A.M. No.

997 September 10, 1979

PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant,
vs.
DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for
disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.
The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the
complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding
her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone
the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent
David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and volunteered his legal
services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal
experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him: that
after the termination of the divorce case, the respondent became
exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to profess his
love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in
continuing the cordial relations between her and the respondent but
the respondent made her believe that although he was living with
another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment
that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been
compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it
was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get
married under the church laws with the complainant; that the
respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in this
good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the respondent;
that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for
the issuance of a marriage license to the complainant and the
respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the respondent

convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married
anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because of the
confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she
reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being
together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond
her control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of
April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the
respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred
to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced
civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting,
informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages
between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and
one under the church law; that upon being confronted by the
complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and
merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done
nothing to make amends for having deceived the complainant and for
having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no other
recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a
member of the Philippine Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. 1
In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having
had any illicit relations with the complainant and alleged that when the
complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing,
the respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the
next day when the complainant came to the office of Congressman
Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty. Geronimo Flores of the
Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or three days
thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally
handle her case; that on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a
letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which letter was
signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of
October 1970, the complainant borrowed from the respondent the sum
of P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization and
treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a
act of pity, the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the
complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked help

in filing a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in
Olongapo City; that the wound sustained by complainant's brother was
only superficial and he could not Identify his assailant, hence, no
criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant
requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a
hospital because of abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent
recommended complainant to be admitted to the Singian Clinic located
at General Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that on December 20,
1970, the complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by
telephone and requested him to assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar
to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for
disobedience; that the respondent prepares a complaint on the same
night and a sworn statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that
he accompanied the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal
and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case
No. 23994 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was
filed by her mother; that the respondent also helped the mother of the
complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for
habeas corpus, the mother of the complainant was able to take Vilma
Abaigar into her custody although the petition was denied; that the
respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled
to contract a civil marriage with his wife; that the respondent never
proposed marriage to the complainant; that the respondent has no
recollection of the supposed application for the issuance of a marriage
license in the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and
complainant had never acted as husband and wife; and that the
respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of
her. 2
In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 3
After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30,
1973 his report and recommendation containing the following findings:

The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz

on grounds that may properly fall under the category of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual
intercourse between complainant and respondent, the
first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether
respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by
making her believe that notwithstanding their subsisting
marriages to their respective spouses, they could
legally get married to each other and based on his
promise of marriage, she consented to go to bed with
him.
Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic
liason with respondent, she was married to a certain
Samuel Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in
the U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2,
Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18, 1971). She also
admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual
desires, she was informed by him that, he had a wife
with whom he was civilly married but that the marriage
was void because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic).
Whether there was deceit hinges on whether
complainant actually believed the representation of
respondent that they could legally marry. Highly
intelligent that she is and with the educational
background that she has, it is difficult to accept the
proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his
supposed assurances that notwithstanding full
awareness by both of the existence of each other's
previous marriages, no legal impediment stood in the
way of their getting married ecclesiastically. It is
worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer

in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering.

She was licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or
1965, after which she taught at one time or another in
different schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or
1971 when she was supposedly tricked into
surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she
was already in her late twenties. It is improbable that at
this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding
indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong
into accepting respondent's proposal that they act as
husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the
serious legal implications and complications of a
second marriage for both of them. She could have
easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter.
Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal is a
lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife testified
on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband
and complainant used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n.,
November 23, 1971). In these conversations
complainant could have asked, perhaps in a casual
manner, Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal effects of
a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the
effects of a marriage brought about through the use of
force and intimidation in order to settle whatever doubts
she had in her mind.
The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did
not even have to consult a lawyer to know that she
could not legally marry respondent. It is of no little
significance that some persons utilized by complainant
as witnesses on her behalf because of their supposed
knowledge of her relations with respondent, were
themselves aware that divorce is not recognized in this
country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that she
knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not
recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November
23, 1971). The same admission was elicited from Fr.

Troy de los Santos, another witness for the

complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her
spiritual adviser admitted at one point of his testimony
that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and
complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n.,
November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest declared
under cross-examination:
Q Do you know that complainant's
husband is still alive?
A Yes.
Q Up to the present?
A Yes.
Q Do you know that divorce is not
recognized in the Philippines?
A I know, but the church does not
recognize divorce.
Q How about the State, do you know
that the State recognize divorce?
A As far as my knowledge, I do not
think that our laws permit divorce.
Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated:
Q Did not the fact that complainant's
husband is still have and that divorce is
not recognized in ' the Philippines be

considered an impediment to
complainant's marriage to anyone?
A Yes.
Q Did you inform her so?
A She knows about that.
(33,34, t.s.n., Id.)
Again, granting that complainant did not actually
comprehend the existence of a legal bar to her
remarriage, 'not being steeped in the intricacies of the
law'. just the mere realization that both respondent's
wife and her own husband being still have was enough
to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own
investigation. She could have, for instance, made
discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent
was married to and verified his claim whether he was
forced into the marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply
have asked Congressman Bagatsing about
respondent's personal status. After all she was
competent enough to prepare, without anyone's help
her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to
make research in the Supreme Court's Library on the
subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November 18,
1971).
What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw
from the given premises? Either complainant was so
helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent's
blandishments or. comprehending fully the legal
impossibility of the fulfillment of his marriage proposals,
she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms,
too much enamored of him to care about anything else.

For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has so pithily stated

of the profundity of human love, 'love has reasons that
reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide
behind the camouflage of innocence, considering her
intellectual capacity and educational background, no
other conclusion is possible 'except that she voluntarily
submitted to sexual intimacy with respondent without
entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit
relations by legal union.
The question is intriguing whether respondent ever
made vehement protestations of love and actually
made an offer of marriage to complainant. If there was,
the evidence adduced does not clearly show.
Complainant asserted that she had evidence in the
form of love letters and the marriage application form
showing respondent's sustained courtship and offer of
marriage. However, such purported documents were
not presented, complainant making the excuse that
respondent tricked her into giving him the envelope
containing the evidence. Such explanation, however,
staggers human credulity considering that the
supposed documents were vital to establish the case. It
is simply preposterous that she would easily Dart with
the documents and give them to no other than the
respondent himself . Be that as it may, if respondent
had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly
established that complainant's submission to his sexual
desires was not on account of the offer but for the
gratification of her mundane human longings.
The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy
between complainant and respondent. Complainant
testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live
as husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had
three sexual intercourses that took place in the Tower
Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel

in Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual

intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her
testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the
Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the
guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A' and 'B'.
Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.'
stated in the entry in said guest cards was a 'good-time'
woman, not the complainant, common sense will tell us
that complainant could not have known that respondent
lodged in said hotels on those particular dates unless
she was the woman whom respondent brought there.
On this score, we are inclined to believe that evidence
has been sufficiently adduced to establish that intimacy
between complainant and respondent took place once
in the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the
Honorable Court has stated, when the lawyer's integrity
is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and
to show proof that he still maintains the highest degree
of morality and integrity which at all times he is
expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No.
389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point
is concerned, the evidence of the complainant as to the
trysts they had in the two hotels has not been met and
overthrown by respondent. 4
Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor
General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972, resolved to
require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding complaint against
the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 139 of
the Revised Rules of Court. 5
On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding
complaint against David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be
suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice of law,

with a warning that similar transgressions in the future win be dealt with
more severely.
Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March
29, 1974 to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein the
complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious activities of a
certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with the
respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to
her interest. Among other allegations, the complainant stated in her
verified complaint the following.
6. That there never is an illicit relationship between
Atty. Paz and me at present because I believed all
along that he was single and able to marry me. In fact,
our relationship is above- board just like any engaged
couple.
7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal
Assistant Office that the tenor of the affidavit made by
Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration for
the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all
intents and purposes is immoral and illegal.
8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which
Atty. Paz got from me and not revenge for his
deception. 6
The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the
complainant.
In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as
morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned letter, she states
that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the
respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was
aboveboard just like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that

she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent got
from her and not for revenge for his deception.
It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should
be exercised with caution because of its serious consequences. 7 The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against a
respondent must be established by convincing proof. 8

The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any

cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Solicitor
General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for
doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for
there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion
between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the
consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only
to their own private consciences."

In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:

The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the
charge against the lawyer must be established by
convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct.
23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C.
No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty.
Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan. 21. 1974,
55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose as free from
doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court
of its disciplinary powers. The corrupt character of the
act done must be clearly demonstrated. Moreover'
considering the serious consequences, of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We
have consistently held that clearly preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either
penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs.
Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44).
This Court likewise held that where there is no proof
that respondent lawyer was guilty of any unethical
conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment
case against him should be dismissed (Ricafort vs.
Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 418;
Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No. 483, July 21, 1967,
20 SCRA 763). 9

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby

DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8390

July 2, 2010
[Formerly CBD 06-1641]
A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary
action against respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio filed by A-1 Financial
Services, Inc., represented by Diego S. Reunilla, its account officer,
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1642, now A.C.
No. 8390, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and nonpayment of debt.
On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing
corporation, granted the loan application of Atty. Valerio amounting
to P50,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan obligation, Atty.
Valerio issued a postdated check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725;
dated April 1, 2002, in the amount: P50,000.00.2 However, upon
presentation at the bank for payment on its maturity date, the check
was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of the instant
case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio
failed to pay the whole amount of her obligation.
Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against
Atty. Valerio, docketed as Criminal Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerios
arraignment was scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she failed to
appear despite due notice.3 Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest4 was
issued but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On November 22, 2004,
complainant sent a letter5 to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the
issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against her and requested her to

submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The said letter
was received by Atty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry
return cards.6 Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to
abide.
On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Valerio before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On January 26, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) required Atty. Valerio to file an answer, but she did not file any
responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter7 dated March 16, 2006,
respondents mother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explained that
her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia; thus, could not
properly respond to the complaint against her. Futhermore, Mrs.
Valerio undertook to personally settle her daughters obligation.
On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear
before the mandatory conference. Atty. Valerio, again, failed to attend
the conference. Subsequently, in an Order dated November 15, 2007,
the IBP ordered the parties to submit their position papers. No position
paper was submitted by Atty. Valerio.
Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008,
the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Valerio be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, having found her guilty of
gross misconduct.
The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by
Atty. Valerios mother, in view of the latters failure to appear before the
IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the truthfulness thereof or present the
physician who issued the same. The IBP-CBD, further, pointed out that
Atty. Valerios failure to obey court processes, more particularly her
failure to appear at her arraignment despite due notice and to
surrender to the Court despite the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered her
morally unfit to be a member of the bar.8

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved with modification the report and recommendation of the IBPCBD. Atty. Valerio was instead ordered suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.
Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her
side, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 15, 2010, directed
Atty. Valerio and/or her mother, to submit a duly notarized medical
certificate issued by a duly licensed physician and/or certified copies of
medical records to support the claim of schizophrenia on the part of
Atty. Valerio within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of
notice9 to comply with the said Resolution, no medical certificate or
medical records were submitted to this Court by either respondent
and/or her mother. Thus, this resolution.
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan
obligation despite respondents failure to cooperate before any
proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to the filing of the
complaint against her, Atty. Valerios act of making partial payments of
the loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation
to pay on her part. Respondents mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise,
acknowledged her daughters obligation.
The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that
her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health condition,
i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly answering
the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the "medical
certificate" on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios failure to prove the
contents of the certificate or present the physician who issued it.

