FREEDOM AND POLITICS: A Lecture

Author(s): HANNAH ARENDT

Source: Chicago Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (SPRING 1960), pp. 28-46
Published by: Chicago Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25733551 .
Accessed: 29/12/2014 14:01
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Chicago Review is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Chicago Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

HANNAHARENDT

FREEDOM AND POLITICS: A Lecture

I
To discuss the relation of freedom to politics in the brief time of
a lecture can be
a book would be
as
nearly
justified only because
or
we
Whether
know it
not, the question of politics is
inadequate.
we
when
of
of freedom; and we
the
present
always
speak
problem
a
can
or ex
single political issue without, implicitly
hardly touch
an
issue of man's liberty. For freedom, which
plicitly, touching upon
is
times of crisis or revolution?the
seldom?in
direct aim of
only
the reason why men live together in
is
action,
actually
political
politi
cal organization at all; without
be
it, political life as such would
raison d'etre of
is freedom, and its field of
The
meaningless.
politics
experience is action.
shall see later that freedom and free will (a human faculty
We
the philosophers have defined and redefined for centuries) are by
no means the same. Even less is it identical with inner freedom, this
inward space into which men may escape from external coercion

the
of this
and feel free.Whatever
be and
feeling may
legitimacy
however eloquently itmight have been described in late antiquity,
a late
it is
and itwas originally the result
historically
phenomenon,
of an estrangement from the world inwhich certain worldly
experi
ences were transformed into
one's own self. The
experiences within
of inner freedom are derivative in that they
experiences
always pre
a retreat from the world, where freedom was denied, into
suppose
an inwardness to which no other has access. This inward space where
the self is sheltered against the world must not be mistaken for the
heart or the mind, both of which exist and function only in interre
the world. Not the heart and not the mind, but in
lationship with
wardness as a
of absolute freedom within one's own self was
place
28

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

discovered in late
own
those who had no
antiquity by
place of their
in theworld and hence lacked a
condition
from
which,
worldly
early
to almost the middle of the nineteenth
century, was unani
antiquity
a
for freedom.1
mously held to be
prerequisite
in
of
which the concept of an inner,
influence
the
Hence,
great
spite
has
exerted
freedom
upon the tradition of thought, it
non-political
seems safe to
man would know
that
of inner freedom ifhe
say
nothing
a condition of
as a
had not first
experienced
being free among others
aware
or
We
first become
of freedom
its
worldly
tangible reality.
our intercourse with others, not in intercourse with our
in
opposite
selves. Before it became an attribute of thought or a
of the
quality
will, freedom was understood to be the free man's status which en
abled him to move, to get away from home, to go out into the world
was
in deed and word. This freedom
and meet other
clearly
people
liberation: in order to be free, man must have liberated
preceded by
himself from the necessities of life. But the status of freedom did
act of liberation. Freedom needed
not follow
automatically upon the
1The
ences

as of the
of inner freedom,
of the concept
character
derivative
experi
of human
the theory that "the appropriate
is
region
liberty"
underlying
more
the "inward
domain
Stuart
of consciousness"
Mill),
(John
appears
clearly
ifwe go back to their
the modern
individual with
its desire to un
origins. Not
its justified fear lest
and to expand, with
fold, to develop,
society get the better
of its individuality, with
its emphatic
"on the
insistence
of genius"
importance
are
and
but the philosophers
of late antiquity
in this
originality,
representative
the most
for the absolute
of
arguments
respect. Thus,
persuasive
superiority
inner freedom can still be found in an essay of
the
Epictetus,
slave-philosopher,
"On Freedom"
IV, 1). Epictetus
(JDissertationes, Book
begins by stating that free
a sentence
is who
lives as he wishes
from
(?1), a definition which
oddly echoes
means
a
in which
Aristotle's
Politics
the statement
"Freedom
the doing what
man
likes" is put in the mouth
of those whq
do not know what
freedom
is
then goes on to show that a man
is free, if he limits
(1310a25
sq.). Epictetus
himself to what
is in his power,
if he does not reach into a realm where
he can

be hindered (?75). The "science of living" (?118) consists in knowing how to

distinguish

between

the alien world

over which

man

ofwhich hemay dispose as he seesfit (?? 81& 83).

has no power

and

the self

In this
freedom and
have
for good.
If the
interpretation,
politics
parted
only
to freedom
own self or rather his
to restrain
obstacle
is man's
possible
inability
no
his self's desires, then he needs no
and
in order
political
politics
organization
to be free. He
can be a slave in the world
and still be free. The
back
political

ground of this theory is clearly indicatedby the rolewhich the ideas of power,

to ancient
and property
in it.
man
domination,
play
According
understanding,
could
liberate himself from
over other men, and
necessity
only through power
a
a home
he could be free
trans
in the world.
only if he owned
place,
Epictetus
these worldly
own
into
within
man's
self,
posed
relationships
relationships
as that which man
he discovered
that no power
is so absolute
whereby
yields
over himself, and that the inward
space where man
struggles and subdues him
self ismore
more
shielded from outside
inter
entirely his own, namely
securely
home could ever be.
ference, than any worldly

29

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in addition tomere liberation the company of other men who were in

the same state, and it needed a common public space to meet them?
a
in other words, intowhich each of the
politically organized world,
free-men could insert himself by word and deed.
not every form of human intercourse and not every
Obviously,
men live
kind of community is characterized by freedom. Where
for
but do not form a body politic?as,
example, in tribal
together
or
in
the
of
the
factor
household?the
societies
ruling their
privacy
not
is
but
freedom
the necessities of life and
actions and behavior
concern for its
wherever
the man-made
Moreover,
preservation.
in des
world does not become the scene for action and speech?as
communities which banish their subjects into the
ruled
potically
narrowness of the home and thus prevent the rise of a
realm
public
a
Without
freedom has no worldly
reality.
politically guaranteed
freedom lacks theworldly space tomake its appearance.
public realm,
To be sure it may still dwell in men's hearts as desire or will or
or
but the human heart, as we all know, is a very
hope
yearning;
and whatever goes on in its obscurity can
be
dark
hardly
place
as a demonstrable
fact and
called a demonstrable fact. Freedom
and are related to each other like two sides of the
politics coincide
same

matter.

