry out his responsibilities
at the higher level.
CAMPAIGN TERMINATION
14.27. The operational level commander must have a clear understanding of when
and how the campaign should end.
14.28. During the initial planning, the strategic end state was developed, which
would indicate what the situation should look like when the campaign
ended. In other words the campaign must end on favourable terms to the
State Departments involved, in line with their departmental strategies.
Other State Departments might in turn, use the final end state of the SFs
campaign, to kick start their unique campaign.
14.29. The operational level commander must prior to ending his campaign have a
clear understanding of the situation in his area and that success has
indeed crowned his endeavours, not wishful thinking.

26
14.30. He must subsequently redeploy his forces in order to capitalise on the
situation and prevent any reversion to the previous situation. He must in
other words continue to dominate the area.
14.31. He must ensure that he is able to support any other State Department
strategies in his area and in so doing assist in achieving a political or
State end state.
14.32. Draw up and implement his own campaign exit strategy which will tie in with
his follow up or next campaign plan.
THE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
15. As with most problems, the best way to solve a problem would be to approach it
in a logical and holistic way. The problem solving process presented
here is of course useful not only for the security environment but also for
all situations with minor adaptions. The methodology stays the same
even if the complexity of the problem changes.
16. The security problem facing a TFP demands a systematic approach to the problem
and requires that one should marshal all the facts known to one in
preparation for the start to the problem solving process. The size of the
problem will dictate the volume of work required to arrive at a correct
solution. To consider for example poaching as sole issue is to be
confronted by a much smaller problem than that of covering the state of
the security of an entire park!
AIM
17. The aim of this section of the manual is to assist security officials and
management to be able to develop effective security management plans
to solve their unique situations in the most cost effective manner.
ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
18. The following broad process is laid down in outline to give the reader an overall
understanding of the entire process before the process is broken up into
its components for detailed discussion and analysis. The step by step
approach is preferred, than to launch straight into the process which
could give rise to some confusion and loss of focus, because of the detail
needed to be gone into, to be able to properly analyze the problem as
defined. The following steps need to be followed to go through the
process completely:
18.1.

The process is started by either the CEO or his political superiors requiring
that a particular problem be solved that has a direct impact on the TBPA
and where applicable the State. All things being equal, a National
Strategic End State with a goal/s identified will be drawn up at

27
ministerial/departmental level or by the CEO if he is the originator. If
the CEO is the originator then it might be that the problem has no
national implications and this would mean that the end state would be at
regional or even at park level.
18.2.

The designated operational commander (Shortened to commander) would on

receipt of the End State and goal/s, analyse these as previously indicated
in par 3.12. This would allow him to arrive at his operational end state
and determine his and his subordinates goals and objectives. This is
called campaign planning. He is assisted in developing his plan by his
close aides. The campaign plan as it now appears is presented to his
subordinate commanders in order to guide and direct them in what the
operational commander wants. It is good practice, although not always
practicable or feasible to use the subordinate commanders to assist in the
development of the operational commanders campaign plan. The
subordinate commanders must now, secure in the knowledge of what is
expected of them, go away and develop their own operational plans
which will not only be in line with the commanders intention and
campaign end state, but will dove tail with each others plans as well.

18.3.

The commander must as the next part of the process, task his intelligence
officials to produce for him a detailed document spelling out the nature
of the threat he the commander is faced with in terms of the problem
with which he has been presented.

18.4.

The commanders campaign planning process is further as follows:

18.4.1.Having received from his intelligence officials their review of the situation in a
formal or informal presentation, he has to start analysing the situation
confronting him in terms of the headings listed below (par 19.4.2
19.4.6) plus others he feels are relevant to allow him to arrive at his
operational end state. He is in receipt of his superiors strategic end state,
which he must also analyse to determine what his superiors have in
mind. As mentioned before if no strategic end state is forthcoming he
will have to develop one himself for their approval. He will follow the
same process as for his own operational end state.
18.4.2.Political Constraints. Consider political resolve, must one demonstrate ones
determination. Avoid alienating various groups, neighbours.
18.4.3.Legal. Laws of Armed Conflict, different approaches to law between
countries, powers of SF, extradition and laws of evidence.
18.4.4.Moral. Attitude of park officials, affect of casualties so far and future, attitude
of population and tourists.
18.4.5.Time Factor. How long has he got before deployment, when are results
expected, by whom? How long before any forces can begin to operate in
terms of a plan?