In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,10 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that
reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
explicitly states that:

Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings
is also a matter of serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint
against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary
hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the
court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her
and appear during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from
the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath
which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no
man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
1avvphil

In Ngayan v. Tugade,11 we ruled that "[a lawyers] failure to answer the

complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are

evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and

illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We come to the penalty imposable in this case.
In Lao v. Medel,12 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts
and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondentlawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,13 having found guilty of gross misconduct
for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property, the title to
which was only entrusted to him by the complainant.
However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction
imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years,14 because, aside from issuing
worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown
wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the course of the
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11,
2008 of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty
of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is
hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law,
effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Valerio as a
member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 5436

May 27, 2004

ALFREDO BON, complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. VICTOR S. ZIGA and ANTONIO A.
ARCANGEL, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On May 9, 2001, Alfredo Bon (complainant) filed a Complaint1 dated
April 3, 2001 for disbarment against the respondents, Attys. Victor S.
Ziga (Ziga) and Antonio A. Arcangel (Arcangel). Allegedly, the
respondents, conspiring with each other and with the use of fraud,
intimidation, stealth, deception and monetary consideration, caused
Amalia Bon-Padre Borjal, Teresa Bon-Padre Patenio, Felecito Bon and
Angelina Bon (collectively, the Bons) to sign a document
entitled Waiver and Quitclaim. According to the complainant, the Bons
signed theWaiver and Quitclaim because of Zigas representation that
the document was merely a withdrawal of a previously executed
Special Power of Attorney. As it turned out, the document was a waiver
in favor of Ziga of all the properties which the Bons inherited from their
parents and predecessors-in-interest. Attached to
theComplaint are Affidavits2 executed by the Bons renouncing
the Waiver and Quitclaim.
Moreover, the complainant claims that the Bons are residents of Manila
and did not appear before Arcangel who was then in Albay to
acknowledge the Waiver and Quitclaim. Despite this fact, Arcangel
notarized the documentand even made it appear that the Bons
personally appeared before him to acknowledge the same.
On November 20, 2001, the respondents filed their Joint
Comment3 dated October 6, 2001. According to them, the allegations
in the Complaint that the Bons did not understand the contents of

the Waiver and Quitclaim and that they did not personally appear to
acknowledge the same before Arcangel indicate that the cause of
action is based on alleged intrinsic defects in the document. As such,
only the parties to the document, i.e., the Bons, whose rights were
violated can file the Complaint. Being a stranger to the allegedly
defective document, the complainant cannot file
the Complaint. Besides, Maria Bon Borjal and Rafael Bon-Canafe who
are co-signatories to the Waiver and Quitclaim both declared in
their Joint Affidavit4 that Ziga thoroughly explained the contents of
the Waiver and Quitclaim to the Bons before they signed the
document. The subscribing witnesses, Rogelio Bon-Borjal and Nida
Barrameda, also declared in their Joint Affidavit5 that the contents of
the document were explained to the signatories.
The respondents also aver that it is difficult to believe that the Bons did
not understand the contents of the document they were signing since
Amalia and Angelina Bon are both high school graduates, while Teresa
Bon is a college graduate.6 Further, the fact that the Bons admit having
accepted P5,000.00 from Ziga to sign theWaiver and
Quitclaim precludes them from questioning the document.
For Arcangels part, he explains that assuming that he notarized
the Waiver and Quitclaim in the absence of the signatories, his act is
merely a violation of the Notarial Law but not a ground for disbarment.
He further avers that he was able to talk to Maria Bon and Rafael BonCanafe, both co-signatories to the document, over the phone. Maria
Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe allegedly declared that they signed
the Waiver and Quitclaim. The two, in fact, personally delivered the
document for notarization in his office. Thus, he posits that there was
substantial compliance with the Notarial Law since a notary publics
primordial undertaking is merely to ensure that the signatures on a
document are genuine. As long as they are so, the notary public can
allegedly take the risk of notarizing the document although the
signatories are not present.

In conclusion, the respondents aver that the complainant must first

prove that the Waiver and Quitclaim is defective before he can file an
administrative case against them.
The complainant filed a Reply, Opposition and Comment to Joint
Comment of Respondents7 dated April 5, 2001 asserting that he has a
right to complain over the acquisition of the properties subject of
the Waiver and Quitclaimhaving been mentioned therein. He also
avers that he has the right to inform the Court of the deception
committed by the respondents. He further states that the Bons signed
the document after having been deceived and intimidated by Ziga who,
he claims, exercises moral ascendancy over the Bons. That the Bons
are educated does not necessarily mean they could not have been
intimidated and deceived. He maintains that the Bons were misled into
believing that what they were signing was a withdrawal of a previously
issued Special Power of Attorney and were given P5,000.00 each to
induce them to sign the Waiver and Quitclaim.
Even assuming that the signatures appearing on the Waiver and
Quitclaim are genuine, he asserts that it was still highly irregular for
Arcangel to notarize the document by telephone when it could have
been notarized in Manila where the signatories reside. Lastly, he avers
that it is not necessary for a court to declare that the Waiver and
Quitclaim is defective before the instant administrative case can
proceed.
The respondents filed their Comment on Complainants Reply8 dated
April 12, 2002 alleging that in his reply, the complainant changed his
cause of action from fraud and deception to intimidation and moral
ascendancy. According to them, the complainant is incompetent to
charge Ziga with intimidation as he was not a party to the document
and was not even present when it was executed. The respondents
insist that the only instance when anyone can file a disbarment
complaint against a lawyer is when the ground therefore is a public
offense like immorality, misbehavior, betrayal of trust and the like.
When, as in the instant case, the parties to the alleged defective

document have not formally impugned the document themselves, no

one else can.
In the Courts Resolution9 dated July 22, 2002, we referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Citing the Report and Recommendation10 dated
November 7, 2002 of its Investigating Commissioner, the IBP
passed Resolution No. XV-2002-60411 on December 14, 2002
dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. According to the Report and
Recommendation, the Bons failure to file the appropriate action to set
aside the Waiver and Quitclaim casts doubt on their claim that Ziga
misled or deceived them into signing the document. As regards
Arcangel, the IBP concluded that while he may have been remiss in his
duties as a notary public, the same does not constitute a ground for
disbarment.
The complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 dated February
24, 2003 which the IBP denied inResolution No. XV-2003-14913 issued
on March 22, 2003 since it no longer has jurisdiction to consider and
resolve a matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court. The
complainant then filed with this Court a Motion for Re-Examination of
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines14 dated September 10, 2003
mainly rehashing his claim that the respondents induced the Bons to
sign the Waiver and Quitclaim by means of deceit and abuse of moral
ascendancy.
We are hard put to ascribe to Ziga the fraud, intimidation, stealth and
deception with which the complainant labels his actuations. The fact
that Amalia and Angelina Bon are both high school graduates, while
Teresa Bon is a college graduate15 makes it difficult to believe that they
were deceived into thinking that the contents of theWaiver and
Quitclaim were other than what they themselves could have easily
ascertained from

a reading of the document. As held by the Court in Bernardo v. Court

of Appeals:16
The rule that one who signs a contract is presumed to know
its contents has been applied even to contracts of illiterate
persons on the ground that if such persons are unable to read,
they are negligent if they fail to have the contract read to them.
If a person cannot read the instrument, it is as much his duty to
procure some reliable persons to read and explain it to him,
before he signs it, as it would be to read it before he signed it if
he were able to do so and his failure to obtain a reading and
explanation of it is such gross negligence as will estop him
from avoiding it on the ground that he was ignorant of its
contents17
Besides, the Waiver and Quitclaim is plainly worded. It does not
contain complicated terms that might be misconstrued by anyone who
has half the education attained by Amalia, Angelina and Teresa Bon.
Moreover, the Bons admitted therein that in 1930, their predecessors
sold to the Ziga family the properties to which they now lay claim. They
also declared in the document that it was only their brother, Alfredo,
the complainant in this case, who still claimed rights over the
properties. The relevant provisions of the Waiver and Quitclaim state:
1. We are heirs and direct descendants of the late Santiago
Bon of Tabaco, Albay;
2. We had been named as formal parties in DARAB Case No.
V-RC-010, Albay Branch 11 99 entitled Virginia Desuyo, et al.
vs. Alfredo Bon, et al.;
3. We admit that, we the descendants and relatives of the late
Santiago Bon do not have any right or interest anymore over
Lots No. 1911, 1917-A, 1917-B, 1970, 1988, all of Tabaco,
Cadastre, because the above lots had been already sold by our
predecessor in favor of the Ziga Family, predecessor of Ex-

Senator Victor Ziga since 1930, and that the above family had
been continuously in possession thereof, thru their tenants
since 1930, or for more than 70 years already, to our exclusion;
4. It is only our brother, Alfredo Bon, who adamantly refuses to
admit the above fact and still claim rights over said properties
despite the explanation of our ancestors that the above
mentioned lots had been long sold by our predecessor to the
Zigas18
Significantly, as pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the
Bons have not filed the appropriate action to set aside the Waiver and
Quitclaim. The complainant, however, explains that they "will pursue
that the Waiver and Quit Claim be annulled by the court"19 in Civil Case
No. T-2163 pending with the Regional Trial Court Branch 18, Tabaco
City. That they have yet to do so almost four (4) years after the
execution of the Waiver and Quitclaimdiminishes, if not totally
discredits, their position that they were defrauded, intimidated and
deceived into signing the document.
At this time, all that the complainant offers to boost his claim that Ziga
employed deceit in procuring the Bons signatures are the latters bare
allegations to the effect that Ziga told them there was nothing wrong
with the document except that they were withdrawing the Special
Power of Attorney. These allegations are belied by theJoint
Affidavit20 of Maria Bon-Borjal and Rafael Bon-Canafe, the Bons cosignatories, and the Joint
Affidavit21 of Rogelio Bon Borjal and Nida Barrameda, the subscribing
witnesses to the Waiver and Quitclaim,both of which assert that the
contents of the document were sufficiently explained to the Bons.
Given these circumstances, the presumptions that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns;22 that private transactions have been fair
and regular;23 and that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the

thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact24 have not been
sufficiently overcome.

the risk of notarizing the document although the signatories are not
present.

However, we do find the act of Arcangel in notarizing the Waiver and

Quitclaim without requiring all the persons who executed the document
to personally

Arcangel seems to be laboring under a misguided understanding of the

basic principles of the Notarial Law. It is well to remind him that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. For this reason, notaries public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
this form of conveyance would be undermined.27

appear before him and acknowledge that the same is their free act and
deed an unpardonable breach of his duty as a notary public.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public
or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgement shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so
state.25
The Acknowledgement contained in the Waiver and
Quitclaim executed in Zigas house in Manila specifically states:
"BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, for and in the above mentioned locality
personally appeared"26However, the Bons did not personally appear
before Arcangel to acknowledge the document. Arcangel himself
admits as much but posits that he was able to talk to the Bons cosignatories over the phone, i.e., Maria Bon and Rafael Bon-Canafe,
and that the two promised to bring the document to Albay for
notarization. Hence, Arcangel claims that there was substantial
compliance with the Notarial Law. He adds that as long as the
signatures on the instrument are genuine, the notary public can take

Thus, a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public

should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone
for what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal
knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not
through any representative. Otherwise, their representatives name
should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the
same. That is the only time the representative can affix his signature
and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of the
said document.28 Simply put, the party or parties who executed the
instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the Notary
Public to acknowledge the document.29
From his admission, we find that Arcangel failed to exercise due
diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public. He violated Rules
1.0130 and 10.0131 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well.

However, his transgression does not warrant disbarment, which is the

severest form of disciplinary sanction.
In Ocampo v. Yrreverre,32 the Court, taking note of the remorseful
attitude of the respondent who was found guilty of breach of the
notarial law for notarizing a document in the absence of the
signatories, revoked his notarial commission for a period of two (2)
years and suspended him from the practice of law for six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, the Complaint filed against Atty. Victor S. Ziga is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
As regards Atty. Antonio A. Arcangel, his commission as Notary Public,
if still existing, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years. He is also
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
immediately, with a WARNING that a repetition of a similar violation will
be dealt with even more severely. He is further DIRECTED to report
the date of his receipt of this Decision to the Court within five (5) days
from such receipt.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately
circularize this Decision for the proper guidance of all concerned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and recorded in the personal
files of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been
commuting to this Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed
a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return
the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on
June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the
judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a
writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of
execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's
house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised
them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the
auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago
appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the
writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were
denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the

highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to

redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of
sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their
petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes
Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriff's sale
on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment
was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal
residential house and lots which were levied upon and sold by the
sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment.
They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the
replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution
was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was
not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which
failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the
conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's final deed of
sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing
new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of
possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had
ordered to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On
November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary
injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of
Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued
new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of
possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued
a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored.
On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the
restraining order.

While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date of
May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession.
This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute
resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18,
1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this
Court (L-27140). We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on
February 8, 1967.
1wph1.t

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where
they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course to the
petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from
enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is
made permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil
Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the
merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement
as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and
Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with
the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court
of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession,

ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it
had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's
writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the
enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in
one case and the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their
conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu
Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her husband for
which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is
not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from
the husband's business venture.

3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals
held that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third
person to half-interest in the property is adversely determined, the said
appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a
"third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously
wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim
ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he
got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the sheriff of their
conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely
determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the
writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has
jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the
judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of
third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling
in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there
has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any
interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the
time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the present.

4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P.

