THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS1

BY JOHNPASSMORE

One restrictionon the absolutismof man's rule over Nature is now

generallyaccepted:moralphilosophersand publicopinionagreethat it
is morallyimpermissibleto be cruel to animals.And by this they mean
not only that it is wrong to enjoy torturing animals-which few
moralistswouldever have wishedexplicitlyto deny, howeverlittle emphasis they might have placed on cruelty to animals in their moral
teaching-but that it is wrong to cause them to sufferunnecessarily.
"The Puritan," Macaulay once wrote with condemnatory intent,
"hatedbear-baiting,not becauseit gave painto the bear,but becauseit
gave pleasureto the spectators."2In other words, what they hatedand by no meansperversely-was the enjoymentof animalsuffering;to
the mere fact that the bearssufferedas a consequenceof humanaction
they wereindifferent.That, on the whole,is the Christiantradition.But
now the situation has changed;not only cruelty-the enjoyment of
animalsuffering-but callousness,indifferenceto animalsuffering,not
taking it into account in decidinghow one ought to act, is morally
condemned.3
Controversiesno doubt remain.But they now turnaroundthe question what is to count as "making animals suffer unnecessarily,"
whether, for example, vivisectionor fox-huntingare, in these terms,
morallyjustifiable.By looking in some detail at the way in whichthe
general moral principlethat it is wrong to act callouslyhas gradually
won acceptance, we can hope to see revealed,first, how reluctantly
Westernman has acceptedany restrictionwhatsoeveron his supposed
right to deal as he pleases with Nature and, secondly,how changesin
his moraloutlookhaveneverthelesscome about.
The Old Testament did not leave men totally withoutguidancein
theirtreatmentof animals.The Hebrewsweretold, for example,not to
"seethe a kid in his mother'smilk" and not to "muzzlethe ox whenhe
treadeth out the corn."4 But these somewhat outre prohibitions,as
lAn occasional sentence in this paper also appears in my Man's Responsibility for
Nature (London, 1974).
2Thomas Macaulay, History of England (London, 1850), I, ch. 2, 161.
3The distinction between cruelty and callousness, here suggested, does not conform
to ordinary usage which includes under the head of "cruelty" both indifference to and
enjoyment of suffering. In the argument that follows, this usage will sometimes be
adopted. But at other points it leads to the confusion of issues, and I shall have to distinguish, as I have just done, between enjoyment (cruelty) and indifference (callousness).
4Exodus 23:19; Deuteronomy 25:4.
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JOHN PASSMORE

Maimonides and Aquinas suspected and modern scholarship has

confirmed,weredirectedagainstheathenmagicalpracticesratherthan
against cruelty or callousnessas such.5As for the other familiarOld
Testamentprohibitions,they sometimesrest on the fact that asses and
oxen were a valuableform of property,just as whenLukereportsJesus
as askingthe Jews "Whichof you shallhavean ass or an ox falleninto a
pit, andwillnot straightwaypullhim out on the Sabbathday?"he is not
suggestingthat they will breakthe Sabbathto relieveanimalsuffering,
but that they will do so to retrievetheir property.6In other cases they
reflect a superstitiousfear of sheddingblood. So one must not exaggerate, as some interpretershave been tempted to do, the degree to
which the Old Testament condemns callousness. Its total effect,
however, is certainly not one of complete indifferenceto animal
suffering.
Paul, however,refusesto interpretliterallyany Biblicalpreceptsrelating to the treatmentof animals."Doth God," he rhetoricallyasked,
"take care of oxen?"Whenmen are told not to muzzlethe mouthof the
ox, this, Paul is confident,is meant metaphorically,as a way of telling
men that "he that plowethshouldplow in hope."7Nor does Paul stand
alone. In his commentaryon Psalm 104, Augustineafter quotingwith
approvalPaul's"Doth God take care of oxen?"carrieshis habitof allegorical interpretationso far as completelyto.disguisethe characterof
that psalm as a hymn to God's providentialgovernmentof Nature.
("Theearth,"for example,becomesin Augustine'sinterpretation,"the
Church.")8The preceptnot to seethe a kid in its mother'smilkAugustine understandsas a prefiguringof Christ.9In short, God, as understood by Augustine,is quite unconcernedabout man's treatment of
Nature;all God cares aboutis man'srelationto God andhis Church.
Augustine was particularlyconcerned lest Christians should be
temptedby the Manichaeandoctrinethat it is wrongto kill andeat animals. He had been a Manichaeanhimself and knewits attractions.As
is so often trueof vegetarianism,Manichaeanvegetarianismrestedon a
complex religioussystem. The divinepart of the world, so the Man"Moses Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed (Part III, ch. 48) and the commentary
by David Bourke and Arthur Littledale to their translation of Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 29, The Old Law (la 2ae, 98-105), question 102, article 6, p. 225.
7I Corinthians 9:10-11.
6Luke 14:5.
8Expositions on the Book of Psalms, trans. by members of the English Church (Oxford, 1853), V, 85.
9Aurelii Augustini Opera, Pars V: Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, Liber Secundus,
Quaest. Exodi, XC, 23, 19 in Corpus Christianorum, XXXIII, 114-15 (Turnhout,
1958). On the whole theme of Christian attitudes to animals: Edward Westermarck,
Christianity and Morals ch. XIX, and C. W. Hume, The Status of Animals in the
Christian Religion (London, 1956).

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ichaeanstaught, was constantlybeingreleasedfrom the soil. It enters

thence into plants in virtueof the fact that they have their roots in the
soil.10Animals eat the plants, but in the process defilethe divineingredients the plants contain-inevitably so, on Manichaeanprinciples,
since animalsare born as a resultof the supremelydefilingact of sexual
intercourse.Holy men, spiritualizedby prayer, celibacy, and fasting,
can extract divinityin its pure form from plants whereas even their
holinesscouldnot abatethe corruptioninherentin animalbodies."
In the course of attackingthe ManichaeansAugustinewas led to
make a quitegeneralpoint about man's treatmentof animals."Christ
Himself,"he writes, "shows that to refrainfrom the killingof animals
and the destroyingof plants is the height of superstitionfor, judging
that there are no common rights betweenus and the beasts and trees,
he sent the devilsinto a herdof swineandwith a cursewitheredthe tree
on whichhe foundno fruit.""Surely,"Augustinecontinues,"the swine
had not sinned, nor had the tree." Animals, that is, have no rights.
Christ, who might simply have destroyedthe possessingdevils, chose
ratherto transferthem to swine in order to make that fact perfectly
clear to men. At anotherpoint Augustinetells us that animalsuffering
means little or nothing to human beings. "We can perceive by their
cries," he writes, "that animalsdie in pain, althoughwe make little of
this since the beast, lacking a rational soul, is not related to us by a
common nature."12Since beasts lack reason, that is, we need not concern ourselveswith their sufferings.And this, too, is why they have no
rights.
The source of these Augustinianteachingsis certainlynot the Old
Testament,accordingto whichanimalsand men sharea commonprinciple of life (nebesh). For the author of Ecclesiastes, indeed, "that
which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleththem; as the one dieth, so dieth the other;yea, they have all one
breadth;so that a man hath no preeminenceabove a beast."13And if
Ecclesiastesis a hardnut for orthodoxyto crack-it is nowherequoted
in the New Testament-there is nothingnovel, from an Old Testament
point of view, in its suggestionthat man and beast share"one breath,"
?1Thisview-that the soil is the source of all goodness-persists in Europeanand
Americanthinking.Jefferson(Notes on the State of Virginia,QueryXIX) was convincedthat "thosewho labourin the earthare the chosenpeopleof God."Or compare
P. W. Foxburgh'sThe Natural Thing(New York, 1953):"The land is good, in fact
good beyondquestionandit is good to live on the landandworkit" (24). Thegoodness
of virginsoil is oftentakenfor granted,withdisastrousagriculturalconsequences.
"Augustine,The Catholicand ManichaeanWaysof Life, trans. D. A. Gallagher
andI. J. Gallagher(Washington,1966),ch. XV, 91.
ch. XVII, 102and 105.
21Ibid.,
3Ecclesiastes3:19.

