Cooperation on drones?

THE drones are back. After a long pause, the past week has seen a flurry of strikes in Fata- and, as ever,
there is little independently verifiable information from the scene of the attacks; nor are the Pakistan
and US governments shedding much light on who specifically the targets are. Yet, for a programme that
is mostly murky and always controversial, there are several patterns that can be discerned over the
years in the strikes. Connecting those dots, it appears at the moment that there is renewed cooperation
between the Pakistan military and the US administration/CIA on drones, for there has been very little by
way of fierce verbal pushback by the Pakistani government over the latest strikes. Relative silence can
certainly be interpreted as, at the very least, tacit acceptance and, possibly, active cooperation between
the countries. In fact, from the general location of the strikes and their emphasis on North Waziristan
where the Pakistan Army is actively engaged in fighting militants, it would appear that active
cooperation is taking place for surely neither the US nor Pakistan could possibly want an errant US-fired
missile hitting a Pakistani military target.
Much of what can bring Pakistan and the US closer together in fighting militancy and terrorism is good
for the bilateral relationship as well as a boon for counterterrorism in the region. However, the
connection between the tactical and the strategic has often been missing, so that while periods of
intense drone strikes have damaged militancy networks in Fata, especially the two Waziristan agencies,
they have never really extended to a convergence of overall interests of Pakistan and the US. There is a
sense then that the drone strikes programme and its details are handled in a compartmentalised way,
where the only spill-over has been on the negative side rather than the positive side of developing a
wider partnership with shared security interests. Nevertheless, with Pakistan at long last having
launched an operation in North Waziristan thereby necessarily disrupting the operations of Afghancentric militants with sanctuaries in North Waziristan and the US mission in Afghanistan vastly
decreasingly at least militarily by the end of the year, there is also a possibility that renewed security
cooperation, on drone strikes, for example, could lead to a closer understanding on other critical
security matters.
A close Pakistan-US relationship may be anathema to some sections of the state and society here and
Pakistan may have few real friends left in the US. But impatience, mistrust and suspicion cannot
obfuscate the underlying truth: the US and Pakistan need each other.
Going it alone has worked for neither Pakistan nor the US a reality borne out not just by the experience
of the past decade and a half but over the course of this country`s history. Better to cooperate than to
posture especially when it`s the militants who stand to gain from the latter.
=========

No asylum
THE queue of those wanting to leave the country to escape persecution or for opportunities abroad is
long. The aspirants are persistent even if their destinations change. These days, Australia is a prime ideal
to be chased. While Pakistanis may not be on top of the list of those seeking asylum in Australia in
recent years, the government there has found it necessary to issue a stern reminder. An advertisement
appearing in newspapers last week tells those whether man, woman or child who get on an
Australiabound boat without visa to beware. It is a loud, clear message, entitled `no way`, designed to
convey the resolve to not let in the `unwanted`. Their struggles necessitated by a genuine desire for a
better life, for which they cannot be faulted, the human side to the asylum seekers is eclipsed by rules

and numbers. According to the UN refugee agency, `there were 45.2 million forcibly displaced people
worldwide at the end of 2012, the highest number since 1994.
Of these, 28.8m were internally displaced persons, 15.4m were refugees and 937,000 were asylum
seekers`. This puts extra pressure on governments of destinations preferred by asylum seekers.
Meanwhile, the number of countries putting up a `no entry` board for Pakistanis has increased. For
example, in recent times, Sri Lanka has had problems with Pakistanis looking for asylum. Those who put
up the bar routinely come under criticism, which has not prevented them from setting tougher
conditions for entry for Pakistanis and others. The logic is simple: the flow of refugees has to be
contained and the traffic has to be closely monitored, even when the UN rules for refugees and other
international law are adhered to. In the latest instance, the Australian emphasis is on unlawful entry,
and on those who approach the country by the sea. The focus may expand if the pressure from refugees
mounts. There are many legal ways that remain open to asylum seekers, whatever destination they may
have in mind. The declaration by the Australian government is not the first attempt to make people
aware. Since containing people is a hard act to defend and throws up its own stories of human suffering
and ambition, it will always be argued against. In the end, however, the law has to take its course.
Pakistan can avert a few tragedies by undertaking to educate the people about the law before they take
the deep, long and often hazardous plunge.
============