28
18.4.6.Financial. Restrictions? Availability?
18.4.7.An example of a strategic end state could be; The Xyz TBPA will find itself in
a situation where there is political stability and economic well being
between the countries involved, with the security situation normalised
with only minor poaching occurring from time to time.
18.4.8.An example of a operational end state could be; The security situation
within the Xyz TBPA is of such a nature that the only security forces
necessary in the park are provided by the rangers in the field and
security guards at the entrance gates and no criminality bar the
occasional crime occurs from time to time. The security forces are
able to freely with the minimum red tape carry out anti crime drives
across national borders with the maximum of international
cooperation.
18.4.9.Having identified the operational end state the commander must determine
what he feels is the criminal centre of gravity encapsulated within the
threat analysis given to him by his intelligence officials. One remembers
that the centre of gravity is that aspect without which an organisation
cannot continue or maintain its purpose. Such a centre of gravity could
be; The poachers ability to use the local population to hide in while
disposing of their stolen game carcases to the outside market.
18.4.10.The commander must now determine his lines of operation between his
current situation and how he intends to achieve his operational end state.
To do this he must identify the lines of operation needed to achieve his
end state and determine all the decision points and decisive points along
that line. Each line or operation must lead the forces allocated to that
specific line through the criminals centre of gravity relevant to that
operation. Each line of operation will therefore represent a particular
operational task or specific operation, for example a line of operation
could be To prevent the poachers from crossing a particular stretch of
park border line. Another line could be To identify criminal elements
in the local population bordering on the park. A third line could be
Socio economic operations amongst the border fence to reduce the
populations dependence on poaching. The commander must identify
the critical steps in the process of attaining the right position to conclude
the campaign with the destruction of each line of operations centre of
gravity, which would allow him to attain his operational end state and
thereby succeed in his given task.
18.4.11.The lines of operation as identified by the commander, no doubt in
conjunction with his staff, are now given to his subordinate commanders
as guidelines for the achievement of their own operational plans. The
subordinate commanders will now in turn proceed with their own
analysis of their problem in keeping with the guidelines given to them.
18.5.

Problem Solving Process Layout. Listed below is the skeleton layout of the
process of analysis the tactical level commanders must go through, in

29
order to be able to develop the operations along the given a line of
operation so as to achieve the operational end state as defined for them.
The detailed discussion of each heading follows after.
18.6.

Review of the Situation facing the Park. (Environmental Scan.)

18.6.1.Terrain Orientation. (Discuss the physical features of the terrain)

18.6.2.Threats to the Park. Includes all aspects from criminal to social.
18.6.3.Security Forces available. Includes all possible help.
18.6.4.Infrastructure. Built up areas, Transport system etc.
18.6.5.Tourism.
18.6.6.Finance Available.
18.6.7.Anything else of relevance.
18.7.

Aim. Define your Aim. (What do you wish to achieve?)

18.7.1.For example, To combat all criminal/ Illegal/ activity in the Park.

18.8.

End State. Determine what the End State should be or look like.

18.9.

Factors. Draw up a list of critical Factors, which directly or indirectly affect

the problem. These factors must be analyzed individually and also
looked at in terms of their interdependence. (Eg transport, as a factor, is
influenced by roads or communication networks/infrastructure.) The
following can serve as a list of possible factors that one could analyse:

18.9.1.Terrain. How does the terrain lend itself to exploitation by the illegal
activities of the criminals.
18.9.2.Security Forces. All organizations that can assist.
18.9.3.Criminal activities. What is it that they can do which will affect the Park?
(Corruption can be viewed as separate factor if need be.)
18.9.4.Legal. What is the effect of the law on SF operations and criminals.
18.9.5.Communities. This will include not only the population living around such a
park but also those people who live for various reasons inside the park.
Staff, temporary workers etc.
18.9.6.Tourism. What are the sources of tourism in the area, foreign, local, where do
they stay, what do they tend to visit, methods of travel, tourism periods,
tourist agencies and structures.

30

18.9.7.Other factors could be; Infrastructure; IT/ Communications; Finance;

