Paper number: F965

Assess the view that the main reason for the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 was Wellingtons
leadership. [40] (2726 words)

There are numerous different interpretations by historians as to why Napoleon lost the battle of
Waterloo in 1815. Historians supporting him claim that Napoleon had in fact won Waterloo by
splitting Wellington and Bluchers armies and that it was purely down to his subordinates that his
plans were not carried out properly. Other pro Napoleonic historians argue that he could have won
the battle had it not been his ill health on the battlefield. British supporters claim that the defeat of
France at Waterloo was solely down to the tactical genius of Wellington, and the way in which he
united his polyglot army. On the other hand, critics of Wellington suggest that it was down to
alternative factors that Wellington did not control, such as the Prussian army, the weather and pure
luck. I believe the most important factor leading to the downfall of Napoleon at Waterloo to be the
intervention of the Prussians.
Wellingtons leadership was clearly important. Jac Weller and David Chandler assert that Wellington
was a superb organiser, as he was always close to the point of maximum crisis1 2. Their analysis of
Wellingtons military capabilities is supported by primary evidence. Using evidence from military
units during the war, Andrew Roberts highlights that commanders of the opposing French army, Soult
and Foy, were quoted subtly praising Wellingtons ability to command and control army during
battle3 4. However, what both these sources fail to address is what Roberts claims to be as two crucial
mistakes that Wellington made. On the 18th June, Wellington placed too many troops on the right
flank, leaving the right flank vulnerable5 and also meant that there were around 17,000 troops on the
right flank that never actually fought in the battle. The other mistake he made during the battles at
Ligny and Quatre Bras was allowing himself and his allies to be split in two, which put repeated strain
on both halves of the army until they managed to regroup later on.6 Lord Montgomery of Alamein, a
modern British general and historian, suggests that Wellington had only himself to blame7 for the
split that occurred at Ligny. Both these historians assert that is was down to Wellingtons poor
planning and execution, and therefore highlights a crucial misunderstanding of Wellingtons
leadership capabilities by Weller and Chandler. Weller seems to completely avoid the topic of
Wellington making any mistakes, not acknowledging any failures that may have been made by him.
Peter Hofschroer also argues that in hindsight Wellington over-emphasised his own role through
projecting an overly positive image of his victory at Waterloo8. This was most probably due to
Wellington representative of Britain to the rest of Europe, and also because he wanted to improve his
self image back at home, as any general would want to do.

Jac Weller notes.

The Campaigns of Napoleon David Chandler p1084
3
Who was Who at Waterloo: A Biography of the Battle - Christopher Summerville Page 143
4
Napoleon and Wellington - Andrew Roberts introduction
5
Napoleon and Wellington: The Battle of Waterloo Andrew Roberts p154
6
The Royal Green Jackets - Christopher Wilkinson-Latham p13
7
A concise history of warfare Lord Montgomery of Alamein p234
8
While an objective analysis of Wellingtons role and achievements in this campaign show it not to
have been his finest hour
2

Paper number: F965

The next element this essay will consider was the balancing of the number of troops by the Prussians.
The most important factor for the defeat of Napoleon was the intervention of the Prussians.
Clauswitz, a contemporary Prussian military analyst, states that without the intervention of the
Prussians, Wellington would have been severely outnumbered by up to 38,000 men9 and would have
been beaten at Waterloo just on numbers. Immediately after the battle, Wellington himself also
attributes the successful result of Waterloo to the timely assistance provided by the Prussians10.
Beatrice Heuser, although a Prussian analyst, describes Clauswitz, as someone who provides an
unbiased examination of modern military history 11 . Further, it is also widely accepted that
Wellington was significantly outnumbered without the Prussians, (this was made explicit by Col
Lanning, a historian currently serving in the British Army12). However, it must be addressed that
although Wellington does attribute his success to the Prussians, in his memoirs a number of years
later renounces the role of the Prussians. This is most probably to do with trying to create some sort
of Waterloo myth that tries to exclude the Prussians from British history to make Britain appear
more dominant across Europe.
However Hibbert and Chandler, both cynics of the Prussian intervention during Waterloo, argue that
the choice of Prussian leadership was extremely limited with Blucher being the only possible
choice 13 and the quality of army was extremely poor - he compared it to worm eaten
woodbehind shimmer polish14. This does suggest that the Prussian army, although numerically
balancing the allied troops against Napoleon, were not of sufficient quality to execute orders
effectively and were piecemeal in their organisation and ability. Hibbert continues to claim that
Blucher had no experience and littleknowledgeof strategy [and] tactics. This view does
appear to be over cynical, but a primary source from General Muffling of the Prussian army also
confirms this view, stating that Blucher knew nothing at all about leading an army15 which suggests
that both Chandler and Hibbert are correct in stating that the Prussian army was poor. At Waterloo,
the British had also defeated the best of Napoleons soldiers - the Imperial Guard, which had been
the hardest challenge of the battle. However the Prussians clearly played and important part in the
battle; The Kaiser of Prussia further backs this point by saying that Wellington would have been
hopelessly cut to pieces and that the Prussians arrived in the nick of time to save a stupid English
commander from annihilation16
It must be remembered that Wellington drew up his battle plan on the assumption that the Prussians
would be part of the battle, and therefore the plan involved complete dependence on Blucher and
his army. It can be deduced that the only reason Wellington fought at Waterloo was because he was
assured that the Prussians would intervene. The Prussians subsequently did intervene, and in my
opinion were the only reason that Wellingtons army was able to hang on is due to the Prussian
diversion of Napoleons reserves at Placenoit almost in the rear of the French Army 17
Weighing up both sets of sources, I believe that the Prussians were definitely needed by Wellington,
and more importantly were the tipping factor for the main reason for the defeat of Napoleon at
Waterloo. Furthermore the victory was a decisive one because of the pressure of the Prussian pursuit
of the French all the way to Paris.
9

