Jurisdiction - Case Digest - J. Mendoza

REMEDIAL LAW
JUSTICE MENDOZA CASE DIGESTS

JURISDICTION
MTC J URISDICTION
FRANCEL REALTY v. CA
22 Jan. 1996
Facts: P, a subdivision developer, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against R in the MTC.
In its complaint, P alleged that R failed to pay monthly amortizations despite demands to update
his payments and to vacate the premises. The MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the case was cognizable by the HLURB.
Issue: Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Held: No. While generally speaking an action for unlawful detainer falls within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, this case is a not simply an unlawful detainer case. This case
involves a determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D.
No. 957, which controversy is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB. The HLURB has jurisdiction
not only over complaints of buyers against subdivision developers but also over actions filed by
developers for the unpaid price of the lots or units.
VDA. DE CRUZ v. CA
4 Mar. 1999
Facts: P filed an unlawful detainer case against D with the MTC. D claimed ownership over the
disputed land.
Issue: Was the MTC ousted of its jurisdiction, considering the question of ownership was
raised?
Held: No. After the enactment of B.P. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an
ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the
issue of ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved
only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
RTC J URISDICTION
VINZONS-CHATO v. NATIVIDAD
2 Jun. 1995
Facts: P, a revenue officer, wrote the Commissioner of the BIR to reconsider her decision to
transfer him to another revenue district. With his letter unacted upon, P filed with the RTC a
complaint for Injunction against the Commissioner.
Issue: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to entertain Ps complaint?
Held: No. Under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal
to the Civil Service Commission. The RTC judge should dismiss the action for failure of P to
exhaust administrative remedies.
REPUBLIC v. CA
30 Oct. 1996
Facts: P owned several hectares of land which the government took pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). A dispute on the proper valuation of Ps
land was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who sustained the
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initial valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines. P filed a Petition for Just
Compensation in the RTC, sitting as a special Agrarian Court. The RTC dismissed its petition on
the ground that P should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), before recourse to it could be had.
Issue: Was the dismissal proper?
Held: No. Under 57 of R.A. 6657, the Special Agrarian Courts, which are the Regional Trial
Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation of just compensation to landowners. Furthermore, the DAR is an administrative
agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain. The valuation of
property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies.
NATIONAL STEEL v. CA
2 Feb. 1999
Facts: P filed a complaint against D. P, however, failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees.
Issue: Should the complaint be dismissed?
Held: No. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the
RTC may allow P in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the expiration of
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If P fails to comply with this requirement, D
should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the
latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by P
will be considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his favor.
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
ODSIGUE V. CA
233 SCRA 626 (1994)
Facts: P, as co-owner and assignee of subject land, sent a demand letter to D to vacate
premises. The letter was delivered by the barangay captain who, in a sworn affidavit, stated that
he tried to deliver the letter to D but D refused to receive it. P brought a suit for unlawful detainer.
D said that the jurisdictional requirement of formal demand was not complied with because the
affidavit of the barangay captain had no evidentiary weight absent any hearing. The MTC, RTC
and CA decided in favor of P.
Issue: Whether jurisdictional requirements were properly complied with.
Held: Yes. The affidavit by P stated that demand letters were personally handed to D but D
refused to receive them. The affidavit is entitled to great respect absent anything to the contrary.
The Rules on Summary Procedure provide for the submission by parties of affidavits and position
papers and enjoins courts to hold hearings only where it is necessary to do so to clarify factual
matters.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
APPEAL
OBUGAN V. PEOPLE
244 SCRA 263 (1995)
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Facts: P was accused in two criminal cases of violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act. P
was found guilty. 14 days after promulgation of decision, P filed a motion for reconsideration.
Afterwards, P also filed an urgent motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The motion for reconsideration was denied but the motion for new trial was granted.
The judge however affirmed his decision after trial de novo.
Issue: Whether the 15-day period to appeal should be counted from the date of promulgation of
the original decision subject of the motion for new trial, deducting the time the motion was
pending, or from the time a new judgment was rendered.
Held: The period to appeal should be counted from the time of the rendition of the new
judgment. The mere grant of the motion for new trial operates to vacate the original judgment.
The original judgment is set aside and the case is reversed to its original status before judgment.
MOSQUERA V. PANGANIBAN
258 SCRA 473 (1996)
Facts: A, B, C, D, E, F were initially charged with frustrated homicide before the Provincial
Prosecutor. After the preliminary investigation, it was changed to less serious physical injuries.
Subsequently, the former information was reinstated by the RTC upon motion for reconsideration
of the private prosecutor. Appellants contended that because the direction and control of criminal
prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, a motion for reconsideration which the private
prosecutor filed without the conformity by the public prosecutor, was a nullity and did not prevent
the order of dismissal from becoming final.
Issue: Whether the action by the trial court was proper.
Held: Yes. Private respondent through prosecutor has the right to intervene as he had neither
instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so. The right of offended
parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has always been
recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so should
place the accused in double jeopardy. Every court has the power and the duty to review and
amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or
defect therein. In the present case, the motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the private
prosecutor who, as already discussed, has the legal personality to do so.
ARRESTS
PEOPLE V. NAZARENO
260 SCRA 256 (1996)
Facts: A and B were found guilty of the murder of X. Both claimed that their arrests without
warrant were illegal and justify the nullification of the proceedings of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the arrest was unlawful due to the fact that it was done without a warrant.
Held: No. From the records presented, it was shown that A and B waived objections based on
the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges
against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when
they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. If objections based on this ground are
waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise
valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error.
D EATH P ENALTY
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PEOPLE V. REDULOSA
255 SCRA 279 (1996)
Facts: A and B were accused of kidnapping for ransom and murder and were sentenced to
death. The case was brought to the Supreme Court on automatic review. A then filed an "Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal."
Issue: Whether the action was proper.
Held: Yes. The action was proper only because of the decision of A to continue his case as an
appealed case. However, as appellant had the right to continue with his case as an appealed
one, so does he have a right subject to the approval of this Court to terminate the appeal by
withdrawing it.
The death penalty imposed was automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of
Art. III, 19 (1) of the Constitution, which took effect on February 2, 1987. While this case was
brought to the Court for automatic review as required by Rule 122, 9 of the Rules of Court, the
case ceased to be in this Court by virtue of such Rule.
INFORMATION
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR V. CA
348 SCRA 714 (2000)
Facts: The provincial prosecutor filed with the RTC an information charging A, B, C, D and ten
other individuals with murder and multiple frustrated homicide which was based on a joint affidavit
by individuals claiming to be members of the New People's Army. A, B, C and D challenges the
information filed on the ground that in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated murder,
the provincial prosecutor disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed
rebellion. The RTC denied the motion and ruled that the power to determine what crime to charge
on the basis of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public prosecutor. The CA,
however, while agreeing with the trial court, nevertheless found the prosecutor to have gravely
abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground that the evidence
adduced showed that the crime committed was rebellion.
Issue: Whether the prosecution, even before the start of the trial, can be ordered to change the
information which it had filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary
investigation shows that the crime committed was not murder with multiple frustrated murder but
rebellion.
Held: No. It was improper of the CA to consider the record of the preliminary investigation as
basis for the finding that the provincial prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion when such
record was not presented before the RTC and therefore, was not part of the records of the case.
It is the public prosecutors who should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be
initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. Hence, a municipal judge has no legal authority to
determine the character of the crime but only to determine whether or not the evidence presented
supported prima facie the allegation of facts contained in the complaint. He has no legal authority
to determine the character of the crime and his declaration upon that point can only be regarded
as an expression of opinion in no wise binding on the court.
JUDGMENTS
PALU-AY V CA
293 SCRA 358 (1998)
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Facts: A was charged with frustrated homicide. He was however found guilty by the RTC judge
of serious physical injuries. The RTC judge found that A had no motive to do harm and that in all
probability, A accidentally pressed the trigger.
Issue: Whether the basis for the judge's decision would render the decision null and void.
Held: No. Within the issues made out by the parties, a court can find out what it thinks
happened. A judge is free to decide on the basis of probability. He can make his assessment of
the truthfulness of the testimonies aided by his own knowledge and experience.
