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Mind Association

D. F. Pears On `Is Existence A Predicate?'


Author(s): D. A. Griffiths
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 84, No. 335 (Jul., 1975), pp. 431-435
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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D. F. Pears On 'Is ExistenceA Predicate?'


D. A. GRIFFITHS

Two quite different


pointshave, on different
occasions,been meantby,
or been givenas themeaningof,'Existenceis not a predicate'.The points
may be related,but they are different
points. This would not matter
unless it resultedin confusionbetween the two points; unfortunately
confusionhas occurredon at least one occasion. My aim in this note is
to show that such confusioncan be foundin D. F. Pears' 'Is Existence
a Predicate?'(reprintedin PhilosophicalLogic,editedby P. F. Strawson).
More precisely,my claim is that Pears is led to say some very strange
thingsbecause he is tryingto relateto one meaningof ENP ('Existence
is not a predicate') remarksthat were intendedto relate to the other
meaning.
(i) The twopoints.The two pointswhich have been linkedwith ENP
are familiar.One we findin (amongstmany othersources) Russell (e.g.
to MathematicalPhilosophy,Chapter I5). The point can at
Introduction
least be identifiedby the followingstatement:'A's exist' is not about
particularmembers (instances,arguments)or each member (instance,
argument)of the class of A's (of the concept 'A', satisfying
the function
'x is an A'); rather,itis abouttheclass ofA's (theconcept'A', the function
'x is an A'). Specificallyto say thatA's existis to say thatthe class ofA's
has members(the concept'A' has instances,the function'x is an A' has
argumentsthat satisfyit). Let us call this point the CMP (the classmembershippoint).
The otherpoint we can findstatedin Pears' article(on p. 98). In the
statement'This room exists' the subject-phrase'This room' implies
thatthisroomexistsby makinga reference
to it, and thustheverb 'exists'
is redundant.And in the statement'This room does not exist' the verb
contradictswhat is implied by the subject-phrase.Pears describes the
contradictions'
point in termsof 'referential
tautologies'and 'referential
(let us call it the RTCP) and extendsit (p. ioi) to covergeneralexistential statements.
Now, about the RTCP Pears says two particularthingswhich I want
to examine.He says thatthe RTCP is a refinement
of two 'inexactformulations'of ENP; and he says that in his expositionof the RTCP, he
is followingup some ideas that G. E. Moore put forwardin his article
'Is Existencea Predicate?'(Proceedings
of theAristotelianSociety,Supp.
Vol., I936. Reprintedin Logicand Language,SeriesII, editedby A. G. N.
Flew.)
(ii) Thefirstinexactformulation
(IFi). 'If I assertthattigersexist,the
verb "exist" does not add anythingto theconceptofthe subject"tigers"
(P. 97).
How does Pears show that the RTCP is 'reallya refinement'
of IFi?
The connectionis made throughthe idea of adding. In that the verb
43I

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432

D. A. GRIFFITHS:

'exists' is redundantin 'This room exists' it adds nothingnew (p. 98).


'Adds nothing'in IFi means 'adds nothingnew' in the sense relevantto
the 'T' partof the RTCP.
to
But is this sharingof the notionof adding nothingreallysufficient
justifythe claim thatthe RTCP and IFi make the same point? Firstly,
we mightnote that IFi talks about not adding anythingto the concept
of the subject 'tigers', whereas Pears' point seems best expressed by
impliedby the use
talkingabout not adding anythingto the information
of the subject phrase. Secondly,IFi is about 'Tigers exist'; Pears' point
is about 'This tigerexists'. IFi is about generalstatements,Pears' point
about singular statements.However, Pears does say somethingabout
general statements.He points out that 'All tame tigers exist' lacks a
clear sense, and argues that it lacks sense because 'All tame tigers'
impliesthatthereexist tame tigers,and therefore'All tame tigersexist'
is a referentialtautology.But again Pears seems to be dealing with
somethingotherthan that containedin IFi, namely'Tigers exist'. And
here is the crucialobjectionto Pears' 'refining'.All Pears' examplesare,
tautologies.But 'Tigers exist' makes perfectlyclear
of course,referential
tautology.To suggestthatthe RTCP is the
sense; it is not a referential
same point as that made in IFi is absurd; for the RTCP is a point
about existence statementsthat are referentialtautologies (or contradictions),whereas IFi claims that 'exist' adds nothingin cases that are
not referential
tautologies.
So IFi does not relatein any directway to the RTCP. Does it relate
to the CMP? (For, my claim is thatPears triedto relateto one meaning
of ENP remarksthat were intendedto relateto the othermeaning.) It
relates,very obviously,to the CMP in the followingway: The CMP
assertsthatto say thatA's existis not to say somethingabout instancesof
the concept'A', but to say thatthe concept'A' has instances;but to say
thata concepthas instancesis not to add anythingto thatconcept.
Now, it will be pointedout that,accordingto Pears (p. 97) 'to say that
a concepthas instancesin realityis certainlyto add somethingto it, even
if what is added is peculiar'. But this,if true,does not of course require
us to say thatIFi concernssome pointotherthanthe CMP. All we need
say is that those who have proposed IFi have been inexact in stating
what followsfromthe CMP.
(And, anyway,one is surelyinclinedto thinkthat Pears is just mistaken. If we say that a concept has instanceswe can be describedas
saying somethingabout the concept, and, thereforeadding something
(to whathas alreadybeensaid) aboutthe concept; but not adding somethingto theconcept.)
(iii) The secondinexactformulation(IF2). 'When I assert that tigers
exist I am not sayinganythingabout tigers'(p. 97).
of IFi, we mightexpectto findthat IF2
Preparedby the 'refinement'
means that in 'This tigerexists' and 'All tigersexist', since existenceis
alreadyimpliedby 'This tiger'and 'All tigers',the verb 'exist' does not
say anythingabout tigers that has not already, in some sense, been
since we have rejectedhis
expressed.But Pears in fact(and fortunately,
He claims that IF2
refinementof IFi) does somethingquite different.