On Waterloo Clauswitz p161

The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington: Volume 8 Arthur Wellington. I should
not do justice to my own feeling of to Marshal Blucher and the Prussian Army if I did not attribute the
successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance that I received from them
11
Reading Clausewitz Beatrice Heuser p79
12
The Military 100 Lt. Col. Lanning p91
13
Waterloo: Napoleons Last Campaign Christopher Hibbert p127
10

15
16

Waterloo: Napoleons Last Campaign Christopher Hibbert p128

New York Times June 13 1915

17

A Selection from the Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon D. A. Bingham

Paper number: F965

Another reason Napoleon lost was the weather because it caused him to critically delay the French
attack. Barry OMeara states, the weather was dreadful18. All these acknowledge that there was
bad weather on the day of the battle, however Jomini further states that the artillery could not pass
over *the causeway+19 which Redway explains as the reason why Napoleon was unable to carry out
the preliminary bombardment by his favourite 12 pounders20 This would explain Napoleons
inability to carry out his original plan of attack at 8am in the morning, with the plan being executed
nearer to 11am when he launched his attack. Napoleon claimed that had if the weather had allowed
the French army to attack at 4AM the Anglo-Dutch army would have been cut up, dispersed and
defeated21
Mark Adkin even notes that when Napoleon did decide to attack the cavalry charges took place at a
canter rather than a gallop22 which would have severely disrupted the speed of execution that
Napoleon wanted to achieve.
However Wellington, in a letter to Duc de Berry, seemed to think that even the poor weather would
not have stopped the Napoleon, and that he was still going to attack regardless of the weather23. This
suggests that Napoleon could well have attacked on the day, and chose not to out of lethargy or
possibly illness. Jomini also disagrees with Napoleons decision to delay the attack*Napoleon and I]
cannot share this opinion *delaying the attack+nothing then prevented him from making the new
effort at 9AM24 this insinuates that there may have been a plan B that Napoleon could have executed
(denoted by the new effort). This means it could be a pointer towards Napoleons ill health i or
lethargy.
Although OMeara, Redway and Adkin do present strong evidence to suggest that the weather was a
main reason for the delay of commencing battle, however the fact that one of Napoleons own
subordinates claims that there was a plan B suggests that Napoleon held off for other reasons,
possibly being scared of an impending defeat. A more likely explanation could be explained by further
scientific analysis of the battle points out that fields of rye that had been soaked by the rain. Due to
the heights it grew to, around 1.5m during that time of the year, it meant keeping gunpowder dry for
the muskets was nigh on impossible25, which could have led to Napoleons reluctance to delay the
battle until at least the rye had dried.
Nevertheless his delay, whatever the cause, led to other repercussions; in particular it meant that the
Prussians had enough time to which eventually led to Napoleons defeat.
Overall, from whichever side you look at it, cynic or sympathiser, it is clear that the weather was very
much a hindering factor on the day of the battle. Without dry gun powder for the muskets and the
canons getting stuck in the mud, Napoleon was not able to carry out his initial admirable26 plan.
This does show that although weather could be interpreted as a main factor for Napoleons defeat, it
was actually only the tipping factor in Napoleons defeat with the crux of the defeat down to the
Prussian intervention.

18

Historical Memoirs Book 9 Barry Edward OMeara p.114

Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo Antoine Henri de Jomini p158
20
Wellington and Waterloo Redway p76
21
Napoleon and Wellington: The battle of Waterloo p222
22
The Waterloo Companion: The Complete Guide to History's Most Famous Land Battle Mark Adkin
p231
19

23

A Voice from Waterloo: A History of the Battle Fought on the 18th June 1815 Edward Cotton