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JOHN PASSMORE

one soul, one principleof life. In the New Testament, too, all living
thingsare representedas possessingapsyche.14
We do not have to look far into Greekphilosophy,however,to find
the source of Augustine'steachings.The Stoics thoughtit obviousthat
animals were devoid of reason. They were as confidentas Paul that
Providencecared nothing for animals, except as an indirect way of
caringfor men. And like Augustine,they were readyto concludethat
animals, as lacking reason, must also lack rights.15"From the society
of rational beings," so Pohlenz sums up the Stoic position, "animals
are naturallyexcluded.""Against the Pythagoreans,"he goes on to
pointout, "the Stoics vigorouslydefendedthe viewthat thereis no legal
or moral tie of any kind betweenman and animal."16Even the most
unorthodoxof Stoics stood firm on this point, during the long fivehundredyear historyof the Stoic school.
Not all Christianswere convinced,however,by the Stoic argument
that since the beasts are irrational,men may treat them as they please.
"Even to the unreasoningcreatures,"wrote John Chrysostomin the
Also a Greekfourthcentury,"[the saints]extendtheirgentleness."17
the Italian Fathers absorbed something of the inhumanitycharacteristic of Rome-Basil the Great composed a prayer for animals:
"And for these also, O Lord, the humblebeasts, who bear with us the
heat and burdenof the day, we beg thee to extendthy great kindnessof
heart, for thou hast promisedto save both man and beast, andgreat is
thy loving-kindness,O Master."18Note that Basil thinks of God as
having"promisedto save both man and beast." He relies,no doubt,on
Paul's Epistleto the Romans, wherePaul tells us that "the earnestexpectation of the creaturewaiteth for the manifestationof the sons of
God." Paul's phrase"of the creature,"particularlywhenit is followed
by the observationthat "the wholecreationgroanethand travailethin
pain togetheruntil now," does not suggest that it is only humanbeings
who are waitingon God.19But, althoughBasil is by no means the sole
exception,this passagehas not normallybeentakento implythat beast
as well as man will be saved, as distinct from being "transfigured."
That beasts are incapable of immortality, indeed, is often taken to
followfrom the very natureof theirsouls.20
4W. E. Lynch, "Soul," in New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York, 1967), XIII,
449-50, sums up the Biblical situation.
15Cf.E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (London, 1911), 187, 205, 274.
16MaxPohlenz, Die Stoa (G6ttingen, 1948), 137.
17Homilies of St. John Chrysostom on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, trans.
of the English Church (Oxford, 1861), Homily XXIX, 471.
members
by
"8QuotedA. W. Moss, Valiant Crusade (London, 1961), 5.
"9Romans, 8:19, 22. Compare Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III, pt. IV, trans.
G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh, 1961).
20E.g.,Charles Journet, The Meaning of Evil, trans. M. Barry (London, 1963), 142,
which lays it down that not even God can bring an animal back to life.

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In the popular mediaeval tradition, as contrasted with official

theology, there are many legends which associate saintliness and
martyrdomwith kindnessto animals:even Jeromehas his lion, to say
nothing of Androcles. Vicious animals in that traditionwere like the
Gadareneswine,inhabitedby demons. They might be broughtto trial
for their misdeedsand punishedby the extremestof penalties-a form
of distinction which, no doubt, they would willinglyhave foregone.
Domesticatedanimals,in contrast, were the dwellingplaces of angels.
The merely wild, but not the vicious, were spirituallyuninhabited.
Saintlinesswas demonstratedby a capacityto drivethe demonsout of
the vicious-as some of the biographersof Francis of Assissi report
that he tamed the wolf of Gobbio-and ordinary human virtue in
domesticatingwild animals,thus makingof them a fit residencefor angels.
Saint Francisis, of course,the most famousexampleof a Christian
Nature-lover,callinguponbirdsas his sisters in an Umbriastill not enBut his case is anything
tirely Christianizedout of Nature-worship.21
but a clear one. Biographiesby Englishanimal-lovers,often Protestant,
naturally stress his fellowshipwith Nature; Roman Catholic biographers,in contrast,are intenton establishinghis orthodoxy.22
Theywrite
with scorn of those who see in Francisa sentimentalnature-lover,only
by an accidentof time ineligiblefor the Presidencyof the Royal Society
for the Preventionof Crueltyto Animals.Nor is there any hope of settling such controversiesby returningto primarysources;those sources
are for the most part deliberatelydesignedto create a particularimage
of Saint Francis,the imagevaryingfrom chroniclerto chronicler.
A few facts, however,seem to be relativelyuncontroversial.His attitude to Nature-as given expression,for example,in his Canticleto
the Sun-is very like that of the psalmist. When he "preachesto the
birds" it is to exhort them to glorify God in the same spirit as the
psalmist calls upon not only all living things but even "fire and hail;
snow andvapors;stormywindfulfillinghis word"to praisethe Lord,or
as an old Englishhymn informs us, in a somewhatunfortunatemetaphor, that "eventhe worm bendshis knee to God." "My sister birds,"
Francisis said to have preached,"you owe much to God andyou must
alwaysandin everyplace give praiseto him."23And his chroniclergoes
on to drawa moralin whichthe birdsare comparedto the friars"who,
like the birds, owned nothingof their own in the world and entrusted
21E.M. Almedigen, Francis of Assisi (London, 1967), 23.
22Esp.Michael de la Bedoyere, Francis (London, 1962).
23The Little Flowers of St. Francis, and other Franciscan Writings, trans.
S. Hughes (New York, 1964), 78. The introduction should be read as illustrating how
difficult it is to decide what Saint Francis did and taught; also J. R. H. Moorman, The
Sources for the Life of St. Francis of Assisi (Manchester, 1940), in the 1966 reprint
with a new preface by Bishop Moorman.

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JOHN PASSMORE

their lives only to the providenceof God." It was, indeed,to the friars,
not to the birds, that Franciswas preaching.Anthony of Padua,in a
similarspirit,was to "preachto fish"as a meansof rebukingheretics.
Only once does the questionof callousnessarise in the biographies
andthen
of Saint Franciswrittenby his friendsor near-contemporaries
taken
it does so rather disconcertingly.One of the brethren,
ill, told
Saint Francis' disciple, Jonathan,he had a longing for pig's trotters.
"In great fervorof spirit,"Jonathancut a trotter off a livingpig. Saint
Francis rebukedhim, but with no referencewhatsoeverto his callousness. He urgedhim, only, to apologizeto the ownerof the pig for having
damagedhis property.24
The vogue of Saint Francisis a modernone; he was in no sense a
well-knownsaint until after the appearanceof Paul Sabatier'sLife in
1893.For Sabatierhe was that favoritenineteenth-century
figure:an individualin revolt against an institution. Subsequentapologists have
found him useful as a livingdemonstrationthat Christianitydoes not
necessarilythink of Nature as somethingto be dominated.But Saint
Francishad, in this particularrespect,no immediateinfluence.And as
that staunchhumanitarian,FrancesCobbe,puts it:
It is a very small matter that a Saint, six hundredyears ago, sang with
nightingalesand fed wolves, if the monks of his own Orderand the priests of
the Churchwhichhas canonisedhim, neverwarntheirflocks that to torment
God's creatures is even a venial sin, and when forced to notice barbarous
crueltiesto a brute,invariablyreply"Non e Cristiano,"as if all claimsto compassionweredismissedby that consideration.25

In general terms, certainly, Christianity,like Stoicism, has not

thoughtof man as beingboundby moral considerationsin his dealings
with animals.Whenin 1772James Grangerpreachedagainstcrueltyto
animalshis sermon, he tells us, "gave almost universaldisgust to two
considerablecongregations.""The mention of horses and dogs," he
continues, "was censured as a prostitution of the dignity of the
pulpit."26

The characteristicRoman Catholicteachingon man'streatmentof

animals derives from Aquinas. Aquinas draws a distinctionbetween
affectionsof reasonand affectionsof sentiment.At the level of reason,
he says, it is a matterof indifferencehow men behavetowardsanimals.
For God has given men completedominionover them. In the wordsof
the psalmist, praisingGod: "Thou madest him to have dominionover
24Lifeof Brother Jonathan, Ch. I, in The Little Flowers, 186-87.
25Lifeof Frances Power Cobbe, by Herself (London, 1894), II, ch. XVIII, 174-75.
2E. S. Turner, All Heaven in a Rage (London, 1964), 72-73.