Yet, it is precisely this coincidence of politics and freedom which

ex
in the
cannot take for
of our present
granted
light
political
rise of totalitarianism, its claim to
subordinated
The
periences.
having
of life to the demands of politics and its consistent non
all
spheres
above all the rights of privacy, makes us
civil
recognition of
rights,
doubt not only the coincidence of politics and freedom but their very
are inclined to believe that freedom
We
begins where
compatibility.
we
seen
because
have
that
freedom
has
disappeared
politics ends,
when so-called political considerations overruled everything else.Was
more freedom,"
not the liberal credo, "the less
politics the
right after
not
true
that the smaller the space occupied by the
all? Is it
political,
the
the domain left to freedom? Indeed, do we not
larger
rightly
measure the extent of freedom in any
given community by the free
to
scope it grants
apparently non-political activities, free economic
or freedom of
teaching, of religion, of cultural and intel
enterprise
lectual activities? Is it not true, as we all somehow believe, that
we

with freedom only because and insofar as it

politics is compatible
a
guarantees
possible freedom from politics?
as a
freedom from
This definition of
potential
political liberty
us
not
our
most
recent
is
politics
merely by
experiences;
urged upon
30

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

a
it has
need
large role in the history of political theory.We
played
cen
no
the
of
18th
farther
than
the
17th
and
thinkers
go
political
turies who more often than not simply identified
freedom
political
with security. The highest purpose of politics, "the end of govern
ment," was the guaranty of security; security, in turn,made freedom
a
of activities
possible, and theword freedom designated
quintessence
which occured outside the
realm. Even
though
political
Montesquieu,
a different, but a much
the essence
he had not
higher opinion of
only
or
of politics than Hobbes
equate
Spinoza, could still occasionally
with
freedom
political
security.2 The rise of the political and social
the breach
sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries has even widened
for government which, since the begin
between freedom and
politics;
had
been
identified with the total domain of
of
modern
the
age,
ning
not
was now considered to be the
the
appointed protector
political,
as
so much of freedom
of the life process, the interests of
society
remained the decisive criterion, but not
and its individuals.
Security
the individual's security against "violent death" as inHobbes
(where
the condition of all liberty is freedom from fear), but a security
which should permit an undisturbed development of the life process
of society as a whole. This life process is not bound up with freedom
but follows its own inherent necessity; and it can be called free only
in the sense that we speak of a freely flowing stream. Here freedom
but a marginal
is not even the non-political aim of
phenome
politics,
non?which
somehow forms the boundary government should not
overstep unless life itself and its immediate interests and necessities
are

at

stake.

not
have reasons of our own to distrust
only we, who
for the sake of freedom, but the entire modern age has sepa
politics
rated freedom and politics. I could descend even deeper into the
secu
past and evoke older memories and traditions. The pre-modern
lar concept of freedom certainly was emphatic in its insistence on
the subjects' freedom from any direct share in government;
separating
the
and freedom consisted in having the govern
people's "liberty
ment of those laws
which their life and their goods may be most
by
their own"?as Charles I summed itup in his speech from the scaffold.
de
It was not out of a desire for freedom that
people eventually
or
to
the political realm,
admission
manded their share in government
but out of mistrust in those who held power over their life and goods.
arose out of
The Christian concept of
political freedom, moreover,
Thus

2 See
de

Esprit des Lois, XII, 2: "La libertephilosophique consiste dans l'exercice

la volonte.

...

La

liberte

politique

consiste

dans

la surete."

31

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

the
and hostility against the
realm
early Christians' suspicion
public
to be absolved in order
as such, from whose concerns
demanded
they
to be free. And does not this Christian definition of freedom as free
dom from
we know so well from ancient
politics only repeat what
philosophy, namely, the pholosopher's demand of ^xoA^, of "leisure,"
or rather of abstention from
politics which since Plato and Aristotle
was held to be a
for the /?a>s?cwp^rtK?, the
prerequisite
philosopher's
now the Christians demanded for all,
that
life,"
only
"contemplative
for "the many," what the philosophers had asked for only "the few?"
the enormous weight of this tradition and despite the
Despite
our own
even more
perhaps
telling urgency of
experiences, both
same direction of a divorce of freedom from
into
the
pressing
politics,
I think you all believed you heard not more than an old truism when
I first said that the raison d'etre of
politics is freedom and that this
we shall
in action. In the
freedom is
primarily experienced
following,
do no more than reflect on this old truism.