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
LASTIMOSA V. VASQUEZ
243 SCRA 497 (1995)
Facts: X filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for
immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against A, mayor of Santa Fe. The cases
were filed at the office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The Ombudsman directed that A be charged
with attempted rape in the RTC. The case was assigned to P, a provincial prosecutor. P after
preliminary investigation only filed an information for acts of lasciviousness. The Ombudsman
cited P for contempt and suspended P for six months.
Issue: (a)
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution.
(b)
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to cite for contempt and whether
the suspension was valid.
Held: (a)
Yes. The ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sec 31
of the Ombudsman Act allows designation of investigators and prosecutors. When a prosecutor is
deputized he is under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. He is subject to the power
of the Ombudsman to direct, review, reverse or modify his decision.
(b) Yes. The Ombudsman Act gives the office the power to punish for contempt, in accordance
with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties. The
preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of the same may not be
hampered.
ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ
244 SCRA 286 (1995)
Facts: The Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum and orders requiring A, an accountant
and B, a record custodian, to produce all documents in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau had been illegally disbursed. A and B claimed that military
and diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel
of the EIIB.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman's act was proper although the complaint in this case was
unsigned and unverified.
Held: Yes. The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in
an form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Likewise, 26 (2) of RA 6770 provides
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission. The general investigation in the Ombudsman's office is
precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the State from useless and expensive
trials.
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ORDERS
WASHINGTON DISTILLERS, INC V CA
260 SCRA 821
Facts: RTC judge X, to search the premises of X Company, issued a search warrant. A
Company filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to issue a search warrant and there was no probable cause for issuing the search
warrant. RTC judge Y, who had been designated assisting judge, granted the motion. On appeal,
the CA ruled that an assisting RTC judge does not have the authority to quash the search warrant
issued by another RTC judge acting in his capacity as executive judge.
Issue: Whether a judge may revoke the orders of another judge.
Held: Yes. A judge may revoke the orders of another judge in a litigation subsequently
assigned to him. The fact that a judge was the executive judge is not material, because
jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in him as executive judge. Applications for search warrant
are made to the executive judge only for administrative purposes. Hence, an assisting judge was
competent to resolve the motion seeking to quash the search warrant.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
GOZOS V TAC-AN
300 SCRA 265 (1998)
Facts: A, B, C, D and E were accused of killing X. The prosecutor, after conducting a
preliminary investigation, filed an information charging the five with murder. The RTC judge,
however, conducted his own preliminary investigation and decided to issue a warrant of arrest
only for A.
Issue: Whether the judge's action was proper?
Held: No. The Rules of Court specifically enumerates the persons authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations, and an RTC judge is not one of those authorized to do so. To justify
his orders, the judge invoked Article III section 2 of the Constitution. However, this provision
should be distinguished from a preliminary investigation. The determination of probable cause for
the issuance of such orders of arrest is vested in the courts, but the conduct of preliminary
investigations is entrusted to the executive branch, with the exception of inferior court judges.
ORDER OF TRIAL
PEOPLE V ROMULO GUTIERREZ
302 SCRA 643 (1999)
Facts: A was charged with murder. He initially pleaded "not guilty" but later moved for
modification of the order of trial. The RTC denied A's motion for a modification of the order of trial.
Issue: Whether the RTC judge's action was proper?
Held: Yes. The Rules of Court does not require a change in the order of trial but only allows it in
the discretion of the court. This can be seen on the use of the permissive "may." In this case,
there was no basis for reversing the order of trial as the burden was on the prosecution to prove
that it was the accused who committed the act.
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UNJUST C ONVICTION
PEOPLE V. DRILON
233 SCRA 5 (1994)
Facts: A and B were convicted of murder and two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of X
and wounding his wife and son. A appealed and the CA acquitted A on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between A and B. A now filed a claim under RA 7309 sec
3 which provides for the payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. It was
denied because there was basis for finding him probably guilty.
Issue: Whether or not under RA 7309, the mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a
crime that he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself as required by law.
Held: No. What the law requires is that the claimant must be unjustly accused and convicted.
To say that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with the manner of his conviction
rather than of his innocence. The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted
is not itself proof that the previous conviction was unjust.
COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS
OLIVAS VS. OMBUDSMAN
239 SCRA 283 (1994)
Facts: P retired from the AFP. Shortly thereafter, anonymous letters were sent to the PCGG
charging him with violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Unexplained Wealth Act.
P was informed by BPI that a freeze order had been issued covering his current and savings
account. The letters were referred to the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board
that the PCGG had created.
Issue: Whether P may be compelled to file a counter affidavit notwithstanding the fact that no
complaint or affidavit has been filed against him.
Held: No. It is incumbent upon the PCGG as complainant to reduce the evidence it has into
affidavits before the respondent should be required to explain. It must be noted that the general
power of investigation of the PCGG consists of 2 stages, criminal investigation and preliminary
investigation
CIVIL PROCEDURE
PAYMENT OF D OCKET F EES
NATIONAL STEEL v. CA
2 Feb. 1999
Facts: In a complaint filed by P against D, P sought the execution in his favor of a deed of
assignment of shares of stock. The docket fees paid by P, however, were not based on the value
of the shares of stock sought to be recovered.
Issue: Did P pay the right amount of docket fees?
Held: No. This is an action for the recovery of personal property, the main purpose of which is
to regain the ownership and possession of the said shares of stock. Accordingly, P should pay
docket fees based on the value of the shares of stock and the amount of damages he seeks to
recover. Under Rule 141, 7(a) as it stood at the time of the filing of the complaint, docket fees for
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ordinary civil actions should be based on the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated
value of the property in litigation.
ORDER OF D EFAULT
VILLAREAL v. CA
17 Sept. 1998
Facts: P et al filed a Motion to lift an order of default. The motion alleged that P et al were
residents of the US which local newspapers do not reach and that they did not know about the
case filed against them until well-meaning friends informed them about the matter. The motion
also alleged that P et al have absolutely no knowledge, much less any hand, in the incident
falsely imputed to them
Issue: Did the motion to lift an order of default follow the requirements in Rule 18, 3?
Held: No. Under Rule 18, 3, a motion to lift an order of default must allege with particularity
the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect which caused his failure
to answer. The motion must show that the defendant has a meritorious defense or that something
would be gained by having the order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the motion is not
accompanied by affidavits of merits, it may be properly denied. The allegation that P et al have
absolutely no knowledge, much less any hand, in the incident falsely imputed to them does not
meet this requirement. Such allegation is a conclusion rather than a statement of facts showing a
meritorious defense.
PETITION FOR R ELIEF
TENEBRO v. CA
7 July 1997
Facts: D filed a petition for relief from judgment. In his petition, D claimed he was deprived of
due process. The court rendered a decision, not only on the issue of due process, but also on the
merits of the case.
Issue: Did the court err in considering the merits of the case in a petition for relief from
judgment?
Held: No. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases because, as a rule, a final judgment should not be disturbed where a party
could have appealed or availed himself of another remedy. Accordingly, a court may validly
consider the equities of a case in order to determine whether there is a compelling reason for
setting aside the decision. That is why Rule 38, 3 provides that a petition for relief from judgment
must be accompanied by an affidavit of merit containing the facts constituting the petitioners
good and substantial cause of action or defense.
COUNTERCLAIM
FRANCEL REALTY v. CA
22 Jan. 1996
Facts: P, a subdivision developer, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against R in the MTC.
The MTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction; nonetheless, it awarded Rs
counterclaim for damages.
Issue: Can the MTC make such an award?
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Held: No. Since it has no jurisdiction over the case, the MTC cannot grant Rs counterclaim for
damages.
FLETCHER CHALLENGE v. CA
20 April 1998
Facts: P filed a complaint against D. D filed an answer with counterclaim. Later P filed a
pleading in which they asked for the dismissal of the complaint that they had filed and for the
dismissal of the counterclaim filed against them on the ground that, being an ancillary remedy, a
compulsory counterclaim cannot stand by itself. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the
counterclaim.
