Académique Documents
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OF THE UNITEDSTATES
Obstacles To U.S. Ability To
Control And Track Weapons-Grade
Uranium Supplied Abroad
!,$+k*
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iii&
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GAO/ID-82-21
AUGUST
2, t 982
Requast
sent to:
(202) 2756241
ch8ckYJlouldbemede
to the Superintendent
of Docum8nts.
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL
WASHINGTON
OF
D.C.
THE
UNITED
STATES
20548
B-207024
The Honorable
United States
Dear Senator
Gary W. Hart
Senate
Hart:
Comptroller
General
of the United States
of
unless
COMPTROLLERGENERAL'S
REPORTTO THE
HONORABLEGARY HART
UNITED STATES SENATE
DIGEST
------
ENRICHED URANIUM
Sheet
GAO/ID-82-21
AUGUST
2,1982
--Some
countries
have limited
U.S. access at their
nuclear facilities.
Some visits
had to be made
to "representative"
facilities
rather
than those
handling or receiving
U.S. materials.
--Some
ii
--Intervals
between
have been as long
visits
to
as 5 years.
some
countries
(See p. 19.)
Nevertheless,
U.S. officials
believe
that the
levels of physical
security
have improved as
a result
of U.S. initiatives.
Moreover,
the
establishment
of an ?nternational
convention
for protecting
nuclear materials,
particularly
in transit,
represents
a growing effort
to establish
some universally
acceptable
standards
for physical
protection.
(See p. 27.)
COMMONSAFEGUARDSPROBLEMS
The problems of safeguarding
weapons-grade
nuclear materials,
including
highly enriched
uranium, can be significant.
The State
Department said that the application
of
safeguards
by the International
Atomic Energy
Agency is uneven for a variety
of reasons
and the Agency often fails
to meet
its
own
goals.
(See p. 29.)
It has been generally
recognized
that bulk
handling facilities,
such as fuel fabrication
and enrichment
plants,
pose significant
safeguards
difficulties.
During the review#
GAO learned that the International
Atomic
Energy Agency has been able to carry out only
50 percent of its estimated
routine
inspection
effort
and that a number of research reactors
which use highly enriched uranium,
including
a few with significant
quantities
of fuel,
were
not
being visited
even once a year.
According
to
the Agency, the approximate
time to convert highly
enriched uranium into usable material
for a nuclear
explosive
device is 7 to 10 days for unirradiated,
pure form, material
and 1 to 3 months for irradiated
material.
(See p. 29.)
For research reactors
that were inspected,
specific
information
about the Agency's ability
to meet
its timely detection
goals is not made
public.
U.S. and International
Atomic Energy
Agency officials,
nevertheless,
agree in general
terms
that the effectiveness
of safeguards
has
been adversely
influenced
by (1) a limited
number
of inspectors
and (2) a lack of suitable
techniques
and equipment.
To secure sufficient
numbers of
inspectors
and equipment,
in the long-term,
will
require
broad financial
and political
support by
member nations.
(See p. 29.)
Tear Sheet
U.S.
iV
As part
of the review
process
relating
to the
extension
and possible
expansion
of the authority
to accept
spent research
reactor
fuel,
the Secretary
of Energy should
also determine
the principal
reasons
why only a small
percentage
of spent highly
enriched
uranium
has been returned
in the past and adequately
address
the disincentives
to some countries
in
returning
such spent
fuels.
(See p. 18.)
AGENCY COMMENTS
In commenting
on the draft
of this
report,
the
Departments
of Energy and State,
the Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission,
and the Arms Control
and
Disarmament
Agency were generally
supportive
of
the thrust
of GAO's conclusions
and recommendations.
They did offer
suggestions
to improve
the
clarity
and technical
accuracy
or to provide
a
more balanced
presentation.
The report
has been
modified
to reflect
their
comments which are
reprinted
in appendices
VIII
through
XI.
In line
with
the GAO recommendation,
DOE is
initiating
a review
to examine
the increased
integration
of the various
systems
gathering
information
on highly
enriched
uranium.
(See p. 80.)
DOE commented
that
it has been actively
working
to extend
the authority
to accept
spent highly
enriched
uranium.
It is also considering
expanding
the authority
to permit
the acceptance
of the low enriched
uranium
fuels
currently
being
developed.
However,
the Department
also recognizes
several
disincentives
to countries
regarding
the
return
of spent highly
enriched
uranium.
(See p. 75.1
Tear
Sheet
CONTENTS
Page
DIGEST
CHAPTER
1
INTRODUCTION
Historical
overview of U.S.-supplied
Assessment of risk
Objectives,
scope, and methodology
HEU
19
security
8
9
12
14
16
17
18
19
20
27
27
28
29
29
30
31
32
34
35
36
36
42
42
44
45
45
Page
CHAPTER
6
47
47
49
52
53
54
54
APPENDIXES
I
Request Letter
from Senator
Dated July 14, 1981
Gary Hart
II
U.S. Shipments
1954
III
59
IV
Summary of Criteria
for Cooperation
60
to Renegotiate
Status of U.S. Efforts
Agreements for Cooperation
61
VI
64
VII
Countries
Which Have Signed And/Or
Ratified
the Convention on the
Physical Protection
of Nuclear
Materials
68
VIII
Letter
dated
Department
April
1, 1982 from the
of State
69
IX
Letter dated
Department
April
15, 1982 from the
of Energy
73
Letter
dated April 1, 1982 from the
U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
83
XI
Letter
dated April
12, 1982 from the
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
87
of HEU Since
for
56
58
Agreemet'ItS
Security
Breaches
from 1966-1979
ABBREVIATIONS
ACDA
Arms
Control
and Disarmament
DOE
Department
of
EURATOM
European
Atomic
GAO
General
HEU
highly
IAEA
International
IPELTS
International
License
LEU
low
NMMSS/INMTS
Nuclear
Materials
Management
Safeguards
System/International
Nuclear
Materials
Tracking
Energy
Energy
Accounting
enriched
enriched
Agency
Community
Office
uranium
Atomic
Energy
Agency
Programs
Export
Tracking
System
uranium
NNPA
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
NRC
Nuclear
Regulatory
RERTR
Reduced Enrichment
and Test Reactors
STAMAS
Special
Nuclear
Material
and Management
System
UNSSOD
United
Nations
Special
on Disarmament
System
Act
Commission
for
Research
Tracking
Session
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On July 14, 1981, Senator Gary Hart requested
that we
undertake an investigation
covering
certain
issues dealing with
the U.S. ability
to control
and account for the use of the highly
enriched uranium (HEU) L/ fuel it exports.
(See app. I.)
In
response to his request,
this report
reviews U.S. efforts
to
minimize the use of HEU, describes
the various U.S. controls
over this type of nuclear fuel and the physical
security
and
international
safeguards
related
to it,
and assesses U.S.
efforts
to keep track of its exports of HEU.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEWOF U.S.-SUPPLIED
HEU
L/Highly
enriched uranium refers
to uranium which has been
enriched
to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235.
However,
HEU is typically
uranium enriched
to 93 percent U-235,
1
Presidential
approval
than 15 kilograms.
for
any supply
--Undertake
efforts
to identify
projects
and facilities
which might be converted
to use LEU instead of HEU.
--Take steps to minimize
uranium abroad.
inventories
of weapons-usable
A/LEU refers
to uranium which has been enriched
to about
20 percent in the isotope U-235 and is generally
considered
to be non-weapons usable.
2
has called
upon the executive
branch
enriched
fuels
for research
reactors
time."
The executive
branch
has had
to reduce
for
the past several
years
and thus improve
the proliferation-resistance
cycles.
"to substitute
lower
at the earliest
possible
a high priority
program
the HEU inventories
abroad
of related
fuel
According
to the Argonne National
Laboratory,
current
worldwide
use and inventory
levels
create
a considerable
concern
that HEU might
be diverted
for non-peaceful
purposes
while
in fabrication,
transport,
or storage
and, particularly,
while
it is still
unirradiated.
Concerning
the proliferation
risks
and the need for the
State
and ACDA officials
made
reduced
enrichment
program,
HEU
involves
weapons-usable
the following
assessment
in 1978.
Even irradiated
material
at all
points
of the fuel
cycle.
research
reactor
fuel
involving
the use of 90 percent
enriched
uranium
in significant
quantities
can pose a substantial
hypothetical
risk,
in that
the enrichment
level
of the residual
The officials
material
is still
typically
80 percent
or more.
added that
the relatively
greater
ease of reprocessing
metal
in HEU means that
only modest reprocessing
capabilities--even
large
hot cells-could
produce
enough material
for one or
more weapons per year.
These officials
also stated
that
a single
seizure
of a
significant
quantity
of HEU by an irresponsible
government
or terrorist
group could
have profound
repercussions
for the
security
of all
nations
and would almost
certainly
have a
highly
negative
impact
on all
peaceful
nuclear
activities
to the detriment
of all
nations.
Furthermore,
the officials
said that
the dangers
are not limited
to material
located
in
irresponsible
nations.
They said that an irresponsible
nation,
or a sub-national
groupl
might
seize material
from
the territory
of the most responsible
nation.
Thus,
they
concluded
the problem
is no respector
of the political
orientation,
social
system,
location,
alliance
relation
or even
nuclear-weapons-nation
status
of the nation
concerned.
The
officials
indicated
that
to the extent
that
LEU can be substituted
for HEU, it will
eliminate
the problem.
OBJECTIVES,
In line
with Senator
Hart's
request,
review
was to assess
the U.S. ability
to
for its
exports
of HEU.
As specifically
objectives
of this
review
were to:
(1)
the thrust
of this
control
and account
requested,
the
Evaluate
the mechanisms
established
in international
agreements
of cooperation
for controlling
the use of U.S.- supplied
HEU fuel
and assuring
adequate
protection
of HEU fuel
shipments
from
terrorists.
4
(2)
(3)
Ascertain
the rationale
for supplying
HEU fuel to
foreign
countries
and the possible
nuclear proliferation
consequences.
(4)
of the International
Atomic
Energy Agency
(IAEA)
to detect
diversions
of
HEU and fissionable
materials
produced from this
fuel,
through material
accounting
techniques
and
containment
and surveillance
devices.
Review
programs
Session
the implementation
announced at the
on
Disarmament
and effects
of the U.S.
United Nations Special
in 1978
aimed at limiting
in research
reac.tors,
as well
Folicy initiatives
in this
(5)
(6)
Government
sources
laboratories
U.S. national
laboratories
are Government-owned,
contractor-operated
facilities
which conduct extensive
research
and development.
To gain insight
into the state-of-the-art
of
of safeguards,
we contacted
officials
at Erookhaven, Los Alamos,
5
U.S.
LEU
We obtained
information
on
fuel from officials
at the
industry
We discussed
the U.S. conversion
program to LEU with
representatives
of General Atomics, Atomics International,
and
We also talked with an official
at Allied
Babcock and Wilcox.
General's
Nuclear Fuel Plant in Barnwell,
South Carolina,
to
learn about reprocessing
differences
between high and low
enriched
uranium.
Embassies
of foreign
nations
reviewed
In addition,
reports,
including
a number of other
the following:
--Annual
Presidential
Proliferation
--International
--1978
U.F.
of
Proliferation
--Our
Reports
Nuclear
Special
--Congressional
--Office
published
we reviewed
on Nuclear
Fuel Cycle
Seseion
Research
reports
on related
reports
reports
reports
Technology Assessment
and Safeguards
previous
Evaluation
on Disarmament
Service
Non-
Report
on Nuclear
issues
(See app.
III.)
Agency comments
We obtained
comments from the Departments of Energy
and State,
NRC, and ACDA on the draft
of this
report.
(DOE)
We also received
technical
comments from the Argonne and
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories,
as well as DOE's
Savannah River Plant and Oak Ridge Operations
Office.
The comments offered
suggestions
and technical
accuracy of the report
6
balanced presentation
and we have modified
the report
to
reflect
their
comments.
We also have included the general
comments provided
by the four agencies in appendices VIII
through XI.
Limitations
In conducting
our review,
we were confronted
by two
We believe,
however, these limitations
do not
limitations.
significantly
detract
from our evaluation,
--IAEA does not provide member nations with the
results
of its inspections
in a particular
nation
or any related
documents.
does
Thus, this report
not reflect
problems associated
with a specific
nation or facility,
but rather
includes
a general
overview of safeguards
implementation.
In addition (1) we do not have audit authority
at IAEA,
(2) IAEA does not make public
specific
information
about safeguards
implementation,
and (3) some information we had hoped to include
in the discussion
of
safeguards
over HEU was classified
by the executive
branch and therefore
was not included
in this report.
We did not obtain IAEA comments on this report.
--DOE has not yet completed verification
of the International
Nuclear Materials
Tracking System for completeness
and accuracy.