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D. F. PEARS

ON 'IS

EXISTENCE

A PREDICATE?'

433

(unlike IFi) does really (as they both appear to) make a point about
statementslike 'Tigers exist'.
fullysignificant
But how is Pears goingto pull offthe trickof givinga precisereformulation of 'not saying anythingabout tigers'; a reformulationthat is
applicable to statementsthat are not referentialtautologies,yet a rein termsof the RTCP, which,on the face of it, is applicable
formulation
tautologies?He claimsthat ' "being about something"
onlyto referential
means "being about somethingin such a way thatits existenceis referentiallyimplied" ' (p. 98). But this reallyis a trick!If the tutor'scomment
at the bottomof a student'sessayis 'This does not answerthe question',
and the studentsays to himself'All he means is that I did not answer
the questionin such a way . .. (as, forexample,to relateit to last week's
essay), i.e. I did answer the question, but not in this particularway',
thenwe can onlythinkthathe is deludinghimself(at least,overwhathis
tutormeant). Pears' 'refining'at least leaves open the question whether
anythingis said about tigers,and stronglysuggeststhe followinginterpretation:'Althoughsomethingis being said about tigers,it is not said
in such a way that . . .' (particularlysince Pears, on page 97, arguesthat
somethingis said about tigers).But IF2 states,quite simply,thatnothing
is said about tigers.Whatevermay be said about the truthor falsityof
but a rejecting.
IF2, Pears' 'refining'is not a refining,
Thus Pears makes the strangesuggestionthat 'says nothing about
tigers'reallymeans 'says somethingabout tigers,but not in such . . .
My claim thenis thathe is led to make this suggestionin his attemptto
forceonto the RTCP somethingdesignedto expressthe CMP. So how
does IF2 relate to the CMP? Well, if we turn back to the identifying
statementof the CMP, we findwhat is, simplyand clearly,a generalised
IF2. In this particularcase we get: 'When I assertthattigersexist I am
not saying anythingabout (individual) tigers(that is, about particular
members,or each member,of the class of tigers),(but I am sayingsomethingabout the class of tigers).'This, I would claim,is neitherrejection
(which is what Pears does) nor refining(Pears' intention),but merely
clarification.
(iv) Pears and Moore. Let us now turnto Pears' suggestionthathe is
followingup some ideas of G. E. Moore. Moore, in his article,draws
between 'exists' and other grammatical
attentionto certaindifferences
are perhaps involvedin
predicates,and suggeststhat these differences
what has been meantby ENP. Our question,then,is this: Do Moore's
relateto the RTCP, as Pears appears to claim, or do theyin
differences
is in
factrelateto the CMP? Moore's positiveaccountof the differences
two parts (Sections I(i) and I(2) of his article),and it will be convenient
to take the second partfirst.
(a) 'This tigerexists'. In Section I(2) Moore comparescertainuses of
is that,
'exists' and 'growls' and argues that the fundamentaldifference
given a certainunderstandingof 'exist', then to say 'This exists' would
(unlike saying'This growls') be to express no propositionat all, would
be absolutelymeaningless(p. I85 in P.A.S.S.V. I936). Now Pears, as
we have seen, uses the RTCP to explain the queerness of 'This exists'.
Thus bothwritersprovidea reason for 'This exists' being, in some way,

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434

D.

A. GRIFFITHS:

defective.But (i) Moore's accountis quite explicitlya discussionof the


CMP, and (2) Moore himselfdistinguisheshis conclusionsharplyfrom
anythingresemblingPears' conclusion.
(i) The understandingof 'exist' that, Moore thinks,involves the
meaninglessnessof 'This exists' is preciselythat understandingset out
by Russell in 'Introductionto MathematicalPhilosophy',that is, precisely that understandingthat constitutesthe CMP. About this there
can be no question; Moore examinesRussell's accountin some detail,and,
like Russell, concludes that it entails the meaninglessnessof 'This
exists'.This is not to say thatMoore thinksthatthisis all thereis to say
about existence; he later argues that 'This exists' can have meaning.
Nor is it to say that Russell and Moore are rightin thinkingthat the
CMP entailsthe meaninglessnessof 'This exists'. Nakhnikianand Salmon (' "Exists" as a Predicate', Phil. Rev. I957) have shown in what
sense it does not. It is merelyto say thatPears' remarksabout the queerness of 'This exists' relateto a quite different
point.
(2) If any doubt can remain,Moore eliminatesit for us in the last
sentenceof his discussion(p. I85): ' "This is a tame tiger,and exists"
would be not tautologous,but meaningless.'
(b) 'Tame tigersexist'.In I(i) Moore discussesthe followingdifference
between 'exist' and 'growl': whereas 'Tame tigersgrowl' is ambiguous
between 'All tame tigers growl', 'Most tame tigersgrowl' and 'Some
tame tigersgrowl', 'Tame tigers exist' must mean 'Some tame tigers
exist'. The point is that 'All tame tigersexist' and 'Most tame tigers
exist' have no clear meaning.
in the same
Now we mightexpect Moore to deal withthis difference
way that he dealt with 'This tigerexists'. Justas 'This tigerexists' is,
on Russell's interpretation
of existence,meaningless,so will all stages of
the 'This .

. a few .

. most . . . all tigers exist' sequence of statements

be meaningless.'A's exist' is not about particularmembersof the class


ofA's, so it is notabout somemembers,or mostmembers,or all members.
Thus 'Some tigersexist' does not stand to 'Tigers exist' as 'Some tigers
growl' stands to 'Tigers growl'. But Moore does not straightforwardly
do this. Instead he provides an explanationthat does perhaps warrant
Pears' linkingof the RTCP withMoore's article.
What he does is to relatethe queernessof 'Most tame tigersexist' and
'All tametigersexist'to the queernessof 'Some tame tigersdo not exist'.
And about this he says that if it has any meaningit must mean 'There
are some tame tigerswhich do not exist'; which is, he claims,nonsense.
Here, perhaps,are groundsforintroducingthe RTCP. For Moore seems
to be sayingthatthe use of the expression'Some tame tigers'indicates
that there are some tame tigers (implies that some tame tigersexist);
hence, we can explain the 'nonsense' by sayingthat if we go on to say
that these same tame tigersdo not exist,we get involved in a sort of
whichwe can call a referential
contradiction.
contradiction,
The claim thatthe two inexactformulations,
and that Moore's point
about 'This tiger exists', relate to the RTCP, we found to involve a
confusionbetween the RTCP and the other meaning for ENP, the
CMP. For it is the latter,not the former,thattheyrelateto. But in this

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D. F. PEARS

ON 'IS

EXISTENCE

A PREDICATE?'

last case, Moore's pointabout 'Some tigersdo not exist',we findthathis


accountdoes seem to relateto the RTCP. However,the interesting
point
is thatif it is the case that Moore, in I(i) is concernedwith the RTCP,
thenwe can transferto himthe chargeof confusionbetweenthe RTCP
and the CMP. For, what Moore says about 'Some tame tigers do not
exist' is that it is 'pure nonsense' and 'has no meaning at all'. And it
follows,he claims, that 'All tame tigers exist' and 'Most tame tigers
exist' also have no meaning at all (p. I79). But, of course, the RTCP
shows that these statementsare contradictionsor tautologies,which, as
we have seen, is for Moore a quite different
matter.The RTCP does
not lead to the conclusionsthat Moore draws. So, what possible reason
could Moore have forclaimingthat the statementshave no meaningat
all? Only the reason givenforthe meaninglessnessof 'This tigerexists',
the reason containedin the CMP. Thus, in this last case, if we cannot
claim thatto link Moore's accountwiththe RTCP involvesa confusion
betweenthe RTCP and the CMP, we can claim that Moore's account
itselfcontainsthis confusion.
UNIVERSITY

OF HONG

KONG

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