Issue: Was the dismissal of the counterclaim valid under the circumstances?
Held: Yes. The rule is that the counterclaim may not be dismissed if defendant objects, unless
it can be independently considered by the court. Here, however, D made no objection and so the
RTC validly dismissed the same. At any rate, D are without a remedy because under Rule 12, 2,
the dismissal of the counterclaim is without prejudice to its filing as a separate action.
INJUNCTION
OROCAM ENTERPRISES INC. V CA
319 SCRA 444 (1999)
Facts: Lessor X filed a case of unlawful detainer against lessees A, B, C and D for failure to pay
the increased rent which the RTC granted. X then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution specifically against A and E enterprise (a privy to the contract of lease between X and
A). E enterprise filed an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which the
RTC granted. On appeal, the CA declared the writ of injunction as null and void.
Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring as null and void the writ
of preliminary injunction.
Held: No. The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it
cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of
a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in
the main case, citing thereon the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party
concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. In the present case, the RTC issued a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment, in spite of the fact that the
right of E to occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent.
Having no clear legal right, E's plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court.
EJECTMENT
LUCIO SAN ANDRES V. CA
6 Dec. 1996
Facts: P, before filing an ejectment suit against D, sent the latter a letter, demanding that a
formal contract of lease between P and D must be executed immediately otherwise D would be
considered intruders of the property from which he can be ousted. A suit for ejectment was later
filed. The case reached the CA which dismissed the complaint. The CA held that no demand to
vacate had been made by P before bringing the ejectment suit.
Issue:
Was the ejectment suit preceded by a proper demand to vacate?
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Held: No. An action for ejectment is subject to the requirement of Rule 70 2 of the Rules of
Court concerning the need for a demand to be made before the lessee may be considered a
deforicant, unlawfully withholding possession from the owner of the land. The demand must be
either to pay the rents or to comply with the terms of the contract, as the case may be. But the
letter of P makes neither demand on D. Instead, the letter demands the execution of a new lease
contract on the theory that the old lease agreement had been terminated. However, the old
agreement was not, in fact, terminated.
OROCAM ENTERPRISES INC. V. CA
319 SCRA 444 (1999)
Facts: Lessor X filed a case of unlawful detainer against lessees A, B, C and D for failure to pay
the increased rent which the RTC granted. X then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution specifically against A and E enterprise. E enterprise opposed the motion on the ground
that it was never impleaded nor included as part defendant in the ejectment case.
Issue: Whether judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon defendants in the suit but
also against those not made party thereto.
Held: Yes. A judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit
but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are: a) trespassers, squatters or agents of
the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; b) guests or other
occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant; c) transferees pendente lite; d)
sub lessee; e) co-lessee; or f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.
In this case, E enterprise admitted that it was the actual occupant of the leased premises and has
been authorized by A to pay the rents for and in its behalf.
LIMPO V CA
333 SCRA 577 (2000)
Facts: The RTC judge issued a writ of execution levying 2 parcels of land owned by X.
Subsequently, a writ of possession was issued ex parte commanding the sheriff to place Y in
possession of the properties after X was unable to redeem them. X contended that she was never
furnished a copy of Y's petition for issuance of a writ of possession, nor given a notice of the
hearing. Hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her and had no authority to issue a writ
of possession.
Issue: Whether a writ of possession may be issued of ex parte.
Held: Yes. What was filed, as a petition for issuance of writ of possession, was in substance
merely a motion, as Y actually sought just the execution of the final decision rendered in her
favor. Such motion could be made ex parte.
GARNISHMENT
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. V CA
326 SCRA 18 (2000)
Facts: W charged H with attempted parricide. H and W entered into a compromise agreement
with respect to the civil aspect of the case. Upon failure to comply with his obligations, a Notice
of Garnishment was issued by another RTC branch to Company X, H's employer. The notice of
Garnishment remained partially unsatisfied as evidenced by the two checks paid by Company X.
Issue: Whether W can validly seek to obtain satisfaction of the writ of execution against
Company X, H's employer.
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Held: No. Garnishment proceedings are the means by which the judgment creditor seeks to
subject to his claim the property of the judgment debtor in the hands of a third person. Such
proceeding must be had in the trial court that has jurisdiction over the suit in which the judgment
creditor prevailed.
PARTIES
SANTIAGO LAND DEV. V. CA
267 SCRA 79 (1997)
Facts: P, as assignee of the mortgagor, filed action against the mortgagee D to enforce an
alleged right to redeem. Pending this action, D sold the property to X. Consequently, X filed a
motion to intervene. P opposed the motion stating that X's interest was a mere expectancy. Trial
court allowed the intervention.
Issue: Whether the action of the court was proper.
Held: No. While D may have legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation, its interest as
transferee pendente lite is different from that of an intervenor. D asserts that the rules are
interchangeable and that it is erroneous to insist on the application of Rule 3 20 solely. The
purpose of Rule 12 2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party to
protect his interest and the court incidentally to settle all conflicting claims. The purpose of Rule 3
20 is to provide for the substitution of the transferee pendente lite precisely because he is not a
stranger but a successor-in-interest of the transferor, who is a party to the action. As proper party,
a transferee's title to the property is subject to the incidents and results of the pending litigation
and is in no better position than the vendor in whose shoes he now stands.
SAMANIEGO V AGUILA
334 SCRA 438 (2000)
Facts: The Office of the President granted the exemption from the coverage of the "Operation
Land Transfer Program" the land owned by X. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition
questioning the decision of the Office for failure to implead the Office of the President, as they
should be considered as indispensable parties.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President should be considered as an indispensable party and
must therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules.
Held: No. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action without that party being impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such
an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that the
court cannot proceed without their presence. "Interests" within the meaning of this rule, should
be material, directly in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from a mere
incidental interest in the question involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is
one who is joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real interest on the
subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical rules of
pleadings require the presence of such party on the record. In the case at bar, the failure to
implead the Office of the President does not warrant the dismissal of the case as such is
considered as a pro forma party.
INTERVENTION
LIMPO V CA
333 SCRA 577 (2000)
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Facts: In a case questioning the legality of a writ of possession issued ex parte, spouses H and
W filed a motion for leave to intervene as the new owners of the parcel of land being litigated
upon as such land was foreclosed and sold to the spouses as the highest bidder. The motion was
filed only after the appeal in this case had been submitted for resolution.
Issue: Whether the intervention is proper at the late stage of this case.
Held: No. Intervention may be granted only its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice the
rights of the original parties to a case. Generally, it will be allowed "before rendition of judgment
by the trial court." After trial and decision in the case, intervention can no longer be permitted.
Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal without unduly delaying the disposition of the case and
prejudicing the interest of the parties.
MISJOINDER/NONJOINDER
HEIRS OF ASUNCION V. GERVACIO
304 SCRA 322 (1999)
Facts: A case for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land was filed against X. Although X
in his petition to the SC failed to implead Y and Z as private respondents, Y and Z filed a Motion
with Leave to File Comment and/or Intervention, presented arguments in support of the
questioned orders, and specifically referred to themselves as private respondents.
Issue: Whether failure to implead is a ground for dismissal of an action.
Held: No. The Rules provides that the misjoinder/non joinder of parties is not a ground for
dismissal of an action and that parties may simply be dropped or added by order of the court,
either on motion of the parties or on its own initiative. In the present case, it was upon the
initiative of Y and Z that for all intents and purposes they have been joined as respondents.
PRETRIAL
BEMBO V. CA
250 SCRA 404 (1995)
Facts: The RTC declared D in default for failure to appear in pretrial conference. The CA
reversed the decision finding that notice to re-set pretrial was not given to parties, but only to the
counsels who were informed that a "hearing" was scheduled.
Issue: Whether notice was sufficient.
Held: Yes. The discretion and authority of the respondent court to declare private respondent in
default after it failed to appear at the pretrial is clear from 2 of Rule 20 and the CA, without a
clear showing of grave abuse of this discretion, should not have annulled the default order.