II
as related to
is not a
politics
phenomenon of the will.
deal here not with the liberum arbitrium, a freedom of choice
that arbitrates and decides between two given things, one good and
one evil as, for
III determined to be a villain.
example, Richard
Rather it is, to remain with Shakespeare,
the freedom of Brutus:
"That this shall be or we will fall for it," that is, the freedom to call
not exist before, which was not
into
being which did
something
not even as an
or
of
given,
object
cognition
imagination, and which
therefore strictly speaking could not be known. What
guides this
act is not a future aim whose
intellect
the
has
desirability
grasped
before the will wills it,whereby the intellect calls upon the will since
can dictate action?to
a characteristic
only thewill
paraphrase
descrip
tion of this process by Duns Scotus: lntellectus apprehendit agibile
antequam voluntas Mud velit; sed non apprehendit determinate hoc
esse agendum quod apprehendere dicitur die tare. (Oxon. IV, d. 46,
no. 10.) Action, to be sure, has an aim, but this aim varies and
qu. 1,
the
of the world; to
depends upon
changing circumstances
recognize
or
the aim is not a matter of freedom, but of
wrong judgment.
right
seen as a distinct and
Will,
separate human faculty, follows judgment,
the
and then commands its execution.
of
i.e., cognition
right aim,
The power to command, to dictate action, is not a matter of freedom,
or weakness.
but a
question of strength
Freedom

We

32

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the

Action
intellect nor under the dictate of the will,
for
although it needs both
the execution of any particular
Action
from
springs
goal.
something
which
famous analysis
altogether different
(following Montesquieu's
a
can
of forms of
government) I shall call principle. Principles
inspire,
a
but they cannot
result in the sense which is
prescribe
particular
out a
for
the judgment of the
program. Unlike
required
carrying
intellect which precedes action, and unlike the command of the will

which initiates it, the

becomes
manifest only
inspiring principle
fully
act itself,which, however, does not exhaust its
in the
performing
an action, in distinction from its
can
validity. The principle of
goal,
be
time and again; it is inexhaustible and remains manifest
repeated
as
are honor
as the action lasts, but no
long
longer. Such principles
or
love
of
which
called
virtue, or dis
glory,
equality,
Montesquieu
tinction or excellence?the Greek
del apiareveiv ("always strive to do
or hatred.
your best and to be the best of all") and also fear or distrust
Freedom or its opposite appear in theworld whenever such
principles
are actualized; the appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of
act. Men are free?as dis
the
principles, coincides with
performing
as
tinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom?as long
they
nor
act
are the same.
act, neither before
after; for to be free and to
Freedom as inherent in action is perhaps best illustrated by Machia
velli's concept of virtu, the excellence with which man answers the
the world opens up before him in the guise of fortuna,
opportunities
best
and which is neither Roman virtus nor our virtue. It is
perhaps
translated by "virtuosity," that is, an excellence we attribute to the
arts (as
arts of
distinguished from the creative
making),
performing
lies in the
and not in
where the accomplishment
performance itself
an end
that
it into exist
product which outlasts the activity
brought
ence and becomes
of
it.
The
of Machia
independent
virtuoso-ship
velli's virtu somehow reminds us of theGreek notion of virtue, apery,
or "excellence,"
although Machiavelli
hardly knew that the Greeks
and sea
used
flute
like
playing, dancing, healing,
metaphors
always
to
from other activities, that is, that
they
distinguish political
faring
drew their analogies from those arts inwhich virtuosity of perform
ance is decisive.
all acting contains an element of virtuosity, and because
the excellence we ascribe to the performing arts, politics
virtuosity is
has often been defined as an art. This, of course, is not a definition
but a metaphor, and the metaphor becomes completely false if one
falls into the common error of regarding the state or government as
Since

33

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

In the sense of
of art, as a kind of collective masterpiece.
the creative arts, which bring forth something tangible and reify
human thought to such an extent that the
produced thing possesses
an existence of its own,
an art?which
exact
politics is the
opposite of
does not mean that it is a science. Political institutions,
incidentally
no matter how well or how
badly designed, depend for continued
is achieved by the
existence upon acting men; their conservation
same means that
them into
being. Independent existence
brought
marks the work of art as a product of making; utter dependence
as a
upon further acts to keep it in existence marks the state
product
of action.
here is not whether the creative artist is free in the
The
point
of
creation, but that the creative process is not displayed in
process
not destined to appear in the world. Hence,
and
the element
public
of freedom, certainly present in the creative arts, remains hidden;
matters
it is not the free creative process which
finally appears and
art
for the world, but the work of
itself, the end product of the
on the
contrary, have indeed a certain
process. The performing arts,
musi
with
affinity
politics. Performing artists?dancers, play-actors,
cians and the like?need an audience to show their virtuosity, just
as
can
men need the
presence of others before whom
acting
they
a
for
their
"work"
both
need
and
appear;
publicly organized space
both depend upon others for the performance itself. Such a space
is not to be taken for granted wherever men live
of appearances
once was
that
in a
together
community. The Greek polis
precisely
"form of government" which provided men with a space of appear
ances where
with a kind of theater where freedom
they could act,
could appear.
nor far-fetched if I use
I
it neither
hope you will find
arbitrary
sense of the Greek
Not
theword
in
the
only etymo
'political'
polis.
for the learned does the very word, which
and not
logically
only
in all
derives from the
historically unique
European
languages still
of the Greek
echo the experiences of the
organization
city-state,
which first discovered the essence and the realm of the
community
to talk about
It is indeed difficult and even
politics
political.
misleading
and its innermost
without drawing to some extent upon
principles
the
of Greek and Roman antiquity, and this for no other
experiences
so
reason than that men have never, either before or after,
thought
so
much
its
of
and bestowed
dignity upon
highly
political activity
realm. As regards our present concern, the relation of freedom to
com
reason that
politics, there is the additional
only ancient political
a work