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201

the works of thy hands;thou hast put all thingsunderhis feet."27This,

accordingto Aquinas,is the sense in which"St. Paul says that Godhas
no carefor oxen, since he does not judge a man on how he has acted
withregardto oxen or other animals."28
The situation at the level of the emotions is ratherdifferent.Animals can feel pain; men can feel pity for their pain. And the man who
often feels pity for sufferinganimalsis morelikely, so Aquinastells us,
to have compassionon his fellowman.It is in the light of this fact, he
argues, that we ought to interpretwhat is often taken to be the most
unambiguousOld Testament moral exhortationto man to care for his
beasts: "a righteousman regardeththe life of his beast:but the tender
mercies of the wicked are cruel."2 Men, on Aquinas'sview, are "of a
piece"; they are compassionate both to men and to animals. So
righteousmen will in fact treat their beasts well. But only their compassion or their cruelty to men is of any moral consequence;they are
not righteousbecause they treat their beasts well. The Jews, Aquinas
goes on patronizinglyto remark, were particularlygiven to cruelty.
God, therefore,"exhortedthem in pity even to animals,by forbidding
certain practices savoringof cruelty to them." The fact remainsthat
there is nothing morally objectionablein cruelty to animals, as such,
consideredin isolation from the cruelty to men with which it is empirically associated. And "cruelty" includes both enjoyment of and
indifferenceto their sufferings.He sums up his position thus: "If any
passages of Holy Scriptureseem to forbidus to be cruel to brute animals, for instanceto kill a birdwith its young, that is eitherto remove
men's thoughts from being cruel to other men, or lest throughbeing
cruel to animalsone becomes cruel to other humanbeings,or because
injuryof an animalleads to the temporalhurtof man,eitherof the doer
of the deed, or of another; or because of some signification... ."30
These conclusionsare supposedto follow from the fact that rational
creatureshavethe rightto governirrationalnature.
This interpretationof the moral situationwas to have a long life. In
the eighteenth century Hogarth's engravingsThe Stages of Cruelty
produceda considerableeffect; they purportedto show, somewhatin
the mannerof his now better-knownRake's Progress, how cruelty to
animals developsinto cruelty to man. In his lectures on ethics, Kant
used these engravingsas a text on whichto hanghis Aquinas-likeviews
about man's treatment of Nature. The LeibnizianBaumgarten,so
Kanttells us, had maintainedthat we havedutiesboth towardsanimals
27Psalms 8:6.
28Summa Theologiae, Vol. 29, la 2ae 102, 6, p. 225.
9Proverbs 12:10.
30Summa contra gentiles, Bk. III, ch. CXIII.

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JOHN PASSMORE

This Kantdenies.Animals,he says,

andtowardsbeautifullandscapes.31
"arenot self-consciousand are there merelyas a meansto an end,"the
end beingman. What Baumgartenthinksof as dutiesto animalsare in
fact "indirectdutiestowardshumanity."In so far as the actionsof animals are analogousto humanactions,e.g., in so far as we can thinkof
an animal,like a servant,as doingserviceto us, we haveduties relating
to them. But this is only because"thus we cultivatethe corresponding
duties towards human beings." If, for example, a man shoots a dog,
althoughit has servedhim well, becauseit is getting old, "he does not
fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannotjudge."Nevertheless,"his
act is inhumanand damages in himself that humanitywhichit is his
duty to show towards mankind."Anyone who is cruel or callous in
regard to animal suffering,so Kant suggests, will become cruel or
callousin his dealingswithmankind;inversely,"tenderfeelingstowards
dumbanimalsdevelophumanefeelingstowardsmankind."
In his last publishedwork, his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant includes compassionto animalsamong a man's duties to himself rather
than his dutiesto others. But evenif Kant'smodificationof his original
view may bear witnessto a degreeof uneasiness,the generalline of his
argument is unaffected. "Intimately opposed to man's duty to
himself," Kant writes, "is a savage and at the same time cruel
treatmentof that part of creationwhichis living,thoughlackingreason
[animals].""For thus," he goes on, "is compassionfor their suffering
dulledin man, and therebya naturalpredispositionvery serviceableto
moralityin one's relationswith other men is weakenedand gradually
obliterated."Kantwas anythingbut a callous man:he is readyto maintain that "physicalexperimentsinvolvingexcruciatingpainfor animals
and conductedmerelyfor the sake of speculativeinquiry(whenthe end
might also be achieved without such experiments) are to be abhorred."32But he cannot see how men can be said to havea duty to animals as distinctfrom a duty relatingto or concerninganimals;he has
somehow to convert it either into a duty to other men or a duty to
ourselves.(For a rationalethics, as distinctfrom religion,there can be,
on Kant's view, no such thing as a duty to God-the only other
hypothesishe mighthaveentertained.)
The generalizationson which Kant's argumentdepends are more
8"Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. L. Infield (London, 1930), 239-40. I have not
been able to trace the reference in Baumgarten. In his lectures, Kant is commenting,
for the most part, on Baumgarten's Ethica Philosophica. In ?398 of that work
Baumgarten lays it down that brutal men should be avoided. But Kant's reference is to
a much more developed view.
"Metaphysics of Morals, Pt. II; The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue (1797), Elements of Ethics, Pt. I, ?17, trans. J. Ellington and W. Wick (Indianapolis, 1964), 106.

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than dubious-tyrants from Nero to Himmler have been notoriously

devotedto animals.It is a matterof commonobservation,indeed,that
kindnessto animalsis often substitutedfor kindnessto humanbeings.
Whetherthe inversealso holds, whetherthose who are cruel to animals
are also cruel to humanbeingsit is more difficultto say. Thereis certainlyno difficulty,at least, in conceivinga situationin whichcrueltyto
man and cruelty to animals are completely dissociated:Kant would
have us believethat underthese circumstancesthere wouldbe nothing
wrongin crueltyto animals.
Newman's conclusionson cruelty to animals-sufficiently authoritative in the Roman Catholic Church to be quoted at length in the
CatholicEncyclopedia-belong to this same Stoic tradition:
Wehavenodutiestowardsthebrutecreation;thereis no relationofjustice
betweenthemandus. Ofcourseweareboundnotto treatthemill, forcruelty
is anoffenceagainstthatholyLawwhichourMakerhaswrittenonourhearts,
to Him.Buttheycanclaimnothingat ourhands;intoour
andis displeasing
handsthey are absolutelydelivered.We may use them, we may destroythem
at our pleasure,not our wantonpleasure,but still for our own ends, for our
own benefitor satisfaction,providedwe can give a rationalaccountof whatwe
do.33

Men, in other words, can deal with animalsas they like, providedonly
that they have a good reasonfor doingso: the sufferingof animalsdoes
not count as a countervailingreason. They ought not to enjoy maltreatingthem, but indifferenceto theirsuffering-callousness-is not a
sin. Althoughit wouldbe wrong,for example,to makeof crueltyto animals a sport, it is morallyunimportantif animalssufferincidentallyto
our sport. Bullfighting,on this view, is thereforepermissibleand so is
coursing.If whatNewmancalled"wanton"pleasurein the sufferingsof
animalsis forbidden,this is only as a consequenceof the fact that all
wantonpleasuresare morallyimpermissible.
Behindthis attitude to animalslies a theology, a theology bitterly
opposedto any form of naturalism,determinedto insist that between
man and beast there lies an absolute barrier.(Considerthe everyday
use of the words "brutes,""beasts,"and even "animal.")So, askedto
permitthe settingup of a Society for the Preventionof Crueltyto Animals, Pope Pius IX repliedthat "a society for such a purposecouldnot
be sanctionedin Rome." The principleto whichhis replyappealedwas
the familiarStoic one that "man owed dutiesto his fellow men;but he
owedno dutiesto the loweranimals."34
33J.H. Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 2nd ed. (London, 1858),
Sermon VI, 106-07.
3"Lifeof Frances Power Cobbe, by Herself (London, 1894), II, ch. XVIII, 171-72.
Cardinal Manning was more sympathetic: man, he thought, had a duty to God to be

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Neither Aquinasnor Kant nor Newman denied,however,that animals could suffer:DescartesandMalebranchethoughtdifferently.It is

impossible,they argued,to be cruel to animals,since animalsare incapableof feeling.They lack not only-as Aquinashad followedAristotle
in arguing-a rationalsoul but even that sensitivesoul whichboth Aristotle and Aquinashad allowed them. To suppose that animals could
feel would be to suggest that there could be pain and sufferingwhere
there has been no sin. For animalsdid not eat of the ForbiddenTree.
"Beinginnocent,"Malebranchewrites,"if they werecapableof feeling,
the effect wouldbe that underthe governmentof an infinitelyjust and
all-powerfulGod an innocent creature would suffer pain, which is a
penalty, and the punishmentof some sin."3 The only possible conclusion, appearancesto the contrarynotwithstanding,is that animals
cannot feel. "Theyeat withoutpleasure,"Malebranchethereforetells
us, "they cry without sorrow..., they desire nothing, they fear
nothing, they know nothing."36(The Stoic Chrysippus,it is worth
noting,had also suggestedthat animalsdo not feel but only "as it were"
feel.)37Whatwe hear as a cry of painis of no more significancethanthe
creaking of a machine. An organ, the Cartesian Rouhault argues,
makes more noise when I play it than an animalwhenit cries out, yet
we do not ascribefeelingsto the organ.38
These teachings, it should be observed, were more than
metaphysicalspeculations.They had a direct effect on seventeenthcenturybehavioras manifested,for example,in the popularityof public
vivisections,not as an aid to scientificdiscoverybut simply as a technical display. "They administered beatings to dogs with perfect
indifference,"so La Fontaine,a contemporaryobserver,tells us, "and
made fun of those who pitiedthe creaturesas if they had felt pain....
They nailed poor animalsup on boards by their four paws to vivisect
them and see the circulationof the blood whichwas a great subjectof
conversation."39
kind to the animals God had created. Nowadays, indeed, there is in Great Britain a
Catholic Study Circle for Animal Welfare-with its own journal, The Ark, founded in
1932. (Within the Anglo-American Roman Catholic Church, too, there are Animal
Blessing Services.) Even more strikingly in the United States, what was once The National Catholic Society for Animal Welfare has significantly renamed itself Society for
Animal Rights, although this still does not go quite as far as the name of the parallel Indian Society, Animal Citizens.
3Recherche de la Verite, IV, XI, ?11, in Oeuvres Completes, ed. G. Rodin-Lewis,
II, 104.
36Ibid., VI, II, VII, 394; also C. A. Sainte-Beuve, Le Port Royal, 3rd. ed. (Paris,
1867), Bk. 2, ch. 16, 316-17.
38Entretienssur laphilosophie, II, 157.
37Pohlenz,Die Stoa, 147.
39Quoted (no source given) in Loren Eiseley, The Firmament of Time (New York,
1962). 28-29.

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The theologicalproblem Descartes and Malebrancheprofessedto

have solvedwas quite a seriousone:to accountfor the sufferingsof animals on the suppositionthat the worldis governedby a benevolentand
omnipotentGod. Augustinehad soughtto solveit by arguingthat there
was a lesson for menin animalsuffering.He condemnedthose "carping
critics" who "try to shake the faith of those less instructed on the
problem of pain and hardshipsalso suffered by animals"-animals
whichhad not beenimplicatedin Adam's fall. The solution,according
to Augustine,is that only throughtheirobservationof animalsuffering,
suffering which is "a conscious struggle against disintegrationand
dissolution,"can men be madesufficientlyawarethat animalspossess a
longingfor unity, a longinghe tells us, whichcould only have beenimplantedin them by "the supreme, sublime, and unspeakableunity of
their Creator."40Animal suffering,in other words, is a chapterin the
book of nature.
Less sophisticatedtheologianswere more ready to adopt the alternative view that animal sufferingwas after all a consequenceof
Adam's sin;that sin threwthe entireuniverseinto confusion-as indeed
Paul seems to suggestwhenhe writesthat "the wholecreationgroaneth
and travailethin paintogetheruntilnow."41But thereis somethingsingularlyrepellentin the idea of a God who wouldcause animalsto suffer
eitherso that theologianscouldsupplyanotherreasonfor believingthat
animalsare his creationor becauseAdam had disobeyedhim. It was in
many ways a theologically easier solution to suppose, however implausibly,that animalsdo not in fact sufferat all. Indeed,a contemporary Roman Catholic moral philosopher, Dom Trethowan, is still
ready to suggest that the apparentsufferingof, for example, cats can
only be explainedon the suppositionthat "a cat is so arrangedthat if
you pullits tail, a noise comes from the otherend."42
One of his co-religionists,Jacques Maritain, adopts, however, a
very differentattitude. He specificallyrejects the Aquinas-Kantview
that men ought not to be cruel to animals only because "cruelty
towardsanimalsdevelopsfeelingsand habits of insensitivityor sadism
whichvitiate one's personalityand menace others." This is in spite of
his agreeingwith Kantandthe Stoics that animalsarenot moralagents
and have, in consequence,neither duties nor rights. Nonetheless, he
says, we have duties toward them; for all that, they have no duties
towardus. Animals are "foreshadowingsof humanpersons";in virtue
of that fact, they have a foreshadowing,althoughonly a foreshadowing,
4?Augustine, The Free Choice of the Will (Washington, 1968), trans. F. P. Russell in
The Fathers of the Church, LIX, 227.
4Romans 8:22.
42Trethowan,An Essay in Christian Philosophy, 41; also 92.

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of rights. Our duties towardsthem, however,are real.43This view has