Moreover, the sufficiency of the written notice of pretrial is irrelevant where the evidence shows
that the counsel and the parties actually knew of the pretrial. Counsel of D admitted that a copy of
the order resetting the pretrial conference had been served on him and that he notified D of this
date. Nor was the notice given defective for referring to a "hearing" rather than to a pretrial. A
hearing as known to the law is not confined to a trial but embraces the several stages of a
litigation. It does not preclude pretrial.
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. V CA
326 SCRA 18 (2000)
Facts: X filed a complaint for damages against Company Y. By way of a counterclaim,
Company Y prayed for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The RTC then
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required the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and scheduled the pre-trial conference.
Counsel A, on behalf of X's counsel, Counsel B, file an "Urgent Motion for Resetting " of the pretrial conference on the ground that Counsel B was on sick leave. Company Y was declared as in
default on the ground that no medical certificate had been attached to the motion. The court
allowed X to present her evidence ex-parte.
Issue: Whether Company Y should be declared as in default for their failure to file their pre-trial
briefs at least three days before the pre-trial conference.
Held: No. In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for postponement of pre-trial, the court
must take into account the following factors: a) the reason for the postponement, and b) the
merits of the case of the movant. In this case, there is no showing that Company X, in asking for
the resetting of the pre-trial conference, sought merely to cause unjustifiable delay in the
proceedings. Also, the presence of another lawyer from counsel's law firm during the scheduled
pre-trial conference negates any suggestion of bad faith or wanton disregard of the rules on the
part of the petitioners.
CAUSE OF ACTION
MERALCO V. CA
271 SCRA 417 (1997)
Facts: D supplies P with electricity. Upon billing, P refused to pay until D informs P of the basis
for the purchase power adjustment costs. D sent a notice of disconnection to P for failure to pay
the bill. P sought to enjoin D from disconnecting electric supply. D claimed that the trial court
had no jurisdiction, and that the Bureau of Energy was the proper forum. The trial court dismissed
the case.
Issue: Whether dismissal was proper.
Held: No. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. P was not invoking the
jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric
companies," but the regular court's power to adjudicate cases involving violations of rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable. What P demanded from D was only the basis upon
which the latter had computed the purchased power adjustmentit is not a matter that in any way
pertains to BOE's supervision, control, or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates . . .
PHILSEC V. CA
274 SCRA 102 (1997)
Facts: A Co., a foreign corporation, with Y, a non-resident, undertook the obligation of X,
Filipino, to B Co. For breach of contract, A Co. sued B Co., a domestic corporation, before a US
court. While this was pending, B Co. filed a case before RTC Makati for sum of money for
damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against A Co., where it reiterated
its counterclaims. A Co. sought the dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, and that the
litigation before the US court was proper forum. The trial court and the CA dismissed the action
for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether action by lower courts was proper.
Held: No. The trial court's refusal to take cognizance of the case was justifiable under the
principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule
16 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based
on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered a matter
of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction
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on this ground, it should do so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances" require the court's desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the
pleadings filed by A Co. in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of
the plaintiffs (B Co.) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (X) is a Filipino, and that
it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which was the object of the transaction under
litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that X was not a party in
the U.S. case. It was error for the CA and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over A Co. and Y
could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served by
extraterritorial service. Rule 14 17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of summons
on a non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where,
among others, "the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines."
COMETA V. CA
301 SCRA 459 (1999)
Facts: P filed an information for Falsification of Public Document against D. The case was
eventually dismissed. Following the dismissal of the criminal case, D filed a complaint for
malicious prosecution against P. P moved for its dismissal for supposed failure to state a cause
of action and failure to implead indispensable parties. P's motion was denied.
Issue: Whether the denial of the motion was proper.
Held: Yes. The pivotal consideration to determine the proper statement of cause of action is
whether the facts pleaded and the substantive law entitle plaintiff to a judgment. A complaint is
sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations may be
vague and indefinite, for, in such case, the recourse of the defendant is to file for a motion for a
bill of particulars. Pleadings should be liberally construed. A court, dealing with a motion to
dismiss an action for malicious prosecution, has only to determine whether the allegations of the
complaint, assuming them to be true, entitle the plaintiff to a judgment.
W RIT OF POSSESSION
VACA V. CA
234 SCRA 146 (1994)
Facts: For the failure of H and W to pay their mortgage obligation to the Bank, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and the property was sold to the Bank as highest bidder. The one-year
redemption period expired. A new TCT was issued to the Bank after cancellation of TCT in the
name of the spouses. However despite demands, they refused to turn over possession. The
spouses filed a separate action to annul the mortgage. The writ was eventually issued ordering
spouses to turn over possession to the Bank.
Issue: Whether issuance of the writ of possession was proper.
Held: Yes. The pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot
bar the issuance of the writ of possession because the same is a ministerial act of the trial court
after title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. Deferments of issuance of the
writ are justified only under equitable circumstances where the obligation ceased to be ministerial.
VENUE
GESMUNDO V. JRB REALTY
234 SCRA 153(1994)
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Facts: P and D entered into a lease contract where the parties stipulated that "the venue for all
suits, whether for breach hereof or damages or any cause between the lessor and the lessee,
and persons claiming under each, being the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City." P
filed a suit for damages because D terminated the lease. D moved to dismiss on the ground that
the venue was improperly laid in the RTC of Makati, contrary to the terms of their contract.
Issue: Whether venue was proper.
Held: No. Stipulations limiting venue are valid and binding between contracting parties. It is
clear from the parties' contract that they intended to limit the venue of all suits between the lessor
and the lessee, and those between parties claiming under them, regardless of their residence.
This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided by in Rule 4, 2(b).
The terms can not be construed to merely provide an additional forum because the parties made
it plain that in no other place may they bring suit against each other.
W RIT OF ATTACHMENT
OATE V. ABROGAR
241 SCRA 659(1995)
Facts: By virtue of an action against D, P succeeded in having a writ of attachment issued over
the property of D. Records showed that there was no prior service of summons and complaint.
The deputy sheriff already served D notices of garnishment and sought their implementation. D
claimed that jurisdiction was not properly acquired.
Issue: Whether issuance of writ of attachment was proper.
Held: No. A writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is served upon the
defendant. However, it has been ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until
jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore it is required that when the proper
officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be
simultaneously made. The Rules do not require that issuance of the writ be kept a secret until it
can be enforced. Otherwise in no case may the service of summons on D precede the levy on
attachment. To the contrary, Rule 57 13 allows the defendant to move to discharge the
attachment even before any attachment is actually levied upon. Since the attachment was invalid,
any examination of the property attached thereof is also invalid.
SUMMONS
LITTON MILLS v. CA
15 May 1996
Facts: P filed a complaint against D Corp. for specific performance. Ds counsel move to dismiss
the case and quash the summons on the ground that D was a foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines, and as such, was beyond the reach of the local courts. Ds counsel
contended that the fact of Ds doing business must first be proved before summons can be
served in accordance with Rule 14, 14.
Issue: Must the fact that a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines be proved first
before summons can be served?
Held: No. A court need not go beyond the allegations in the complaint to determine whether or
not a defendant foreign corporation is doing business for the purpose of Rule 14, 14. The
allegation that D ordered soccer jerseys from P and for this purpose D caused the opening of an
irrevocable letter of credit in favor of P is a sufficient allegation that D was doing business in the
Philippines.
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VALMONTE V. CA
252 SCRA 92 (1996)
Facts: H and W are foreign residents, but H maintains a law office in the Philippines as member
of the Philippine bar. Y filed for a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals
against H and W. Y sent summons to the office of H who received it only insofar as H was
concerned. H maintained that he had no authority to accept the summons on behalf of W. H filed
an Answer with Counterclaim. W did not file an Answer. RTC refused to declare W in default
because summons was not properly served.
Issue: Whether service of summons was proper as to W.
Held: No. W is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her
must be in accordance with Rule 14 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines,
must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient. Service under the
third mode in this case is not proper because like the first two, it must be made outside the
Philippines. The service to H cannot be considered a valid service of summons on W because it
was not made upon the order of the court.
