PEOPLE V.

PONDIVIDA
G.R. NO. 188969, FEBRUARY 27, 2013
SERENO, C.J.;
FACTS:
Accused John Alvin Pondivida, alias Scarface,was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. Accused-appellant Pondivida on the evening of 8 July 2005, went with Glen Alvarico and George
Reyes to the house of Gener Bondoc; and he knocked on the door and he and his companions were able to enter
the house; and both Glen Alvarico and George Reyes shot the victim.
The accused contended the insufficiency of the evidence presented to convict them of the said crime beyond
reasonable doubt. They alleged that Rodelyn Buenavistas failure to witness the actual shooting constituted
reasonable doubt of their guilt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING: YES.
His admissions place him at the scene of the crime and confirm that he was with Reyes and Alvarico when they
shot the victim. The RTC may still take cognizance of Rodelyns eyewitness testimony on all the events, except
the actual shooting, and properly appreciate it as positive identification through circumstantial evidence.
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct
evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no
eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome
the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification in People v. Gallarde, to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the
victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
x x x. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as
an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last
seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together
with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion,
which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are
the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then
nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be
no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd,
because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court
may
draw
its
conclusion
and
finding
of
guilt.
Thus, while witness Rodelyn admittedly failed to see the actual shooting, her account properly falls under the
second type of positive identification described above. To require her positive identification of accusedappellant as the actual shooter is absurd. She last witnessed her common-law husband held at gunpoint in their
own house by the accused and his companions, a fact admitted by accused-appellant himself. Direct evidence is
not the only means to prove commission of the crime.

SENADOR V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 201620 March 6, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged with the crime of Estafa. Accused, having obtained and
received from one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of
P705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the same on consignment basis with express obligation to account for
and remit the entire proceeds of the sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time
and despite repeated demands therefor fail to remit proceeds of the sale of said items or to return any of the
items that may have been unsold to said Cynthia Jaime but instead converted the same to his/her own use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia Jaime in the aforementioned amount of P705,685.00.
Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the prosecution, and instead,
she relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven and established during
the trial differ. In particular, Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information
is not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador, the private
complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private
complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness. Hence,
citing People v. Uba, et al. (Uba) and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy), Senador would
insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against her has been violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING: YES.
What is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the information. Thus,
in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the
Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by
which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described
with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is
thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or
information and the record.
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been described in the
complaint with sufficient certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall
be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right
of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar to the instant
case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which
he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act
was to the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which
suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was
described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged. In the

instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the
check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever
Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information."
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against property, if the subject
matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in
Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the
acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic property.
Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total
amount of P705,685.00." The charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt
Agreement24 signed by Senador and presented during trial, which enumerates these "various kinds of jewelry
valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685,"

PEOPLE V. VILLAREAL
G.R. NO. 201363

MARCH 18, 2013

PERLAS- BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Nazareno Villareal Lualhati was convicted for the violation of Sec. 11 Art. II of RA. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. He was apprehended
by a Police officer while holding and scrutinizing in his hands a plastic sashet of shabu, andescaped quickly
with the help of a tricycle driver.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING: YES.
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his
presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery
substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected
numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in
appellants hands was indeed shabu.
In fine, appellants acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared
to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient
to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 above-quoted. Probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellants case.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu
is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal
liability.