34

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

munities were founded for the express purpose to serve the free?
nor
those who were neither slaves, subject to coercion
by others,
on
and
the
of
life.
driven
necessities
If, then, we
laborers,
urged
by
understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or raison
d'etre would be to establish and keep in existence a space where free
can
dom as
appear. This is the realm where freedom is
virtuosity
a
in words which can be heard, in deeds
worldly reality, tangible
can
events
in
and
which
be seen,
which are talked about and turned
are
into stories before
remembered and incorporated into the
they
occurs in this
space of
great storybook of human history.Whatever
even
not a direct
it
is
when
is
definition,
appearances
political by
remains outside it, such as the great feats
product of action. What
of barbarian empires, may be impressive and noteworthy, but it is
not
political, strictly speaking.
These conceptions of freedom and politics and theirmutual relation
as free
we
seem so
strange because
usually understand freedom either
will or free thought, while, on the other hand, we impute to politics
the concern for the maintenance of life and safeguarding of its in
as we
are with the
terests. Yet even we,
preoccupied
apparently
concern for life, still know that
the
cardinal
is
courage
among
politi
cal virtues. Courage
is a big word, and I do not mean the daring
of adventure which gladly risks life for the sake of being as thor
alive as one can be only in the face of danger
oughly and intensely
is no less concerned with life than cowardice.
and death.
Temerity
we still believe to be
for
which
indispensable
political action,
Courage,
and which Churchill once called "the firstof human qualities, because
it is the quality which guarantees all others," does not gratify our
individual sense of vitality but is demanded of us by the very nature
realm. For thisworld of ours, because it existed before
of the
public
can not afford to
us and ismeant to outlast our lives in it,
simply
concern to individual lives and the interests connected
give primary
with them; as such the public realm stands in the sharpest possible
contrast to our
domain where, in the protection of family
private
and home, everything serves and must serve the security of the life
even to leave the
protective security
process. It requires courage
not because of par
our
enter
the
and
four walls
of
public realm,
ticular dangers which may or may not lie inwait for us, but because
we have arrived in a realm where the concern for life has lost its
liberates men from their worry about life for the
validity. Courage
is indispensable because in politics
freedom of the world. Courage
not life but the world is at stake, a world about which we have to
35

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

decide how it is going to look and to sound and in what shape we

want it to outlast us.
think of freedom
Those therefore who, in
spite of all theories, still
not believe that the
when
hear
the
word
will
they
"politics,"
political
is
the sum total of
interests and that therefore it is the
only
private
to check and balance their conflicts; nor are
task of
they
politics
to hold that the role of
to that of a
government is similar
likely
with freedom.
In both instances, politics is
incompatible
paterfamilias.
Freedom
is the raison d'etre of politics only if it designs a realm
but
is
which
and therefore not merely
distinguished from,
public
even
to the
realm
and
its
interests.
opposed
private

Ill
of freedom and
this notion of an interdependence
Obviously,
in contradiction to the social theories of the modern
stands
politics
to revert
it does not follow that we need
age. Unfortunately,
only
to older
the greatest diffi
theories.
traditions
and
Indeed,
pre-modern
an
in
of freedom to
culty
understanding of the relation
reaching
return to tradition, and
arises from the fact that a
politics
simple
to what we are wont to call the
not
great tradition, does
especially
us. Neither the
arose
as
it
first
of
freedom
help
philosophical concept
a
in late
of
antiquity, where freedom became
phenomenon
thought
which man could, as it were, reason himself out of the world,
by
nor the Christian and modern notion of free will have any
ground
in
tradition is almost unani
political experience. Our philosophical
mous in
men have left the realm
freedom
holding that
begins where
of political life inhabited by the many, and that it is not experienced
in association with others but in intercourse with oneself?whether
in the form of an inner
since Socrates, we call
dialogue which,
or a conflict within
the
inner
strife between what
thinking,
myself,
I would
and what I do, whose murderous dialectics disclosed first
to Paul and then to
of
and
the
Augustine
equivocalities
impotence
the human heart.
For the
of the
tradition has
problem of freedom, Christian
history
indeed become the decisive factor.We
almost automatically equate
freedom with free will, that is, with a
unknown
faculty virtually
to classical
For will, as
discovered
it, had so
antiquity.
Christianity
to desire and intend
little in common with thewell-known
capacities
come into conflict with
that it claimed attention
it
had
after
only
but a
of the
them. If freedom were
actually nothing
phenomenon
36

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

will, we would have to conclude that the ancients did not know
freedom. This, of course, is absurd, but if one wished to assert it
he could argue that the idea of freedom played no role in the works
reason for this
to
of the great philosophers
Augustine. The
prior
is that, in Greek as well as Roman antiquity, freedom
fact
striking
was an
the quintessence of the
exclusively political concept, indeed
and
of
Our
tradition, beginning
citizenship.
city-state
philosophical
with Parmenides and Plato, was founded explicitly in opposition to
this
and this citizenship. The way of life chosen by the phi
polis
was understood
in opposition to the fiio* itoXltlkos, the
losopher
of
life.
Freedom, therefore, the very center of politics
political way
as the Greeks understood it,was an idea which almost
by definition
could not enter the framework of Greek philosophy. Only when
the
and especially Paul, discovered a kind of free
early Christians,
dom which had no relation to politics, could the concept of freedom
enter the
became one of the chief
history of philosophy. Freedom
as
occur
was
it
when
something
experienced
problems of philosophy
me
of the
outside
with
and
between
myself,
ring in the intercourse
men.
became
Free-will and freedom
intercourse between
synonymous
notions,3 and the presence of freedom was experienced in complete
solitude "where no man might hinder the hot contention wherin I
had engaged with myself," the deadly conflict which took place in
the "inner dwelling" of the soul and the dark "chamber of the heart."
Book VIII,
ch. 8)
(Augustine, Confessiones,
In view of the extraordinary potential power inherent in thewill
are indeed almost identical notions4?we
tend
will and will-power
to
that the phenomenon of the will origi
historical
fact
the
forget
not manifest itself as I-will-and-I-can, but, on the contrary,
nally did
in a conflict between the two, in the experience that what I would
I do not.What was unknown to antiquity was precisely that I-will
3 Leibniz