HAHN V. CA
266 SCRA 537 (1997)
Facts: P sued D for alleged breach of a Deed of Assignment. In P's complaint, he alleged that D
was a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Service of summons was made to
the DTI. D moved to dismiss the case claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
case since D was not doing business so the service to DTI was improper. The trial court deferred
resolution of motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether summons was properly served.
Held: Yes. For purposes of having summons served on a foreign corporation in accordance
with Rule 14 14, it is sufficient that it be alleged in the complaint that the foreign corporation is
doing business in the Philippines. A determination that the foreign corporation is doing business
is only tentative and is made only for the purpose of enabling the local court to acquire jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation. This determination does not foreclose a contrary finding should
evidence necessitate it.
MACAPAGAL V. CA
271 SCRA 491 (1997)
Facts: D issued a check to P. The check was dishonored upon presentation. P sued D for
damages. Summons was served at the law office of the counsel of D. D claimed that the service
was improper. Thus, jurisdiction was not acquired over him. Trial proceeded where P won.
Issue: Whether service of summons proper.
Held: Yes. The object of summons is to inform the defendant in an action commenced against
him directing him to answer the complaint within the reglementary period and giving notice that
failure to answer shall result in judgment by default. Although D now claims that he did not
authorize counsel or the latter's law office to receive the summons for him, the fact remains that
the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by the same law office in his behalf. Petitioner
did not take action against the lawyers for their unauthorized representation until after 8 years
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and only because the CA stated that D's failure to file an administrative complaint against the
lawyers showed that he did not feel genuinely aggrieved by the actions of the law firm.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
APA V. FERNANDEZ
242 SCRA 509 (1995)
Facts: P filed case for squatting against A, B and C. A, B and C moved to suspend their
arraignment based on the pendency of a civil case among the same parties regarding ownership
of the subject land. In the civil case, A, B and C sought to nullify the partition and cancel the TCT
in P's name. P argued that the issue was only physical possession, so the issue of ownership in
the civil case was not a prejudicial question.
Issue: Whether the civil action justified suspension of criminal proceedings.
Held: Yes. P claimed the right to possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership is
thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case, the proceedings in the
criminal case must be suspended in the meantime. Surely, if A, B and C are co-owners of the lot
in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as much entitled to the use
and occupation of the land as are P and his family.
CONTEMPT
PACIFIC BANKING v. CA
13 Oct. 1995
Facts: The RTC rendered a decision in favor of A and issued a writ of execution against B. B
filed a petition for certiorari with the SC and the SC issued a temporary restraining order ordering
respondents to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing such writ of execution until
further orders from this Court. Eventually the SC dismissed the petition. Four days thereafter,
respondents tried to enforce the writ of execution.
Issue: Should the SC cite the respondents for contempt of court?
Held: Yes. The respondents knew that there was an existing TRO issued by the SC. While the
petition, in which the TRO was issued, had been dismissed by the SC, the fact was that it was not
yet final and executory and the TRO had not yet been lifted at the time respondents tried to
enforce the lower courts writ of execution. The TRO was expressly made effective until further
orders from this Court, which means that it was not automatically lifted upon the dismissal of the
main case. However, there is no basis for holding the Clerk of Court guilty of wrongdoing in
certifying that D failed to file a record on appeal, since this was a matter of record.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEV'T CORP. V. UNION BANK
334 SCRA 443 (2000)
Facts: Judge A denied the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the collection
suit filed by P. Judge B replaced Judge A. P, through new counsel, filed an ex-parte Motion to
Resolve Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Judge B granted the motion. P moved for
execution of Judge B's order which has become final. Judge A was re-assigned to the case. He
denied the motion for execution citing as basis his earlier order denying motion for summary
judgment.
Issue: 1. Whether Judge A acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
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2.
Whether the case was proper for summary judgment.
Held: 1. Yes. A trial court cannotapart from reconsidering its decision, granting new trial or
allowing a relief from judgmentreview much less set aside a decision on the merits. Such
power pertains exclusively to the appellate courts. Judge B's resolution granted all reliefs prayed
for by P in the collection suit. It disposed of all issues and constitutes a judgment on merits.
Judge A's order denying motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order that did not finally
dispose of the case. An interlocutory order is always under the control of court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. It is
immaterial that the judge who exercises such powers is different from the one who issued the
rescinded or amended order. Judge B had authority to review prior interlocutory orders of the
court as he did when, in response to a new motion by P, he granted motion for summary
judgment even though previously denied by Judge A.
2. Yes. Under rule 35 1 and 3, a summary judgment is proper where, upon motion
filed after the issues had been joined and on the basis of the pleadings and papers filed, the court
finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact except as to amount of damages. A
genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence. While the records
show that no hearing was conducted by judge B before he resolved the motion for summary
judgment, in proceedings for summary judgment, the court is merely expected to act chiefly on
the basis of what is in the records of the case. The hearing contemplated in the rules is not de
rigueur as its purpose is merely to determine whether the issues are genuine or not, and not to
receive evidence on the issues set up in the pleadings.
EFFECT OF J UDGMENTS OR O RDERS
REPUBLIC V. TACLOBAN CITY ICE PLANT
258 SCRA 145 (1996)
Facts: The PCGG resolved that TCIP substantially proved ownership of Price Mansion. This
resolution was affirmed when the Republic brought the sequestration case of Price Mansion
before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan declared that Price Mansion be
removed from the list of "ill-gotten wealth." Thereafter however, UBC filed a Motion for
Intervention claiming that Price Mansion was sold to it by TCIP. Sandiganbayan refused to
resolve the motion stating that it has already lost jurisdiction over the case when it declared that
Price Mansion was not ill-gotten wealth.
Issue: Whether action by Sandiganbayan was proper.
Held: No. It behooved the Sandiganbayan to conduct a hearing to determine the truth of UBC's
claim. For whether the Price Mansion had been acquired by the UBC is a question that was not
decided in the Sandiganbayan's final order declaring it to be not to be sequestered. The Rules
provide that as to the effect of court judgments or final orders in any other litigation between the
same parties or their successors in interest, is that deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
SUPPLEMENTAL/AMENDED PLEADING
SUPERCLEAN SERVICES V. CA
258 SCRA 265 (1996)
Facts: P won as lowest bidder to provide cleaning services for D. D refused to enforce the
contract between them. P filed for mandamus. However, a year passed without the petition
being resolved such that P, in view of supervening events, sought a change in the relief prayed.
Through a Supplemental Complaint, P claimed damages for lost profit. D argued that the action
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was prohibited as it was tantamount to a change in cause of action which was prejudicial to D's
interests.
Issue: Whether Supplemental Complaint should be allowed.
Held: Yes. The so-called Supplemental Complaint by P should simply be treated as embodying
amendments to the original complaint or P may be required to file an amended complaint. The
change in the relief sought was necessitated by a supervening event which rendered the first
relief sought impossible of attainment. There will be no unfairness or surprise to private
respondent, because after all D will have a right to file an amended answer and present evidence
in a support thereof.
CONSOLIDATION
ALLIED BANKING CORP. V. CA
259 SCRA 371 (1996)
Facts: P and D are parties to a back-to-back loan transaction. P filed a case for collection
against D for his failure to comply with obligations. However, on a separate civil action, D filed a
case for accounting against P to determine the amount of his obligation. Case for accounting was
dismissed on the basis of litis pendentia.
Held: No. Litis pendentia merely requires that there be another pending action, not a prior
pending action. Dismissal is allowed if one of the actions would be the better vehicle to ventilate
the issues between the parties. In this case, there are countervailing considerations which make
dismissal of D's suit inequitable. The fact that one case was already partly tried should not justify
the refusal of the trial judge to consolidate the cases because the evidence already submitted by
the plaintiffs in the first case could be submitted as part of the evidence in the second case,
without further need of retaking the testimonies of the witnesses, in view of the fact that both
cases involve the same parties, the same subject matter and the same issues. The rules of
consolidation should be liberally construed.
MOTION TO DISMISS
HAHN V. CA
266 SCRA 537 (1997)
Facts: P sued D for alleged breach of a Deed of Assignment. In P's complaint, he alleged that D
was a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Service of summons was made to
the DTI. D moved to dismiss the case claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
case since D was not doing business so the service to DTI was improper. The trial court deferred
resolution of motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether action by trial court was proper.