Although we cite data and
statistics
from this computer system, we recognize
its possible
shortcomings.
(We discuss the difficulties
with this system in ch. 5.)
CHAPTER 2
CONTROLSOVER U.S.-SUPPLIED
HEU FUEL
has been
It is used
show that only about 7 percent of all HEU exported has been
returned
as spent fuel. L/
According
to U.S. officials,
factors,
such as the minimum charge for accepting
spent HEU and high shipping costs, may be discouraging
some nations
from returning
such
fuel.
The authority
to accept spent U.S.- supplied
research reactor
HEU) fuel,
unless extended,
will
expire in December 1982.
(e.g.,
State and DOE officials
commented that they are in the process of
revising
the regulations,
but that several disincentives
are
hampering the return
of this fuel.
AGREEMENTSFOR COOPERATIONSET CONDITIONS
Agreements for cooperation
are a precondition
for export
of nuclear material,
including
HEU, to other nations
and,
generally,
do not legally
commit the United States to make such
exports.
Legal commitments exist only with the conclusion
of specific
supply contracts
and the issuance of specific
export licenses
for such exports.
Certain
controls
in the
agreements are designed to assure both the United States and
the recipient
nation or group of nations
that materials
and
equipment transferred
between the parties
will
be used
for authorized
purposes only
and will
be properly
safeguarded.
As of February 1, 1982, the United States had agreements
with 25 individual
countries
and 2 international
organizations.
Agreements for cooperation
are not exactly
alike,
due to
provisions
tailored
to the needs of recipients,
changes in U.S.
statutory
and regulatory
requirements,
new international
treaties,
technological
developments,
and an evolving
U.S.
non-proliferation
policy.
They also differ
according
to the
scope of nuclear cooperation
involved.
Most agreements cover
both research and power applications
of nuclear energy: a few
older agreements cover only research or power.
The duration
of
the agreements also varies.
Early agreements for research
applications
ran for 5 to 10 years, while agreements for
power applications
ran up to 40 years.
Newer agreements
have customarily
covered both research and power applications
and run about 30 years.
Prior to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act (NNPA), the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 had specified
that each agreement
contain guarantees
that safeguards
would be maintained,
U.S.
nuclear exports would not be used for atomic weapons, and
materials
would not be retransferred
except as allowed under
the agreement.
In practice,
agreements in effect
in 1978
typically
contained
controls
above and beyond those required
by
L/Minor
fuels.
in forms
other
than spent
common to most
--Cooperating
nations guarantee
that (11 material
provided
under the agreement will
not be used for
atomic weapons, for research and/or development of
device;
atomic weapons, or for any nuclear explosive
(2) material
made available
and, in most cases,
material
produced from supplied material
will
not
be transferred
to unauthorized
persons or beyond
the jurisdiction
of the cooperating
party except
as authorized
by DOE; and (3) safeguards
will
be
maintained
on such material.
--Enriched
uranium may not be supplied
in excess
of a ceiling
specified
in the agreement. A/
A specific
technical
or economic justification
may be required
for supplying
uranium that is
enriched to more than 20 percent because of the
suitability
of HEU for weapons development as
well as for use in reactors.
--The reprocessing
of any special
nuclear material
may be performed
in facilities
acceptable
to both
parties
upon a joint
determination
that the safeguards provisions
of the agreement may be effectively
applied,
or with the prior
approval of the
United States.
The NNPA added six new criteria
for agreements to the 1954
Act and expanded three others.
(See app. IV.)
Some of these
changes codify what had been U.S. practice,
while others extend
controls
beyond those in pre-1978 agreements or the new export
licensing
criteria.
Two of the most important
changes involve
safeguard requirements and U.S. prior
consent rights.
A cooperating
partner's
safeguard
requirements
regarding
U.S. nuclear exports
are
specified
with greater
clarity
than before,
and non-nuclear
weapon nation partners
must also have IAEA safeguards
maintained with respect
to all peaceful
nuclear activities
at the
time of the export.
U.S. prior
consent rights
over the reprocessing of spent U.S. -origin
fuel are now required
in future
agreements.
(Similar
provisions
were already part of most
existing
U.S. agreements.)
Furthermore,
in future
agreements,
prior
consent rights
to be obtained
by the United States over
reprocessing
and retransfers
are to be expanded to cover
materials
used in or produced through the use of U.S. nuclear
exports.
Thus, under a new agreement,
if a nation were
to use non-U.S.
fuel in a U.S. supplied
reactor,
it would
have to obtain U.S. permission
to reprocess or retransfer
Most of the agreements existing
in 1978
the spent fuel.
did not include prior
consent rights
involving
non-U.S,
fuel,
nor are such rights
required
under the export licensing
criteria
established
in the NNPA.
Recent agreements for cooperation
have included provisions
respects,
more restrictive
than other
that are, in certain
For
example,
agreements
agreements or than the law requires.
for cooperation
concluded since 1978 typically
limit
the
quantity
of transferred
nuclear material,
such as HEU, to
amounts sufficient
for the loading and continuous,
efficient
operation
of reactors
or for use in reactor
experiments,
or
In cases where
for other purposes as agreed by both parties.
the new agreements (with such
HEU supply is provided
for,
countries
as Peru and Indonesia)
provide that if excess amounts
the United States has a right
to require
of HEU are accumulated,
with
the return
of some HEU. Other new agreements (e.g.,
Egypt r Morocco, and Bangladesh) do not provide for the transfer
of any special nuclear material
other than slightly
enriched
uranium, except for insignificant
quantities
for certain
specified uses.
In addition,
DOE officials
pointed out that in
newer agreements,
the cooperating
nation authorizes
IAEA to
provide the United States with nuclear
inventory
data.
Renegotiation
progress
is slow
U.S.
for
--application
of IAEA safeguards
(for non-nuclear
weapon nations,
IAEA safeguards
must
be maintained
on all of their peaceful
nuclear activities
at the
time of export from the United States),
12
--adequate
physical
security
measures,
--prior
U.S. approval
export,
and
for
any enrichment
to
of
or other
of the
and economic
justification
merit"
for new
is tightly
restricted
J/Includes
Defense,
officials
from the Departments
and Commerce, ACDA, and NRC.
13
of State,
Energy,
to a finding
of *'exceptional
such a determination
cials,
--The level and type
involvement.
merit."
According
to U.S. offiis to be based on several criteria:
or nature
of government
--Fuel
alternatives
available,
i.e.,
the need for
the reactor
in question
and its design
requirements
which necessitate
HEU fuel usage.
--The
country's
--The
nature
non-proliferation
of a high-powered
credentials.
research
reactor.
Weight in kilograms
of returned
spent HEU
element weight
Contained
3.4
2.3
Belgium
86.6
63.2
Canada
408.2
268.9
37.9
25.9
France
408.2
324.6
Germany, West
131.5
93.5
Italy
12.0
9.6
Japan
69.8
61.8
.6
.4
105.5
80.4
19.0
14.3
204.1
153.8
Denmark
Mexico
Netherlands
South Africa
Sweden
United
Kingdom
Total
.4
11487.2
U-235
.3
1,099.o
15
DOE is required
to recover the full
cost for all fuel
As a result,
cycle services
rendered to non-DOE customers.
DOE has a minimum charge for accepting
and reprocessing
spent
HEU which reflects
an estimate
of the cost of providing
processing
services
for small quantities
of material.
The
charge includes process system start-up
costs,
recovery
operations,
and plant clean-out
for materials
accountability.
DOE believes
it is logical
that the per kilogram cost for
processing
small quantities
of fuels is higher than for larger
batches because much of the process is insensitive
to the
quantity
of material
involved.
According to a Savannah River official,
the minimum
charge is currently
$30,000 plus a charge per kilogram
for
He estimated
that a country would need to
waste management.
return
about 100 kilograms
at one time for it to be cost
As a result,
the minimum charge can act as a diseffective.
incentive
to nations with smaller volumes of spent HEU,
These countries
tend
according
to some U.S. officials.
to store spent fuel and accumulate it to make the minimum
charge economically
justifiable.
One ACDA official
believes
it would better
serve non-proliferation
goals to abolish
the minimum charge or adjust it selectively
for different
countries.
DOE's Federal Register
Notice concerning
authority
to
take back and reprocess
spent U.S. -supplied
HEU expires
in
An ACDA official
said it is critical
that
December 1982.
this authority
be extended.
He added that it might be
desirable
to also expand the authority,
if possible,
to
allow for U.S. retrieval
of spent foreign-origin
HEU fuel.
He also said that this would help advance U.S. nonproliferation
interests
by further
preventing
spent fuel
accumulation
in countries'
inventories
and provide
them
an alternative
to developing
their
own reprocessing
capabilities.
CONCLUSIONS
International
agreements for cooperation,,
licenses,
and regulatory
review of subsequent
are the mechanisms by which the United States
its exports of HEU.
export
arrangements
can control
However,
do for non-weapons-grade
slightly
enriched uranium.
the additional
care taken in analyzing
the justifications
for proposed exports of HEU have resulted
in reduced quantities of material
being exported and the deferral
of shipments
in a few cases.
To minimize the risks of having weapons-grade material
accumulated abroad, the United States has had the authority
for years to accept the return
of HEU of U.S.-origin
from
However, only a limited
amount of U.S.-supplied
other nations.
Moreover,
the authority
to accept
HEU has been returned.
in 1982 and a decision
on
spent U.S. -supplied
HEU expires
extending
it will
need to be made during 1982 if this practice
is to continue.
the practice
of accepting
We believe that,
in general,
spent U.S. -supplied
HEU fuel is beneficial
to the overall
U.S.
In our
non-proliferation
strategy
and should be continued.
draft
report,
we suggested that DOE (1) extend the authority
HEU and (2) consider
the conto accept spent U.S. -supplied
cerns expressed by U.S. officials
that the minimum standard
charge for accepting
and reprocessing
spent HEU acts as a
disincentive
to some countries.
AGENCY COMMENTS
DOE commented that it has had active plans underway for
several months to extend the U.S. offer
to reprocess
and
HEU irradiated
in foreign
research reactors.
store U.S. -origin
DOE indicated
that the offer would be extended before the
current
Federal Register
Notice expires at the end of 1982.
With regard to the minimum reprocessinq
charge, DOE believes
sufficient
flexibility
exists
in U.S. policy to permit several
small users to combine their
spent fuel into single batches.
DOE added that it has encouraged this type of batching
in the
past and intends to encourage it to a greater
degree in the
future.
Given its obligation
to recover its full
costs in
such activities,
however, DOE does not anticipate
that it
will
be feasible
to reduce its charges.
issues
In responding
to our draft,
those commenting raised other
about accepting
spent research reactor
fuel.
For example,
--The State Department agreed with our suggestion
that
the authority
to accept spent U.S.-supplied
HEU be
extended.
Additionally,
State commented that the
authority
should be expanded to permit the return of
the LEU fuels being developed to replace the currently
used HEU. Without such a U.S. commitment in the near
future,
the State Department believes
the implementation
of the program to reduce the levels of HEU abroad will
be significantly
delayed.
DOE is now considering
the
incorporation
of provisions
in the Federal Register
17
--According
to the Argonne National
Laboratory,
the cost
of shipping spent HEU from foreign
reactors
to an
assigned DOE reprocessing
facility
is probably a greater
disincentive
than the minimum reprocessing
charge.
--NRC commented that on at least one occasion a country was
reluctant
to return HEU because DOE has no authority
to
reimburse
for the value of reclaimed material
and U.S.
export policies
preclude reimbursement
through provision
of material-in-kind.
RECOMMENDATIONTO THE SECRETARYOF ENERGY
As part of the review process relating
to the extension
and
possible
expansion of the authority
to accept spent research
reactor
fuel,
we recommend that the Secretary
of Energy determine
the principal
reasons why only a small percentage of spent HEU
has been returned
in the past and adequately
address the disincentives
to some countries
in returning
such spent fuel.
18
CHAPTER 3
U.S.
ABILITY
TO ENSURE ADEQUATE
19
or extortion
to gain concessions
such as freeing
establishment;
In short,
terrorists
are interested
in those actions
prisoners.
cause harm to the public or otherthat may directly
or indirectly
wise undermine government ability
to inspire
public confidence
and to control
events.
the United States and other countries
Since the mid-1960s,
and acts of sabotage or
have experienced
an upsurge in threats
Although such acts may
violence
directed
at nuclear facilities.
not involve the efforts
of organized
terrorist
groups specifically to divert
nuclear materials
for the purpose of making an
explosive
device,
the incidents,
whatever the .motives,
illustrate
Eetween
1966
and 1979, at least
the need for physical
security.
39 physical
security
incidents
occurred at nuclear facilities.
VI
for
a
listing
of
the
attacks
and/or physical
security
(See app.