sums up and articulates

he writes:
tradition when
the Christian
only
nichts
bedeutet
Freiheit
ob unserem Willen
zukommt,
eigendich
Frage,
'frei' und Villensgemass'
zukommt. Die Ausdriicke
anderes, al ob ihm 'Willen'
zu dem car
zur Metaphysik
dasselbe."
I, Bemerkungen
(Schriften
besagen
Zu Artikel
tesischen
39.)
Prinzipien.
"Die

stresses
in his Confessions,
about will
in the famous
Augustine,
chapters
.. . et paretur
"it com
inherent in will:
the great power
statim,
Imperat
already
. . . and is
that man might com
the "monstrosity"
mands
immediately
obeyed";
and 'to com
arises from the fact that 'to will'
mand himself and not be obeyed
tantum imperat, in quantum
are the same?in
mand'
vult, et in tantum non fit
as the mind
non vult.
the mind
("Insofar
commands,
quod
imperat, in quantum
and
wills,
ch. 9.)

insofar

the thing

commanded

is not

done,

it wills

not."

Book

VIII,

37

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and I-can are not the same?non hoc est velle, quod posse. (Augustine,
ibidem) For the I-will-and-I-can was of course very familiar to the
ancients.We
need only remember how much Plato insisted that only
those who knew how to rule themselves had the right to rule others
true that self
and be freed from the
obligation of obedience. And it is
control has remained one of the
if only
virtues,
specifically political
I-will
because it is an
of
where
virtuosity
outstanding phenomenon
coincide.
and I-can must be so well attuned that
they practically
Had ancient philosophy known of a possible conflict between what
I can and what I will, itwould
certainly have understood the phe
nomenon of freedom as an inherent
or it
might
quality of the I-can,
have defined it as the coincidence of I-will and I-can;
conceivably
not have
it
of it as an attribute of the I-will
certainly would
thought
or I-would. This assertion is no
we wish to
empty speculation; if
check itwe need only to read
whose thought followed
Montesquieu,
so
the
who therefore
closely
political thought of the ancients, and
aware of the
was so
the
and the
of
Christian
deeply
inadequacy
of
He
freedom
for
philosophers' concept
expressly
political purposes.
and
and the
distinguished between philosophical
political freedom,
no more of freedom
difference consisted in that
demands
philosophy
than the exercise of the will (Vexercice de la volonte),
independent
set.
of circumstances and of attainment of the
goals the will has
Political freedom, on the contrary, consists in
able to do what
being
one
to will (la liberte ne pent consister qu'a pouvoir faire ce
ought
2 and XI,
que Von doit vouloir).
3) For
(Esprit des Lois, XII,
as for the ancients itwas obvious that an
agent could
Montesquieu
no
to
called freewhen he lacked the
longer be
do?whereby
capacity
it is irrelevant whether this failure is caused
exterior or
by in
by
terior

circumstances.

I chose

a
the example of self-control because to us this is
clearly
more
than any
phenomenon of will and of will-power. The Greeks,
other
have reflected on moderation and the
to tame
people,
necessity
never became aware of the will
the steeds of the soul, and yet
they
as a distinct
faculty, separate from other human capacities. Histo
men first discovered the will when
rically,
they experienced its im
not
and
its
with Paul: "for to will
when
said
potence
power,
they
is present with me; but how to
that
which is good I find
perform
not." It is the same will of which
that it
Augustine
complained
seemed "no monstrousness
to
to
will, partly
[for it] partly
nill;" and
out that this is "a disease of the mind," he also
he
although
points
admits that this disease is, as itwere, natural for a mind
possessed of
38

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

a will

"For the will commands that there be a will, it commands not

. . Were
.
the will entire, it would not
something else but itself.
even command itself to be, because itwould
already be." In other
words, ifman has a will at all, itmust always appear as though there
were two wills present in the same man,
fightingwith each other for
over
his
mind.
VIII,
9) Hence, thewill is both
(Confessiones,
power
and
and
unfree.
free
powerful
impotent,
we
set to
When
speak of impotence and the limits
will-power,
we
think ofman's
with
respect to the surround
usually
powerlessness
some
to notice that in these
ingworld. It is, therefore, of
importance
was not defeated
some
testimonies
will
the
early
by
overwhelming
force of nature or circumstances; the contention which its appearance
nor
raised was neither the conflict between the one
against the many
the strife between body and mind. On the contrary, the relation of
mind to body was forAugustine even the
outstanding example for the
enormous power inherent in the will: "The mind commands the

body, and the body obeys instantly; the mind commands itself, and
is resisted." (ibidem) The
in this context the exterior
body represents
world and is by no means identical with one's self. It iswithin one's
self, in the "interior dwelling"
(interior domus), where Epictetus
still believed to be an absolute master, that the conflict between man
and himself broke out and the will was defeated. Christian will,
power was discovered as an organ of self-liberation and immediately
It is as
the I-will immediately
the
found
though
wanting.
paralyzed
I-can, as though the moment men willed freedom, they lost their
to be free. In the
capacity
deadly conflict with worldly desires and
to liberate the self,
intentions from which will, power was
supposed
to achieve was
the most
of
seemed
able
willing
oppression. Because
to generate
the will's
its
genuine power, its
impotence,
incapacity
constant defeat in the
with
the
which
in
the power of the
self,
struggle
at once into a will
I-can exhausted itself, the
turned
will-to-power
I can only hint here at the fatal consequences
for
to-oppression.
with the human capacity
of
of
this
freedom
political theory
equation
we almost auto
to will; itwas one of the causes
even
why
today
or at least rule over others.
with
matically equate power
oppression
However
that may be, what we
understand by will and
usually
a
a
out
has
of
conflict
this
between
will, power
grown
willing and
an
out
of
the
of
I-will-and-canwctf,
performing self,
experience
which means that the I-will, no matter what iswilled, remains sub
to the self, strikes back at it,
spurs it on, incites it further of is
ject
ruined
it.How
far the will to power may reach out, and even
by
39