Held: Yes. Rule 16, 3 authorizes courts to defer the resolution of a motion to dismiss until after
the trial if the ground on which the motion is based does not appear to be indubitable. The
records dealt with factual issues which were not clear as to whether some allegations correspond
to the proof. The trial court properly deferred resolution of the motion to dismiss and thus avoided
prematurely deciding a question which requires a factual basis, with the same result if it had
denied the motion and conditionally assumed jurisdiction.
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MOTION FOR N EW T RIAL
REYES V. CA
6 Feb. 1997
Facts: D was charged for falsification of deeds of sale of 4 parcels of land. D pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution proceeded to present evidence and soon rested its case. Presentation of evidence
by defense was re-set for 6 times. D was absent for 3 times. D's counsel was absent 5 times.
Due to these absences, D was deemed to have waived right to present evidence. Trial court
found D guilty. D hired new counsel who filed Motion for New Trial before the CA.
Issue: Whether Motion for New Trial should prosper.
Held: Yes. It was counsel's absences more than D's which appear to be the cause for the
defense's failure to present its evidence. Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty,
the negligence of counsel was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice
petitioner's constitutional right to be heard.
MODES OF DISCOVERY
DELA TORRE ET AL V. PEPSI
298 SCRA 363 (1998)
Facts: P, et. al, holders of 349 Pepsi crowns, tried to claim prizes from D who refused to deliver.
Trial court consolidated the 8 complaints for specific performance and damages. P claimed right
to litigate in forma pauperis. Written interrogatories were sent to P to determine status as pauper
litigants. Trial court suspended proceedings until documents on status of P were completed. P
did not serve their answers. Trial court dismissed case for failure to make discovery. CA
affirmed.
Held: No. Generally, orders of the court do not affect ongoing process of discovery between
parties, unless the same expressly so provides. However, the interrogatories were on ancillary
matters, not directly related to the main issues in the suit. The failure to answer by P was due to
misapprehension of scope of trial court's order which suspended proceedings until documents
were completed. The dismissal was a drastic sanction for an excusable mistake.
FORUM SHOPPING
DE DIOS v. CA
19 June 1997
Facts: The CA denied a motion for extension of time within which to file a petition for certiorari
for violation of Circular No. 28-91, because the certification against forum shopping was executed
not by the petitioner himself but by petitioners counsel.
Issue: Does the requirement of Circular No. 28-91 for a certification against forum shopping
apply to petitioners motion for extension?
Held: No. Under this circular, such certification is required in every petition filed with the SC or
the CA. Obviously, a motion for extension is not the petition spoken of in this provision. While
such certification may be attached to a motion for extension and, in such a case, may be
considered as compliance with the rules even if none is attached to the petition subsequently
filed, the reverse does not follow.
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. GORDON
298 SCRA 736 (1998)
Facts: D was apprehensive of his removal as SBMA Chair due to the change of administration.
D filed a petition for prohibition to prevent his ouster, saying that he had a fixed term. His
appointment was eventually cancelled by the President. Instead of pressing for his Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, he filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Petition. D then filed a case in
RTC Olongapo. P filed a case for forum shopping and contempt against D based on Rule 7 5 of
the Rules. The SC granted the Notice of Withdrawal without prejudice to the contempt petition.
Issue: Whether P was guilty of forum shopping.
Held: No. Forum shopping consists filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, simultaneously or successively, to obtain a favorable judgment. In this case, no
adverse decision was rendered against D by the SC for which he thought proper to institute
second action at the RTC. This is a situation where the party realizes his mistake because the
court in which he brought his case had no jurisdiction. However, D should have at least
apologized to the SC and explained the need to re-file without awaiting the resolution on their
Notice of Withdrawal of Petition. But, the purpose of citing one in contempt is preservative more
than punitive, so the SC overlooked the lapse.
MELO V. CA
318 SCRA 94 (1999)
Facts: D mortgaged a parcel of land to P to secure a loan. Due to failure of D to pay, the
mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and P was the highest bidder. P filed a Petition for ExParte Issuance of a Writ of Possession. As counter-petition, D filed a complaint for injunction
against P. P moved to dismiss D's action based on forum shopping and failure of private
respondent to attach a certification of non-forum shopping to the complaint. D amended complaint
by including the certification.
Issues: 1. Whether D's action was tantamount to forum shopping.
2. Whether there was substantial compliance with the rule requiring submission
of certification of non-forum shopping together with initiatory pleadings.
Held: 1. No. The petition for Ex-Parte Issuance of a Writ of Possession that P filed involved a
different cause of action from the complaint for injunction filed by D. P sought possession of the
subject property, whereas D sought to enjoin them from consolidating title over the same. P's
action is founded on Act No. 3135, Sec. 7, which gives the purchaser at a public auction the right
to have possession of the property sold to him during the redemption period even if eventually
they do not succeed in consolidating their title to it. D's action is based on RA 337, Sec. 78,
which gives a mortgagor the right to redeem the property sold at foreclosure sale within one year
thereof. D can oppose P's action to obtain possession of the property while trying to prevent
them from consolidating title in a separate case. The decision in one is not conclusive of the
other.
2. No. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure
to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that P is not guilty of forum
shopping. Otherwise, we would have an absurd situation where the parties themselves would be
the judge of whether their actions constitute a violation of the rule. Compliance with the
certification against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance of forum
shopping itself. Nor can subsequent compliance with the requirement excuse a party's failure to
comply in the first instance. Unless condoned by the Court due to compelling reasons, noncompliance is inexcusable. Thus, there is a difference in the treatmentin terms of imposable
sanctionsbetween failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping. The former is merely a cause for the dismissal, without
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prejudice, of the complaint or initiatory pleading, while the latter is a ground for summary
dismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt.
APPEALS
IDANG v. CA
14 Jul. 1994
Facts: In an action for recovery of possession of land, the RTC rendered a judgment in favor of
P. On review, however, the CA reversed the decision. P did not appeal but instead, brought an
ejectment case against R.
Issue: Was filing an ejectment case against R the proper remedy?
Held: No. The validity of the CA decision cannot be collaterally attacked. P should have
appealed from that decision but he did not. Neither did he bring an action for the annulment of the
judgment against him.
COCO-CHEMICAL v. CA
19 Nov. 1996
Facts: P filed a complaint against D. The case was dismissed. Ps counsel filed a notice of
appeal which stated that it was being filed on behalf of W. For this reason, as W was not a party
to the case, D moved to dismiss the appeal. Ps counsel opposed the dismissal of the appeal and
explained that the error was due to inadvertence. The RTC dismissed the appeal.
Issue: Was the dismissal proper?
Held: No. It is obvious that the error was due to inadvertence on the part of Ps counsel.
Although counsel was negligent in failing to discover the errors before signing the notice, his
negligence should be considered excusable considering that the title of the case and its number
as well as the name of the court were correctly stated in the caption of the notice of appeal and
no prejudice would be caused by the allowance of the appeal, while real prejudice would be
caused to P by its disallowance.
DE DIOS v. CA
19 Jun. 1997
Facts: Ps motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) was denied in a resolution received by P on July 31. On August 9. P
moved for an extension of 15 days, until August 24, within which to file a petition for certiorari in
the CA. On August 23, P filed his petition, denominated as one for review by way of appeal by
certiorari. In a resolution, however, the CA denied the motion for extension on the ground that
the petition for certiorari which P intended to file was not the proper remedy.
Issue: Was the CA correct in denying the motion for extension on this ground?
Held: No. The CA was rather hasty in concluding that P was going to file a petition for certiorari
solely on the basis of Ps allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should have
reserved judgment on the matter until it had actually received the petition especially considering
that Ps motion for extension was filed well within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review. As it turned out, what P actually filed was a petition for review which complies with all the
requirements for such petition.
VILLAREAL v. CA
17 Sept. 1998
Page 22 of 30
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Facts: On April 20, D filed a Motion for Reconsideration of a decision. On August 10, the RTC
issued an order denying said Motion. On August 16, a photocopy of the said order was served.