Yemen on the brink

AS Syria and Iraq grab headlines due to the rise of the selfstyled Islamic State, another potential
tinderbox in the Middle East sizzles in the background. Yemen, which has long suffered from instability,
may implode if its multiple crises are not addressed crises which could ultimately see Al Qaeda or
ideologically similar groups carving out a new base. A warning sign came in the shape of two bombings
recently in which around 70 people were killed. The first struck a gathering of Houthi rebels in the
capital Sana`a, while the second attack took place in Mukalla targeting a military outpost. Al Qaeda`s
local branch considered to be the most active of the terror franchise`s wings is believed to be
responsible as it had earlier warned it would target the Houthis.
At present, there are three main crises brewing in Yemen. The first involves the Houthis, a tribal militant
group that follows the Zaydi Shia school, based in northern Yemen, which swept into Sana`a last month
demanding, amongst other things, a new prime minister.
The Houthis have had a testy relationship with the government both during strongman Ali Abdullah
Saleh`s rule as well as after his 2012 ouster. The second critical issue is the presence of Al Qaeda in
Yemen; the terrorist group is opposed to both the government and the Houthis. Thirdly, a separatist
campaign in the formerly independent South Yemen refuses to simmer down. There is also a sectarian
element to the crises; while the Houthis are Zaydi Shias, among the government`s supporters are Sunni
and Salafi groups.
Also, the Houthis are believed to have Iranian support, while the government is reportedly close to the
Saudis. At this critical juncture, it is essential for political forces in Yemen as well as their external
backers to find negotiated solutions to their problems. For the collapse of the state or an escalation of
sectarian conflict could pave the way for Al Qaeda to take advantage of the power vacuum.
=============

Need for new survival kit

BY BABAR SATTAR (Column)

W H AT is the best-case scenario for Nawaz Sharif`s government? That it might just survive PTI`s
onslaught? Sums up the dilemma of those who believe that nothing except continuity of the political
process will instil sustainable change in Pakistan. Many of those opposed to mid-term polls and extraconstitutional or extraordinary regime changes are wondering if the Sharif government will be left with
any room for policymaking and governance even if it manages to limp along in its incapacitated state.
The best time to initiate policy reform is during the post-election honeymoon period they say. With a
freshly harvested mandate, with needs of political expediency still at bay and with no urgent need to
rally core constituency, this period affords the required political space to take unpopular decisions. Once
this window closes it becomes harder to pursue tough agendas. Can a crisis cultivate the urge within a
status quo PML-N to experiment with new ideas? Will survival instinct heighten the prime minister`s
focus on conservation or change? The personal challenge for Sharif is two-fold.
One, the policy space left with him as a civilian prime minister has shrunk drastically (he`s already pulled
all favours with the khakis as well as his competitors in parliament). And two, faced with PTI animus and
public angst, he would be tempted to recede to the comfort of being surrounded with sycophants as
opposed to reaching out to critics. The first threatens to reduce him to a lame duck in the first quarter of
his term, the second to isolate him further and accelerate his downward spiral.
What compounds this conundrum is that Sharif comes across as a distant potentate who can`t be
bothered to fight for anything, including his own position. We`ve heard all kinds of accusations hurled at
him during the last couple of months and he won`t respond. We`ve heard his acts and omissions as
prime minister being censured, from atop containers and from within parliament that stood behind him,
and he won`t respond. Nawaz Sharif exhibits an inexplicable lack of urgency to review and revise
thedirection in which his government is headed.
Does he feel no need to reassure people that he is all there and alive to the war-like situation in which
his government continues to exist without functioning? Does he feel no need to buoy up his supporters
and convince fence-sitters that he has the wherewithal to pull his government out of the mess it has
landed itself in as well as a thought-out plan to do so? Does he not realise that the sentiment unleashed
by PTI (even if inadvertently) is now fixated on the abusive relationship between our political class and
our society and not just the issue of rigging? It is no longer sufficient for Sharif to address the six-point
agenda flagged by PTI. The basis of PTPs support is an amorphous message of hope and change linked to
the person of Imran Khan combined with rancour for an opulent, distant, corrupt and ineffectual ruling
elite presently symbolised by traditional politicos like Sharif. To break free of this unflattering narrative
gaining momentum, Sharif will need to respond with a plan that is both substantive and symbolic. He
will have to establish through actions that he is not the caricature he is being made out to be.
The demand for Abdul Qadir Gilani`s arrest for the very unfortunate killing of the innocent Tahir Malik
by a private guard, without first verifying Gilani`s role in this tragedy, is another manifestation of the
national mood. Public tolerance for the sense of entitlement of our power elites` offspring and the
abuse of authority and privilege by them has run out. In this context, they loathe Mariam Nawaz and
Hamza Shahbaz lording over state resources and Hussain Nawaz and Salman Shahbaz building business
empires under state patronage.