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

to conquer the whole world, the

it
if
begins
somebody possessed by
I-will can never rid itself of the self; it always remains bound to
to the self distin
it and, indeed, under its
bondage. This bondage
the I-will from the I-think, which also is carried on between
guishes
me and
in whose dialogue the self is not the object of
myself but
the activity of thought. The
fact that the I-will has become so
have become practically
will
and
that
will-to-power
power-thirsty,
identical, is perhaps due to its having been first experienced in its
at
any rate, the only form of government which
impotence. Tyranny
to an ego
arises directly out of the I-will, owes its greedy
cruelty
tism
absent from the Utopian tyrannies of reason with which
utterly
to coerce men and which
the
conceived
philosophers wished
they
on the model of the I-think.
I have said that the
firstbegan to show an interest in
philosophers
the problem of freedom when freedom was no
longer experienced
in
and
with others but inwilling and the intercourse
acting
associating
with one's self,when,
will. Since
briefly, freedom had become free
a
the
first
freedom
has
been
of
then,
order; as
philosophical problem
a
to the
such it was
become
and thus has
applied
political realm
aswell. Because of the
action
from
political problem
philosophic shift
to
as a state of
from
freedom
manifest in action
will-power,
being
to the Hberum arbitrium, the ideal of freedom ceased to be
virtuosity
in the sense we mentioned before and became sovereignty, the ideal
of a free will,
independent from others and eventually prevailing
our current
notion
against them. The philosophic ancestry of
political
of freedom is still
in
eighteenth century political writers,
quite manifest
when, for instance, Thomas Paine insisted that "to be free it is suffi
cient [forman] that he wills it," a word which Lafayette applied to
the nation state: "pour qu'une nation soit libre, il suffitqu'elle veuille
with
l'etre."5
Politically, this identification of freedom
sovereignty
the most
of the
and
is
pernicious
perhaps
dangerous consequence
For it leads either
free
will.
of
freedom
and
equation
philosophical
to a denial of human
if it is realized that what
freedom?namely
ever men
or to the
never
are
be,
may
insight that
sovereign?,
they
can
the freedom of one man or a group or a
be pur
body politic
only
of all others.
chased at the
of the freedom, i.e. the
price
sovereignty,
it is in
Within
the
conceptual framework of traditional philosophy,
5
modern
the most con
theorists, Carl Schmitt has remained
Among
political
sistent and the most
of sovereignty. He
of the notion
able defender
recognizes
that the root of
is who wills
is the will:
and com
clearly
Sovereign
sovereignty
mands.
See
146.
Miinchen
his Verfassungslehre,
7
1928,
ff.,
pp.
especially

40

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

deed very difficult to understand how freedom and

non-sovereignty
can exist
to put it another way, how freedom could have
together or,
to men under the condition of
been
given
non-sovereignty. Actually,
non
it is as unrealistic to
deny freedom because of the fact of human
as it is
to believe that one can be free?as an
sovereignty
dangerous
if one is sovereign. The famous sover
individual or as a
group?only
been an illusion which, more
of
bodies
has
eignty
political
always
over, can be maintained only by the instruments of violence, that is,
means. Under human conditions, which
with
essentially non-political
are determined
not man but men live on the earth,
the
fact
that
by
are so little identical that
cannot even
freedom and
sovereignty
they
men wish to be
as individuals
exist
Where
simultaneously.
sovereign,
or as
must submit to the
of thewill,
organized groups, they
oppression
or the
be this the individual will with which I force
myself
"general
sov
will" of an organized group. Ifmen wish to be free, it is
precisely
must renounce.
ereignty they
IV
us in the horizon of
problem of freedom arises for
traditions on one hand and of an
originally anti-political
tradition on the other, we find it difficult to realize
philosophic
that there may exist a freedom which is not an attribute of the will
but an accessory of doing and acting. Let us therefore go back once
more to
to its
traditions,
antiquity, i.e.,
political and pre-philosophical
not for the sake of erudition and not even because of the
certainly
a freedom
of our traditions, but
experi
continuity
merely because
and
of course,
enced in the process of
acting
nothing else?though,
never
mankind never lost this
experience altogether?has
again been
articulated with the same classical clarity.
rooted in the curious fact that both
This articulation is
ultimately
theGreek and the Latin language possess two verbs to designate what
Since

the whole

Christian

we

call 'to act.' The two Greek words are

apx^v: to
uniformly
to rule, and irpaTreiv: to carry
to lead and,
finally,
begin,
something
Latin verbs are agere: to set
The
something
through.
corresponding
inmotion, and gerere which is hard to translate and somehow means
the
and supporting continuation of past acts which result
enduring
in the res gestae, the deeds and events we call historical. In both in

stances, action occurs in two different stages; its first stage is a

which something new comes into theworld. The Greek
beginning by
word
apxeiv which covers beginning, leading and even ruling, that
41