On August 21, D received the duplicate original copy of the order. On the same day, D filed a
notice of appeal. The RTC denied due course to Ds appeal, holding that it was filed out of time.
Issue: From which date should the period for filing an appeal be counted: from August 16, or
from August 21?
Held: August 21. It cannot be from August 16, when D was given a mere photocopy of the
courts order. Such copy lacks assurance of its genuineness, considering that photocopies can
easily be tampered with, for the purpose of enabling D to determine whether or not to appeal and,
if they do so, what issues to raise on appeal. The RTC, therefore, should have given due course
to Ds appeal.
PACIFIC v. CONCORDIA
20 Nov. 1998
Facts: A judgment was rendered by the RTC ordering D to pay damages to P. D filed a notice of
appeal. Subsequently, however, the decision was modified by the RTC with respect to the award
of damages and the amounts thereof. D did not appeal the modified decision.
Issue: Should D have filed another notice of appeal when the original decision, from which it had
appealed, was modified?
Held: No. D did not have to file another notice of appeal, having given notice of its intention to
appeal the original decision. To be sure, the modified decision substantially amended the original
decision. But Ds failure to appeal from the modified decision did not render its prior appeal from
the original decision ineffective. Both decisions ordered D to pay damages to P although in
different amounts. It is also undisputed that D seasonably appealed from the original judgment.
ABELLERA V. CA
326 SCRA 485 (2000)
Facts: P won an unlawful detainer case against D. On appeal, the RTC held 7 clarificatory
hearings wherein the parties presented additional evidence. The RTC reversed the MTC ruling. P
argued that the RTC committed an error when it conducted a trial de novo, which should not have
been done.
Issue: Whether the RTCs decision should be set aside because it conducted a trial de novo.
Held: No. Indeed, although the RTC should decide cases on appeal on the basis solely of the
record of the proceedings in the MTC and other courts of equal rank, nonetheless, the principle of
estoppel may bar a party from questioning the reception of additional evidence. P is estopped
from claiming that the RTC acted in excess of jurisdiction as she herself participated in the trial de
novo and she questioned the courts authority only after the RTC ruled against her.
APPEALPAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE
AYALA LAND, INC. V. CARPO
345 SCRA 579 (2000)
Facts: P brought action to quiet title against D. P won. D appealed. CA dismissed the appeal
since, as per computation, D was P5.00 short of the correct amount of the required docket fee.
Issue: Whether the CA erred.
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Held: Yes. Rule 41 4 must be read in relation to Rule 50 1(c) such that despite the
jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of docket fee, the appellate court still has discretion to
relax the rule in meritorious cases. With the exception of 1(b) which refers to failure to file
notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period prescribed by the Rules, the grounds
enumerated in Rule 50 1 are merely directory ("may"). Failure to pay the required docket fees
may be excused where appellant was ready and willing to pay the correct amount from the start,
but was unable to do so due to the error of an officer of the court, i.e., the clerk of court, in
computing the correct amount.
MOTION FOR R ECONSIDERATION
MERALCO V. CA
271 SCRA 417 (1997)
Facts: P did not assign the trial court order dismissing its complaint which had become final and
executory as error in its brief before the CA. D thus argues that that in itself became final. D also
argues that the order became final because the motion seeking reconsideration was filed the day
after the expiration of the extension was granted.
Issue: Whether the order of the trial court became final and executory.
Held: No. The April 30 order did not become final because, although the motion seeking its
reconsideration was filed a day after the expiration of the extension, the last day, June 23, fell on
a Sunday. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration could be filed the next day. A judgment
becomes final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial declaration. The September 17
order of the trial court, declaring its April 30 decision final and executory, has no effect because in
fact P filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
prevented the decision of the trial court from attaining finality.
REPUBLIC v. CA
9 Jul. 1998
Facts: G (for Government) filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the decision of the RTC.
The motion did not have attached to it proof that a copy thereof had been served on the adverse
party, D. However, a copy of the motion was sent to Ds counsel the day after the motion had
been filed. The RTC denied the motion for giving been filed without proof that a copy thereof had
been served on the adverse party. The CA upheld the RTC decision.
Issue: Should the motion for reconsideration be allowed?
Held: Yes. Considering the question raised in the appeal of G and the amount involved in this
case, the CA should have considered the subsequent service of the motion for reconsideration to
be a substantial compliance with the requirement in Rule 15, 6. The demands of substantial
justice were satisfied by the actual receipt of said motion. Indeed, as much as possible, cases
should be determined on the merits, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
LITIS PENDENTIA
COKALIONG SHIPPING LINES, INC V. AMIN
260 SCRA 122 (1996)
Facts: P filed a complaint for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against A
and B. The case was filed in Cebu. R, as insurer of A, filed a case against P before the RTC of
Makati. P filed a motion to dismiss the Makati case due to pendency of the Cebu case.
Page 24 of 30
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Issue: Whether or not there is litis pendentia.
Held: Yes. All the requisites for litis pendentia are present. For litis pendentia to be a ground for
dismissal of an action, the following requisites must be present:
1. identity of parties
2. identity of rights asserted and identity of relief prayed for
3. the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would later on amount to
res judicata.
The fact that the position of the parties was reversed does not negate the identity of the parties
for the purpose of litis pendentia.
C ERTIORARI
REPUBLIC V. CA & TRADERS ROYAL BANK
322 SCRA 81 (2000)
Facts: The trial court dismissed the Republics complaint for collection of sum of money.
Republic filed its notice of appeal 12 days beyond the 15-day reglementary period. The appeal
was dismissed and Republics motion for reconsideration was denied. Instead of appealing under
Rule 45, Republic filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, 60 days after receipt of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the petition should be allowed to prosper.
Held: No. The proper remedy was to appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Apparently, the Republic resorted to special civil action for certiorari because it had
failed to take an appeal on time. But this special civil action cannot be used as a substitute for an
appeal that has been lost. There is no showing in this case of any extraordinary circumstance that
may justify a deviation from the rule on timely filing of appeals. Anyone seeking exemption from
this rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist.
The doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice cannot be invoked here. The failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is
not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction over the appeal.
C ERTIORARI T REATED AS P ETITION FOR R EVIEW
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES INC. V. CA
268 SCRA 597 (1997)
Facts: P filed an action for sum of money against D in RTC Pasig. RTC rendered a decision
ordering D to pay. D filed a notice of appeal. Later on however D moved for the dismissal of the
appeal on the ground that the judgment was already satisfied. P however filed with the RTC a
motion for the execution of judgment. It alleged that no money had actually been remitted to it. D
filed a motion for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed. Petition for certiorari with the SC
was filed. P urges that petition for certiorari be dismissed outright because what P should have
done is a petition for review under Rule 45 and that certiorari should not lie because there was no
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held: The SC, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, may decide to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially if it has been filed within the reglementary period for the same.
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TRIAL BY C OMMISSIONER
ALJEMS CORPORATION V. CA
March 28, 2001
Facts: P sued D for the payment of his share in their joint venture. The case was referred to a
commissioner. P complained that the commissioner did not observe the mandatory requirements
of the Rules. P contended that instead of merely interviewing the parties, the commissioner
should have subpoenaed witnesses who could enlighten her under oath and she should have
conducted a hearing.
Issue: Whether the commissioner committed an error by merely basing her report on her
interview of the parties.
Held: Yes. Rule 32 3 and 5 of the Rules clearly indicate the necessity for a formal hearing
and the swearing of witnesses; otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine factual questions
that arise in the course of the examination of the accounts. For this purpose, the witnesses must
necessarily be sworn in and offered for cross-examination. This would not be possible if the
commissioner merely interviews the parties. What 3 authorizes to be limited is the scope of the
proceedings before the commissioner, but not the modality thereof. The requirement for the
commissioner to hold a hearing is clear, for this is the essence of due process.
EVIDENCE
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
TENEBRO v. CA
7 Jul. 1997
Facts: During trial, D and his counsel were always absent. The RTC allowed P to present its
evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of P which later became final and
executory. D filed a petition for relief from judgment. D contends that his failure to appear at the
hearing of the case was a ground for considering him to have waived the right to cross-examine
Ps witnesses, but not his right to present evidence.
Issue: Is Ds contention meritorious?
Held: No. D waived not only the right to cross-examine Ps witnesses but also his right to
present evidence as a necessary consequence of his repeated failure to appear at the hearings
of his case. D could not be found at his given address and utterly neglected to let the court and
his counsel know of his whereabouts.
ADMISSION OF G ENUINENESS
ENGR. MERCADO v. CA
12 Jul. 1994
Facts: A, charged with estafa, did not question the genuineness of his signature on the receipt
given to the witness. He did not deny the claim of witnesses, made in his presence, that he
signed the receipt himself.
Issue: Is A deemed to have admitted the genuineness of the signature?
Held: Yes. The SC upheld the RTCs finding that A did not question the genuineness of the
signature on the receipt. What A was questioning was not the signature itself but a marking that
appeared on top of the signature, which he alleged was only superimposed on the receipt.
Page 26 of 30
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B EST EVIDENCE R ULE

DE GUZMAN v. CA
7 Aug. 1996
Facts: The RTC admitted Exhibit C in evidence although it is a mere photocopy of the letter sent
by P to R. However, the cause of the unavailability of the original letter was without bad faith on
Rs part and the due execution of the same was proven during trial.
Issue: Could Exhibit C be admitted in evidence?
Held: Yes. It appearing that the execution and the loss of the original document have been duly
proven, the introduction in evidence of a photocopy thereof was proper. It is settled that if the
original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witness.
W ITNESSES / EXPERT W ITNESS
PEOPLE V. BAID
336 SCRA 656 (2000)
Facts: A was found guilty of the crime of rape against V, a mental patient diagnosed as having
schizophrenia. The prosecution presented V as a witness. A argued that Vs testimony should not
have been given credence since V is a schizophrenic. A also questioned on appeal the
qualifications Vs attending psychiatrist who was presented by the prosecution as an expert
witness.
Issues: (1) Whether V should be disqualified as a witness.
(2) Whether A could question the qualifications of an expert witness on appeal.
Held: (1) No. Notwithstanding her mental illness, V showed that she was qualified to be a
witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of making known her perception to others.
Thought she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim during her
testimony, her behavior was such as could be expected from a person suffering from
schizophrenia. Otherwise, she was candid, straightforward, and coherent, and it has been settled
that a person should not be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.
(2) No. A did not raise any objections to the expert witness qualifications in the trial court
and he even cross-examined her. Objections not timely raised are deemed waived (Rule 132
36). The fact that the psychiatrist was hired by Vs family to give expert testimony did not by that
fact alone make her a biased witness. The problem of credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not
reviewable in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
PEOPLE V. GONZALES
337 SCRA 590 (2000)
Facts: A was convicted of kidnapping with attempted rape. The prosecution presented
complainant V as a witness. A argued that Vs testimony should not have been given credence.
Issue: Whether Vs testimony was worthy of credence.
Held: No. According to V, several persons saw her after escaping from A but none of these
people was ever presented to testify and corroborate Vs testimony. While the testimony of 1
witness may be sufficient to support a finding of guilt, this only applies if said testimony is
Page 27 of 30
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credible. In this case, the SC did not find Vs testimony concerning her detention sufficiently
credible (she did not run when A was opening the door of his house, she did not shout for help
when her house was just next door, she did not go home but instead went to school to attend
classes after allegedly escaping from A, etc.)
FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE
ONG CHIA V. REPUBLIC
328 SCRA 749 (2000)
Facts: RTC admitted P to Philippine citizenship. CA reversed and denied Ps application for
naturalization, taking into account the Solicitor Generals contentions. P argued that the CA erred
in considering documents that had merely been annexed by the State in its appellants brief. P
contended that since the State failed to present and formally offer these documents as evidence,
they should not have been considered by the court.
Issue: Whether the rule on formal offer of evidence should be followed.
Held: No. Rule 132 34 states that the rule shall not apply to naturalization proceedings. The
rule on formal offer of evidence is clearly not applicable in this case involving a petition for
naturalization. It was also not practicable and convenient to apply the Rules of Court by analogy
in this case. P cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the documents
authenticity. He could have included his objections, as he in fact did, in the brief he filed with the
CA.
OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE
MACASIRAY V PEOPLE
291 SCRA 154 (1998)
Facts: The prosecution, in the course of the trial, introduced in evidence an extrajudicial
confession executed by A in which he admitted participation in the crime and implicated B and C.
Also presented in evidence was the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation of the case. The defense objected to its admissibility on the ground that they were
given without the assistance of counsel. On appeal, the CA ruled on the admissibility of the
evidence presented as there was a waiver made in the objection to the admissibility of the
documents.
Issue: Whether there was a waiver in the objection to the admissibility of the documents, either
by failing to object to their introduction during trial or by using them in evidence.
Held: No. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered. Also, a
party is not deemed to have waived objection to admissibility of documents by his failure to object
to the same when they were marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial objection to
documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. Objections to
admissibility of documents may be raised during trial and the court may rule on them then, but, if
this is not done, the party should make the objections when the documentary evidence is formally
offered at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the other party.
CREDIBILITY
PEOPLE V. REYES
242 SCRA 264 (1995)
Facts: A and B are husband and wife who are accused of illegal recruitment. B was convicted
although A remains at large. X testified that he and five others went to A and Bs house to seek
Page 28 of 30
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employment abroad and paid certain sums therefore. B now contends that she has nothing to do
with her husbands activities.
Issue: Whether or not the testimonies should be given credence.
Held: An accused can be convicted on the strength of the testimony of a single witness, if such
testimony is credible and positive and produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. When the
issue is the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court unless certain facts and circumstances might have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied. This is because the trial court heard the testimony itself.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
HABEAS CORPUS
DAVID v. CA
16 Nov. 1995
Facts: C was born out of an adulterous relationship between P and R. One day, R took C and
refused to give back the child to P. P filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of C.
Issue: Can the question of custody of a minor child born out of an illegitimate relationship be
decided in a habeas corpus case?
Held: Yes. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It is indeed true that the determination of the
right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to
each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation.
CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
REPUBLIC v. CA
15 Mar. 1996
Facts: P filed a petition for the adoption of M.M. with prayer for the correction of the minors first
name Midael to Michael. The Solicitor General opposed the petition, arguing that the
correction could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction
of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Significantly, the notice and
publication requirements of Rule 108 were not complied with. The RTC dismissed the opposition
of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 does not apply in this case.
Issue: Does Rule 108 apply in this case?
Held: Yes. This case falls under letter (o) in Rule 108, 2, referring to changes of name.
Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this court that Rule 108, implementing Art. 412 of the
Civil Code, covers those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
clearly misspelled. Under Rule 108, the local civil registrar must be impleaded in the case and a
notice of the petition for correction of entry must be published. Since these requirements were not
complied with, the RTC had, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, no jurisdiction.
VENUE OF S ETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Page 29 of 30
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MALOLES III V. PHILLIPS
324 SCRA 172 (2000)
Facts: De Santos filed a petition for probate of his will (ante-mortem probate) before the RTC of
Makati Branch 61. His will was allowed. De Santos died subsequently. D, the designated
executrix of the will, filed a petition for issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 65, Makati
RTC. P, the testators nephew, contended that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon the petition
for letters testamentary since the probate proceedings in Branch 61 did not terminate upon the
issuance of the order allowing the will.
Issue: Whether RTC Makati Branch 65 could grant the petition for letters testamentary.
Held: Yes. In cases for probate of wills, the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the
extrinsic validity of the will. After the allowance of De Santos will, there was nothing else for
Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73 12. It
was error for the judge to say that Branch 61 of RTC Makati, having begun the probate
proceedings, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
others. Although Rule 73 1 applies in so far as the venue of the petition for probate of the will, it
does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of estate
of the testator after his death.
Page 30 of 30

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JUSTICE MENDOZA CASE DIGESTS

Was the ejectment suit preceded by a proper demand to vacate?

Whether the case was proper for summary judgment.

B EST EVIDENCE R ULE

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