behindit, too, a long if very broken tradition.The Romans carried
cruelty to animals to new depths of barbarity.Only very gradually,
indeed,did they imposelimitationson a man'streatmentof his children
or a citizen'sof foreigners.As for slaves,the ChristianEmperorJustinian's codificationof Roman Law lays it down that "slaves cannot be
outragedthemselves"althougha master can be outragedthroughhis
slave.Not surprisinglyit takes a very similarviewaboutoxen.44
The Greeks, however, had generally opposed cruelty to animals:
"do not be cruel to animals"is said to have been one of three moral
preceptsof Eleusis,45and Plutarchwas no exception.Especiallyin his
earlywritings,he attacks that sharpcontrastbetweenman andanimals
whichhad been typical of the Stoics. He sets out to show, relyingfor
this purposeon a long series of popularfables, that animals are quite
Of considerablymore interestis his attempt to
capableof reasoning.46
cope with a somewhatspecial, and very relevant,argumentwhichderives, he tells us, from Stoic sources. There could be no such thing as
justice, this argumentruns, if beasts partake of reason. For men are
then "necessarilyunjustif they do not sparethem";yet if they do, "life
becomes impracticableand impossible."In short, "we shall be living
the life of beasts once we give up the use of beasts"-no civilizedpursuit, no "refinementof living" could survive.47Civilizedman, so the
Stoic argumentconcludes,simplycannot affordto allow that animals
are rational.
Plutarch suggests a reply to this line of argument,a reply which
dates back, so he tells us, to Pythagoras.Thereis no injustice,he says,
in punishingand slaying such animals as are vicious, "anti-socialand
merely injurious."Nor is there any injusticein taming those animals
whichlend themselvesto domestication,"makingthem our helpersin
the tasks for which they are fitted by nature," trainingdogs as sentinels, or keepingherds of goats and sheepto be milkedand shorn.For
men, too, are punishedor put to deathif they are viciousand men, too,
are trainedfor particulartasks, for which they are by nature suited.
Only in two respects do men need to alter their conductif they are to
43Maritain, Neuf lecons sur les notions premieres de la philosophie morale (Paris,
1951), as trans. in Charles Journet, The Meaning of Evil, trans. Michael Barry
(London, 1963), 138-39. Journet follows Maritain on this point.
"Institutes ofJustinian, trans. J. B. Moyle, 5th ed. (London, 1913), 169-70.
45So Porphyry says, quoting from Mermippus, citing Xenocrates. The precepts can
be traced back, he also alleges, to Triptolemus (On Abstinence IV, 22).
46Plutarch, The Cleverness of Animals in Moralia, ?961, trans. W. Helmbold, Loeb
Classical Library, 335. On Plutarch and other classical writers: George Boas,
"Theriophily," Dictionary of the History of Ideas (1973), IV, 384-88.
47Ibid., ?6,963-64, p. 347.

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dealjustly with animals:they shouldgive up slaughteringthem for the

table and they should give up those varieties of sport which involve
crueltyto, or the death of, animals."For I thinksport shouldbejoyful
and between playmates who are merry on both sides."48Thus it is
possible to reconcile beingjust to animals and sustainingcivilization.
For civilizationdoes not depend, Plutarchis confident,either on the
eatingof meat or on blood sports. (Laterin life, Plutarchwas to excuse
meat-eatingon the ground that it "has become a sort of unnatural
second nature," i.e., a fixed custom which it would be impossibleto
overthrow,althoughhe still thoughtit best to do withoutit.)49
Plutarch's arguments were taken over by the neo-Platonist
Porphyry.Animals,he agreeswith Plutarch,"arenot entirelyalienated
from our nature." They participatein reason, even if to an inferior
degree.It is thereforequitewrongto hunt or to eat them, or at least it
is wrongfor such men as aspireto perfectionto do so, the only class of
manin whomPorphyrywas interested.But Porphyrywentevenfurther
than Plutarch. "He who does not confine harmless conduct to men
alone," he writes, "but extends it to other animals, most closely approaches to divinity and if it werepossible to extend it to plants, he
wouldpreserve this imagein a still greaterdegree."50A typicalascetic,
he was quiteunimpressedby the Stoic argumentthat the refinementsof
civilizationdepend on our dealing autocratically with animals and
plants.So muchthe worsefor refinements!
Like Genesis, Porphyrytells us that men in their perfected state
would eat nothingbut the fruits whichplants bear in numbersbeyond
theirneedto reproduce.(Thisis at least a gastronomicimprovementon
the bill of fare permittedby the prophetsof Samuel Butler'sErewhon.
They restrictthe diet of the righteousto rottingfruitanddecayingcabHe adopts a ratherdifferentapproachto the Stoic arbage-leaves.)51
that
gument
any attempt on man's part to be just to the beasts would
reducehim to theirlevel. Justice,he says, is "nothingmore than a philanthropy";it consists in "abstainingfrom injury to anythingwhich
is not noxious":that is why men can properlyeat superfluousfruit,
shearsheep,andtake theirmilk.52
It is illuminatingto observethe use whichhas been madein modern
times of Porphyreanteaching. In 1792 the Platonist Thomas Taylor
publisheda work entitledA Vindicationof the Rights of Brutes which
48Ibid.,?7,964-65, pp. 353-55.
49De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta, XVIII, in Plutarch's Moralia, trans. F. C. Babbitt, II, 265.
500n Abstinence, VI, 27. I have followed the translation in Westermarck.
"5Erewhon,ch. XXVII.
"5De Abstinentia, 3, 26, trans. Thomas Taylor (1823), 127.

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consists in largepart of quotationsfrom Porphyry'sConcerningAbstinence. But his purpose,like Samuel Butler's,was ironic. His title page
bearsthe epigraphQuidRides?andhis work as a wholeis intendedas a
reductioad absurdumof ThomasPaine'sTheRights of Man andMary
Wollstonecraft'sjust publishedA Vindicationof the Rights of Women,
echoedin his title. Here, he is saying,are the conclusionsto whichyou
are driven if once you allow that even the least rational of men-or
what is worse, even women-have rights. Beforeyou know whereyou
areyou will be treatinganimalsas havingrights.
Thereis a certainhistoricaljustice in this line of reasoning.For certainly the view that animals have rights came to the forefrontin the
eighteenthand nineteenthcentury as a result of that same reforming
zeal whichled to the abolitionof slaveryandunderlaythe ReformBills.
But it wouldbe wrongto suppose,as sometimesis supposed,that there
was a suddenrevelationat the end of the eighteenthcentury,that in the
centuries which elapsed between Porphyry and Henry Primatt's
lengthyDissertationon the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Crueltyto Animals-first publishedin 1776-the Stoic arguments,as refurbishedby
AugustineandAquinas,hadit all theirown way.
Skeptics, for one thing, attacked the Stoic presumptionthat man,
and man alone,is endowedwith a rationalsoul, and,alongwiththis, the
Stoic conclusionthat men had no duties to animals.So in his Apology
for RaimondSebond,writtenas earlyas 1576,Montaigne-profoundly
influencedby the Greek skeptic Sextus Empiricus,whose works had
just beenrediscovered-had arguedthat it is absurdlypresumptuousof
men to set themselvesaboveNature as its absoluteruler,or to suppose
that animalslack rationality.Fouryears later, in his Essay on Cruelty,
he is willingto accept the Stoic teachingthat we owejustice only to our
fellowman. But justice, he says, is not the only virtue: We have "a
generalduty to be humane,not only to such animalsas possess life and
feelingbut even to trees and plants."(Porphyry,as we saw, had made
substantiallythe same point by redefiningjustice so that it means"philanthropy.")Indeed,in the case of animalswhichstandclose to us, our
pets, "thereis some intercoursebetweenthem and us and some degree
of mutual obligation."53

David Hume, also an apt pupil of Sextus Empiricus,devoted a

chapter of his Enquiryto the reasoningof animals, arguingthat in
respect to everydayreasoning,as distinct from mathematicaldemonstration,the mindsof men and animalsworkin exactlythe same way.54
He, too, admits that in their dealings with animals men are not
53Montaigne, Oeuvres Completes (Paris), 181.
"5Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, ch. IX. In discussing the animal
soul, Hume could draw upon two articles in Bayle's Dictionary: Pereira and Rorarius.