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

is, the outstanding qualities of the freeman, bears witness to an experi

ence inwhich
to
new
being free and the capacity
begin something
was
in
coincided. Freedom, as we would
say today,
experienced
The manifold
of
indicates
the
follow
apx^v
meaning
spontaneity.
new who were
those could
already rulers
ing: only
begin something
over
and
household
heads
who
ruled
slaves
(i.e.,
family) and had
thus liberated themselves from the necessities of life for
enterprises
in distant lands or
in the
in either case, they no
citizenship
polis;
longer
rule, but were rulers among rulers, moving among their peers whose
as their leaders in order to
help they enlisted
begin something new,
to start a new
enterprise; for only with the help of others could the
apxcov, the ruler, beginner and leader, really act, ttpcltt lv9 carry
through whatever he had started to do.
are also interconnected,
In Latin, to be free and to
begin
though
in a different way. Roman freedom was a
the
legacy bequeathed by
was tied to
founders of Rome to the Roman
their
freedom
people;
the
their forefathers had established
by founding the City,
beginning
whose affairs the descendants had to manage, whose consequences
had to bear and whose foundations
had to
All
they
'augment.'
they
are the res gestae of the Roman
this
Roman
his
together
republic.
asGreek
as
toriography therefore, essentially
political
historiography,
never was content with themere narration of
great deeds and events;
or Herodotus,
unlike
the Roman historians always felt
Thucydides
con
bound to the
of
Roman
beginning
history, because this beginning
tained the authentic element of Roman freedom and thus made their
to relate,
started ab urbe
history political; whatever
they had
they
with
the
foundation
of
the
the
condita,
guaranty of Roman
City,
freedom.

I have
that the ancient concept of freedom
already mentioned
no role in Greek
played
philosophy precisely because of its exclu
Roman
writers, it is true, rebelled occasionally
sively political origin.
the
against
anti-political tendencies of the Socratic school, but their
strange lack of philosophic talent apparently prevented their finding
a theoretical
concept of freedom which could have been adequate
to their own
to the
great institutions of liberty present
experiences and
in the Roman res publica. If the
of ideas were as consistent
history
as its historians sometimes
we should have even less
imagine,
hope
to find a valid
political idea of freedom inAugustine, the great Chris
tian thinker who in fact introduced Paul's free will,
its
along with
we find in
into
Yet
the
of
perplexities,
Augustine
philosophy.
history
not
as liberum arbitriumy
only the discussion of freedom
though this
42

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

discussion became decisive for the tradition, but also an entirely dif
notion which characteristically appears in his
only
ferently conceived
inDe Civitate Dei. In the City of God, Augustine,
treatise,
political
as is
more from the
background of specifically
only natural, speaks
Roman experiences than in any of his other writings, and freedom
is conceived there, not as an inner human disposition, but as a char
acter of human existence in theworld. Man does not possess freedom
so much as he, or better his
with
into the world, is
equated
coming
the appearance of freedom in the universe; man is free because he is
come
a
was so created after the universe had
already
beginning and
into existence: [Initiumjut esset, creatus est homo, ante quern nemo
fuit. (Book XII, ch. 20). In the birth of each man this initial beginning
is re-affirmed, because in each instance something new comes into an
which will continue to exist after each individ
already existing world
ual's death. Because he is & beginning man can begin; to be human and
to be free are one and the same. God created man in order to intro
the faculty of beginning: freedom.
The strong anti-political tendencies of early Christianity are so fa
miliar that the notion that a Christian thinker was the first to formu
duce into the world

of
late the philosophical
implications of the ancient political idea
seems
The
freedom strikes us as almost
paradoxical.
only explanation
to be that
was a Roman as well as a Christian, and that
Augustine

in this part of his work he formulated the central

political experience
was that freedom
of Roman
qua beginning became
antiquity, which
manifest in the act of foundation. Yet, I am convinced that this im
if the
pression would considerably change
sayings of Jesus ofNazareth
were taken more
We
find
in their
seriously
philosophic implications.
in these parts of theNew Testament an
extraordinary understanding
of freedom and
the power inherent in human freedom;
particularly of
to this power, which, in
but the human
which
capacity
corresponds
not
the words of the
is capable of
gospel,
removing mountains, is
will but faith. The work of faith,
iswhat the
its
actually
product,
a word with many
in the New
gospels called 'miracles/
meanings
can
Testament and difficult to understand. We
the
difficulties
neglect
not
to those passages where miracles are
here and refer
clearly
only
men
those
all
miracles,
performed by
supernatural events?although
no less than those
a natural
a divine agent,
interrupt
performed by
con
series of events or automatic processes in whose context
they
stitute the
wholly unexpected.
are
the same, it
If it is true that action and
beginning
essentially
miracles must likewise be with
follows that a capacity for
performing
43

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in the range of human faculties. This sounds stranger than it actually

is. It is in the nature of every new beginning that it breaks into the
world wholly unexpected and unforeseen, at least from the
viewpoint
moment it comes to
of the processes it
interrupts. Every event, the
were a miracle. It
us
as
may well
pass, strikes with surprise
though it
contexts as
to consider miracles
in
be a
prejudice
religious
merely
occurrences. It may be better not
supernatural, wholly inexplicable
our whole existence rests, as itwere, on a
to
forget that, after all,
chain of miracles, the
into being of the earth, the
coming
develop
on it, the evolution of mankind out of the animal
ment of
life
organic
of processes in the universe and their
For from the
species.
viewpoint
statistically overwhelming probabilities, the coming into being of the
as the natural scientists would say,
earth is an "infinite
improbability,"
same is true for the formation of
a miracle as we
it.
The
call
might
or for the evolution of man
out
of
life
inorganic processes
organic
out of the processes of
life.Each of these events appears to us
organic
a
like miracle the moment we look at it from the
of the
viewpoint
no means
is
processes it interrupted. This viewpoint, moreover,
by
or
it is, on the contrary, most natural and
sophisticated;
arbitrary
indeed, in ordinary life, almost commonplace.
to illustrate thatwhat we call 'real' in
I chose this
example
ordinary
has come into existence
through the advent of infinite
experience
it has its limitations and cannot
improbabilities. Of course,
simply
be applied to the realm of human affairs. For therewe are confronted
with historical processes where one event follows the others, with
oc
the result that the miracle of accident and infinite
improbability
curs so
it seems strange to speak of miracles at all.
that
frequently
the reason for this
is merely that historical
However,
frequency
are created and
human initiative.
processes
constantly interrupted by
as
If one considers historical processes
processes, devoid of hu
only
man initiative, then every new
in
it, for better or worse,
beginning
as to be
becomes so
infinitely unlikely
well-nigh inexplicable. Objec
that is, seen from the outside, the chances that tomorrow will
tively,
so overwhelm
be like yesterday are
always overwhelming. Not quite
so
as
are
of
but
the
chances
that no earth
course,
very nearly
ing,
would ever rise out of cosmic occurrences, that no lifewould
develop
out of
no man would ever
out
inorganic processes, and that
develop
of the evolution of animal life.The decisive difference between the
"infinite improbabilities,,, on which
life and the whole
earthly
reality
of nature rest, and the miraculous
character of historical events is
obvious; in the realm of human affairswe know the author of these
44