On the symbolic front, Nawaz Sharif needs to let his family members disappear into the shadows away
from public eye. Musharraf might have been an illegitimate ruler, but one never heard of his son`s
involvement in lucrative business deals between Pakistan and other countries. It is rumours such as
those about Hussain Nawaz or Salman Shahbaz travelling with government teams exploring business
deals with friendly countries that lend credence toaccusations that the PML-N government`s style may
be different, but it is no less corrupt than its maligned predecessor.
Had Shahbaz Sharif not been the brother (and only a party loyalist like Rana Sanaullah), wouldn`t he
have been asked to quit after Model Town? Is Ishaq Dar just another minister who can be sacked if he
messes up the country`s finances? Relationship with family, especially in our culture, is complicated.
Shahbaz, Dar, Mariam and Hamza must be great people. But family and politics don`t mix well, just like
politics and religion. If there is little distinction between the prime minister`s family and PML-N`s core
ruling team, are we a democracy or a hereditary plutocracy? Pakistan is a big country with no dearth of
bright people. The cabinet must reflect such diversity and merit with portfolios matching expertise as
opposed to reflecting the fears and insecurities of the prime minister. Can one think of another
democracy without full-time defence, law and foreign ministers? And a cabinet reshuf fle will no longer
cut it. It needs a makeover reflecting reordered priorities: fully empowered ministers; visible focus on
key policy issues such as energy, national security, local governance and education, due representation
offederating units.
Sharif often comes across as someone deliberately dragging his feet just to get fired, either because he
thinks his job is too much work or because he is bored out of his mind. If the impression is false, he
should tell people that. And what he will do to improve the lives of Pakistanis, in what time frame and
how. Political rhetoric and regime change are no solution to Pakistan`s ills. But neither is a dysfunctional
regime relying on miracles. Pakistan is changing. And if Nawaz Sharif refuses to reinvent himself, it won`t
be Imran Khan but he himself responsible for his undoing. The writer is a lawyer.
=========

Contesting VIP culture

By Umair Javed (Column)
TO belabour the obvious, preferential treatment given to political and economic elites by state
institutions is wrong. It is wrong at a legal level, and in a cripplingly poor country, it is doubly wrong at a
moral level. This in itself is sufficient reason for why the issue of `VIP culture` short for any and all
extralegal privileges and corrupt practices should be turned into a political question.
In the light of recent events (on an aeroplane and elsewhere), many have arrived at a consensus over
the need to do away with it. What is more contentious though is the diagnosis, which, in the long run,
remains crucial to developing an adequate solution.
Here`s how things are currently understood: for a vast majority of people in this country, extra-legal
privilege and preferential treatment is a product of `muk-muka` between individuals belonging to a
`corrupt` political/economic elite and their facilitators, patrons, and clients in various state institutions.
In this `us vs them` interpretation, the problem lies squarely with particular individuals, who are often
thought of as immoral, self-serving, and largely predatory.
The solution, then, logically emanating out of this understanding is as agent-based as the diagnosis
replace corrupt individuals with honest ones and the problem will go away. This, quite tellingly, is also