Nuclear
terrorist
acts
have
breaches at nuclear facilities.)
continued
through 1982 with the January 19 assault on the
Creys-Malville
fast breeder reactor
under construction
in
Lyons, France.
Although terrorists
firing
five Soviet-made
antitank rockets
caused no injuries
and little
damage, they scored
four direct
hits on the plant's
concrete outer shell,
demonstrating
the severity
of the challenge
to physical
protection.
As a 1976 U.S.
Government
report
on
nuclear
export
activities
said:
$
1
:
/
II * * * any vulnerability
in the fuel
cycle might conceivbe exploited
if it could be used for financial
return
or in some way cause
harm to the public,
or at least
threaten
such harm in a way that concessions would have to
be made. * * * The physical
security
* * * system must be
based on an assumption that the possibility
of a serious
threat
exists."
ably
20
Physical
security
is a sensitive
subject
internationally,
because it is considered
to be a matter within
a country's
domesConsequently,
some
countries
limit
U.S.
access
tic jurisdiction.
Nevertheless,
in export licensing,
to their
nuclear facilities.
NRC and other Federal agencies have relied
on the results
of these
visits
to judge the adequacy of physical
security
measures in the
recipient
country.
Physical
security
standards
Storage
tration
of materials
in areas
resistance
and delay:
which
provide
and storage
areas
pene-
(ii)
Protection
intrusion
(iii)
(iv)
Armed offsite
(VI
Independent
duplicated
transmission
two-way voice communication.
of processing
alarm system;
forces
21
capable
with
of response;
system
for
(vi)
Procedures
continuing
processing
to control
surveillance
areas;
(vii)
Protection
of transport
by escorts
or guards to be
armed if armed emergency teams are not available
for timely response to prevent attempted
theft
and
facilitate
recovery;
(viii)
Transport
in vehicles
equipped with communications
capable of calling
for assistance
from the local
police
or emergency team;
2
$
(ix)
A program for
and individuals
determining
trustworthiness
of guards
who have access to nuclear materials.
protection
reviews
any
are limited
22
Countries
visited
Facilities
reviewed
1974
1975
17
28
1976
20
38
1977
15
1978
1979
1980
1981
17
5
J/Bangladesh,
Bolivia,
Czechoslovakia,
Iran, Vietnam, and Zaire.
With the exception
of Iran,
which has received 5.2 kilograms,
the others have each received no more than a few grams in total
shipments.
NRC noted that physical
security
visit
are not
required
for gram quantity
amounts and that the shipment to
Iran was made before the United States established
physical
security
requirements
for exports.
23
for
initiating
visits
1.
Political
unrest or increased
terrorist
the country
since the last visit.
2.
3.
Significant
improvements in physical
occurred since the last visit.
4.
Consideration
of the time
since
by U.S.
activity
under
since
security
the last
in
conthe
have
visit.
The following
table
shows the number of facilities
in each
country visited
since the review program began and the date of
these visits.
Number of
sites visited
Date of Visit
Country
December 1974
France
April
Sweden
Netherlands
West Germany
Italy
1
1
3
3
Japan
Republic of China
(Taiwan)
Philippines
South Korea
Canada
South Africa
Romania
Turkey
Pakistan
2
1
1
Denmark
Sweden
United Kingdom
1
2
2
1975
June-July
July
1975
1975
August
1975
September
Oct.
i/A
1975
- Nov.
1975
designation
in IAEA's physical
security
includes
a facility
containing
5 kilograms
diated HEU.
24
3
1
1
guidelines
which
or more of unirra-
Number of
sites visited
Date of visit
Country
November 1975
India
Yugoslavia
February
Japan
Philippines
Thailand
Indonesia
Australia
April
1976
Austria
Switzerland
Spain
Belgium
France
Italy
1976
Argentina
Brazil
June 1976
July
- August
October
July
1
2
1
Portugal
Israel
Greece
1976
Finland
Norway
Ireland
Luxembourg
1976
1977
September
2
1
1977
Japan
Thailand
Malaysia
2
3
1
Colombia
Venezuela
1
2
December 1977
Argentina
Uruguay
Paraguay
Peru
October
1978
Mexico
October
1979
Netherlands
Belgium
Switzerland
a/Visit
conducted
as part
(note
of IAEA support
25
a)
1
3
1
program.
Number of
sites visited
Date of visit
Country
United Kingdom
Denmark
France
2
1
2
March - April
Switzerland
Spain
3
2
South Korea
Japan
2
4
Italy
West Germany
2
3
November
1980
1980
September
1981
No future
visits
planned
as of December 1981.
26
the reported
resistance
of certain
information.
In addition,
nations
to hosting
return
visits
by U.S. teams threatens
the
tinuation
of the review
program.
con-
The establishment
of an international
convention
for protecting
nuclear
materials,
particularly
in transit,
represents
a growing
effort
to establish
some universally
acceptable
standards
for physical
protection.
AGENCY COMMENTS
DOE commented
that
in all
of the 41 countries
visited
one or
more times,
there
has been, in general,
excellent
cooperation.
U.S. physical
security
teams have visited
representative
nuclear
facilities
in each country
and all
facilities
in most countries.
However,
DOE pointed
out that
countries
view physical
security
as
a national
responsibility
and not one to be executed
by the United
States
or IAEA.
DOE feels
this
is a reasonable
position.
According
to DOE, the U.S. team has emphasized
to each country
that
the mutual
benefits
to be derived
by an exchange
of informaThe United
tion would be improved
security
systems
worldwide,
States
has provided
suggestions
for improvements,
when appropriate,
and has held up some exports
until
systems
were upgraded
to satisfactory
levels.
DOF, believes
the results
of this
program
have
been encouraging
as evidenced
by an international
awareness
and
concern
of the risks,
a willingness
to cooperate,
and commitments
to upgrade programs
where needed.
28
CHAPTER 4
PROBLEKS WITH INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS
IAEA safeguards
are aimed at providing
timely
detection
of
diversion
of nuclear
material
from peaceful
nuclear
activities.
the adequacy
of such safeguards
has been increasingly
However,
In general
terms,
IAEA and U.S.
challenged
in recent
months.
officials
admit
that
IAEA inspectors
have experienced
some
difficulty
in meeting
the Agency's
timely
detection
goals
at
the facilities
inspected.
During
our review,
we learned
that
IAEA has been able to
carry
out only about half
of its estimated
routine
inspection
effort
and that
a number of research
reactors,
including
a few
with
significant
quantities
of HEU, were not being visited
even
once a year.
If HEU were diverted,
it could
be converted
for
use in a nuclear
explosive
device
in as short
as 7 to 10 days.
Details
on IAEA's
ability
to meet its own timely
detection
goals
for HEU at facilities
it has inspected
are not available
to the public.
Nevertheles.s,
U.S. and IAEA officials
agree that
the general
effectiveness
of IAEA safeguards
has been adversely
influenced
by
several
factors,
including
(1) a limited
number of inspectors
and
(2) a lack of suitable
techniques
and equipment.
To secure
sufficient
numbers of inspectors
and equipment,
in the long-term,
will
require
broad financial
and political
support
by member nations.
IAEA
DETECTION
The objective
ABILITY
of
IAEA
safeguards
is
to
provide
" * * * timely
detection
of diversion
of
tities
of nuclear
material
from peaceful
to the manufacture
of nuclear
weapons or
sive devices
or for purposes
unknown,
and
diversion
by the risk
of early
detection."
significant
quannuclear
activities
other
nuclear
explodeterrence
of such
To measure
its ability
to meet this
objective,
IAEA established
detection
goals
in 1979 in which
it defined
a significant
quantity
of nuclear
material
as the approximate
amount needed to
construct
a nuclear
explosive
device.
For example,
IAEA considers
25 kilograms
(about
55 pounds)
of contained
HEU to be enough to
make a nuclear
explosive
device.
Fccording
to IAEA, timely
detection
refers
to the ability
to identify
any diversion
within
the
approximate
time needed to convert
nuclear
material
into
the fissile
Lomponent
of a nuclear
explosive
device.
For certain
forms
of HEU that
time could
be as short
as 7 to 10 days.
For irradiated
HEU, the detection
time is 1 to 3 months.
According
to
DOE, IAEA determined
that
detection
goals,
such as 25 kilograms,
29
were considered
reasonable
for a non-nuclear
weapon nation because
of the difficulties
such a nation would have in making efficient
use of the material
in making a bomb. DOE added that nuclear
weapon experts
from various nuclear weapon nations,
including
the
advised IAEA on this determination.
United States,
In commenting on a draft
of this report,
ACDA said that
IAEA's policy
is to inspect every facility
at least once a year
and that this policy
is not dependent on the particular
goal being
reactors
possessing more than
used.
According to DOE, research
a significant
quantity
of fissile
material
are inspected with a
frequency governed by the size and characteristics
of the project,
the quantities
of unirradiated
HEU likely
to be involved,
as well
as the potential
for plutonium
production.
However, our review
showed that a number of facilities
with HEU, including
a few with
significant
quantities
of unirradiated
HEU, were not inspected
once in a typical
year.
The main inspection
objective
of IAEA safeguards
at research
reactors
is to detect the absence of fuel items (e.g.,
assemblies,
rods, bundles,
plates,
or pins) containing
one or more significant
quantities
of HEU within
the timeliness
guideline.
However,
during any single year, IAEA often does not inspect many research
reactors,
including
some with more than a significant
quantity
of
HEU, because of inspection
staff
shortages.
In addition,
IAEA has
considered
its goals automatically
attained
when less than a significant
quantity
of material
was reported
as being on hand.
STAFFING LIMITATIONS
To fulfill
its safeguards
responsibilities,
IAEA must have
However, the number of IAEA inspectors
the necessary staffing.
has
not kept pace with its rapidly
growing safeguards
responsibilities.
IAEA has been experiencing
shortages
in its inspectorate
staffing
for several years.
Although there have been major
increases
in the inspectorate,
there has also been a substantial
increase
in the number of facilities
under safeguards.
Consequently,
IAEA achieves significantly
less than its estimated
routine
inspection
effort.
This trend has continued,
although
improving somewhat.
According
to the State Department,
IAEA
carried
out only about SO percent of its estimated
routine
inspection
effort
in 1981 due to its inspector
shortage.
The
Department indicated
that IAEA expects to increase
this mark to
60-70 percent by 1983.
Thus, the shortage of inspectors
is expected to be a continuing problem.
To help offset
the lack of regular
professional
inspectors,
the IAEA Secretariat
has proposed employing inspection assistants
to handle some of the less complex aspects of
safeguards.
30
EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS
IAEA lacks suitable
equipment to adequately
make quantitative
verifications
of nuclear material
in many cases.
A
substantial
amount of material,
including
HEU, is in a form
According
to IAEA officials,
that is currently
unmeasurable.
further
development of methods and equipment for nondestructive
irradiated
fuel,
at research
measurements of HEU, especially
reactors
is still
needed.
L/ IAEA officials
indicated
that
During a previous
review,
only about 10 percent of all safeguarded
material
is quantitatively
measured.
Material
inside reactors
and irradiated
material
is not quantitatively
measured; for the material
that
can be measured, IAEA inspectors
generally
take sample nonU.S. officials
advised us that
destructive
assay measurements.
such as TV monitors
and cameras, are seldom
surveillance
devices,
used at research
facilities
fueled with HEU because the nature
However,
of the facilities
does not lend itself
to such devices.
they noted that IAEA uses seals on HEU, but does not rely solely
or indefinitely
on them.
Substantial
efforts
have been made by member nations,
particto develop new equipment.
However, much
ularly
the United States,
of the equipment is considered
to be in the prototype
stage or
For example, only 11 out of the 21
under evaluation
and testing.
new types of equipment developed by the United States over the
last 5 years is in routine
field
use by IAEA inspectors.
IAEA estimates
that the cost of this new safeguards
equipment
through 1985 will
be about $20 million
with an additional
$10 million
for maintenance and consumable supplies
(e.g.,
seals
IAEA
officials
believe
the
total
and film).
2/ With inflation,
and supplies
would be about
cost for equipment,
maintenance,
ACDA pointed out that most of this
$40 million
through 1985.
amount would be used for safeguarding
facilities
which do not
handle HEU. Even without
additional
costs, many member nations
have already expressed concern about the rising
cost of safeguards.
It is generally
recognized
that new procedures
and techniques
must also be developed to meet the safeguard
challenges
presented
by
the larger
and more complex facilities
that have come under safeguards in recent years.
Large amounts of material
in various
forms
are present
in or flow through "bulk handling"
facilities.
For
example, significant
amounts of direct
use material
(e.g.,
HEU) at
A/See our classified
report
entitled
"International
Safeguards Need Further
Improvement"
(C-ID-81-4,
/According
to IAEA budget projections
for 1982,
about $2.1 million
on safeguards
equipment.
31
Nuclear
Feb. 13, 1981).
it
will
spend
fuel fabrication
facilities
and enrichment
be manufactured,
have been cited as posing
for IAEA inspectors.
plants,
where HEU can
substantial
problems
shares
budget
Safeguards
portion
Argentina
Non-safeguards
portion
29,519
408,675
Costa Rica
754
10,346
Ecuador
754
10,346
India
42,563
315,559
South Africa
17,849
222,443
United
States
7,033,069
12,932,750
Political
obstacles
include rejection
of whole categories
of inspectors.
Although every nation has the right
to accept or
reject
a proposed inspector,
many countries,
including
the United
increasingly
reject
broad ranges of proposed inspectors
States,
or nationalistic
grounds.
The State
on political,
linguistic,
Department contends that,
in practice,
the designation
of inspectors has not been a serious problem and has not prevented
inspections in any country or facility.
However, according
to IAEA
officials,
the practice
is growing and has diminished
safeguards
They indicated
that it has led to
credibility.
--retaliatory
discrimination
by
member nations,
--distortions
in the recruiting
pattern,
forcing
IAEA to accept a bias toward designating
inspectors
from within
certain
groups of countries,
and
--ineffective
deployment of inspectors
in the field,
and less-than-full
utilization
of inspectors
specializing in particular
types of facilities.
33
34
safeguards
problems
--diminish
the consequences
abrogating
its safeguards
essentially
eliminate
the
terrorism
associated
with
use of HEU.
and
of a nation's
obligations
as well as
risks of nuclear
the current
widespread
35
CHAPTER-5
U.S.
HEU
is often
2-year effort
completed but
has not been
the data in the
--Intended
users of the system
to meet their
needs.
find
it
inadequate
--Although
this one DOE system is supposed to
provide a central
repository
for storage and
retrieval
of information
needed to track HEU
furnished
to other countries,
DOE and NRC have
developed three other information
systems on
HEU supplied
abroad.
data
The need to have four separate U.S. systems gathering
on HEU supplied
abroad appears questionable.
A/ Considering
the
costs of the systems and the needs of the users, efforts
to
streamline
and consolidate
needed information
into one system
seem to be warranted.
We believe
that to be responsive
to its
nuclear tracking
system should
intended users, an international
up-to-date
information
in a useful format.
provide accurate,
TRACKING SYSTEMCONTAINS UNRELIAELE
DATA DESPITE UPDATE EFFORT
The DOE computerized
tracking
system, implemented in 1968,
is called the Nuclear Materials
Management and Safeguards System
(NMMSS) and contains
data on 19 different
nuclear materials,
including
HEU, which have been supplied
by the United States both
domestically
and abroad.
In 1977, DOE established
a subsystem to
NMMSSwhich contains
only international
nuclear material
information-- the International
Nuclear Materials
Tracking
System,
to DOE, the mission of INMTS is to record
NMMSS,'INMTS. According
and maintain
export,
import,
and retransfer
data for U.S.-origin
material.
A/Although
not evaluated
in this report,
it should be noted
that IAEA maintains
a computerized
information
system on
nuclear material,
including
HEU, under IAEA safeguards.
36
manually
incomplete.
--The system shows where the material
was originally
current
location
of
shipped, but may not identify
the system does not show
the exported
HEU. Moreover,
the current
physical
status of the material
(e.g.,
irradiated,
fabricated,
or reprocessed).
--Information
from the tracking
system on the amount
of
spent
HEU returned
to the United States did not agree
with records at the Federal facilities
that actually
received the material.
--In
Pre-1968
trying
to upgrade the system,
DOE may have been
overlooking
sources of data which would be useful in
verifying/reconciling
the amounts shown in the system.
manual system
In establishing
the beginning
inventory
base for the comexports
prior
to
1968
were
compiled only as a
puterized
system,
total
figure
summarized from manual reports
rather
than being
As
part
of
its
upgrade
entered as individual
transactions.
effort,
DOE has been working to reconstruct
these early export
This task
transactions
for input into the computerized
system.
is difficult
because (1) many documents during that time
were
maintained
as loose pieces of paper containing
little
informaand (2) some documents are missing.
tion about the transaction,
DOE officials
recognize
that these problems create some gaps
that will
continue
to exist
in the computerized
data base
despite
the upgrade effort.
System
location
data
37
information
in the international
tracking
Additionally,
system does not show the current
state of the nuclear material
exported,
i.e.,
whether it is unirradiated,
irradiated,
fabrior reprocessed.
When DOE's nuclear material
cated, burned-up,
leasing program was in effect
(from 1955 to 1974), burn-up
information
was routinely
provided
to the United States and
and was incorporated
into the central
system.
Although
burn-up information
is available
through other Government
systems, adjustments
are not being made in NMMSS/INMTS to
According
to an Argonne National
Laboratory
reflect
it.
official,
the average burn-up could be as high as 50 percent
over the useful life
of the fuel.
Although the NMMSS/INMTS system shows HEU supplied to
specific
facilities,
DOE said that this system is not designed
to track the movement of U.S. -origin
materials
within
a cooperating
nation
(or within
EURATOM) or the status of the
material.
DOE added that if the United States moved in
that direction,
the United States would have to impose an
entire
series of new reporting
requirements
on cooperating
countries
which could be resented by most of them.
Also,
DOE contends such a requirement
is not easily
justifiable
since all U.S. exports are already subject
to IAEA or EURATOM
accountability
and verification.
The United States,
DGE
commented, looks to these bodies to perform the basic safeguards functions
to help determine
that no diversions
occur.
DOE officials
argue that agreements for cooperation
do
not require
the collection
of data on fuel fabrication,
certain
material
movements, burn-up,
reprocessing
losses,
and inventories.
A State
Department official
told us, however,
that nothing in the agreements either
authorizes
or precludes
collecting
this information.
I?OE officials
advised us that
collecting
data on the physical
state of HEU is not routinely
done for the centralized
computer system because the United
States requires
this data only if the exported material
is retransferred
to another foreign
agreement entity
or
is returned
to the United States.
However, we learned that
consent of the United States for reprocessing
or otherwise
altering
transferred
material
(including
HEU) is explicitly
required
by agreements for cooperation,
as well as U.S.
export licensing
criteria.
(The only exception
involves
EURATOM.) Thus, information
on some changes in the physical
status of U.S.-supplied
HEU should be routinely
available
from DOE records.
Moreover, the United States requires
that each foreign
facility
operator
requesting
exports of 5 kilograms
or more
of HEU submit detailed
inventory
information
on the facility's
38
return
records
did
not agree
inclusion
of materials
other
the NMMSS/INMTS data on HEU.
--Transaction
quantities
inadvertently
from NMMSS/INMTS or Savannah River
than
omitted
records.
--Quantities
in the NMMSSsystem reflected
the
original
shippers'
estimated
values not the
more accurate
Savannah River measured values.
--Some spent
facilities
records.
verification
effort
to other U.S. data
of the NMMSSdata
process of verifying
to
the computerized
data with other records kept since 1954.
The project
is targeted
for completion
in September 1982.
DOE officials
believe
that a thorough review of transaction
documents, correspondence,
licenses,
contracts,
and other
pertinent
records will
enable them to correlate
and refine
the data now in the system.
tion
which
information
with foreign
records
materials
in this
verifica-
on uranium enrichment
entities,
and
40
T,RACKING SYSTEMCONSIDERED
INADEQUATE TO MEET USER NEEDS
a growing number
In recent years, DOE and NRC have received
of requests
for information
relating
to nuclear material
from
House, the State Department,
other
the Congress, the White
U.S. Government entities,
foreign
governments,
and private
However, many intended
users have
research organizations.
complained that DOE's centralized
international
tracking
system has been unable to satisfactorily
meet their
needs.
Officials
at the Department of State, ACDA, and NRC have
criticized
the system.
Some officials
said it is not being used in their
reviews
of export license applications
because it contains
inaccuracies,
is not up-to-date
and/or is incomplete,
and the printouts
are
improperly
designed for their
needs.
Some said they had come
to rely on information
from other sources.
In addition,
the
system was criticized
for the time lag required
to respond to
specifically
designed reports,
thereby reducing
the usefulness
of the system.
We requested
and received
from NMMSS/INMTS--after
a time
lag of 1 month-- information
on HEU supplied
abroad and identified
a number of anomalies which DOE officials
were unable
to explain.
Among these were the following:
--The DOE international
tracking
system shows
that the United States had supplied
about
13,000 kilograms of contained
HEU (element
weight of exports less returns)
to non-nuclear
weapon nations from 1954 thru 1980.
However,
according
to IAEA, it safeguards
only about
11,000 kilograms of HEU in non-nuclear
weapon
nations
from all sources.
Eecause all U.S.supplied material
must be safeguarded
and
because the United States does not supply all
of the world's
PEU, the amount of IAEA safeguarded EEU should be greater
than the amount
supplied by the United States.
DOE officials,
however, were unable to explain the difference.
--The printout
showed shipments to 246 accounts
in non-nuclear
weapon nations.
IAEA safeguards
175 research reactors
and a few HEU fuel fabricators.
Because all facilities
in non-nuclear
weapon nations receiving
U.S.-SupFlied
HEU must be
subject
to IAEA safeguards,
a basic assumption is
that the numbers should be comparable.
DOE officials
said that an IAEA safeguarded
facility
might
41
National
Lawrence
LiVermOre
Laboratory
National
is
located
Laboratory
42
Corporation
for
(note
a)
($000 omitted)
NMMSS/INM!W
STAMAS
525
y905
RERTR
(cl
IPELTS
18
$1 r4.48
a/Except
for
of nuclear
contains
RERTR, each system
materials,
including
HEU.
information
h/According
to Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory,
$50,000 of the $905,000 is related
to the disposition
on a number
about
of HEW.
s/RERTR is a noncomputerized
system.
Its records are manually
maintained
and no cost breakdown is available
for the information gathering
segment.
As discussed
in chapter
6, the
RERTR program was begun
An integral
part of the program is the accumulation
in 1978.
and analysis
of information
on the
current
status of research
reactors,
including
general operating
data; the current
inventory of HEU; spent fuel inventory;
and HEU reprocessed.
This
information
serves two purposes--it
provides
data for the
economic and technical
justification
for an export license
(see ch. 2), and determines
the
feasibility
of converting
research reactors
to LEU fuel.
(See ch. 6.)
Lawrence Livermores
STAMAS system
is a computerized
data
which was developed in 1977 to provide more accurate
information
on the amount, composition,
and location
of plutonium in the world.
In 1981, STAMAS began developing
a computer data base to describe
the flow and stockpiles
of HEU.
Despite the fact that STAMASand NMMSS/INMTS are both
called
tracking
systems
and contain
information
on HEU, a STAMAS
official
said the two share only the topical
concern for
fissile
material
flow but that
the
goals, operations,
and
outputs of the systems
are different.
One major
difference
is that NMMSS/INMTS does not focus on proliferation
while
STAMAS is a substantial
component of CUEs efforts
to technically
analyze the nuclear proliferation
threat
by monitoring
system
43
material
which
is not of U.S. oriqin
or does not cross U.S.
Officials
boundaries,
material.
as well
as U.S. -supplied
from both programs
said there
has been very limited
coordination
and/or
information
exchange
between
these two DOE systems.
Likewise,
coordination
between STAMAS and the RERTR program
has been very limited
even though both contain
several
similar
data elements,
including
reactor
name, location,
inventory
levels,
and general
operating
data.
The IPELTS system was developed
by NRC in 1977 as a computerized
method of accumulating
information
on export
licenses.
The IPELTS system maintains
individual
license
information
such
material
type with
element
and
as the name of the applicant:
isotope
weights;
enrichment
percentage;
plant;
facility
and country;
intermediate
consignee:
ultimate
end use; and
dates
the license
was issued
and will
expire.
IPELTS does
not record
the actual
supply
or receipt
of material,
nor
track
nuclear
material
abroad.
License
information
from
IPELTS is provided
to NMMSS/INMTS.
In this
regard,
IPELTS
supplements
the central
international
tracking
system.
systems
are maintaining
information
Thus, four separate
on HEU supplied
abroad for different
but closely
related
reasons.
The NMMSS/INMTS system
tracks
HEU actually
exported;
IPELTS provides
information
on the amount of HEU licensed
for
export;
the RERTR system gathers
data on the current
inventory
of HEU at foreign
facilities;
and STAMAS is developing
data
on international
flows
of HEU.
It can be argued that
each
system
complements
the others
and each concentrates
on a
different
aspect.
However,
the need to maintain
four separate
systems
to monitor
or track
certain
aspects
of HEU supplied
abroad appears
questionable.
None of the systems,
by itself,
affords
1J.S. officials
the capability
to quickly
and coherently
see the complete
picture.
CONCLUSIONS
-The central
computerized
system
to track
HEU supplied
abroad
(NMMSS/INMTS)
is incomplete
and inaccurate.
Intended
users also consider
it inadequate
and unreliable.
DOE officials
have been working
to improve
the information
in the system,
but have not used some readily
available
information
within
their
own Department
to help verify
the quantities
of HEU
supplied
abroad.
Furthermore,
the U.S. Government
is currently
maintaining
four distinct
systems
to gather
information
on HEU supplied
to
foreign
countries
--DOE has three
systems
(NMMSS/INMTS,
STAMAS,
and RERTR), NRC has one (IPELTS).
Individually,
however,
each
system
provides
only a segment of information
(e.g.,
amounts
44
amounts licensed
for export,
or amounts currently
exported,
We believe
reconon hand at the foreign
facility).
ciliation
and efforts
to consolidate
the information
into
a more accurate
and comprehensive
system are warranted.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ____--_-SECRETARY --OF ENERGY
~___.__
We recommend that
the Secretary
of Energy,
in conjunction
with
the Chairman
of the Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission,
streamline
and consolidate
the information
maintained
on
HEU supplied
abroad
into
a more accurate,
comprehensive,
which meets the needs of the intended
and flexible
system,
in the most economical
and efficient
manner.
users,
To increase
the accuracy
and utility
of such a system,
the Secretary
of Energy
should
direct
that
information
from
other
readily
available
sources
be used to verify
and reconcile
the data on HEU exports
within
the system.
AGENCY COMMENTS
in accordance
with
our recommendation,
DOE commented
that,
to see whether
a better
integration
it is initiating
a review
of the different
systems
can be achieved
even though they are
NRC said that
it agreed
designed
to serve different
purposes.
with
the recommendation
that
information
on U.S.-supplied
nuclear
material
should
be streamlined
and consolidated,
but it was not clear
to NRC that
this
could
be best accomplished
through
the development
of a single
information
system.
NRC emphasized
that no !J.S. Government
agency currently
has been assigned
responsibility
to track
U,S.-origin
nuclear
material
within
foreign
entities
and negotiation
of international
agreements
with
export
recipients
would be required
NRC added that
sources
have not been
to accomplish
this.
developed
for collecting
transaction
data for individual
between countries
in
foreign
facilities
or for transfers
EURATOM. However,
DOE pointed
out that
in newer agreements
the cooperating
nation
authorizes
IAEA to
for cooperation,
provide
the United
States
with
inventory
data.
Concerning
the individual
information
received
the following
comments.
systems,
we
--DOE commented
that INMTS was conceived
in 1977
to automate
a manual system of records
dating
from 1954 pertaining
to the international
transfer of U.S. -origin
nuclear
materials.
The
automation
was completed
in 1978, and a subsequent audit
was performed
to determine
the
accuracy
and completeness
of the data base.
The data base was found to have serious
problems
45
and a verification
project
was planned
to
compare the data base with
all
Fertinent
available
sources
of data in the United
States
and correct
This
the deficiencies
to the extent
possible.
project
will
be completed
in 1982, and DOE
believes
the INMTS will
then be able to perform,
with an acceptable
degree of accuracy,
those
functions
it has been delegated.
--The
Lawrence Livermore
National
Laboratory
advised
us that
the STAMAS system does not yet monitor
the
flow and stockpiles
of HEU abroad.
The Laboratory
described
its efforts
regarding
HEU as being
in an
embryonic
stage with the present
focus on obtaining
and understanding
the data that might
be obtained
on the operating
histories
of the most interesting
(from
a proliferation
viewpoint)
research
reactors.
The Laboratory
added that
about $50,000
of its
fiscal
year 1982 budget has gone into
this
evaluation
of
operating
histories
and the associated
guestions
of HEU disposition.
DOE commented
that discussions
have been initiated
with
the Lawrence
Livermore
National
Laboratory
on
the desirability
and feasibility
of addressing
research
facilities
and materials
such as HEU under
the STAMAS effort.
DOE indicated
that
should
HEU
data be monitored
by STAMAS, this
system would use
NMMSS/INMTS data as a portion
of its
input.
Nevertheless,
DCE emphasized
that
although
STAMAS does
address
tracking,
it is not an accountability
system
and cannot
provide
accountability
data.
46
CHAPTER 6
U.S.
EFFORTS TO REDUCE
around
Our review showed that progre- "s has been made in developing
new LEU fuels and in obtaining
foreign
support for the program.
program has experienced
However, the reduced enrichment
several limitations
which have been hampering completion
These include financial
constraints
of the conversion
effort.
market potential
to
on the U.S. Government program; the limited
interest
U.S. private
sector involvement
without
continued
and various
foreign
concerns about such
Government support:
issues as the lack
of participation
by U.S. reactor
operators,
potential
difficulties
in getting
converted
reactors
(e.g.,
using new fuel)
relicensed,
technical
problems associated
with reprocessing
and waste disposal,
and uncertainty
of
W.S. willingness
to continue
accepting
spent U.S.-origin
fuel from foreign
research reactors
if they convert
to the
new fuel.
In addition,
two U.S. initiatives
announced at the 1978
United Nations Special Session on Disarmament were aimed at
limiting
the spread of HEU exported around the world.
We
learned during our review,
however, that the United States
has done little,
to date, to carry out these proposals.
We believe that reducing the use of HEU is a sound nonproliferation
objective,
but further
efforts
are needed if
the conversion
to LEU fuels is to become a reality
in the
next few years.
THE REDUCEDENRICHMENT PROGRAM
In April
1977, the Carter administration
adopted a new
policy
aimed at minimizing
the use and distribution
of HEW.
As a result,
in 1978 DOE launched the RERTR program as a
multi-year
program to provide the technical
means to convert
research reactors
now using uranium enriched to go-percent
or more U-235, to 20-percent
U-235 fuel or, where necessary,
45-percent
U-235 fuel.
The program structure
was developed
to accommodate the large number of reactors
involved
(approximately 156 worldwide which use U.S. -origin
uranium enriched
47
48
--Tacit
understanding
has been obtained from
foreign
reactor
operators
that conversion
from HEU to LEU would take place when the
currently
under demonstraappropriate
fuels,
tion,
are adequately
tested to satisfy
licensing
requirements
within
their country.
the RERTR program,
Apart from, but in consort with,
one U.S. company developed an LEU fuel (referred
to as Triga
However,
this
fuel)
for its own type of research reactor.
particular
fuel is not readily
usable in research reactors
built
of research reactors
by other companies which comprise the majority
worldwide.
LIMITATIONS AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE REDUCEDENRICHMENT EFFORT
Notwithstanding
the progress
the RERTR program has made,
several factors
are hindering
the implementation
of the reduced
Consequently,
many countries
have taken
enrichment
effort.
a wait-and-see
attitude
about actual conversion
to the new
has been converted
fuels.
To date, only one research reactor
The Ford Nuclear Reactor in Michigan
through the RERTR program.
has been converted
and licensed by NRC to use one of the
new LEU fuels for "full-core
demonstration"
purposes.
U.S.
funding
constraints
year
Funding level
(million)
1978
1979
1980
1981 (note a)
1982 (estimated)
1983 (requested
(note b)
$ .64
3.85
4.95
2.56
4.14
4.80
by ACDA)
a/In fiscal
year 1981, only $1 million
was specifically
authorized
for RERTR. Additional
funding of approximately
$1.6 million
was provided
from other programs by the Department of State,
DOE, and ACDA.
h/In
fiscal
year
49
no funds
for
RERTR.
According
to the fiscal
year 1983 ACDA budget submission,
ACDA would assume financial
responsibility
for the program.
RERTR program officials
had anticipated
that RERTR would
be funded outside DOE. These program officials
had hoped
the funding would come from the State Department or ACDA,
felt,
would give the program
either
of which, one official
DOE has taken the
a higher priority
than DOE had given it.
position
that by the end of fiscal
year 1982, 90 percent
of the RERTR research
and development effort
will
have been
DOE officials
said that the next steps--commercompleted.
cialization
and deployment of the fuel --are not DOE projects.
ACDA commented that,
in its opinion,
the RERTR research and
development will
not be go-percent
completed by the end of
fiscal
year 1982,
ACDA added that considerably
more research
and development efforts
are needed.
Several U.S. officials
said they believed
that if a
lack of adequate funding for the U.S. RERTR program occurred,
it would, in turn,
adversely
affect
foreign
participation
This helief
was
in the overall
effort
to reduce HEU use.
substantiated
by one Japanese official
who said that without
it was uncertain
whether Japan would
the United States,
continue
its LEU effort.
On the other hand, West German
and French officials
told us that their
conversion
programs
were independent of the U.S. program and that their
countries
would probably continue
regardless
of the future
status of the
A program official
commented that West German
U.S. program.
and French commercial fuel fabricators
of research reactor
fuel have made similar
statements.
Market
limitations
Officials
at U.S. companies indicated
that,
although their
companies have the technical
capabilities
to produce LEU fuels,
it is questionable
whether they would get into the market without U.S. Government support.
They indicated
the limited
market
potential
for these fuels poses a significant
risk.
Furthermore,
because of a lack of interest
by U.S. vendors in providing
fabrication
services
for the fuel to be used in the RERTR tests,
the United States has relied
on France and West Germany for
such services.
According
to DOE, there is only one TJ.S.
firm interested
in commercially
fabricating
the new fuels
developed under the RERTR program.
Officials
at that company
said they probably would not do the conversion
work without
Government support because the cost would be too high.
Foreign
perceptions
and concerns
50
in deciding
the acceptability
of using HEU in foreign
and
For example, the U,S, Government
U.S. research reactors.
has not indicated
whether it will
restrict
or inhibit
the
According
to an
continued
use of HEU in U.S. reactors.
Argonne National
Laboratory
official,
there have been
only limited
discussions
between U.S. operators
and DOE
by U.S.
about switching
to LEU. The lack of participation
facilities
in converting
to the new LEU fuel could undermine
foreign
acceptance of the new fuel and, thus, negate an
objective.
important
part of the U.S. non-proliferation
Of the 156 research reactors
worldwide
which use U.S.supplied
HEU enriched
to between 70 and 94 percent in U-235,
54 (about one-third)
are located
in the United States.
The State Department commented that,
although the use
of LEU by U,S. research reactor
operators
is primarily
a
domestic policy
issue,
(1) a consistent
approach between
domestic and foreign
policies
would benefit
overall
nonproliferation
goals and (2) recent proposed changes in NRC
safeguards
requirements
would provide an incentive
to NRC
licensed
U.S. research reactor
operators
to convert
to
LEU, when it becomes available.
U.S. officials
told us that the need to license
the new
fuels could slow HEU conversion
abroad.
According
to the State
Department,
each country may have to relicense
its facilities,
some of which are 20 to 30 years old.
Foreign research reactor
operators
believe that,
in addition
to limited
modifications
of their
facilities
to use the new LEU fuel,
they would
also have to significantly
upgrade their
facilities
to meet
new safety
standards
and current
licensing
criteria
of their
countries.
At the September 1981 IAPA Seminar for Research
Operators,
foreign
operators
voiced concern about the
cessing of the new LEU fuel.
In most countries,
the
authority
will
not allow a reactor
to operate unless
can prove that the fuel can be reprocessed
or that a
waste disposal
can be ensured.
Reactor
reprolicense
it
safe
51
Also, reprocessing
plants throughout
the world may
not be willing
to accept the new fuel because significant
The relatively
modifications
to the facilities
may be required.
as compared to the larger
amounts
small
amounts of such fuel,
of other spent fuel normally
reprocessed,
could make such
modifications
economically
impractical.
IMPLEMENTATION OF INITIATIVES
ANNOUNCEDAT U.N. HAS EEEN LIMITED
At the 1978 United Nations Special
(UNSSOD), the U.S. Ambassador announced
to minimize the use of HEU. They were:
Session on Disarmament
two initiatives
designed
--Authorizing
$5 million
over 5 years to provide
20 percent enriched
uranium fuel for research
reactors
through IAEA, with preference
to developing
countries
party to the NPT.
--Providing
up to $1 million
annually
in fuel cycle
services
to assist
countries
in the use of LEU
fuel in research reactors.
(This program was not
linked to NPT adherence.)
as yet, to carry
The United States,
however, has done little,
out these proposals,
According
to a State Department official,
the initiatives
are being implemented,
at least to some extent.
U.S. financial
support for the two initiatives
has been as
follows:
1979
1980
--$75,000
to IAEA to study the feasibility
using 20 percent enriched
uranium fuel
research reactors.
of
in
--$435,000
to Argonne National
Laboratory's
RERTR program for training
reactor
operators
and for defraying
costs of assistance
for
reactor
conversions
in IAEA selected
developing countries.
--$75,000
to IAEA for the
enriched fuel program.
20 percent
--$50,000
to Malaysia for fuel fabrication
costs associated
with the purchase of LEU
(Triga)
fuel for one of its research reactors.
52
initiatives
has come from the Foreign
Money to address
these
A State
Department
voluntary
contributions.
Assistance
Act--U.S.
official
informed
us that
he has requested
funding
over and above
contribution
each year;
but,
to date,
the normal
U.S. voluntary
has not received
any additional
funding
for the UNSSOD initiatives.
requested
$18.5 million
for fiscal
year 1982, State
For example,
of
which
$4
million
was
designated
for voluntary
contributions,
However,
the
Office
of
Management
for the UNSSOD initiatives.
and Budget
cut the request
to $14.1 million
by eliminating
funding
for those initiatives.
It can be argued that
the RERTR program
addresses
the
same overall
objective
of the U.S. initiatives
announced
However,
minimizing
the use of HEU abroad.
at UNSSOD, i.e.,
Government
officials,
the
RERTR
program
according
to U.S.
was never intended
to meet the UNSSOD initiatives.
Nevertheless,
the 20 percent
enriched
fuel
is not yet
available
for routine
use and the United
States
has not yet
fulfilled
the initiatives
announced
at the UNSSOD.
CONVERSION PROGRAMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Several
the areas of
reactors.
other
countries
have also initiated
programs
in
reduced
enrichment
fuels
for research
and test
53
Canada, Argentina,
Denmark, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union also have programs dealing with
fuels.
Spain,
LEU
A paper delivered
by an Argonne Laboratory
official
at an international
meeting in early 1981 described
the
agreement and coopinternational
scene as one of "excellent
between the RERTR program and various
foreign
national
eration"
he said that
Furthermore,
and international
organizations.
these organizations
are conducting
"ambitious
programs"
with the same general
goals as the RERTR program.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the executive
branch has taken steps to develop
new LEU fuels for research reactors,
it is difficult
at
this time to measure the effectiveness
that this effort
will
have in converting
research reactors
to LEU fuels and in
significantly
reducing worldwide
inventories
of HEU. Most
countries
recognize
the need to reduce the use of HEU
worldwide,
but have taken a wait-and-see
attitude
in the
actual conversion
of the research reactors
because of a
According
to DOE,
variety
of concerns and uncertainties.
many countries
have deferred
their conversion
decisions
pending demonstrations
of the new fuels.
We believe that reducing the use of HEU abroad is a sound
non-proliferation
objective.
However, a number of issues
need
to be resolved if the conversion
to LEU fuels is to become
a reality
in the next few years.
AGENCY COMMENTS
use
reducing
the
54
55
APPENOIX I
APPENDIX I
GARY HART
COLoRId
WASHINGTON.
DC,
July
Mr.
20510
14,
1981
Office
Socolar:
Increasing
concern
over the proliferation
of nuclear
weapons
has raised
questions
about
the United
States'
ability
to account
for,
and monitor
the use of the highly-enriched
uranium
fuel
it
exports
to foreign
countries.
For example,
Victor
Gilinksy,
Commissioner
of the Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission,
has been quoted
nobody keeps track
of this
material
as saying,
"To my knowledge,
in a serious
way."
In
Office
light
of these questions,
to undertake
an investigation
I request
the
that
will:
General
Accounting
(1)
Evaluate
the mechanisms
established
in international
agreements
of cooperation
for controlling
the use of U.S.supplied
highly-enriched
uranium
(HEU) fuel
and assuring
adequate
protection
of HEU fuel
shipments
from terrorists.
Assess the ability
of the International
Atomic
Energy
(2)
Agency (IAEA) to detect
diversions
of HEU and fissionable
materials
produced
from this
fuel,
through
use of material
accounting
techniques
and of containment
and surveillance
devices.
Ascertain
the rationale
for
13)
foreign
countries
and the possible
consequences.
supplying
nuclear
HEU fuel
to
proliferation
States
for
fissionable
keeping
materials
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX I
Letter
to Milton
Page Two
Socolar
Determine
what controls,
(6)
has over the use of fissionable
U.S .-supplied
HEU fuel or in
if
any, the
materials
U.S. -supplied
United
States
produced
from
nuclear
facilities.
My staff
has discussed
the issues
presented
in this
request
with
Joseph F. Murray,
group director
for arms control
and nonproliferation,
International
Division.
If you have any questions
about the scope or
please
contact
me or my staff.
nature
of this request,
Thank
you for
your
prompt
attention
to
57
this
matter.
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX II
U.S.
SHIPMENTS OF
11392.6
2.0
(a)
23.5
.8
4,550.l
6,206.6
6.1
(4
2.4
5.2
(a)
17.0
344.4
11021.9
18.3
5.7
73.0
(a)
5.2
3.0
7.1
36.6
30.2
12.3
133.3
7.9
9.2
4.8
4.8
2,140.7
(a)
(a)
(a)
5.2
..3
Total
cumulative
U-235)
59.2
9.1
7.5
(a)
148.8
[a)
7.1
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Eangladesh
Eelgium
Eolivia
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany, West
Greece
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
The Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam, South
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Source:
SINCE 1954
Guantity
shipped
(kilograms
of isotope
Country
a/The
HEU
16,302.7
quantity
Department
Management
shipped
is less
of Energy reports
from
and Safeguards System,
58
than
.05 kilograms
Nuclear Materials
June and October
1981.
APPENDIX III
APPENDIX III
Title
The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Act of 1978
Modified
(OCG-81-2)
Should Be Selectively
International
Nuclear Safeguards
Further
Improvement (C-ID-81-4)
Evaluation
of Selected
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(EIYD-81-9)
Features of U.S.
Law and Policy
Evaluation
of U.S. Efforts
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Nuclear
Need
(Confidential)
to Promote the
Treaty (ID-80-41)
Fuel Reprocessing
and the Problems
Against the Spread of
Weapons (EMD-80-38)
of Safeguarding
Nuclear
United
Nations
Disarmament:
Participation
Federal
Nuclear
Special Session On
Forum For International
February
13, 1981
July
31, 1980
July
3, 1979
(ID-79-27)
Facilities
Fuel--Are
For Storing
Spent
They Needed? (EWC-79-82 )
59
APFENDIX IV
APPEND1X IV
weapn
nuclear
nuclear
technology
is defined
in section
APPENDIX V
APPENDIX V
Cooperating
partner
Status of
U.S. effort
Argentina
Giscussions
begun October 1978.
Limited
informal
discussions
since then. (note a)
Australia
Aqreement renegotiated,
January 1981.
Austria
Discussions
held June 1978.
Suspended.
Referendum voted
against nuclear power.
Bangladesh
Aqreement completed:
signed
in Dacca, Congressional
review needed.
Brazil
Discussions
begun June 1978.
Informal
discussions
since
then.
(note a)
Canada
Agreement amended,
July 1980.
Colombia
Aqreement completed.
Conqressional review completed.
Colombian Parliamentary
ratification
needed.
Egypt
Agreement completed,
December 1981.
EURATOM
Limited discussions
November 1978.
Finland
Negotiations
Greece
EURATOMmember as of January
IAEA
Agreement
May 1980.
?/Discussions
cooperation
Title
III's
Source:
last
in force
in force
in force
begun
held
of State
as of December 1981.
Gi
1981.
amended, in force
are limited
to assurances needed to permit
under the existing
agreement in conformity
export licensing
triter
ia.
Department
June 1980.
continued
with
APPEND1X.V
APPENDIX V
India
"Special
problems"
involved.
Nuclear cooperation
addressed
"in the context
of broader
discussions."
Indonesia
Aqreerrent renegotiated,
December 1981.
Japan
Negotiations
Korea,
South
in force
in progress.
Discussions
begun September
and are ongoing.
1978
k?orocco
Aqreement completed
in force May 1981.
Norway
Draft
Neqotiations
comp1ete.d.
Under
initiated
May 1979.
Presidential
review.
Peru
Congressional
Agreement completed.
review completed,
Peruvian parliamentary ratification
needed.
Philippines
Discussions
held May 1978 and May
Further
discussions
were
1979,
deferred
due to pending litigation
on reactor
exports.
Portugal
Discussions
held September and
October 1978; and late 1979-80;
not currently
active.
South Africa
Nuclear
"Special
problems"
involved.
cooperation
addressed "in the context
of broader discussions."
Spain
Discussions
begun March 1978.
Limited discussions
have been held.
Sweden
Negotiations
Switzerland
Discussions
discussions
Taiwan
Discussions
held during
1980 (non-governmental).
Thailand
Discussions
current
program.
no
62
and entered
in progress.
held
held
held
plans
Limited
May 1979.
subsequently,
1979 and
APPENDIX V
APPENDIX V
Turkey
Discussions
held and then deferred.
Draft provided by the U.S. in October
1980.
Current
agreement expired.
Venezuela
Current
State
agreement expired.
Department expects discussions
to
commence soon on renegotiation.
63
APPEWUIX
VI
APPENDIX
VI
ATTACKS
AND/ORPHYSICALSECURJ.TY
BREACBES
AT NUCLEAR
FACILITIES FROM1966-1979
Date
Installation
Incident or.result
November18, 1966
May 4, 1969
USA: Illinois
Institute
Technology Reactor
September 1970
mamite
March 1971
5 uranium rodsdisappeared;
stolen perhaps in transit or
at the wlfa reactor in
Anglesoy.
August
1971
of
reactor
discovered.
Eecember 7, 1971
2 bombscaused heavydaanqe
to electronic control
equipment.
USA: Oconee,
September 4, 1974
pay 3, 1975
South Carolina
64
APPENDIX VI
APPENDIX VI
Date
Installation.
Incident
assailants
apparently
fired two shots at security
No damwe reported.
guards.
June
June 1975
An individual
carried a
Panzer-faust bazooka into the
plant to present it to the
Director as part of a security
demonstration.
July
1975
July
1975
July
2,
Attempted
August 1, 1975
Canada: Pickering
in CN-&ario
A visitor
entered the plant
carrying a satchel; he was not
checked at the gate or during
his brief visit.
Attempted
Nov.14-15,
6,
1975
1975
1976
Ulkmwn
in
reactor
reactor
of Tech.
65
or result
in
forced entry.
extraction
plant and other
facilities.
Responsible
group be1 ieved known.
APPEIWIX VI
APPEEjDIX VI
Date
Installation
Incident
July 1977
Nov. 19-20,
December 1977
March 1, 1978
Spain: Iberduero
proper ties
Spain:
Lemoniz
April
Spain:
Lemoniz
1977
1978
utility
or result
Sweden: Goteborg
Municipal building
and German
church damaged by a bomb
apparently placed by an
antinuclear
group.
February
Switzerland : Kaiseraugst
Wclear mwer Plant in
Basel; Liebstadt Nuclear
Power Plant
France : La Seynesur-Mer
nuclear manufacturing
plant
April
19, 1979
6, 1979
66
APPENDIX
VI
APPENDIX
VI
Date
Installation
Incident or result
April 8, 1979
No primitive explosive
devices damageda pylon
supporting high tension
power lines.
Damagewas
not extensive and the line
was not severed.
June 1979
Spain: Lemoniz
Iwvmber 1979
Switzerland: Coesgen
Nclear Plant
November1979
Spain: Maliano
APPENDIX
VII
APPENDIX
VII
COUNTRIES
WICW HAVESIGNEDAND/ORRATIFIEDTHE
CCNVENTION
ON TEEPHYSICALPROTECTION
OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS
AS OF FEBRUARY
1, 1982
Date of ratification
State
Date of siqninq
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
March 3, 1980
June 13, 1980 d
May 15, 1981
June 23, 1981
September 23, 1980
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
minican Republic
East Germany
Finland
France
Greece
Guatemala
Baiti
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Morocco
Ektherlands
June
June
June
July
June
Panama
Paraguay
Philippines
Poland
Romania
South Africa
Soviet Union
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
August 1, 1980
Wst Germany
Yugoslavia
+igned
Source:
13,
13,
13,
25,
13,
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
February 5, 1981
d
g
g
d
as memberof EURAlU&
International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin,
Department of State.
68
June 1981.
APPENDIX VIII
APPENDIX VIII
Dear
Office
Frank:
I am replying
to your
copies
of the
draft
Monitor
Weapons-Grade
letter
report:
Uranium
of
March
"U.S.
Supplied
The enclosed
comments
on this
report
reflect
the views of
Oceans
Acting
Assistant
Secretary
in
the
Bureau
of
International
Environmental
and Scientific
Affairs.
We appreciate
on the draft
trust
you will
having
had the
report.
If I
let me know.
opportunity
may be of
the
and
to review
and comment
further
assistance,
I
Sincerely,
Roge#B.
Feldman
Enclosure:
As Stated.
GAO note:
We have modified
the report
provided
by those commenting
69
to reflect
information
on the report.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX VIII
VIII
GAO note:
The March
70
APPENDIX VIII
PPPENDIX VIII
is primarily
an issue of domestic
policy,
we believe
that
a
consistent
approach
would benefit
our overall
non-proliferation
goals.
Full
scale
testing
of LEU fuels
has not yet
advanced
to the stage where conversion
of either
foreign
or
domestic
reactors
to use of such fuel
is presently
feasible.
Several
years of further
test
work on fuels
by DOE are
needed.
Recent proposed
changes
in ?JRC safeguards
requirements,
46 FR 46333 (1981),
will
provide
an incentive
to NRC
licensed
U.S. reactor
operators
to convert
to use of LEU fuels,
when they become available.
we also note concern
in the report
on p. 50 about
the
absence
of a viable
U.S manufacturer
of LET? fuel
in the commerical
market
and the impact
this
may have on the reduced
enrichment
program.
It is our understanding
that
the POE
(RERTR program)
has entered
into
contract
with
a U.S. manufacturer
for the transfer
of LEU plate-type
fuel
technology.
DOE may be able to furnish
more specific
information
concerning
this
program
for LEU fuel
production
and whether
it
is likely
to lead to U.S. industrial
participation
in the
-ommercial
market.
In addition,
rod-type
fuel
technology
has
tieen developed
by a U.S. commercial
manufacturer
and testing
of this
fuel
is partially
supported
by the RERTR program.
In
view of these
develonments,
concern
for the weakness
in the
U.S. RERTR program,
namely,
absence
of U.S. LEU fuel
manufacturers,
both for the U.S. Government
and commercially,
may
be unduly
pessimistic.
We note the concern
in the report
for the capacity
of
the IAEA adequately
to apply
safeguards
to weapons
grade
material.
P!uch of this
concern,
however,
appears
to be based
on misundertanding.
Thus,
comment on pp. i and ii of the
digest
and on p. 29 implies
that
the total
amount of REU exported
since
1954 is still
abroad
and readily
available
for
conversion
into
nuclear
explosive
devices.
However,
most HEU
abroad
is contained
in irradiated
fuel
elements,
not easily
convertible
into
weapons-grade
material.
This fact
and the
limited
number of reprocessing
facilities
available
have an
important
bearing
on the level
of the IAEA inspection
effort.
Except
for two large
critical
assemblies,
the safeguarding
task for the IAEA with
respect
to HEU is fairly
straightforward
and we have no reason
to believe
the IAEA is not
doing
an adequate
job.
This issue
is of prime
importance
to
the Department
of State
in furtherance
of non-proliferation
policy,
and close
interaction
with
the IAEA is maintained.
We also note,
on p. 19, in relation
to physical
protection,
the statement
that
"the United
States
receives
no
information
from the IAEA in relation
to review
trips."
The
IAEA has no statutory
basis
for conducting
physical
protection
reviews.
71
APPENDIX VIII
APPENDIX VI-II
-3We believe
that
certain
of the findings
do not sufficiently
take into account:
1) the significance
of the current strict
U.S. export
controls
over HEU supply;
2) the
relatively
few countries
which are deemed eligible
to
receive
kilogram
quantity
HEU exports:
3) the need to distinguish
between
exports
of significant
quantities
of HEU
for fueling
research
reactors
and gram quantities
for
industrial
and research
purposes
which are not significant
from a proliferation
standpoint;
and 4) the need to dis'tinguish between
the national
sovereign
responsibility
of each
nation
with a nuclear
program
to apply appropriate
physical
security
measures
and the international
responsibility,
administered
by the IAEA, to apply safeguards.
In summary,
the Department
of State generally
agrees with
the recommendations
of the draft
report,
and believes
it will
make a positive
contribution
to overall
U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation
policy
development.
72
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
Department
Washington,
of Energy
D .C. 20585
APR 15 1982
Peach
Mr. J. Dexter
Energy and Minerals
Division
U.S. General
Accounting
Office
2054R
Washington,
D.C.
Dear
Mr.
Peach:
This refers
to your letter
of March 10, 1982, to Secretary
Edwards,
enclosing,
for Department
of Energy (DOE) review
and comment,
the
"U.S. Ability
to Control
and Monitor
draft
GAO report
entitled
Weapons - Grade Uranium Supplied
Abroad is Limited."
The interested
DOE offices
have
have met with your representatives
the interest
of producing
a more
the status
of the various
issues
we aqree,
in part,
with some of
major efforts
should be made to
More specific
comments follow:
reviewed
the
subject
report
and
DOE's comments in
balanced
and accurate
picture
of
While
addressed
in the report.
the recommendations,
we believe
give the report
qreater
balance.
to provide
Overall
we do not believe
the document
presents
an entirely
fair
and accurate
picture
of the efforts
the United
States
has had
underway
- both in the current
and previous
Administrations
- to
phase out the use of hiqhly
enriched
uranium
(HEU) for use in
research
reactors
where found to be technically
and economically
feasible.
This is most unfortunate
since
from the very beqinning
of the U.S. international
nuclear
program
there
has been an appreciation
that unirradiated
HEU merits
special
caution
and attention
and over recent
years,
in export processing,
proqress
has been made
in moving to lower enrichments.
Also,
in some instances,
the
threats
described
in the GAO report
are overstated,
and neither
the
Executive
Branch nor NRC are given fair
credit
for efforts
already
underway
that are consonant
with GAO's recommendations.
Further,
there
is an erroneous
implication
- that
the current
Administration
is treating
this
area of concern
in a more relaxed
manner
than the previous
one.
9ccordingly,
while
we believe
that
substantially
more work needs to be done to encourage
nations
around the world to actually
shift
to lower enrichments,
in
our view,
the report
should
be rewritten
to present
a more
factually
accurate
and balanced
picture
of where we stand in
the process.
GAO note:
We have
provided
modified
by those
report
to reflect
information
commenting on the report.
the
73
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
-2Criteria
for
Review
The digest
of the report,
under the caption
"U.S. Controls
Over
Highly
Enriched
Uranium"
indicates
that
the relevant
agencies
follow
the same general
export
license
criteria
and review
process
procedures
for subsequent
arrangements
for highly
enriched
uranium
as they do for low enriched
uranium.
We are concerned
that
this
gives
a misleading
picture
of what occurs,
when in fact,
all proposed exports
of HEU are subject
to rigorous
inter-agency
review
(supported
by analytical
studies
by the Argonne National
Laboratory)
with the view of encouraging
cooperating
nations
to phase out the
use of highly
enriched
uranium
as soon as technologically
and economically
feasible.
The fact
that reports
resulting
from such
efforts
are no longer
submitted
to the President
is a reflection
of a desire
to simplify
the procedures,
but the criteria
that we
the same as those adopted
are employing
in reviewing
cases remain
by the previous
Administration.
Our evaluations
have been supported
by analytical
studies
conducted
by the DOE Reduced Enrichment
Research
and Test Reactor
(RERTR) Program as well as cooperation
by U.S. industry
and foreign
fuel fabricators
and users.
For
example,
as a general
rule U.S. manufactured
and deployed
TRIGA
reactors
around the world will
use 20 percent
enriched
uranium
for
all fuel replacements,
and we are hopeful
that many larger
test
redctura
aisu
wiii
convert
to lower enrichments
when such replacement fuels
become available.
To place this
matter
in perspective
that the DOE RERTR program
is
it must be understood,
however,
addressed
to developing
the technology
of lower enriched
fuels
to the point
where they can be put to practical
application
with
the assent of foreign
and domestic
reactor
operators
- including
foreiqn
licensing
and regulatory
authorities.
The actual
deploywent of such fuels
by foreign
reactor
operators
is not within
DOE
control.
Reprocessing
The GAO report
appropriately
notes the importance
of U.S. acceptance (for reprocessing)
of spent highly
enriched
uranium
of U.S.
origin
from other
nations.
While the report
recommends
that
this
program of acceptance
be extended,
it implies
that DOE has not been
sufficiently
active
in encouraging
such returns,
that our financial
terms for reprocessing
are an impediment
in this regard,
and that
this
in turn is leading
to a less than satisfactory
situation
given
the inventories
of U.S. origin
HEU still
overseas.
In our view,
the
report
should
be modified
to reflect
the
following
points:
74
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
-3-
First,
it should be stressed
that DOE has had active
plans underway,
for several
months,
to extend
the U.S.
offer
to reprocess
U.S.
origin
HEU irradiated
in research
reactors.
We intend
that
the offer
will
be extended
before
the current
Federal
Register
Notice
expires
at the end of
1982.
Second, with
only a small
to the U.S.,
reference
to the GAO report
assertion
that
fraction
of U.S. origin
fuel has been returned
we believe
it is important
to note that
in
most
cases
the fuel
involved
is in irradiated
form
overseas,
either
in reactors
(some of which use a core load for
several
years before
discharge),
or in spent
fuel storage
Irradiation
of HEU produces
very small amounts
of
basins.
plutonium,
and the HEU itself
cannot be employed
in a nuclear
weapon unless
a country
is able to separate
out
the
highly
radioactive
fission
waste products.
Only a few nations
have such capabilities.
Third,
with reference
to the assertion
that our minimum
reprocessing
charges
are serving
as a disincentive
to some
countries
to return
fuel to the U.S.,
we believe
there
is
sufficient
flexibility
in existing
U.S. policy
to permit
several
small
users to combine their
batches.
This is a
step we have encouraged
in the past and intend
to encourage
to a greater
degree
in the future.
Given our obligation
to
recover
our full
costs
in such situations,
however,
we do
not anticipate
that it will
be feasible
for us to reduce
our charges.
The minimum hatch charge reflects
an estimate
of the cost of providing
processing
services
for small
quantities
of material.
It is composed of costs
for start-up
recovery
operations,
and plant
cleanouts
of process
systems,
for materials
accountability.
Operations
conducted
before
and after
fuel dissolution
and uranium
purification
are for
the most part
insensitive
to the actual
quantity
of fuel
it is logical
that
the costs on a per
processed;
therefore,
kilogram
basis
for processing
small quantities
of fuels
will
be higher
than larger
batches.
75
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
IX
-4Physical
Security
The digest
caption
in the GAO report
entitled
"Limited
U.S.
Ability
to Assure Adequate
Physical
Protection"
suggests
that
the U.S. is not receiving
timely
and sufficient
facility
specific
data on the physical
security
measures
that apply to U.S. origin
HEU fuel shipped
overseas.
The suggestion
also is made that
cooperating
states
have not been sufficiently
forthcoming
in
giving
us the data or access we need to make timely
judgments.
We believe
that this
is a misleading
conclusion
that overlooks
most counseveral
important
factors,
including
the following:
tries
voluntarily
adhere to the IAEA's guidelines
on physical
security
and have their
own independent
reasons
for wishing
to
protect
their
nuclear
installations
from dissident
or terrorist
groups;
the London Nuclear
Suppliers
Group has also agreed on
minimum physical
security
requirements
for exports
of HEU.
Under a U.S. initiative,
an
international
convention
on
physical
security
of nuclear
materials
has been approved
by 34 countries.
Although
there was some initial
resistance
in 1974 in one of the
first
countries
that a U.S. team visited
for a physical
security
review,
this
resistance
was rapidly
changed to a cooperative
attitude.
Criteria
include
for initiating
the following:
physical
security
1.
Political
unrest
or increased
terrorist
the country
since the last
visit,
or
activity
2,
New, or expanded,
Category
consideration
or have been
the last
visit,
or
3.
Significant
occurred
4.
Consideration
visits
by U.S.
improvements
since the last
of
the
time
I facilities
under
put into operation
in physical
visit,
and
since
the
security
l&t
teams
in
since
have
visit.
76
TX
APPENDIX IX
"APPENDIX IX
-5exchange
of information
which would improve
security
systems
The U.S. has provided
suggestions
for improvements
worldwide.
when appropriate
and has held up some exports
until
systems were
upgraded
to satisfactory
levels.
The results
of this program
There is an international
awareness
and
have been encouraging.
a willingness
to cooperate,
and commitments
concern
of the risks,
to generate
upgrading
programs
where needed.
The report
ing courses
Character
should
under
of
the
also mention
that the U.S.
IAEA sponsorship
in physical
Material
Overseas
and
its
is providing
security
trainsystems.
Location
We also believe
it is important
to make two general
comments on
the total
volume of U.S. exports
of HEU. First,
of the 16,000
kilograms
that has been exported,
about 300 kgs of HEU is dispersed
Few of
in fairly
small
inventories
to a total
of 25 countries.
these countries
have enough material
to make a nuclear
explosive.
Furthermore,
almost
all of this material
was exported
in fabricated
and only exported
on an as needed basis,
e.g.,
fuel element
form,
when new fuel was needed or after
return
to the U.S. of spent fuel.
Thus, this
material
in these 25 countries,
in our view, does not
constitute
a significant
proliferation
risk.
Second,
the remainder
of the 16,000
kilograms
which has been exported
has been transferred
to nine countries
who either
are close allies
of the U.S., weapons
and/or
NPT signatories.
These are Belgium,
Canada,
France,
states,
West Germany,
Italy,
Japan,
The Netherlands,
Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
The U.S. does not consider
these countries
to be proliferation
risks.
However,
the U.S. has been concerned
about the
unauthorized
diversion
of highly
enriched
as well as any weapons
useable
material
(Category
I material)
by a terrorist
group.
The
U.S., particularly
in concert
with these countries,
has placed
a
premium on ensuring
that adequate
physical
security
exists
for
Category
I material.
The U.S. took the lead in establishing
an
international
convention
on physical
security.
Before
exporting
HEU to these nine countries
as well as the others,
the U.S. must
obtain
a government-to-government
assurance
that measures
will
be maintained
to ensure,
at a minimum that,
the physical
security
standards
set forth
in IAEA INFCIRC 225/Rev
1 are maintained.
To review
physical
security
measures,
the team has visited
each
of the nine countries
within
the last
two years and has concluded
that
adequate
physical
security
measures
exist
in each country
for all Category
I material,
including
U.S. origin
HEU.
Application
of
The section
Limit
Ability
argues
that
of
IAEA Safeguards
the report
entitled
"Common Safeguards
Problems
to Detect
Diversions
of Highly
Enriched
Uranium"
the IAEA is not inspecting
research
reactors
that
77
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
-6-
significant
quantity
with the frequency
the project,
the
be involved,
as well
production.
Most
is in the core or
GAO report
fails
capability
to recover
78
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
GAO note:
79
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
-7Trackinq
Nuclear
Materials
"Central
Tracking
System Is
portion
of the digest
captioned
Inaccurate
and Unreliable"
characterizes
the Department
of Energy's
central
computerized
system used for tracking
all U.S. exported
Unidentified
highly
enriched
uranium
as incomplete
and inaccurate.
intended
users are described
as considering
the system "inadequate,
inflexible
and unreliable".
The report
also suggests
that DOE is
not effectively
using all of the information
available
to it and
has suggested
that DOE better
integrate
the various
information
systems
that
it employs
for tracking
such materials.
the
situation,
the
followinq
additional
80
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
-8The mission
of the INMTS is to record
and maintain
export,
import,
and retransfer
data for U.S. origin
material.
However,
the way
this
issue is treated
in the report
leads us to believe
this
is
not clearly
understood
by the GAO.
For example,
the report
states
on page 48, "Our review
showed that
the NMMSS/INMTS international
tracking
system is not reliable
for
monitoring
HEU supplied
overseas
for the following
reasons:
and
was
lists
as one reason,
II . ..The system shows where the material
originally
shipped,
but may not identify
current
location
of the
exported
HEU. Moreover,
the system does not show the current
physical
status
of the material
(e.g.,
irradiated,
fabricated,
or
reprocessed)."
It should be noted that INMTS was never intended
to monitor
either
the location
within
the national
boundaries
of the recipient
foreign
entity
or the physical
status
of the
material.
It should be made clear,
however,
that INMTS does not track
the
disposition
of HEU within
a country.
DOE has developed
a system
designed
to address
worldwide
plutonium
generation
and utilization.
This system,
the Special
Nuclear
Materials
Tracking
System
(STAMAS) , is designed
to address
the generation
and utilization
of
plutonium
in the commercial
nuclear
fuel cycle.
Recently,
discussions
have been initiated
on the desirablility
and feasibility
of addressing
research
facilities
and materials
such as highly
enriched
uranium.
Should HEU data be monitored
by STAMAS, this
system would utilize
the NMMSS/INMTS data as a portion
of its
input.
One other
point
should
be made -- although
the STAMAS
does address
"tracking,"
the system is not an accountability
system and cannot
provide
accountability
data.
Terrorist
Threats
Finally,
the report
seems to imply that some,
and perhaps
a number
acts have involved
group efforts
"to divert
special
of, terrorist
nuclear
material
for making explosive
devices."
DOE has no information
that indicates
such organized
efforts
on the part of
terrorist
groups,
and barring
GAO's possession
of some definitive
information
to this effect
the statement
seems misleading.
A second concern
is the suggestion
that all
39 incidents
referenced
by GAO were "terrorist
initiated."
While we do not wish to underrate this area of concern,
a check of Appendix
VI indicates
that
very few of the 39 incidents
were terrorist
inspired.
With the
discussion
developed
under a section
entitled
"Concerns
Over
Nuclear
Terrorism,.,"
the lay reader,
however,
is left
with the
81
APPENDIX IX
APPENDIX IX
- 9 impression
that more acts of nuclear
terrorism
have occurred
than in fact clearly
is the case.
Our concerns
are that a labeling of almost
any criminal
act targeted
against
nuclear
facilimay tend to confuse
the analysis
and the
ties
as "terrorist"
evaluation
of threats.
It is recommended
that GAO establish
a
clearer
definiticr:
in t?,e report
of what it means by a terrorist-group or individual-and in particular
what is meant by the term
nuclear
terrorism.
Then all reference
to the history
of acts of
nuclear
terrorism
would meet the report's
definition
of the phenomenon being analyzed.
We would urge you to factor
our comments into the final
version
of
your report.
A copy of this
letter,
as well as an annotated
copy
of the referenced
draft
audit
report,
have been provided
directly
to your staff.
Sincerely,
William
S. Heffelfinger
A ssistant
Secretary
Management
and Administration
82
.APPENDIX X
APPENDIX X
UNITED
AND
DISARMAMENT
Warhmglcm
April
Dear
Mr.
1,
DC
AGENCY
20451
1982
Conahan:
Enclosed
are ACDA's comments
on the U.S. General
"U.S. Ability
to Control
and
Accounting
Office
report
Monitor
Weapons Grade Uranium
Supplied
Abroad
is
Limited."
I
Sincerely,,
7 I
b
*.-.I ,A% Lwi-
\/.
Enclosure:
ACDA Comments
on GAO Report.
GA.0 note:
We have modified
the report
to reflect
the
provided by those commenting on the report.
83
information
APPENDIX X
APPENDIX X
ACEA General
noting
overwhelming
CHAPTER 1
It
is
worth
This
of
to US allies,
virtually
all
HEU exports
are
alone
tends
from
to reduce
national
diversion
the
theft
majority
US has been
fact
from
the
the
HEU exported
present
that
either
of
the
group
the
continues
risk
at
Countries-
significantly
principal
by a terrorist
and that
to such
Of
possibility
to
in
the
or an outlaw
be exported
area
of
nation.
CHAPTER 3
ACDA agrees
physical
with
security
for
attention
in view
tication
Of terrorist
amount
being
boundaries.
Branch
the
applied
which
transit,
both
COUntFieS
norms
physical
commerce,
become
future
particularly
protection
of
provide
nuclear
of
will
the
that
adequate
materials,
84
be
in
As more
oxide
nuclear
materials,
international
and consistent
particularly
transit.
govern-
materials
international
in mixed
important
which
Executive
US and foreign
nuclear
in
the
national
circumstances.
involvement
in
oxide
measures
protect
increasingly
be established
increase
uranium)
the
of
and sophis-
security
adequately
their
number
and between
facing
problem
increased
a common understanding
phyciral
now and in
expand
cycle
will
will
with
problems
uniform
plus
within
work
the
and the
(plutonium
the
warrants
in
activities
protection
so that
increase
to ensure
that
materials
transported
agencies
ments
it
of
ACDA will
physical
GAO conclusion
nuclear
materials
fuel
the
in
APPENDIX X
.APPENDIX X
CHAPTER 4
ACDA
there
is
and
there
in
port
There
are,
which
are
on
detected
for
long
the
limited
purified
irradiated
uranium
GAO note:
safeguards
in
should
the
nature
be
periods
of
in
risk,
fuel
that
most
assemblies,
recovered.
for
being
inspecting
HEU
encountered
of
points
made
and
whose
relevance,
In
of
should
by
the
the
put
that
be
draft
if
the
HEU
be
countries,
could
in
addition,
diversion
time
that
HEU.
indicated.
risks
GAO comments
resources
to
a number
general
of
difficulties
however,
HEU
thrust
IAEA
certain
its
report
i.e.,
general
increased
are
the
very
the
for
applying
safeguarding
in
with
a need
that
IAEA
agrees
might
in
the
diverted
reprocessed
re-
any,
to
comments
go
un-
context
of
material,
and
the
85
APPENDIX X
APPENDIX X
CHAPTER 6
ACDA
agrees
abroad
is
issues
identified
a sound
reactors
the
by
Executive
ACDA
diligently
convert
to
Branch
is
giving
along
with
as
associated
with
reactor
spent
problems
is
program
ments
and
problems
and
petitor
the
a U.S.
G_ACnqte:
most
of
before
the
programs
RERTR
vendor
which
the
ACEA also
changes.
appropriate
worlds
or
with
transfer
could
make
research
in
and
govern-
actually
and
the
the
1Lcensing
con-
optimism
continues
of
these
foretgn
are
personnel
to
of
technical
objectives
program
research
Personnel
SO.
reactors
in
problems
a resolution
working
meetings
program
foreign
cooperation
international
technology,
for
solved
has
as
of
the
For
political
reprocessing
year
which
resolving.
program
and
foreign
those
RERTR
and
are
HEU
the
agencies
the
the
address
international
fuel
of
next
of
Finally,
fabrication
the
to
be
to
Branch
addressed,
operators
accomplishing
with
and
being
precisely
technical
Rranch
a spirit
participants.
The
of
before
priority
complete
use
Furthermore,
are
level
Executive
must
at
fuels
Executive
to
within
reactor
demonstrated
closely
are
and
which
verted;
toward
fuel
the
resolution
high
take-back
expected
RERTR
LEU
possible.
the
require
funding
necessary
reducing
that
objective.
other
the
budget
expeditiously
GAO
GAO which
supported
FY 83
with
non-proliferation
actually
example,
the
strongly
to
be
program
are
advanced
working
fuel
a U.S.
vendor
reactor
fuel
a comorders.
suggested
clarifying
language
and editorial
These have been deleted
here,
however
changes were made to the report.
86
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
XI
UNITED
NUCLEAR
XI
STATES
REGULATORY
WASHINGTON.
COMMISSION
D. C. 20555
APR 12 1982
U. ue<tr reacn,
uirector
Energy and Minerals
Division
U.S. General
Accounting
Office
Washington,
D.C.
20548
;:I-.
Dear
Hr.
Peach:
This is in response
to your letter
of March 10, 1982, requesting
comments
on the draft
report
to the Congress
entitled,
"U.S. Ability
to Control
and
Monitor
Weapons-Grade
Uranium Supplied
Abroad is Limited."
The draft
report
has been reviewed
by the Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
staff.
In addition
to the general
comments below,
detailed
comments are enclosed.
The subject
of the report
is a complicated
one.
Although
considerable
information
is presented,
the report
needs to achieve
better
balance
and
perspective
and to avoid
focusing
on events
or circumstances
in isolaIn addition,
the report
sometimes
generalizes
too broadly.
These
tion.
rnncernc
aricn
;I'?icz!:rly
in connection
with Chapters
3, 4, and 5 which
address
physical
protection,
international
safeguards
and material
tracking
systems
For example:
I-
It should
be clearly
pointed
out that exports
of Highly
Enriched
Uranium
are given
comprehensive
inter-agency
review
of far greater
intensity
than that applied
to
most Low Enriched
Uranium
exports.
-_
The discussion
of foreign
physical
protection
reviews
needs
to be put into
better
perspective
by noting
that the great
majority
of HEU has been exported
to a limited
number of
of countries
and that exported
HEU has received
better
coverage
by U.S. physical
security
reviews
than implied
in
the report.
--
The discussion
of IAEA safeguards
in Chapter
4 should
be
balanced
bv noting
that
the IAEA concentrates
its inspections
on facilities
with significant
quantities
of material
like
HEti that can be used directly
in explosives
rather
than
on small research
reactors.
--
Chapter
5 should
clarify
that no USG agencies
currently
have responsibility
to track
U.S.-origin
nuclear
material
abroad and negotiation
of international
agreements
with
export
recipients
would be required
to accomplish
this.
GAO note:
We have
provided
modified
the
report
commenting
by those
87
to
on
reflect
the
the
report.
information
APPENDIX Z$I
APPENDIX XI
Mr.
J. Dexter
Should
detail,
- 2 -
Peach
to
discuss
the
report
and our
comments
in more
Sincerely,
Executive
Director
for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated
GAO note:
(465266)
88
: U.S.
GOVERNMENTPRINTING OFFICE:
1982-361-843:2175
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EMPLOYER
UNITEDSTATES
GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
OFRCE
WASHINGTON,D.C.MS48
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