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restrainedby what he significantlycalls "the cautious,jealous virtueof

justice." The same is true, he argues,of their dealingswith uncivilized
peoplesand with women;womenandthe barbarians,like animals,lack
sufficientpower to compel men to compromisewith them. The fact
remains that "we should be bound by the laws of humanityto give
gentleusageto these creatures."55
But it was not only the skeptics who were beginningto think
differentlyabout man's relationshipsto the animals. Rather surprisingly, Hume's teacher Hutchesonhad been preparedto suppose that
animalswere capableof virtue,if only virtueof a primitivekind,of the
sort childrencan also possess.56Othermoralphilosophersdidnot go so
far as this in theircriticismof the Stoics, butevensuchStoic-influenced
moralistsas WilliamWollastonwerepreparedto grantthat menought
to take the happinessof animalsinto accountwhenthey act "inproportion to their several degrees of apprehension."57
And Wollaston's
fellow-rationalist,John Balguy,while rejectingHutcheson'sview that
animalsare themselvescapableof virtue,nonethelessis confidentthat
"brutes,as they are capableof beingtreatedby us either mercifullyor
cruelly,may be the objectseitherof virtueor vice."58
Poets andnovelists,as well as moralphilosophers,did somethingto
preparethe way for a new attitudeto animals,as indeedto Nature as a
whole.In As YouLikeIt not only "the melancholyJacques"but, much
more significantlyeven the aristocraticexiles display an unexpected
degree of sensibilityto the sufferingsof a woundeddeer.59Sterne's
somewhatmawkishapostropheto a donkey and Cowper'spoem, The
Task, are well knowneighteenth-century
examplesof the newtendency.
The "sentimentalist"movement as a whole, like Romanticismlater,
encouragedmen to reflect on their relationsto animals as well as to
theirfellowman.Indeed,it sometimesemphasizedthe formerat the expenseof the latter.
But these were observationsin passing, straws in the wind, or
perhapsnot even so much, the personal reactions of men of unusual
sensibility.The fact remains,as we have alreadyseen, that the preacher
John Grangerarousedhostility and ridiculewhenhe preachedin 1772
againstcruelty to animals.And as late as 1798,ThomasYoung began
his Essay on Humanityto Animals by expressingthe fear that he had
exposed himself to ridicule by writing a book on such a topic. Yet
55Enquiryconcerning the Principles of Morals, Sect. III, Pt. I; ed. Selby-Bigge,

?145, 152.
"5Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and

Virtue,Treatise11,4th edition(London,1738),Section7, ?3.

57Wollaston,TheReligionof NatureDelineated(London,1724),Section2, ?10.
58Balguy,The Foundation of Moral Goodness (London, 1728), Pt. I, ?3.
5eAs You Like It, Act II, Sc. I.

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Henry Primatt had already,in 1776,publishedhis Dissertationon the

Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Animals and the century that
followedwas to witness a long series of books on man's treatmentof
the animals. Both Primatt and Young, it will be observed,plead for
"humanity"to animals;Primattdescribesmercy as a duty and cruelty
as a sin.
The belief still widelyprevailed,it must be remembered,that large
segments of mankindwere, as Aristotle had maintained,born to be
slaves.60"From the hour of their birth, some are markedout for subjection, others for rule.... Some men are by nature free, and others
slaves, and ...

for these latter slavery is both expedient and right."

From our present point of view, significantly,Aristotle comparedthe

naturalslave to tame animalswhich,he was convinced"havea better
naturethan wild."Not until 1792did Wilberforcepersuadethe British
House of Commonsto agreeto the gradualabolitionof the slavetrade;
not until 1811 was slave-tradinga felony. In America Delaware
abolished slavery as early as 1776, but it was not abolishedin the
United States as a whole until 1865.And in the widerworldit lingered
on, perhapsstill lingers on, well into the twentiethcentury. Not only
slaves but primitivepeoples, too, were commonly thought of as lying
beyondthe boundsof morality, as Calibans.As late as the mid-nineteenth century, the aboriginal inhabitants of Tasmania were deliberatelywipedout.
So long as callousness towards the sufferingsof slaves and aborigineswas not morally condemned,it was unlikely that callousness
towardsanimalswouldbe seriouslyregarded.Indeedto insist on men's
moral responsibilitytowards slaves and barbariansit was sometimes
thoughtnecessary,as it was by Herder,to drawa sharpdistinctionbetween the treatment proper to man and the treatment even of such
higher animals as apes. "O man, honor thyself," Herder writes,
"neitherthe pongonor the gibbonis thy brother;the Americanandthe
Negro are;these thereforethou shouldnot oppress,or murder,or steal
from;for they are men like thee;with the ape thou canst not enterinto
Elsewhere,however,Herderdraws attentionto the close
fraternity."61
relationshipbetween men and, at least, domesticated beasts. "It is
generallyknown,"he writes, "that all animalssubservientto the purposes of man are more useful, in proportionto the humanityof the
treatment they receive."62Note that it is the usefulness of kindness
6?Politics1.5, 1254a-1255a,trans. B. Jowettin The Worksof Aristotle, ed. W. D.
Ross, Vol. X (Oxford,1921).
"'Herder,Reflections(Ideen), Pt. I, Bk. 7, ch. 1, trans. T. O. Churchill(London,
1800).By a "pongo"the translatorprobably,if wrongly,meantan orangutan.
62lbid.,Bk. 8, ch. 3.

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which is here emphasized:there is no suggestion that animals have

rights. Nineteenth-centurywriters, in contrast, tended to emphasize
not so muchthe inhumanityof slaveryor crueltyas the violenceit does
to rights-the typicalreactionsof a politically-consciousage.
As so often, the Benthamitescouldjoin handswith the evangelicals.
"The French have already discovered," Bentham wrote, "that the
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be
abandonedwithoutredressto the capriceof a tormentor.It may come
one day to be recognisedthat the numberof legs ... or the termination
of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficientfor abandoninga
sensitivebeingto the same plight."63Observethe transitionfrom slave
to animal.Bentham'sUtilitarianismlooks not to the rationalityof the
agentor the patient,in the Stoic manner,but to the effectof the agent's
actions on all sentientbeings,who are from this point of view to be accountedequal. If all pain is evil, as Benthamthought,then the pain of
animals-assuming only that they can feel pain-ought not to be
ignoredin man'smoraldecisions.The painsof animalsmightbe less, as
not includingthe pains of anticipation,than the pains felt by man, but
that is no reason for not taking them into account. "The questionis
not," so Bentham argues, "Can they reason?"nor "Can they talk?"
but "Can they suffer?"So whereasPlutarchand Porphyrythoughtit
necessaryto begintheir case against treatinganimalsmerely as chattels by arguingthat animalshave a sharein reason,for Benthamit is irrelevant whether or not they are rational and to what degree. It is
enoughthat they are capableof suffering.
In his later writings,however,Benthamrevertedto somethingmore
like the Aquinas-Kant position. The Traites edited by Dumont
condemncruelty to animalsonly-if Dumont can be trusted-on the
groundthat it can give rise to indifferenceto human suffering.In his
ConstitutionalCode, Bentham'semphasisis not on sufferingbuton the
allegedfact, madesecondaryin the Principles,that maturequadrupeds
are more moral and more intelligentthan young bipeds.I do not know
why Benthamchangedhis mind. But perhapshe boggled,and not unnaturally,at the conclusionthat to determinewhetheran act is rightwe
ought to take into considerationits consequencesfor every sentient
being.64
The evangelical-Benthamite
crusadehas beenlargelysuccessful.In
Great Britainthe law has extendedits protectionfirst (1822) to horses
63lntroduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, written 1780, published
1789, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London, 1970), ch. XVII, ?IV, note b. In some
other editions the chapter number is XIX.
64For details of the change: David Baumgardt, Bentham and the Ethics of Today
(Princeton, 1952), 338, 362.

