ISIS: A Threat?

WILLIAMSON MURRAY

Military History

A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY ON TERRORIST THREATS IN AMERICA POST-9/11

In effect this is two questions. The first is easily answered: with the collapse of
US strategyin the Middle East since 2009 and the expansion of ISIS in Syria and
northern Iraqin the intervening years, the tactical threat has certainly increased.
Most of theMuslims and converts to that religion who have trooped to heaven on
earth in the ISIS caliphate of the Middle East will find their way to death in the
dusty byways of Mesopotamia. But eventually a number of these fanatics will return
to their homelands inthe United States, Canada, and Europe. Some, shocked by
whatthey have seen, will turn their back on the past. Many will be caught up in the
network of evidence that Western intelligence agencies have gathered abouttheir past
and will be rendered harmless. Butsome will escape the net and bringtheirviolent
activities to bear on Western societies. Yet one should not overestimate the
capabilities they will bring with them, for virtually all of them will have served
as nothing more than foot soldiers in the religious war that iscurrently occurring
innorthern Iraq and Syria.
History is clear in its lessons about the capacity of terrorist organizations to
overthrow societies. Relatively small numbers of terrorists can cause mayhem and
casualties, but in theend they cannot destroy complex, interconnected societies
withtheir redundant political, economic, and financial systems. Even the wellorganized Russian terrorist organizations of the late nineteenth century were not able
to overthrow the largely bumbling oligarchy of the tsarist regime. Those who return
as terrorists from the Middle East will undoubtedly be able to shoot up a number
of malls or university campuses, on campuses helped by the fact that firearms are
banned from those gated communities, or commit atrocities such as the beheading
of a soldier on a London street several years ago. They will gather major headlines in
the New York Post and other similar dailies. But one should not forget that eventhe
horrific, targeted damage of 9/11 caused little more than a blip on the onward march
of the US economy in the months and years that followed.
So in the largest sense the blow back by the Westerners who have joined ISIS will be
a nuisance. The resulting responses to their acts by Americas and Europes political
leaders and intelligence organizations will undoubtedly prove costly, annoying,

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and in the end not terribly effectiveat least in preventing further attacks.
One can only imagine, for example, the havoc that the Transportation Security
Administration(TSA) would cause if it were asked to protect the commuter trains
thatrumble into and out of New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago each day. The
actions ofthese returning terrorists, of course, will result in a political and social
response from the American people; but the society will not fall, the economy
will not collapse, and life will continue, although with the hindrances imposed by
thosewho run the intelligence and security agencies of the Western nations.
The second part of the question, however, is more nuanced and requires a two-part
answer: in the short termat least for the next ten years in US termsas suggested
above, the potential damage that terrorists returning from the Middle East can cause
is minimal, should ISIS continue to survive in some haven in northern Syria. At
present ISIS only represents direct threats to the immediate nations that surround
it:Lebanon, the remnants of Assads regime, Jordan, and, of course, the bits and
pieces that once made up Iraq. It is a list that is not exactly at the center of the worlds
strategic balance of power. Moreover, the Turks, should they eventually believe that
ISIS represents a threat to their stability, are fully capable of ending the so-called
caliphate in a matter of weeks.
The real danger has to do with the long term and how the United States and the
European Union respond to current events in Iraq and Syria. Here the echoes of
the past are suggestive. The Germany that Adolf Hitler took over as chancellor
on January30, 1933, was a threat to no one but itself. From 1933 through to
September1938, the fuhrers bluff and soft words, as well as pusillanimity and
miscalculations on the part of the Reichs enemies, allowed the Nazis to destroy
thesafeguards of the Treaty of Versailles and the strategic advantages enjoyed
by the victorious powers.
The problem that confronted British and French political leaders was that there was
no easy, peaceful approach to the potential strategic and military threat that Nazi
Germany posed in the interwar period. The solving of the Nazi problem throughout
that period would have demanded the extermination of that polity. That would have
required a major war, whether one talks about the reoccupation of the Rhineland or
the defense of Czechoslovakia. Therein is the problem because how does one judge
whether it is worth the terrible cost in lives and financial burdens to destroy a threat
that lies in the future? That is not a question that statesmen are ever comfortable in

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addressing or answering. Britain finally woke up in March 1939, but by then it was
almost too late; and the result was a catastrophic war that came close to destroying
Western civilization.
ISIS confronts Western leaders with precisely that problem, particularly that
highly intelligent but thoroughly ahistorical man who holds the presidency of the
UnitedStates. Moreover, one must not forget that the American people have already
grown tired of a decadelong war that has every prospect of lasting through to the
end of the twenty-first century. To push ISIS back from the lands held by the Kurds,
even to retake Mosul, which the Kurds with significant resupplies of weaponry from
the west could do, is not to address the fundamental problem. ISIS represents not
only the threat posed by all terrorist organizations but also the threat of a real rogue
political and ideological entity in the midst of petroleum resources essential to the
continued stability of the global economy. To stamp it out will require more than
occasional precision strikes. It will require a major air campaign and American and
European boots on the groundperhaps not many but real soldiers and marines
as more than advisers. Most depressingly, that campaign to destroy ISIS must reach
intoSyria as well as into northern Iraq.
Therein is the rub. Do the Americans and Europeans have the stomach for such
an effort, given the war weariness that currently besets them? It will not be
enough merely to contain ISIS in northern Syria, as the president has suggested.
My close friend and colleague, Richard Sinnreich, recently commented to me on
the conundrum the United States faces: If ISISs outright destruction isnt in the
cards, then opportunity costs intrude. How much do we invest, for how long, and
at whatprice in other strategic priorities forsaken? To only attempt only limited
actionsagainst ISIS might well be worse than doing nothing.
So far, the murderous thugs of ISIS have displayed none of the sophistication that
Hitler and Goebbels used to keep British and French political leaders in a stage of
denial, but they have certainly displayed considerable capacity to mobilize young
men in a society attracted to the worst sides of violence. Admittedly, the Munich
analogy has misled US policy makers in the past. The North Vietnamese never had
any intentions of taking over the world. After all, mindful of their history, they never
forgot that they had the Chinese to their north. The difference between Munich in
1938, when the dominoes did fall, and South Vietnam, where they probably would
not have fallen, has to do with the context within which those two events took place.

