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Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any
evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm:
"The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
ERMITA-M ALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS. M AYOR OF M ANILA
[20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967]
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of
its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general
manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who
was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to
enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection
of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
city authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13,
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance
were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of
Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels. it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of
Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
Issue:
Facts:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional,
therefore, null and void.
Held:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought
to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation
of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an
ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to
be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind
of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying
for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of said ordinance.
have already taken their oath and have assumed office. Petitioners contend
that such Resolution is null and void because they were not accorded due
notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the due process
principle.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the
Constitution.
Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation
or the effects thereof without notice and hearing.
Held:
Held:
It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00
pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not
only for the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an
employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion
and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is
regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment
of a
sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial
of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not
obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot
be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City
Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.
medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was
enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty,
the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power
of the state.
Facts:
Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election
among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a
supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among
the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the
PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to
represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein
agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the
amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and
directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory,
professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses,
midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a
decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the
appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied;
hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the
DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held:
There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial
proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and
notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be
left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases.
The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines
so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to
benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive
a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him
the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat
analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the
action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement
of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully
method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly
say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally
drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
Held:
Facts:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible
under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact
Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal
board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following:
xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for
the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid
disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of
laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more
familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance
invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the
guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property
rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its
operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they
belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without
exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with
the ordinance. The obvious objection for the implementation of the
ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an
additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected
by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words
in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a
receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if
private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss
will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not
sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The
very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the
public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first
instance of Manila, with a violation of Act 2972, which provides that (Section
1) it shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation
engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit
in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account
books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He
was arrested, his books were seized, and the trial was about to proceed,
when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, on their own behalf, and on
behalf of all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines, filed the petition
against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and the collector of
internal revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge
presiding.
Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of
its taxpayers to keep proper records of their business transactions in English
or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an adequate measure of what is due
from them in meeting the cost of government can be had. But we are clearly
of opinion that it is not within the police power of the Philippine Legislature,
because it would be oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese
merchants from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese language, and in
the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from keeping advised of the
status of their business and directing its conduct.
Held:
A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an
appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the
Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in
Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in
gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully
as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent
any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner
and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the
firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had
not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner
was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his
right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully
given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not
informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless
search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized
during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the
petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set
aside.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the
private respondent the winner in the election.
Held:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they
will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise
they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance
with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans
for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made
and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are
not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of
rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than
quasi-legislative. But respondents contention that notice and hearing are not
required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the
Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon
notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon
proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or
saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to
make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order
be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of
respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
(6)
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.
[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]
(7)
Facts:
A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was
summarily closed on grounds of national security. The radio station was
allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that
they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual
evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station
violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a
decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were
sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in
pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic,
(because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the
case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative
tribunals in matters as this case.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right
of Freedom of Expression.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of
Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms
of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right.
Although the government still has the right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the
limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule. If
in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this
danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it.
However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or
signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public
affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people
continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast
media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the
most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the
the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
Held:
The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void.
The absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary
requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine
should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang
Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Issue:
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present
one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented
at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the
case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from
dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the
charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was
requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation
of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the
students was ordered.
Issue:
Held:
There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due
process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled
out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the
instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and
the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students
have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from
Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.