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and cattle, excepting only bulls, and eventually, although slowly, to

other animals.65It is sometimes argued-as by H. S. Salt in his
Animal'sRights (1892)-that this is all that is neededto show that animals have rights:to say that they have rightsis just to say that they are
protected by law. Yet trees may also be protected by law, as in National Parks;it wouldbe very odd to concludethat they have rights.If
we thinkof a "right"as a demandwhich,if it is made,is backedby law
or commonpractice,then animalshaveno rights;they makeno claims.
Nor (in this respectthey are unlikeinfants)can someoneelse demand,
let us say, free pasturagefor the rest of its life as compensationfor
damages incurredin an accident. Its owner, no doubt, can claim for
damages in such a case, but he does not hold the damagesin trust for
the horse;he is, indeed,at perfectlibertyto shoot it.
What has happenedover the last centuryand a half in the West is
not that animals have been given more power, more freedom, or
anythingelse which might be accountedas a right. Rather, men have
lost rights:they no longerhave the same powerover animals,they can
no longer treat them as they choose. This is characteristicof a moral
change;it followsfrom the fact that, in Hart's words,"moralrulesimpose obligationsand withdrawcertain areas of conduct from the free
option of the individualto do as he likes."66But that men have lost
rightsover them does nothingto convertanimalsinto bearersof rights,
any more than we give rights to a river by withdrawingsomebody's
rightto polluteit.
DisputingSalt's conclusions,D. G. Ritchiehas argued,in my view
correctly, that animals cannot have rights, "not being members of
human society."67We sometimes now meet with the suggestion,
however,that animalsdo in fact form, with men, a single community.
Indeed,the Americanecologist, Aldo Leopold,has gone furtherthan
this: "Whenwe see land as a communityto whichwe belong,we may
beginto use it withlove and respect."68(As a finalabsurdity,it is worth
noting, Thomas Taylor's Vindicationof the Rights of Beasts had
looked forwardto a time when "even the most contemptibleclod of
earth"wouldbe thoughtof as havingrights.He was betteras a prophet
thanas an ironist.)
Ecologically,no doubt, men form a communitywith plants, animals, soil, in the sense that a particularlife-cycle may involve two,
three, or even all four of them. From the point of view of a virus-if I
may be permittedthis way of talking-men are hosts in whichthey can
65Fordetails of this crusade: E. S. Turner, Heaven in a Rage (London, 1964).
66H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), 7.
67D. G. Ritchie, Natural Rights (London, 1894), 107.
68Leopold,A Sand County Almanac (New York, 1970), Foreword, xviii.

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develop,hosts which,regrettably,sometimesdie beforethe virushas a

chance to pass on to other hosts. But if it is essentialto a community
that the membersof it have common interests and recognizemutual
obligationsthen men, plants, animals, and soil do not form a community.Viruses and men do not recognizemutualobligations,nor do
they have common interests. In the only sense in whichbelongingto a
communitygeneratesethicalobligation,they do not belongto the same
community.And it can only create confusionto supposethat they do,
or oughtto.
Spinozawas rightin sayingthat "exceptingmanwe do not knowof
anythingin nature in whose mind we can take pleasure, or anything
with whichwe can unite ourselvesby way of friendship."A dog cannot
be "a man'sbest friend"unlessthis is just a way of sayingthat the man
has no friends.At best, to adoptMaritain'sphrase,his relationwiththe
dog is a "fore-shadowing"of friendship.A man can, of course, take
pleasurein a dog's feelings,he can be pleasedthat his dog is happy,and
he can take pleasure,too, in his dog's intelligence.Buthe cannot"share
his mind"with the dog, if only becausethe dog, unlikeman,has no concern for the future.It does not follow, as Spinozaalso thought,that we
are free to destroy everythingexcept human beings"or to adapt it to
our servicein any way whatever,"that to have scrupleson this pointis
a sign of "empty superstitionand womanishtenderness."69There is
nothing "womanish"or "superstitious"about condemningcruelty to
animals,even if it is not difficultto thinkof attitudesto animalswhich
are both "womanish"in their coddlingand "superstitious"in that they
try to treat a dog as if, let us say, it werea personin a poodle'sskin.
At the same time, the referenceto dogs remindsus that domesticated animalsmay in a senseform part of a communityas wildanimals
do not. Or at least this is true of societies in which a domesticated
animal belongs to a particularfamily, which tends to treat it as a
"honoraryhumanbeing,"referringto it, as one signof this attitude,as
"he" or "she," not as "it." Its wants are respected,andits ownersfeel
some sense of obligationto it, perhapsto the degreethat they will not
migrate to another country, or take a long holiday, if this means
desertingit. Such a feelingof obligation,however,is onlyjustifiableon
the assumptionthat to desert one's pets is a form of cruelty and that
cruelty is morallywrong. Otherwiseit can properlybe condemned,in
Spinoza'smanner,as superstitious.
It is sometimes supposedthat compassionto animalsis a duty; as
we have alreadyseen, Kant gets into some difficultyin tryingto determine to whom it is our duty. But, as Hart has pointed out, there is
somethingvery odd in describingcompassionas a duty, as if a manwho
69Ethics, Pt. IV, Prop. 37, Note 1.

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JOHN PASSMORE

is cruelto animalsis guiltyonly of a derelictionof duty.70It is far more

natural to describe compassion as good and cruelty to animals as
morally wrong. It can still be granted, of course, that particular
persons can have particularduties which relate to particularanimals.
So a family,havingacquiredan animalas a pet, can have a duty to feed
it and care for it generally,and a transporterof sheepmay have a duty
not to pack too many sheep into his transportand to give them food
and water en route, even whentheir routeleads them to the slaughteryard. But these are obligations,as I have alreadysuggested,whicharise
from the fact that cruelty to animalsis morallywrong:that principle
now has the status of a duty-imposingpropositionwhichwe do not expect to hear questioned. Indeed, moral theorists of many different
schools ratherscornfullywonderwhy their predecessorswere so blind
on this point. Schopenhauer,writingin 1841, rejects with indignation
Kant's view that cruelty to animalsis wrongonly becauseit weakens
our feelings of compassion towards other human beings. "Only for
practice,"he sums up Kant as saying, "are we to have sympathyfor
animals." In rejecting this Kantian analysis as "revolting and
abominable,"Schopenhauerhas on his side, he tells us, "the whole of
Asia not taintedwith Islam." Kant, he goes on to argue,is drawingdeductions from Christiantheology:animalsare for that theology mere
things and can thereforebe left out of account in moral philosophy.7'
But so muchthe worsefor Christiantheology.
More orthodoxmoral philosophersagreewith Schopenhauerin his
analysisof the situation."It is to be regretted,"writesJ. S. Mill, "that
metaphysicalscruplesrespectingthe natureandsourceof the authority
of government,should induce many warm supportersof laws against
cruelty to animals, to seek for a justificationof such laws in the incidental consequences of the indulgence of ferocious habits, ... rather

than in the intrinsicmerits of the case itself."72To Mill brutalitywas

wrong in itself, to whomeverit was directed-whether to children,to
slaves,or to animals.
John Laird rebukes his predecessorsfor not, as a touchstone of
their "moral theories," constantly advertingto the principlethat it is
wrong to inflict unnecessarysufferingon animals;he treats it as obvious, as againstKant andAquinas,that "it is not simplythe evil effects
of crueltyuponhumanitythat makesthe [animal]torturerwhathe is."
"The sufferingof his victims who are not men," he continues,"is its
70H. L. A. Hart, "Legal and Moral Obligation" in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in
Moral Philosophy, 82-83.
71Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, Pt. 2, ?8, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Indianapolis, 1965), 96; also Bk. 3, ?19, 7, pp. 175-82.
72Mill, Principles of Political Economy (Boston, 1848), II, 534.

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chief condemnation."73
Hastings Rashdall,himself a Dean and much
influencedby the Kantian,T.H. Green,ascribesthe blindnessof moral
philosophers to "prejudices of theological origin."74Leonard Nelson,

althoughin general terms a neo-Kantian,condemns the Kantianargument on animalsufferingas "sophistical"and "threadbare";we can
only conclude,he says, that Kant was in this case governedby special
interests ratherthan by reason.75The revolutionis complete;old slogans are now commonplaces.
Suppose we turn now to the East. How differenthave attitudesto
crueltybeenthere?One must be verycarefulin answeringthis question;
as in interpretingthe Old Testament, it is easy to read as a precept
againstcrueltywhat is actuallya preceptagainstdamageeitherto personal propertyor to the sacred, to that which is the propertyof the
gods. So the Institutesof Vishnucontainsmany regulationsrelatingto
man's treatmentof cows; he must, for example,give assistanceto any
cow which has fallen into a pit, preservecows from danger, and not
"seek shelterhimself againstcold (and hot winds)and similardangers
without having previouslyprotected the cows against them."76He is
told, too, not to over-travelyoung, diseased, or afflictedanimals and
not to appeasehis hungerand allay his thirst withouthavingfirst given
grass and water to the animals. But althoughpenancesare minutely
laiddown for the killingeven of insects, cruelty,except in these special
cases, is passed over. The PahlaviNasks describein detail the way in
whicha shepherdought to treat his dog and the penaltiesappropriate
for any action which damages beasts of burden. But they are uninterestedin animalswhichare not immediatelyusefulto man.77
Other Eastern texts, however, less ambiguously assert the desirabilityof compassionfor animalsin general.So the PahlaviMarvels
of Zoroastrianismcomment on Zoroaster's compassion,not only to
other men, but to animals.78And in contrast even the maltreatmentof
beasts of burden,unless they were someone else's property,did not
incur any penalties, moral or religiousor legal, in Englandbefore the
nineteenthcentury.
The sensibilityof the fourteenth-centuryJapaneseessayist Kenko
couldcertainlynot be matchedin Europeanwritersof the same period.
A Studyin Moral Theory(London,1926),296, 302.
73Laird,
74Rashdall,TheTheoryof GoodandEvil(London,1907),I, 213-15.
76Nelson,System of Ethics(1932),trans.N. Guterman(New Haven,1956),137.
7lInstitutesof Vishnu,119-21,trans.J. Jolly,in SacredBooks of the East (Oxford,
1880;reprintedDelhi, 1965),VII, 159.
7Pahlavi Texts, ch. XXII, Pt. IV, Contents of the Nasks, trans, E. W. West,
SacredBooks,vol. 37.
78Pahlavi
Texts, Pt. V, MarvelsofZoroastrianismin SacredBooks,vol. 47, p. 152.

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JOHN PASSMORE

He opposes, for example, the caging of birds. Anyone who enjoys

torturingliving creatures,he says, "is of the same companyas Chieh
and Chou,"two emperorsrenownedfor theircruelty.79He tells a story
about the effect on the Emperorwhen he was informed-falsely, as it
turnedout-that one of his courtiershad cut off the legs of a livingdog
to feed to his hawks.The emperorconcludedthat his courtier"mustbe
a vile and loathsome man." (Contrastthe reactionof Saint Francisto
the tale of the pig'strotters.)Kenkoexpressessurprisethat the courtier
shouldhave kept hawks. "A man who can look on sentientcreatures
withoutfeelingcompassionis no humanbeing."80
It is often suggestedthat it was their beliefin transmigrationwhich
led some Eastern religiousteachers to lay such stress on the proper
treatmentof animals.Undoubtedlythis has had an effect. In Western
Europe, belief in transmigrationhas been uncommon.But the tale is
told of Pythagorasthat, passingby whena puppywas beingwhipped,he
protested:"Stop, do not beat it; for it is the soul of a friend that I
recognizedwhen I heard it giving tongue."s' Malvolio was orthodox,
however, in rejecting "the opinion of Pythagoras ... that the soul of

our grandammighthaply inhabita bird."82His groundfor refusingto

follow Pythagoras,he tells us, was that "I thinknoblyof the soul." No
one, however, has taught more nobly of the soul than did Plato. If
Christianityfinally rejected the Platonic theory of the soul, it was
indeed because Plato thought too nobly of it. Yet, in that very same
Phaedo in whichhe describesthe soul as god-like,he accepts transmigration.The theoryof the soul, however,whichAquinastook over from
Aristotle, accordingto which the soul is the form of the body, completely rules out, as Aristotle expressly observes, the possibility of
Once more, theology was of vital importancein detransmigration.83
an
attitude
to nature. Or, not to beg the causal question,in
termining
such
an
attitude,for it might be the case that the theoryof
expressing
can
transmigration only flourishin a society in whichanimals,as such,
are not sharplydifferentiatedfromhumanbeings.
Let us now try to sum up. We have been tracing the process by
whichWesternmen have divestedthemselvesof certainrightsto treat
animals as they please. We have seen that throughoutthe intellectual
history of the Westernworld there have been occasional philosophers
79Kenko, Essays in Idleness, ?121, trans. Donald Keene (New York, 1967), 101,
104.
80Ibid.,? 128, 107-08.
81Trans.in Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), 222
(DK 268).
82TwelfthNight, Act IV, Sc. 2.
83Aristotle, De Anima 1.3, 407b, 24-25 and Aquinas' Commentary on the De
Anima, trans. K. Foster and S. Humphries (London, 1957), Bk. 2.

THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS

217

or theologianswhohavecondemnedsuch crueltyas intrinsicallywrong.

Other moralists,however,have soughtto show that it is wrongonly indirectly, in so far as cruelty to animals encouragescruelty to man.
There can be little doubt that they favoredthis indirectapproachbecause they began from the theologicalpresuppositionthat man, in his
treatment of Nature, was completely at liberty to deal with it as he
pleased,except in so far as his doingso adverselyaffectedhimselfor his
fellow-humans.
It was not only animals, however,who were thought of as things
rather than as animate beings;slaves and barbarianswere put in the
same class. Man's treatment of animals was no worse than his
treatment of a great many of his fellow humanbeings The attack on
slavery, at the hands of the evangelicalsand of Bentham,ran hand-inhandwith the attack on crueltyto animals.Susceptibilityto suffering,
ratherthan rationality,was thoughtof as the dividingline betweenwhat
could,andwhatcouldnot, be dealtwithas Westernmanthoughtfit.
In the East, moralists have condemnedthe killing of animal life
ratherthan crueltyto it. But crueltyto beasts of burden,at least, was
regardedas reprehensibleand at times compassion for animals was
carried beyond that point. Such compassion met with no resistance
from theology.
Once a definitesocial movementgot underway in the West withits
objectivethe restrictingof man's treatmentof animals,it movedwith
relativerapidity.Moral philosophersbegan to regardit as an obvious
truth that it is wrong to treat animalscruelly. So the history we have
been tracingis at once discouraging,in so far as it took two thousand
years for Western men to agree that it is wrong to treat animals
cruelly, and encouragingin so far as it suggests that man's opinionon
such matters can changewith considerablerapidity.This is especially
true nowadayswhenthe critic of man's treatmentof Nature no longer
has to contendwith a generalpersuasionthat in this respectman'sconduct must be left unconfined.It should be observed,however,that if
our analysis of the situationis correct, then this changein moral attitude resulted in a restrictionof rights rather than an extension of
them.
The degreeof restrictionplacedon humanbehavior,furthermore,is
relativelyslight. Whereasit once used to be argued, as by Newman,
that the least human good compensates for any possible amount of
animalsuffering,the currentdoctrineis that it requiresa considerable
good to compensatefor such suffering.Thereis far from beinga precise
analogy, however,betweenthe importanceattached to animal and to
human suffering.So whileit is generallyagreedthat it is wrongto experimenton human beingswithouttheir consent in the expectationof
making scientific discoveries,there is no such general opposition to

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JOHN PASSMORE

animalvivisection.Biologicalwarfareagainsthumanbeingsis generally
condemnedbut not biological warfare against animals. Man-hunting
is ruled out as a sport but not, at least with the same degree of
unanimity,fox or birdhunting.In all these cases, of course, a minority
opinionwould supportlaws whichgo furtherthan the presentlaws in
limitingthe circumstancesin which men are entitled to cause pain to
animals. But not so far as seriouslyto limit man's dominationof the
world.
AustralianNationalUniversity.