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The context within which ISIS has appeared is equally important because it is that
context that indicates whether or not it is a long-term threat. At present the vast
bulge of young, unemployed, easily manipulated young males throughout the Middle
East is a harbinger of massive turmoil throughout the region well into the future.
And an ISIS that survives as something more than a mere terrorist organization like
al-Qaeda represents a magnet to recruit the turbulent youth of the Middle East and
perhaps beyond. Thus, it will become much more of a threat than Osama bin Ladens
organization did at its height. ISIS represents an attractive brand of fanaticism not
only to many in the Middle East but, as we are finding, in the west as well. Its goals
are as megalomaniacal as were those of Nazi Germany. And unlike al-Qaeda, the
finances of which had considerable limitations, ISIS has acquired huge sums from
the Europeans for the hostages it has seized as well as territories that can and will
provide real revenue, unless military actions are taken against it to destroy its leaders
andforces.
For the short term, its leaders may or may not be able to feed back the occasional
terrorist to Europe and the United States to cause some local horror. In the long
term, however, if they can stabilize and continue to hold the areas that they are
now calling their caliphate, they will add to the wealth they have already acquired
in hostage taking and oil revenue. Over the long term that will gain them the
financial resources and access to weapons that will allow them to destabilize much
of the Middle Eastand expand the territory they hold. It could also lead to a massive
religious warthroughout the Middle East between Shias and Sunnis. Then ISIS would
represent a real and palpable threat to the United States because its leaders will have
access with their money to the technologies and weaponry that could cause terrible
damage to the people of the United States.
Thus, how America reacts to the local, murderous actions of a relatively few terrorists
does matter. To continue to follow the same path as we did in the aftermath of 9/11
in beefing up the TSA and arming the police with ever more sophisticated military
weapons is to waste resources. Nor will it address the real threat that ISIS poses.
Moreover, the lavishing of money on our intelligence agencies that we have seen
during the last decade is hardly going to provide a more sophisticated and capable
ability to read the dangers of the outside world. After all, what good are analysts who
read no foreign languages and are ignorant of history, culture, and strategic issues?

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Hard choices lie before not only Americas leaders but also the American people.
And their record for staying the long course is not particularly good. One should
not forget that the Northern Virginia campaign of 1864, devoutly wished by much
of the northern population in the spring of that year, almost cost Abraham Lincoln
the election of 1864. Americans confront the present prospect of a long war with
an ignorance of history, including their own, a desire for quick, easy victories and
to shed uncomfortable and costly long-term conflicts no matter how crucial to their
interests. It is not a prospect that bodes well for thefuture.

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Working Group on the Role of Military History

inContemporary Conflict

About the Author

WILLIAMSON MURRAY
Williamson Murray is a former
air force officer and professor
emeritus in history at the Ohio
State University. He is the author
of a number of books including
The Change in the European Balance
of Power, 19381939; Luftwaffe; A
War to Be Won, Fighting the Second
WorldWar (with Allan Millett), and
most recently Military Adaptation
in War and The Iran-Iraq War (with
Kevin Woods).

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

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Stanford, CA 94305-6010
650-723-1754

Murray_ISISaThreat.indd 8

The Working Group on the Role of Military History in

Contemporary Conflict examines how knowledge of past
military operations can influence contemporary public
policy decisions concerning current conflicts. The careful
study of military history offers a way of analyzing modern
war and peace that is often underappreciated in this age of
technological determinism. Yet the result leads to a more
in-depth and dispassionate understanding of contemporary
wars, one that explains how particular military successes
and failures of the past can be often germane, sometimes
misunderstood, or occasionally irrelevant in the context
ofthe present.
The core membership of this working group includes David
Berkey, Peter Berkowitz, Max Boot,Josiah Bunting III, Angelo
M.Codevilla, Thomas Donnelly, Admiral James O. Ellis Jr.,
ColonelJoseph Felter, Victor Davis Hanson (chair), Josef Joffe,
Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Edward N. Luttwak,
Peter Mansoor, General Jim Mattis, Walter Russell Mead, Mark
Moyar, Williamson Murray, Ralph Peters, Andrew Roberts,
Admiral Gary Roughead, Kori Schake, Kiron K. Skinner, Barry
Strauss, Bruce Thornton, Bing West, Miles Maochun Yu, and
Amy Zegart.
For more information about this Hoover Institution Working Group
visit us online at www.hoover.org/research-topic/military.

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