Poaching; Stock encroachment; Illegals; Invasions etc.
18.10. Global Conclusions. At this stage it will be useful to go through the factors
completed and list here all the conclusions reached. Once this has been
done by factor, it will be possible to start identifying main or global
conclusions that bridge a series of factors conclusions. Terrain and
Criminal Organization may together present a global conclusion that
could be something like;
Security Force observation posts must be placed on the following likely
hills x, y, z looking in the following area for the following poachers,
-- , with not less than five men each, armed as follows, -, due to the
strength of the poachers operating in the area. They should deploy on a
full moon, the earliest being next week Friday, and they should be
dropped off no closer than w place to prevent warning being given.
They must be able to stay for at least four days while the reaction force
moves into position identified as either q or t in order to------ . etc.
this sort of global conclusion will start to formulate a rough form of plan
of action or as we call them in the next paragraph Options. In ones
minds eye, in a well thought out analysis the options to be dealt with
next will represent alternative plans that are each worthy in their own
right but must be weighed up to find the better of them.
18.11. Options. Having analyzed each factor and come to conclusions in each case
one must now determine possible options. These are very broad
scenarios which are not in great detail but encapsulate the conclusions
previously reached but differ from each of the other options in at least
three aspects. (Eg timings, deployment of security pers, location of
border posts, fencing, IT systems, management styles and cost,
movement control on roads etc.) Normally one should attempt to
identify at least three options so as to allow the commander more
freedom of decision in deciding which option he approves of. The
commander must also indicate the options in priority sequence to allow
for subsequent changes of plan and also to develop contingency plans to
cover all eventualities.
18.12. Courses of Action. The next step in the process is to take a long look at the
options identified and endeavour to see if one could mix and match as it
were in order to arrive at optimum results. This is called identifying
possible Courses of Action. One tries to identify at least two courses of
action (CoA) and these are worked out in detail even to the extent of a
roughly accurate costing of the possible solution, which is in effect
where one now is in the process. It is important to remember at this
stage that in these modern times nothing will take place without the
requisite funding. Therefore during the whole development of the plan
right up to this stage, the effect of possible costs must be kept in mind, as
this could easily ship wreck any good plan. These potential solutions are

31
now carefully weighed up against each other to determine any flaws.
This sub process is also looked at from the criminal perspective to see
how they would react to the solution. Where one finds holes and
opportunities for criminal activities, the CoA is simply adjusted to
overcome the identified weakness. Contingency courses of action will
cover any unexpected criminal changes of plan.
18.13. Now it will become a relatively easy process to evaluate the CoAs against
each in order to arrive at the best and most cost effective plan. The mere
fact that one plan is more expensive than another should not affect the
final decision necessarily. Additional funding may be forthcoming
which the planners were not aware of and so affect the final outcome.
The suggested and alternative CoA will normally be presented to the
responsible official who has authority over the development of the
TBCA/P for his approval and selection of best CoA.
18.14. The CoAs are now costed accurately as the final step in confirming the best
CoA.
18.15. The accepted CoA is now developed into an Action Plan giving the required
goals, objectives, which are coupled to managers giving costs and target
dates to be adhered to.
18.16. The last step is implementation and management.
ANALYSIS PROCEDURE: DETAIL
19. REVIEW OF THE SITUATION/ENVIROMENTAL SCAN
19.1.

Terrain Orientation. (Discuss the physical features of the terrain) The

requirement for a detailed briefing of the terrain will depend largely on
the level of current knowledge on the terrain that the commander has. It
is necessary however for some briefing on terrain to occur to at least put
the question of terrain in perspective with regards the problem and its
location relative to the whole area. Maps, photographs and diagrams
would be of great assistance in terms of orientation. All that is
mentioned at this stage are the facts relating to the particular terrain in
question. Note terrain also includes where built up areas are as well. At
the end of the briefing the audience should have a clear idea of what the
terrain looks like and obviously where it is relative to the briefing locale.
At this stage it may be advisable to look at terrain and divide it up into
rough sectors which reflect areas that are easily identified as
geographical entities and as such, facilitate analysis. When terrain is
actually analysed then the division of the terrain into sectors will be
formalised should there be a requirement for such a division of the area.
All subsequent factors will be analysed within these sectors. It can occur
that some factors or elements of a factor dont lend themselves to
sectoring. This is not a problem one simply keeps the big picture in
mind as one continues.

32
19.2.

Threats to the Park. Includes all aspects from criminal to social. This
question is a critical one as if it not properly discussed, the very real
possibility might exist that important elements of the criminal equation
are ignored and could cause a misdirection of effort. Either the CIO or
delegated staff or members of the intelligence community would
normally present the threat situation. This presentation should not turn
into a litany of criminal activities over the past period under review.
That these activities must be mentioned is true, but the discussion must
lead one to understand who and what does the threat consist of and their
organization. Back up notes, photographs, diagrams of the criminal
chain of command, inter-connectivity with other organizations, graphs
and details of incidents are aspects that should all be on hand to give the
audience a clear understanding of the total nature of the threat facing the
park.

19.3.

Security Forces Available. The complete breakdown of all the security

forces available or deployed in the area whether under the Parks control
or not. The key point here is that an organization, not under the park
control, but still operating in the same area, may well have an influence
on criminal activities in the area. This review must include a list of all
personnel, vehicles and aircraft available plus their capabilities,
restrictions, limitations and periods of deployment. Costs can also be
mentioned if relevant. Although bases will be mentioned under
infrastructure it is good to couple places with people for completeness
sake.

19.3.1.Legal Matters. The affect of the law on all that we do is an important fact that
must be borne in mind at all times. The laws and instructions etc
applicable must be clearly mentioned here and will serve as a guide for
all future planning. The legal staff must be on hand at all times during
the planning phase, as they may well be needed to pass legal comment
on some concept of operation or other that has been developed and needs
legal testing.
19.3.2.Communities. All the communities that are to be found in the area must be
listed and discussed. The nature, location, attitude, communal activities
of all people living in the area are important. One must however be
careful to avoid that opinions of and crimes of the population are
mentioned here as this would be the wrong place. The so called pro and
anti factions in the community towards the SF must be mentioned
19.3.3.Tourism. What are the potential and actual tourist attractions in the park?
What routes will be followed to get to them and what method of
transport could be used. What has been the history of attacks in the area,
indicating dates, times and locations? What was the result of these
attacks in terms of arrests and convictions? What was the affect on the
tourism industry? What are the tourism drivers in the region and what is
the spending power of these drivers.

33
19.3.4.Illegals. Are there any illegals living in the park? If so how many and where
do they occur. Where do they come from? How long have they stayed
in the park? What are their attitudes towards tourists and the park
officials? Do they have a history of criminality? How do they survive,
what jobs do they do.
19.3.5.Poaching. What poaching occurs in the park? Where does it occur and who
can be linked to this. What is the history of the poaching and their
attitude towards the rangers? What tactics, size of gangs, leaders,
weapons do they have? Are they aggressive? What type of game do
they hunt and what are their methods. Do they use transport? Where do
they sell or use the poached items. What can be done about the buyers?
What is the incidence of bribery amongst park staff in relation to the
poachers?
19.3.6.There are many other factors to look at, the analyst will need to identify those
required as will suit the situation and proceed from there. Note however
all factors identified here must be subsequently analysed in par 3.43
below. It is possible that after identifying a factor and doing some
preliminary work on it, one realises that it is irrelevant then it will be
discarded and work will proceed on another factor.
19.4.

AIM

19.4.1.Two situations can arise for a commander, he is given a mission or task to carry
out by his seniors or he, in the absence of such direction, for what ever
reason, decides that a particular action is required to be carried out.
19.4.1.1.Self Initiated Action. When such a situation arises and the commander has
decided to act on his own initiative he should allow himself to be guided
by some or all of the following guidelines:
19.4.1.1.1.Have his superiors given him any general guidelines or intentions that they
might have, which would allow the commander to best carry out their
wishes in respect of this possible operation.
19.4.1.1.2.Legal implications of the intended action if any.
19.4.1.1.3.The abilities and limitations of his available forces viz a viz the opposing
forces or the situation that needs to be dealt with.
19.4.1.1.4.The influence of the population and terrain.
19.4.1.1.5.The nature of the criminals or the problem which could be any thing from
a fire to a flood situation.
19.4.1.2.Task or Mission Received. The commander must analyse what he has been
given to do on order to best understand the full implications of the
mission. He must therefore consider the following guidelines to assure
himself that he fully understands what is expected of him to do:

34

19.4.1.3.Operational End State. In order to determine what the Operational End

State should be or look like, the commander must look at and base it on
based on the Strategic End State that has been given? by ones senior.
Note that the Operational end state will differ from the higher end state,
as the parameters will be more closely drawn at the lower level. The
higher level will be aimed at a more strategic level while at ground level
the view must of necessity be much more tactical and focused on the nut
and bolts of the task before one.
19.4.1.4.Mission Given. The commander must ask himself what does my superior
want me to do? If this can be answered unambiguously then this will
form the core of the commander's mission as written up when formally
tasking the forces to be deployed.
19.4.1.5.Type of Operation. The nature or type of the operation must be grasped
thoroughly. Example is it a search of an area for hidden contraband or
searching for illegals or launching a rescue mission of some sort or could
elements of these form part of the operation?
19.4.1.6.The Specific or Possible Tasks. Out of the mission given one will be able to
identify a number of tasks for which solutions must be found during the
analysis phase to follow. Specifically one could say that if the mission
given, or identified as necessary, is to search an area for hidden weapons
then the specific task is clearly one of a cordon and search. Possible
tasks that could arise out of a mission to solve a devastating fire or flood
might be as follows and can be increased or reduced as the analysis
process proceeds:
19.4.1.6.1.Where could one find areas to launch boats?
19.4.1.6.2.How are the deployed workers to be got to the disaster area?
19.4.1.6.3.What transport logistic implications are there?
19.4.1.6.4.How are communications going to work?
19.4.1.6.5.How is casualty evacuation going to work? And so on.
19.4.1.7.Having effectively and thoroughly analysed the mission given or identified,
the aim of the operation must be formulated by the commander keeping
in mind what the Operational End State must be. The commanders aim
must be clear and unambiguous and is based logically on the mission
given and the Operational End State. The aim will be in the singular and
focus on the most important elements of the job on hand.
19.4.1.8.For example, To search area X for hidden illegal weapons and animal traps.
Note a multiple aim would include for example, ..and stop all illegal
poachers from entering the area. This would clearly give rise to two
different activities with differing focus areas.

35

19.4.1.9.The aim must serve as guiding light throughout the analysis process and
serve to focus attention on the reason (aim!) for the operation. The aim
should also be cleared with higher authority to confirm that one is not
misdirected.
19.5.

ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS

19.5.1.Terrain. The analysis of this factor determines the tactical and logistical
possibilities of the terrain and of course how it has an influence on the
achievement of the criminals aim.
19.5.1.1.Terrain is a neutral factor which influences both the criminal and own
security forces. The critical aspect of the analysis is to determine how
the terrain will influence the criminals plan of action.
19.5.1.2.Possible Facts to Analyse.
19.5.1.2.1.Topography. Mountain ranges, summits, plains, densely overgrown areas,
swamps and forests. The influence on movement, possible hiding areas
and approach routes as they would affect the opposing sides.
19.5.1.2.2.Hydrography. Rivers, dams and lakes.
19.5.1.2.3.Obstacles. What natural and man made obstacles are there and what is
their influence on mobility of both sides. ie the ability to get where one
needs to be and the identification of possible routes around such
obstacles.
19.5.1.2.4.Infrastructure. Roads, railway lines, airports, harbours, airfields, power
lines etc. How and where do these have an influence on both sides, and
so affecting possible plans?
19.5.1.2.5.Negotiability. What is the affect of weather and flooding on the mobility
of the forces to move in any direction? This is for both dry and wet
seasons.
19.5.2.Conclusions. Conclusions from this factor could cover broadly where the
criminals could move, set up bases, drive through easily to reach an
objective etc. Conversely what does the terrain allow own forces to do
in attempting to prevent or capture the criminals? One could identify
possible ambush sites or areas that need to be blocked off to prevent the
criminals from passing by or catching them.
19.5.3.Criminal Threat. There are a number of facts that one need to analyse in
order to guide ones mind towards a positive action in order to address the
criminal threat. Remember that each fact that one lists must be so
approached that it will lead one to a conclusion that ultimately results in
an action from your part which is measurable in time and space:

36
19.5.3.1.Organisation. By looking at the structure of the criminal organisation, one
aims to find an aspect that can be turned in your favour. The structure
for example consists of people from a tribe bordering on the park. By
examining who and what these members are, it may be possible to arrive
at a way of infiltrating the criminal structure. This may / will lead one to
the conclusion that by tasking x a member of the intelligence
community of the same tribe, it may be possible to infiltrate and in so
doing, gain intelligence as to the next act that the criminals wish to
perform. The criminal organisation may as a fact consist of people from
differing ethnic back grounds. This offers the potential for this to be
exploited by launching an information war against elements of the
organisation, in order to allow one or more from the gang to
surrender/give information once detained, to allow for the destruction of
the criminal organisation sense of cohesion and allow there by for
infiltration and criminal charges to be laid at the right doors. The
identification of certain tendencies by the top structure, eg hanging out in
certain areas/bars etc once again allow for the possible infiltration of
those places to spot the leaders and so launch operations to arrest them or
to conduct deliberate misinformation operations to mislead the leaders
into actions we would like them to carry out or not to. So one can
continue analysing the organisation and arriving at actions to carry out in
support of the operational end state.
19.5.3.2.Tactics and Weapons. The criminal organisation may have certain types of
weapons at its disposal. These will have an effective fire range, which
will mean that the SF must deploy or attack with this in mind. A
conclusion that could be made could be that the use of bulletproof
jackets could become required, along with the use of bulletproof vehicles
under certain circumstances. Other conclusions could be that the
launching of the operation planned should occur at night and so
neutralise the effectiveness of their weapons, while the deployment of
men by helicopter onto an objective and there by gaining surprise which
will also go a way to neutralise the effectiveness of the gang weapons
and own casualties. The methods used by the gang to poach game may
lead one to identifying most likely areas for them to operate in and
therefore deploying people into those areas to identify at an early stage
such movements and allowing one to act more effectively. The tendency
to steal and use a particular type of vehicle on certain routes, could lead
one to identify certain routes for observation by security observation
parties coupled to the fact that these vehicles are mainly stolen on
certain days and they on average take x length of time to arrive in the
area. The size of the gangs will lead one to observe trails and paths in
certain areas for signs of use into or out of the areas. These tendencies or
routine activities could lead one to possible deployments in those areas
in order to either catch or identify the criminals movements. The known
reaction of the gangs on being discovered will lead one to deploying SF
elements in a fashion calculated to counter those attempts to escape,
given that the area has been reconnoitred and analysed properly under
the factor Terrain. The style and attitude of the criminal organisation
members towards elements of the local population may lend itself to