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

"miracles"; it is men who perform them, namely, insofar as they

have received the twofold gift of freedom and action.
V
From these last considerations, it should be easy to find our way
to contemporary
It follows from them,
political experiences.
that the combined danger of totalitarianism and mass
is not
society
freedom and civil rights, and that
that the former abolishes
political
the latter threatens to engulf all culture, the whole world of durable
to abolish the standards of excellence without which no
things, and
can ever be
these dangers are real enough.
produced?although
thing
them we sense another even more dangerous threat, namely
Beyond
that both totalitarianism and mass society, the one by means of terror
and ideology, the other by yielding without violence or doctrine to
the general trend toward the socialization of man, are driven to stifle
as such, that is, the element of action and
initiative and
spontaneity
in
all activities which are not mere laboring. Of these
freedom present
two, totalitarianism still seems to be more dangerous, because it at
earnest to eliminate the
of "miracles" from
tempts in all
possibility
or?in more familiar
the realm of
exclude the
language?to
politics,
to the automatic
events in order to deliver us
of
entirely
possibility
we are surrounded
our historical
processes by which
anyhow. For
and political life takes
of natural processes which,
in
the
midst
place
in turn, take place in themidst of cosmic processes, and we ourselves
are driven
by very similar forces insofar as we, too, are a part of
to
nature. It would be sheer
for miracles,
organic
superstition
hope
the context of these automatic
for the
in
"infinitely improbable,"
can be
excluded. But
processes, although even this never
completely
it is not in the least
it is even a counsel of realism, to
superstitious,
look for the unforeseeable and unpredictable, to be
for and
prepared
to
are
in
the
realm
where
in
fact
"miracles,"
expect
political
they
a matter of meta
Human
freedom is not
always possible.
merely
but a matter of fact, no less a
auto
reality, indeed, than the
physics
matic processes within and against which action always has to assert
to become
itself.For the processes set intomotion
by action also tend
no
act and no
event can ever
automatic?which
is
single
why
single
once and for all deliver and save a man, or a nation, or mankind.
It is in the nature of the automatic processes, to which man is sub
ject and by which he would be ruled absolutely without the miracle
can
to human life; once histori
of freedom, that
only spell ruin
they
back

45

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

cal processes have become automatic, they are no less ruinous than
the life process that drives our organism and which biologically can
never lead
but from birth to death. The historical sciences
anywhere
know such cases of
and declining civilizations only too well,
petrified
and they know that the processes of stagnation and decline can last and
far the largest
go on for centuries. Quantitatively,
they occupy by
recorded
in
space
history.
In the history of mankind, the periods of being free were always
In the
of petrification and automatic de
relatively short.
long epochs
to
of freedom, the sheer
the
velopments,
capacity
begin,
faculty
which animates and inspires all human activities, can of course remain
intact and produce a great variety of great and beautiful things, none
of them political. This is probably why freedom has so frequently
been defined as a non-political phenomenon and eventually even as
a freedom from
current liberal
misunderstanding
politics. Even the
is incompatible with the existence
which holds that "perfect
liberty
and that freedom is the price the individual has to pay for
of
society"
has its authentic root in a state of affairs inwhich political
still
security,
action impotent to interrupt
life has become
and
petrified
political
such circumstances, freedom indeed is
automatic processes. Under
as a mode of
no
with its own kind of "vir
being
longer experienced
tue" and virtuosity, but as a supreme
which only man, of all
gift
seems to have received, of which we can find traces
creatures,
earthly
in almost all his activities, but which, nevertheless, can
develop fully
where action has created its own worldly space where freedom
only
can

appear.

We
have always known that freedom as a mode of being, together
with the
where it can unfold its full virtuosity, can be
public space
be
Since our acquaintance with totalitarianism, we must
destroyed.
fear that not
the state of being free but the sheer
of freedom,
only
gift
to him, may be
that which man did not make but which was
given
too. This fear, based on our
of the newest form
destroyed,
knowledge
of government, and on our
that
it
may yet prove to be the
suspicion
a mass
on us under
of
perfect body politic
society, weighs heavily
the present circumstances. For
more may
on human
today,
depend
ever
to turn the scales which
freedom than
before?on man's
capacity
are
auto
in favor of disaster which
heavily weighted
always happens
to
and
therefore
be
irresistible.
No
less
than
matically
always appears
the continued existence of mankind on earth may
this
time
depend
man's
to
to
that
the
about
miracles,"
is,
upon
gift
"perform
bring
as
it
and
establish
infinitely improbable
reality.
46

This content downloaded from 66.11.2.165 on Mon, 29 Dec 2014 14:01:21 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions