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Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 159161

At this time a year ago the last thing on my mind was any expectation
that I would be here now writing an editorial for the Journal, but I feel
honoured to have been asked to continue in the Journals venerable
tradition and particularly pleased and excited to do so during a period of
international development in the world of Jungian practice and study. It
is daunting to step into the role in succession to an editor of Warren
Colmans calibre, and reading his nal editorial in the previous issue
impressed on me again the achievements of his time in ofce. Warrens
own experience in publication gave him great understanding of the birth
pains of authorship and I was personally grateful for his willingness and
ability to facilitate my efforts as a new and narcissistically vulnerable
author. Also under his editorship, whilst remaining true to the clinical
and developmental approach in which it is rooted, the Journal has reected
the diversity of subjects towards which Jungian authors and scholars have
been directing their thought and study. Warren is indeed a hard act to
follow, so perhaps it is unsurprising that two of us have stepped into his
shoes. I look forward to working with Linda Carter, the US editor whose
experience provides an important link of continuity, with William
Meredith-Owen, whose acquaintance I rst made at editorial board
meetings of the Journal about 15 years ago, and with Pramila Bennett,
who tutored me in the ways of the Journal during my years of editing journal
and book reviews.
I would like to see the Journal continuing to function in its unique position as
the home of Jungian clinical reporting and research, as a showcase for the rst
publications of newcomers to the Jungian world, a place for dialogue and
debate, and for the cross-fertilization of ideas from conference papers. Online
access now allows the Journal to offer itself as a training resource in the
international forum and can lead in time to richer cultural exchange and input
in the clinical thinking it reects.
To briey introduce myself: an academic background in ancient Greek
and Latin literature and philosophy, followed by some years of interest
and engagement in Buddhist practice, left me with a lively sensitivity
towards myth, the deep meaning embedded in language, and religious
mysticism. It is a biography that explains my determination to nd a Jungian


2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12000


Susanna Wright and William Meredith-Owen

analyst. However, my Society of Analytical Psychology analyst turned out

to have a strongly developmental approach with no trace of Buddhist or
any discernible mystical leanings. So, whilst maintaining a loyalty towards
the areas of study that deeply inuenced my young adulthood, the foundation for my clinical practice and thought is in the developmental school.
Further study into the psychodynamics of organizations at the Tavistock
grounded me in psychoanalytic ideas, particularly their Kleinian approach,
and this continues to inform my work. More recently, four years working as
a shuttle analyst in St Petersburg has opened my eyes to the challenges and
opportunities of working across national and cultural boundaries and the
continuing signicance that Jungs ideas hold for new generations of students
and practitioners. There are growing numbers of new Jungians in Russia, as
well as in China and the Far East, and I hope the Journal will be theirs too
over the coming years.
This issue of the Journal has a characteristically broad spread of papers
from the old to the new, from the clinical to the philosophical. Thanks to
agreement from the Foundation of the Works of C.G. Jung, we are able to
publish Jungs 1943 seminar on the medieval drawings of Opicinus de
Canistris, delivered during the Eranos series, alongside which Riccardo
Bernardini and his colleagues have provided us with a detailed commentary.
Warren Colman reects on the changes in his analytic practice that have
come with years of experience and brings Aristotles concept of phronesis
into his discussion, using links between analysis and the wisdom traditions
of religious practice. In a tour de force employing quantum theory and
philosophical modelling, Atmanspacher and Fach offer a typology of
mind-matter relations embedded in a dual-aspect monist framework as
proposed by Pauli and Jung. Explication and commentary on their
endeavour from David Tresan give some welcome help for those of us who
are innocent of the complexities of quantum theory to venture into the foothills
of this awesome subject. Continuing the discussion of Jungs theory of
archetypes, Ritske Rensma writes with detailed consideration of whether Jung
believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Finally, in a response to
Christian Roeslers paper published in this Journal in April 2012, Franois
Martin-Vallas argues against a logical and univocal denition of archetype,
pointing out that Jung lacked the concept of emergence which appeared in
scientic theory around the time of his death; Christian Roesler responds with
a vigorous rebuttal and restatement of his position.
The Boston conference (www.jungianconferences.com) in early April will
coincide with the publication of this issue, and I look forward to meeting,
getting to know and joining in debate with some of the valued contributing
authors and readers on whose energy and enthusiasm for informed discussion
the Journal depends.
Susanna Wright



It is perhaps only possible to get a fuller insight into the role and value of an
editor when one experiences the complex vicissitudesthe setbacks and the
satisfactionsthat the submission of a paper brings in its wake. At that point
of consignment all authors must surely feel that their paper is as good as it
can possibly get, and yet they also knowor the uninitiated will soon nd
outthat the experienced eyes of our valued panel of readers will soon be
nding fault, as well as praise. All this feedbackwhether questioning the
complacent, reining in the overly ambitious or encouraging the emergence of
not quite yet realized promisehas to be metabolized and rendered palatable
to the anxious author by the presiding editor. I know from my own experience
that both Warren and his co-editor Linda Carter have maintained this essential
role with patient generosity. I do hope that Susanna and I, in joining Linda in
this task, will prove able to maintain such constructive feedback to contributors
which is so important a part of the Journals remit. All this background work
continues to be facilitated by the experienced eye of our managing editor,
Pramila Bennett, who is also largely responsible for the high production values
for which the Journal is justly noted.
Of course Warren Colman, our departing editor, has in addition to all his
editorial work, contributed a succession of pellucid papers to the Journal over
recent years. Their evolution represents a ne example of the Journal working
at its best, providing a central forum for the ongoing development of analytic
thought within the Jungian community, whilst keeping the value of clinically
grounded work to the fore. These papers are also a testament to the enduring
value of good writing: a great paper should be a pleasure to read as well as a
source of insight. Clarity and understated elegance, combined with a rigorous
eschewal of pretension or mere gesture, are the hallmarks here: values which I
trust will also be reected in the ongoing editorial work of the current team.
Contemporary analytical psychology covers a wide spectrum of clinical
attitudes, from the relational intersubjective to the neo-Kleinian. I am not by
nature a pluralist, and my rather narrow plough is drawn particularly to the
established landmarks (Oedipus et al.) of what nowadays might be regarded
as traditional analysis. I particularly enjoy the interweaving of Jungian thought
with this landscape, always mindful of that complex relationship between Jung
the man and Jung the theoretician. But I am very condent that the breadth of
view so characteristic of the Journal will continue to be represented by the
editorial team as a whole, and I welcome the ongoing debate that the inevitable
tensions generated by this diversity may stir.

William Meredith-Owen

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 162

Preface to
Opicinus de Canistris: concluding lecture by
C.G. Jung, Eranos, Ascona, 1943 and Further
studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on
Opicinus de Canistris
Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano, Turin, Italy
In 1943, Jung held a seminar at Eranos for a limited number of students dedicated to
solar myths, which were exemplied specically in the cartographic art of Opicinus
de Canistris (c. 12961352). This seminar has stayed out of print until a few years
ago. Notes taken during the seminar by one of Jungs students, Alwine von Keller
(18781965), were discovered in the Eranos archives and published. Now, for the rst
time ever, the notes of another of his students, Rivkah Schrf Kluger, taken during the
same seminar, are being published. This second series of notes are more extensive. They
complete the rst series by adding many features and so allow us to put together a more
complete picture of Jungs seminar. James Hillman, who received these notes from
William McGuire in 1976, rmly believed that they were important enough to be published. Now, seventy years after this seminar, thanks to the support of the Stiftung der
Werke von C. G. Jung, the Eranos Foundation and the Journal of Analytical Psychology,
these notes are nally being published.
Key words: Alwine von Keller, Christianity, Eranos, James Hillman, Jung, mandala,
Opicinus de Canistris, Rivkah Schrf Kluger, William McGuire, Emma Hlne von
Pelet-Narbonne, Shadow


2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12001

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 163183

Opicinus de Canistris: concluding lecture by

C.G. Jung, Eranos, Ascona, 19431
Notes taken [probably] by Rivkah Schrf Kluger2
Ladies and Gentlemen! As you can see, I have the honour of concluding with a
brief epilogue for this conference of ours, which has been so successful. You
have heard so many wonderful things along with me and you have heard them
with such magnicent organization and with such completeness, that I am
preparing myself to take on my taskthat of giving you a halfway decent
epiloguewith a certain embarrassment. When we hear lectures of such depth
conveying so many things that come out of the highest culture, at least in my
case there are many questions about these that come into my head. The high
points of culture are mountain tops that rise up high over the plains, plains
somewhat submerged in fog and somewhat marked by marshes or fertile elds.
My glance turns to what lies all around us or what lies as our bases. All of these
cultures were built on foundations that go back far in time, foundations we nd
only hints of in the materials that are directly available to us.

[The words between the square brackets, both in the text and the notes, are those of the editors
Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano. The English translation is by
Vincent Marsicano. This edition of Rivkah Schrf Klugers typescripted notes was made possible
through the kind permission of the Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung, to which the editors would
like to express their gratitude for allowing them to publish her notes after examining them at the
Eidgenssische Technische Hochschule (ETH), Wissenschaftshistorische Sammlungen, in Zurich.
Nomi Kluger-Nash kindly granted us permission to make use of her stepmothers notes. The English
translation was generously funded by the Associazione per la Ricerca in Psicologia Analitica (ARPA).
The Italian translation, for later publication, was funded by the Turin University Department of Psychology. The editors would also like to thank, for their support, the Eranos Foundation, the Journal
of Analytical Psychology, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., and Paul & Peter Fritz AG, Literary Agency. Special thanks also to Pramila Bennett, Gianfranco Bonola, Thomas Fischer, Robert Hinshaw, Ulrich
Hoerni, Nomi Kluger-Nash, Fabio Merlini and Ferruccio Vigna for their encouragement at all stages
of the editorial project.]
[Comments handwritten on the rst page: Not to be publ.[ished], [Marianne] Nie[hus]. To hand
over to A.[niela] J.[aff]. Unfortunately, [Richard Salomons book on] Opicinus in the Zentralbibl.
[iothek] [in Zurich] was out on loan, so the Latin quotations are partly missing. Typescript lecture.
Eranos 1943.]


2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12002


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

So, when we are dealing with sun divinities, our glance readily goes back to
the so-called primitives and we may ask ourselves: what did they do with the
sun? You know, the sun is just one of the planets in ancient astrology, as it is
in alchemy. It is in a position that is certainly prominent but not dominant.
There are the sun and the moon and the host of planets and it is precisely in
alchemy that the sun is not the main point. Much more, the coniunctio soli et
lunae is the main point. And, what is more, Mercury is more important. Or,
in certain older forms of alchemy, it is Saturn. So, perhaps for the primitives,
too, the sun is not at all in the rst place. Really, Im now talking in a way thats
wholly a cross-section. Here I cant present you with any more accurate material.
For, in the little time that I was given, it would have been entirely impossible to
set forth something fundamental. So, I can only give you some examples.
For example, for the Bataks there are many suns.3 They have a cosmogonic
myth that begins with thisthat, originally, there were many suns. That was
very uncomfortable for people because it was always terribly hot. There was
no night at all. Then the moon helped the people, in that it tricked the sun into
eating up its own children. From then on, there has been only one sun. That is
an attempt to start to develop the sun out of an original multiplicity in a more or
less henotheistic way. Or, the sun is, above all, made by people. It is made by the
forefathers, by the ancestors. Like this, for example, in that well-known Navajo
myth,4 where it talks about how people gradually climbed out of the four
absolutely dark underworlds under the earth until they came to the surface of
the earth, where they then heaved up a shield to the sky, and that became the
sun. Hence, there is no trace of any kind of high honour for this shining star.
Sometimes, too, the sun obviously plays a role. I can talk from my own experience. Among the small ethnic groups where I spent some time in East Africa
the so-called Elgonyi, I was rst impressed by that fact that these people apparently had a sun cult. They used the word adhsta, and that meant sun. And so I
rst assumed that their God is the sun. They tied in with this attitude a kind
ofreally, more than optimismof euphoric pantheism, and they called everything good and beautiful, for which they used a special word, msuri,5 which
can be lengthened as they wished. So, they said msuuri, msuuuri, and even
higher levels. So, everything that goes along with it is good and beautiful, so I
assumed that that was the sun; and I once made the comment at half past nine
in the morning at the palaver: so this god is mungu. This is a word borrowed
from Swahili that the Elgonyis used. I was speaking [word missing]-Swahili
with them, which one had to speak with them, and mungu is the word that
was also used by the missionaries in order to translate the word God.

[On Jungs interest in the Bataks, one of the most numerous so-called pagan ethnic groups in
Sumatra, see CW 7, para. 293; CW 4, para. 512; CW 8, para. 125; and CW 9i, para. 188.]
[On Jungs interest in the cosmogony of the Navajos, see CW 13, para. 130.]
[On the idea of msuri, or Mzuri, see C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reections, New York, NY:
Random House-Vintage, 1989; 1961, p. 267.]

Opicinus de Canistris


Mungu is known as God in all of Africa. The people laughed at that and
found it terribly funny that I meant to say that that was God. They even greeted
the sun every morning when they got up with a kind of hand-kissing, which is
not so appetising, because they also spit in their hand in order to offer their
saliva, their soul-substance, to the sun. That is a soul offering. They offer their
soul-substance, their saliva, to the sun, as it seemed to me. For that reason, I was
very astonished when they said that that was absolutely and not at all God, that
it was only the sun and nothing more. And, it took three weeks of steady
research until I nally caught on to it. Namely, I noticed that, when the rst
quarter moon came out, they also go out towards the moon and greet it in
the same way as the sun. Then, when I asked them if that now is mungu, they
laughed again and said that that is absolutely and not at all God. I saw then that
they do not tie in any concept of God with the sun. It is an emotion that links
itself with the ortus solis. And hardly is the sun over the horizon than the reverence to it has also disappeared. The moment is holy, a kind of Horus experience.
The moment where the moon appearsthat is holy. They greet this moment.6
This is characteristic for the primitive personthat he is overwhelmed by his
emotions, not by the object. He does not necessarily attribute itwhat he
feelsto the object. He is overwhelmed by the sentiment, the truth taking, the
feeling, the emotion; and he makes this gesture out of his being overwhelmed.
It is, hence, entirely useless to ask him: What does this mean? He says: Our
fathers did this. And when I asked one of the fathers who is still in stock [who
still was able to testify about this], he said: The grandfathers had still known it,
his father had still known it; but he has already been in the grave a long time.
And, certainly, we can assume that they also did not know it. As little as my
grandfather knew what a Christmas tree was better than me. We really know
nothing about the Easter bunny and such fun and games. It does it for them.
And in the study of the primitive spirit one has to get used to the fact that it
is preconscious. It has not yet reached the heights of meaning and interpretation. But these are already at hand in peoples spirit, even long before a person
knows them, and they take effect from there and act such that the people have
to go out of their huts and offer their saliva to the sun, without their making an
abstract concept of a sun god.
I only wanted to mention this to you in order to show how far primitive
people, mostly, are from such personications of the sun. On higher levels
e.g., the Pueblo civilization, which one naturally can no longer call primitive
there is a true (? or: perfect?) sun cult. E.g., they [the Pueblo-Indians] say: The
sun is our father in (on?) the sky. Now, this attitude sounds rather personied,

[Jung recalls that the Elgonyi worshiped adhsta, that is, the sun at the moment of rising. Only
then was the sun mungu, God (Jung, Memories. . ., cit., p. 267); the sun is not mungu when it is
above the horizon; mungu is the actual moment of the sunrise (CW 18, para. 551) and only the
moment when [the Sun] rises is mungu or adhsta (CW 8, para. 411).]


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

so that I assumed, they really are presenting a person with this, a father. For, they
called him father. E.g. We must really help our father, so that he can go over the
sky. Or: If we are not helping him, he will no longer rise in ten years, and the
world will lose its light. But I learned that nothing goes out over the sun. It is this
sun therethis real, physical sun and not, maybe, someone who made this sun. I
performed this Augustinian experiment: Sol deus non est, sed qui eum fecit7 (?)
to their greatest uproar. Hethe chiefalmost had a t that there could be
someone over the sun or who actually made the sun! That was the most awful
blasphemy. That is the original sun cult, still not yet complicated through any
kinds of personal representations.8
So, it is out of these pre-suppositions, then, that those gods have emerged,
gods who, on higher levels of culture, either have already to do with the sun
or, later, have owed together into the sun. You have surely heard, too, that,
in any case, the sun had not yet been correctly represented in Olympus and only
later made its entrance, and also that there were roots to Apollo of utmost
interest, which go back to chthonic roots, which Prof. Kernyi pointed out.9
Overall, one has the impression that the sun god is already some kind of
abstraction, an idea, and even the abstraction of a causal principle. It was
already thought out, already reduced to the sun. Hence, for example, what is
the original reason that we are living, have blood, have warm breath, move,
that plants and animals move, and we have nourishment? And the answer: all
that comes from the sun. The idea of the sun, the sun god, is really an act of
acknowledgement, an illumination. Originally, acts of acknowledgement had
not been judgements, but they happened to people in the form of enlightenment,
vision, an opening up. For this reason, the sun is basically a living symbol for
the illumination of consciousness. And, anywhere a sun god steps out, we can
safely conclude that there is a kind of cultural thinking. Therefore it happens
that, in cosmogonies, the creation of light (?), the creation of the sun (?), is often
only a myth of becoming conscious [Bewusstwerdung], which you likewise can
see very beautifully in the myth of the Navajos. Unfortunately, I cannot describe
the climbing out of the darkness more closely, where consciousness or conscious
thinking was still in (?) a preliminary stage.
We also nd clear evidence in many places for the conviction that the making
of the picture of the sun comes out of the depth of the soul, hence, for example,
in the primitive idea that people or ancestors had fashioned the sun. The

[Jung was explaining that God was not the sun, but he who made the sun, as in the argument of
Augustine: Non est Dominus [Christus] sol factus, sed per quem sol factus est (It is not Christ our
Lord who became the sun, but the sun that was created by him (CW 5, para. 162 and n. 69; CW 18,
para. 16).]
[Jung notes: The Pueblo Indians derive consciousness from the intensity of feeling. Abstract thought
does not exist for them (CW 18, para. 16; see also CW 18, para. 688; Memories. . ., cit., p. 250).]
[Kroly Kernyi gave a talk that August at Eranos, on Helios in Greek mythology (K. Kernyi,
Vater Helios, in Eranos-Jahrbuch, Vol. 10, 1943, pp. 81124).]

Opicinus de Canistris


emergence of the sun was, hence, attributed to people. So, whether it is an originalman or ancestors, totem-ancestors, that will not tell us much. For the ancestors
who lived in the heroic age were really always the strong ones who created and
built everything. Especially in India, this point is clear. For example, it says in
the Maitryana-Upanishad (6, 27):
The ether-storehouse
Is bliss, is the supreme abode!
This is ourself, our Yoga too;
And this the heat of re and sun.10

There is alsounfortunately I was no longer able to nd the relevant passage

in the rush I found myself ina very beautiful poem from the prayer of the singer
out of which the gods come forth. I found a passage parallel to the poem, which
also claries this thinking.11 This is the song of udgtha, a Vedic ritual. It is the
canticle of the mythic formula Om; and so it goesyou nd it in the ChndogyaUpanishad (third Khanda, 1):
Him who glows yonder [i.e., the sun] one should reverence as an udgtha. Verily, on
rising (ud-yan), he sings aloud (ud-gyati) for creatures. On rising, he dispels darkness
and fear. He, verily, who knows this becomes a dispeller of fear and darkness.12

Therefore the udgtha stands in the place of the sun. The sun is a likeness for
the udgtha, the singing of Omthe mystical calling out. And, whoever knows
that is the udgtha him/herself, that person is also the mystical song himself
and, coming out of this, himself the sun. So, this stress on the subject is absolutely
characteristic of the Indian East. So, it is not so very rare that there are other
stories that place the creation of the world in relation to the shape of people. I remember, there, e.g. in the Aitareya-Upanishad, [rst Khanda, 14], where it says
about the Purusa:

tman (Self, Soul), verily, one only, was hereno other
1. In the beginning, A
blinking thing whatever. He bethought himself: Let me now create worlds.
2. He created these worlds: water (ambhas), light-rays (marci), death
(mara), the waters (ap). Yon is the water, above the heaven; the heaven
is its support. The light-rays are the atmosphere; death, the earth; what
is underneath, the waters.


P. Deussen, Sechzig Upanishads des Veda [Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1897], p. 349. [The Thirteen
Principal Upanishads, trans. R. E. Hume, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 440.]
[The following text was noted later on a separate piece of paper:] And this prayer of the singer /
continually expanding / Became a cow that was there before the beginning of the world. / The gods are
foster-children of the same brood / Dwelling together in the womb of this god (gveda 10.31, cfr.
P. Deussen, [Allgemeine] Geschichte der Philosophie [Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 3 voll., 19221924],
vol. I, pp. 14 ff.) [quoted in CW 5, para. 55.]
P. Deussen, op. cit., p. 71. [The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. . ., cit., p. 180.]


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

3. He bethought himself: Here now are worlds. Let me now create worldguardians. Right (eva) from the waters he drew forth and shaped
(murch) a person (Purusa).
_ + tap). When he had been brooded upon,
4. Upon him he brooded (abhi
his mouth was separated out, egg-like; from the mouth, speech (vc);
from speech, Agni (Fire). Nostrils were separated out; from the nostrils,
breath (prana); from breath, Vyu (Wind). Eyes were separated out; from
_ (caksus); from sight, Aditya (the Sun). Ears were separated
the eyes, sight
out; from the ears, _hearing (rotra); from hearing, the quarters of heaven
(Di). Skin was separated out; from the skin, hairs; from the hairs, plants
and trees. A heart was separated out; from the heart, mind (manas);
from mind, the moon. A navel was separated out; from the navel, the
out-breath (apna); from the out-breath, death (mrtyu). A virile member
was separated out; from the virile member, semen,
from the semen,
water (ap).
So, here you see how the sun and the moon and other things come on out
of the shape of people. These ideas differentiate themselves in the idea of the
Vedic steed-offering. The mythical steed then, in the place of people, is hence
the fountainhead for all being, for the whole creation.14 And, this is said about
that Puruna, and, whats more, in the very old vetvatara-Upanishad [third
Adhyya, 810]:
8. I know this mighty Person [Purusa]
Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness.
Only by knowing Him does one pass over death.
There is no other path for going there.15
9. Than whom there is naught else higher,
Than whom there is naught smaller, naught greater,
The One stands like a tree established in heaven.
By Him, the Person, the whole world is lled.
10. That which is beyond this world
Is without form and without ill.
They that know That, become immortal;
But others go only to sorrow.16

ibid., pp. 1416. [The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. . ., cit., pp. 294 f.]
P. Deussen, [Die] Geheimlehre des Veda [Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1907], p. 21, quoted in CW 5,
paras. 658 ff.]
[Line 8 of the third Adhyya of the vetvatara-Upanishad is quoted by Jung in CW 5, para. 177.]
P. Deussen, Sechzig Upanishads des Veda. . ., cit., p. 298. [The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. . .,
cit., pp. 400 f.]

Opicinus de Canistris


Thus, that is this person who, after all, opens up the being of the world and
out of whom the sun and the moon go forth. This person is the thumbling of
the heart of every individual.17
By now we have observed how the sun god runs through a development in
older culture and, in fact, takes on, as we have surely seen clearly in these very
beautiful talks,18 a more and more spiritual shape; and, in the end, this light of
the sun becomes the light of Johns logos, which shines out in the darkness and
undoubtedly means spiritual illumination and the raising of human consciousness. It is the light of the gnosis theou. This fact of the elevation of human
consciousness through the manifestation of logos is conrmed in the following
centuries and, namely, through a new psychic appearance that antiquity did not
know, and, namely, the fervour of dogmatic discussion. I am not talking about
dogmatic disputes that people, eventually, really could talk about. These have
already been talked about. However, I am looking at these endless discussions
from an entirely different angle. Namely, in my opinion, they are nothing more
than highly earnestly-intended attempts at a higher development of logical
thinking, the practice of which nally came out in Scholasticism, which implies
the highest level of intellectual training. Precisely, consciousness has a meaning
that is entirely extraordinary. It is really the world. Without consciousness,
nothing exists. The world had really been nothing at all until somebody said:
that is the world; that is. As long as that was not known, the world was really
entirely superuous.
This meaning of consciousness also has a moral or ethical aspect, for there is
no will without consciousness. If I am aware of a certain intention (?), I can thus
exercise or develop my will in relation to it. So, the will is that mass of psychic
energy that stays at my disposal. This energy stays with me, though, only to the
degree that I even have a consciousness of it. Out beyond the borders of my consciousness I have no energy at my disposal. Primitive people have no will in so
far as they have a limited will. Therefore complicated rites dentre and de sortie
are needed in order to get them used to situations and then to get them unused
to them again. There are very interesting examples here.
So, anybody who travels in those regions where primitives live and has anything to do with them in any way that is important for life has to know about
these situations. I would not be able to send out any message-carrier with a
letter without having to have a rite dentre performed, which seemed silly,


[The expression, thumbling of the heart, is referred to again a few weeks later in a letter to
Aniela Jaff on September 3, 1943 (Letters, Vol. I.). With that expression Jung identies a personication of the libido, the psychic energy in its creative aspect (CW 5, paras. 180 ff.; CW 9i, paras.
270, 310; CW 12, para. 84). See also G. P. Quaglino, A. Romano and R. Bernardini (2010), Opicinus de Canistris: some notes from Jungs unpublished Eranos Seminar on the Medieval Codex
Palatinus Latinus 1993, Journal of Analytical Psychology, 55, 3, 2010, p. 410.]
[For a complete list of the 1943 Eranos lectures and their original titles, see R. Bernardini, Jung a
Eranos. Il progetto della psicologia complessa, Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2011, pp. 213 ff.]


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

but it simply had to be performed. The messenger had to, as it were, be threatened with death, his parents and his descendants had to be cursed down to the
ground, a whole dance had to be performed, then a shiny grin and he understood and ran 25 km in one stretch. But, before that, he would not have been
able to take one step. This is the phenomenon in South Americagana. They
say: I have no desire. That is all right. Here they say: You, lazy dog!. But,
there, there is nothing to be done until gana appears.19 That is still primitive.
That shows a low level of consciousness: no psychic energy at ones disposal.
Hence, it was, over all, through this spiritual training that will and consciousness and intellectconscious, intentional thinkingwas made possible. In this,
the church did an enormous job of education that is hard to estimate. The
dependency of people of the ancient world on heimarmene is this lack of consciousness that one is in the hands of. Everything is fatal. Nobody can make a
move without a gods being jealous. A person stumbles and right away goes
back in, like the president of Haiti. Two crossed matches lie on his stairs, and
right away he scrambles back in and disappears for the entire day. Dependency
on psychological interpretations (?). If you say, I am in a bad mood, that is
primitive. For example, English education, an education against emotionality,
is a great cultural achievement that we can thank this development for.
This is doubtlessly one of peoples greatest achievements, that they have
reached consciousness and are able to exercise their wills. However, these great
achievements are, unfortunatelyas I, as a medical doctor, must maintaintied
in with certain dangers. A person can easily say: I know, I will; but what
stops him in this from saying: I know, I will? The difference is very, very little.
It is a nuance. But, these are two toto coelo different worlds. I will can still
stand under a higher judgement. Here, I can still say deo concedenteif God
allows it. Here, I look right and left. I want to, after all, but certain things have
to be taken care of. But, if I say I will, in front of my will everything can go to
hell. It is in this shift of sentence stress that the whole issue of our time stands.
I think, I know, I will: the new age began with this.
You see, it is out of this development that the undermining of divine authority
came. The judgement can easily free itself. ThisI would almost like to saycan
easily become an obsessionwhat we have worked out as culture (?) or as our
highest achievement. The sovereignty of the earthly person manifested itself in
various ways and manners in that time, when the judgement achieved its
dangerous freedom. At the same time as the great world-shaking schism of the
Church, the conquistadores climbed down the western slope of America
toward the Pacic Ocean and, by doing this, so to say, they established the extent

[In Spanish gana means appetite or desire. The experience of the loss of gana, which was reported
in South America, corresponds to a so-called loss of the soul in primitive people. Jung borrows the
term gana from Hermann Keyserling (H. Keyserling (1932), Sdamerikanische Meditationen,
Stuttgart/Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1932, pp. 153 ff.). See also G.P. Quaglino, A. Romano
and R. Bernardini, Opicinus de Canistris. . ., cit., p. 410.]

Opicinus de Canistris


of our earth and nally blew up the old view of the world. . . I will not talk
about this: that they discovered those Maya crosses in Yucatan on which bloody
sacrices were hanged, and that led a Spanish synod to reach back again to the
argument of Justin Martyr: that the devil already knew a long time ago that the
conquistadores were to come and he had whispered to them: make crosses right
now and when they come then, you should say: We have it already! An old
story! This is to be taken in relation to the mysteries of Dionysus.
This freedom of human consciousness, the emancipation of the judgement
and will from dependency on what is higher, brought one, I would like to say,
one problem into the worldduality, a problem that really had never been there
before. There had never been the sovereignty of the person in this sense. There
had always been higher controlling powers at hand, which put a damper on
things. So, this duality brought about a foundation of human consciousness,
which had never been there before. There had always been one nature, but this
nature was included in the nature of the gods, or the gods were included in
nature. It was a unity. Now there was a nature and there was a divinity. There
was a revealed truth and there was a lumen naturae which was surely explained
anyway through the illumination of nature or the endowment of nature, of dark
human nature, or even of the nature of animals, with a divine light. But, this was,
to a certain extent, a palliative. It was felt that here some rough terrain was being
trodden over. And, so, we can nd various bases for this lumen naturae straight
away in the conicting spirit of Paracelsus. I would like to read you some of his
observations, so that you can see what kind of chain of hard issues he got himself
into without really knowing it. So, once he said:
Therefore Christian knowledge is better than natural knowledge, and a prophet or an
apostle better than an astronomer or a physician. [. . .] But I am compelled to add that
the sick need a physician not apostles, just as prognostications [prognosticationes]
require an astronomer not a prophet.20

Therefore, revealed truth is really very ne and good, but we nd ourselves

facing problems that the apostles do not help us with. This is what his rst student,
Adam von Bodenstein, said:
The Spagyric has the things of nature not by authority, but by his own experience.21

One has to be clear about what this was meant to mean at that time. Paracelsus
says in the IV Treatise of the Paramirum, where he treats the ens spirituale of
sicknessthat is, the spiritual substance or the noxe, the essence of the sickness,
which is, nevertheless, of a spiritual nature:

Paracelsus, Erkantnus des Gestirns, in Smtliche Werke, 14 vols., ed. K. Sudhoff, vol. XII, pp. 496 ff.
[quoted in CW 13, para. 148, n. 3.]
Paracelsus, De Vita Longa, ed. A. von Bodenstein, Basel: P. Perna, 1562, p. 36 [quoted in CW 13,
para. 148.]


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

If we are to talk of the Ens Spirituale, we admonish you to put aside the style [stylum]
which you call theological [Theologicalem]. For not everything which is called Theologia is holy and also not everything it treats of is holy. And, moreover, not everything
is true which the uncomprehending deal with in theology. Now although it is true that
theology describes this Ens most powerfully, it does not do so under the name and text
of our fourth Pagoyum. . .22

I will explain this later.

And, in addition, they deny what we are proving. But there is one thing which you
must understand from us, namely, that the ability to recognize this Ens does not come
from Christian belief, for it is a Pagoyum to us. It is, however, not contrary to the
belief in which we shall depart from this life. Accordingly, you must recognize that
in no way are you to understand an Ens as being of the spirits, by saying they are
all devils, for then you are talking nonsensically and foolishly like the Devil.23

Pagoyumthus, this is meant to mean: there is a source of knowledge for the

spagyrus, for the researcher into nature, and that is the pagoyum. This is one
of his arcane word-syllogisms, something that, in fact, sick people have too. It
comes from goyem24 (in Hebrew) and paganum, which together make
pagoyum. It is a hybrid construction that means a strengthening in the degree
of pagan-ness. This is, hence, very pagan. And, because it was not so very
understandable, he, in addition, even created a hybrid constructionnot the
understandable Latin paganum, but an arcane word at that, so that the matter
is not very accessible. Because he says: this is pagan light, pagan knowledge.
And, one should not use the stylum Theologicalem [the theologians pen]
because they would say, that is all the devil. So, take notice of this: this
pagoyum is the truth that, e.g., presents itself in this way: that the ens spirituale
of the sickness is not a work of the devil but a natural event, which, in itself, is
incommensurable with revealed truth. And, in another passage of Caput de
morbis somnii, Paracelsus says:
Look at Adam and Moses and others. They sought in themselves what was in man and
have revealed it and all cabbalistic arts and they knew nothing alien to man neither
from the Devil nor from the spirits, but derived their knowledge from the Light of
Nature. This they nurtured in themselves. [. . .] It comes from nature which contains
its manner of activity within itself. It is active during sleep and hence things must be
used when dormant and not awakesleep is waking from such artsfor things have
a spirit which is active for them in sleep.
[Quoted in CW 13, para. 148, n. 4. Paracelsus coins the term pagoya to use in his ve chapters of
his medical work, Paramirum de quinque entibus omnium morborum (Paramirum of the 5 causes
of illness). For Jungs reading of the conict between the two sources of knowledge in Paracelsus
the mysterium of nature and the mother Churchsee CW 13, and especially Chapter I, The Two
Sources of Knowledge: the Light of Nature and the Light of Revelation (paras. 14568)the source
of all the quotations from Paracelsus that Jung used in this seminar.]
Paracelsus, Paramirum primum, Treatise IV, in Smtliche Werke. . ., cit., Vol. I, p. 215 [quoted in
CW 13, para. 148, n. 4].
[Quoted in CW 13, para. 148, n. 6.]

Opicinus de Canistris


This is a ne description of the unconscious, which plays in dreams.

Now, it is true that Satan in his wisdom is a Cabbalist and a powerful one. So,
too, are these innate spirits in man. . .

Namely, these spirits are also Cabbalistic, yet Cabbalistic like the devil. There is
something Lucifer-like to them,
for it is the Light of Nature which is at work during sleep and is the unseen

i.e., the invisible [unsichtbare]

body and was nevertheless born like the visible and natural body. But there is
more to be known than the mere esh, for from this very innate spirit comes that
which is visible. . . . The Light of Nature which is mans mentor dwells in this
innate spirit.25

Then Paracelsus says: it is true that people die, but the schoolmaster keeps on
So, here you can see how a researcher into nature reports his own idiosyncratic mentality to us (?), even right back then at that time that we were
talking about. We can see, if we look into these remarks in him, in Agrippa
and in others, that it was a matter of a real split between sources of knowledge. We seeespecially, in Paracelsushow far this goes. Namely, this lumen
naturae, which is born with the person, which lies in his sidereal nature, this
schoolmaster, who keeps on teaching and keeps on living, even if the person
diesthis falls together with the prima materia of nature. That was the
substratum in which God implanted the godly seeds of creation, and this
material is, according to Paracelsus, not the creatum ex nihilo but the
increatum, the uncreated. Hence, it is a Not-Created something on hand
next to the godhead. And that is a novum in Christian circles. These people
back then did not at all know what they were saying with this. It did
not come into their consciousness. But it is then thatto a certain extent
outside the light of revealed trutha counter-light started up. A dark sun
stepped into the shining sun of the daywhat the alchemists called the sol niger
or the umbra solis.27


[Quoted in ibid.]
Paracelsus, Caput de morbis somnii, in Smtliche Werke. . ., cit., Vol. IX, pp. 359 ff. [quoted in
CW 13, para. 148, n. 6].
[On the alchemical idea of umbra solis, the shadow of the sun, see CW 12, p. 168, g. 81 and n.
106; CW 16, paras. 420 f. and n. 17; and CW 14, paras. 21, 32, 110, n. 7, 117 f., 152, 155, 172, and
346; see also G. P. Quaglino, A. Romano, and R. Bernardini, Carl Gustav Jung a Eranos 1933-1952,
Torino: Antigone, 2007, pp. 189 ff., n. 23.]


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

Here I have let such a picture from an old alchemist be painted for youthe
sun, the earth, to a certain extent the shadow of the earth, so to say, a black
counter-sun (Figure 1).28
And this state of things, which I have just described to you, rises up like a
vision at one time in the rst treatise of the Corpus Hermeticum. It goes like
this: (Dr. Pulver has already referred to this text,29 but I would like to bring it
to your attention a bit more fully.)
When he [Poimandres30] had thus spoken, forthwith all things changed in aspect
before me and were opened out in a moment. And I beheld a boundless view; all was
changed into light, a mild and joyous light; and I marvelled when I saw it. And in a little
while, there had come to be in one part a downward-tending darkness, terrible and grim.
[. . .] And thereafter I saw the darkness changing into a watery substance, which was
unspeakably tossed about, and gave forth smoke as from re; and I heard it making an
indescribable sound of lamentation, for there was set forth from it an inarticulate cry.
But from the Light there came forth a holy Word, which took its stand upon the watery
substance and me thought this Word was the voice of the Light.31

A splitting up of the four elements from out of the chaotic darkness follows this
This place shows us how a dark night suddenly broke out of the realm of
light. And, here, I would like to come to a case that has already attracted my
attention for a long time now, and that is the case of the sickness of a thirteenthcentury cleric, Opicinus de Canistris, a notary at the Papal court at Avignon.
There is a codex by this author (Codex Palatinus Latinus 1993, Vatican). It
was worked on by Salomon, who wrote a book about it. I would, next, like
to read out to you something very short from Salomon, so that you can see what
it is about. And, so, it is one of the many gures that are found in this codex.
The codex is not exactly what alchemy was later to call a mutus liber, a dumb
book, but rather is made up of drawings with writings and, really, it is a kind of
mutus liber. And, here, Salomon says about itas this shape is still to be
construed as the ecclesia universalis, the shadow-body of the old, bad person (?).
This is the way Salomon handles these pictures. Unfortunately, he had too

[Michael Maiers image, which doesnt appear in Jungs original typescript, is commented on in
Psychology and Alchemy (g. 81).]
[Max Pulver gave a talk, that August at Eranos, on The understanding of light in Gnosis, in the
Corpus Hermeticum and in the Eastern Church) (M. Pulver, Die Lichterfahrung im JohannesEvangelium, im Corpus Hermeticum, in der Gnosis und in der Ostkirche, in Eranos-Jahrbuch,
Vol. 10, 1943, pp. 260 ff.).]
[The Poimandres is the rst treatise in the Corpus Hermeticum, attributed to Hermes Trismegistes.
Poimandres, which means shepherd of people, is a character in Corpus Hermeticum who plays the
role of teacher of Hermes Trismegistes.]
Poimandres, Scoll. Hermetica, Vol. 1, Libellus 1. [Corpvs Hermenticvm. Libellus I: The Poimadres
of Hermes Trismegistus, Hermetica Part 1: The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings Which Contain
Religious or Philosophical Teachings Ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus, ed. W. Scott, Whitesh, MT:
Kessinger, 1995, rpt., pp. 115 and 117.]

Opicinus de Canistris


Figure 1. Sol et ejus umbra perciunt opus (Michael Maier, Atalanta Fugiens
[Scrutinium chymicum], Emblema XLV, 1618)

little psychological and psychopathological knowledge. It would surely have

given this investigation a great advantage if these pictures had been looked at
through the eyes of a modern psychologist. Among these drawings. . . (there
are c. 50 uncut parchment pages upon which such drawings are to be found.
These illustrations are somewhat simplied. In the original they are covered
over with writings and are very complicated.). . . there are not only long drawings but also round ones, mandalas that have magic meanings (Figure 2).
There are banishing circles. Whenever something has to be put in order, a
context has to be set up, and these circle-drawings are drawn. They have always
been drawn like that and, today, they will keep on being drawn by individual
people here in the West and keep on being drawn in order to put somethingnot-in-order together into order and context. Usually, there is a splitting into
four that is tied in with this. And that is the high theorem of alchemy, which
you already have come across in the Corpus Hermeticum: that the dark chaos
must be submitted to being split up into the four elements. Here, there is such
a presentation from the alchemical realm: chaos inside a circle, but still there
is no divisio into four parts at hand (Figure 3).
But, so far, it is very interesting, as you can see something: here, in the middle,
the opposites have been enclosed insidenamely, the ames of re and the drops
of water. These are the re of concupiscentia and the tears of repentance
the moral opposites, the pair of opposites par excellence. And, here, outside:
the ow of water and ame of re are still together, and between them


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

Figure 2. Table 20 (Opicinus de Canistris, Codex Palatinus Latinus 1993, c. 13351350)

fragments like these. Those are kinds of islands, of fragments of something,

stone or metal, and these bearwhat is not specied here eitherplanetary
designations: the sun, the moon, Venus. Then there is Saturn and Mars, too,
etc. Those are, then, the old astrological elements constituting the human personality, but, here, expressed alchemically. And that is, then, the original,
unordered, dark, chaotic condition where everything acts against everything
and where the absolute heimarmene-force of the constitutive elements takes
its stand. Here, there is no will, no separation, no choice, no consciousness,
and it is supposed, then, that this chaos be harnessed inside a system of
ordernamely, the four aspects and, thereby, this splitting up into four is to
be accomplished in this chaos. I have shown you this, especially, on
purposeit is an alchemical picturebecause here in Opicinus we have hit upon
a dark disorder.

Opicinus de Canistris


Figure 3. Primordial res (Robert Fludd, Utriusque cosmi majoris scilicet et minoris
metaphysica, physica atque technica historia, 16171621)

Now, wed like to look at such a picture more closely (Figure 4).
You see a human shape, which is composed (complicated?) remarkably. As a
rule, (it) is enclosed inside such an oblong image and there are then magic lines
drawn around it, which are labelled with names of saints or with signicant
namese.g., in this case here with the 12 apostles, then the names of the 12 tribes,
then here all the apologists that this learned gentleman knew about, this
Opicinus. And then the signs of the zodiac are written inside, to some extent,
in order to be able to prot from magic-powered boundary lines. And, there,
you see, that this is, then again, split into two parts, which are characterized as
very opposite. Above, there is a light world; below, a dark world, and all of it is
a human shape. So, there, you can see it clearly: here is the head, which is labelled
as sun, and so, it says here, ecclesia universalis. And thus, below, there are the
feet, and then, there is another gure that comes in there, and that is the body
of the inner person. That could be said to correspond to the representation of
Puruna in India. The body has a mirror opposite, too. That is the corpus umbratile.
The inscriptions are very interestingnamely, this shadow body, about which is
said Hic est vetus homo exterior [missing word] (?) = This is the old, outer, sinful
person, in similitudine mortis Christi = in analogy with the death of Christ. 32

[The complete quotation, which appears in Table 38 on the side of the vetus homo exterior (old,
outer man), is: A lumbis deorsum usque ad verticem est umbratile corpus veteris hominis exterioris
in similitudine mortis Christi mortui mundo.]


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

Figure 4. Table 38 (Opicinus de Canistris, Codex Palatinus Latinus 1993, c. 13351350)

Hence, this is, virtually, the person in his own grave, his going under, his dark
condition. And now, corresponding to this sun (above), there comes the writing
luna and the West; above is oriens and below is the moon, and that is the
Madonna. Here you see a moon gure, so to say, which stands in the middle
of the darkness. Now, it is highlightedthrough and through, beyond any
doubtand conrmed denitely that this world of darkness is evil. And, to boot,
it is not only nature that was distorted by the macula of original sin, but
also Haec est prima perversio sine substantia corruptionem accidentalem secum
trahens. Therefore, that is the rst or principal perversion, therefore the

Opicinus de Canistris


distortion of accidental corruption sine substantia. It is substance less, while the

corruptio naturae has substance. Corruptionem accidentalem secum trahens:
therefore this perversion drags down nature with it into absolute damnation
nature that is not only the naturally corrupt nature but also the nature that
was distorted by the macula of original sin. That is therefore a perverted
corruptio, worse than the macula of original sin. After all, that can only be the
devil, abysmal evil.33
Here, over there, there is a sharpening of the state of things (Figure 5).
There, there is the mother of God; in there, the moon goddess, luna. Here,
there is a black thing (?) and there, there are devils that appear now and,
whats more, even in the shape of a map of Europe. There, there are Spain,
South Africa, Italy, and there, in Italy, where he lives, in upper Italy, where
he comes from, there are all the sinsvenilitas (being up for sale), then,
excessio peccati feminae, vis mali, etc. Hence, there, where he comes from,
all hell has broken loose, and the world of hell and the world of the
demons, that is the map, and, here, there is Satan himself with his goat
beard. And, about him, it saysunfortunately, the text is hard to decipher
from its photostatic reproduction(lat. text), whose picture is shown with
his goat beard, which is called: the mare Aegeum, sive mare Caprinum.
That is related to aix = goat, thus mare Caprinum. And that is, hence, this
sea here, the goats beard of the devil, the rams beard. And there, there
are, interestingly, the single fragments. The irrational circumstances of the
map of Europe have taken on a devilishly distorted shape. There, Spain is
whispering into the ear of Africa. Here, the legsof Italy, one of which is
stretched out towards the Dalmatian coast, but even. . .! Now that is the
chaotic dissolution of the shadow, hence of the negative personality, a dark
persons going backwards to the original chaos of the darkness.
This manone can posit it from the text with considerable certaintyhad a
kind of schizophrenia. He had stepped too far back into the original shadowcondition (?). And, even in this age, the darkness that appears behind the
waning moon has already become all too clear, the moon is surely not always
a light. It is dark and, when it is dark, it is really dark. There is really a massa,
which has been robbed of the light and which points back towards the extreme
original state of darkness. Because all this, this dark, which is behind the moon,
is much darker than one has meant, and this appears, thus, at those moments
where the sovereignty of the principle of light becomes questionable, where it

[In Opicinus, the old, outer man is the persons own ego that corrupts itself with its passions,
while the new, young man is the very same ego that rehabilitates its own Christian wholeness. In
other words, outerness and innerness, shadow and light, can be taken as overlapping existential
categories, as can be gathered from Ephesians 4:2224 and Colossians 3:910. See G.P. Quaglino,
A. Romano and R. Bernardini, Opicinus de Canistris. . ., cit., pp. 411 ff; R. Bernardini, Amor
carnalis, amor spiritualis. Notes on Jungs Treatment of Love from an Eranos Seminar on Opicinus
de Canistris, in Eranos Yearbook, Vol. 70, 2009-2010-2011, pp. 33971.]


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

Figure 5. a. Table 39 (Opicinus de Canistris, Codex Palatinus Latinus 1993, c. 13351350),

b. Table 39 (detail) (Opicinus de Canistris, Codex Palatinus Latinus 1993, c. 13351350)

Opicinus de Canistris


is endangered, and the I will, the I know take a stand against divine authority,
and where one cannot say a single time, the devil did it [der Teufel tuts], as
Paracelsus did, but rather that nature did. There is a lumen naturae that really
shines out behind the moon.
I was thinking that it would be very interesting to you if I showed you an
example like this from the Middle Ages, where this psychology is presented in

Figure 6. The Sephirot Tree (Robert Fludd, Utriusque cosmi. . ., 16171621)


C.G. Jung (from notes by Rivkah Schrf Kluger)

Figure 7. Dies Microcosmicus, Nox Microcosmica

(Robert Fludd, Utriusque cosmi. . ., 16171621)

the most vivid way. And, what is relevant to the characteristic form of the problematics (?) (or systematics?) is what we still nd, here above, in the positive
gurethe vultus dei, the face of God in the form of sol. That, here, is the pope
and this (a gure) says I am the people of the lord. So, the people have a sword,
too, and [missing word?] a crown. Id like not to go into any more of the details.
But, what is relevant to the idea of this split into two, hence, is the fact that it is
characteristic that this upper half is labelled as the agnus dei and the lower half
as ariesram, horned-ram, goat beard, and that is the devil. Now, what did this
cleric really want? It is really clear52 parchment leavesuncut, with the
necks onthese he had to produce because he had to. He pursued an intensive
[missing word?] need. He wanted to and wanted to rule this fearsome conict
out and shut himself off inside the Corpus mysticum of the Church. He had
always tried to shut this absolutely irreconcilable conict in, inside the Corpus
mysticum, as if, inside the lumen (?) of the Corpus mysticum, this hermetic
darkness had originated and to a certain extent had to be held in. And,
naturally, in this, he was shattered.

Opicinus de Canistris


I would like to show you an entirely independent parallel to this, which Opicinus
surely did not know about, and this is the Sephirot Tree of the Cabbala (Figure 6).34
Above, as a sun-symbol, is the crown (Kether), and there below is the queen,
Malchuth or the empire, and in the middle is the son himself, which is to a
certain extent the uniting of above and below. This is exactly the same thought;
here, it is now in parallel with the Puruna of the tree, whose roots are in
heaven and whose crown is on the earth, exactly as in the Indian presentation.
There is another version of the same idea, which is not directly connected
with the Cabbala, but is by the same author, by Rob. Fludd. It says here: dies
mundi (?) microcosmica (?) and, below, nox mundi (?) microcosmica (?) (Figure 7).
Hence: above, the day; below, the night. Everything positive is above. Everything negative is below. Just as, here ([in] Opicinus), catalogues of sins, curses
are written all around and then, above, there are more positive expressions at
hand that allude to the spiritual world.
This psychology is, to a certain extent, the rosy dawn of that golden age of
which we, today, are its shaken witnesses.


[Christian Knorr von Rosenroth maintains that the great tree should be understood as the
Sephirah Tifereth, the wife of Malkhth. The upper Sephirah is also called the root of the tree,
from which the middle line starts out, a kind of trunk that goes downward to the earth, to life.
See C. Knorr von Rosenroth (ed.), Kabbala denudata, seu, Doctrina Hebrorum transcendentalis
et metaphysica atque theologica opus antiquissim philosophi barbaric variis speciminibus
refertissimum. . ., 2 vols., Sulzbach/Frankfurt s.M. 16771684, Vol. I, pp. 77, 165 ff., 629; quoted
in CW 13, para. 411.]