37
exploitation and deployments of security forces. The style and nature of
the gangs reaction to SF activities against them must also be analysed
and potential counters arrived at, which could also include a measure of
retraining of the SF. These are all actions that will arise out of the
detailed analysis of the factor, enemy criminal organisation.
19.5.4.Conclusions on Criminal Threat/ Enemy. There are obviously many
conclusions one could arrive at, which would be based on the nature and
threat posed by the criminals. At this stage one is looking for a definite
action flowing from ones analysis which could help when added to all
the other conclusions from the other factors will lead one inevitably to a
reasonable plan. An example of a conclusion emanating from factor
Criminal Threat could be that; Given that poacher gang (code name
Andrew) operate in a gang of twelve and are armed with AK 47 rifles
and always operate in the Luvubo area on full moon nights and are
expected to do so on the 22 April, the SF will deploy patrols into x and
y areas to determine their being on route and the possible timings of
their arrival at possible poaching sites. The SF will also mount
observation posts equipped with night sight binoculars at points a, b, c
and d,) to confirm target areas of the poachers and mount vehicle patrols
in the following areas (e, f, g.) to scare the poachers off from operating
in those areas. Once a degree of certainty has been arrived at as to the
actions of the poachers a strike force will be activated to deal with the
poacher group. Clearly from the Criminal Threat factor one can only
identify certain actions that can take place but these actions will hang in
the air as the supporting plans derived from the rest of the analysis still
have to be done. These would come from analysing other factors which
would indicate where likely observation posts are to be found, where and
what radios and communication systems need to be placed, how long it
would take to arrive at the deployment area once the signal was given
and what should be done with any casualties and prisoners captured.
19.5.5.Permanent Population. In this case it is the local tribes who live along the
borders of the park who are being analysed. The fact that the population
in a particular area defined as area A are very poor and have difficulty
in growing sufficient food and also have to few jobs to sustain the needs
of the community leads one inevitably to the deduction that they will
become involved in smuggling and the poaching of game, leading to the
involvement of criminals who most likely come from area Y etc who
will use the population to carry out their bidding to increase their profits
without spending to much of their own ill gotten gains on the population
as a reward. Conclusions flowing from these deductions could be that
the SF will need to develop a life skills programme in the area to allow
the law abiding people to develop sufficient income. This will hopefully
turn them away from the disaffected elements among them and possibly
even encourage some of them to become informers. This raises the
requirement to have a sound informant handling and payment process.
Broad details as follows . Included in this will be who is to start the
skills development programme, with what resources, starting when.
Further conclusions could be that it is necessary to deploy under cover

38
teams into areas identified from a study done of tendencies, to find
possible routes used by the local population into the park and act as the
eyes and ears of reaction forces to deal with such incursions as they
occur. The numbers of teams and the size of the reaction forces could be
indicated already although not vital at this stage. Remember why you
are analysing the population. It is to be able to determine what actions
are needed by own forces and what the reaction could be to such
deployments as well as what the expected actions of the criminal
elements could be.
19.5.6.Legal Implications. As a factor the conclusions derived from analysing the
legal implications of any operation are of the greatest importance as
closely tied into legal implications are public relations aspects and
publicity in general which has a spin off on fund raising and donor funds
currently in use. Tourism is directly affected by publicity, which has an
affect on income! The legal officers involved in the planning must
consider all the relevant factors affecting the operation including the
following; What are the rules of engagement when in contact with an
aggressive criminal? What should be ones actions in the event of some
one being killed or injured? Memorandums of Understanding need to be
drafted where cross border operations are considered? Or planned.
Should a lawyer be on hand during the operation and where should he be
positioned.
19.5.7.Time and Distance. All operations are dependant on time and distance. If one
does not know how far it is to a particular place then one cannot be
expected to know at what time one will arrive there. The factor has at its
heart a marshalling of all the facts in terms of routes, land, sea and air
plus the influence of weather and time of day or night. The criminals
reaction to the deployment of forces will also have an effect on the
movement of the forces and needs to be factored in. The actual time it
would take to travel at a specific speed along route z with a convoy of
vehicles, for example 10 strong. This is repeated with all the possible
and applicable routes that the SF and Criminals could use to carry out
their plans. This factor can best be understood by being displayed
tabularly. The analysis will lead one to the best and or most likely route
to carry out an approach to a particular objective by all parties. The state
of readiness, availability and or location of available forces for the
operation. Another aspect that needs to be considered is the amount of
time available to carry out the operation. This is done by identifying
time now and what actions need to be carried out, measured in time
taken. Having identified this fact, one must now proceed to analyse this
fact as follows; the time available is enough or not enough to carry out
the operation? If not enough, then what should be done to ensure
sufficient time for example re-look at times allocated for actions as listed
below, or reduce time allocated to a function. Concurrent activity can
save time by for example taking all the groups with on the
reconnaissance. Another important aspect to consider is the question of
travelling time of the component parts of the operation to get to the
forming up area, or even to the deployment area. Bad timing is the

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quickest way to ruin a good operation. The various routes for the
deployments must be analysed for time and distance effect on the
operation and normally the tables so prepared can be used for the writing
of the orders and even, if presentable used for the carrying over of the
orders. The ultimate conclusion of this factor is to identify if sufficient
time is available and the potential start time for the operation.
Time Now: 23 June 12h00.
Do reconnaissance of target area:
5 hours 30 min.
Plan and write operation:
18 hours.
Give orders:
1 hour 25 mins.
Subordinate preparations and
Reconnaissance etc.
24 hours
Subordinates give orders:
2 hours 40 mins.
Rehearsals for operation:
2 hours 40 mins.
Preparations for move to
Deployment area:
4 hours 25 mins.
Travelling time to arrive at target: 6 hours 40 mins.
Possible start time of operation:
x time
(Dependant on many factors
including enemy actions)
Time taken for operation:
5 hours 30 mins.
Travel back to base:
7 hours 50 mins.
Time approximate back in base:
y June
Therefore the start time for the operation will be X hour and this is within the
time parameters set for the operation.
19.6.

GLOBAL CONCLUSIONS

19.6.1.At this stage it will be useful to go through the factors completed and list here
all the conclusions reached. Once this has been done by factor, it will be
possible to start identifying main or global conclusions that bridge a
series of factors conclusions. Terrain and Criminal Organizations may
together present a global conclusion that could be something like;
Security Force observation posts must be placed on the following likely
hills x, y, z looking in the following area for TSgang of poachers,
-- , each observation post with not less than five men each, armed as
follows, -, due to the strength of the poachers operating in the area. They
should deploy on a full moon, the earliest being next week Friday, and
they should be dropped off no closer than w place to prevent warning
being given. They must be able to stay for at least four days while the
reaction force moves into position identified as either q or t in order
to------ . etc.
-this sort of global conclusion will start to formulate a rough form of
plan of action or as we call them in the next paragraph Options. In
ones minds eye, a well thought out analysis of the global conclusions or
options, dealt with in the next paragraph, represents alternative plans that

40
are each worthy in their own right but each must be weighed up to find
the best of them in priority sequence.
19.7.

OPTIONS

19.7.1.Having analyzed each factor and come to conclusions in each case one must
now determine possible options. These are very broad scenarios which
are not in great detail but encapsulate the conclusions previously
reached, differing from each of the other options in at least three aspects.
(Eg timings, deployment of security pers, location of border posts,
fencing, IT systems, management styles and cost, movement control on
roads etc.) Options are therefore an easy way of presenting to the
commander, possible solutions in brief format so as to make it easier for
him, the commander, to grasp the variations in the solutions and thereby
assisting him to make an effective and informed choice. Normally one
should attempt to identify at least three options so as to allow the
commander more freedom of decision in deciding which option he
approves of. The commander must also indicate the options in priority
sequence to allow for subsequent changes of plan and also to develop
contingency plans to cover all eventualities.
19.7.2.An option would therefore be a written story like explanation of one of many
methods (options) of solving a problem. This method is a logical and
effective way of dealing with the set problem but represents but one of
the possible choices that one could make. However only one option can
be used although it is possible to combine options and so form an
additional option. The option is therefore a paraphrased and concise
summing up of a possible solution which when chosen needs to be
expanded upon to be formulated as the best course of action to resolve
the particular problem facing the park. It is useful to graphically
illustrate, by means of a diagram, an option in conjunction with the
written aspect.
19.7.3.Once the commander has chosen the best option or combination thereof and
listed them in priority of importance, the staff must take these and
develop them into courses of action as indicated below.
20. COURSES OF ACTION
20.1.

The next step in the process is to take a long look at the options identified and
endeavour to see if one could mix and match as it were in order to arrive
at optimum results. This is called identifying possible Courses of
Action. One tries to identify at least two courses of action (CoA) and
these are worked out in detail even to the extent of a roughly accurate
costing of the possible solution, which is in effect where one now is in
the process. It is important to remember at this stage that in these
modern times, nothing will take place without the requisite funding.
Therefore during the whole development of the plan right up to this
stage, the effect of possible costs must be kept in mind, as to ignore the
effect of costs during the development of a plan is to set oneself up to

41
fail and this could easily shipwreck a good plan. These potential
solutions are now carefully weighed up against each other to determine
any flaws. This sub process is also looked at from the criminal
perspective to see how they would react to the solution. Where one finds
holes and opportunities for criminal activities, the CoA is simply
adjusted to overcome the identified weakness. Contingency courses of
action will cover any unexpected criminal changes of plan.
20.1.1.One must remember that a well written course of action, that is contains
sufficient detail, will immeasurably assist one with the detail tasking that
must follow the acceptance of the plan. If one discovers that the Co A
needs to be added to now or during the tasking phase, then this can be
seen as the result of an incomplete analysis of the problem and poorly
written CoA. That situations can change with time, one must recognise
and factor into ones plan by means of contingency or alternative plans.
20.2.

