Certainty and Circularity in Evolutionary Taxonomy

Certainty and Circularity in Evolutionary Taxonomy
Author(s): David L. Hull

Source: Evolution, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1967), pp. 174-189
Published by: Society for the Study of Evolution
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2406751 .
Accessed: 21/07/2014 17:05
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Society for the Study of Evolution is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Evolution.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 17:05:49 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CERTAINTY AND CIRCULARITY IN EVOLUTIONARY TAXONOMY

DAVID L. HULL
Departmentof Philosophy,Universityof Wisconsin-Milwaukee,

Milwaukee, Wisconsin53201
Received October11, 1965
Aftera considerableperiodof uncritical condemned vertical construction of hypothesis

acceptance,the principlesand procedures upon hypothesis.
"Remane (1956), in spite of his fundamentally
taxonomyhave been sub- phylogeneticorientation,has also realized that
of evolutionary
jected to carefulscrutinyand, none too phylogeneticreasoning cannot serve as the basis
have been found not com- for erectinga natural system. He similarlyrejects
surprisingly,
pletelyadequateor totallyfreefromvague- affinity(based on a few characters) as the basis
of a natural classification.He considersthatwhile
ness and ambiguity.One of themoreseri- both of these approaches enter on occasion into
popularis thatevo- the techniques practiced by 'good systematists,'
ous criticisms
currently
circular. the exclusive application of only one of them is
lutionaryreasoningis inherently
For example,RobertR. Sokal and P. H. A. likely to lead to misclassification.Affinityor resemblancewhen based on one or a few characters
Sneath (1963) say:
can lead the systematistastray, Remane claims,
"In recent years three comprehensiveanalytic
studies of systematicprincipleshave been published in books by Hennig (1950), Reinane
(1956), and Simpson (1961)....
"All three authors mentioned above are fully
aware of the dilemma of circular reasoning inherent in systematic procedure. They are not
satisfiedwith solutionsbased on 'groping.' Simpson (1961) thinks that taxonomy is an evolutionary science, and he attempts to outline a
series of phylogeneticprincipleson the basis of
which taxonomic evidence should be examined
to yield evolutionaryinterpretationsand classifications. We shall examine these principlesin detail in Chapter 8. However, Simpson nowherein
his book is able to present a logical and consistentdefenseof the circularityof reasoninginherentin such procedures. By calling the process
of classificationan art, rather than a science,he
definesthe problem out of existence.
"Hennig (1950) describesthe dilemma in even
greaterdetail. He defendsthe circularityof reasoning by the 'method of reciprocalillumination.'
By this he means that some lightis thrownfrom
one source of logical illuminationonto a natural
situation kindling another, brighterlight in the
latter,which in turn will throw added illumination onto the first source. Thus, in a selfreinforcing,positive feedback type of analysis,
the relationshipsunder study are eventuallyclarified. Hennig feels that phylogeneticrelationships
are the entityof systematicswhose parts consist
of morphological, ecological, physiological, and
zoogeographic similarities. Each of these parts
mirrorsphylogeneticrelationships,which are to
be investigatedby the method of reciprocal illumination. But we cannot see how the principle
of reciDrocalilluminationdiffersfrom the muchEVOLUTION
21: 174-189. March, 1967
as he would be too easily deceived by chance convergences resultingfrom poor sampling of the
characters. Remane attempts escape from the
circulusvitiosus by basing his taxonomyon nonphylogeneticcriteria of homology."
The charge of vicious circularityhas

been commonthroughoutthe historyof
taxonomy.For example,Darwin (1859)
accused his predecessorsand contemporaries of arguingin a circle when they
claimedthat importantorgansnevervary
and decidedwhichorganswere important
by whichdid not vary. Sachs (1890) repeated the chargeand directedit specifically at Linnaeus. It was onlya matterof
timeuntiltheevolutionists
themselves
were
accused of reasoningin vicious circles.
Thompson(1952) seemsto have been the
firstto do so. The charge,however,has
been made mostoftenand mostforcefully
by A. J. Cain. Initially it was directed
against Cuvier; Darwin was expressly
exempted(1959a). Cuvierclassifiedliving
organismsby means of propertiesordered
accordingto theirpresumedphysiological
importance.Cain alleges that Cuvier decidedwhichproperties
werephysiologically
importantby observingwhich characters
were constantin a classificationalready
constructed
accordingto overallsimilarity,
makingpheneticclassificationfundamen-
174

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
IN TAXONOMY
175
But later Cain brings the charge of

tal. Darwin,on the otherhand, proposed
fullcircle. In principle
be classifiedbymeans viciouscircularity
thatlivingorganisms
orderedaccordingto theirpre- phyletic developmentcan be discerned
ofproperties
sumed phyleticimportance.In principle withoutrecourseto the constancyof propimportant ertiesin a pheneticclassificationbut too
are phyletically
whichproperties
de- oftenin practiceit cannot. Cain (1962b)
and, hence,indicativeof evolutionary
of concludes:
scentcan be discoveredindependently
the constancyof charactersin any pre"If there were any method of analysing aniestablishedclassification.Cain (1962a) mals so that the constructionand behavior of
his viewsas follows:
summarizes
each could be shown to follow from a few great
"By equating taxonomic with ancestral relationship,Darwin, like Cuvier,adopted two criteria
of the importance of characters. On the one
hand, he said that those characterscommon to
large groups (i.e. natural groups, although he
did not say so explicitly) are more important
than those common to groups containing little
diversity. This is always right if only natural
groups are to be made. But he also said (a) that
those least likely to have been modifiedin relation to particularmodes of life will be more important in showing ancestral affinity,and (b)
that they can be recognizedbecause they will be
the most constant ones within a natural group.
But this assumes that natural groups are always
phyletic or, in other terms,that convergenceis
never so great as to obscure or outweigh ancestralresemblanceeven in poorly known groups.
He did not committhe earliererrorof arguingin
a circle. His principlesof evolutionaryimportance
were not derived from a pre-existingtaxonomy,
but from the results of artificial selection and
fromthe studyof heredity,variationand ecology.
This is a point worth emphasizing. In many
elementarytextbooks of biology, classificationis
treatedas one of the lines of evidence for evolution. Darwin did not treat it thus; he discussed
it quite late in the 'Origin' as consonantwith the
theory of evolution, and explicable as a consequence of it. He never regarded it as primary
evidence for evolution,and his caution was certainlv iustified."11
principles,then ideally each form could be expressedin termsof these principlesin such a way
as to define it and its properties completely.
Somethingof this sort has happened in the classification of the elements by their atomic structure. Such a taxonomy of analyzed entitieshas
been attemptedmany times. In Linnaeus's period
and before, logical analysis, plus Aristotelian
physiology,was thought to help in this. About
the beginningof the nineteenthcentury,physiological criteria of what must be the most importantcharacterswere widely used. But in both
periods there was far too little informationfor
such analytical taxonomy to be attempted,and
workerswere in fact arguingin a circle fromthe
observed constancy of certain characters in already recognized'natural groups' to theirphysiological importance. Darwin rightlyrejected such
attempts,but he tried to recognize which characterswere more likelyto remainconstantduring
evolution and to use them as the best indicators
of ancestry-and his criterionagain, in theabsence
of a really good fossilrecord,could only be constancy within 'natural groups.'X2
argues cogently(and in agreementwith Darwin)

that evolution by gradual change entails difficulty,not success,in classification.Hence, if anything,continueddifficultyin classificationshould
be consideredevidence for evolution.
2 Cain's distinction between classificationsof
analyzed and unanalyzed entitiesreflectsan acceptance of the Aristotelianview of the relation
and the empirical sciences
1 Darwin discussed the hierarchical arrange- between mathematics
which relativitytheoryhas made untenable. The
mentof taxa quite earlyin the Origin (1859: 128)
reason that essentialdefinitionsin the Aristotelian
and treatedit as he treatedall evidence for evo- mannerare possible in geometryis that the varilution, as consonant with his theory. The group
ous geometriesare pure deductive systems with
subordinate to group relation evident in nature
no empirical import. Such "entities" as pure
was just one more fact inexplicableon the special
Euclidean triangles can be completely analyzed
creation view but to be expected on his view.
into the species scalene, isosceles and equilateral
Cain is right,however,that he did not treat clasis nothing to analyze but some
sificationas primary evidence for evolution, as because there
definitions.Such is not the case with
say George J. Romanes (1892) was to do later. axioms and
clasAs he did with so many of the argumentsput any of the entitiesin empiricalscience. The
forth to justify evolutionary theory, Fleeming sification of the physical elements according to
Jenkin (1897) found a hole in this one. Initial their atomic numbers is not in the least like a
success in a rough hierarchicalclassificationmight taxonomy of analyzed entities. One end of the
be evidence for evolution, but just the opposite periodictable is open. There are about a hundred
elementsstable enough to exist for any lengthof
should be the case under continued efforts. He

176
DAVID L. HULL
Sokal and Sneath,and Cain have been ing or arguingis not veryhelpful. What
are thereasonsforconsidering
quoted at some length to make clear is important
exactlywhichlines of reasoningcommon argumentserroneous. They are of two
with
taxonomyare supposedto types. Logiciansare mainlyconcerned
in evolutionary
be viciouslycircular. Accordingto Sokal formalfallacies,those lines of reasoning
and Sneath no logical and consistentde- whichare erroneoussolelybecause of the
fensehas been presentedforsuch "circu- formof the propositionsand arguments,
larityin reasoning."It willbe thepurpose regardlessof the subject matter. For
of thispaperto providejust sucha defense. example,it is fallaciousto arguethatsince
By the verynatureof the accusation,the Communistsdisapproveof abstract art,
defensewill have to be in termsof logic anyonewho disapprovesof abstractart is
and logical distinctions.In the firsthalf a Communist.A personneedknownothing
or abstractart to deof thepaper,it willbe explainedwhatcon- of eitherCommunism
stitutesa logical fallacyand whyit is un- cide that this argumentis invalid. The
desirableto reason fallaciouslyand then fallacyof reasoningin viciouscirclesdoes
severallinesof reasoningwhichhave been notbelongto thisclass of fallacies.Instead
termedviciouslycircularwill be examined it is an exampleof what logicianscall a
to see if theyactuallyare circular.It will materialfallacy. In diagnosingmaterial
be seen that these lines of reasoningde- fallaciesbothcontentand theuse to which
generateinto vicious circles only if cer- the argumentis being put play central
tain evolutionarylaws and principlesare roles. An argumentcan fulfillall the rethese quirementsof formalvalidityand still be
forignoring
ignored.The justification
thetaskit is
laws and principlesis that they are not fallaciousifit failsto perform
warranted.The secondhalf of the paper intendedto perform.One of the commonwill deal withtheproblemof whatin gen- est uses of argumentsis to prove conclueral makes an inductiveinferencewar- sions th'atare in some way unknownor
rantedand specificallywhetherthose in- doubtfulor that have been called into
this
ferencesused in evolutionaryreconstruc- question. A prerequisitefor fulfilling
tionsare warranted.
purposeis that the argumentcannot assume in the premiseswhat it proposesto
LOGICAL FALLACIES
prove. An argumentwhichfails to prove
procedureis accused anythingbecause it somehowtakes for
Since evolutionary
reasoningin vicious grantedwhat it is supposed to prove is
and
circular
of being
circlesis a logical fallacy,it is certainly called beggingthe questionor petitioprinto explainwhatlogicalfallacies cipii. More subtleversionsof this fallacy
worthwhile
are and why it is undesirableto commit are oftensingledout and termedvicious
thata logical circles.
them. The generalstatement
An argumentcan presupposeor depend
fallacyis any erroneousprocessof reasonupon its conclusionin two ways. In the
time under ordinary conditions; there are three simplestcase the dependenceis straightand only three species of triangles on the dif- forwardly
logical. One of the premisesis
ferentiaimplied. Further,the superficialneatness just a restatement
of theconclusionso that
of the periodic table is destroyedby the existence anyonedoubtfulof the truthof the conof isotopes and isomers. No such borderlinecases
clusionwould have to be equally doubtful
can occur in a pure deductive systemlike Euclidean geometry. The entities classified in the of the truthof thepremises.For example,
periodic table have been more thoroughlyana- any propositioncan be deduced validly
lyzed than have most of the entitiesclassifiedin fromitself,
proved
butwe have notthereby
the Linnaean hierarchy,but there is not the
It is formallycorrectto conanything.
slightesthope of ever completelyanalyzing either
of them,in the sense in which the "entities" of clude that the Pope is infalliblewhen he
speaks ex cathedrafromthe premisesthat
pure geometrycan be completelyanalyzed.

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
IN TAXONOMY
177
he said so ex cathedraand everything

that tor,by the commondefinitionof the term), or to
thePope says ex cathedrais true,but such decide a priori which charactersare importantor
are reliable guides to phylogeny,soon leads to a
an argumentwould stillbe fallacious.
tangle of circularargumentsfromwhich there is
The dependenceneedn'tbe logical,how- no escape. Even Simpson (1961), who strongly
ever. Often the circle is epistemological. supports a phylogeneticallybased taxonomy, is
The onlyway thatyoucouldknowthatthe aware of and points out the circulus vitiosus of
premisesare truewould be to know that this procedure."
to thedefithe conclusionis true. All cases of deducSokal and Sneath'sreference
tion fromgenuineenumerative
generaliza- nitionof "homology"in termsofphylogeny
tions (generalizationsarrivedat by com- mightmake it soundas if theywerearguis circular,when
plete enumeration)are examplesof arguing thatsuch a definition
ing in vicious circles. For example,it is theirintentseemsto be thatthe definition
formally
correctto arguethata certainball can lead to circulararguments.As Ghiselin
in a jar is redbecauseall of theballs in the (1966a and 1966b) has pointedout, the
jar are red, but such an argumentwould definition
of "homology"in termsof phybe viciouslycircularif the generalization logenyis not circularbecause"phylogeny"
had been establishedonly throughthe is not definedin termsof homology.Sokal
examination
of each of theballs in thejar. and Sneath'spointis thatone is ofteninThe onlyway thatyou couldknowthatall ferredvia the otherand thatthiscan lead
of theballs wereredwouldbe by knowing to circulararguments.3In anotherplace
that the ball in questionwas red. How- theymakeit clear thattheyhave an arguever,arguingthat Tamias striatusevolved mentin mindand thattheargument
is supbecauseall speciesevolvedis not an exam- posed to be epistemologicallycircular.
ple of a viciouscircle. The generalization They say:
was not arrivedat simplyby enumerative
"We do not know of any infalliblecriteriafor
induction.Some specieswereexaminedto overall phenetic convergence that may be obto tained froma study of living formsof organisms
establishthe truthof the generalization
be sure and many have been examined alone. To detect convergence,we have to dissince,but theacceptanceof thegeneraliza- tinguish those features which do accurately reflectthe phylogenyfromthose featureswhich do
tion rests primarilyon the explanatory not.
This, however,is a question which can only
powerof evolutionary
theory.
be answered by knowing the phylogeny first.
HOMOLOGY
AND PHYLOGENY
The problem thereforeis insoluble within this

logical framework,and one musthave independent
evidence (not derived frompheneticrelations) in
order to attack it."
There are threelines of reasoningcommon in evolutionary

taxonomywhichare
It is tautologicalto say thathomologous
oftensingledout as circular: (a) the deare indicativeof commonline
resemblances
finingof"homology"in termsofphylogeny
homologous
and then using charactersclaimed to be of descent,since by definition
due to
are thoseresemblances
homologousto inferphylogeny,(b) the resemblances
classification
on
basingof an evolutionary
a pheneticallyconstructedclassification, 3The differencebetween the two assertionsis
since there is considerable
and (c) the inferring
of phyleticdescent worth pointing out,
differencebetween a definitionand an argument.
fromoverallpheneticsimilarity.The first The reasons for the undesirabilityof circular
twolinesof reasoningare derivativeof the definitionsand circular argumentsare, however,
third. They shall be discussedin order. the same. If you don't know what the word "exSokal and Sneath (1963) say withrespect planation" means, it doesn't help to be told that
an explanationis somethingwhich explains someto the first:
"Any attempt to decide the phylogenyon one
set of characters,in particular those believed to
be homologous (derived from a common ances-
thing. Similarly,if you are in doubt of God's

existence,the argument that if God is all-good
and existent,then He exists won't prove very
convincing.

178
DAVID L. HULL
commonline of descent. To be sure,any fined on the basis of this charactercomplex,say

evidenceto the effectthata particularre- X. It is assumed that taxon A is monophyleticor
a 'natural' taxon. Thus everymemberof A (both
semblanceis homologouswouldnecessarily knownand unknownforms)
is expectedto possess
be evidenceto theeffectthatit was due to X; conversely,possession of the character comcommonline of descent and vice versa. plex X definesA.
"Henceforthgroup A, as definedby X, assumes
is
But, the evidencefromwhichphylogeny
a degree of permanenceand reality quite out of
inferredis not limitedjust to homologous keepingwith the tentativebasis on which it was
resemblances.For example,twotaxa which established. Subsequently studied species are
in point of fact are very closely related compared with A to establish their affinities;
cladisticallycould exhibita strikingdis- they may be withinA, close to it, or far fromit.
It is quite possible that a species not showing X
similarity.Anyevidence(e.g., geneticevi- would
be excluded fromA, althoughit was closer
dence) to the effectthat this particular overall to most of the membersof A than some
can arisequitequickly were to each other. It may be said that such
typeof dissimilarity
to the correctreconstruc- problemswould arise only when A was an 'artiwouldcontribute
ficial' group erected on the basis of 'unsuitable'
tion of the phylogenybut would not de- characters.
However, except in long-established
pend on homologiesat all. Fossil evidence taxa or those separated by very wide gaps from
that it did so arise would be even more theirclosest relatives,the effectof the last classiconclusive. On the other hand, evidence fication carried out with a limited number of
charactersis quite pervasive. The circularreasonthat the geneticmechanismnecessaryfor ing
arises from the fact that the new characters,
to ariseis suchthatthe instead of being evaluated on their own merits,
sucha dissimilarity
change could arise only very gradually are inevitablyprejudiced by the prior erectionof
thatthetwo taxon A on other characters(X). Such prejudgwoulddisprovethehypothesis
share a recentcommonancestryeven in mentignoresthe fact that the existenceof A as a
natural (or 'monophyletic') group defined by
the absence of fossil evidence. But too character complex X has been assunmedand not
often the only evidence that is readily demonstrated."
available is pheneticsimilarity,and the
In all due respect,theprecedingis not a
whichhas beencalled
firstlineofreasoning
characterization
of thebestin evolutionary
circularmergesinto the third.
taxonomybut a parodyof theworst. Perhaps the practice of some evolutionists
VICIOUS CIRCLES AND SUCCESSIVE
sometimesdegeneratesto thislevel,but it
APPROXIMATION
need not and if the principlesof evoluThe secondline of reasoningwhichhas
tionarytaxonomyare given proper conbeen termedcircularis spelledout in some sideration,
it shouldnot. Sokal and Sneath
detail by Sokal and Sneath (1963) as are well awarethateventhemostcarefully
fnl MAxIc
formulatedproceduresrun the dangerof
"It may be advantageous at this stage to out- unimaginative
applicationif the principles
line an importantlogical fallacy underlyingcur- on whichtheyare based have been imperrent taxonomicprocedure. It is the self-reinforcof evoluing circular arguments used to establish cate- fectlyunderstood.The principles
shouldnotbe judgedany
gories [taxa], which on repeated application in- tionarytaxonomy
vest the latter with the appearance of possessing moreby theirmisapplication
than should
objective and definablereality. This type of reaof
those
numerical
There are
taxonomy.
soning is, of course,not restrictedto taxonomyin evolutionary
taxonomy
but it is no less fallacious on that account. Let linesofreasoning
us illustratethis point. An investigatoris faced whichcome close to beingcircular.In the
with a group of similar species. He wishes to
precedingquotationSokal and Sneathhave
show relationshipsamong the members of the
group and is looking for characters which will extractedone of the most importantof
subdivide it into several mutually exclusive taxa. theselines of reasoning,
but theirdescripA search for charactersreveals that withina sub- tion tends to
rather
than reveal
disguise
group A certaincharactersappear constant,while
varyingin an uncorrelatedmanner in other sub- the outlinesof thispotentialcircle.
For example,accordingto theiraccount,
groups. Hence a taxon A is described and de-

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
IN TAXONOMY
179
afterA has been definedin termsof X, be undesirable.In thissense,the practice

any specieswhichhas a sufficient
number is vicious,but it is not circularand, hence,
of the propertiesin X is automatically not logicallyfallaceous. The criticismat
taxonplaced in A (although it mightnot be issue is whetheror not evolutionary
similarin otherrespectsto the otherspe- omistsare makinga logical error,not an
cies alreadyin A) and any specieswhich errorin tactics.
lacks a sufficient
numberof theseproper- As Sokal and Sneath say, the type of
ties is excludedfromA (althoughit may reasoningwhichtheyhave indicatedis not
be similarin otherrespectsto the other restrictedto taxonomy.It is inherentin
species). The classification
and reclassifi- any attemptto obtainobjectiveknowledge,
cationwhichgoes on all the timein evolu- includingthe efforts
of the numericaltaxtionarytaxonomyin the lightof the dis- onomists. Abraham Kaplan (1964) has
coveryof previouslyunknownspeciesand called thisspecial problemthe paradoxof
additional evidence belies this extreme conceptualization
and considersit an exisposition.However,whatis wrongwiththis tentialdilemma:
procedure,
evenif evolutionary
taxonomists
"The proper concepts are needed to formulate
wereguiltyof it,is notthata self-reinforc-a good
theory,but we need a good theoryto aringcircleis involvedbut thatno reinforce- rive at the proper concepts. Long before the
mentis involved.If anything,
the alleged scientificrevolutions of the twentieth century,
procedureis contradictory.On the one Jevons (1892) remarkedthat 'almost everyclassiwhich is proposed in the early stages of
hand, evolutionarytaxonomistsare sup- afication
science will be found to break down as the
posed to reasonthat the degreeof covari- deeper similaritiesof the objects come to be deance in X is indicativeof phyleticsimi- tected.' Every taxonomyis a provisionaland imlarity. On the otherhand, theyare sup- plicit theory (or familyof theories). As knowlof a particular subject-mattergrows, our
posed to maintainthatin thelightof more edge
conceptionof the subject-matterchanges; as the
evidenceand a slightlydifferent
distribu- conceptsbecome more fitting,we learn more and
tion of characters,that this new complex more. Like all existentialdilemmasin science,of
Y is not indicativeof phyleticsimilarity. which this is an instance,the paradox is resolved
better our
The wholepointof evolutionary
procedure by a process of approximation: the
concepts,the betterthe theorywe can formulate
is that if X is indicativeof phyleticsimi- with them, and in turn, the better the concepts
larity,thenY is moreindicative.
available for the next, improved theory. V. F.
Now in ordinarydiscoursesuch self- Lenzen (1938) has spoken explicitlyof 'successive
reinforcingproceduresare often called definition.' It is only through such successions
"vicious circles" if the consequencesare that the scientistcan hope ultimatelyto achieve
success."
undesirable.For example,in a recentissue
of a popularmagazineit was reportedthat
Thereare severalpossibleways to avoid
doctorshad "found that the more over- thedilemmaof whichKaplan speaks,none
weightthe diabeticgets,the moreinsulin of which have engenderedany great enthereis in his blood. And themoreinsulin, thusiasmamongscientists.The easyway is
themorehe tendsto eat and thusstoreup to introducesome metaphysicalfaculty
more fat in an ever-widening
vicious cir- such as intuitionwhichis capable of dicle." The situationmay be vicious,but it rectlyand infalliblyapprehending
reality.
is notcircularsincethediabeticgetsfatter This was Aristotle's
way. At least one conand fatter.Similarly,
evolutionary
taxono- temporary
taxonomiststill advocatessuch
mistsclassifyand reclassifyin an attempt
to representevolutionary
descentwith an and some system of classification. The more
ever increasingaccuracy.4This goal may powerful the system of classification,the more
extensive and precise this relationship can be

4 The claim that classificationis to represent made. Unfortunately,the Linnaean hierarchyis
phylogenyis merelythe claim that theremust be not a very powerfulmeans of classification.See
some systematicrelationshipbetween phylogeny Hull (1965) for furtherdetails.