24

The Campaign of Waterloo General Baron de Jomini p158

(https://ia700502.us.archive.org/13/items/politicalmilitar00jomiuoft/politicalmilitar00jomiuoft.pdf)
25
26

not sure if I should attribute the idea? http://tinyurl.com/ndm8523

Wellington at Waterloo Weller p188

Paper number: F965

Paper number: F965

Another reason for his defeat was Napoleons inadequate. This involved the appointment of Marshal
Ney and Marshal Grouchy who were viewed as unfit for leading troops into battle, and sacrificing
Davout, arguably the best general that Napoleon had, because he could trust the leadership of Paris
with no one else27. This hugely compromised the quality of the French leadership at Waterloo.
Will and Ariel Durant argue that Ney was extremely wary of going straight into battles and although
considered bravest of the brave was incapable of carrying out timely orders made by Napoleon28.
The orders he did carry out were done so, poorly. Chandler claims he *threw+ away the cavalry29 at
Waterloo when Napoleon went to fight his battle at Planchenoit rather than holding them back for a
strategic attack.
Similarly Chandler argues that Grouchy was in no position to lead the right flank due to him being a
cavalry officer and had virtually no skill in leading troops30, and was not a patch on Napoleons
strategic genius.
As a result the two marshals solely relied on Napoleon being the command centre of the attack at
Waterloo co-ordinating every little movement. This meant that if anything unexpected happened
during battle, then Napoleon had to send a message back to his subordinates with changes in battle
plan and the subordinates were basically puppets. Napoleon himself also blames Ney and Grouchy
heavily in his memoirs31 Napoleon further asserts that, had Grouchy decided to pursue the Prussians,
he could have caught up with them before they met with Wellington. His literal interpretation of
Napoleons order meant that he sent his troups towards Corbaix. This decision ultimately proved the
ruin of Napoleons chances of victory at Waterloo32
However, Clauswitz argues that Ney failed to achieve victory at Quatre Bras, because of Napoleons
unclear orders, that the odds were stacked against Ney during Waterloo the result would always
have been [very unequal]33. Ney corroborates this statement by saying that Napoleon often gave
vague and ambiguous orders because if anything went wrong he could easily throw the blame upon
some of his lieutenants.34 Furthermore, Napoleons accusation does not stack up with Allan Douglas
opinion of Ney being consistently lauded by his superiors35
Similarly, Grouchy misinterpreted Napoleons orders (this possibly links with Napoleons very unclear
orders) and supposedly carried them out wrong. Clauswitz takes very much an objective view on the
battle of Waterloo, without any bias which is why many historians view him as a credible historian.
Douglas, although presenting some arguments that could be deemed anti-Napoleon has a strong
amount of primary evidence to support his assertion that Ney was an exceptional general. All of this
suggests that Napoleon himself should have taken responsibility for the failings of his subordinates,
because of his extremely poor communication, and the way in which his army was structured.

27

Napoleon and Waterloo A. F. Becke p36

The age of Napoleon Will and Ariel Durant p743
29
The campaigns of Napoleon Chandler p1092
30
The campaigns of Napoleon Chandler p1092
31
Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, Volume 4 - Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne p135
32
The campaigns of Napoleon Chandler p1072
33
On Waterloo Clauswitz p130
34
Historic doubts as to the execution of marshal ney James Weston p41
35
Member's Bulletin, Napoleonic Society of America Allan Douglas p12-15
28

Paper number: F965

In summary it is clear that the most important reason for the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo was the
arrival of the Prussian forces during the Battle of Waterloo. The argument hinges on whether or not
Wellington needed them at the battle in order to win, and the answer to that is yes. Wellington
planned the whole battle around the Prussians arriving, which suggests that his victory rested on
their arrival. Another crucial quote to note is Wellingtons gratitude to the Prussians immediately
after the battle. The reason for this change over time would have been inevitably to do with the
reputation of the British, and also the bigging up of Britains ego post the Napoleonic wars.
Weather, although a significant factor in the delay of attack for Napoleon, would have only been a
tipping point, and not the pressing reason for his defeat

Paper number: F965

FOOTNOTE 1: Jac Weller notes that before Waterloo Wellington was considered to be one of
the best generals at fighting, logistics and getting the most fromstrange lands whilst also
possessing great talents in organizing and integrating (Wellington at Waterloo Jac Weller
p30) He had proved himself to be an extremely capable general during the six years of war in
Spain, Southern France and Portugal. Wellers view is also supported by Cowley who said that
his instincts, his charisma, his judgment and composure under fire, his determination and
focus, his courage and confidence made him a worthy opponent of Napoleon and his
marshalls (The readers companion to military history p515)

It is stated by James Kemble that on the night of the 17 th, Napoleon did suffer from haemorrhoidsi
which would have dramatically affected the way he led his army on the 18 th and that his ill health
may well have *been the reason that+ cost him the dayi However the problem with Kembles analysis
is that he does include witnesses who saw him on the day. Roberts articulates, at no period of his
life did the emperor display more energyi Roberts analysis of Napoleons illness is based on both
the medical report released by Napoleons doctor as well as many accounts of Napoleons activities
on the 18th. J. Holland Rose also corroborates Roberts claim by saying that Napoleon was in his
usual healthi
The claim of Napoleons ill health was undoubtedly a cover-up for French sympathisers as to why
Napoleon lost, and Roberts states it Cannot blamed for his failure to attack Wellington that
morningi By claiming ill health, it does not tarnish Napoleons military record, and tries to justify ill
health as the reason for defeat.