ACTION PLAN

20.2.1.The accepted CoA is now developed into an Action Plan giving the required
goals, objectives, as allocated to the subordinate commanders including
funding and logistic guidelines /constraints and target dates to be
adhered to.
20.2.2.Suffice to say that such a plan should include a clear and definite task for each
of the role players, indicating who should do what, where, when and
with what personnel and equipment. Timings must be given in terms of
the start times, completion times and what the end result or state should
be. The more strategic the plan the less detail included and the more
scope for initiative is left for the subordinate commanders. The lower
the level of the plan, progressively less initiative will be made available
to the junior commanders within certain parameters.
20.2.3.An example of a low level tactical plan tasking of a component of a force could
be;
Mr X is to take five rangers and drive in their allocated transport to
Redhill and there leave their vehicle. They will walk unseen up to the
Gansi river and at the first bend after the S bend lay out an observation
post with the aim of identifying all people who use the river. They will
stay in position until day break on the forth day at which point they will
retrace their steps back to base. In reality much more detail could be
expected, to ensure that precise compliance of the instructions occurs
and that the subordinates are fully aware of the commanders wishes.
The more experienced the subordinate the less precise the detail
required.
A strategic level tasking of a component of a force could read;
Mr X is to take control of the Southern sector of the park and in so
doing bring to an end all illegal acts in practice in the area. In four

42
months time he will present a report as to progress. This process will
constitute phase one of the Operation Thrasher. Successful completion
of this phase will lead to phase two starting, subject to the degree of
success measured and any corrective actions needed prior to the start of
phase two.
20.2.4.Between the tasking of subordinates and the writing of the analysis lies a
essential requirement to ensure that that which is concluded is not only
correct but also feasible. To this end the following essential step is
required.
21. EVALUATION OF THE PLAN
21.1.

Any plan must be evaluated and tested to confirm it can work. The
commander and his staff must confirm the feasibility of the plan before it
is converted into an operational tasking of the forces available and the
final confirmation of the costs of the plan.

21.2.

The most suitable method to evaluate the feasibility of a plan is to role play
the elements of the plan with the parties involved. This way every
person gets to know what they are expected to do and all possibilities are
checked and confirmed. The timings and distances should be adjusted
for the game plan. The security of the plan must be ensured as this could
compromise the operation. It is possible and advisable to change certain
dates and place names to hide the nature of the operation from prying
eyes and ears where any doubt exists as to the security of the plan.

21.3.

All problems must be identified and investigated to determine a possible

solution. The solution is work shopped to confirm suitability and
implemented where acceptable.

21.4.

21.5.

TASKING OF SUBORDINATES

21.5.1.

It would be unwise at this stage to be prescriptive as to the method which

the varying Park organisations involved in TBPAs give instructions to
their subordinates. There are many differing methods which involve
both verbal and written formats. Clearly the more writing there is, the
better able one is to ensure close adherence to instructions, and will
prevent recriminations later if some error creeps into an operation.

21.5.2.

The higher up the authority ladder one goes the less need there is for
detailed instructions. The intent and the end state may well be all that is
necessary to launch a successful operation. Conversely the lower down
the more detail is necessary.

43
21.5.3.

The commander may follow any one of three widely differing methods
to get his operation launched. He can order his subordinates to carry out
an operation verbally with the minimum of paperwork, or he could
develop a tabular tasking format giving goals and objectives with target
dates linked to them. The last method would be to write out in detail the
tasking of each and every role player plus all administrative and logistic
requirements covering all aspects of the plan leaving nothing to chance.
The commander must select the method that best suits his situation.

CONCLUSION
22. The success of any park is dependant on many intertwined factors. These are in
the main the following:
22.1.

Every park must be financially well managed.

22.2.

The park must be properly managed in terms of its biodiversity.

22.3.

The park must be administratively well organized.

22.4.

The security affairs of the park must be properly in place. If the security of a
park is poor there will be no animals, tourists, foreign exchange nor local
jobs and of course those who come to the park will be continually
subject to petty and grand theft and will go home as a bad ambassador
for the park and the country.

22.5.
23. E
24. E