San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents Agos
to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable because it
belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is normally privy
to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties
in question; (4) her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5)
the properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice
attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final
sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had
impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by
his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent
execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife
filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue
that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the
ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party
to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise
the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did
not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal
infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and

ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging
to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an
inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor

equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and
settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision
sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect
a right not in esse and which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of
its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same
house 5 which is conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession
Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under review
would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house
would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to
stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually
separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in
effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the
dissolution of the conjugal union.

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in
the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The
respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen
(14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold
tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme
Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who
seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very
ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a

mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of

technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour

and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and
is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily
a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold
the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client;
its primacy is indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for
purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in
the disposition of the case below which might again come up to the
appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined
the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We
find that

(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago)
but trial on the merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a
counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where
they impleaded new parties-defendants;

(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a
motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads
an additional new party-defendant (no action has yet been taken on
this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted
supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974,
grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer.
(Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint,
supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are all
untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon
conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the
judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the
business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin
suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the
conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already
resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the
Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion
of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the
first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5,
1959 the Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of
seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries, depriving
the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000 up
to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause
of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.

It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the

conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the
sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the
sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at
the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back
of the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the
Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for
P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago
contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of
P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos
suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to
require payment of the purchase price in the auction sale because
"when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim
has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not
exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the
vendees Castaedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the
cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out
of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January
31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of
action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly
suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the
preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life
from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless,
the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim

As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the

action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were
compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P7,500;
that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the
transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castaedas,
they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17,
1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their
actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action besmirched
their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the
complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the
preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and
evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration
of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the
defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land
in question; that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith;
that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his
wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal
Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional
damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the
aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring
that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs.
Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith,
while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the

two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who
acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are
the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint, the validity of the cause of action would depend upon the
validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint, for, the
Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and
possession of the properties by reason of the agreements
subsequently entered into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the
sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's
levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties
could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps
prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the
first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it
must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause
of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is
set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is
ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners'
counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are
assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which
shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this
decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the
custody of the Clerk of Court.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for
complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice
for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June
13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance
of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged
to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having
published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney,
he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict
ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that
the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and
that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

A.C. No. 376

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant

violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.)

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended

from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his
services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters.
That case, however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and
insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the
respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

April 30, 1963

BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959,
complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J.
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed
on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of
this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in
the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3,
1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the
case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently
removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958,
Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house
and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00
p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the
second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a
newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with
one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the
bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor.
She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her
family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor,
then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her
panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to
subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned
her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would

kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing
clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she
joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a
result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n.,
hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have
been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage
to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that
she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5,
1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him,
cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on
November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza,
she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia
Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24,
t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He
testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the
Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal,
and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March
25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations
with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958,
when their clandestine affair was discovered by the
complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for
seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed
her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse
on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the
second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took

place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had

sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and
sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He
intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage
without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will
permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her
foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will
object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the
complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia,
explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she
(Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal
knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she
surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and
intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual
intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with
her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged
rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the
victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the
undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's
exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live
maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted,
and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled
because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and
on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not
bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years
of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on

June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave

abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage
which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the
woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could
have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence
over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an
uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is
the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age
(she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why
she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the
respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging
"that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and
praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar
examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954,
or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he
represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles
whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a
married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact
permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations,
and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would
not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year
or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he
was then permanently disqualified from admission to the
Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a
married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct
should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment,
unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for
membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment
from the office of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after
due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently
removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken
from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty
of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of
falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the
bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with
the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him
unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the
legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment
ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office
as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special
defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of
action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original
cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary
formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court."
Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional
evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators
to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for
hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29,
1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was
granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the
following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no
act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of
perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent

when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the
respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.
1w ph1.t

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his

common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first
met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna
(t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were
evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was
already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She
and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).
Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as
evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she
told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia,
were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent
courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was
married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n.
26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she
and respondent were already living together as 'husband and
wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him,
when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her
sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but
she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had
already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27].
Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga,
Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to
live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to
Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate
husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named
Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti

(in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35);
in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35)
[Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a
later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on
December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction
against the complainant, because the latter was born on
February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her
took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18
years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he
began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for
her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he
courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter
accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia
alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had
gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living
together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks
thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed
she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was
still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away,
because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her
to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in
1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to
Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter;
that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him
that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was
ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband
(Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines)
was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice

but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his
petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have
the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his
'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles);
that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not
see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact
must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and
believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was
only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not
so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent
concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp.
6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that:
1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by
having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by
committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability;
and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously
cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in
1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his
moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being
then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also
recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on
respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing
before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his
memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the
corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had
sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he

likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous

manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the
complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has
not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that
the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery
on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment
proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred.
But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and
that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of
the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper
administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special
statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited
by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will
give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard.
(1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the
Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that
certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine
is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of
creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general
powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they
may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the
United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the
continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and
its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for

which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in

either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417).
The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the
rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar,
the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension
that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he
refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur
criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself
merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates
a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he
took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the
complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed
a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As
the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral
influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated
him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he
is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she
was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist
him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer
no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without
fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be
devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may
constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have
followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court
quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the
Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398,
404), to wit:.

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and
the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral
character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a
license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it
would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that
an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way
directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to
his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the
Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his
simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not
disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would
in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for
admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the
moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that
even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as
to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of
the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued
his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in
some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and
Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission

to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse

for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in
order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by
courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her
makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was
to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to
continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of
the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom
whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded
his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction,
adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from
those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape,
and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the
evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds
no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he
shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his
findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent
shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the
respondent. If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent
shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy

of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen

days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the
foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint
the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the
Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by
the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General
therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be
justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take
the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and
estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral
character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own
approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral
character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not
what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to
escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
[1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and
People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not
possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to
the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact
that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status,
did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no

moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is

clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein
respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

A.C. No. 389

February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified
complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross
immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all
the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense
averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for
disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former
Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the
then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant,
assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and
documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined
the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He
denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon
Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A.
Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa
Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally
charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora
Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be

married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend

a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant
that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater;
that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo,
Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said
Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that
they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway
we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's
promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they
entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the
registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at
the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that
as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and
undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to
molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have
promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the
reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again
assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I
promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent
pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then
placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat
on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of
complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took
place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening
when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party
together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1,
1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but
complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they
were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1,
1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way,
complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his
promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on
February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge

with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he
did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present
constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of
the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of and must be possessed by members of the
Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962.
Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again
denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on
the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse
with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and
the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when they
broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958,
to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention
of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the
complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the
day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the
complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument.
There was no appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his
intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a
waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm.
Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the
Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an
opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses,
may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139
of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as
stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school
teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to
the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as
"Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver
Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno"
arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00
P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5,
1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that
respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram
sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble.
Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October
of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she requested
him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to
Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent
and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.
1w ph1.t

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958,

and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November,
1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the
respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the
Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true
copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity
and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the
hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the
testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even
respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he
used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by
the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent
averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November,
1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958
is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the
complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant
dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony
(pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse
because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a
desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
(Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17,
1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is
that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules
of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963,
citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all

times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant

to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June
1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that
date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to
the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always
expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the
easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to
help himself but actively conceals from the State the very
means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his
answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of
Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is
not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its
officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme
Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm.
Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras,
Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of
fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for
suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has

committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important
that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must
conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the
admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain
the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but
the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

A.C. No. 6492

November 18, 2004

MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing several documents during the year
2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he
filed before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a
complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Security Pacific
Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter's
failure to honor SPAC's Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where
respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter's
counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissioned
Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications1 issued by the Clerk of Court of
Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization,
as evidenced by the following documents, viz:
1. Verification2 executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of
defendant SPAC, subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 18, 2002 as
alleged notary public, in Quezon City and attached to

defendants' Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift the Order of Default;

and (2) To defer Plaintiff's Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte
dated February 18, 2002;
2. Affidavits of Merit3 signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the
pleading mentioned in par. 1 hereof, likewise notarized by Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged "Notary Public" in
Quezon City, on February 18, 2002;
3. The Affidavit of Service4 signed by a certain Renee L.
Ramos, a Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law
Office, and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson
Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as alleged "Notary
Public" in Quezon City. Said Affidavit of Service was attached
to the pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;
4. The Affidavit of Service5 of one Nestor Abayon, another
Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office,
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano on 01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as "Notary
Public." This Affidavit of Service was attached to defendants'
Motion (1) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March
2002; and (2) To allow defendants to Present Defensive
Evidence dated 27 March 2002.
5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping6 signed this time by a certain Celso N. Sarto, as
affiant, "notarized" on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson Alnor
G. Simpliciano. This Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping was attached to defendant's Motion For
Extension of Time To File Petition Under Rule 65 before the
Court of Appeals;
6. The Affidavit of Service7 signed by a certain Joseph B.
Aganan, another Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela
Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson

Alnor G. Simpliciano as "Notary Public" on 16 August 2002.

This Affidavit of Service signed by Aganan was also attached
to that Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition under
Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;
7. Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping8 executed by one Celso N. Sarto, alleged Executive
Vice President and Claims Manager of defendant SPAC and
"notarized" by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19
August 2002, attached to the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, etc., filed before the Court of Appeals; and
8. Affidavit of Service9 signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan,
Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office,
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as alleged "Notary Public" for
Quezon City with notarized commission to expire by December
31, 2002.
On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig
required respondent Atty. Simpliciano to submit his answer within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.10
On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion11 for
extension of time to file answer.
On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion12 to resolve the complaint
after the extension requested by respondent ended on 30 May 2003,
and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May 2003, with no comment
or pleading filed by respondent.
On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an
order,13 giving respondent a last chance to file his answer, otherwise
the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent failed
to do so.

Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and

recommendation14 dated 12 February 2004, pertinent portions of which
read:
A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted
by the petitioner showed that respondent notarized up to
Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and
his commission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to
the Affidavit of Service signed and executed by Joseph B.
Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor
G. Simpliciano whose commission expires December 31, 2002.
All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book
II of respondent's alleged notarial book which reflected that his
commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notary public.
However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification
dated October 4, 2002 stated that as per records on file with
their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary
public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC
Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as per records
on file with their office respondent was commissioned notary
public for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to
December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002 and 2003 he did not
apply for notarial commission for Quezon City.
It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized
the aforementioned documents, he was not commissioned as
notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for
having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his
commission as notary public without having renewed said
commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of
the legal profession.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned

respectfully recommends the revocation of respondent's
commission as notary public permanently if he is
commissioned as such at present and his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months from receipt
hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a registered
member a copy hereof for implementation should this
recommendation be approved by the Honorable members of
the Board of Governors.15
Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of
Governors modified the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a suspension of six (6)
months.16
We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent Atty. Simpliciano did not have a commission as notary
public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as
evidenced by the two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October
2002.17Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP Commissioner
Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent had already notarized
a total of 590 documents.18 The evidence presented by complainant
conclusively establishes the misconduct imputed to respondent.
The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by
complainant, consisting of affidavits of merit, certifications and
verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service,
were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in respondent's petition
forcertiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not
even attempt to present any evidence. His counsel filed an exparte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no
answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro

gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again
unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut complainant's
evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His
lack of interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge
and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and
valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not
a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year
2002.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege.19 Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right
to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of
it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading
any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney's right to practice law
may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose
of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of
attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish an
attorney.20 Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that
"[t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well
as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession."22 Towards this end, an
attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath
or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all

of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a

lawyer in his professional or private capacity.23
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must
be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the
administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties.24
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public
must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of
public documents."25 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting
as such, and even disbarment.26
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,27 the Court had occasion to state that
where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the
lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law.
Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he
is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. These

violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates
Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers
for notarizing documents with an expired commission:
1. In Flores v. Lozada,28 the court disbarred a lawyer who
notarized six documents such as the extrajudicial partition of an
estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and four (4)
deeds of absolute sale - all involving unregistered lands, after
his commission as Notary Public expired;
2. In Joson v. Baltazar,29 the court suspended the lawyer for
three (3) months since only one (1) instance of unauthorized
notarization of a deed of sale was involved.
3. In Nunga v. Viray,30 the court suspended the lawyer for three
(3) years when he notarized an absolute deed of sale of the
buyer minor, who was his son and, at the same time, he was a
stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank, and when he
entered in his notarial registry an annotation of the cancellation
of the loan in favor of a certain bank, at a time when he was not
commissioned as a Notary Public. What aggravated
respondent's unlawful notarization was the fact that the
transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was then only
eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.
4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,31 the lawyer was suspended for
one (1) year when he notarized five (5) documents such as a
complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a

deed of sale and a contract to sell, after his commission as

Notary Public expired.
Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action
in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the Philippine
Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of
the IBP must be increased. Respondent must be barred from being
commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby
MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As
modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is
hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary
Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land
through the Court Administrator as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the
personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.

ADM. CASE No. 3319

June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with
Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the
Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1 and as a result of their
marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui,
was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that
they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent.
Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of
June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui.
Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with
Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her
and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent
and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an
end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship

between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in
December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a
second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime
in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship
persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent
had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was
then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983
and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy,
China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during
one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her
and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853. Upon their return
to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued
to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because
respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know
and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live
together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii
and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her
law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila
sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted
that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her
discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March
1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after
she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the
woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came

to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating

with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not
illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988,
when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all
her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with
her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a
house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that
the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds.6 By way
of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of
Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having
filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others,
that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to
complainant and had children with her even at the start of her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar,
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with
the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987.
The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui
was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988
and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the

"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent
Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly,
continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
(sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the
same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho
(sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had
been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this
same evidence had failed to evenprima facie establish the "fact
of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and
wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of
which is necessary and indispensable to at least create
probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone
of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion
respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the
complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents
in support of their respective positions on the matter support
and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that

respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527

San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among
others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State
Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of
marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was
October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent
in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false
allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said
IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes
a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and
also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in
making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and
lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in
Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the original
copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she
relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage
certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised

the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an
immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice
of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on
two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with
the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the
legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she
who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not
know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this
fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She
stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the
civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so
much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged
that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such
marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for
her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in
1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui
got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that
he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present
evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the
pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos

Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house
and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove
that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value
according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a
private security agency and who was not presented during the
hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the
complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal
of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument
that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered
the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct
cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it
suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she
believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil
status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie
Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated
that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with
a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s
because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who
was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed
by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24, respondent stated that
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her
disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of

complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of

the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be
single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to
believe in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard
to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single
men.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A",
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her
Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the
(sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States
(in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent
only talked to each other because of the children whom he was
allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to
find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered
as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic)
anything else and should deserve compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her
chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream
cherished by every single girl.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the
bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of
law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral

turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission
to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character.
More importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
such privilege. It has been held
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the
bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is
also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral

indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable

members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that
when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single.
Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of
such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the
actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far
cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with
a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such
a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more
vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior
to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance,
respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived
with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui
was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However,
the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was

with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be

considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct
to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that
is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true
civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that
she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if
she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by
respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment
of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily
recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a
bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year
when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she
has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated

date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot

stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
1avv phi 1

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.

Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her
Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of

Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile
Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse

thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of
this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without
his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election
year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the
"Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of
strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having
been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among
others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70
per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of
this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR

EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August
nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one
per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations;
seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty
per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar:Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any

exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one

and included as part of the next whole number.

1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventyfive per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades
shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738 1,033

426

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

1953

2,555

284

TOTAL

968

12,230 5,421 1,168

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not
they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the
bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared
valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have
filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly
classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account
of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by
section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent

examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to
the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had
each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain
a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their
highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their
latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic
Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these
604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125
unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because they could be
favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, although as has been
already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider
their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the
practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and
because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court
set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the
sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant
assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally
an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J.
Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of
the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando,
Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside
from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and
of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly
helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the
matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation
of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to
place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or
partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit
to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade
is the tremendous handicap which students during the years

immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome

such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952,
5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be
admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because
it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained
firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property,
life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission
is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there
was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those
years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly
magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have
entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even
with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during
those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published
since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of
new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be
enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of
view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would
have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals
by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved
and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of
more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the
law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had
been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the
cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon,
240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion
of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared
them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully
the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law
that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia
College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court
of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New
York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public
trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except

that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the

people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses
the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State.
(p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional
precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this
was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which
this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which
the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before
them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed
directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision"
expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section
of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the
object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word
`admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means
to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily
implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of
determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite
qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the
validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school
of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws
was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however
quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the
law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent.
Columbia College being an institution of established reputation,
and having a law department under the charge of able
professors, the students in which department were not only
subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being
entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination,
together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully
equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study
was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning
and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object,
and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions.
We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as
to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a

diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits

is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent
evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and
nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with
these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to
determine the present condition of the law on the subject.
(p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction
over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed
what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper
with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following
distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of
Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to
the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has
not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission
of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any
lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines
are entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at
law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this

attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the

judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering
the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously
established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect,
a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions
on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked
or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be
permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of
this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without
parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as
we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to
prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been
expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission
has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in
this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power.
(p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a

Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications
which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other
and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments
are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and
thought of the people setting upon the form of government
under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p.
445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the
plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a
portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department
of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or
interference by any other department of government, the courts
cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers
of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are
exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate

relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of
justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree
upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring
scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring
the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than
six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts
of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in
Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial
power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of
that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say
with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of
the court, or an essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the
judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of
the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its
attorney at law. There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power
of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers
of our constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The

idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial

department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for
attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of
making the judicial independent of the legislative department,
and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to
protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a
standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order
that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do
not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from
which the court must make its selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications
beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional
qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed
by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law.
(p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of
law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey
(In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How.
9,15 L. Ed. 565;Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.
Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20
Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been

perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally
held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice
is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part
of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no
matter where the power to determine the qualifications may
reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the
honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is
highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for
doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People
ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487,
489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of
the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department
of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England. Admission to
practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action.
Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and
notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records.

The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial

department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its
powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an
inherent power of such a department of government ultimately
to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect
itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief
Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well
settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it
rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to
become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and
for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure
license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the
court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional,
explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon
evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair
private character. It has always been the general practice in
this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in
the highest court of the states to which they, respectively,
belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded
as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal
learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and professional character
is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that
the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of
the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct.

They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not
the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of
judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was
so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only
officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and
the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as
engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions."
(pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception
conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function,
and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the
exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. Re
Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial
function, and is an inherent power of the court. A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to
bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the
judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to

establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of

transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action,
while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist
at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction
is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by
legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded
by either of the other departments of the government. 16
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to
its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling
aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular
steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations
of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below
50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons,
it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any
of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is
the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning
the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13,
article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to

promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress
and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it
would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by
this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of
its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly
attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of
law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing
rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better
service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not
relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and
reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate
and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the

concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and

should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other,
giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of
each department requires. These powers have existed together for
centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the
existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands
which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it
may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility
for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of
the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as
the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it
that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise
of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but
rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a
Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of
the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion.
Guaria took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the
practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without
taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as

follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered
One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and
orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the
United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to
the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have
held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First
Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land
Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney
General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city
attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial
fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this
appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination.
The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the
various branches of legal learning upon which he was
examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance
of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this

affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the

required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to the bar,
we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of
these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his
failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the
bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof
that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of
the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the
object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and
in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that
the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the admission of
certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give
effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the
United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to
16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the
commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would
be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as
used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid
and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to

the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of
Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to
the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had
reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively
appears that the applicant was not and never had been
practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to
the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that
occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of
the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We
conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in
the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination
he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle
him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of the
governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave
evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent
and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain
him in the Government service by appointing him to the office

of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the

above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case
the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided
he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of the
court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his
right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. (In
re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has
been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the
Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began studying before November
4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued
by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and
would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three
years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date.
The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of
this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to
amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28,

1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it

appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the
section of the following: "And every application for a license
who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard
to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law
school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". In
re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of
which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under
the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is
two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at
least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the
student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character.
The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has
studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in
a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose
course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be
admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining
board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If
the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso,
which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges
upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly
a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid
as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of
justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be

done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const.

art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a
license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the
court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to
argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such
privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may
classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought.
There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of
the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35
N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad
Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill
acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession
cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination,
making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor,
65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to
say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of
the law, and plainly, any classification must have some
reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such
practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who
began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is
subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas
issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two
years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part
in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to
this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for
making application for admission. As to both classes, the

conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the

two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course
of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted
upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may
prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law
resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will
furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began
the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to
practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd.
The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years
in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend
three years, although they would complete two years before
the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course
of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification
cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation
to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441,
where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the
practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that
the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely
the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be
exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the
Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue
chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West

Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626,
said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United
States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he
may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may
in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of
our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to
every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for
their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the
right to continue their prosecution is often of great value to
the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any
more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It
is fundamental under our system of government that all
similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall
enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice
of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession
on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before
he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from
such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of
the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional
because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs.
Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State
ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon
him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of
this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is
not material that he had once established his right to practice
law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and
other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no
matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the
great body of the public an individual upon whom it would
confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)

commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law
without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received
a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress
approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act,
1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was
held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the
quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application
of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is
explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities
that a classification to be valid must rest upon material
differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and
real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial
ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class
of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to
which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the
members of the class and the situation and circumstances of
all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause
for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial
reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50

per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per
cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and
73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which
has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the
nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this
classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years
before, with the general average indicated, were not included because
the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years
under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no
record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one
concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal
consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in
such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ?
Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal
permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72
per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948,
70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who
obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent
to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or
criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the
license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75

per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to
do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal.
What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per
cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete
the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being
extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year
the general average by one per cent, with the order that said
candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct
are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by
means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the
Tribunal should have done during those years according to the
judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What
was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included
in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls
within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the
judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations,
at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not
take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary,
and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that
the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but
was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title
will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary
to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and
annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article
1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they

are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress
has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and
third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its
basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers
from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic
Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any
force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed
in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this
Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of
these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members
of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on
the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this
Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having
examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time
for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and
alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated
the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such
additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the

admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the

Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on
who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates,
which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general
knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the
law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable
from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1
referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1,
insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in
force.

resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of
the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to
the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1
which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law,
that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in
force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates
who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied,
and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this
decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION
ANNEX I
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of
the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by
our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of
two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have
announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946
to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 19461

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates

206

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

12

73'S

72'S

Number of candidates who passed

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates

749

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per
85

Number of candidates who failed

October, 1947

43
1

cent

121

69 per cent

40

18

68 per cent

Percentage of success

(per cent)

41.62

Number of candidates who passed

409

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

58.74

Number of candidates who failed

340

Passing grade

(per cent)

72

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

972

November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates

481

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

19

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent --Minutes of March 31, 1947)

Percentage of success

(per cent)

54.59

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

45.41

Passing grade

(per cent)

69

(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.

Number of candidates who passed

249

Number of candidates who failed

228

August, 1948

43

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

Percentage of success

(per cent)

52.20

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

47.80

Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis

P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.

Passing grade
(By resolution of the Court).

(per cent)

72

Number of candidates
Number of candidates whose grades were raised

899
64

71's

29

Number of candidates

70's

35

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

Number of candidates who passed

490

Number of candidates who failed

409

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

11

Percentage of success

(per cent)

62.40

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.60

Passing grade

(per cent)

70

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo,
Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates

1,218

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

55

Number of candidates who passed

686

Number of candidates who failed

532

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

164

Percentage of success

(per cent)

56.28

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

43.72

Passing grade

(per cent)

74

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco
A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.

1,316
38

(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and

authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed

432

Number of candidates who failed

894

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

26

Percentage of success

(per cent)

32.14

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

67.86

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates

2,068

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

112

Number of candidates who passed

1,189

Number of candidates who failed

879

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

196

Percentage of success

(per cent)

57.49

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

42.51

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio

without invoking said law, which are still pending,

Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, reconsideration
Atty.
follows:
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates

2,738

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

163

Number of candidates who passed

1,705

Number of candidates who failed

1,033

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

426

Percentage of success

(per cent)

62.27

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.73

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates

2,555

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

100

Number of candidates who passed

1,570

Number of candidates who failed

986

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

284

Percentage of success

(per cent)

61.04

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

38.96

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No.
972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations,
with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration
which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Le

MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L.

66

71

61

76 80

83

73

75

MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino

76

72

74

75 70

70

65

72

MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V.

64

64

65

68 83

74

68

80

MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R.

71

68

66

75 63

75

70

88

MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu.

75

73

73

65 63

66

65

80

MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud

72

66

71

75 78

68

65

50

69

79

75

75 71

89

55

75

76

80

62

86 81

72

60

65

63

85

70

77 80

81

65

80

10. Alacar, Pascual C.

61

63

83

79 71

85

65

80

11. Amog, Pedro M.

75

66

76

78 81

74

55

85

12. Apolinario, Miguel S.

75

84

78

78 70

70

60

75

13. Aquino, Maximo G.

82

77

71

77 76

77

60

75

14. Asinas, Candido D.

75

83

69

80 81

83

55

85

15. Baldivino, Jose B.

75

65

72

82 82

69

60

80

16. Balintona, Bernardo

75

80

64

78 74

67

65

70

17. Banawa, Angel L.

78

70

70

75 81

83

60

60

18. Bandala, Anacleto A.

66

80

66

71 93

72

55

70

19. Bandon, Alawadin L.

74

79

69

77 91

73

60

80

20. Baquero, Benjamin

76

79

64

77 85

72

65

75

1948

1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A.
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D.
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L.

21. Blanco, Jose

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

72.547. Jesus, Felipe D. de

75

83

67

79 78

85

60

75

22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T.

75

71

72

78 67

82

60

75

70.85
48. Jocom, Jacobo M.

77

77

74

77 74

64

55

85

23. Canda, Benjamin S.

75

72

75

82 76

77

65

75

73.55
49. Juares, Nicolas

77

84

56

76 73

82

60

85

24. Canon, Guillermo

77

86

67

88 75

69

70

85

73.950. Kalalang, Remigio

65

75

74

80 70

70

65

85

25. Carlos, Estela S.

75

81

81

79 72

73

65

70

73.851. Layumas, Vicente L.

67

84

65

75 89

66

60

80

26. Cerezo, Gregorio O.

69

76

76

79 71

80

55

80

70.452. Leyson, Amancio F.

69

83

75

76 81

75

65

75

27. Clarin, Manuel L.

75

82

76

81 73

69

70

75

73.95
53. Libanan, Marcelino

71

83

61

77 80

81

65

85

28. Claudo, Conrado O.

76

62

78

77 73

72

60

70

71.454. Lim, Jose E.

77

77

72

76 72

64

65

70

29. Condevillamar, Antonio

V.

68

65

74

80 85

75

60

75

71.65
55. Lim, Jose F.

70

75

62

83 80

71

65

80

84

76

78 80

75

60

75

75

69

82 83

79

65

80

67

81

75

72 79

81

55

80

31. Corona, Olvido D.

68

76

73

81 81

72

60

75

77

75

60

75 77

85

60

75

32. Dizon, Marcial C.

76

86

69

83 75

74

65

80

56. Linao, Mariano M.

73.457. Lopez, Angelo P.
71.15
58. Lopez, Eliezar M.
73.159. Lopez, Nicanor S.

66

72

72

71

70

78 77

84

60

75

33. Enriquez, Agustin P.

75

77

70

81 81

77

65

80

72

70

65

78 81

90

60

80

34. Espiritu, Irineo E.

80

88

69

75 76

77

65

75

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

35. Fernandez, Macario J.

63

82

76

75 81

84

65

75

73.75
60. Manoleto, Proceso D.
73.861. Mancao, Alfredo P.
72.95
62. Manera, Mariano A.

75

78

75

75 68

79

60

65

36. Gallardo, Amando C.

78

79

67

77 76

75

60

65

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

37. Garcia, Freidrich M.

76

80

66

75 72

70

60

75

76

81

67

82 74

77

65

80

38. Garcia, Julian L.

64

77

68

82 89

77

65

75

70.95
63. Mercado, Arsenio N.
69.764. Miranda, Benjamin G.
72.15
65. Manad, Andres B.

77

75

68

82 69

72

65

75

39. Garcia, Leon Mo.

77

86

71

80 60

82

65

40. Garcia, Pedro V.

76

82

73

81 74

83

60

72

84

69

81 70

82

65

75

41. Garcia, Santiago C.

62

91

79

75 72

75

65

751948
71.85
85 73.666. Orosco, Casimiro P.
80 71.867. Padua, Manuel C.

76

76

68

80 79

79

50

75

42. Genoves, Pedro

75

83

70

78 87

76

55

80

71

75

82

71 55

87

55

75

43. Gonzales, Amado P.

75

71

71

75 86

75

60

75

62

75

69

93 80

79

55

80

44. Guia, Odon R. de

77

76

66

81 74

76

60

75

72.768. Palang, Basilio S.

72.65
69. Palma, Cuadrato
70.970. Paganiban, Jose V.

67

83

61

81 91

74

60

75

45. Fernandez, Simeon

62

68

71

80 74

90

65

75

66

71

75

81 67

74

60

70

46. Jakosalem, Filoteo

82

83

73

82 61

87

65

70

70.85
71. Pareja, Felipe
73.672. Patalinjug, Eriberto

73

77

78

73 78

71

55

75

MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R.

73. Paulin, Jose C.

66

69

71

77 83

82

65

75

72.199. Espaola, Pablo S.

71

78

55

76 85

69

65

93

74. Pido, Serafin C.

72

78

63

80 71

85

70

80

72.05
100. Foronda, Clarencio J.

60

78

68

79 84

88

62

93

75. Pimentel, Luis P.

77

75

76

81 76

68

55

80

71.6
101. Hechanova, Vicente

59

76

75

75 69

68

75

96

76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C.

72

78

68

89 79

81

65

85

80

78

61

76 61

77

66

85

77. Regalario, Benito B.

72

80

64

80 75

81

55

80

73.55
MRD- Pealosa, Osias R.
102.
69.55

78. Robis, Casto P.

62

77

74

73 68

80

70

80

Sarmiento, Floro A.

65

86

63

82 89

72

60

72

79. Rodil, Francisco C.

68

69

70

81 76

75

65

Torre, Catalino P.

75

85

68

78 69

67

65

69

80. Rodriguez, Mariano I.

80

75

69

80 72

80

65

81. Romero, Crispulo P.

78

75

66

77 76

83

65

Ungson, Fernando S.

61

87

75

70 57

85

83

82

82. Saez, Porfirio D.

75

75

72

81 69

77

60

83. Saliguma, Crisogono D.

79

79

74

78 69

65

65

Abasolo, Romulo

77

70

64

65 76

70

76

64

84. Samano, Fortunato A.

75

84

72

77 70

82

60

Adeva, Daniel G.

75

59

74

65 69

51

78

67

85. Santos, Faustina C.

71

68

68

76 75

85

55

Aguilar, Vicente Z.

73

63

68

75 70

69

75

75

86. Santos, Josefina R.

68

69

76

71 77

82

65

Amodia, Juan T.

75

76

66

75 76

60

77

76

87. Seludo, Ananias G.

75

80

69

79 77

82

65

Aosa, Pablo S.

76

78

63

75 74

61

75

79

88. Semilia, Rafael I.

68

85

55

83 89

79

65

103.
70.9
MRD75 70.75
104.
80 73.35
105.
75 72.85
1951
75 71
106.
70 71.8
107.
75 71.9
108.
75 69.5
109.
75 72.3
MRD75 73.25
110.
80 71.25
111.

Antiola, Anastacio R.

68

76

75

70 71

70

81

66

89. Telan, Gaudencio

77

79

70

75 70

75

60

75

70

71

71

60 74

62

76

77

90. Tesorero, Leocadio T.

75

71

63

75 82

62

65

63

71

78

68

80 86

51

82

75

91. Torre, Valentin S. de la

85

81

71

76 69

65

55

70

70.85
112. Aquino, S. Rey A.
69.65
113. Atienza, Manuel G.
70.4
114. Avancea, Alfonso

71

71

65

75 70

72

78

80

92. Torres, Ariston L.

78

71

72

81 61

84

55

85

75

73

75

70 72

65

75

76

93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de

70

75

71

79 65

80

65

80

70.4
MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N.
115.
70.65

94. Viado, Jose

67

70

74

75 75

90

55

80

68

69

73

70 74

50

80

79

95. Villacarlos, Delfin A.

73

87

71

82 69

70

75

85

76

60

67

55 74

63

77

62

96. Villamil, Leonor S.

73

81

76

86 86

73

55

85

97. Zabala, Amando A.

76

70

67

75 76

76

60

75

116. Barinaga, Jeremias L.

70.7
MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.
73.85
117.
73.6
MRD- Benitez, Tomas P.
70.6
118.

67

75

75

60 73

72

75

78

82

67

65 66

72

77

68

71

78

81 76

72

64

96

119. Biason, Sixto F.

73.4

73

70

1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la

MRD- Brias, Isagani A.

120.

71

69

74

70 76

52

79

72

121. Buela, Arcadio P.

72

77

61

70 71

58

79

71

122. Cabilao, Leonardo S.

73

50

75

75 75

60

71

79

123. Cabrera, Ireneo M.

75

66

70

65 72

81

70

79

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

124. Cacacho, Emilio V.

125. Calilung, Soledad C.
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B.
126.

71.95
142. Fernan, Pablo L.

67

88

66

85 73

68

78

75

143. Gandioco, Salvador G.

69.75
144. Gastardo, Crispin B.
71.25
145. Genson, Angelo B.
72.4
146. Guiani, Guinald M.

64

58

66

65 76

70

89

75

70

69

68

75 78

66

86

72

75

57

73

65 67

54

78

56

68

60

75

65 74

67

75

77

147. Guina, Graciano P.

69.65
MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P.
69.65
148.

66

69

67

60 78

52

83

61

74

74

75

75 71

69

75

71

60

75

74

70 74

70

80

75

72

78

75

75 72

56

82

77

71

70

63

85 71

60

85

53

127. Calimlim, Pedro B.

66

82

69

60 69

52

83

75

128. Camello, Sotero H.

70

77

63

65 75

66

84

64

149. Ibarra, Venancio M.

70150. Imperial, Monico L.
71.55
MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.

129. Campos, Juan A.

71

88

70

75 64

69

71

62

70.15
151.

130. Castillo, Antonio del

78

78

70

60 79

67

69

76

72.65
152. Inandan, Fortunato C.

77

77

67

53 73

75

79

57

MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad.

131.

75

61

72

75 74

71

67

66

71.1
153. Jimenez, Florencio C.

75

70

70

75 72

61

75

78

83

72

65 76

73

75

69

72

86

72

75 65

75

76

71

154. Kintanar, Woodrow M.

72.85
155. Languido, Cesar V.

70

MRD- Castro, Jesus B.

132.

63

71

63

85 70

61

85

79

133. Casuga, Bienvenido B.

75

72

72

70 69

61

75

60

61

89

75

55 73

63

75

78

134. Cabangbang, Santiago

B.

77

67

61

80 73

59

83

76

156. Lavilles, Cesar L.

70.95
157. Llenos, Francisco U.
72.2
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de

64

70

65

60 72

65

92

75

63

73

60

85 75

75

90

70

135. Cruz, Federico S.

69

74

75

75 68

65

76

70

72

68

60

65 76

67

84

68

136. Dacanay, Eufemio P.

70

73

62

75 72

69

85

71

159. Llanto, Priscilla

71.65
160. Machachor, Oscar
72.05

68

59

78

70 67

57

75

75

137. Deysolong, Felisberto

66

62

72

75 70

62

83

62

Magsino, Encarnacion

77

66

70

70 76

71

75

61

MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N.

138.

78

79

63

75 73

75

81

59

Maligaya, Demetrio M.

70

61

75

65 75

50

91

51

139. Espinosa, Domingo L.

78

63

58

70 70

67

87

63

MRD- Farol, Evencia C.

140.

80

78

66

75 81

72

62

73

MRD70.85
161.
73.5
MRD162.
71.6
163.
72.25
164.

Manio, Gregorio

67

67

69

80 71

67

75

75

Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

82

60

60 69

70

68

72

141. Felix, Conrado S.

71

71

75

65 70

58

75

69

70.75

MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R.

165.

66

75

74

70 75

67

81

75

73.15
185. Saavedra, Felipe

73

80

63

75 76

73

68

62

72

73

75 67

68

77

69

68

72

63

75 69

63

84

62

77

81

72

65 73

60

76

75

MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S.

167.

70

80

75

80 76

66

82

51

186. Salazar, Alfredo N.

70.1
187. Salem, Romulo R.
73.95
188. Foz, Julita A.

66

166. Martin, Benjamin S.

75

72

75

75 65

70

76

64

MRD- Montero, Leodegario C.

168.

73

67

66

80 81

65

81

75

189. Santa Ana, Candido T.

73.75
190. Santos, Aquilino

77

69

65

75 81

75

70

75

72

66

69

65 68

70

81

71

169. Monzon, Candido T.

70

72

74

75 67

70

77

69

76

72

75

75 68

62

76

79

170. Natividad, Alberto M.

73

79

68

65 73

69

75

79

191. Santos, Valeriano V.

72.05
192. Suico, Samuel
72.2

73

79

72

75 71

59

84

65

MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C.

171.

70

72

68

85 81

66

71

74

74

68

66

80 66

59

79

67

64

76

67

65 76

72

76

53

69

72

69

70 76

73

82

79

67

60

71

75 79

67

84

60

68

71

71

70 70

63

82

71

69

72

75

60 69

54

78

66

Velasco, Avelino A.

65

72

75

75 71

67

78

76

Villa, Francisco C.

65

80

73

75 68

79

65

75

Villagonzalo, Job R.

78

67

74

65 72

51

69

71

Villarama, Jr., Pedro

75

74

75

55 75

66

67

75

203. Abacon, Pablo

73.35
MRP- Abad, Agapito
204.
70.9
MRP- Abella, Ludovico B.
70.15
205.

75

72

78

81 78

72

64

55

73

76

73

85 75

63

62

75

70

81

76

81 70

66

77

58

MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F.

72.65
206.
72.2

75

79

79

87 76

51

63

70

66

66

75

65 79

68

85

62

75

81

76

65 74

67

75

69

174. Olaviar, Jose O.

72

70

69

55 66

70

77

75

193. Suson, Teodorico

72.1
194. Tado, Florentino P.
73.5
195. Tapayan, Domingo A.
73.75
MRDTiausas, Miguel V.
196.
70.5
197. Torres, Carlos P.

MRD- Perez, Cesario Z.

175.

75

76

66

80 72

63

82

69

72.95
198. Tria, Hipolito

70

66

65

70 75

64

75

70

177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75

73

62

65 78

59

75

178. Recinto, Ireneo I.

73

76

68

75 74

68

80

MRD- Redor, Francisco K.

179.

62

77

73

75 69

64

76

MRD- Regis, Deogracias A.

180.

76

74

68

65 65

65

88

172. Nisce, Camilo Z.

MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de
173.

176. Pogado, Causin O.

181. Rigor, Estelita C.

199.
69.95
200.
66 70.2
201.
53 72.3
202.
69 70
1952
75

67

78

61

80 71

77

79

65

70

72

62

60 88

66

67

79

183. Rosario, Prisco del

70

64

70

70 72

73

85

57

184. Rosario, Vicente D. del

75

91

65

75 68

68

79

62

MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela

182.

MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N.

207.

71

72

78

84 70

75

69

70

72.9
MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D.
227.

72

67

78

89 72

67

77

65

208. Alandy, Doroteo R.

64

83

93

91 68

59

60

60

71.2
228. Atienza, Ricardo

72

87

70

79 66

55

75

75

209. Alano, Fabian T.

70

83

61

83 72

87

72

70

71.9
229. Balacuit, Camilo N.

75

78

89

75 70

54

66

75

71

79

80

81 73

70

72

62

73.65
MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S.
230.

77

84

83

80 69

70

61

65

211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag.

75

85

71

73 76

65

68

65

71.85
231. Balcita, Oscar C.

75

77

79

90 64

60

67

50

212. Acosta, Dionisio N.

75

81

78

87 56

65

77

70

72.8
232. Barilea, Dominador Z.

71

67

82

77 64

61

65

80

MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C.

213.

66

85

80

84 75

58

76

75

73.65
MRP- Banta, Jose Y.
233.

75

80

77

81 75

63

71

75

214. Adove, Nehemias C.

76

86

78

77 66

78

69

62

76

70

67

80 67

65

70

81

215. Adrias, Inocencio C.

75

83

61

88 76

67

79

75

73.55
MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.
234.
73.4

216. Aglugub, Andres R.

75

83

73

88 72

62

72

62

66

76

78

88 62

76

67

78

217. Andrada, Mariano L.

76

85

66

87 63

77

75

77

235. Batucan, Jose M.

72.65
73.236. Bautista, Atilano C.

70

82

84

85 58

61

71

62

MRP- Almeda, Serafin V.

218.

72

72

75

81 61

67

73

65

237. Bautista, Celso J.

70.75
238. Belderon, Jose

71

68

63

87 80

67

80

70

76

81

76

92 70

66

67

62

219. Almonte-Peralta,
Felicidad

73

71

72

91 75

67

65

53

70.7
MRP- Belo, Victor B.
239.

76

77

64

73 75

71

76

76

MRP- Amodia, Juan T.

220.

75

79

68

85 62

64

75

78

71.4
MRP- Bejec, Conceso D.
240.

79

80

73

82 63

77

75

50

MRP- Antonio, Felino A.

221.

71

76

81

83 79

52

72

70

73.3
MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M.
241.

72

75

81

73 75

57

75

80

MRP- Antonio, Jose S.

222.

75

92

90

68 65

64

68

60

73.75
MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74
242.

84

77

84 75

63

68

62

223. Aonuevo, Ramos B.

71

87

78

81 64

63

74

76

70

80

79

79 68

72

64

78

224. Aquino, S. Rey A.

67

77

57

78 69

70

69

80

72.7
MRP- Beria, Roger C.
243.
67.7

225. Arteche, Filomeno D.

78

83

50

89 76

77

70

70

75

86

65

92 64

64

84

75

75

78

70

81 73

70

67

78

MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M.

70.8
244.
72.2
MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M.
245.

73

69

78

83 73

59

70

82

MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V.

210.

MRP- Arribas, Isaac M.

226.

MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B.

246.

76

86

76

83 68

59

71

78

73.05
MRP- Campos, Juan A.
266.

66

85

83

84 67

61

80

57

247. Buenafe, Avelina R.

78

80

75

75 70

55

72

80

72.75
267. Cardoso, Angelita G.

78

71

73

76 79

56

69

60

248. Bueno, Anastacio F.

73

78

71

78 71

67

71

60

71.15
268. Cartagena, Herminio R.

71

72

65

89 64

73

80

70

249. Borres, Maximino L.

67

85

62

91 72

63

76

80

65

75

77

76 85

60

75

69

MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V.

250.

72

71

76

75 74

70

71

60

70.9
MRP- Castro, Daniel T.
269.
72.2

70

78

72

73 77

69

64

80

MRP- Cabello, Melecio F.

251.

72

78

78

89 58

70

67

71

70.5
271. Castro, Pedro L. de

70

68

69

87 76

75

72

70

82

75

86 60

54

76

75

79

88

53

91 71

85

75

76

272. Cerio, Juan A.

73.3
273. Colorado, Alfonso R.

75

MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M.

252.

68

75

80

74 77

66

67

80

253. Cabreros, Paulino N.

71

79

83

84 60

62

71

50

65

79

84 73

69

66

84

254. Calayag, Florentino R.

69

79

66

88 69

75

68

76

76

79

86 74

53

71

75

76

72

80

67 62

71

66

62

274. Chavez, Doroteo M.

73
70.85
275. Chavez, Honorato A.
77
70.6
MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69
70.85
276.

81

74

82 76

61

78

80

70

82

81

77 78

51

75

75

MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N.

257.

76

87

69

80 58

64

78

75

258. Calagi, Mateo C.

73

93

71

87 70

66

69

62

259. Canda, Benjamin S.

72

71

77

90 62

75

66

82

260. Cantoria, Eulogio

71

80

71

89 70

55

72

75

277.
73.7
278.
71.8
MRP279.
71.8
MRP71.95
280.
71
MRP-

261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado

67

78

71

90 65

75

72

60

70.65
281.

262. Capitulo, Alejandro P.

75

70

53

87 78

63

76

91

MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo

263.

75

93

81

76 64

75

68

56

MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V.

264.

75

86

70

87 77

52

77

82

MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B.

265.

80

75

78

77 73

71

63

76

MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la

255.
256. Canabal, Isabel

270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V.

Cortez, Armando R.

78

60

88

86 60

66

69

64

Crisostomo, Jesus L.

76

87

74

76 62

55

76

66

Cornejo, Crisanto R.

68

87

78

86 79

50

80

60

Cruz, Raymundo

75

81

79

85 72

57

68

75

Cunanan, Jose C.

78

92

63

83 76

72

68

65

71.2
282. Cunanan, Salvador F.

70

82

64

92 67

75

73

76

73.15
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B.

71

76

76

80 70

71

75

71

284. Crisol, Getulio R.

73.9
MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R.
285.
73.65
MRP- Datu, Alfredo J.
286.

70

91

78

85 68

55

71

50

76

82

69

82 66

62

80

71

70

75

72

86 80

55

68

79

287. Dacuma, Luis B.

71

67

87

83 71

50

65

70

MRP- Degamo, Pedro R.

288.

73

80

82

74 80

67

67

289. Delgado, Vicente N.

MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A.
290.
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo

66

75

80

82 80

71

67

70

57

71.25
MRP- Fabros, Jose B.
306.
73.65
MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P.
307.
72.65

77

69

82

83 65

60

75

75

308. Fajardo, Genaro P.

70
72.25
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75

79

77

79 79

50

73

75

75

72

87 63

63

77

70

70

84

82

84 77

52

73

50

75

83

86

73 54

54

75

75

73

84

64

89 71

78

75

66

72.8
310. Familara, Raymundo Z.

68

75

87

83 64

65

68

65

MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M.

292.

71

77

71

81 69

75

80

70

73.65
311. Farias, Dionisio

70

78

89

66 65

75

70

50

84

74

70 75

67

73

59

70

76

82

73 79

70

72

56

71

69

70

85 69

81

72

70

MRP- Delgado, Abner

294.

75

84

63

67 64

60

70

72

73

77

86

79 70

76

64

50

MRP- Domingo, Dominador T.

295.

70

69

81

82 68

63

71

75

312. Favila, Hilario B.

73.9
MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I.
313.
68.35
MRP- Fernando, Lope F.
314.
72.2
MRP- Flores, Dionisio S.

71

MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R.

293.

78

72

77

83 67

60

68

73

70

82

70

70 78

65

64

75

70

78

53

88 75

77

62

76

75

77

78

86 76

72

64

75

315.
68.05
MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B.
73.9
316.

88

72

74 60

71

79

79

75

80

73

83 66

67

65

66

MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la

70.65
317.

76

298. Duque, Castulo

299. Ebbah, Percival B.

70

80

85

76 66

63

76

75

73.95
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S.

72

79

71

77 68

61

76

60

300. Edisa, Sulpicio

65

77

75

89 75

62

75

65

76

81

74

69 71

71

73

60

301. Edradan, Rosa C.

70

75

84

84 71

59

69

86

72
MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B.
319.
73.4

MRP- Enage, Jacinto N.

302.

66

70

88

93 72

67

65

75

320. Gabuya, Jesus S.

73.2
321. Galang, Victor N.

70

83

82

83 70

63

75

65

69

83

84

76 70

57

71

60

MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B.

303.

75

86

73

81 63

77

69

75

72.65
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L.

73

87

77

90 67

61

72

75

79

86

78 60

61

75

70

65

78

58

68 66

64

75

78

75

88

75

75 63

70

70

65

305. Estoista, Agustin A.

78

76

74

86 58

67

70

76

323. Galem, Nestor R.

67.1
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B.
71.7
MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B.
325.

72

304. Encarnacion, Cesar

70

78

84

91 80

51

65

70

296. Ducusin, Agapito B.

MRP- Duque, Antonio S.
297.

326. Galindo, Eulalio D.

70

89

87

65 78

71

62

62

73.4
347. Homeres, Agustin R.

73

84

65

86 70

77

63

76

327. Galman, Patrocinio G.

72

72

80

85 71

56

70

53

71.15
348. Ines, Leonilo F.

65

88

71

88 77

73

61

70

328. Gamalinda, Carlos S.

76

79

81

86 67

63

69

55

72.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S.

68

75

83

89 80

61

65

50

329. Gamboa, Antonio G.

71

67

70

72 76

60

75

68

75

65

68

85 76

70

83

54

330. Gannod, Jose A.

69

80

75

81 68

62

73

68

70.95
MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.
350.
71.25

MRP- Garcia, Matias N.

331.

67

78

74

90 79

59

76

65

MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio

72.8
351.

73

86

72

78 82

67

67

64

MRP- Ganete, Carmelo

332.

75

87

77

82 74

57

68

81

MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F.

73.3
352.

76

75

78

84 71

66

70

77

333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R.

75

67

80

82 67

57

64

70

Jaring, Antonio S.

72

77

79

70 72

57

71

50

334. Gofredo, Claro C.

68

78

72

86 78

52

70

76

Javier, Aquilino M.

75

84

79

78 77

61

66

66

335. Gomez, Jose S.

71

76

71

81 76

63

69

62

MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V.

336.

68

93

85

78 64

69

70

54

Jomuad, Francisco

75

75

72

88 78

58

76

43

Jose, Nestor L.

78

61

64

73 68

76

64

80

MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C.

337.

77

75

71

89 55

70

70

60

353.
70.5
MRP70.9
354.
70.85
355.
72.35
MRP356.
70.05
357.

La Q, Jose M.

75

71

75

72 70

67

81

59

MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de

338.

66

68

90

84 77

59

69

65

358. Leon, Brigido C. de

73.3
359. Leones, Constante B.

67

75

78

91 78

51

72

80

68

81

79

84 73

60

77

60

339. Grageda, Jose M. A.

70

85

72

67 70

60

73

73

70.75
360. Liboro, Horacio T.

72

69

80

87 73

62

70

61

340. Guzman, Juan de

75

86

69

84 64

79

75

76

73.6
361. Llanera, Cesar L.

77

81

80

78 64

59

75

63

MRP- Guzman, Mateo de

341.

76

79

79

73 72

69

68

80

73.9
362. Lomontod, Jose P.

75

76

69

70 73

76

74

75

75

69

83 59

53

74

75

71

61

74

72 61

66

78

75

76

90

78

88 64

58

75

77

343. Guzman, Salvador T. de

75

84

64

81 74

61

78

58

363. Luna, Lucito

70.75
MRP- Luz, Lauro L.
71.75
364.

70

342. Guzman, Salvador B.

344. Habelito, Geronimo E.

71

76

71

87 73

60

67

55

73

81

72

83 66

75

72

70

345. Hedriana, Naterno G.

75

68

84

76 66

58

76

60

69.65
MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S.
365.
72.9

346. Hernandez, Quintin B.

67

75

72

81 72

72

66

76

366. Magbiray, Godofredo V.

70.6
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P.

80

67

84

76 70

62

65

68

70

62

64

82 88

75

71

79

1952

MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo

368.

75

90

77

83 59

71

72

78

MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S.

369.

74

83

74

89 58

60

72

76

370. Maloles, Iluminado M.

70

87

73

76 77

50

76

76

371. Maniquis, Daniel R.

75

80

73

91 69

71

65

372. Maraa, Arsenio

65

79

60

72 73

51

373. Marasigan, Napoleon

75

71

83

75 69

MRP- Marco, Jaime P.

374.

75

67

74

76 64

MRP- Martir, Osmundo P.

375.

70

MRP- Masancay, Amando E.

376.

73

87

75

77 72

50

78

MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T.

377.

62

87

72

79 73

76

378. Mara, Guillermo L.

70

78

78

89 75

MRP- Mercado, Felipe A.

379.

73

77

82

MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P.

380.

70

82

73

381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr.,

79

78

73

75 71

68

69

53

MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio

382. D.

79

79

68

88 64

78

69

83

400.
71.95
401. Orden, Apolonio J.
73.1
402. Ortiz, Melencio T.

MRP- Montero, Leodegario C.

383.

72

89

69

89 70

68

70

75

384. Morada, Servillano S.

75

76

67

71 65

66

75

76

385. Mocorro, Generoso

78

84

78

84 60

73

68

70

75

78

75

85 72

55

77

66

MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L.

386.

86

76

73.3
387. Motus, Rodentor P.

80

78

70

94 72

75

70

57

70

67

74

86 78

63

72

66

72

64

64

81 73

50

75

75

67

70

71

76 76

79

75

57

70

388. Macario, Pedro R.

71.1
MRP- Nadela, Geredion T.
389.
72.3
MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P.
72.1
390.

75

86

67.9
391. Nieto, Benedicto S.

69

79

77

77 72

62

76

76

62

69

70

71

86

81

80 73

56

72

70

75

75

57

72.75
MRP- Noguera, Raymundo
392.
71.9

70

70

69

73 57

37

64

72

53

MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R.

393.
72.95
394. Nono, Pacifico G.

67

77

78

67 75

59

71

76

80

73.2
MRP- Nuval, Manuel R.
395.

78

72

67

90 72

68

78

67

69

77

71.3
396. Ocampo, Augusto

75

90

77

72 69

55

65

67

75

68

72 84

50

75

79

66

65

76

77

74

67 73

66

68

70

82 78

52

69

85

70

62

85

81 74

50

68

79

86 77

52

79

65

397. Oliveros, Amado A.

72.35
398. Opia, Jr., Pedro
73.9
MRP- Olaviar, Jose O.
399.
72.8
MRP- Olandesca, Per O.

72

67

70

91

76

87 72

66

70

79

72

65

84

86 66

50

72

68

71

75

78

81 66

67

70

78

MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S.

72.15
403.

72

64

76

86 72

61

76

75

404. Pacifico, Vicente V.

70.9
MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D.
73405.
73.15
406. Padlan, Crispin M.

76

79

69

80 76

52

72

80

75

69

72

75 78

58

75

70

71

66

76

79 68

67

74

66

78 72

71

75

407. Padilla, Jose C.

70

65

67

82 78

75

78

75

408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71

88

78

86 59

75

78

50

81

80

82 71

75

69

75

73.3
MRP- Quietson, Bayani R.
427.
72.95

73

75

76

77 70

81

71

53

428. Racho, Macario D.

73.25
429. Ramirez, Sabas P.

68

75

81

82 78

53

66

54

71

80

73

87 62

62

75

80

MRP- Palma, Bartolome

409.

67

MRP- Papa, Angel A.

410.

75

72

85

85 77

59

63

71

73.45
MRP- Raffian, Jose A.
430.

80

83

79

79 62

72

68

65

MRP- Parayno, Mario V.

411.

71

88

74

89 69

66

76

73

73.65
MRP- Ramos, Patricio S.
431.

75

87

76

75 72

72

61

75

412. Paria, Santos L.

70

87

85

77 64

67

63

76

84

76

90 48

75

80

65

MRP- Pasion, Anastacio

413.

63

80

68

81 82

79

76

58

71.85
MRP- Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78
432.
72.55
75

81

76

67 75

77

55

77

414. Pastrana, Rizal R.

69

76

71

76 68

63

77

83

MRP- Raro, Celso

433.
71.65

MRP- Paulin, Jose O.

415.

70

66

80

87 75

50

65

80

MRP- Rayos, Victor S.

70.9
434.

75

86

79

91 71

67

67

70

MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C.

416.

79

87

73

83 69

71

68

65

435. Revilla, Mariano S.

73.2
436. Reyes, Abdon L.

75

78

81

90 70

54

69

81

72

64

81

78 76

73

69

53

417. Pea, Jesus

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66

70.4
437. Reyes, Domingo B.

72

87

78

83 72

75

62

70

418. Perez, Toribio R.

71

64

81

92 69

58

67

70

71.25
438. Reyes, Francisco M.

75

85

84

68 75

71

68

50

419. Pestao, Melquiades

77

81

74

87 59

68

76

75

73.2
439. Reyes, Lozano M.

80

57

78

79 78

65

64

79

MRP- Pido, Serafin C.

420.

77

81

72

82 69

71

60

75

71.15
MRP- Reyes, Oscar R.
440.

75

75

82

82 76

64

68

60

421. Pinlac, Filemon

67

76

74

86 65

79

65

72

70.55
441. Rigonan, Cesar V.

71

85

65

86 75

70

76

70

422. Poblete, Celso B.

72

79

82

76 66

64

74

50

72.15
442. Rivera, Honorio

71

56

70

90 71

65

75

71

68

70

75

87 74

67

64

75

70.8
MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72
443.

88

72

94 68

73

66

80

424. Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

80

81

69 72

53

67

70

75

77

75

77 82

64

69

70

425. Quetulio, Josefina D.

75

90

60

93 64

78

76

83

71.05
MRP- Robles, Enrique
444.
72.9

MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V.

426.

69

88

79

82 65

62

71

66

445. Rodriguez, Orestes

71.55
Arellano

76

75

76

63 69

77

65

78

MRP- Piza, Luz

423.

446. Roldan, Jose V.

67

80

79

83 73

71

75

70

73.9
MRP- Sybico, Jesus L.
466.
73.15

79

70

70

72 75

75

72

60

447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del

80

75

65

70 68

72

80

70

448. Rosario, Restituto F. del

75

75

79

90 68

65

66

63

467. Tabaque, Benjamin R.

72.1
MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita
72.95
468.

69

68

77

79 74

68

72

60

MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S.

449.

71

81

69

75 77

71

75

70

81

79

72

80 62

75

73

80

450. San Juan, Damaso

77

86

72

89 59

76

65

72

Tando, Amado T.

71

82

78

83 71

61

71

60

Tasico, Severo E.

71

69

75

89 70

75

67

63

Tiburcio, Ismael P.

73

82

72

93 76

57

68

54

Tiongson, Federico T.

70

70

76

84 77

75

75

50

Tolentino, Jesus C.

75

89

63

84 85

73

73

50

Torrijas, Alfredo A.

77

66

67

83 68

75

71

63

70

MRP71.6
469.
72.1
470.
70.6
471.
73.95
MRP472.
72.95
MRP473.
71.8
474.
71.25
MRP73.7
475.

451. Saiel, Felix L.

72

93

76

80 67

75

66

62

452. Samaniego, Jesus B.

75

80

76

72 60

67

68

70

MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75

453.

83

70

83 77

67

77

60

MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q.

454.

71

75

81

90 62

64

76

68

455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal

75

76

84

93 63

65

59

70

456. Santillan, Juanito Ll.

76

89

83

83 63

58

65

52

MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C.

457.

75

75

78

82 73

76

66

Tobias, Artemio M.

69

58

74

81 71

55

65

57

MRP- Santos, Ruperto M.

458.

67

54

69

76 63

64

71

60

MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio

66.75
476.

76

86

76

86 70

68

75

50

MRP- Santos, Aquilino C.

459.

72

71

73

79 73

79

71

85

MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O.

73.8
477.

66

91

83

75 63

66

67

65

MRP- Santos, Rufino A.

460.

75

81

79

85 74

72

66

54

Trinidad, Pedro O.

66

78

78

85 78

51

64

75

Udarbe, Flavio J.

80

82

77

82 67

56

68

75

67

92 79

59

76

76

79

76

78 72

75

68

67

478.
73.3
MRP479.
73.1
480.
73.5
481.

461. Suanding, Bantas

75

67

76

Umali, Osmundo C.

68

75

81

80 71

69

68

60

Umayam, Juanito C.

77

75

87

85 56

56

66

60

463. Songco, Felicisimo G.

70

68

82

84 60

69

76

65

75

72

75

74 73

76

71

70

464. Soriano, Aniceto S.

64

79

77

80 80

53

70

65

465. Suarez, Pablo D.

73

85

70

87 76

70

64

70

72

81

80

84 62

78

71

75

67

75

81

86 72

57

81

70

MRP- Sulit, Feliz M.

462.

MRP- Usita, Gelacio U.

73.35
482.
70.7
483. Valino, Francisco M.
71.9
484. Varela, Dominador M.

485. Vega, Macairog L. de

78

62

79

87 70

70

71

MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D.

486.

71

80

74

85 60

66

76

which were denied, indicated by the initials

65reconsideration
73.8
MRD, follows:
76 71.85

487. Velez, Maria E.

73

70

89

80 56

50

72

67

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

71.05

MRP- Venal, Artemio V.

488.

78

91

58

67 76

55

75

73

73.65

489. Venus, Conrado B.

69

81

74

85 62

66

72

77

MRP- Verzosa, Federico B.

490.

75

79

72

88 76

68

74

MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V.

491.

75

83

70

76 64

64

75

MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C.

492.