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 184199

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on

Opicinus de Canistris
Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano, Turin, Italy
[Translated by Vincent Marsicano]

On August 23, 1942, Olga Frbe-Kapteyn, the creator of the Eranos Conferences,
wrote to her friend and condante Ada Hondius-Crone: Next years topic is
Helios, which is a very broad eld of research. It will talk about the
sun and the cult of the sun in mythology, the role of light in the gnosis, the
god Ra in ancient Egyptian texts, and Christ-Helios in ancient Christianity
as well as the symbolism of the sun in Mexico, Babylonia, and the Nordic
cults. It seems that this would be a favourable omen to treat this topic. The
world really needs to get more light and more consciousness (Ritsema,
p. 40ter).
We can just imagine how disappointed Olga Frbe-Kapteyn must have been,
when she found out that Jung was so busy working on the draft of his
Mysterium Coniunctionis that he could not have enough time to prepare a text
for the symposium for the following summer (Hannah 1976/1997, p. 275).
Jung arrived in Ascona anyway that summer along with his wife Emma. For
Jung and his wife, Eranos was an event that they looked forward to all year
and that they took as a chance to relax even against the background of the
liveliness that marked the symposium (Gaudissart 2010, pp. 101 ff.). From
August 4 to 11, Jung participated as a simple listener in the entire convention,
which by then had taken on the title Helios. Mittelmeerische Sonnenreligionen
(Helios: the Religions of the Sun in the Mediterranean) (Frbe-Kapteyn
1943, 1944).
Jung thus was able to attend the various presentations by the distinguished
speakers. On August 4, 1943, Georges Hermann Nagel spoke on Le culte du
soleil dans lancienne Egypte (The Cult of the Sun in Ancient Egypt) and
showed a series of slides on the topic gyptische Sonnensymbolik (Egyptian
Sun Symbolism). Nagel was a theologian and professor of Egyptology, Hebrew
Studies, and the Exegetics and History of the Old Testament in Geneva. On

2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12003

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on Opicinus de Canistris


August 5, Kroly Kernyi spoke on Helios in der griechischen Mythologie

(Helios in Greek Mythology), later published as Vater Helios (Father Helios).
Kernyi was a scholar of the religions of the classical world. On August 6,
Walter Wili spoke on Die rmischen Sonnengottheiten und Mithras (The
Roman Sun Divinities and Mithras). Wili was a classical philologist and
professor at Bern. On August 7, Paul Schmitt spoke on Sol invictus: der
Staatsgott der spteren Caesaren (Sol invictus: The State God of the Late
Caesars), later published as Sol invictus. Betrachtungen zu sptrmischer
Religion und Politik (Sol invictus: Reections on the Religion and Politics of
Ancient Rome). Schmitt was a jurist, an editor and a scholar of history of
philosophy and political science. On August 9, Max Pulver presented a
theoretical essay entitled Die Lichterkenntnis in der Gnosis, im Corpus
Hermeticum und in Ostkirche (The Perception of Light in Gnosis, in the
Corpus Hermeticum, and in the Eastern Church), later published as Die
Lichterfahrung im Johannes-Evangelium, im Corpus Hermeticum, in der
Gnosis und in der Ostkirche (The Experience of Light in the Gospel of John,
in the Corpus Hermeticum, in Gnosis, and in the Eastern Church). Pulver
was a former professor of graphology and anthropology at the Institute of
Applied Psychology in Zurich. He was president of the Swiss Graphological
Society and had been working as a professor of graphology at the University
of Zurich. On August 10, Hugo Rahner spoke on Die christliche Symbolik
des Verhltnisses zwischen Sonne und Mond (Christian Symbolism of the
Relationship between the Sun and the Moon). Rahner was a theologian and
professor of the History of the Church and Patristics. On August 11, he also
gave a second lecture on Weihnachtssonne und Ostersonne im christlichen Kult
der Antike (The Christmas and the Easter Suns in the Ancient Christian Cult),
later published as Das christliche Mysterium von Sonne und Mond (The
Christian Mystery of the Sun and Moon).
Louis Massignon and Charles Virolleaud sent papers that were to be
published along with the others in the Eranos Yearbook. They had been unable
to enter Switzerland because the borders were closed. Massignon wrote on La
gnose de la lumire en Islam (Gnosis of Light in Islam), published as Les
inltrations astrologiques dans la pense religieuse islamique (The Inltration
of Astrology into Islamic Religious Thought). Massignon, an orientalist, was
president of the Institut des Hautes tudes Iraniennes at the University of Paris
at the Sorbonne. Virolleaud wrote on Le dieu Shamash dans lancienne
Msopotamie (The God Shamash in Ancient Mesopotamia). An archeologist,
he was president of the Asia Society in Paris and a member of the Acadmie
des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Slide presentations by Wili and Rahner had
been planned in Olga Frbe-Kapteyns original programme, but did not take
placeWilis on The Roman Divinities of the Sun and Mithra and Rahners
on The Christian Symbolism of the Relationship between the Son and the
Moon (Bernardini 2011, pp. 213 ff.).


Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano

After the symposium was over, Jung held a two-day seminar for a limited
number of participants, many of whom were his students.1 The rst part of
the seminar was dedicated to solar myths in general. The second part had a
more specic focusa number of images from the Codex Palatinus Latinus
(CPL) 1993, a medieval illuminated manuscript attributed to Opicinus de
Canistris (c. 12961352), an Italian cleric, cartographer, and miniaturist, who
is also known today for being the rst paraphrenic known to the history of
psychiatry (Laharie 1996, p. 50). Jung had not had enough time to get an
articulate paper together and so he held a rather makeshift seminar. This was
probably the reason why he chose to talk after the symposium was over and
not, as he usually did, during the symposium. The winter following the
conference, Jung was stricken by coronary thrombosis, probably another reason
why he never went over the material again. Alwine von Keller visited him in Zurich
while he was convalescing on September 27, 1944. At that time, Jung was
working on Sal, the chapter of Mysterium coniunctionis (Jung, 19551956,
paras. 234348). In this chapter he investigated the alchemical symbolism of
the sea, a topic he had developed directly in the seminar he had held at Eranos
the year before, when he talked about the maps of the Mediterranean and
Europe that Opicinus had drawn (Bernardini et al. 2011).
Over the last few years we were able to rediscover several pieces of evidence
that have served to reconstruct Jungs seminar, at least in part, a seminar which
had already been referred to in the literature (McGuire 1982, p. 72; Hakl 2001,
p. 217; Kugler 2006, p. 114, n. 12; Jung 2009, p. 349, n. 94). Let us go over
some of these references now.
1. Alwine von Kellers notes
Alwine (Alwina) von Keller (18781965) documented this extemporary
seminar in a series of notes. She was a student of Jungs who had opened a
professional ofce at Eranos in those years. Her nine typewritten pages allowed
us to retrieve Jungs presentation, at least in part. Entitled Notizen zu Jungs
Seminar- am 12. und 14. August 1943 auf der Terrasse der Casa Gabriella im
Anschluss an die Eranos-Tagung vom 4. bis 11. August 1943 gehalten, the notes

No list of the seminar participants has been found. However, we know the names of many of the
approximately 100 listeners attending the convention. These included: Fritz Allemann, Gustav Bally,
Hans Conrad Bnziger, Julius Baum, Carol Baumann-Sawyer, Dagmar Bendix, the couple Katharina
and Rudolf Bernoulli, Cornelia Brnner, Kristin and Alfons Bhler, Gertrud and Walter Diethelm,
Mary E. Elliot, Margarethe Fellerer, Mary H. Foote, Anita Forrer, Marie-Louise von Franz, Richard
Hadl, Barbara Hannah, Ninon Hesse, Aniela Jaff, Jolande Jacobi, Nettie Katzenstein-Sutro, Alwine
von Keller, Magda Kernyi, Joseph Bernhard Lang, Alice Lewisohn Crowley, Fritz Meier,
Erich Alfons Oppenheim, Margret Ostrowski-Sachs, Emma Hlne von Pelet-Narbonne, Maria
Pster-Ammende, Stef Rabinowitz, Alfons Rosenberg, Catharine Rush Cabot, Rivkah Schrf
Kluger, Else and Paul Speck, Kurt von Sury, Toni Wolff, and Hedy Alma Wyss (Bernardini 2011,
p. 214).

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on Opicinus de Canistris


were rediscovered in the archives of the Eranos Foundation in 2006 (von Keller
1943/2007) and published rst in Italian translation the following year
(Quaglino et al. 2007, pp. 16197) and then, partially, in English (Quaglino
et al. 2010).
According to these notes, the seminar did not take place as usual in the lecture
hall at Casa Eranos, but on the terraces of Casa Gabriella on Thursday, August
12 and of Casa Shanti next door on Saturday, August 14. It was in Casa Shanti
that Alwine had been living and working since 1937, along with her friend
Emma Hlne von Pelet-Narbonne. According to Jung, Opicinus was not able
to integrate his Shadow. This is what Jung recognized in Opicinuss drawings,
which he interpreted as mandala. Opicinuss integration failed on the theological
level because he was not able to take on the schism that he had in his own
unconscious. Jung based his comments on the rst edition of the CPL 1993,
edited by Richard Salomon for the London Warburg Institute in 1936. That
same year this book was sent to Jung by Fritz Saxl, who had been the director
of the Warburg Institute since 1929. There is a copy at the library of Casa
Gabriella as well as at the Eranos Collection of Jungian Archetypes of the
Warburg Institute (Quaglino et al. 2010, pp. 409 ff.).

2. Olga Frbe-Kapteyns correspondence

There is no signicant information about this seminar in the correspondence
between Olga Frbe-Kapteyn and Jung, most of which has not been published.
However, we can gain some insight into it through a letter that she wrote to
Hans Conrad Bnziger (18951956) while the seminar was going on, on
August 13, 1943. Bnziger was a noted psychiatrist from Zurich (Bair 2003,
p. 538). He had been an adviser to Olga Frbe-Kapteyn for many years, especially
for her project for the Eranos Archives for the Research on Symbolism (Bnziger
1955). He was also a member of the board of the rst Eranos Foundation.2 In this
letter she tells him that the rst part of the seminar was held in the afternoon of
Wednesday, August 11 (an apparent discrepancy with Alwine von Kellers dating)
and that the second part took place on Thursday, August 12, from 9:30 a.m. to
12:00 p.m., open, as she had suggested, to all the students and patients of Jung.
Let us take a look at her letter in its entirety.

The rst Eranos Foundation lasted from 1943 to 1955. The other members of the council were
Adolf Portmann, Professor of Biology and Zoology at Basel and, later, Rector of the same university;
Tadeus Reichstein, Professor at the Institute of Organic Chemistry at the University of Basel and 1950
Nobel Prize winner in physiology and medicine, along with Edward Calvin Kendall and Philip
Showalter Hench, for the discovery of cortisone; and the Zurich lawyer Walter Keller-Staub. The
second Eranos Foundation, which still exists, was founded in August 1961, as bequeathed by the estate
of Olga Frbe-Kapteyn, who named Adolf Portmann the rst president (Bernardini 2011, p. 47).


Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano

Dear Dr. Bnziger,

By now all the guests have gone and I have been left behind with many impressions
and experiences. As soon as your letter came, I sent the Hlderlin right off. Jungs talk
was a very loose construction because, naturally, he had had no time. The talk will not
get into the Yearbook because he said something, that he would rather not have it
printed up, especially so that he did not want to irritate Rahner and the Church. I
think hes right. The book will be big enough without his article. In the evening
the Jungs and I were at the Kernyis for dinner. And we went down later to the
Collinetta,3 where the folks were gathered. Pulver, who had already drunk quite
a bit, made a speech where he presented me as the living unknown soldier. What
an enormous compliment it was! Evidently, I always sat behind the glass doors in
the room still and almost out of sight. My last chess moveasking Mrs. Jaff to set
up a kind of Jung seminar on my terrace for all his students and patients for Thursday
afternoonwas a great success. In this way I have (oh wonder of wonders!) won over
the hearts of all the club ladies (except for Jacobi, naturally). So, from 9:30 until noon
Jung spoke to about 27 people in the best of moods and they had the feeling that the
old days of the seminar had come back to life. I hope I can do this every year after the
end of the conference because in this way those unsatised temperaments can be
contented. I saw very interesting things in this conference, which I really want to tell
you aboutnamely how Eranos had taken hold of some important people and made
them get down to business. My notary and the buyer of my land came right after
Jungs talk; and, although the contract could not be signed until 10 days after then
because of complicated measurements, he still gave me a third of the purchase price!
So, the thing is set. And today I had the pleasure of being able to pay all the taxes,
together with some debts and all of the conference expenses. Down to the last
centime!!! That is a great feeling. I will now be very careful about spending with
money. The image research is provided for next winter and so I am very relieved
and can look forward to a whole year ahead. Meanwhile, Prof. Wili will be setting
something up since I have given him the news that he needed. I feel a lot better than
at the beginning of the conference, which then was not yet the case. I was very happy
to have you here at least a few days. About the conference itself, everybody feels the
same: it was the most wonderful! Isnt it remarkable that it was possible to experience
these 10 days as in inexplicable peace. Now the hard knocks of the war are coming
soon. Rahner told me how he felt very much at home here. We will organize some
series of image nights with him in the winter. Heartfelt greetings.
Your Olga Frbe-Kapteyn4

It is interesting that Olga attributes Jungs choice not to publish his seminar to
his cautious attitude towards the Church. In particular, she attributed Jungs
resistance to his relationship with Hugo Rahner. Rahner, who belonged to a
Jesuit community in Innsbruck and was the older brother of the theologian Karl
Rahner, had taken refuge from the Nazi persecution in Switzerland. As Barbara

As Barbara Hannah recalls, Of course, life was very different without our cars and we missed the
Jungs in our daily life, for from then on they stayed in the at over the lecture hall. But there was a
very nice hotel, the Collinetta, in Moscia, quite close to Eranos, where Toni Wolff and many of our
old Monte Verit group lived happily in 1941 and 1942. Then, unfortunately, it ceased to be a hotel.
After that there was no general hotel and everybody had to lodge in Ascona, or very near it, with a
transportation problem to Eranos in the hot August days (Hannah 1976/1997, pp. 272 ff.).
O. Frbe-Kapteyn, letter to H. C. Bnziger, August 13, 1943 (Eranos Foundation Archives).

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on Opicinus de Canistris


Hannah continues, He was a specialist on the writings of the Fathers of the

Church, a well-known author and an unusually good lecturer, as well as a
charming personality (Hannah 1976/1997, p. 275). He spoke at Eranos on ve
different occasions, from 1943 to 1948, as long as the provisional headquarters
of his order remained in Switzerland. Rahners article appears in the special
Yearbook assembled for Jungs seventieth birthday. That August was
Rahners rst at Eranos, as we have seen, a talk on Christian Symbolism of
the Relationship between the Sun and the Moon. Rahner was very much
impressed by the atmosphere at Eranos (Rahner 1957, introduction; 1965,
pp. 8 ff.). As we have seen in his letter to Bnziger, he felt at home. Several
weeks after the convention ended, Olga Frbe-Kapteyn suggested that Jung
invite Rahner to give a talk at the Psychological Club. Jung answered that the
idea had tempted him, but that it would be dangerous to invite a Jesuit to
Zurich because this would have attracted undesired attention for political
reasons. The Catholic hierarchy did not look favourably on the Jesuits. Since
the Jesuits were a militant order, they were afraid that religious peace might
be disturbed. His invitation to Eranos raised no problems because he was there
together with other speakers.5
Jung was very cautious in reference to his seminar on Opicinus because it
apparently touched on several issues about which he did not know how the
Church would have reacted. When he commented on Opicinuss images, in
particular, he pointed out that they seemed to lack a counterpoint on the
level of the image of the world of the Church that Rahner had given in
reference to the Church (Quaglino et al. 2007, p. 183; 2010, p. 405). Jung
manifested his caution just as clearly in the case of Ernesto Buonaiuti.
Buonaiuti had been excommunicated and suspended a divinis from the
Catholic Church in 1925 because of his modernist positions. In 1926 he
was forced to leave his post as instructor of the history of Christianity at
the University of Rome, a chair he lost for good in 1931 when he refused
along with thirteen other professors to take an oath of loyalty to Fascism.
In 1942 Jung wrote a letter to Olga Frbe-Kapteyn in which he conveyed
Jolande Jacobis opinion that it would not be opportune to include an essay
by Buonaiuti in the Eranos-Jahrbuch. She replied that Jungs Catholic
adviser was playing a role that was superuous in reference to the contents
of the Yearbook.6 Nevertheless, Jung answered that he shared Jacobis doubts
because Eranos would risk being considered an adversary of the Catholic
Church just as Buonaiuti was reputed to be.7

C. G. Jung, letter to O. Frbe-Kapteyn, September 6, 1943, quoted in Hakl 2001, p. 218.

O. Frbe-Kapteyn, letter to C. G. Jung, May 7, 1942, quoted in Hakl 2001, reference in hitherto
unpublished English edition.
C. G. Jung, letter to O. Frbe-Kapteyn, May 9, 1942, cit. quoted in Hakl 2001, reference in
hitherto unpublished English edition.


Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano

3. H. A. Wysss press article

H. A. Wyss published a short summary of the encounter for the newspaper Die
Tat of August 28-29, 1943. Here is an excerpt:
According to the programme, the conference was supposed to have ended. Nevertheless,
Prof. C. G. Jung did not want to resist the pressures of his followers any more and so
what was in store was an exciting and multifaceted impromptu talk, an astounding
epilogue that helpful spirits readily cooperated in, propping it up with their drawing
pencils and deciphering skills. There is only one series of thoughts from this dense
history of humans becoming conscious that will be disclosed here, the series of
thoughts that marks the turning point in the development of humankind around the
time of the Renaissance. That was the time when the consequential shift of word stress
from I know to I know started and from then on the undermining of divine authority
set in. The unbridgeable duality between nature and God developed through the emancipation of the I-will, the duality between the Sol niger and the Lumen naturae on the one
hand and revelation, on the other. This entire issue was already contained in Paracelsus.
Thus the two spheres interacted as never before at this conference, those of the Christian
and the purely symbolic, those of belief and the psychological. Hence nothing is missing
of the basic sense of opposition, of inner tension, which are the guarantors of genuine life.
What could be more striking evidence for the stimulating liveliness of the hours spent
together than the fact that one already thought of coming back at the moment of
departure? Eranos, the place where the talks were held, and its Archivethat peaceful
lounge with its repository of images from all the heavens and from all the realms of ritual,
mythic, and religious lifeall this proved, this time again, to be an extraordinary site of
suggestions, of immersion in the foundations of our culture, a cell at the core of the
European spirit.8

Wyss thus conrms that the seminar was not only interesting and multifaceted,
but also that it was a lesson that was improvised, one that Jung was evidently
convinced to give in reaction to the impulse of Olga Frbe-Kapteyn and the other
participants of the conference.

4. Emma Hlne von Pelet-Narbonnes diaries

Emma Hlne von Pelet-Narbonne (18921967), a close friend of Alwine
von Kellers, had been a patient of Jungs (Bernardini et al. 2011, pp. 237 ff.).
In the diaries recounting her analytical relationship,9 currently in the process
of publication in an ample critical edition, she wrote that Jung probably wanted
to counterbalance the Helios of the conference with a seminar on the other
side. Nevertheless, she had a feeling of dissatisfaction and disillusion because

Wyss 1943, p. 11.

These diaries collect the dreams of Emma Hlne von Pelet-Narbonne from 1935 to 1966. They
attest to her process of analysis with Carl Alfred Meier in 1940 and 1941 and then with Jung from
1941 on. The diaries are now in the course of publication in an ample critical edition edited by
Riccardo Bernardini for the Eranos Foundation.

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on Opicinus de Canistris


the lesson didnt reach a vertex as it was expected to do, but instead it resulted
as a descent (Hinabfhren) into the reality of the world (von Pelet-Narbonne
19351964, August 1112, 1943; Bernardini 200920102011a, p. 343).

5. Rivkah Schrf Klugers notes

There is a second series of notes on Jungs seminar that joined those of Alwine
von Keller. This additional material consists of notes probably taken by the
analytical psychologist Rivkah Schrf, (later Schrf Kluger) (19071987). The
26-page typescript, entitled Opicinus de Canistris Schluvortrag Eranos Ascona
1943, is housed in the archives of the Eidgenssische Technische Hochschule
(ETH), Wissenschaftshistorische Sammlungen, in Zurich (Schrf Kluger
1943; Bernardini 200920102011a, pp. 343 ff.; Bernardini 2012b, p. 166).
These notes not only conrm the accuracy of the transcription attributed to
Alwine von Keller, but they complement it, adding many references not present
in the other series of notes. Moreover, as Nomi Kluger-Nash points out, Rivkah
Schrf Kluger was such a punctilious scholar that. . . the subjectivity in note
taking was at a minimum, if indeed present at allwhich would make it Jungs
Rivkah Schrf Kluger was, as is well known, a student of Jung, with a
doctorate degree in Semitic Languages and the History of Religionundertaken
at the behest of Jung who suggested this switch from her previous pursuit of
philosophy and history. Although she was raised in an orthodox Jewish
home, Jung believed it important for her to become equally acquainted with
the scientic knowledge of her religion. In Zrich she was welcomed rst as
a guest of the Psychological Club in 1939 and then as a member in 1945. She
read numerous papers for the Club, including The Image of the Divine
Marriage in the Old Testament Prophets, particularly Ezekiel (1940), King
Saul and the Spirit of God (1944), The Figure of Satan in the Old Testament
(1945), Some Psychological Aspects of the Epic of Gilgamesh (1949),
two papers on Women in the Old Testament (1953), a testimonial paper upon
the occasion of Jungs 80th birthday at the Grand Hotel Dolder entitled
The Queen of Sheba in Bible and Legend (1955; see Cabot Reid 2001,
p. 590), Psychology and Religion (1957), and, at the Los Angeles Analytical
Psychology Club, The Feminine Principle in Kabbalah (1972; see Neri 2010,
pp. 177 ff.). These papers and others led to publications of essays in books,
three of which are Flood Dreams (in The Reality of the Psyche, 1968), Old
Testament Roots of Womans Spiritual Problem (in Journal of Analytical
Psychology, 1978), and Evil in Dreams (in Evil: Self and Culture, 1984) culminating
in the publication of her own books, Satan in the Old Testament (1967),

N. Kluger-Nash, personal communication, October 20, 2012.


Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano

Psyche and Bible (1974) later republished and revised as Psyche in

Scripture (1995), and The Archetypal Signicance of Gilgamesh. A Modern
Ancient Hero (1991).
When the C.G. Jung-Institut of Zurich was established, she continued to
teach students in their pursuit of a formal degree as an analytical psychologist.
Before this, she had been in analysis with Jung (Kluger-Nash & Henderson
2008, p. 109), then Toni Wolff for a short time, and later with Carl
Alfred Meier for a longer time. She began her in-depth psychological study
of the Epic of Gilgamesh at the personal prompting of Jung. She succeeded
in joining together the study of ancient Babylonian texts with a Jungian
interpretation of the myth of the hero, as illustrative of the process of the
development of consciousness in a culture, as well as a personal process of
According to Rgine Heim, Rivkah Schrf Kluger was an exceptional
woman endowed with great warmth. She was not only an intellectual, but
she also had a great prophetic capacity in relation to the destiny of the
Jewish people and their suffering (quoted in Neri 2010, p. 175). For many
years, she stayed in close contact with Jung, collaborating directly in many
of his works. Besides Marie-Louise von Franz, she was the only student of
his to publish an essay, in this case her Magna cum Laude doctoral thesis,
The Figure of Satan in the Old Testament (Die Gestalt des Satans im Alten
Testament) in Jungs Symbolik des Geistes (1948). She later married one of
her students at the C.G. Jung-Institut in Zrich, Dr. Yehezkel Kluger, after
his graduation as an analyst. The marriage took place in a large ceremony
attended by Jung et al. on April 4, 1955. She moved with her husband to
his former residence of Los Angeles where they lived until 1969, when they
fullled their dream of moving to Haifa, Israel (Wagner et al. 1979; Peck
1997). Rivkah was the rst Swiss Jungian analyst to move to the United
States. For that reason, along with her general standing as a scholar, she
was treated almost like a queen (Frantz 1995). When the C. G. Jung Institute
of Los Angeles, in 1950, invited analysts from Zurich, Rivkah Schrf Kluger
was the rst one to be chosen (Kirsch 2000, p. 93). The Klugers were both
members of the Society of Jungian Analysts of Southern California where
they had private practices and taught at the Los Angeles Institute and
lectured at the Club. From Los Angeles, Rivkah Schrf Kluger would write
to Jung of her feelings, quandaries, and ideas, and he would write wonderful
letters in returnall of which she insisted be destroyed (Kluger-Nash &
Henderson 2008, p. 111). After the Klugers move to Haifa, they both
continued to work as analysts and educators (Neri 2010, p. 177; KlugerNash & Henderson 2008) and furthered the establishment of the Israel
Society of Analytical Psychology.
According to Nadia Neri, Rivkah Schrf Kluger felt the problem of evil in
particular, certainly as a Jew but also as a woman, a problem that she had
dedicated some of her most beautiful essays to. Within a Jungian perspective,

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on Opicinus de Canistris


she had wanted to delve into one of the most complex problems and mysteries
of lifethe reality of evil and its relationship to the existence of God (Neri
2010, p. 178). Carl Alfred Meier also shed some light on the personality of
Rivkah Schrf Kluger. Meier remembers how Jung was convinced that Jews
had a special ability to articulate their reections on religious problems by
infusing modern thought with the rigour learned in their traditional studies.
Meier remembered Jung as saying, The Jews have a stronger religious genius
(quoted in Neri 2010, p. 184; see also Rosen 1996; Kahn 1998; Kirsch 2002;
Dreifuss 2003; Malizia 2011).

6. Conclusion
As Ulrich Hoerni of the Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung pointed out, the
publication of Jungs Eranos lecture on Opicinus confronts us with a couple
of problems . . . There is no doubt that the script . . . reproduces a lecture by
Jung. The script itself was not made by Jung but, most probably, by Rivkah
Schrf Kluger, who was skilled in the use of shorthand . . . We cant exclude that
it contains gaps and misunderstandings since it was not visibly checked or
corrected by Jung. This must be the reason why it was neither published in
the Eranos Yearbook, nor in the Collected Works, nor in the series Jungs
seminars.11 And Thomas Fischer remarked: There exists a general uncertainty
with the text whether it represents with full accuracy the words as spoken by
Jung . . . The typewritten version contains some language, which is either
grammatically not correct in German or in some instances not fully intelligible
in the original . . . There exist also a number of gaps in the typewritten text,
where a word, or several words, is missing . . . In some cases, it remains unclear
to us what the missing parts are.12
When editing Rivkah Schrf Klugers notes, surprisingly, a few pages of
handwritten notes by Jung were found in his familys archives. They are on
six small size slips of paper (size approx. 10 x 15 cm), containing a few
keywords and written out sentences.13 These speaking notes were obviously
the basis for his talk on Opicinus at the Eranos Conference and conrm the
impression of a somewhat improvised talk. On the basis of these notes, now
being studied and to be included in a further publication, it can furthermore


U. Hoerni, personal communication, May 18, 2011.

T. Fischer, personal communication, December 20, 2011.
There are actually two sets of notes: the rst set existing of 3 small size pages (rst draft, about
240 words), later crossed out by Jung. They were obviously replaced then by the second set of notes
(denite notes, 6 small size pages, about 350 words), which he used as a reminder, when giving his
talk at the conference. The second set of notes clearly develops the keywords and thoughts of the
initial draft notes (T. Fischer, personal communication, October 29, 2012).


Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano

(From left) Aniela Jaff, Carl Gustav Jung, Olga Frbe-Kapteyn and (on the right)
Rivkah Schrf Kluger on the terrace of Casa Eranos in the 40s
(Ph.: unknown; courtesy Nomi Kluger-Nash)

be said that the shorthand notes taken by Rivkah Schrf Kluger follow
accurately the keywords that Jung had prepared for the speech. It is also known
that the notes taken by Rivkah Schrf Kluger were later considered by the
editors of the Collected Works for inclusion in the materials for publication
(as indicated by the handwritten notes by Marianne Niehus on the rst page),
but were dropped from the denite list of texts selected, probably because they
were considered too fragmentary, among other things.14 In any case, as Thomas
Fischer of the Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung conrms, the notes in general
reect the structure and subjects of Jungs talk as registered by Rivkah KlugerSchrf and, thus, largely conrm the accuracy of the notes taken by her.15
In 1976, James Hillman and Rudolf Ritsema exchanged a series of letters
about the notes of Rivkah Schrf Kluger (Bernardini 200920102011a,


T. Fischer, personal communication, October 26, 2012.

T. Fischer, personal communication, October 29, 2012.

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on Opicinus de Canistris


pp. 343 ff.; 2012a, p. 64). At the time, Ritsema was collaborating with Adolf
Portmann in coordinating the Eranos Conferences and later in 1982 he became
the president of Eranos. In an unpublished letter dated May 21, 1976, James
Hillman wrote to Rudolf Ritsema saying that William McGuire was sending
him an unnished text in German about Opicinusprobably, notes taken by
Rivkah Schrf Kluger. Hillman was aware that the document was never
published and asked Ritsema to tell him anything more about the 1943
Conference and the circumstances of Jungs lecture. On May 31, 1976,
Hillman wrote to Ritsema that he had received Jungs paper, but had not
reviewed it yet. He knew that Opicinus de Canistris was a twelfth century cleric
in the Avignon court of the Pope. However, he realized that the text simply
included notes and comments on others lectures and that only towards the end
of the document did it mention Opicinus; it was full of lacunae too. On June 3,
1976, Ritsema wrote to Hillman that he was very interested in hearing about
Jungs notes, even though he doubted they were part of a lecture on the topic
by Jung, since his name was not on the programme of the Tagung. In his opinion,
Jung made these notes for discussion with his inner circle of followers. Ritsema
said he would seek more information about this seminar from Lucy Heyer-Grote,
who might have notes about those early years, or from Tadeus Reichstein, both of
whom had been in close contact with Olga Frbe-Kapteyn for many years
(Bernardini 2011, pp. 47; 266; 314; 336 ff.). The publication project was never
nished (Bernardini 200920102011a, pp. 343 ff.).
We are happy that, almost forty years after this letter exchange, Rivkah
Schrf Klugers notes, although fragmentary, are nally published thanks to
the trust of the Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung, the Eranos Foundation and
the Journal of Analytical Psychology.

En 1943, Jung a tenu un sminaire Eranos pour un nombre limit dtudiants, sur les
mythes solaires , tels ceux qui sont plus particulirement illustrs dans lart cartographique
dOpicinus de Canistris (1296-1352). Ce sminaire navait pas t dit jusqu ce que, il y
a quelques annes, les notes prises pendant ce sminaire par lun des tudiants de Jung,
Alwine von Keller (1878-1965), furent dcouvertes dans les archives dEranos et publies.
Maintenant, pour la premire fois, les notes dun de ses autres tudiants, Rikvah Schrf
Kluger, prises lors du mme sminaire, sont publies ici. Cette seconde srie de notes est
plus approfondie. Elle complte la premire srie, ajoutant de nombreux lments, nous
permettant de nous faire une ide plus complte du sminaire de Jung. James Hillman,
qui avait reu ces notes de William McGuire en 1976, avait la ferme conviction que les
notes taient sufsamment intressantes pour tre publies. Aujourdhui, grce au soutien
de la Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung, de la Fondation Eranos et du Journal of Analytical
Psychology, ces notes sont enn publies. Suit un commentaire des confrences.


Riccardo Bernardini, Gian Piero Quaglino and Augusto Romano

1943 hielt Jung vor einer begrenzten Anzahl von Studenten ein Eranos-Seminar ber
Solare Mythen, wie sie im besonderen in der kartographischen Kunst des Opicinus de
Canistris (ca. 12961352) dargestellt ist. Dieses Seminar blieb unverffentlicht bis vor
einigen Jahren die Aufzeichnungen hierber, die von einer von Jungs Studentinnen,
Alwine von Keller (18781965), gemacht worden waren, im Eranos-Archiv entdeckt
und publiziert wurden. Nun werden erstmalig die Mitschriften einer anderen seiner
Studentinnen, Rivkah Schrf Kluger, gedruckt, die diese whrend des Seminars fertigte.
Diese zweite Serie von Aufzeichnungen ist umfangreicher. Sie vervollstndigen die erste
Serie unter Hinzufgung vieler Merkmale und erlauben uns, ein vollstndigeres Bild
von Jungs Seminar zusammen zu stellen. James Hillman, der diese Unterlagen von
William McGuire 1976 erhalten hatte, glaubte fest daran, da diese Mitschriften wichtig
genug seien, publiziert zu werden. Jetzt, sieben Jahre spter, werden diese dank der
Untersttzung der Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung, der Eranos Stiftung und dem Journal of Analytical Psychology verffentlicht. Ein Kommentar der Referate schliet sich an.

Nel 1943, a Eranos, Jung tenne un seminario, riservato a un numero ristretto di studenti,
dedicato ai miti solari, esemplicati in particolare nellarte cartograca del sacerdote
italiano Opicino de Canistris (12961352 ca.). Questo seminario rimasto inedito no a
pochi anni fa. Sono stati recentemente ritrovati negli archivi di Eranos e pubblicati gli
appunti che una sua allieva, Alwine von Keller (18781965), prese durante la lezione di
Jung. Vengono ora presentati, per la prima volta, gli appunti che unaltra sua allieva,
Rivkah Schrf Kluger, prese durante il medesimo seminario. Questa seconda serie di
annotazioni, pi estesa, completa la prima serie con molti elementi, permettendo la
ricostruzione di un quadro pi completo del seminario junghiano. Nel 1976 James Hillman,
ricevendo da William McGuire questi appunti, ritenne che fosse importante che arrivassero
alla pubblicazione. A distanza di settantanni da questo seminario, grazie al sostegno della
Stiftung der Werke von C. G. Jung, della Fondazione Eranos e del Journal of Analytical
Psychology, queste note arrivano nalmente a pubblicazione.

1943 ,
(1296-1352). ,
, (1878-1965),
. ,
, .
. ,
. , 1976
, , , .
, , , .. , ,
, . .

Further studies on Jungs Eranos seminar on Opicinus de Canistris


En 1943, Jung realiz un seminario en Eranos para un nmero limitado de estudiantes

sobre mitos solares ejemplarizado especcamente en el arte cartogrco de Opicinus
de Canistris (s. 1296-1352). Este seminario permaneci indito hasta hace pocos aos
cuando las anotaciones tomadas por uno de los participantes, Alwine vos Keller
(1878-1965) fuero descubiertas en ls archivos de Eranos y publicadas. Ahora, por primera vez, las anotaciones de otro de los estudiantes, Rivkah Shrf Kluger, tomadas en
el mismo seminario, han sido publicadas. Esta segunda seria de anotaciones son ms
extensas. Ellas complementan la primera serie, aadiendo muchos aspectos y permitindonos integrar una visin ms amplia del seminario de Jung. James Hillman, quien recibiera esta noats de William Mcguire en 1976, crey que estas eran lo sucientemente
importantes como para ser publicadas, Ahora, despus de setenta aos, gracias al apoyo
del la Stiftung der Werke von C.G. Jung, la Fundacin Eranos y el Journal of Analytical
Psichology, estas anotaciones son nalmente publicadas. Se sigue con un comentarios
sobre las anotaciones

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[MS rst received October 2012; nal version December 2012]

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 200218

Reections on knowledge and experience

Warren Colman, St Albans, UK
Abstract: As analysts become more experienced, theoretical knowledge becomes more
integrated and implicit and is gradually transformed into the practical wisdom (phronesis)
described by Aristotle. While this leads to greater freedom in ways of working, it remains
conditional on the consistent disciplined practice represented by the analytic attitude. In the
context of my own development as an analyst, I suggest that increasingly the analyst works
from the self rather than the ego and link this with Fordhams account of not knowing
beforehand. Some implications for boundaries, enactment and the use of personal disclosure
are discussed in relation to clinical material. I compare analysis with the wisdom traditions of
religious practice and suggest that analysis is concerned with a way of living rooted in humane
values of compassion and benevolence.
Key words: analytic attitude, analytic super-ego, boundaries, enactment, phronesis,
unknowing, wisdom

Introduction: becoming an analyst

For many years, I struggled with a nagging doubt that I was not really a proper
analyst since, in various ways, my practice did not seem to conform to
recognizable descriptions of what analysts do. Ironically, only as I have become
more accepting of the kind of analyst I am have I realized the ubiquity of my
doubts. For example, Joseph Sandler refers to the conscious or unconscious
conviction of many analysts that they do not do proper analysis. He argues that
The conviction that what is actually done in the analytic consulting room is not
kosher, that colleagues would criticize it if they knew about it, comes from the reality
that any analyst worth his salt will adapt to specic patients on the basis of his
interaction with those patients.
(Sandler 1983, p. 38)

Similar remarks were made by Bion in his clinical seminars posthumously

published in 1987:
It is only after you have qualied [as an analyst] that you have a chance of becoming an
analyst. The analyst you become is you and you alone; you have to respect the uniqueness
of your own personalitythat is what you use, not all these interpretations (these
theories that you use to combat the feeling that you are not really an analyst and do
not know how to become one).
(Bion 1987, p. 15; quoted in Gabbard & Ogden 2009, p. 311)

2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12004

Reections on knowledge and experience


The irony implicit in Bions remarks is that only someone who has given up
trying to be an analyst can actually become one. The emphasis on the analysts
own personality is also redolent of Jungs much earlier remark that
The personalities of the doctor and the patient are often innitely more important for
the outcome of the treatment than what the doctor says or thinks.
(Jung 1929/1966, para. 163)

Nevertheless, relying on ones own personality is a potentially risky option,

not least because it exposes us to the vagaries of our own limitations and
blind-spots. Where is the dividing line between adapting to specic patients
and departing from the boundaries of good analytic practice if neither
psychoanalytic theory nor established practice are reliable guides to fall back
on? This question immediately confronts us with the ethical dimension of
analytic work: in this regard, reliance on being a proper analyst may be a
defence against the effort to discern what constitutes being a good analyst, in
the philosophical sense of the quest of the good. This is inevitably a stressful
activity. On the one hand, we need to maintain a exibility and openness to
the unknown that avoids having too denite an idea of the task in order to
allow for the more unpredictable and inexplicable aspects of psychic life. On
the other hand, analytic work demands an attitude of continual questioning
in which nothing can be taken at face-value and the analyst is continually engaged in an intensive effort to discover what is really going on. Furthermore,
the recognition of the complex interplay between transference and countertransference extends this exploration to rigorous self-scrutiny, requiring
analysts to be ruthlessly honest with themselves regarding their fallibility,
countertransference illusions, limitations, blind-spots, etc. The dangers of
falling into error, complacency, rote behaviour or acting out ones own
complexes are rifehence the need for consultation with colleagues, although
the uniqueness of each analyst/patient relationship and the difculty of conveying
its complexity, detail and implicit dimensions to others means that the guidance
offered by colleagues is inevitably limited. This can sometimes make being an
analyst a very lonely business.
As a result of these pressures, analysts live with high levels of anxiety and
uncertainty. In a previous paper (Colman 2006) I suggested that this is one of
the main reasons for the pervasiveness of an analytic super-ego that generates
further levels of persecutory anxiety about who is and who is not a proper
analyst. In the conclusion of that paper, I suggested that the functioning of a
more benign super-ego might be considered as being akin to a council of elders
consulted by a ruler (ibid., p. 113). This idea of eldership implies that the
internalization of an external set of rules may be gradually transformed into
something that is based on the kind of knowledge that comes from long
experience. Although such knowledge is rooted in analytic theories and traditions,
it is oriented more towards learning from experience in Bions phrase. This


Warren Colman

quality is akin to Aristotles concept of phronesis, translated as prudence or

practical wisdom. The role of long experience in phronesis is made plain by
Aristotles remark that
a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is
concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from
experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is the length of time that gives
(Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, ch. 8)

In other words, there is a transformation of the generalities with which all theories
are concerned (universals) into becoming familiar with the particulars out of
which such theories are made. The more one becomes able to recognize theory
in practice, the less relevant the theory seems to become since the universal generalities are replaced by a long series of unique particulars, albeit these are organized
in terms of a range of increasingly pre-conscious schemas. This also enables the
analyst to apply old theoretical principles in new and unexpected situations they
could not have foreseen. The result is similar to that described by Michael Parsons
(2000) as the rending of theory. But it is also a question of making the theory
ones ownthe same point that Sandler was making in his 1983 article.
Phronesis may also be regarded as the outcome of a super-ego function that has
been made ones own. Aristotle refers to the phronimos, as the normal, ideally
good agent; the man whose goodness is intelligent and says of him that the rules
which the phronimos nds and applies for himself are based upon his own
intelligent moral experience. This may echo the distinction Jung made between
the collective conscience embodied in Freuds super-ego and the personal
conscience which is a function of the individuated self (Jung 1940, para. 390).
In this paper I aim to outline the development of phronesis in my own
practice and explore some of the implications and dilemmas of working in this
more personally oriented way. While this confers a greater freedom, openness
and authenticity, its shadow aspect appears when freedom slides into laziness
and licence. So it is important to remember that phronesis is an ethical attitude
concerned with intelligent goodness, a theme to which I return at the end of the
paper with a brief consideration of the values underlying analytic practice.

The surprise and discomforts of being oneself

Inevitably, many of the most important changes in life happen outside conscious
awareness. Often this is because they occur very gradually and only become
noticeable in retrospect. As John Lennon put it shortly before he was murdered,
Life is what happens while youre busy making other plans1 (Lennon 1980).

Tragically, in his case, the same was true of his death.

Reections on knowledge and experience


Over the past few years, I have noticed a change in the way I practise that seems
to have occurred between ten and fteen years after qualication. This time scale
seems to be borne out by the fact that I qualied as a couple psychotherapist several
years before my qualication as an analyst and the change in my couple psychotherapy practice occurred several years earlier than the change in my analytic work.
In both cases, I noticed that I no longer seemed to be formulating the material of the
session in terms of psychoanalytic concepts. With couples I found that I was focusing almost entirely on the actual interaction between the couple and rarely made
transference interpretations since I had found that, in my experience, couples rarely
seemed to nd them relevant or useful. In my individual work, while I was still
paying as much attention as ever to what was going on in the room2 and still struggling to understand enough to say something I considered to be a useful intervention, I noticed that it was becoming much more difcult to know which of these
might be regarded as interpretations. Nor could I say what theory I might be
drawing on to make them or even whether I was drawing on any theory at all.
Having become much less internally persecuted by the need to justify myself to
my analytic super-ego, what went on in my consulting room now seemed to be
getting further and further away from what might be recognizable as analysis.
Despite the discomfort I continue to feel about this from time to time, I have
come to feel that the overall sense of being more at ease in the work and the
apparent decoupling from explicit theoretical formulation is mainly a sign of the
integration that occurs through long years of experience. It also reminds me of
an intangible quality I had noticed in the senior training analysts I consulted in
the course of seeking election to more senior levels of membership of my
analytic society, a process that provided opportunities to take stock of my own
level of professional development. These elders did not seem to know more in
the sense of theoretical knowledge but they still had a great deal to teach me. I
realized that what they possessed was a kind of clinical wisdom apparent not so
much in what they said about my work as in its pertinence and the way it
deepened my own understanding. This could perhaps best be compared with
artistic communication: the intangible quality that makes a performance emotionally moving or spiritually inspiring as compared to one that is merely competent
and enjoyable. We know that what lies behind the performance is a depth of integration that comes from long hours of practice but practice alone does not necessarily make perfect; there also has to be a spark that comes from the inner
depths of an artist or an analysts individual beingfrom the self as Jungians
might say.3 This intangible quality was probably what Hanna Segal was getting
at when she described one of the qualities needed in a psychoanalyst as intuition
but also a kind of knack (Segal et al. 2012). An indication of what Segal might
I use the phrase in the room as a common shorthand for in the patient, between me and the patient and in my own mind.
This touches on the issue of the relative contributions of character and competence in the making
of an analyst (see Wiener 2007).


Warren Colman

have meant is given in a conversation reported by one of my supervisors, Hugh

Gee, about Kenneth Lambert, one of the rst analysts to train at the SAP in the late
1940s. One of Lamberts previous patients remarked to a colleague that Kenneth
hadnt made any transference interpretations throughout his analysis. The colleague replied: Ah, but Kenneth was a very subtle man. I took this to mean that
Lamberts way of interpreting the transference was so integrated into his overall
discourse that it could no longer be differentiated by the label transference
Recently, I have begun to notice this intangible, even ineffable quality in some
of my own work, particularly as a supervisor, and this has led me to feel that
perhaps I too have become a senior training analyst, by which I mean nothing
to do with status but rather a quality of deep integration that comes from long
experience and generates a kind of clinical wisdom. One of these experiences
was quite dramatic.

The house is having an orgasm

The supervisee had made very detailed notes most of which consisted of a long
dream in which the patient being presented found herself in a wooden house in
the forest. Her powerful female boss was holding court there with several male
gures and after a series of incidents, they all had to leave the house
because it was shaking violently as if about to fall down, perhaps due to some
kind of earthquake. Throughout this lengthy presentation I found myself
entirely bereft of thought and eventually the supervisee expressed her concern
that she had overwhelmed me, like in the dream where the male gures were
weak and fragmented. The session was nearly over and I had still not
come up with anything when I had what felt like a mad thought. I suggested
to my supervisee that the shaking house was not falling down but that
the house is having an orgasm. The supervisee understood this immediately
and was able to link it with her patients feeling that her sexuality is a (destructive) witch. Only now does it also occur to me that the dream was also being
re-enacted in the supervision when the supervisor, apparently overwhelmed by
the supervisees excited presentation, suddenly bursts into life and makes an
orgasmic interpretation. Even this, though, barely conveys the emotional experience in the room with my supervisee which I can perhaps best convey by comparing it to that sense of shocked amazement that occurs with the more remarkable
examples of synchronicity. I suggested to my supervisee that we must have been
working together in the deep unconscioushence the mad thought that arose
as if from nowhere into my conscious mind.
Although there may be various ways in which an experience like this may be
explainedfor example by reference to implicit relational knowing (Stern
et al. 1998; Lyons-Ruth 1999), moments of complexity (Cambray 2011) or
symbolic density (Hogenson 2009)my emphasis here is on the phenomenology

Reections on knowledge and experience


of the experience in which I had no idea where my thought had come from. The
experiential impact of this is hard to describe. I could see that my mad thought
had in some way arisen out of a well-practised use of metaphorical interpretation
especially the sexual metaphors that are so prominent in psychoanalytic thought
(Colman 2005). But at the same time, I had a strange feeling as if this knowledge
had nothing to do with me and I was as surprised as anyone else by where it had
come from. There was an odd sense of being both strange and familiar to myself
in seeing that the person who could do this was me. Although pleased that I could
do it, I felt as if I could not take any particular credit for it. To put it in Jungian terms,
such insights appear to come out of the self and have a distinctly non-ego character.
By this I do not mean to imply any kind of a priori Self that thinks and acts
independently of the ego. Rather I am thinking of a dynamic, uid and
contextualized self that is responsive to the environment but in a way that
exceeds conscious knowledge and control. This may be thought of in terms of
Fordhams model of a self that learns from experience via the ongoing sequence
of deintegration and reintegration. Another perspective may be found in
developmental theories concerning the implicit dimensions of cognitive
development. According to Lyons-Ruth (1999), cognitive-developmental research
shows that thinking progresses to highly complex, formal modes through the
development of enactive procedures that are not easily, and never completely,
translated into a verbal, explicitly retrievable medium. This is most apparent in
non-verbal domains such as artistic or athletic skills but also occurs in scientic
work and in clinical practice where implicit clinical knowing . . . proceeds to high
levels of complexity outside the medium of words (p. 599). So the self out of which
such spontaneous, non-rational insights and interventions arise is a highly trained
and skilled selfsomething which can only develop through many long hours of
practice. Jung himself repeatedly referred to the need for the ego to scrutinize and
interrogate the products of the unconscious, as the endless series of dialogues in
The Red Book amply demonstrate. Furthermore, he stressed the ethical aspect of
this ego-self relation and, in mythic form in Answer to Job, depicts the way the
self might develop via confrontation with the ego. That which comes forth as
Christ in Jungs grand narrative has its microcosmic correspondence in the
emergence of a living symbol in the analysts mind out of the long, hard gestation
of analytic questioning and self-scrutiny referred to earlier.
This process requires a kind of radical unknowing and an inner trust that
something will turn up. I was initially perplexed when I began to notice this in
myself while supervising groups of trainee psychodynamic counsellors. The other
members of the group would have lots of ideas and nd much more to say about
their colleagues presentations than I could, even though I was supposed to be the
one who knows. Quite appropriately, they were all keen to try out their new
found knowledge whereas I was casting around in the smoke rings of my mind
(in the foggy ruins of time) for something that seemed relevant and useful. It would
seem that in this process there is a lot going on that has become subliminal so that
it may be that many possibilities are rejected out of awareness before something


Warren Colman

gets selected as worth sayingand even then, that which I feel most certain of may
need to be treated as a hypothesis to be tested against further knowledge and
experience and discarded if need be. To this extent, analysis is a scientic
discipline although very similar processes go on in artistic work as well.4

Not knowing beforehand

Thinking about this has led me to wonder whether I am nally beginning to
understand what Bion may have meant by working without memory, desire
or understanding. In my experience, this is something that happens rather than
being intended and can only be understood once it has already occurred. If I can
feel condent and relaxed enough to settle into a reverie of knowing nothing,
something might occur that catches my interest and attention and seems worth
pursuing, even if I dont know why. Examples of such selected facts, as Bion
calls them, might include an incongruous image in a dream, an odd choice of
words or a non sequitur in what the patient is saying. It takes time to be able
to trust that the selected facts which interest us are also likely to be analytically
relevant, regardless of whether they seem like mad thoughts or an irrelevant
enquiry into aspects of the patients external life.
This underscores the futility of attempting to make Bions eschewal of
memory, desire and understanding into a deliberate instruction of how to
work, a difculty that is apparent in one of Michael Fordhams last papers on
Not knowing beforehand(1993). He certainly seems to be addressing the kind
of experiences I have described when he writes (regarding the process of
digesting projective identications):
At this point it is desirable to trust ones unconscious and wait further developments,
rather than fall back on technical, i.e. conscious knowledge. It is out of that emergent
experience that a communication by the analyst, relevant to the patient, can develop,
because it relates immediately to the patients emotional experience.
(Fordham 1993, p. 130)

Yet he also describes his investigation of mutual projective identications in

terms of a conscious trying to perceive the patient as if he had never seen him
before and had no knowledge of him (ibid.) and recommends this to trainees,
saying that they should imagine that they have a mental ling cabinet which
should remain locked during the time they are with the patient. He acknowledges
that it is rare for trainees to achieve this and adds that it is an ideal to be
approximated (ibid., p. 131). However, I have come to feel that this is an
impossible recommendation that can only increase the trainees severe

For example, David Lean is said to have discarded the best scenes of Doctor Zhivago because they
did not t in with the whole; the ceramic artist, Edmund de Waal, regularly enjoys breaking up pots
that are not good enough (Desert Island Discs, BBC Radio 4, 25/11/2012).

Reections on knowledge and experience


bewilderment that the not-knowing behaviour . . . can evoke (ibid.). The more the
trainee tries, the more they will fail since something which can only arise through a
natural process of development becomes instead yet another super-ego injunction,
especially when issued by as august a gure as Michael Fordham. I sometimes
need to reassure supervisees that they need to accept where they are rather than
struggling to be where I am. Rather than trying to perceive the patient in a
particular way, the key thing is to allow oneself to recognize the way one is
perceiving the patient even if that includes recognizing ones own self-critical
judgements. Its a question of accepting what is. Gradually it becomes possible
to recognize what is happening in the room through not trying to perceive or
do anything in particular. This usually leads to a much greater freedom in the
way we relate with patients, the sorts of things we say and more broadly, how
we are with them. This is the meaning of having the freedom to be oneself with
the patient.

Analytic freedom and its limits

This is not without its difculties since it carries the ever-present danger of wild
analysis when the analyst abandons the analytic attitude and unconsciously acts
out with the patient either out of the counter transference pressures induced by the
patients transference or out of the analysts own needs, especially their own
narcissism. Of course, it may be hard to distinguish between the two since it is
where ones own vulnerabilities are touched that one is most likely to act out
the counter transference pressures evoked by the patient.
It is now generally recognized that minor incidents of this kind, known as
enactments, occur frequently and that they can provide useful information about
the current state of the transference/counter-transference. However, enactments
are still usually considered as errors of some kind that are only useful as a way
of informing the analysts subsequent understanding expressed either through
interpretation or a re-adjustment of the analysts stance.5 It is less often recognized
that enactments can advance the therapeutic process as a direct expression of the
analysts mainly unconscious response to the patients needs. Jean Knox (2009)
has discussed this in terms of patients who need to establish a sense of self-agency
through being able to have an impact on another person. Such patients cannot grasp
the analysts intentions towards them except through their actions, so they cannot feel
they have an impact on anyone unless they can coerce the other into responding.
Enactments may also be valuable with patients who are not necessarily
functioning at this early stage of development since they are an expression of
an implicit relational communication that is often more powerful in effecting
change than verbal interpretations. This opens up much wider possibilities for

This view can be found even amongst relational analysts who generally have a more neutral view
of enactments (see Benjamin 2009).


Warren Colman

the ways in which we are able to help our patients while remaining within the
overall discipline of psychoanalytic work. This latter point is an essential caveat
because, without it, there would be no boundary between an analytic relationship
and the umpteen other ways in which the patients needs might be met. Nor would
there be any distinction between helpful enactment and unhelpful acting out. So it
is vital that analysts have a well functioning schema of what analytic work looks
like, especially when they begin to depart from it. This is sometimes expressed in
the phrase you have to learn the rules before you can break them. This may be
true but one of my abiding concerns is that the rules should be taught in a way that
opens up the novice therapist to learning from their own experience rather than
closing down these opportunities through super-ego induced guilt and anxiety.
In my experience as a teacher and supervisor it is much more common to nd
therapists who are too inhibited with their patients than those who are too
uninhibited and throw caution to the wind.
Nevertheless, those occasions when analysts depart too far from standard
analytic boundaries and commit ethical boundary violations offer salutary
warnings to us all. Nor is it surprising to learn that it is senior male analysts
who are most at risk of transgressing in this way since the additional freedom
and condence that come with experience can easily tip into the omnipotent
belief of those who believe the rules do not apply to them (Gabbard &
Hobday 2012).
Here the distinction between boundary crossing and boundary violation is
most helpful (Gutheil & Gabbard 1998). Analytic boundaries are not like the
dened boundaries of a football pitch and it is sometimes difcult to know
precisely where they are; sometimes there may be good reason for behaving
differently. For example, there is a wonderful account of working at the implicit
level of relational knowing in Beebe and Lachmmans book on Infant Research
and Adult Treatment (2002). Lachmann describes his work with a suicidal
borderline patient who made him so anxious that he phoned her a couple of
hours before every session to remind her to come (ibid., p. 59). Perhaps even
more telling is a similar account by the Kleinian analyst, John Steiner (1993,
pp. 1823), who phoned a patient who had stopped coming to sessions for a
few days. From the highly boundaried perspective of Kleinian analysis, this
must have been rather more unorthodox than it would have been for
Lachmann, and Steiner includes his uneasy sense of doing something improper
(ibid., p. 23) in his clinical report while nevertheless concluding it was what
the patient needed at the time.
Clinical example: Dont let the bastards grind you down
I would now like to give an example from my own practice of a more or less
deliberate enactment that I felt was benecial to the patient. Although I became
aware of the transference implications during the session, I chose to enact the
countertransference rather than interpret it. In doing so, I was allowing

Reections on knowledge and experience


something to unfold that had a deep relational signicance despite the outer
world content of the discussion.
The patient is a young man with whom there has been a strong father/son transference/
countertransference relationship from the start. Even before I met him, I imagined him as
a younger version of myself merely on the basis of his initial phone call. His own father is
a rather narcissistic man who tends to be self-preoccupied and unreliable. This is already
hinted at in the countertransference fantasy of the patient being a younger version of
myself. So I have had to pay attention to this in order to differentiate the patient from
my own expectations of him. This necessary work on my own countertransference also
has the effect of providing an experience of a father who can allow him to develop in
his own way.
In this session, the patient talks about the stresses of his job in the public welfare services
many of which are due to cuts in funding and wider political pressures bearing down on
his area of work. He regrets not speaking out at a meeting, feeling that he should have
mounted a challenge to political views he abhors and which will adversely affect the client
group he works with. He feels that his values are being gradually chipped away in the
current climate. I comment that this is a case of dont let the bastards grind you down
and that he needs to be clear about whats really important in this situationfor example,
maybe its better to keep a low prole than make an open challenge and risk being
shot down. (I felt this might be a rather adolescent and ineffective kind of protest).
He wonders if hes being naveperhaps this is just the way of the world? Thats
how it is in business (his fathers world) and hes been shielded from it by working
in the welfare services. I now make a statement that expresses a more personal
understanding rooted in my own experience and values. Thats just the problem
I say. In business, the ultimate aim is to make a prot and it doesnt really matter
what the product is whereas in the public services, the product is the end and not
the means. He picks this up and asks if Ive seen this kind of thing before?
I refer to the social changes brought about by Thatcherism in the 1980s and his
response makes it apparent that he knows virtually nothing about this fairly recent
history that took place when he was a child and I was the age he is now. At this point
I feel a strong prompting to ll in this important gap in his knowledge with
particular reference to the changes I had experienced myself in social work. In doing
so, I am alerted to the fact that an enactment is taking place since I am speaking
much more personally than usual and in a way that reveals my own emotional
investment. I tell him about the way Thatcher attacked the social welfare ethos of
the previous era, replacing it with the law of the market, how she didnt believe in
society and about her attack on professional autonomy. I contrast the autonomy
and responsibility I had as a newly qualied social worker in the 1980s with the
situation now in which social workers are drowned in bureaucratic control and
unable to exercise their own judgement. He concurs, telling me of a social work
department hes heard about where the staff have to account for every minute of
their day and if they fail to reach a certain target, are called to supervisionso
supervision has become policing rather than facilitation.

In this discussion which took up the remainder of the session, I knew that I
was answering him just as I would answer a son of my own. In doing so I
was expressing my own values and beliefs which are implicitly in opposition


Warren Colman

to his fathers values but, perhaps of greater signicance, his own father had
never taken the time and trouble to talk to him in this way and there were a
number of areas in which his father had invaluable knowledge and experience
to pass on to him and had not done so. So I was enacting a particular aspect
of the father, concerned with passing on the fruits of knowledge and experience
in a context of personal values. This was of much greater signicance than any
educational value the interchange might have had for him. For example, my
remarks about business were not exactly nuanced and represent only one
version of a range of views I might hold. So, in retrospect, I think the patient
drew out of me a response that resonated with his own feeling values about
his current situation and it was this willingness to share something of myself
that may have been most valuable, especially since it was unusual. I was thus
implicitly afrming his need for a paternal relationship of mutual identication
at this point in his therapy and his life.
It seemed to me that to have stepped back from the enactment towards a
more neutral, disengaged stance that merely interpreted this need would have
missed the opportunity for a moment of meeting and would have been
experienced as withholding and repetitive of his original deprivation. It may
well have elicited the negative father transference but I would be concerned that
this might be an iatrogenic artefact of abstinent analytic behaviour. As for the
value-laden aspect of my comments, it is, in any event, well known that analysts
cannot help but reveal their own values. An amusing example of this is the
patient of Ralph Greensons who knew his analyst was a Democrat because
whenever he said anything critical towards the Democrats Greenson interpreted
it, but whenever he said anything positive about them he accepted it without
comment (Greenson 1967, p. 273; cited in Orange & Stolorow 1998). There
is also an oft-quoted comment of Karl Menninger that what the psycho-analyst
believes, what he lives for, what he loves, what he considers to be good and
what he considers to be evil, become known to the patient and inuence him
enormously (Menninger 1958, p. 91).
One aspect of the enactment of which I wasnt aware at the time was the
implicit reference to the earlier discussion about whether or not to speak out.
Although I had counselled caution, my own behaviour represented an
endorsement of speaking out and laying claim to the things you believe in. I
was giving him an experience of a way of being and relating that was inuenced
consciously and unconsciously by a sense of something for which he seemed
desperately hungry. In that sense one might say that he was feeding from my
knowledge and experience. Some analysts talk about interpretations as feeds
and perhaps there might have been ways of interpreting that could also have
been nourishing. What matters here is not the form in which the metaphorical
feed is given but the fact of it being given. In that sense, even an interpretation
might constitute an enactment. So the salient relational element was not
whether I made an interpretation or a personal disclosure but that I responded
to the patients implicit need for a father. The elements of personal disclosure

Reections on knowledge and experience


were simply a medium for the experience of a particular kind of relating that
was taking place in the session. This does not diminish the importance of
remaining aware of the transference/countertransference aspects and the fact
that there is an enactment going on. This awareness does two thingsrstly,
it acts as a measure of my behaviour and enables me to keep a sort of running
tally as to where we are in the therapy and, secondly, it provides food for later
thought: the interpretation of the father/son transference could be made at a
later date, referring back to this session as an example.
One concern about this way of proceeding might be the risk of colluding in
the patients wish for an idealized benevolent relationship that would conrm
his view that his father was to blame for his difculties. Subsequent
developments in the analysis and in the patients life do not bear this out. In
fact, it seems more likely that the enactment in the analysis was indicative of
the early emergence of a different kind of relationship that was later replicated
elsewhere. For, despite ongoing difculties, the patient was able to reach a
better understanding with his father as well as being able to recognize some
of the disliked aspects of the father in himself. I might also have been more
wary of enacting this kind of identicatory relationship if it was a consistent
feature of the transference. However, at other times, I had been experienced
in very different ways (e.g., rigid and unreasonable) and had felt very differently
towards the patient (e.g., irritated and impatient).
Subsequently, the patient became more dependent and regressed for a while and it
is possible that the implicit support provided by my identicatory response facilitated this development. Out of this he was able to have the insight that his earlier
tendency to try and pick ghts with me had maintained him in a position of always
having a father to blame, enabling him to avoid having to grow up and accept
responsibility for his own difculties. Having some of his father hunger provided
for in his therapy seemed to have helped him give up his grievance with his father,
whereas a more abstinent stance might have entrenched a negative transference in
which he continued to feel justied in blaming the father-analyst for his difculties.
The transference is thus always operating in a uid and multi-faceted relational
context: it can be understood to some extent but there is always more going on
than we know. Enactments and open expressions of emotion may sometimes be
a vital part of this. The development of a clinical phronesis facilitates this since
the growth in the analysts capacity to think about and metabolize emotion
enables him or her to move more freely between the intellectual and affective
elements in thinking feelingly, where the emotion is the meaning (Fisher 2002).
I do not wish to imply that this was the only way of proceeding. Although my
own development has taken me towards a more relational, intersubjective
stance, my intention is to describe a process of personal evolution that I believe
could be found in similar form in any analyst who has developed an authentic
individual voice through long experience. The experience I have learned from
is inevitably my own and, given the importance of the analysts own personality
and their particular clinical experiences, it follows that other analysts are likely


Warren Colman

to develop along quite different trajectories. In this respect I have come to

regard myself as an advocate of the Deng Xiaoping school of psychotherapy.
As Deng remarked in relation to the development of capitalist enterprise in
Communist China, it doesnt matter whether a cat is black or white as long
as it catches the mice. Similarly, the most important thing in psychotherapy is
that the patient gets better.

Practical wisdom (phronesis)

This is far from giving permission for the abrogation of analytic boundaries
since, in that case, the cat is unlikely to succeed in catching the mice at all.
Analytic freedom is quite different from analytic licence. This is one reason
why I retain my respect for the analytic tradition of theory and practice in which
I was trained and continually refer back to it. This constitutes a form of internal
dialogue which every analyst needs to practise as a form of ongoing internal
supervision (Casement 1985). It was this that enabled me to recognize rstly
that I was attempting to justify myself to an ideologically rigid analytic superego and, secondly, that I had done good work despite practising in a much more
open, non-interpretative and self-disclosing way than I used to believe was
necessary. I have also realized that the competencies I have developed are those
which are best suited to my character (Wiener 2007) and that trying to work in
some other way would only succeed in making me less than the analyst I could
be. This continuation of ones own analysis by other means6 has gradually had
the effect, not of getting rid of the analytic super-ego, but of transforming it
from a stern judge to a wise counsellor. Increasingly, too, the wisdom of the
super-ego counsellor is derived from my own knowledge and experience and
is therefore better adapted to my own way of working.
This brings me back to the relation between phronesis and personal knowledge,
rooted in long experience. This does not come about through knowledge or
experience alone but through what is done with knowledge and experience, a
process of thought informed by a fundamentally ethical intention, the pursuit of
the good of analysis and the good in analysis. Joachims commentary on Aristotles
Nichomachean Ethics (Book VI, paras. 113839) notes that the possession of
phronesis also requires a principlelogoswhose rightness is determined by its having
the right aimscopos (Rees 1962, p. 88-89). I regard the analytic attitude as the best
embodiment of this aim through its implicit commitment to a consistent disciplined
process of thinking about the patient, ones relationship to the patient and the work
as a whole in a way that is informed by past knowledge (theory) and experience
(technique) but is radically open to question and ultimately concerned with what
is right, not in the technical sense of correct but in the ethical sense of good.
I believe it was Winnicott who rst coined this adaptation of the phrase politics is the continuation of war by other means but I have been unable to nd the reference.

Reections on knowledge and experience


For this reason, I consider the analytic attitude to be fundamental, sacrosanct

and non-negotiable in my work as an analyst.

Conclusion: analysis as a wisdom tradition

The idea that analysis is dened more by the analysts attitude than their theory or
technique is borne out by research evidence that shows good outcomes for psychotherapy to be independent of theoretical perspective. The evidence for this has been
summarized by Jean Knox who refers to the nding of randomized controlled trials
that no one type of psychotherapy can be shown to be better than another, known
as the Dodo effect: Everybody has won and all must have prizes (Knox 2011,
p. 184). Knox also quotes Jonathan Shedlers (2010) review of the empirical
evidence that demonstrates the crucial signicance of the qualities and style of the
individual therapist with the individual patient and the unique patterns of interaction that develop between them. Furthermore, rigid adherence to specic theories
is correlated with poorer outcomes due to implementation of the cognitive treatment model in dogmatic, rigidly insensitive ways (Knox 2011, p. 187). Knox uses
this evidence to argue persuasively in favour of a relational approach to therapy that
is supported by a wealth of observational studies of parent-infant relating and the
long-term consequences of adverse relational experience in early life (ibid., p. 190).
Nevertheless, theories and techniques of some kind are clearly indispensible. One
cannot practise psychotherapy on the basis of relational support alone any more
than one could play a violin concerto on the basis of a love of music. Analytic
technique (techne) does not constitute wisdom (phronesis) any more than perfectly
played scales constitute musicality, yet the one is vital to the other. Perhaps the
closest analogy to the consistent disciplined practice of an analytic attitude is the
practice of meditation. In this respect, a conversation between the philosopher
John Gray and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams (Gray & Williams
2012) about the nature of Christianity is equally illuminating with respect to
psychoanalysis. Speaking of the signicance of Canterbury Cathedral Williams says
You could call it almost a sanctuary of self-doubt. You come in here to be questioned.
The kind of space this is very frequently does speak to people in that way: Im in
question, Im not obvious to myself. Its St. Augustine reallyIve become a question
to myself. So that when you come into a building like this you expect to be changed in
some way, you expect to enter another world.

Gray and Williams go on to discuss the difculty facing all analysts and
patientsthe fact that the deepest problems for which our patients consult us
are ultimately insoluble. Gray suggests that
One of the profound truths that Christianity conveys is this fact of inescapable tragedy
and comedy being a permanent unalterable feature of being humanin other words
not something transitional, not something that we regard as soluble problems but as
permanent discordances, that are not all bad either.


Warren Colman

Williams replies:
Thats right. Its the soluble problems thing thats most disturbing here because I dont
believe that Christian faith comes in as a solution to problems. It comes in as a different
frame of reference, a different set of images, a different set of metaphors a different sense
of who or what youre answerable tonone of which, I think, has to do with just
mopping up difculties.

In this respect I would suggest that psychoanalysis belongs to a philosophical

wisdom tradition that is fundamentally concerned with how to live. However
much we may need to be informed by current scientic research, as Knox
recommends, and however much that research may support the notion that
love matters as Sue Gerhardt (2005) argues in her popular book, our dayto-day work goes beyond research towards the development of phronesisa
prudent, practical wisdom rooted in an ethical consciousness in which feeling
and values are ineluctably at the heart of thought and practice (Whan 1987).
Primarily, the kind of wisdom that analysts develop is clinical wisdom, that is, a
deepened understanding of the kind of situations that arise in analysis and how best
to think about and respond to them. But it is important to acknowledge too that our
therapeutic practice is not isolated from the rest of our lives and that, if analysis has
taught us anything, it will also be facilitating the development of greater wisdom in
the practice of our own lives as well as understanding the lives of others. So practical
wisdom is not just the wisdom of analytic experience but the wisdom that develops
through ones own life experience. Being an analyst offers unique, privileged
opportunities to learn about this with and through the experience of others; in helping
them make sense of their lives, we learn about ourselves and our own life and vice
versa, the lessons we learn in our own lives feed back into our work with patients.
Psychoanalysis is therefore far more than a technical procedureit is a way of
living informed by values about what constitutes a good life. Amongst these I
would highlight a passion for the truth of authentic relating, combined with a
compassion and respect towards others that, for me, is best expressed in the
central value of being humane: a quality characterized by courtesy, kindness and
consideration as well as compassion and benevolence. This is related to the Jewish
ethic of being a mensch, literally a human being but, specically, a person of
integrity and honour. The Yiddish word, mensch was derived from the German
menschlichkeit, a reference to the Roman and Renaissance ideal of humanitas, a
better human being, one inspired by compassion (Wikipedia on mensch). It is also
connected with the kind of love designated by the Greek word agape as used in the
New Testament, sometimes translated as charity.7 The theologian Thomas Jay
Oord relate this to the Hebrew tradition of hiesed, translated as steadfast love or
what the Hebrew authors called righteousness (Oord 2005, p. 929).
In a remarkable paper published over 40 years ago on The Promise of
Psychoanalysis, Harry Guntrip (1971, pp. 4456) addressed very similar issues

For a discussion of the role of agape in analysis, see Lambert 1981.

Reections on knowledge and experience


in a context that seems prescient of the crisis facing psychoanalysis today. He

begins by asking what is life about? thus placing psychoanalysis squarely in
the context of the search for meaning and purpose in life. He goes on to outline
pessimistic anxieties about the demise of psychoanalysis that were current even
then but contrasts this pessimism with his own point of view:
a psychoanalysis which is closely related to the realities of everyday living, that
penetrates to the depths of suffering human beings, has nothing to fear for the
future and will ourish. . . . However, psychoanalysis will hold the attention of
the public only insofar as it speaks truly to the human condition, and insofar as
people realize that the psychoanalyst should not be just a professional man with
a theorya psychotechnicianbut a human being with a developing experience of
understanding, able to help others with their struggles to be real persons living meaningful lives with their fellowmen.
(Guntrip 1971, p. 45)

And in a message that echoes directly down the decades to our current concerns
he concludes:
Psychoanalysis will decline only if it becomes a closed society of the initiated defending
an older, undeveloping theory as dogma.
(ibid., p. 55)

That, I believe, is precisely the challenge facing the psychoanalytic profession today.

Au fur et mesure que les analystes deviennent plus expriments, le savoir thorique
sintgre davantage, devient implicite et se transforme progressivement en une
sagesse pratique (phronesis) dcrite par Aristote. Bien que ceci mne une plus
grande libert dans la faon de travailler, cela demeure conditionn par une discipline
pratique permanente reprsente par lattitude analytique. A la lumire de mon
propre dveloppement en tant quanalyste, je pense que lanalyste travaille de plus
en plus avec le soi plutt quavec le moi, et je relie ceci avec ce que dit Fordham du
non savoir lavance . Je discuterai de certaines implications sur les limites, le
passage lacte et lutilisation de renseignements personnels, en relation avec du
matriel clinique. Je fais des liens entre lanalyse et les traditions de sagesse de la
pratique religieuse, et pense que lanalyse est engage dans une faon de vivre
enracine dans les valeurs humaines de compassion et de bienveillance.

Mit zunehmender Erfahrung des Analytikers wird theoretisches Wissen

fortschreitend integriert und verinnerlicht und allmhlich in praktisches Wissen
(Phronesis) berfhrt, wie sie Aristoteles beschreibt. Solange dieses zu grerer
Freiheit bei der Arbeit fhrt, bleibt es Voraussetzung der konsistenten disziplinierten


Warren Colman

Praxis, wie sie in der analytischen Haltung reprsentiert ist. Im Hinblick auf meine
eigene Entwicklung zum Analytiker empfehle ich, da der Analytiker strker vom
Selbst als vom Ego her arbeiten mge und verbinde dies mit Fordhams nicht
im voraus wissen. Einige Folgerungen fr Grenzsetzungen, Agieren und die
Anwendung persnlicher Offenbarungen werden unter Bezugnahme auf klinisches
Material diskutiert. Ich ziehe Verbindungen zwischen der Analyse und den
Weisheitstraditionen religiser Praktiken und stelle die Vermutung an, da die
Analyse eine Lebensweise betrifft, die in menschlichen Werten des Mitgefhls und
des Wohlwollens gegrndet ist.

In quanto analisti si acquisisce maggior esperienza, la conoscenza teorica diventa

pi integrata e implicita e viene gradualmente trasformata in quella saggezza
pratica (phronesis) descritta da Aristotele. Mentre tutto ci porta a una maggiore
libert nei modi di lavorare, continua a rappresentare un condizionamento su una
coerenza pratica della disciplina rappresentata dallatteggiamento analitico. Nel
contesto del mio proprio sviluppo come analista, penso sempre pi che il lavoro
dellanalista venga dal S piuttosto che dallIo e connetto ci con il valore che
Fordham dava al non sapere in anticipo. In relazione a del materiale clinico
verranno discusse alcune implicazioni per quanto riguarda i limiti, lenactment e
lutilizzo di rivelazioni personali. Io penso ci siano legami tra lanalisi e le
sagge tradizioni di pratica religiosa e credo che la considerazione nei confronti
dellanalisi sia sostenuta da un modo di vivere radicato nei valori umani di
compassione e benevolenza.

, ,
. ,
. ,
, ,
, ,
. ,

Reections on knowledge and experience


A medida que los analistas son ms experimentados, el conocimiento terico se

hace ms integrado e implcito y es gradualmente transformado en sabidura
prctica (phronesis) descrita por Aristteles. Mientras ella conduce a una mayor libertad en las formas de trabajo, permanece condicionada en prctica disciplinada y
consistente representada por la actitud analtica. En el contexto de mi propio desarrollo como analista, sugiero que el analista debe trabajar ms desde el Self que desde
el ego y relaciono esto con la aseveracin de Fordham de no conocer por adelantado. En relacin al material clnico se discuten algunas implicaciones en relacin
a los lmites, la actuacin y el uso de la apertura personal. Relaciono algunas lneas
entre el anlisis y la sabidura de las prcticas de tradiciones religiosas y sugiero que
el anlisis tiene que ver con formas vivas enraizadas en los valores humanos de compasin y benevolencia.

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[MS rst received September 2012; nal version December 2012]

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 219244

A structural-phenomenological typology of
mind-matter correlations
Harald Atmanspacher, Freiburg, Germany, and Zurich, Switzerland;
Wolfgang Fach, Freiburg, Germany
Abstract: We present a typology of mind-matter correlations embedded in a dual-aspect
monist framework as proposed by Pauli and Jung. They conjectured a picture in which
the mental and the material arise as two complementary aspects of one underlying
psychophysically neutral reality to which they cannot be reduced and to which direct
empirical access is impossible. This picture suggests structural, persistent, reproducible
mind-matter correlations by splitting the underlying reality into aspects. In addition, it
suggests induced, occasional, evasive mind-matter correlations above and below,
respectively, those stable baseline correlations. Two signicant roles for the concept of
meaning in this framework are elucidated. Finally, it is shown that the obtained typology
is in perfect agreement with an empirically based classication of the phenomenology of
mind-matter correlations as observed in exceptional human experiences.
Key words: mind-matter correlations, dual-aspect monism, Pauli, phenomenology,
Spinoza, synchronicity

The classic starting point for most contemporary discussions of the mind-matter
problem and mind-matter relations, respectively, is Descartes ontologically
conceived dualism of the mental (res cogitans, thought) and the material
(res extensa, extended matter). In the history of philosophy, Descartes
position was immediately upgraded, criticized, or replaced by essentially
three forms of thought: (i) alternative dualistic approaches (occasionalism,
parallelism), (ii) essentially monistic approaches (idealism, materialism),
and (iii) approaches combining (i) and (ii) by assuming a monistic domain
underlying the mind-matter distinction. An early protagonist of this latter view
is Baruch de Spinoza.
Spinozas monism provides an elegant and robust sense in which mind and
matter are related to a unity of essence. It does so by concatenating an ontological
monism with an epistemological dualism, yielding an overall worldview in which
both philosophy and the sciences can nd appropriate places and mutual
relations. This framework began to be explicitly exploited in the mid-19th

2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12005


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

century, by both philosophers and scientists, and today we can recognize two
main reactions to Spinozism, called dual-aspect monism1 and neutral monism.
Unfortunately, there is no authoritative delineation of the twothe many
versions of dual-aspect monism and neutral monism that are around today have
a tendency to blend into each other in ways that make clear assignments to one
or the other problematic. This can be seen in Stubenbergs (2010) excellent
overview; see also Silbersteins (2009) taxonomy and Seagers (2009) discussion,
among others. Important commonalities and key differences between dualaspect monism and neutral monism are discussed in Atmanspacher (2012).
In dual-aspect monism, the aspects are not a priori given, but depend on
epistemic issues and contexts. Distinctions of aspects are generated by epistemic
splits of the distinction-free, unseparated underlying domain, and in principle
there can be as many aspects as there are contexts. Moreover, for dual-aspect
monists this domain is apprehensible only indirectly, by its manifestations in the
aspects. Therefore, it is natural for dual-aspect monists to nurture metaphysical
conceptions of the underlying domain.
Beyond the well-known historical representatives of dual-aspect monism such
as Spinoza, Fechner, Schopenhauer, and others, a number of scientists, notably
physicists and psychologists have explored the dual-aspect route since the mid20th century. An incomplete list includes: Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung,
David Bohm and Basil Hiley, Bernard dEspagnat, Hans Primas, Max Velmans (for
more details see Atmanspacher 2012). Needless to say, none of their attempts has
yet resolved the mind-matter problem in its full scope.
Remarkably, these approaches are, in one way or another, attached to ideas
and notions that emerged during the development of quantum theory. In
addition to the names just mentioned, quite a number of other physicists have
been interested in relating physical processes to mental activity. It is impossible
to review all of them in this article, hence the reader should consult a review of
quantum approaches to consciousness (see Atmanspacher 2011). In the following
we will elaborate on one of them, proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl
Gustav Jung from 1932 to 1958, and outline how it may be potentially viable
(see Atmanspacher & Primas 2006, 2009).
A most signicant novel feature of the Pauli-Jung conjecture is the suggestion
that the dual (mental and material) aspects of the underlying reality should be
understood in terms of complementary aspects:
The general problem of the relation between psyche and physis, between inside and
outside, can hardly be regarded as solved by the term psychophysical parallelism
advanced in the last century. Yet, perhaps, modern science has brought us closer to a
more satisfying conception of this relationship, as it has established the notion of

Other terms for dual-aspect monism are dual-aspect theory or dual-aspect approach and, frequently,
dual is replaced by double. The restriction to two aspects is a matter of simplicity rather than
canonical. For instance, for Spinoza the number of possible aspects is innite.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


complementarity within physics. It would be most satisfactory if physis and psyche

could be conceived as complementary aspects of the same reality.

(Pauli 1952, p. 164)2

The notion of complementarity was originally coined by William James
(1890, p. 206) and adopted by some psychologists, for instance referring to
the bistable perception of ambiguous stimuli. Bohr imported it into physics,
originally with the purpose of replacing the term wave/particle duality, in his
Como Lecture in 1927 (Bohr 1928, p. 566). But his extensive later writings
about complementarity make it clear (cf. Kalckar 1985, 1996; Favrholdt 1999)
that Bohrs preeminent concern was to extend the idea of complementarity
beyond physics. In the same spirit, Pauli (1950, p. 79) advanced the opinion that
the issue of complementarity within physics naturally leads beyond the narrow
eld of physics to analogous conditions of human knowledge. Primas (2009)
elaborated such a perspective with respect to physical and mental time.
In a letter to Rosenfeld of April 1, 1952, Pauli writes:
For the invisible reality, of which we have small pieces of evidence in both quantum
physics and the psychology of the unconscious, a symbolic psychophysical unitary
language must ultimately be adequate, and this is the distant goal to which I actually
aspire. I am quite condent that the nal objective is the same, independent of whether
one starts from the psyche (ideas) or from physis (matter). Therefore, I consider the old
distinction between materialism and idealism as obsolete.
(von Meyenn 1996, p. 593)

The Pauli-Jung conjecture

Pauli and Jung began to think about mind-matter relations fairly soon after they
rst met in 1932, but the intense interaction that led to their version of dualaspect monism happened after Paulis return from Princeton to Zurich in
1946. Their discussions were accompanied by an extensive exchange of ideas
that Pauli had with his colleague Fierz at Basel. Fortunately much of this material
is today accessible (in German) in von Meyenns masterly eight-volume edition of
Paulis correspondence.
Although neither Pauli, Jung, nor Fierz was strongly inclined to discuss his ideas
with contemporary academic philosophers (aside from only a few exceptions),
their discussions had a distinctly philosophical avour. However, their usage of
philosophical concepts and notions was unsystematic: it was typical for them to
avail themselves of the history of philosophy as they saw something that tted
their position or intention. Nevertheless, their comprehensive letters yield valuable
information, allowing a fairly detailed reconstruction of their approach in the
landscape of philosophical positions.

This and all other originally German quotations by Pauli and Jung have been translated by HA.


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

In the following we will sketch the framework of dual-aspect monism la

Pauli and Jung in four parts: (1) the relation between local realism and holism
in (quantum) physics, (2) the relation between consciousness and the unconscious
in Jungs psychology, (3) the common, psychophysically neutral ground of both
the mental, conscious realm and the physical, local realm, and (4) the relation
between these realms as a consequence of or as mediated by their common
Local realism and quantum holism
One of the central problems, if not the problem, of quantum mechanics is the
process of measurement. Although much progress has been achieved with
respect to its understanding since the early days of quantum mechanics, the
problem is still not completely solved. However, empirical results and modern
formulations of quantum theory allow us to state it in a way that is more precise
than ever before. From a conceptual point of view, measurement can be viewed
as an intervention decomposing a system constituting an inseparable whole3
into locally separate parts.
The empirical cornerstone of our understanding of this decomposition
involves so-called non-local correlations (Einstein et al. 1935; Bell 1964; Aspect
et al. 1982). They are generic in any system requiring a description in terms of
non-commuting observables. These correlations can be measured in suitable
experiments and indicate post festum that the measured system was in a holistic
state before measurement. Conceptually, this means that one can indirectly infer
knowledge about an unmeasured state by the result of a controlled intervention
into that state due to measurement. At the same time, this controlled intervention
entails that the observed system changes its state in a basically uncontrollable
way (Bohr 1935).
It is tempting to say that such non-local correlations correlate everything with
everything else, thus suggesting a holistic concept of reality through and
through. But this would be misleading without precise qualications. Quantum
holism is only one of the two reality concepts that modern quantum theory
requires. Equally important is the (common sense) concept of a local reality,
which was considered to be the reality for centuries of physicists from Newton
to Einstein. As Bohr has emphasized over and over, local realism is unavoidable
for a proper description of experiments and their results by Boolean (yes-no)

The notion of inseparability derives from the fact that, technically speaking, the state f of the
system as a whole cannot be represented as a tensor product of the separate states f1 and f2 of
its parts. A separation of f into states f1 and f2 is possible, but this abolishes the former state f
of the system as a whole and entails non-local correlations between the parts.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


Today we know that both concepts together are necessary for a comprehensive
description of reality, while neither of them is sufcient on its own.4 In the
framework of algebraic quantum theory, the difference between them can be
mathematically formalized and clearly understood by two different state
concepts: those of ontic and epistemic states. This distinction, originally suggested
by Scheibe (1973), has turned out to be attractive and powerful for identifying the
differences and similarities among various interpretational schemes in quantum
theory. A helpful source for more details in this regard is a comprehensive account
of epistemic and ontic quantum realities by Atmanspacher and Primas (2003).
While epistemic states are those states to which epistemic, i.e., empirical access
is possible by measurement (and observation in general), ontic states characterize
the system independent of its observation and our resulting knowledge.5 One may
wonder why it is useful to have an ontic level of description for which empirical
(or operational) access is no option at all. However, a most appealing feature at
this ontic level is the existence of rst principles and universal laws that are
unavailable in an epistemic description. From such an ontic level, it is possible
to deduce proper epistemic descriptions given enough detailscontexts as it
wereabout empirically given situations.
The distinction between ontic and epistemic states provides an important
clue to understanding the distinction between a holistic and a local concept of
reality. Ontic states and associated intrinsic properties refer to the holistic
concept of reality and are operationally inaccessible, whereas epistemic states
and associated contextual properties refer to a local concept of an operationally
accessible reality. The process of measurement represents the link between the two.
Measurement suppresses the connectedness constituting a holistic reality and
generates (approximately) separate local objects constituting a local reality.
Although this is a fairly modern picture, it also has a conservative aspect:
quantum theory as of today does not at any place refer to the mental world
of human observers, with respect to their cognitive capabilities or psychological
condition in general. The standard view in quantum theory is that measurement
should be treated in terms of an interaction between an observed system and
its environment, including observing device(s). For instance, Heisenberg
(1936) was very explicit about this, talking about a cut between the system to
be observed and the measuring devices. And Pauli (1957) says: As Heisenberg
has emphasized, quantum mechanics rests on a sharp cut between observer or
instrument of observation on one hand and the system observed on the other.

The core of the well-known Bohr-Einstein discussions in the 1920s and 1930s (Jammer 1974,
Chaps. 5 & 6) can be traced down to the belief that only one of the mentioned concepts of reality
can be relevant. As far as we know neither Bohr nor Einstein ever explicitly addressed the question
of whether different concepts of reality might simply have different ranges of relevance.
In a more comprehensive picture, the concepts of epistemic and ontic states need to be considered
relative to a chosen descriptive framework. This leads to the notion of relative onticity introduced by
Atmanspacher and Kronz (1999).


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

In general, the idea is that any inanimate environment can be understood as a

measuring device, though in a non-intentional manner. No consciousness is
necessary for the measurement of a quantum state. On the other hand, as soon
as controlled experiments are considered, it is clear that issues like the design of
an experiment, the choice of observables of interest, or the interpretation of the
results of a measurement play crucial roles. They depend on decisions based on
the intentions of human observers and are not part of the formalism of quantum
In this context, Pauli speculated in a letter to Fierz of August 10, 1954:
It might be that matter, for instance considered from the perspective of life, is not
treated properly if it is observed as in quantum mechanics, namely totally neglecting
the inner state of the observer (. . .) The well-known incompleteness of quantum
mechanics (Einstein) is certainly an existing fact somehow-somewhere, but of course
it cannot be removed by reverting to classical eld physics (that is only a neurotic
misunderstanding of Einstein), it has much more to do with holistic relationships
between inside and outside which contemporary science does not contain.
(von Meyenn 1999, pp. 74247)

However, consciousness is not an ingredient of physical measurements, whether

quantum or classical. In his privately distributed manuscript on modern examples of background physics, Pauli (1948) emphasized that the measurement
problem does not indicate an incompleteness of quantum theory within physics
but an incompleteness of physics within the totality of life. Paulis uneasiness
with the status of science in general and physics in particular was not an odd idea
but a serious criticism of great relevance. The question is how to turn it into viable

Consciousness and the unconscious

According to Pauli and Jung, the role which measurement plays as a link between
local and holistic realities in physics is mirrored by the act in which subjects
become consciously aware of local mental objects, as it were, arising from
holistic unconscious contents in psychology.6 In this sense, which will be discussed
in detail below, they postulate a parallel transition from mental and material
holistic realities to mental and material local realities. This idea is most clearly
elaborated in Jungs supplement to his On the nature of the psyche (Jung 1969).7
We use the term local mental objects to emphasize the analogy with local material objects, meaning
that neither of them is non-local in any holistic sense. More concretely, local mental objects should be
understood as distinct mental representations or categories endowed with a Boolean (yes-no) structure:
a mental state is either in a category or it is not. Such categories can be formally dened, e.g., as attractors
or networks of attractors in an appropriately dened phase space (Van Gelder 1998; Fell 2004).
The German original was rst published as Der Geist der Psychologie in 1946, and later
revised and expanded (including the supplement) as Theoretische berlegungen zum Wesen des
Psychischen in 1954.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


Let us rst quote from a letter by Pauli which Jung cites in footnote 130 in this
supplement (Jung 1969, para. 439):8
The epistemological situation regarding the concepts of consciousness and the
unconscious seems to offer a close analogy to the situation of complementarity in
physics, sketched below. On the one hand, the unconscious can only be made
accessible in an indirect way by its (ordering) inuence on conscious contents, on
the other hand every observation of the unconscious, i.e., every attempt to make
unconscious contents conscious, has a prima facie uncontrollable reaction back on
to these unconscious contents themselves (as is well known, this precludes that the
unconscious can be exhaustively brought to consciousness). The physicist will per
analogiam conclude that precisely this uncontrollable backlash of the observing
subject on to the unconscious limits the objective character of its reality and, at the
same time, provides it with some subjectivity. Although, moreover, the position of
the cut between consciousness and the unconscious is (to a certain degree) up to
the free choice of the psychological experimenter, the existence of this cut remains
an inevitable necessity. Thus, the observed system would, from the viewpoint of
psychology, not only consist of physical objects, but rather comprise the unconscious
as well, whereas the role of the observing device would be ascribed to consciousness.
The development of microphysics has unmistakably led to a remarkable convergence
of its description of nature with that of the new psychology: While the former, due to
the fundamental situation known as complementarity, faces the impossiblity to
eliminate actions of observers by determinable corrections and must therefore in
principle relinquish the objective registration of all physical phenomena, the latter could
basically complement the merely subjective psychology of consciousness by postulating
the existence of an unconscious of largely objective reality.

This commentary describes Paulis position in the framework of objective and

subjective aspects of the mental, a distinction that he adopted from Jung quite
early. Already in a letter to Kronig of August 3, 1934 (letter 380 in von Meyenn
1985, pp. 34041), he talks about the autonomous activity of the soul as something objectively psychical that cannot and should not be explained by material
causes. Hence, the objective reality at the end of the quote refers to the holistic
reality, while the subjective relates to its contextual, epistemic appearances.
It is important to emphasize that the relation between holistic and local realms
in both mental and material domains is conceived as bi-directional. Unconscious
contents can become conscious, and simultaneously this very transition changes
the unconscious left behind. Analogously, physical measurement necessitates a
decomposition of the holistic realm, and simultaneously this very measurement
changes the state of the system left behind. This picture, already outlined in
Paulis letter to Fierz of October 3, 1951 (von Meyenn 1996, p. 377), represents
a genuine interdependence between holistic and local domains. It can entail
mind-matter correlations via the holistic realm that occur in addition to those
correlations that are due to mere dual epistemic manifestations of that realm.
This letter is contained neither in the published Pauli-Jung correspondence (Meier 1992) nor in Paulis
correspondence edition by von Meyenn. Since Jung presents the quotation with the remark that Pauli
was gracious enough to look over the manuscript of my supplement, the letter is likely from 1954.


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

In order to give the reader a sense of how Jung embedded the cited Pauli
quote in his text, here is the passage by Jung (1969) in which it appears:
The application of statistical laws to processes of atomic dimensions in physics has a
remarkable correspondence in psychology insofar as it pursues the foundations of
consciousness to the point where they dim out into the inconceivable and where only
effects of ordering inuences on to conscious contents can be detected [here the footnote 130 quoted on p. 225]. The study of these effects leads to the peculiar fact that
they emerge from an unconscious objective reality which, however, at the same time
appears to be subjective and conscious. This way, the reality underlying the effects of
the unconscious comprises also the observing subject and is therefore of unimaginable
constitution. It is in fact both most intimately subjective and most universally true,
something that does not apply to conscious contents of personalistic nature. The
elusiveness, capriciousness, haziness and uniqueness, with which the layperson connects the conception of the psyche, only applies to consciousness, but not to the absolute unconscious. The efcacious elements of the unconscious, to be dened not
quantitatively but only qualitatively, the so-called archetypes, can therefore not with
certainty be designated as psychic.
(para. 439)

One is struck by the statement: archetypes can therefore not with certainty be
designated as psychic: this peculiarly cautious formulation is due to the shift
that Jungs conception with respect to archetypes underwent from early ideas
about (biological) hereditary instincts over (psychological) raw feelings and
inner images to his nal notion of psychophysically neutral, transcendental
(or metaphysical) principles. The early 1950s was the time when this move
became visible in Jungs publications.9 Since his mature understanding of
archetypes embraces both individual subjective consciousness and the impersonal objective unconscious, Jung invented the term psychoid to characterize
them as structural principles beyond the conscious psyche alone.
Archetypes and Unus Mundus
While the preceding subsections described the way in which Pauli and Jung
thought that epistemically accessible physical and mental domains reect
something ontic behind the mind-matter distinction, the present subsection
addresses this background domain itself. One of its key features is that empirical
tools of observation and measurement, as far as they are capable of providing
knowledge about it at all, can do this only in an indirect fashion.
From the point of view of physics this background domain refers to the holistic
state of a system prior to the transition to a measured state. From the point of view
of psychology it refers to the mentally unconscious prior to the transition to a
conscious state. Both transitions can be described as transitions from a non-Boolean
domain to domains with Boolean classications based on binary alternatives

The background of this development is an interesting topic in itself, which we cannot go into in
detail here. See for instance Roesler (2010) who sketches the conversions and metamorphoses of
Jungs ideas about archetypes.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


(cf. Primas 2007). In physics these appear as classical states actualized by measurements;
in psychology they appear as actualized distinct mental representations.
The simple but radical idea proposed by Pauli and Jung suggests a background
domain of reality in which the mental and the material are supposed to emerge as
epistemically distinguishable. Although physics and psychology point to their
common basis in different ways, the basis itself is assumed to be of unitary nature:
a psychophysically neutral domain that is neither material nor mental and
describable by a non-Boolean neutral language. Needless to say, this caricature
of a much more complicated picture leaves many details unaddressed.
Already in 1948, Pauli expressed his predilection for such a psychophysically
neutral domain beneath (or beyond) the mental and the material in a letter to
Fierz on 7 January 194810:
The ordering and regulating factors must be placed beyond the distinction of physical
and psychicas Platos ideas share the notion of a concept and of a force of nature (they
create actions out of themselves). I am very much in favour of referring to the ordering
and regulating factors in terms of archetypes; but then it would be inadmissible to dene
them as contents of the psyche. The mentioned inner images (dominant features of the
collective unconscious after Jung) are rather psychic manifestations of the archetypes
which, however, would also have to put forth, create, condition anything lawlike in the
behaviour of the corporeal world. . . The laws of this world would then be the physical
manifestations of the archetypes. Each law of nature should then have an inner
correspondence and vice versa, even though this is not always directly visible today.
(von Meyenn 1993, pp. 49697)

In contrast to the bi-directional relationship between ontic and epistemic

domains (in the preceding subsection), this quote refers to a unidirectional
manifestation of ontically conceived archetypes in their epistemic aspects.
Physical and mental manifestations arise in correlation, and the correlations
are due to the joint ordering factors of the manifestations.
Now, Jungs psychology hosts quite a selection of archetypes, to which different
degrees of unconscious depth can be ascribed (cf. Roesler 2010; Young-Eisendrath
& Dawson 1997). Among Jungians there is agreement that the shadow and the
anima/animus complexes are the rst, and therefore least deep-seated archetypes
with whose manifestations individuals typically become acquainted. Candidates
for more fundamental archetypes are the self, as the goal of the individuation
process, and maybe the most basic archetype is number, expressing qualitative
principles like unity, duality, trinity, quaternity, and so forth.
The notion proposed for the ontic, psychophysically neutral domain is the unus
mundus, the one world, a notion that Jung adopted from the physician and
alchemist Gerardus Dorneus (late 16th century). In his Mysterium Coniunctionis
of 1955/56 Jung writes:

Note that this early account by Pauli of psychophysical neutrality emphasizes the ordering
inuence of archetypes and disregards the back-reaction from the conscious on to the unconscious.


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

Undoubtedly the idea of the unus mundus is founded on the assumption that the
multiplicity of the empirical world rests on an underlying unity, and that not two or
more fundamentally different worlds exist side by side or are mingled with one
another. Rather, everything divided and different belongs to one and the same world,
which is not the world of sense but a postulate . . .
(1970, para. 767)

Replying to a letter with some quite private excursions by Pauli, Jung relates the
unus mundus to an inner unity of an individual self with the following remarks
(letter to Pauli of 15 December 1956):
As soon as an individual has managed to unify the opposites within himself, nothing
stands in the way of realizing both aspects of the world objectively. The inner psychic
dissection becomes replaced by a dissected world view, which is unavoidable because
without such discrimination no conscious knowledge would be possible. In reality,
however, there is no dissected world: for a unied individual there is one unus mundus.
He must discriminate this one world in order to be capable of conceiving it, but he must
not forget that what he discriminates is always the one world, and discrimination is a
presupposition of consciousness.
(von Meyenn 2001, p. 800)

In this sense, making a distinction is a primordial principle of every

epistemology, sometimes called an epistemic split.11 In line with Jungs quote
above, an entirely distinction-free state of affairs must indeed be associated with
the fundamentally unconscious, to which there is no conscious epistemic access
at all.
When the holistic unus mundus is split, correlations emerge between the
resulting domains. These correlations are remnants, as it were, of the wholeness
that is lost due to the distinction made. Splitting the unus mundus as the holistic
domain into mind and matter suggests ubiquitous correlations between mental
and material states. The next section will be devoted to this topic.
Mind-matter correlations and synchronicity
Conceiving the mind-matter distinction in terms of an epistemic split of a
psychophysically neutral domain implies correlations between mind and
matter as a direct and generic consequence. It is important, though, to stress
right at the outset that these correlations are not due to causal interactions
(in the sense of efcient causation as usually looked for in science) between
the mental and the material. In a dual-aspect framework of thinking it would
In somewhat more abstract terms, distinctions can be conceived as symmetry breakings.
Symmetries in this parlance are invariances under transformations. For instance, the curvature of
a circle is invariant under rotations by any arbitrary angle. A circle thus exhibits complete rotational
symmetry. Symmetry breakings are a powerful mathematical tool in large parts of theoretical
physics, but we do not know better than by pure speculation which symmetries must be ascribed
to the unus mundus.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


be wrong to interpret mind (or mental states) as directly caused by matter

(or material states) or vice versa.
Pauli and Jung discussed such correlations extensively in their correspondence
between June 1949 and February 1951 when Jung drafted his article on
synchronicity for the book that he published jointly with Pauli (Jung & Pauli
1952). In a condensed form, two (or more) seemingly accidental, but not
necessarily simultaneous events are called synchronistic if the following three
conditions are satised.
1. Each pair of synchronistic events includes an internally conceived and an
externally perceived component.
2. Any presumption of a direct causal relationship between the events is
absurd or even inconceivable.
3. The events correspond with one another by a common meaning, often
expressed symbolically.
The rst criterion makes clear that synchronistic phenomena are psychophysical
phenomena, intractable when dealing with mind or matter alone. The second
criterion repeats the inapplicability of causation in the narrow sense of a
conventional cause-and-effect-relation. And the third criterion suggests the
concept of meaning as a constructive way to characterize mind-matter correlations.
Since synchronistic phenomena are not necessarily temporally synchronous
(in the sense of simultaneous), synchronicity is a somewhat misleading term.
For this reason Pauli preferred to speak of meaningful correspondences
(Sinnkorrespondenzen) under the inuence of an archetypal acausal ordering.
He considered both Jungs synchronicity and the old teleological idea of
nality (in the general sense of a process oriented toward a goal) as particular
instances of such an acausal ordering which cannot be set up intentionally. In
contrast, the mathematical notion of blind chance (referring to stochastically
accidental events) might be considered as the limiting case of a meaning-less
Similar to their idea of complementary notions of efcient causation and
meaningful correspondence, Pauli and Jung discussed a possible complementarity
of statistical limit theorems and singular synchronistic events. The upshot of
this proposal is that synchronistic phenomena cannot be corroborated by
statistical methods as they are usually applied. In a letter to Fierz of 3 June 1952,
Pauli wrote:
synchronistic phenomena . . . elude being captured in natural laws since they are not
reproducible, i.e., unique, and are blurred by the statistics of large numbers. By contrast,
acausalities in physics are precisely described by statistical laws (of large numbers). -Wanted: a type of natural laws consisting of a correction of chance uctuations by
meaningful or purposeful coincidences of non-causally connected events. I would
personally prefer to begin with always reproducible acausal dispositions (including
quantum physics) and try to understand psychophysical correlations as a special case
of the general species of correlations.
(von Meyenn 1996, pp. 63435)


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

And in his Lecture to the Foreign People of fall 1953 where he sketches some
of his ideas about biological evolution, Pauli offers his impression that
external physical circumstances on the one hand and corresponding adaptive hereditary
alterations of genes (mutations) on the other are not connected causally-reproducibly, but
occur -- correcting the blind chance uctuations of the mutations -- meaningfully and
purposefully as inseparable wholes together with the external circumstances. According
to this hypothesis, which differs from both Darwins and Lamarcks conception, we
encounter the requested third type of natural law, consisting of corrections to chance
uctuations by meaningful or purposeful coincidences of non-causally connected events.
(Atmanspacher et al. 1995, p. 326)

What Pauli here postulates is a kind of lawful regularity beyond both deterministic
and statistical laws, based on the notion of meaning and, thus, entirely outside the
natural sciences of his time and also, more or less, of today. It remains to be
explored how this key issue of meaning can be implemented in a world view not
only comprising, but rather exceeding both psychology and physics. A substantial
comprehensive account of psychophysical phenomena needs to address them
beyond the distinction of the psychological and the physical.
For the mindset of a psychologist like Jung, the issue of meaning is of primary
signicance anyway. For a long time, Jung insisted that the concept of synchronicity
should be reserved for cases of distinctly numinous character, when the experience
of meaning takes on existential dimensions. With this understanding synchronistic
correlations would be extremely rare, thus contradicting their supposedly generic
nature. Only in later years did Jung open up toward the possibility that synchronicity
might be a notion that should be conceived as ubiquitous:
As soon as a psychic content transgresses the threshold to consciousness, its synchronistic
byproducts disappear. Space and time resume their accustomed sway, and consciousness
is again isolated in its subjectivity. This is one of those cases which can best be captured
by the term complementarity, known from physics. When an unconscious content
trespasses into consciousness, its synchronistic manifestation ceases and, conversely,
synchronistic phenomena can be elicited by putting a subject into an unconscious state
(trance). The same relation of complementarity can be observed in those frequent medical
cases in which particular clinical symptoms disappear when their corresponding
unconscious contents become conscious. We also know that a number of psychosomatic
phenomena, otherwise outside the control of volition, can be induced by hypnosis, i.e.,
by an attenuation of consciousness.
(Jung 1969, para. 440)

Meier (1975) has later amplied this idea in an article about psychosomatics
from a Jungian perspective.
Features of mind-matter correlations
Structural versus induced correlations
The development of Pauli and Jungs views about archetypes and their role in
manifesting synchronicities suggests a distinction between two basically

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


different kinds of mind-matter correlations, for which we propose the notions

of structural and induced correlations.12
Structural correlations refer to the role of archetypes as ordering factors with
an exclusively unidirectional inuence on the material and the mental (Paulis
letter to Fierz of 1948, von Meyenn 1993, pp. 49697). They arise owing to
epistemic splits of the unus mundus, which manifest themselves as correlations
at the level of mental and material aspects. Since these correlations are a
straightforward consequence of the basic structure of the model, they do not
depend on additional contexts. They must be assumed to be persistent, and
insofar as they are persistent, they should be empirically reproducible.
Induced correlations refer to the back-reaction that changes of consciousness
induce in the unconscious and, consequently, in the physical world as well.13
(Likewise, measurements of physical systems induce back-reactions in the physical
ontic reality, which can lead to changes of mental states.) In this way, the picture
is extended to a bidirectional relation (Paulis letter to Jung of 1954,
Jung 1969, para. 439). In contrast to structural, persistent correlations, induced
correlations depend on all kinds of contexts, so they must be expected to occur
only occasionally, and to be evasive and not (easily) reproducible.
Paulis quote from the letter to Fierz of 1952 (see p. 229) most seamlessly ts
with this distinction. When Pauli proposes to begin with always reproducible
acausal dispositions, this relates perfectly to the structural mind-matter
correlations due to epistemic splits of the unus mundus. What Pauli refers to as
special cases of psychophysical correlations can then be mapped to the induced
correlations superimposing those structural, general species of correlations.
While structural correlations dene a baseline of ordinary, robust psychophysical
correlations (such as ordinary mind-brain correlations or psychosomatic
correlations), induced correlations (positive or negative) may be responsible
for alterations and deviations (above or below) this baseline (see Jungs
quote on p. 230). Induced positive correlations, above the baseline, could be
characterized as phenomena with overemphasized correlationssimilar to
salience phenomena (cf. Kapur 2003; van Os 2009). Synchronistic events in
the sense originally proposed by Jung clearly belong to this class. Induced negative
correlations, below the baseline, are experienced as dissociative with respect to
ordinary baseline correlations. In the following sections, we will relate these
features to the phenomenology of exceptional human experiences.

In an earlier publication (Atmanspacher 2012) it was suggested to distinguish structural
synchronicity from induced synchronicity. For reasons to be discussed below, this terminology
is infelicitous and thus has been improved.
Jungian psychology describes this in more detail: When a subject becomes aware of some
problematic unconscious content, the corresponding unconscious complex may be (partially) dissolved.
This affects the archetypal core that is constellated in the complex, which in turn is supposed to manifest
itself in the physical world.


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

It is important to keep in mind that in both induced and structural correlations

there is no direct causal relation from the mental to the physical or vice versa (i.e.,
no direct efcient causation). The problem of a direct causal interaction
between categorically distinct regimes is thus avoided. Of course, this does not
mean that the correlations themselves are causeless: The cause for structural
correlations is the epistemic split of the unus mundus. The causes for induced
correlations are interventions in the conscious mental or local material domain,
whose back-effects on the unus mundus must be expected to manifest themselves
in the complementary domain, respectively.

Intentionality and meaning

In the characterization of synchronistic events given above, pp. 22830, the
common meaning of mental and material events gures prominently. However,
meaning is a notoriously difcult notion, used differently in different areas and
contexts. In a general sense, meaning is a two-place relation between a sign and
what it designates,14 or a representation and what it represents. Meaning in this
sense is simply a reference relation, in accordance with the philosophical usage
of the term intentionality coined by Brentano (1874).
What Jung had in mind when he emphasized meaning is different, however.
He did clearly aim at meaning as an element of experience, not as a formal
relationship. This can be rephrased in Metzingers terminology, where
intentionalitya reference relation between a representation and its referentis
itself encoded as a (meta-)representation. In Metzingers (2003) parlance this
(meta-)representation is called a phenomenal model of the intentionality
relation (PMIR).
Mental representations have both intentional content and phenomenal content.
While the intentional content explicates their reference, as mentioned above, their
phenomenal content refers to what it is like to instantiate a representation, in
other words, to experience it. So the phenomenal content of a PMIR refers to
what it is like to experience a particular meaning. Jungs usage of meaning refers
to the phenomenal content of PMIRs: the subjectively experienced meaning of a
synchronistic event.15

The pioneering approach in this respect due to Peirce (19311958) is called semiotics, the theory
of signs. Morris (1955) has turned Peirces ideas into an information-theoretical framework which
distinguishes syntactic, semantic and pragmatic information. In this framework, meaning (the
semantic dimension) is encoded in sequences of signs (the syntactic dimension) and becomes
operationally accessible by its usage (the pragmatic dimension). In the theory of complex systems,
an interesting connection between pragmatic information and a particular class of complexity
measures has been established (Atmanspacher 2007), which could be helpful to relate the notion
of meaning to the structure and dynamics of material systems.
Main (2007, chap. 2) emphasizes this distinction between intentional content and experienced
meaning for the interpretation of synchronistic events.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


In this context we should stress that this kind of meaning, although being
subjectively ascribed (by the experiencing subject), is not completely arbitrary.
It depends on the situation as a whole, likely to include conditions that are
not consciously available to the subject. According to Jung, synchronistic events
arise due to constellated archetypal activity. This activity limits the range of
possibly attributable meanings.
The intentional content of a particular class of PMIRs mediates between
internal representations and their external referents.16 Roughly speaking, the
corresponding kinds of intentionality refer from internal mental representations
to external material objects. They belong to the ordinary spectrum of structural
and persistent mind-matter correlations as indicated in the preceding subsection:
the representation of an apple refers to an apple, whereas the representation of a
law of nature refers to the events governed by that law (as in the Pauli quote of
1948, see p. 227).
In typical situations of ordinary structural mind-matter correlations, this
formal intentionality is hardly experienced explicitlysubjects usually know
the corresponding meaning, but are not explicitly aware of its phenomenal quality.
This is different for induced mind-matter correlations: the deviation from the
ordinary baseline stipulates that experienced intentionality is incurred, referring
to the phenomenal content of the appropriate PMIR. In this case, the corresponding
meaning is distinctly and phenomenally inicted upon the experiencing subject.
It is plausible to assume that the extent to which contextually induced
correlations deviate from the baseline of persistent structural correlations
complies with the degree to which the corresponding PMIR is phenomenally
experienced. Small deviations indicate situations of the kind Pauli suggested
to begin with (the generic case, as it were), while large deviations are clear
signiers of what Jung insisted on for truly synchronistic events: the numinous
dimension of the experience.
In his concept of synchronicity, Jung emphasized induced mind-matter
correlations in the sense of meaningful coincidences, i.e., positive correlations
above the ordinary baseline. The approach presented here includes negative
correlations below the baseline, whose meaning appears in dissociation events
rather than coincidence events. Jungian synchronicities may be regarded as
special cases of induced positive mind-matter correlations with large deviations
above the baseline.
Exceptional human experiences
The rich material of extraordinary psychophysiological correlations comprehensively
reviewed by Kelly (2007) suggests various concrete applications of the
typology outlined above. Moreover, a recent statistical analysis of a huge body

In the following subsection such internal and external elements will be rephrased as elements of
Metzingers (2003) self model and world model.


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

of documented cases of extraordinary human experiences, also called exceptional

experiencesEE(Fach 2011; Belz & Fach 2012) provides signicant evidence
that the Pauli-Jung conjecture matches with existing empirical material
surprisingly well.
Self, world, and the relations among them
A recently proposed classication of EE (Fach 2011; Belz & Fach 2012) has
been based on a few key postulates of Metzingers (2003) theory of mental
representations. These representations are elements of a model of reality that
subjects create, develop and modify during their lifetime. Two fundamental
components of this model of reality, or two major representations within it,
are the self model and the world model.
The distinction between the two resembles the Cartesian distinction beween res
cogitans and res extensa, but in contrast to Descartess ontologically conceived
dualism, Metzingers distinction is explicitly epistemic. It is evident that self model
and world model correspond one-to-one with the dual aspects of the Pauli-Jung
conjecture. However, no psychophysically neutral domain occurs in Metzingers view.
The world model contains all representations that a subject has developed
about states of the material world, including the subjects own bodily features.
As a matter of principle, the referents of these representations are observationally
accessible to other individuals as well, so that intersubjective knowledge
(sometimes called objective third-person knowledge) about them is possible.
The self model contains all representations that a subject has developed about his
or her internal states, such as sensations, cognitions, volitions, affects, motivations,
inner images. Knowledge about these states is private and, as a rule, can be experienced
only by the subject itselfit is subjective and based on rst-person accounts.
Although world model and self model are separate elements within the
overall reality model, their referents are often experienced as correlated. For
instance, the bodily organs or limbs, referents of representations in a subjects
world model, and bodily sensations, referents of representations in a subjects
self model, are usually experienced in strong mutual relationship.
Nevertheless, a subject can distinguish self and world. Mental states induced
by external sensory stimuli differ from states generated by internal processing.
This is why, e.g., touching a hot stove, represented in the world model, can be
distinguished from the experienced pain, represented in the self model. In this
sense, (ordinary) subjects are capable of differentiating their inner images, affects
and fantasies from their perception of material events in the external world.
Now, exceptional experiences (EE) typically appear as deviations17 in
the reality model of a subject, i.e., owing to deviating assignments of self- and
world-representations or links between them (cf. Fach 2011; Belz & Fach 2012).
Such deviations are often referred to as anomalies. We prefer the notion of a deviation because
the presented approach leads to particular basic classes of such deviations. This renders their
traditional status as anomalies inappropriate or at least arguable.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


This entails a classication of EE according to four different possibilities based on

two pairs of distinguishing features, as depicted in Figure 1.
One of the two pairs refers to deviating experiences within the self model and
world model of a subject, while the other one refers to the way in which
elements of self model and world model are merged or separated above or
below ordinary baseline correlations. This second pair evidently expresses
induced mind-matter correlations. In coincidence phenomena ordinarily
disconnected elements of self and world appear connected; in dissociation
phenomena ordinarily connected elements of self and world appear disconnected.
It should be emphasized that the mentioned typology of EE derives naturally
from the conceptual framework of dual-aspect thinking, independent of the
empirical material to be discussed in the following subsections. Let us now
explain the four classes of EE in greater detail and give some comments
concerning their phenomenology.
1. External phenomena are perceived in the world model. Their referents
are conceived in the material environment of a subject. This class
comprises visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and kinetic phenomena,
the impression of invisibly present agents, inexplicable changes of the
body, phenomena concerning audio or visual recordings or the location,
structure or composition of material objects. For the affected subject, no
natural laws, efcient causation, stimulus sources, or otherwise conventional
explanations can account for the experienced phenomena.
2. Internal phenomena are perceived in the self model. They include
somatic sensations, unusual moods and feelings, thought invasion, inner
voices, intriguing inner images. As in class 1, the affected subject is
convinced that familiar explanations are suspended, and the experiences
appear egodystonic. Since subjects cannot see conventional reasons for
the phenomena, they assume foreign inuences of unknown origin
exerted on their consciousness, including bodily experiences.
3. Dissociation phenomena exhibit disconnections of ordinarily connected
elements of self and world, i.e., induced negative mind-matter correlations
below the persistent ordinary baseline. For instance, subjects are not
in full control of their bodies, or experience autonomous behaviour
not deliberately set into action. Sleep paralysis and various forms of
automatized behaviour are among the most frequent phenomena in this
class. Out-of-body experiences are a broad class of dissociation phenomena
in which the self model (together with the bodily sensations usually
constituting the basis for its integration with the body model) dissociates
from the body model, and the mental self is experienced as located outside
the body.18

A challenging discussion of out-of-body experiences from the perspective of a representational

account, including the concept of PMIRs, is due to Metzinger (2005).


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

Figure 1. Fundamental types of exceptional experiences resulting from the conceptual

framework of dual-aspect monism.

4. Coincidence phenomena refer to experiences of relations between self

model and world model that are not founded on the regular senses or
bodily functions, representing connections (rather than disconnections)
between ordinarily disconnected (rather than connected) elements of
self and world. They refer to induced positive mind-matter correlations
above the persistent ordinary baseline. Typically, these relations are
assumed to be non-causal, often experienced as a salient meaningful link
between mental and material events, e.g., meaningful coincidences such as
Jungian synchronicities. Spatiotemporal restrictions may appear as
inefcacious, as in several kinds of extrasensory perception.
As mentioned above, the four classes of EE resulting from deviations in a
subjects world model, self model, and their mutual correlations derive from
purely conceptual deliberations, i.e., from a blend of dual-aspect monism la
Pauli and Jung with key notions of contemporary philosophy of mind. In order
to assess whether and how these classes are empirically relevant, they need to be
compared with empirical data. First steps in this direction will be described in
the following subsection.

Empirical classication of EE
An empirical data base of EE occurrences has been documented by the counselling
department of the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology (IGPP) at Freiburg,
Germany, since 1996 (Fach 2011; Belz & Fach 2012). Until to 2006, the data
base contained 1465 clients with EE that were described in sufcient detail
and quality for accurate factor analyses. It turned out that a six-factor solution
yielded the most appropriate basis for differentiation and interpretation.19 The

For further details of the documentation system and the statistical analyses see appendix.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


six factors, ordered by decreasing relative frequency of occurrence, can be

phenomenologically described in the following way.
Poltergeist and apparitions (32%) comprise, e.g., unexplained movements or
changes, disappearing or appearing objects, sensory impressions without
identiable sources. These phenomena t class 1 above, the class of external
Extrasensory perception (25%) refers to experiences of coincidences of events
without causal connection, but related by some common meaning. They are
reported between the inner, mental state of the affected subject and inner
states of others (telepathy) or external physical events past or present
(clairvoyance) or in the future (precognition). They belong to class 4.
Internal presence and inuence (23%) are characterized by somatic
phenomena (energy ux, pain) without medically established explanation,
intrusive thoughts, inner voices and visual impressions exclusively resting
on internal perception, falling into class 2.
External presence and nightmare (9%) phenomena cover cases in which an
invisible entity-like presence, localized externally, is felt by atmospheric or even tactile
sensations, occasionally accompanied by psychophysical dissociation, e.g., the
inability to perform bodily movement (sleep paralysis). They belong to class 3.
Meaningful coincidences (6%) classify, in contrast to extrasensory perception,
coincidences between objective external events (e.g., accidents) among which
no causal relation is available or seems plausible. Subjects relate them to one
another by attributing salient meaning to them, often in terms of fateful
inuences or conspiracies (class 4).
Automatism and mediumship (5%) are EE based on psychophysical
dissociation which, different from external presence, is often deliberately
induced but not controlled. Spontaneous coordinated bodily movements
(e.g., automatic writing, channelling) are interpreted as the ability to contact
external forces or entities. They fall into class 3.
It is notable that classes 1 and 2, as introduced in the preceding subsection, are
uniquely mapped by the empirical material, while classes 3 and 4 split into two
subclasses. These subclasses can be delineated by a slight dominance of external
or internal features, respectively, in the irregularly separated or merged
psychophysical relations dening them. Figure 2 reproduces Figure 1 with the
empirically determined patterns added.

With the approach described in this article we propose a link between dualaspect monism in general, and its particular version due to Pauli and Jung, over


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

Figure 2. Empirically obtained patterns (factors) of EE, embedded within the scheme
shown in Figure 1; percentages are relative frequencies of patterns documented by the
IGPP counselling team.

contemporary concepts in the philosophy of mind to mind-matter correlations as

empirically observed in exceptional human experiences. Our overall contention is
that dual-aspect monism accommodates (though does not fully explain) a broad
range of phenomena occurring in such exceptional experiences.
A detailed reconstruction of the Pauli-Jung conjecture yields a psychophysically
neutral, unitary reality beyond the distinction of the mental and the material.
Splitting the unus mundus generates two domains as aspects with ubiquitous
correlations that are not attributable to direct mutual interactions. Additional
correlations may be contextually induced by interventions in the mental or
material domain.
In this spirit, we distinguish two types of mind-matter correlation: (1) structural
mind-matter correlations that are persistent and reproducible and (2) induced
mind-matter correlations that are occasional and evasive. Persistent, ordinary
correlations dene a baseline (e.g., ordinary mind-brain correlations) from
which induced positive or negative correlations may imply deviations above
or below the baseline.
From the perspective of contemporary conceptions of intentionality,
ordinary mind-matter correlations can be interpreted as reference relations
between representations and what they represent, i.e., their meaning. This
formal intentionality (1) is complemented by contextually induced mindmatter correlations, whose deviation from the ordinary baseline reects the
extent of experienced intentionality (2), i.e., phenomenally experienced
Taking the idea of dual aspects seriously means conceiving of them epistemically
rather than as an ontically given reality. This provides a convenient connection to
contemporary philosophy of mind, in particular to ideas by Metzinger, where a
subjects model of reality as a whole is composed of two basic elements, the self
model and the world model. Connections between those models are typical
examples of intentionality relations.

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


Such intentionality relations can be regarded as due to (1) ordinary, structural

mind-matter correlations and (2) extraordinary (exceptional) deviations therefrom
due to induced mind-matter correlations. A statistical analysis of extensive empirical
material documented by the counselling department of IGPP is in perfect
agreement with this typology. Positive (negative) deviations from baseline
correlations refer to coincidence (dissociation) phenomena with connections
(disconnections) of ordinarily disconnected (connected) elements of self and
world models.
In summary, the Pauli-Jung conjecture leads straightforwardly to a non-trivial
structural framework for mind-matter correlations. Its viable link with
contemporary ideas in the philosophy of mind gives rise to a subtle
phenomenological typology of exceptional experiences. The derived types
are exactly matched by existing empirical material. Although this result is
remarkable in itself, it is only a rst step to more detailed studies of the
spectrum of psychophysical correlations and their potential basis.
Nous prsentons une typologie de lesprit et de la matire xe dans un cadre moniste au
double aspect tel quil a t propos par Pauli et Jung. Ils ont imagin une image dans
laquelle le mental et le matriel mergent comme deux aspects complmentaires dune
ralit neutre psychophysique sous-jacente laquelle ils ne peuvent tre rduites, et
laquelle un accs direct empirique est impossible. Cette image voque des corrlations
esprit-matire structurelles, persistantes, reproductibles par sparation de la ralit
sous-jacente en aspects. De plus, cela voque des corrlations esprit-matire induites,
occasionnelles, vasives, au dessus et en dessous, respectivement, de ces corrlations de
base. Deux modles signicatifs pour le concept du sens sont lucids dans ce cadre.
Enn, il est montr que la typologie existante est en parfait accord avec une classication
base sur lempirisme de la phnomnologie des corrlations esprit-matire telles
quobserves lors dexpriences humaines exceptionnelles.

Wir prsentieren eine Typologie psychophysischer Korrelationen, die sich aus einem
duale-Aspekte Monismus ergibt, wie er von Pauli und Jung entworfen wurde. Sie gingen von
einem Bild aus, in dem das Mentale und das Materielle als zwei komplementre Aspekte aus
einer zugrundeliegenden psychophysischen Realitt entspringen, auf die sie nicht reduziert
werden knnen und zu der ein direkter empirischer Zugang unmglich ist. Dieses Bild fhrt
auf strukturelle, persistente, reproduzierbare psychophysische Korrelationen. Des weiteren
ergeben sich induzierte, gelegentliche, chtige psychophysische Korrelationen oberhalb
bzw. unterhalb der stabilen Baseline-Korrelationen. Zwei bedeutsame Rollen fr das
Konzept der Bedeutung innerhalb dieses Rahmens werden verdeutlicht. Abschlieend
wird gezeigt, da sich die erhaltene Typologie in perfekter bereinstimmung mit einer
empirisch basierten Klassikation der Phnomenologie psychophysischer Korrelationen
bendet, wie sie sich in aussergwhnlichen Erfahrungen von Menschen zeigt.


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

Presentiamo una tipologia di correlazioni mente-materia inserita nella cornice monista

dal doppio aspetto come proposta da Pauli e da Jung. Essi ipotizzarono che il mentale e
il materiale sorgono come due aspetti complementari di una sottostante realt psicosica
neutrale alla quale non possono essere ridotti e per la quale non possibile un accesso
empirico diretto. Tale quadro ipotizza correlazioni mente-materia strutturali, persistenti,
riproducibili dividendo la realt sottostante in vari aspetti. Inoltre, suggerisce correlazioni
mente-materia indotte, occasionali, evasive rispettivamente sia sopra che sotto, cio
correlazioni di base stabili. In questa struttura vengono delucidati due ruoli importanti
per il concetto di signicato. Inne viene mostrato che la tipologia ottenuta in perfetto
accordo con una classicazione empiricamente basata della fenomenologia delle
correlazioni mente-materia come osservata in esperienze umane eccezionali.

, , . ,
, ,
, .
, ,
. , (), ,
. , ,

Presentamos una tipologia de las correlaciones Mente-materia basada en el marco de los

aspectos duales mondicos tal como fueron propuestos por Pauli y Jung. Ellos conjunturaron una visin en la cual lo mental y lo material surgen como aspectos complementarios de la subyacente y neutra realidad psico-fsica a la cual no pueden ser reducidos y a
la cual es imposible el acceso directo y emprico. Esta visin sugiere que las correlaciones
mente-materia son estructurales, persistentes y reproducibles, por medio de la disociacin de la realidad subyacente en sus aspectos. As mismo sugiere las correlaciones
estables mente-materia inducidas, ocasionales y evasivas, arriba y abajo respectivamente,
como su lnea de base. Son elucidados en este marco dos roles signicativos del concepto
de sentido. Finalmente, se demuestra que la tipologa propuesta se encuentra en perfecta
concordancia con la clasicacin emprica basada en la fenomenologa de los correlatos
Mente-materia observadas en excepcionales experiencias humanas

In accordance with current standards of documentation in counselling and
psychotherapy, a documentation system for advice-seeking individuals with

A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations


exceptional experiences (EE) was developed at the IGPP counselling department

in the mid 1990s. It was introduced as mandatory for all client contacts. In
addition to detailed reports of the counselling process itself, the system includes
a number of modules registering sociodemographic and clinically relevant data,
especially those regarding reported EE (for details see Belz-Merk et al. 2002;
Bauer et al. 2012).
In addition, a special questionnaire for the documentation of EE has been
established. It species variables for all internal, external, coincidence and
dissociation phenomena.20 The documentation itself has been carried out by
IGPP personnel on the basis of the reports of the clients.
The types of EE reect the subjective views of the clients about their experiences.
As far as are accessible, the frequency and time frame of the EE, the clients state
of consciousness, the prevailing external circumstances during the EE, and the
subjective beliefs of the clients, are documented as well. It is important to note that
the collected data yield an exclusively phenomenological classication scheme,
not a system for clinical diagnosis.
The results described in the main body of this article are based on a sample of
1649 clients with EE documented (partly retrospectively) from 1996 to 2006
(Bauer et al. 2012; Belz & Fach 2012). An initial analysis of the occurrence
frequencies of specic phenomena suggested a removal of those few cases with
extremely rare phenomena in order to allow for meaningful factor analyses. This
led to a reduction of the sample size to 1465 clients (1.64 EE patterns per client on
Based on this sample, a principal component analysis has been carried out
over 14 variables. The resulting factors represent the most frequent phenomena
within the four basic types shown in Figure 1, conrming and specifying the EE
patterns already found in previous studies. The eigenvalue criterion due to Kaiser
(eigenvalues exceeding one) suggested ve factors to begin with, but a six-factor
solution (varimax rotation, explained variance 54%) was eventually preferred
because it provided better differentiation and interpretation. The types of
phenomena according to these six factors are shown in Figure 2.
Meanwhile the analysis has been extended to clients in the years beyond 2006
with slightly modied and improved questionnaires. It conrms and renes the
results achieved so far. An additional study, together with the Psychiatric
University Hospital Zurich, of self-assessed (rather than expert-assessed) EE
with a sample of 1578 subjects from an ordinary population (rather than
advice-seeking clients) shows that the average intensity and frequency of their
reported EE are rated signicantly lower than for IGPP clients. However, the
factors extracted from the ordinary population sample as well as their relative
frequencies are in perfect agreement with the IGPP sample results described
above (Figure 2). For details see Fach et al. (2013).