the solution given by the country`s most popular leader and his millions of fans and voters.
Here`s why this understanding is wrong corruption is not a biological trait. Some humans aren`t born
more corrupt than others. Corruption is best understood as a complex social and historical phenomenon
that cannot be treated as a randomly occurring wart distinctly cut off from the body it grows on.
What needs to be acknowledged more forcefully is that all aspects of public corruption (ie acts involving
public office) are marked by a history of the state, and state institutions, being treated as a private
resource.
This can be seen going as far back as the 19th century, when the British ruled by handing out
preferential treatment (commonly called patronage) to socioeconomic elites across South Asia.
As a landlord in Punjab, for example, you could borrow money against your land to build large houses,
finance extravagant weddings, and live an unproduc-tive, decadent life, and the government would
simply step in to take care of your loan if you failed to pay back the moneylender. This, by the way, is
not some one-off anecdote. This is what actually happened throughout the 19th and early 20th century
the Raj administration would adopt feudal estates when they faced foreclosure, only to return them to
the original landlords once the treasury had paid off the existing debt.
This sense of privilege and distinction was also cultivated in the colonial civil service and the armed
forces, which unlike organically developing bureaucracies, weren`t meant to act by the consent of the
people; they were intended to rule and discipline the The culture of the state granting favours to the
elite, or the elite privatising state resources for their own benefit, has continued forcefully.
local population. Clubs like the Gymkhana, or residential enclaves like GOR, both built on prime real
estate in the centre of the city are active residues of this particular history.
The culture of the state granting favours to the elite, or the elite privatising state resources for their own
benefit, has continued quite forcefully after independence. Ayub`s government, for example, built its
much-vaunted `golden era` on the back of collusive, rent-seeking arrangements with local businessmen
and industrialists. The Zia and Musharraf regimes patronised equally venal politicians with state offices,
in exchange for their loyalty against opposition parties.
All such examples may seem overblown, or too large-scale in comparison to the more mundane issue of
queue-jumping and extra protocol, but their basis is quite firmly the same. Both are rooted in a logic
ofstate-society relations that has developed over time, and one that continues to be reinforced by
skewed incentives and total lack of accountability.
It is precisely because of the historical nature of this problem, why those shouting loudest against `VIP
culture` should take a step back and reflect on the larger issue at hand elite privilege in a very poor
country.
If the son of an upper-middle-class bureaucrat or army officer someone who has spent a thoroughly
state-subsidised privileged life equates himself with the mythical common man, we have a fairly serious
problem. Because then what we have is a masked desire to replace one set of `undeserving elites, with
another more `deserving` lot. In short, the impulse holds that preferential treatment by the state in any
shape or form is wrong if it`s being handed out to someone else, but okay if it`s coming your way.

This is at best short-sighted, and at worst, even more damaging. If the battle is to be against
stategranted privilege or corruption, two things need to be recognised firstly, VIP culture and corruption
exist in multiple forms it may take the shape of a delayed flight or a bribe, but it also frequently takes
the shape of nepotism for a family member(sifarish), subsidised land grants, and other kinds of perks
and privileges enjoyed by those affiliated with the state in any shape or form.
Secondly, the real burden of an elite-biased state falls not on the civic-minded, upper-middle-class
citizenry (who`ve already graduated to a gated, privatised existence), but on the 65pc of the country for
whom the state fails on a daily basis.
As many earnest, well-intentioned individuals raise their voice against the predatory practices of
Pakistan`s political and economic elite, there are sufficient reasons to rethink several things. And while
the sentiment is appreciable, it is all for nought if it remains unaccompanied by self-reflection, an
understanding of history, and an objective assessment of how the scale of privilege operates in this
country. The writer is a freelance columnist