180
DAVID L. HULL
a procedure(Sattler,1963). Most philoso- single bit of additional evidence. Until

phers and scientists,however,have long such a drasticstep is taken,earlyclassifisince come to the conclusionthat this cations will color later classificationsbe
"solution"just won'tdo forsciencein gen- theypheneticor phyletic.
eral. Cain (1958) and Mayr (1959) have
VICIOUS CIRCLES AND EMPIRICAL
that it won't do
argued quite effectively
CERTAINTY
for taxonomyin particular. (See also,
There remainsthe primaryline of reaHull, 1965.)
Anotheralternativeis to deny that a soning,whichhas been termedcircular,to
classificationis intendedto approximate defend. Once again we turnto Sokal and
estab- Sneath for a vigorousstatementof the
anythingbut thatany classification
lishedon objectivecriteriais "true" in its criticism:
ownright.At times,numericaltaxonomists "The difficultywith the use of the phylogenetic
have seemedto be arguingforthisposition. approach in systematicsemerged after the first
At other times,however,they maintain wave of enthusiasmfor it subsided and has reis to approxi- mained apparent to perceptive observors ever
thata pheneticclassification
since. We cannot make use of phylogeny for
called pheneticsimilarity. classification,since in the vast majority of cases
mate something
and numeri- phylogeniesare unknown. This is one of the stateOn thisview,theevolutionists
cal taxonomistsshare th'e methodological ments most commonlyheard at meetingsof taxproblemof justifyingthe process of ap- onomists,yet it is most consistentlyignored. Let
us restate it in other words for emphasis. The
proximationby successivedefinition,the theoreticalprincipleof descent with modification
processcalled "groping"by Cain and "re- -phylogenetics-is clearlyresponsiblefortheexisciprocal illumination"by Hennig. This tence and structureof a natural classification;we
justificationis no easy matter,but it may even agree with Tschulok (1922) that the
natural systemcan be consideredas proof of the
shouldbe kept in mindthat the problem theory of evolution. However, since we have
and numeri- only an infinitesimalportion of phylogenetic
is one sharedby evolutionary
historyin the fossilrecord,it is almost impossible
equally.5
cal taxonomists
based upon to establishnatural taxa on a phylogeneticbasis.
To be sure,anyclassification
Conversely,it is unsound to derive a definitive
a previous tentativeclassificationis in- phylogenyfroma tentativenatural classification.
evitablyprejudicedby it. Anyerrorin the We have describedthis fallacy of circularreasonearly classificationmightwell infectall ing earlier." [See also Cain, 1962; Cain and
but the effectof the Harrison, 1960; and Bigelow, 1956 and 1958.]
laterreclassifications,
early classificationdecreasesas reclassifi- This quotationcontainstwodistinctcriticationtakesplace in thelightof additional cismsof evolutionary
taxonomy.The first,
evidence. A gradual decrease in error whichhas alreadybeen discussed,concerns
mightnot sound good enough for some the erectionof a phyleticclassification
on
but thereis no otheralterna- the basis of a pheneticclassification.The
taxonomists,
each effectof the originalclassificationmay
tive shortof completereclassification
time a single taxonomicboundaryis re- never be eliminated as reclassification
evaluated. AlthoughSokal and Sneath takes place. Since reclassificationdoes
have advocatedsome ratherextensivere- take place and the laterclassifications
selvisionsin taxonomicprocedure,even they dom circleback on the original,this prohave notgoneso faras to suggestthecom- cedureis not circular. Definitionby sucplete dissolutionof all classificationand cessiveapproximation
providesseverallogide novo each timea single cal difficulties,
reclassification
but none of theseinvolves
taxon is re-evaluatedon the basis of a viciouscircularity.The secondcriticismis
that inferring
phyleticrelationshipsfor a
I Sokal and Sneath object only to Hennig's
groupin theabsenceof a reallygood fossil
particularuse of the process of successive definirecordfor that groupis unwarranted.In
tion, the process which he calls reciprocalillumino fossilrecordis available.
mostinstances,
nation, not to the process itself.

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
IN TAXONOMY
181
The only observationswhichevolutionists can be used later to checkthem. Further,

have to go on are phenetic properties the evolutionaryprinciplesused to infer
needn'tbe completely
and pheneticsimi- phyleticdevelopment
(usuallymorphological),
used by clas- general universalstatements.Much less
larityis exactlythe criterion
to will have to do. Nor do theyhave to be
and numericaltaxonomists
sificationists
constructtheirclassifications.If an evolu- eitherverifiedor verifiablein the early
will
sense. Partialconfirmation
tionarytaxonomistbeginswitha phenetic positivistic
on the have to do. To demandmoreof evolutionexclusively
classification,
reclassifies
basis of pheneticsimilarity,then he will ary taxonomywould be to demandmore
and, than any science can deliver-including
end up witha pheneticclassification
de- physics.
perhaps,also a phyleticclassification,
is
pendingon how goodpheneticsimilarity
THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY
at indicatingphyleticsimilarity.If phycannotbe inferredfrom Philosophersand scientiststhroughthe
letic relationships
phenetic similaritywith sufficientcer- centurieshave demandedmore,but these
tainty, then the line of reasoningjust demandshave stemmedfroma failureto
sketchedis unwarranted.It is plainlynot understand
thenatureof empiricalscience.
circular!
Such "apriorists"as Aristotleawardedthe
These two criticisms,though distinct, honorifictitle"science"only to deduction
are related. They are distinct,since it is frompurely universalgeneralizationsto
one thingto arguethata line of reasoning purely universal generalizations,because
is circular;it is anotherto arguethatit is such inferences
necessarilyresultedin true
unwarranted.In fact,the two errorsare conclusionsif the premises were true.
could Aristotleassuredthe truthof his premises
mutuallyexclusive.No one argument
be both circularand unwarranted.The by claimingthatwe intuitthemand intuitwo criticismsare related,however,since tionis alwaystrue! Largelyin reactionto
those lines of reasoningwhichhave been the excessesof Aristotelianism,
some phitermedcircularbecomecircularonlyif cer- losophersand many scientistsadopted an
tain otherlinesof reasoningcan be shown extremely
empiricalview of sciencein the
to be unwarranted.Thus, the really im- 18th and 19th centuries.These extreme
of evolutionary
taxonomy empiricists
portantcriticism
or "Baconians" as theycalled
does not concerncircularityin classifica- themselves
lookedupon scienceas an "inof inferring ductiveprocess,"but they too demanded
tionat all but thejustification
phyleticdevelopmentfrompheneticsimi- absolute certaintyand attemptedto get
larityon the basis of certainevolutionary it by never going beyond the evidence.
principlesin the absenceof a fossilrecord Scientific
laws werejust empiricalgeneraliforthe group. If a good fossilrecordfor zations,just summations
of thedata. Anythe groupin questionis necessarybefore thing else was mere speculation. Even
can be recon- thoughDarwin himselfclaimed to have
development
its evolutionary
certainty,then in proceededin the true Baconian manner,
structedwith sufficient
can- the main criticismleveled against his
a vast majorityof thecases phylogeny
and the evolutionary theoryby thebiologistsofhis day was that
not be reconstructed
programin taxonomybecomesuntenable. it was speculation.He had gone beyond
It will be arguedthatfossilrecordsforall his evidencein a mannerunbecomingan
or evena majorityof thetaxa to be classi- inductive scientist and an Englishman.
fiedare notnecessary.All thatis required (See Ellegard,1957.)
is that therebe some really good fossil
To a philosopherit sounds strangeto
sequencesfromwhichto deriveprinciples hear a neo-Platonistlike Richard Owen
callDarwinforidle speculation,
concerningthe trendsand tendenciesof criticizing
comand
himself
scientist
an
inductive
others
ing
and
which
development
evolutionary

182
DAVID L. HULL
plimenting
Cuvierfornot being"the man
to draw conclusionsbeyondhis premises"
(Owen, 1860). Inductive inferencesare
whichdo go beyond
just thoseinferences
theevidenceat hand and whichdo runthe
risk of leading to false conclusionsfrom
truepremises.As Peter Caws (1965) put
it recently:
it is an admirableprogrambut one thatis

neithernew nor startling.
THE
LANGUAGE OF LOGICAL
CRITICISM
In his earlycriticalwritingsA. J. Cain

whichhas
exhibitsthe same contradiction
of the writings
always been characteristic
of extremeempiricists.At times he deof the inferences
"One might define deduction as a process of mandsabsolutecertainty
at othertimes
inferencein which one never goes beyond the made by the evolutionists;
given facts,and in which thereforethereis never he seems to be arguingmore reasonably
any loss of certainty. Induction, on the other
are not
that too manyof theseinferences
hand, does go beyond the given facts,and therewarranted.A confusionin the
fore runs the risks that deduction does not. We sufficiently
shall find these risks at the root of scientific language of logical criticismemphasizes
theory."
thisvacillation.For example,afterarguing
the use of deductionin taxonomy
against
Aprioristsand extremeempiricistshave
triedto obtainabsolutecertaintyalthough (Cain, 1958), the only kind of inference
by oppositemeans. Neitherof these ex- which permitscategoricaldemonstration
treme positions is appropriate for the and apodeictic certainty,Cain (1959a)
are not
actual practiceof any science,including complainsthatphyleticinferences
"categorically
or
certain"
"apodeictically
taxonomy.
afterquoting
Furthermore,
During the early years of this century, demonstrated."
in biologybecamequi- two Aristotelianphilosopherson the imextremeempiricism
logicto
escent but it burst forthin psychology possibilityof applyingAristotelian
says:
(1959)
Cain
classification,
biological
underthe name of behaviorism.The behavioristsdemanded "operationaldefini- "The relevance of these quotations from logidefi- cians forthe whole historyof biologicaltaxonomy
tions"of all the termsin psychology,
nitionsof a type which they mistakenly fromAristotleto the presentday can hardly be
imthoughtwere commonin physics. Under over-estimated. They epitomize the most
portant change in taxonomictheorythat has occarefuland repeatedcriticismby philoso- curred, namely the gradual abandoning of atphersand theirfellowpsychologists(e.g., tempts to set up classificationson a priori prinBergmann,1954 and 1956), and afterbe- ciples agreeable to the rules of logic and some
and the partial substitutionof
ing abandonedby the founderof opera- particulartheory,
an empiricalattitude. This substitutionwas not
P. W. Bridgman(1954), behavior- complete when the theory of evolution arrived
tionism,
position. to provide a new theoretical approach to the
istsbeganto modifytheirextreme
It has now become little more than an problem of classifyingorganisms,the full implications of which have still not been completely
emphasison a particularformof experi- thoughtout. [Taxonomists should] proceed emmentand a cryforsomeempiricalcontent pirically,simply findingout what subjects exist
in psychological
laws. The historyof oper- and what are theirattributes,not deducing them
from known principlesand axioms."
ationismshould be an object lesson to
Cain termsthe principlesused by theothose taxonomistswho are attemptingto
fromArisintroduceit into taxonomy.If it is in- reticallyorientedtaxonomists,
a
tendedas a demand that the basic con- totleto theevolutionists,prioriand their
whenin pointof fact
deductions,
defined inferences
ceptsin taxonomybe operationally
his
objectionsto evolutionary
in the strictsense,thenit is untenable.If the thrustof
is
that
the principlesare a poson the otherhand, all that is intendedis taxonomy
inductions.Cain
inferences
the
teriori
and
and laws in taxonomy
that the definitions
because
principles
evolutionary
to
objects
be operational(i.e., have some empirical
comthen
a
and
priori
are
then
supposedly
can
be
they
which
checked),
consequences

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
IN TAXONOMY
183
plains thattheydo not have certainprop- necessarilytrue in and of themselves.At

ertieswhichonly a prioristatementscan best theycan be onlyhighlyconfirmed
or
have. He objects to evolutionaryinfer- made highlyprobable.
ences because theyare supposedlydeducIn additionto thisphilosophicuse of the
tionsand thencomplainsthattheydo not expression,
thereis also a use in everyday
exhibita type of certaintythat only de- discourseaccordingto which a belief is
ductionscan have. Cain findsAristotelian termed a priori if the person who holds
logic inadequate for the purposes of it refusesto entertain
counterevidence.
For
science,but he turnsaroundand uses its example,the belief of many people that
basic distinctionsto criticizeevolutionary smokingwill not increasetheirchance of
taxonomy.If Aristotelianlogic won't do contractinglung cancer is a priori in this
in his everyday sense. The belief is not a priori in the
fortheworkingtaxonomist
pursuits,thenit won't do forthe taxono- philosophicsense, since evidenceis relemistwhen he steps back to evaluate the vant. The problemis that the personrestructureof his science. Terminological fusesto acknowledge
therelevantevidence.
confusionslike those just mentionedper- He is certainthathis beliefis true,but his
vade the taxonomicliterature,
and a rea- certaintyis not justified. Perhaps some
sonable decisionas to the justificationof evolutionistshave treatedtheirprinciples
evolutionary
reconstructions
dependsupon as a priori in this second sense. If they
just those distinctionsblurredby these have,it is unfortunate.
But sometimes
the
confusions.
appearance of ignoringcounterevidence
The principlesused by evolutioniststo stems froma misconstrualof the logical
reconstruct
phylogenyare not a prioriin natureof both evolutionary
principlesand
the philosophicalsense of this avowedly theinferences
madefromthem. The critics
philosophicexpression.Accordingto ac- of evolutionaryreconstructions
complain
cepted philosophicusage, the phrase a that even though every single principle
prioriappliesonlyto our knowledgeof the used by the evolutionists
is knownto have
truthof the statementalthoughit is often exceptions,
theevolutionists
continueto use
used ellipticallyto referto the statement them. It mightbe noted in conjunction
itself. A statementis a prioritrue if its withthis claim that everysingleprinciple
truthcan be decided priorto experience. in Newtonianmechanicsis knownto have
For example,thestatement
thateitherit is exceptions,but physicistscontinueto use
rainingsomewhereon the plain in Spain them. (See Scriven, 1961 and Kaplan,
rightnow or it is not is a prioritrue. Of 1964.)
The misunderstanding
is expressedmost
course,its truthcannotbe knownpriorto
all experience,since we must know what clearlyby R. S. Bigelow (1959) whenhe
the wordsin the statementmean and we arguesthata hypothesis
to the effectthat
must understandEnglish syntax,but its all the balls in a particularbag are white
truthcan be decidedwithoutreferenceto is not probablytrueonce it is knownthat
the weather. If the truthof a statement one ball in the bag is red; the hypothesis
can be decideda priori,verification
is ir- is false. Similarly,the hypothesisthat
relevant. Empirical considerationsjust pheneticsimilaritycorrespondsto recency
suchstate- of commonancestryis not probablytrue
don'tmatter.As a consequence,
ments are necessarilytrue. We can be once it is knownthat thereare numerous
apodeicticallycertainof theirtruth. The exceptionsto thisrule; it is false. This line
scientificprinciples(as distinctfromthe of reasoningfollows,however,only if the
logical and mathematicalprinciples)used statementrelatingpheneticsimilarityand
by the evolutioniststo reconstructphy- recencyof commonancestryis takento be
are not categoricalin form.If it is intendedto be
logeny,like all scientific
principles,
a prioriin thissense. Hence,theyare not a tendencystatement(as it certainlyis),

184
DAVID L. HULL
thena singleexceptiondoes not falsifyit. is biologicallytheirs,it willhave blue eyes.

Even numerousexceptionsare permissible. The inferenceis only inductiveand the
Consequently,if Bigelow still wishes to conclusionfollowsfromthe premiseswith
registeran objectionto evolutionaryrea- only a degreeof certaintyor probability.
soning,he is leftin the unhappyposition As G. G. Simpson(1961) has said:
of arguing (as some philosophershave
"Scientists themselves frequentlyseemed conargued) that the only principlesproperly fused as to the degree and indeed also the kinds
admittedinto the pandectsof scienceare of 'certainty' (actually always probability) that
and conclud- are required or are possible in science."
trueuniversalgeneralizations
have concluded)
ing (as somephilosophers
The moralof theprecedingdiscussionis
that since thereare almost no such gen- that if such empiricists
as Cain are taken
in biology,biologyis almosten- at theirword,then theydo not hold an
eralizations
tirelydevoidof scientificlaws.
empirical view of empirical certainty.
The logic behindsuch a line of reason- Scientistshave a rightto say thattheyare
laws are re- certainof the truthof a particularstateIf scientific
ing is interesting.
strictedto true universalgeneralizations,menteven thoughtheymay findout later
then deductionto the particularcase is that the statementwas false. Any use of
possible and these particularconclusions "certainty"whichmakes it impossiblefor
follownecessarily.If the conclusionturns a scientistto be justifiablycertainof the
out to be falseand the argumentis valid, truthof a statementwhich is later disthenit followsnecessarilythatat least one coveredto be false is a view of certainty
of the premisesis false. Hence, universal inappropriate
to empiricalscience.
are in principleeasilyfalsigeneralizations
It wouldseemunlikelythatthefounders
fiable. Such is not thecase withinferences of numericaltaxonomy,
which
a movement
which are less than relies so heavilyon the use of statistics,
fromgeneralizations
universalin form.Inferencesto particular shouldhold a view of inferencetotallyat
are only moreor less probable variancewiththe foundations
statements
of statistics.
is not so easy. They are Yet, at least in his early writings,Cain
and falsification
falsifiable,but a singleobservationwon't seems to do just this. In his later works,
do it. For example,fromtheuniversalgen- Cain clearlyrevealsan empiricalnotionof
eralizationthat all parentswithblue eyes certainty,for example,in Cain and Harproduceonlyblue-eyedchildren,it can be rison (1960). But in thisverypaper,the
thatif a authorsstate with respectto the recognideducedwithapodeicticcertainty
of tionof convergence,
certainchildis biologicallytheoffspring
"But we have no way
theseparents,it will have blue eyes.6 But of estimatingthese probabilities;even if
thatblue-eyedparents we did, we should obtain only probabilifromthestatements
almostalwaysproduceblue-eyedchildren, ties. . ." It may well be true that presit cannotbe deducedthatif a certainchild ently thereis no way to estimatethese
probabilities,but to say that even if we
6
It should be noted that as is usually the case, did, we shouldobtain onlyprobabilities
is
this universal generalizationhas exceptions and,
oneself an extremeempiricist.
label
to
hence, is not strictlytrue. One way to eliminate
Probabilitiesare all that scientistsever
the obvious exceptionsis to add the phrase "except in cases of mutations,"but if "mutation" is have to go on, probabilitieswhich'somethen definedas it once was as any variation from timesare so highthat theycan be termed
the regularitiesof inheritance,then the law de- certainties.
generatesto a tautologyand is no longer an emPerhaps statementssuch as those cited
piricallaw. In orderto retainits status as an em- are only due to carelessexpression;perpirical law, the generalizationin question must be
haps they reveal a deep-seatedantipathy
such that it is at least logicallypossible for there
possible
to be exceptions. If in point of fact, there are to thekindand degreeof certainty
which
an
antipathy
in
science,
empirical
none, then it is true.

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
IN TAXONOMY
has been traditionally

characteristic
of the
apriorists.Consideringthe importantcontribution
whichCain has madeto taxonomy
by pointingout the dilatoryeffectof the
a priorioutlookin taxonomy,
one hopes it
is the former.However,whenthepointof
contentionis preciselythose issues which
the verbal confusionblur, the resultsare
fatal.
185
Brahe on a single planet, Mars. Later

astronomerschecked his laws for other
planetsin the solar systemand forother
positionsof Mars, but theyalso extended
themto coverall planetsrevolvingaround
all stars. We have littlehope of eververiby
thishypothesis
fyingor evenconfirming
observationformorethanan infinitesimal
portionof thestarsystemsin the universe,
and yet no one wouldwant to call the inEMPIRICAL
CERTAINTY
AND EMPIRICAL
ference unwarrantedor the hypothesis
LAWS
meaningless.
Evolutionarylaws have been devisedon
in mind,we are
With such distinctions
observationsbut
nowin a positionto evaluatetheevolution- the basis of innumerable
ary laws and principleswhichare at the observationswhich have been made priareas of the plant and
heart of the chargeof viciouscircularity. marilyin restricted
portionsof phykingdoms.
Certain
animal
Whenthe criticstermthelaws and princias the farthest
as
inaccessible
logeny
are
ples of evolutionary
theorya priori,what
These
laws have
corners
the
universe.
of
in
mind
is
have
that
evolutheyusually
themfromthe studyof been formulatedon less than total evitionistsformulate
certaingroupsof organismson less than dence, but what is more they have been
total evidencefor those groupsand then foundto be not completelyaccurateeven
extendthemto new groupsforwhichcon- forthosegroupsfromwhichtheyweredefirmatory
observations
have notbeen made rived. Even so, evolutionistsextrapolate
and maynotevenbe possible.Hence,with to othergroupsforwhichlittleor no evihas
respectto theselattergroups,the applica- denceis available. Pheneticsimilarity
found
to
indicator
of
been
be
a
fairly
good
tionof theprinciplesis priorto experience.
in
certain
groups.
relationships
evolutionary
But in this sense all scientificprinciples
are a priori.They go beyondthe evidence Cases are known,however,in whichthisis
use pheat hand. They wouldbe uselessas princi- not true. Even so, evolutionists
forall
phylogeny
netic
similarity
to
infer
ples if theydidn't. This is the sense of a
taxa.
of
ever
verifying
have
little
hope
We
priori used when weightingsgiven to a
by
the correspondence
characterbeforethe taxon has been con- or even confirming
infinitesimal
observation
for
more
than
an
structedare termeda prioriand thoseassignedafterthetaxonhas beenconstructed portionof taxa thathave evolved,and yet
nor the
a posteriori.It is also the senseof a priori the inferenceis not unwarranted,
know
assertion
Evolutionists
meaningless.
used by William Coleman (1964) in his
prois
not
directly
that
similarity
phyletic
bookon Cuvierwhenhe says,"The natural
in
to
cases,
similarity
all
phenetic
portional
systemcan be preparedin two ways: 1.
a posteriori,by directobservation;2. a but it is good enoughfor theirpurposes.
knewthatKepler'slaws were
priori,by the principleof the subordina- Astronomers
accurate, but they were
not
completely
tion of characters."
close
for
their
enough
purposes.What justhisparticularusage
How inappropriate
tifies
inferences
is exactly
evolutionary
is in criticizing
sciencecan be seen in the
what
astronomical
inferencesjustifies
following
example(forthe sake of brevity
only one examplewill be given). Kepler theory.The inductiveleap whichastronoplanetarymotionis
enunciatedhis laws of planetarymotion mersmade concerning
would
whichwere to apply to all the planetsin muchgreaterthanthoseevolutionists
thesolarsystemon thebasis of less thana everthinkof making-and fora verygood
handfulof observationsmade by Tycho reason. Evolutionarytheory,even com-

186
DAVID L. HULL
binedwithmoderngenetictheory,does not tionists is circular stems from several

likethepowerof Newtonian misunderstandings,
the most important
have anything
in both cases concerningthe logic of discovery.What
theory.But thejustification
remainsthe same.
Hennigrefersto as the methodof reciprois nothingnew in science.
The crux of the dispute between the cal illumination
evolutionistsand the empiricistsis the Hypothesesare formedon the basis of exkind and degreeof certaintynecessaryto tremelyinsufficientevidence and then
justifyscientificinferences.Are the in- modifiedin the faceof additionalevidence
ductiveinferences
in or the discernment
of additionalrelationmade by evolutionists
reconstructing
phylogenysufficiently
war- ships in the originalevidence. This proranted? The literature
of hyis fullof arguments cedureis not a verticalconstruction
forand againstthejustification
of particu- pothesison hypothesis.Prejudiceagainst
has been commonin science,
lar phyleticreconstructions;
examplesof hypothesizing
themneedn'tbe reiterated
as hypothehere. The basic expressedsomewhatcryptically
problem-and it is a philosophicproblem ses nonfingoby Newton,one of thegreat-is thejustification
of all time. This prejuof induction.Are in- est hypothesizers
in generaljustifiedand, dice arises in part froma justifiablereductiveinferences
if so, which ones? Philosophershave actionto theexcessesof somescientists
and
arguedthesequestionsat some lengthand philosophers,especially in the scholastic
have attemptedto formulatecalculi to period. But it also seemsto stemfroman
handle inductiveinferenceswithoutover- unjustifiabledesire to make science not
but mistake-proof.
whelming
success. Neitherthesearguments just mistake-free
One
nor the calculi need be presentedhere. of the most carefullyexploredavenuesin
There is a way to decide the issue but a philosophyhas been the unsuccessfulatall experience
in sense
way whichleaves itselfopen to the charge temptto reconstruct
of vicious circularity.Any decision be- data language. The chief advantage of
tween the extremeempiricismsometimes sucha languageis thata simplesensedata
advocated by Cain and perhaps other statementis incorrigible.A personcannot
membersof thenumericalschooland more be mistakenabout his own sense data.
temperate
versionsof empiricism
mustrest Similarly,some taxonomistswant to reon the advances of the various sciences formulatethe purposesof taxonomyuntil
usingthe techniquesof discoveryand jus- thereis nothinganyonecould makea miserectedactificationwhich they do use. Hence, in- take about. Any classification
ductionis justifiedby an induction! The cordingto any objectivecriterion
wouldbe
argumentspresentedby the empiricists "true."
The importantcriticismof evolutionary
against evolutionaryreconstructionsif
soundwouldannihilatenot just evolution- taxonomydoes not, however,concernthe
ary taxonomybut all empiricalscience. logicof discoverybut thelogicof justificaNo empiricalsciencehas everproceededin tion. How highlyconfirmed
mustscientific
the manneradvocatedby the empiricists hypothesesbe to be justified? The criticismhas been formulated
in both extreme
and it seemsunlikelythatit could.
and reasonableversions.W. R. Thompson
CONCLUSION
(1952), althoughhe realizesthat the only
The purposeof this paper has been to way to escape the "Idealist prison"is by
show that the "tangle of circularargu- abandoningthe quest for absolute cerments"referredto in evolutionarytaxon- tainty,arguesthat evolutionary
taxonomy
omyby Sokal and Sneath,once untangled is untenablebecauseits hypotheses
are not
are not circular at all-perhaps unwar- verifiablein the early positivisttradition.
ranted but definitelynot circular. The This extremeversionis reflectedin Cain's
criticismthat the reasoningof the evolu- complaintsthat the inferencesmade by

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
IN TAXONOMY
187
evolutionistsare not infallible,categori- no reasonableman could reject his concally demonstrated

or apodeicticallycer- clusion. Who can say thatthe forelimb
of
tain. To be sure,evolutionists
are not in- the bat was ever anythingbut a wing?
fallible,but it is one of the distinguishingWell,who can say thatthe fluoridation
of
marksof sciencein contrastto orthodox waterhas no seriousside effects,or that
religionthatit does not claim infallibility. smokingis one of themajorcauses of lung
Both of thesemen have also expressed cancer,or that Oswald killed Kennedy?
themselvesmore reasonably. They have Any view of empiricalcertaintywhich
claimedthattheinferences
madeby evolu- makes answersto these questions"guesstionistsin reconstructing
phylogenyare work" is unacceptable.Indeed, continued
not warranted.Sokal and Sneathare com- controversy
in theseareas is a goodindicapletely justified when they warn that tion that many people, includingsome
"taxonomistsoften reason facilely back scientists,
are confusedas to thedegreeand
and forthamong these criteriawithout kindof certainty
thatis requiredor is posstoppingto thinkhow slendertheevidence sible in science.
is on which theirargumentsare based."
In conjunctionwiththeirpredisposition
A decisive settlementof the dispute be- forempiricism
(and perhapseven extreme
tweenevolutionists
and numericaltaxono- empiricism),numericaltaxonomistshave
mistson this point is complicatedby the also advocated making taxonomymore
lack of a definitecriterion
of empiricalcer- quantitativeand objective. Future adtaintyand the factthatphyleticinferences vancesin taxonomycertainlylie in thisdiare not yet couchedin quantitativeterms. rection,but the task is a formidableone
All that can be done in the firstinstance and no easier for pheneticthan phyletic
is to comparethe degreeof certainty
pres- taxonomists.An investigation
of thebiblientin phyleticreconstructions
withthede- ographiesof severalof themajorfiguresin
greeof certainty
presentin othersciences. numericaltaxonomyshowsthat theywere
As faras thestandardsofprobability
estab- workingon the problemof makingphylishedforscienceas a wholeare concerned, letic weightingsquantitativeimmediately
the inferencesmade by the evolutionists beforetheybegan to advocate the abanrate quite highly-evenin the absence of donmentof the methodology
and purposes
fossil evidence. In fact, the previously of evolutionarytaxonomyfor the more
quotedphilosopher,
AbrahamKaplan, uses easily quantifiablemethodsand less amDarwin's line of reasoningwhichled him bitious purposesof numericaltaxonomy.
to concludethat all domesticpigeonsare Perhapsit was the difficulties
whichthey
descendedfromthe rock pigeon Columba encountered
in attempting
to makephyletic
livia as a paradigmof a warrantedinduc- weightings
quantitativewhichled themto
tiveinference.7
It is certainlytruethatall abandon phyleticweightingsand evoluDarwinhad to go on was probabilities,
but tionarytaxonomy,and substitutein their
the weightof evidencewas so strongthat stead "equal weightings,"
one of the basic
7Himmelfarb (1959: 274) shows her ignorance
of inductivelogic when she says, "What Darwin
was doing,in effect,was creatinga 'logic of possibilities.' Unlike conventional logic, where the
compound of possibilitiesresultsnot in a greater
possibility,but in a lesser one, the logic of the
Origin was one in which possibilitieswere assumed to add up to probability." Himmelfarb
undoubtedly has the law of product in mind.
However, this law holds only if the events are
independentand those with which Darwin was
dealing were not. With respect to what Darwin
was doing,Kaplan (1964: 245) says, "The weight

of the evidence for or against a hypothesis,however, by no means depends solely on the frequencies themselves. Other hypothesis already
established may be brought to bear, providing
second-levelprobabilitiesconcerningthe observed
frequencieson the assumptionthat the hypothesis
in questionis false. By thismeans,what Reichenbach has called 'concatenationsof evidence' are
built up; a chain of probable inferencesmay very
well be strongerthan its weakest link, stronger
even than its strongest."

1 Qh
nAA7Tn
T. T-TTTT.T.
principlesof numericaltaxonomy.Later techniques into biological classification

in numericaltaxonomyhave whichnumericaltaxonomists
developments
have fostered
shownthat the maneuverwas to no avail. was long over-due. The title "numerical
As numericaltaxonomistsbegan to de- taxonomist"is complimentary.None of
velop moresophisticated
methodsof treat- the argumentsin this paper should be
ingstatisticalcovarianceofproperties,
they takenas criticizing
theseaccomplishments.
came to realize that if theywere to mea- What has been at issue are some of their
sure on various scales and yet keep all negativetheses; for example,the thesis
propertiesof equal weight,certaintrans- that since phylogenyis "unknowable,"it
formationswould have to be employed. shouldplay no part in the construction
of
They too have come to practicea typeof a classification(althoughinferencesto it
"weighting."Althoughtheweighting
prac- afterwards
are all right)or the claim that
ticed by the numericaltaxonomistsis in- phyleticweightings
are intrinsically
"subtendedto accomplishvery different
ends jective." The title "phenetictaxonomist"
fromthat of the evolutionists,
the meth- is not complimentary.
In recognitionof
odologicalproblemsare thesame. The de- the methodologicalproblemswhich they
cisionto use a logarithmic
ratherthan an sharewith the evolutionists
and fromthe
arithmetictransformation,
forexample,is secure place which their techniquesnow
no morequantitative,objective,etc. than hold in taxonomy,
perhapsnumericaltaxcomparabledecisionsmadeby evolutionists onomistsmightprofitably
re-evaluatesome
in phyleticweighting.The abandonment of their early criticismsof evolutionary
of the purposesof evolutionary
taxonomy taxonomy,
includingthecriticism
thatit is
has servedonlyto delay the need to solve viciouslycircular.
the problemsof weighting.
SUMMARY
There need be no differences
in meth'odologybetweenthe evolutionists
and the
Certain lines of reasoningcommonin
pheneticists(or numericaltaxonomists). evolutionarytaxonomyhave been termed
The basic difference
betweenthemis a de- viciouslycircular. They are quite obvicision as to the purposes of taxonomy. ously not logicallycircular.They do give
Evolutionistswant to make use of both the superficialappearanceof epistemologievolutionarytheoryand moderngenetic cal circularity.
This appearancearisesfrom
theoryin constructing
theirclassifications. the method of successive approximation
Numericaltaxonomists
wantto limitthem- used by evolutionarytaxonomists.It is
selves to just genetictheory.The methargued that this methodis not epistemoodologicalarguments
whichthe numerical
logicallycircular,even whenthe only evitaxonomistshave offeredto justifytheir
has to go on is
preferenceare of a dubious nature. The dence that the taxonomist
of
the
phenetic
similarity
contemporary
insistenceof many contemporary
taxonoThe
criticism
of evoluforms.
important
mists(and notjust numericaltaxonomists)
in
that
the abis
rather
tionary
taxonomy
on the use of certaintechniques,
especially
advanced mathematics,
and a determina- senceof fossilevidencephyleticreconstruction to get somewhere,
thoughadmirable tionsare not warranted.It is arguedthat
in themselves,
are reminiscent
of what in this charge stems initially froma misof thekindof certainty
philosophyhas been called the "hup, two, understanding
posthreeschool." (Kaplan, 1964.) There is sible in empiricalscience. Whenthiscritinothingwrongwitheitherof thesedesires, cism is couch'edin appropriateterms,it
but it shouldbe keptin mindthatneither may be seen to have some force. Many
requiresthe abandonment
of the purposes phyleticinferences
are not as warrantedas
of evolutionary
taxonomy.
one mightwish. However,thereis a great
The introductionof the mathematical deal of difference
betweenarguingthat a

CERTAINTY
AND CIRCULARITY
line of reasoningis unwarranted

and arguing thatit is viciouslycircular.
CITED
LITERATURE
GUSTAV. 1954. Sense and nonsense
BERGMANN,
in operationism.In Philipp Frank [Ed.], The
validation of scientifictheories. The Beacon
Press, Boston. 96 p.
. 1956. The contributionsof John B. Watson. Psych. Review 63: 265-276.
BIGELOW,R. S. 1956. Monophyletic classification and evolution. SystematicZool. 5: 145146.
. 1958. Classificationand phylogeny. SystematicZool. 7: 49-59.
. 1959. Similarity,ancestry,and scientific
principles. Systematic Zool. 8: 165-168.
P. W. 1954. The present status of
BRIDGMAN,
operationism. In Philipp Frank [Ed.], The
validation of scientifictheories. The Beacon
Press, Boston. 96 p.
CAIN, A. J. 1958. Logic and memory in Linnaeus's systemof taxonomy. Proc. Linn. Soc.
London, 169 session, 144-163.
. 1959a. Deductive and inductive methods
in post-Linnaean taxonomy. Proc. Linn. Soc.
London, 179th session, 144-163.
* 1959b. The post-Linnaeandevelopmentof
taxonomy. Proc. Linn. Soc. London, 170th
session, 234-244.
. 1962a. The evolution of taxonomic principles. In G. G. Ainsworthand P. H. A. Sneath
[Eds.], Microbial classification. The Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge. 483 p.
1962b. Zoological classification. Aslib
Proc. 14: 226-230.
CAIN, A. J., AND G. A. HARRISON. 1958. An
analysis of the taxonomist'sjudgment of affinity. Proc. Zool. Soc. London 131: 85-98.
1960. Phyletic weighting. Proc. Zool.
Soc. London 135: 1-31.
CAWS,PETER. 1965. The philosophyof science.
D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., Princeton. 354 p.
1964. Georges Cuvier:
COLEMAN, WILLIAM.
zoologist. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 212 p.
DARWIN,CHARLES. 1966. On the origin of species, a facsimile of the first edition (1859).
Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge. 502 p.
ALVAR. 1957. The Darwinian theory
ELLEGARD,
and nineteenthcenturyphilosophiesof science.
Jour. Hist. Ideas 18: 362-393.
IN TAXONOMY
189
M. T. 1966a. An application of the

theory of definitionto systematicprinciples.
SystematicZool. 15: 127-130.
. 1966b. On psychologismin the logic of
taxonomiccontroversies.SystematicZool. 15:
207-215.
HENNIG, W. 1950. Grundsiigeeiner Theorie der
phylogenetischenSystematik. Deutsch. Zentralverl.,Berlin. 370 p.
HIMMELFARB,
GERTRUDE.
1959. Darwin and the
Darwinian revolution. Doubleday and Co.
Ltd., New York. 422 p.
HULL, D. L. 1964. Consistencyand monophyly.
SystematicZool. 13: 1-11.
. 1965. The effectof essentialismon taxonomy. Brit. Jour.Phil. Sci. 15: 314-326 and
16: 1-18.
JENKIN, FLEEMING.
1867. The originof species.
North Brit. Review, 46: 149-171.
KAPLAN, ABRAHAM.
1964. The conduct of inquiry. Chandler Publishing Co., San Francisco. 428 p.
MAYR, E. 1959. Agassiz, Darwin and evolution.
Harvard Library Bulletin 13: 165-194.
OWEN, RICHARD.
1860. Darwin on the origin
of species. Edinburgh Review 3: 487-532.
REMANE, A. 1956. Die Grundlagen des natiirlichen Systemes,der vergleichendenAnatomie
und der Phylogenetic. Akademische Verlagsges. Geest und Portig, Leipzig. 364 p.
ROMANES, G. J. 1892. Darwin, and after Darwin. The Open Court PublishingCo., Chicago.
460 p.
SACHS, JULIUS VON.
1890. History of botany
(1530-1860). English transl. by H. E. F.
Garnsey and I. B. Balfour. Clarendon Press,
Oxford. 586 p.
SATTLER, ROLF.
1963. Methodological problems
in taxonomy. SystematicZool. 13: 19-27.
1961. The key property of
SCRIVEN, M. J.
physical laws-inaccuracy. In Current issues
in the philosophy of science, edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell. Holt, Rinehart and Winston,New York. 484 p.
G. G. 1961. Principles of animal
SIMPSON,
taxonomy. Columbia UniversityPress, New
York. 247 p.
1963. PrinSOKAL, R. G., AND P. H. A. SNEATH.
ciples of numerical taxonomy. W. H. Freeman and Co., San Francisco. 359 p.
THOMPSON,
W. R. 1952. The philosophical
foundationsof systematics. Canad. Entomol.
84: 1-16.
GHISELIN,


Certainty and Circularity in Evolutionary Taxonomy - by David L. Hull. Evolution, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1967)

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Certainty and Circularity in Evolutionary Taxonomy - by David L. Hull. Evolution, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1967)

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Author(s): David L. Hull

This content downloaded from 142.51.1.212 on Mon, 21 Jul 2014 17:05:49 PM