The main questionnaire (in German) for the analysis reported in this contribution can be found
at www.igpp.de/questionnaire/index.php?xx=/page&xy=/view-01


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

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We are grateful to Michael Baumann, Martina Belz, Adam Crabtree, Ed Kelly,
Marianne Meister and Hans Primas for useful discussions. We also thank the
editors of the Journal of Analytical Psychology for their help in many details
and their encouraging support.
[MS rst received March 2012; nal version December 2012]

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 245253

A commentary on A structuralphenomenological typology of mind-matter

correlations by H. Atmanspacher and W. Fach
David I. Tresan, San Francisco, USA

This commentary was to have been a vade mecum (walk with me), modelled
on the 17th century genre of little guidebooks to a text or a town or whatever.
Certainly this complex paper needed a vade mecum if any did. So I wrote one
in the classic mould, where I played the knowledgeable tour guide. Which didnt
work, especially for this paper. I didnt realize this until my computer mysteriously
crashed, irretrievably losing that rst vade mecum on the eve of the deadline.
No kidding. Had synchronicity visited while I was writing about it? The
thought calmed me, and I wondered if the computer breakdown might be
meaningful, which it was. Very quickly I realized that I had missed everything
If, as I suppose, my computer knew in some way that I was misguided and
said so, then how did it know, and also know what to do? The computer as
agent could not have ordered the breakdown because synchronistic events
are necessarily acausal, and to determine that something is wrong implies causal
reasoning, leading to a value judgement (bad paper) and thence to a consequential
action (equipment failure). Though I still do not know what induced this
meaningful event, the logical yet fantastical presumption is that our allencompassing universe is constitutionally interconnected and intra-communicative
in ways and modes beyond our ken. And thats what Atmanspacher and Fachs
paper is about.
It gures that there must be a common ground for all that is which, if we
grasped its dynamics and mechanics, would let us see how everything happens
in this case how a non-living entity communicates meaningfully with a living
one, namely, a deft manipulator of zeroes and ones with a deluded analyst. I had
taken a tour-guides distance from the material, and in return it had eluded me.
Goodbye, tour-guide mentality and formal vade mecum. I thought it best instead
to do a critical vade mecum to my experience of reading this paper, writing not
as a knowing guide but as a respectful participant in the ow of things. After all,


2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12006


David I. Tresan

quantum dynamics would have me be a participant, as the observed is affected

by the observer and vice versa.
Before the breakdownthe computers, that isI had not realized that
Atmanspacher and Fachs paper had so overwhelmed me that I had shrunk
from grasping its vastness, instead psychically fragmenting. My evaluative
executive function dispersed before an overload of existential information
conveyed in impersonal value-free language, going with peripheral, more
manageable aspects of the overall theme, the nature of reality. I simply regressed
to the collectively dominant mode of classical science and its myth of the
objective observer. In that rst commentary I found myself focusing, for
instance, on why Jung, who with Pauli had scoped out much of what this paper
proposes in the way of neutral psychophysical monism as a key to understanding
synchronicity, had been unable to arrive at his own monistic model. In his own
words: . . .too great the intellectual responsibility without which such a subject
cannot be tackled; too inadequate, in the long run, my scientic training
[1952, para. 816]). I also took up Jungs relation to metaphysics, at rst aversive,
then ambivalent, and then reconciled in positing the psychoid realm and the unus
mundus. What had nally let him grant reality to non-sensory, imageless data?
I also pondered why his treatment of matter was so wanting. He put the
responsibility for making sense of matter largely in the hands of the alchemists
who treated it as symbol, which, as such, belonged to the life of mind, not the
world of matter. I joked (apologies to Pascal): La matire a ses raisons que la
raison ne connat point. How can one sensitively monitor mind/matter
equivalence from within that stance, even when advocating for the neglected
fourth and the feminine? Pauli in his way wondered the same about Jung (Gieser
2005, pp. 343, 344; Meier 2001 passim; Zabriskie 1995 passim). Interesting,
these and other fragments, but they all ew like sparks thrown off by the intensity
of the papers main story, which treats of reality itself, its architecture, its modus
operandi, and its mysterious agenda regarding acausal events, no less.
This next part I dread writing because its so difcult. Like Jung, I couldnt
articulate a comprehensive universe, nor could I easily grasp the one crafted
by Atmanspacher and Fach. It wasnt a reverential matter but an intellectual
one; one must name an ultimate entity without identifying dening properties
or using sensory metaphors as descriptors. One must also name its structures
and operations and their concordance with lived experience. Whenever as
teacher or writer I have nerved myself to address an ultimate source or ground,
a neutral monism or God by any name, I begin to climb the Tower of Babel,
struggling mightily even for basic appellations. Even the Hebrew God demurred:
I am what I am. Heres Jung on the issue:
The existence of a transcendental reality is indeed evident in itself, but it is uncommonly
difcult for our consciousness to construct intellectual models which would give a
graphic description of the reality we have perceived.
(Jung 1970, para. 787)

A commentary on mind-matter correlations by H. Atmanspacher & W. Fach 247

Mirabile dictu and to their great credit, Atmanspacher and Fach have
constructed such a model, and masterfully. Unlike Jung, they have no quibble
with metaphysics, which serves them as responsible inductive reasoning. They
employ a scientic vocabulary in dealing with the ineffable. Their knowledge of
philosophy is comprehensive and deep; moreover, they draw on the still-new set
of analogues from quantum physics, which are not couched in sensory language,
and they handle the existential dimension of their subject descriptively in terms of
structure and pattern, not causal explanations. They name and depict without
anthropomorphizing, and describe an entity that connes them to writing from
inside it. Being all, it has no outside from which an objective viewpoint can be
had. Their model construction works. Atmanspacher and Fachs story is the rst
rigorous and comprehensive scientic update of Jung and Paulis investigations
into synchronicity since their deaths over 50 years ago.
Nonetheless, my rst encounter with the paper was with its bold in-your-face
title (A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter correlations) it
shocked me, and I grasped only one word, typology. I had been forewarned
that the paper had been impenetrable to others but still seemed important
enough to publish. The question was whether to publish. I was proud at being
tapped as a reader, but surprised and humiliated by the title; it made me angry.
After some struggle, I thought that the title might be offering an important
promise, namely, a potential scientic research programme for synchronistic
events and even a quantication of such events and synchronistic-like phenomena.
The supposition was further reinforced when I looked into a sister paper
Atmanspacher published in 2012 in the Journal of Consciousness Studies
(Atmanspacher 2012), which takes up the same issues in more detail and in
greater historical and explanatory depth. I reected that the paper we received
perhaps addressed us specically since we have direct contact with patients
and a capacity for clinical research. Of course, the authors were walking in the
tracks of Jung and Pauli. I began to soften. The research to which they speak
at the end of this paper has overtones of J. B. Rhine and parapsychology, but
their propositions do more than prove statistically that paranormal events are
real. Atmanspacher and Fach raise consciousness regarding the frequency of
acausal events (not rare) that are neither generally noted nor recognized, and
they begin to sort them out according to variables of mind/matter correlations.
All of this not only seemed plausible but also innitely more interesting and
generative than most work done around synchronicity. Their paper stands in
contrast to anecdotal accounts and unsystematic, scientistic, often quasi-mystical
explanations, particularly the ultimate aphorism that everything is connected to
everything else, a sterile new-age nostrum. The paper also moves us beyond eld
dynamics, which has assumed that acausal events are the emergent products of
non-linear reasoning instead of manifestations of a categorically different kind
of interactive space.
While the title had taken me a while, I read the paper in one sitting. It came to
me like a story I thought I understood and still do. It was like skiing over rocky


David I. Tresan

terrain with many moguls covered by a smooth surface of snow. On reection I

realize that while reading I was loosely translating the essays language into
psychological and spatial dynamics, and following the story as if looking in
on a Gedankens experiment that was coming to something. I could sense
analogues from everyday life (local realism in quantum terminology) as well
as a fairytale-like ambiance. On returning to the paper now, I nd that the snow
has vanished and I must nd my way among the particulars, pick in hand. It is
tough going, I think in part because the world-structure as laid out creates some
confusion (more about this later). However, the narrative is beautifully
constructed; the ratio of ideas to words seems extremely well balanced, and
no sentence is gratuitous. While the succession of ideas may be at times too
tight, particularly later, that did not impede my rst reading, which allowed
my evenly hovering attention to see as if through a glass darkly, admitting
the vague along with the specic and still letting me get the drift and track the
argument. I imagine that my apperceptions may resemble what the scientic
mind might apprehend beyond its theories when dealing with waveforms,
mathematical formulations, and clouds of data, the so-called observables of
quantum physics. If psychic life is analogous to this realm, then the macro
world must rest content with cloudy facts as nal explanations, a language of
antinomy. While I suspect that this is pushing analogy too far, I am nonetheless
about to push it still farther.
I have long amused myself with the fantasy that the quantum world is a
fairyland. While no human or animal-like characters live there, whatever does
exist can neither be seen nor precisely located. They are not subject to the laws
of nature as we know them. They change their spatial venue instantaneously
and communicate at a distance without regard for the passage of time. And they
are not subject to causality, which makes everything possible without apparent
cause. Meaningfulness reigns, and wishes dictate, for one wishes only for things
that have meaning for the one who wishes. Most curiously, the freedom of these
denizens may be constrained because they may function as instruments tending
a nal plan built into the world. This role does not entail the power to effect
that end but only to recognize, know, and afrm the reality of t. These fairies
in their generosity seem also to have wished upon us scientic analogues for
psychic states, showing us new dynamics for holism, numinous experience,
and acausal events. The greater boon is this: if the quantum world has bona de
empirical status (which it claims) and is, in fact, an isomorph or analogue, a
complement or exact parallel of psychic life, then psychic life is conrmed as
being as real as matter. Its almost too good to be true.
But thats the very point. Is Schrdingers cat alive or dead? In this life, do we
dream or are we real? And so, in the course of reading this paper, periodically I
return to the literature on quantum physics to reassure myself that I can
understand why it is taken as serious science and empirically real. Each time I
am reassured mostly by the uncontested ndings of the double-slit experiment
and the wave-quantum paradox, and by the failed attempt to locate the

A commentary on mind-matter correlations by H. Atmanspacher & W. Fach 249

electron. Just now I think that our world is real, and that stance, on faith,
includes both the quantum and psychic worlds. I also believe that water is
one part hydrogen and two parts oxygen, but I have never put the ingredients
together to make sure.
So, now its time to say something about Atmanspacher and Fachs story
without the snow. The organization and the earlier sections are very clear,
particularly the Introduction and the beginning of the Pauli-Jung Conjecture.
Then come the intriguing quantum ideas, which begin the major line of reasoning
and drive the argument to its end. Fascinating ideas, but somewhere among them I
get lost. That is, the language somehow backres; the unremitting terminological
abstraction, its absence of sensory analogues and examples, the spare existential
reexivity, and the elliptical compactness of ideas make one feel as if in imaginary
space without images. And I lose the topography, the relationships between the
I tried to draw an organizational tree, with the monist entity at the top, and
then the relationships among the epistemological world, the quantum world,
the psychological world of consciousness and the collective unconscious, the
macroworld constituted by its objects (read correlates) of matter and mind,
coterminous with a world of normal correlations of mind/matter and abnormal
disjunctive ones. Are you following? I feel like Im back with the Scholastics,
maybe Aquinas, probably Duns Scotus.
The trouble was that so many of these worlds, which are one world, are
overlapping synchronic realms, the interdigitation of whose operations is not
clear. The map of the structure and its connections eluded me. For instance,
the holistic quantum state, that harmonious, self-contained, and self-justifying
entity, has an equivalent in the collective unconscious, but also, it seems, in
the underlying monist entity itself. The major argument regarding synchronicity
turns around incursions into these states by measuring devices, which may be
anything from a piece of hardware, as in the bombardment of atoms in a
cyclotron, to just thinking about a holistic state or even intending to think about
it. The subsequent decomposition of the holistic state is tantamount to releasing,
nay, creating subatomic particles from the bombarded atom or to birthing new
conscious contents from the heretofore monolithic collective unconscious. I could
not follow the ner details with certainty because realms and holistic entities
seemed to blend together. From this paper I cannot differentiate between the
holistic states of the ontic monad, the quantum world, and the collective
unconscious. They all seem to be of an ontic realm, and their epistemic
emanations all bring the numinous into the epistemic world. I suspect that this
paper stands at the cutting edge of the work on quantum physics and
consciousness, and that more information will be forthcoming, both theoretical
and otherwise. No one is in a better position to know this than Dr. Atmanspacher,
who since 2004 has written the entry on Quantum Approaches to Consciousness
in the prestigious Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revising it four times, the
last in 2011.


David I. Tresan

But let me cut to the line of reasoning I spoke of above, and put a little snow
back on the rocks. The central premise is that by measuring whole or holistic
states, new items are created in the epistemic realm that, as with the monist
entity, cannot be reduced again to the original state. (By the way, the archmeasuring device is consciousness, so we are talking about raising consciousness
by using consciousness as the tool.) But also, In general, the idea is that any
inanimate environment can be understood as a measuring device, though in a
non-intentional manner. No consciousness is necessary. . . (Atmanspacher &
Fach, p. 223). My rejoinder is that when these roiled holistic states have generated
new elements (consciousness in the mind realm, particles and whatever in the
material one), the holistic states themselves remain roiled in backlash, sending
into the macroworld induced products which are uncoupled, uncorrelated
aspects of mind and/or matter. In such a way, the directly unknowable ontic realm
is affected by consciousness and participates indirectly in conscious life through
these rogue correlates. The completion of this process is a coming-together in
the macroworld through synchronicity which connects disconnected mind and
matter singularities at whatever time. The macroworld identities of the specic
elements and their meaningful re-meetings are unknowable beforehand (maybe
by the fairies alone) and uncontrollable. One could impute them to blind chance,
chance uctuation, or the fullment of some nal unknown plan. (I choose the
plan.) The sine qua non is that the comings-together are meaningful.
What Atmanspacher and Fach call structured is what occurs when correlates
of mind and matter come down paired as anticipated. This is regarded as normal,
and the products are experienced as normal occurrences in the world. In the single
place where Atmanspacher and Fach allow themselves an example from the
sensory realm, they say simply, an apple is an apple. Such normal phenomena
are to be expected and, as such, serve as a baseline against which abnormal
uncorrelated phenomena that have been induced by measurement may be
compared after they have rejoined their counterparts in a synchronistic event.
There emerges hence a continuum running from positive synchronicity where
unanticipated connectedness occurs to negative synchronicity where unanticipated
disconnectedness occurs. Along this continuum are arrayed more or less intense
but always noteworthy and meaningful conuences, synchronicity-like, which
are often called chance, coincidence, or fate. An interesting research interest
coming from this schematic is the contention that still-uncoupled single
correlates (exceptional human experiences) and even strangely-put-together
ones can be discerned by common sense awareness, for instance, in poltergeist
phenomena, automatisms, and mediumship, inter alia. These experiences are
not rare, according to Atmanspacher and Fach. They have predicted which
manifestations obtain when either mind or matter fragments dominate, linked
either with experiences of unusual connectedness or unusual disconnectedness.
These predictions seek a theory which they say is already empirically substantiated
by a sorting of many documented exceptional experiences. The hope, I think, is
that the acausal world can be known, accepted, and understood without

A commentary on mind-matter correlations by H. Atmanspacher & W. Fach 251

destroying the stochastic mystery that is life. What they have conceived is a
universe in which synchronicity and related phenomena are normative and
frequent, and it is our universe.
Awareness of normal correlates of mind and matter is generated by the
amount of consciousness it takes to effect an epistemic split, that is, to go from
what St. Augustine calls the inner word, which is no word at all but only an
elemental inner gathering of undened energy that is the anlage of a later
formed perception, to an outer word, if you will (Lonergan 1997, passim). It
seems to follow that the kind of activity that creates uncoupled correlates from
the backwash of impinged-upon holistic states requires the incursion of a much
greater degree of conscious energy than the energy effecting epistemic splits.
Jung equates level of energy with consciousness, and the level of energy required
simply to perceive is virtually below awareness. As for the much greater degree
of energy inducing uncoupled correlates, one instance might be the energy I
poured into analysing Atmanspacher and Fachs paper and wrangling with
the quantum and ineffable worlds, which would qualify, I think, as a relatively
large provocation of holistic peace. Who knows what was to come down into
my life space, but the likelihood was that something would. The clinical aspect
of this is whether a person will regress to a classical Cartesian state of mind in
reaction to an irrational impediment, seeking its causes and the logical x for it
(I could have taken my computer to an expert, retrieved the lost document, and
given you a nice little tour), or whether one will look for the meaning in the
unusual event and be guided by it. In practice, when disturbing things occur
or when ananke (necessity), probably the arch-property of matter, suddenly
stops mind from making sense of things, one may choose to forego the
rational-causal attitude when its not working and give over to the other. Herein
lies new space, one that honours causal explanation until it doesnt work and
then permits a dispassionate look from specie aeternatatis. With an honestly
open attitude towards impasses there also come, as consoling gifts, the lifting
spirit of the numinous, the broad perspective from philosophy, Aristotles prima
philosophia, and the assurance of knowing that there are universal laws which
serve the higher person. So suggest Atmanspacher and Fach. Further, it is of
great clinical signicance that whatever induced fragments of mind and matter
fall out of supercharged holistic states, they bring the numinous with them,
hence the experience of uncanniness in synchronistic events and inations too.
Early in reading this paper, I began to think about one that I had written over
15 years ago and had largely lost interest in. My ostensible motivation was
voiced in the Introduction: It is my belief that a body of clinical work that is
in frank variance with how the brain works probably will not survive as a
mainstream treatment modality (Tresan 1996, p. 399). In Atmanspacher and
Fachs paper I saw that their attempt to model reality itself raised the stakes
of my challenge. They were going to hold psychology, what we know and what
we do, up to the ndings not of brain neuroscience but of a philosophy about
how the entire world works. Psychology has never had its rst philosophy, its


David I. Tresan

grounding metaphysical anchor. An attempt at it by two philosophically

informed and distinguished theoretical physicists is both a gift and a direction.
Quantum physics is still a young science. Whether they get it exactly right this
time is not important. The attempt is a precedent.
The less conspicuous motive for my own paper was to shine a light on the
shortcomings of neurobiological aspirations. As informative as neurobiology
has been, it is still an hypostasis. The individual core mystery will not be
found out by neuroscience. I ended the paper with an exploration of where
and how the brain creates and appreciates symbols. As I thought, the answer
was not clear. With the inertia of the ages, practice lags well behind
knowledge. In the 1970s, the linear positivistic practice of analysis since
Freuds time began to yield to a more eld-like orientation. Kohuts emphasis
on the transformative epiphenomenal (read: not causal) workings of self was
eld-like; that, together with social constructivism, made for the cocreation
of common space, and later formulations of the analytic third, the common
eld, became cutting-edge practice, the rage as one experienced analyst
called it. In my paper I nurtured this shifting paradigm by introducing into
our analytic lexicon terms for how elds work. I elaborated on chaos theory
but especially complexity theory, emergence or emergentism, and supporting
ideas like supervenience. This helped certain gifted people take these nonlinear notions further, which in practice has taken us still further away from
the assumptions and constraints of a deterministic world. It has meant
greater freedom for the human soul.
In Atmanspacher and Fachs paper I see the coming of a different paradigm
that promises greater freedom, beyond that of eld theory which relies as
always on dependency (neither strictly reductive nor random, but nonetheless
still causal, albeit diluted). Synchronicity is that Kuhnian anomaly which
signalled an incomplete picture of reality and serves as the goad to discovering
a fuller one. The heuristic availability and understanding of an interactive space
that is completely void of causality is that new space and new paradigm.
Implicit in this paper is the systematic, scientic search for reality.
According to Gieser, Pauli was explicit about the need for such work,
which spoke to his vision of scientic integrity. He saw Jungs worshipful
followers gathering around the master and bristled. According to Gieser,
speaking of Pauli, Jungs ideas were turned into items of faith which formed
the foundation of a protable esoteric therapy factory (Gieser 2005, p. 339).
She adds:
Depth psychology has become the big business of therapy that he [Pauli] feared.. . .It is
no longer self-evident what is meant by reality. It is no longer possible to rest in a nave
perception of reality, reality can only be approached by continuous work. Objectivity
is no longer synonymous with the naively perceptible, concrete object which can be
measured and weighed.
(ibid., p. 344)

A commentary on mind-matter correlations by H. Atmanspacher & W. Fach 253

We must have an informed faith born of working at it, that what we do and think
and say is ultimately about objective reality. Or we fail ourselves in our solipsism.
Receiving Atmanspacher and Fachs paper proved to be synchronistic for me,
a slow-motion synchronicity that unfolded into a gift that has let me see where
that 1996 paper of mine was wending and has enlarged the circle of my
understanding. All of which feels wonderful: I am deeply grateful.

Atmanspacher, H. (2012). Dual-aspect monism la Pauli and Jung. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 19, 9/10, 96120.
(2011). Quantum Approaches to Consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), ed. E. N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/
Gieser, S. (2005). The Innermost Kernel. Depth Psychology and Quantum Physics.
Wolfgang Paulis Dialogue with C.G. Jung. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
Jung, C. G. (1952). Synchronicity: an acausal connecting principle. CW 8.
(1970). Mysterium Coniunctionis (VI. The conjunction, 10. The self and the
bounds of knowledge). CW 14.
Lonergan, B. (1997). Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Collected Works of Bernard
Lonergan. Vol. 2, eds. F. E. Crowe & R. M. Doran. Toronto: University of Toronto
Meier, C. A. (Ed.) (2001). Atoms and Archetypes: The Pauli/Jung Letters 19321958.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tresan, D. (1996). Jungian metapsychology and neurobiological theory. Journal of
Analytical Psychology, 41, 399436.
Zabriskie, B. (1995/2001). Jung and Pauli: a subtle symmetry. Journal of Analytical
Psychology, 40 / Preface to Atoms and Archetypes: The Pauli/Jung Letters 19321958.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Journal of Analytical Psychology, 2013, 58, 254257

Encouraging metaphysics: a reply to the

commentary by David Tresan
Harald Atmanspacher, Freiburg, Germany, and Zurich, Switzerland;
Wolfgang Fach, Freiburg, Germany

David Tresan wrote a truly remarkable commentary to our article on the PauliJung-conjecture and some of its ramications, a very generous commentary
which surely needs no further explanations. We could hardly appreciate more
how, with concise insight and the elegance of an experienced writer, he made
much of what we wanted to communicate better accessible or even accessible
at all. So, nothing remains to be added, really, to this excellent introduction
and reection. However, his metaphor of skiing over rocky terrain with many
moguls covered by a smooth surface of snow turns out to be so apt that we
cannot resist the temptation to expand a bit on it.
The framework of thinking that we reconstructed from the exchange of Pauli
and Jung is complex indeed, rocky terrain. And the resulting outline still grossly
simplies many of its more specic featuressome difcult, some subtle, some
bothfor the purpose of endowing the big picture with just enough details to
unveil those basic structures, without which enjoyable skiing would be very
tough to do. We agree with David Tresan that a big picture with a scope like this
is not accidentally metaphysical, it is inevitably metaphysical. Although large
parts of the 20th century witnessed an often pejorative connotation with
metaphysics, insights into the nature of reality would be impossible without
metaphysical assumptions and regulative principles. We thank the editors of
the JAP for the opportunity to say some more words about this, emphasizing
features that are not so prominent in the original paper and picking up some
ideas from Tresans admirable amplications.
The Pauli-Jung version of dual-aspect monism merges an ontic monism,
which is psychophysically neutral, with an epistemic dualism of the mental
and the physical as perspectival aspects of the underlying ontic domain. There
are important respects in which this framework differs from neutral monism
la Mach, James, or Russell. In neutral monism, the mental and the physical
are reducible to the underlying domain, whereas they are irreducible in
dual-aspect monism. The reason for this diffference is that neutral monism


2013, The Society of Analytical Psychology

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5922.12007

Encouraging metaphysics: a reply to David Tresan


conceives the underlying domain to consist of psychophysically neutral elements

whose combinations determine whether the compound products appear mental
or physical. In dual-aspect monism, the underlying domain does not ultimately
consist of separate elements at all. It is radically holistic, and the mental and
physical aspects emerge by a decomposition of the whole rather than a
composition of elements.
Having said this, another issue should be explicated as well: the boundary
between the mental and physical aspects on the one hand and their underlying domain on the other is by far not as sharp as our cartoon picture
suggests. In fact, one should conceive of a whole spectrum of boundaries,
each one indicating the transition to a more comprehensive level of wholeness
until (ultimately) the distinction-free unus mundus is approached. A viable
idea in this context might be archetypal levels with increasing degrees of
generality: the unus mundus at bottom, the mental and physical on top,
and intermediate levels in between make a more rened sense of what we
have in mind. Depending on the status of the individuation process of the
individual concerned, Jungs transcendent function regulates the exchange
among these levels.
This entails that a tight distinction of i) fundamentally ontic and ii) derived
epistemic domains is too simplistic. In the original paper we could only indicate
in a footnote that a concept originally proposed by Quine (1969), developed by
Putnam (1981) and later utilized by Atmanspacher and Kronz (1999) comes to
help here: ontological relativity or, in another parlance, relative onticity. The
key motif behind this notion is to allow ontological signicance for any level,
from elementary particles to icecubes, bricks, and tablesand all the same for
elements of the mental. An archetype which may be regarded as ontic relative
to the perspective of the mind-matter distinction, can be seen epistemic relative
to the unus mundus. This twist is additionally interesting because it also
relativizes Jungs (overly) stern Kantian stance that archetypes per se as formal
ordering factors in the collective unconscious are strictly inaccessible epistemically, and thus empirically (cf. Kime 2012 for more discussion). At the risk of
generating more scholasticism, as David Tresan ironically inserts, this renement might nonetheless be useful to see why and how the blend of epistemic
realms and ontic entities may be regarded as more systematic than sloppy.
We should also drop some remarks about the lack of concrete illustrative
examples from the sensory realm (Tresan), which some readers may be
unhappy with. This is not (only) due to missing imagination, however; there
is a deeper reason. Already in the early days of quantum theory, one of its
main architects, Niels Bohr, insisted that we are concerned with the
recognition of physical laws which lie outside the domain of our ordinary
experience and which present difculties to our accustomed forms of perception
(Bohr 1934, p. 5). Accordingly, so-called intuitively appealing thinking may
mislead us and constitute an inhibiting rather than advancing factor on the way
to insight.


Harald Atmanspacher and Wolfgang Fach

Along the same lines, Heisenberg (1971) remembers a conversation with

Bohr at Gttingen in 1922. He asked Bohr:
If the inner structure of the atoms is inaccessible to an illustrative [anschauliche] description, as you say, if we basically have no language to speak about this structure, will we
ever be able to understand the atoms? Bohr hesitated for a moment, then he
replied: Yes we will. But at the same time we will have to learn what the word understanding means.
(Heisenberg 1971, p. 64)

Perhaps it is not entirely accidental that the issue of meaning arises herepretty
astonishing for a typical physics discussion but absolutely pivotal for Jungs
concept of synchronistic events and the symbolic expression of their meaning.
Tresan repeatedly emphasizes the parallels between basic conceptual structures
of quantum theory and psychology, and this could not be more appropriate. One
of the key common features in both domains is arguably the fact that an observation does not only register an outcome, as in classical thinking, but also changes
the state of the observed system in a basically uncontrollable manner. This holds
for physical quantum systems as well as for mental systems and, simple as it
sounds, it has far-reaching consequences which psychology and cognitive science
are just about to realize (cf. Busemeyer & Bruza 2012). A most evident effect of
this backreaction on mental states is the almost ubiquitous appearance of order
effects in surveys and questionnaires. This has recently been addressed in detail
(Atmanspacher & Rmer 2012) on the basis of non-commutative structures of
mental observables. Since the mathematics of such structures is at the heart of
quantum theory as well, this parallel is not a mere analogyit points to a constitutive joint principle underlying the mental and the physical: almost too good to
be true (Tresan), indeed.
Finally, we do much appreciate Tresans reference to his own paper (Tresan
1996), and we appreciate it for two reasons. For one, his intuition that eld
theory which relies as always on dependency (neither strictly reductive nor
random, but nonetheless still causal, albeit diluted) will fall short of explaining
the substance of synchronicity matches perfectly well with the more radical
vision of the Pauli-Jung conjecture: a holism in which wholes do not consist
of parts to begin with. Elements of eld theory, such as networks of attractors
(archetypes) and their basins of attraction (complexes) can be useful descriptive
tools within epistemic contexts (cf. Cambray 2009), but Paulis and Jungs
daring ideas in their full scope may persuade us to believe that the repertoire
of complex dynamical systems is not deep enough.
Second, Tresans sentiment that brain science alone will be plainly unable to
unveil the mysteries of the mind-matter problem, neither in the decade of the
brain nor in decades to come, accords with our thinking. In the long run, it is
often misleading to follow the most recent trendy fads just to increase the visibility
and (putative) acceptance of ones achievements. Analytical psychology has no
need of getting overly tied to such moves. Only dead sh go with the ow. What

Encouraging metaphysics: a reply to David Tresan


is needed is a new idea of reality, implying novel and rened metaphysical

structures. If we can make progress on this route, it will provide us, and our
culture, with a satisfactory and benecial worldviewa key element of analytical
psychology besides its therapeutic values.

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Atmanspacher, H. & Rmer, H. (2012). Order effects in sequential measurements of
non-commuting psychological observables. Journal of Mathematical Psychology,
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Bohr, N. (1934). Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Busemeyer, J. R. & Bruza, P. D. (2012). Quantum Models of Cognition and Decision.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cambray, J. (2009). Synchronicity. Nature and Psyche in an Interconnected Universe.
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York: Harper and Row. German original: Der Teil und das Ganze. Piper: Mnchen,
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