75

85

79

88 66

77

67

73

69

70

88 76

66

69

80

85

67

77 62

75

76

495. Viterbo, Jose H.

80

77

65

93 70

65

65

496. Yaranon, Pedro

70

77

76

85 72

50

MRP- Yasay, Mariano R.

497.

75

75

72

76 63

MRP- Ygay, Venancio M.

498.

73

80

83

84 62

499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro

73

82

78

75 60

81

75

500. Zamora, Alberto

70

65

76

79 62

77

69

501. Rigonan, Felipe C.

70

79

69

89 76

62

71

493. Villar, Custodio R.

MRP- Villaseor, Leonidas F.
494.

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their

grades in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing
the years in which they took the examinations together with
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for

77.05
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
59 73.7
1946

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Le

68

67

76

76 73

73

49

50

651950
71.2
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
701951
73.95

59

80

67

77 62

80

71

57

65

76

58

55 59

63

75

72

1952
50 70.75
1953
73 73.15
3. Blanco, Jose B.

65

68

75

84 72

59

73

57

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

75

65MRD-1949
70.65
751951
71.85

64

71

58

65 68

70

75

71

77

70

60

59

72

1950
77 72.65
1951
75 5.73.95
Ducusin, Agapito B.

71

80

62

75 75

81

55

92

70

60

61

65 77

64

67

81

82MRD-1949
71.3
641950
71.2

69

70

76

73 76

71

55

60

60

71

55

67 67

75

56

89

MRD-1949

60

70

82

79 70

69

60

80

1950

57

65

51

69 54

85

56

84

71.1
4. Condeno, Mateo

6. Garcia, Manuel N.

7. Luna, Lucito A.

14. Rodulfa, Juan T.

1946

63

53

69

76 75

76

57

69 1951
66.55

67

60

70

65 68

56

75

66

1952

70

75

69

83 59

53

74

75 1952
68.4

70

71

67

78 67

75

71

70

8. Maraa, Arsenio s.

15. Sanchez, Juan J.

1949

72

68

68

75 75

72

60

75 1948
69.35

39

69

82

75 76

72

55

50

1952

65

79

60

72 73

51

75

86 MRD-1949
67.9

67

56

69

75 72

77

60

75

70

59

55

60 68

57

78

67

9. Montano, Manuel M.

1951

1951

61

60

58

60 70

63

75

64 16.
64.8
Santos, Constantino

1952

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50 1952
66.4

62

76

54

82 72

77

66

65

1953

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78 1953
70.65

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

10. Pea, Jesus S.

17. Santos, Salvador H.

1950

25

75

45

75 45

52

46

71 1951
46.2

60

64

55

70 68

52

70

75

1951

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50 1952
66.4

75

64

70

81 76

55

61

75

1952

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66 1953
70.4

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

11. Placido, Sr., Isidro

18. Sevilla, Macario C.

1950

68

78

70

75 69

70

58

69 MRD-1948
67.75

50

64

76

66 66

69

60

52

1951

65

62

75

60 73

57

75

71 MRD-1949
66.8

47

66

78

64 71

86

65

85

35

65

40

75 63

57

27

49

12. Rementizo, Filemon S.

1950

1949

65

75

72

75 60

75

55

85 MRD-1951
66.65

68

59

72

55 69

65

75

75

1951

68

57

48

60 91

66

55

75 1953
64.05

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

1952

68

53

68

67 58

56

1952

67

80

51

69 69

77

1953

65

67

78

74 75

62

75
64 65.7
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some
candidates--85 in all--presented motions for reconsideration of their
grades,
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of
73
53 others
66.35
those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for
69
80 70.9
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic
act, is as follows:

13. Amao, Sulpicio M.

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

24. Gutierrez, Antonio S.

68

77

66

70 72

59

71

74

77

70

76

77 81

62

70

68

66

66

75

70 77

55

71

82

62

70

78

65 78

56

69

81

28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid

72.8
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G.
73.4

76

64

67

69 73

59

73

75

77

76

68

68 71

51

75

78

30. Maloles, Julius G.

72.7
31. Mandi, Santiago P.
73.4

77

71

60

71 79

62

68

72

65

76

70

61 79

68

75

72

32. Margete, Rufino C.

71.25
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B.
70.95

70

76

66

75 85

73

71

75

70

81

73

78 83

52

72

75

34. Molina, Manuel C.

67
35. Muoz, Mariano A.
66.7

75

78

70

61 75

63

66

85

75

80

86

67 74

57

68

76

36. Navarro, Buenaventura M.

73.95
37. Nodado, Domiciano R.
73.35

80

75

65

75 83

55

73

79

60

67

67

50 70

50

56

75

38. Papas, Sisenando B.

70.05
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando
73

65

62

71

61 70

56

66

67

63

75

71

62 83

67

70

72

40. Padula, Benjamin C.

73.35
41. Pasno, Enrique M.
73.95

70

77

54

62 74

78

75

68

78

72

66

54 71

58

72

78

42. Pea, Jr., Narciso

70.2
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P.
71.1

70

95

81

78 67

66

67

73

70

70

52

81 68

63

59

69

44. Pigar, Leopoldo R.

71.6
45. Publico, Paciano L.
72.8

76

75

78

61 72

72

71

79

68

69

76

76 70

59

74

67

46. Radaza, Leovigildo

73.9
47. Ramos, Bernardo M.
71.65

75

78

76

61 77

50

71

86

64

62

75

93 81

52

66

80

48. Rabaino, Andres D.

71
49. Ravanera, Oscar N.
73.6

68

72

75

73 78

55

69

76

70

77

80

71 82

62

69

78

50. Renovilla, Jose M.

65

75

80

68 79

52

62

78

1. Acenas, Calixto R.

25. Ilejay, Abraham I.

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De
Av.
27. Lugtu, Felipe L.
73 70
68
62 82 51
67
77 73.45

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

3. Alejandro, Exequiel

67

72

71

75 80

76

75

77

4. Andres, Gregorio M.

70

73

86

58 79

50

71

78

5. Arnaiz, Antonio E.

66

80

76

58 79

68

77

81

6. Asis, Floriano U. de

66

78

75

81 77

55

73

69

7. Bacaiso, Celestino M.

71

65

76

68 76

50

75

70

8. Bala, Florencio F.

64

82

47

70 82

58

75

82

9. Baldo, Olegario A.

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

10. Barrios, Benjamin O.

65

71

76

75 80

62

83

73

11. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

74

78

12. Burgos, Dominador C.

72

80

89

61 66

37

69

68

13. Cario, Eldo J.

79

81

60

75 74

74

76

74

14. Casar, Dimapuro

67

73

84

79 77

61

71

74

15. Castaeda, Gregorio

70

73

80

71 75

70

73

78

16. Estrellado, Benjamin R.

67

79

64

73 82

62

71

74

17. Fabunan, Edilberto C.

70

72

68

69 77

60

76

74

18. Feril, Domingo B.

75

71

84

65 70

60

65

70

19. Fernandez, Alejandro G.

65

75

87

80 81

63

61

80

20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss)

76

80

86

77 64

74

66

69

21. Garcia, Rafael B.

70

86

70

75 73

63

73

75

22. Gracia, Miguel L. de

73

68

75

59 80

51

72

71

23. Gungon, Armando G.

68

76

76

84 77

57

77

83

51. Sabaot, Solomon B.

69

73

80

69 82

69

69

79

73.85
16. Jacobo, Rafael F.

76

76

75

74 76

50

72

76

52. Sumaway, Ricardo S.

66

76

69

76 74

56

72

68

69.1
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L.

67

77

79

79 74

72

68

77

53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O.

70

77

74

75 73

50

68

72

69.55
18. Mangubat, Antonio M.

70

70

78

61 80

74

62

70

54. Vera, Federico V. de

60

61

47

77 69

50

67

77

60.9
19. Montano, Manuel M.

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78

55. Viray, Venancio Bustos

65

67

67

52 73

64

71

65

67.15
20. Plomantes, Marcos

73

67

74

58 68

70

76

71

56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss)

63

70

56

75 68

54

70

77

64.5
21. Ramos, Eugenio R.

70

80

76

67 72

69

72

79

22. Reyes, Juan R.

71

73

77

76 81

59

72

74

23. Reyes, Santiago R.

65

78

83

60 76

75

70

70

65

67

78

74 75

62

69

80

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

26. Santos, Salvador H.

73.5
27. Sevilla, Macario C.

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

72.8
28. Villavicencio, Jose A.
72.9
29. Viray, Ruperto G.

78

75

70

67 69

77

64

77

76

73

76

73 80

58

68

83

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

24. Rivera, Eulogio J.

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
25. Santos, Constantino P.
Av.
1. Ala, Narciso

70

71

73

59 73

74

81

77

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

3. Arellano, Antonio L.

74

66

73

60 78

63

78

72

4. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

5. Calautit, Celestino R.

71

78

84

75 75

61

6. Casuncad, Sulvio P.

61

73

82

69 81

68

7. Enriquez, Pelagio y
Concepcion

84

69

76

75 82

50

8. Estonina, Severino

80

74

64

89 81

56

9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q.

65

75

87

80 81

63

10. Fernandez, Luis N.

70

75

77

75 78

67

11. Figueroa, Alfredo A.

70

75

87

78 75

50

12. Formilleza, Pedro

65

75

89

68 83

51

13. Garcia, Manuel M.

69

68

83

83 73

62

14. Grospe, Vicente E.

68

75

78

66 79

61

15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952)

72

79

86

78 60

61

74
78 73.35
There
are the
unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by
68
72
73.2
this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any
71
84they
73.05
petition,
reach a total of 1,094.
58
79 72.05
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
68
82 72.4
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the
61
80 72.8
passing general average in the bar examination of august and
72
73 of
73.35
November
1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per
cent in68
1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but
68
72.3
raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This
70
75 73.25
caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill
62
71was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of
No. 1270
which
Rule 127
the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys69
82 of71.6
at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace
75
70 73.05

many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16

immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be
deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the
average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following
relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal
Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law,
5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent;
Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in any subject in which
they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such
rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however,
That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per
cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the
examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any
applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination
held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise
found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the
matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar
examinations should be compelled to repeat even those

subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the

case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court
have therefore been amended in this measure to give a
candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously
passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3,
1951, the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before
acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while
three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With
regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of
this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per
cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his
next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination
on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time.
The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes
it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he
may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two
subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has
passed the last required subjects, which may be several years
away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs
subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories
contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the
one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This
is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations
every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a
candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more
that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time
or number of years intervening between each examination
taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the
law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law.
When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency

in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal
profession and adequately render the legal service required by
prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any
five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year
later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a
passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50
per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to
be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the
time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of

Rule 127. This amendment provides that any application who
has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office.
In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70
per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission
to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain
a passing general average in any of those years, will be
admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding
amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the
passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such
reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should
not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only

admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing

general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
present amendment would have the effect of repudiating,
reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying
and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an
average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if
finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As
one member of the Court remarked during the discussion,
when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or
order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or
rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal
of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or
resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that
members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the
Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar,
the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it
refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in
any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of
70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to
pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and
declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and
qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average
runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme
Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not
accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer
because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified,
nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed
by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is

another important aspect of the question to be carefully and

seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill,
namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and
maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed
in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to
which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision
constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically
one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in
the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final
resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the
law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have
failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect
of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain
the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets
a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally
obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in
the examinations for admission to other professions such as

medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public

accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines,
but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by
section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule
127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after
July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per
cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar
examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per
cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of
the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent
passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this
Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent
in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall
be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President
and to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves
discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when
those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination
but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been
altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In
order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades
and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed
in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for
passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar
examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar
examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per
cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the
condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a
grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading materials will be
under normal conditions, if not improved from those years
preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our
Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the
administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his
objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a
special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered
the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in
good conscience, correct because Congress is merely
supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the
passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947.
These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted,
considered themselves as having passed the bar examination
on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme
Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties
and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We
believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been
altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving
due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the
bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent
was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without
being inconsistent with the principles of their previous
resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple
curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the
power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following
American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to
the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it
leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as
"natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different rules
established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind.
95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides

brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws.
Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If
so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the
condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be
as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there
are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent
to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special
form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative
policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431).
(1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which
always retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only as
in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly
recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as
above transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this
Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive
Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to
Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by

Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of

the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed
to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June
21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times
erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and
that both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for
re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.