METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (METRAN), Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MA. PAREDES, VICENTE DE LA CRUZ and ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, Judges of Court of Industrial
Relations, and THE NATIONAL LABOR UNION, Respondents.
HILADO J.:
Before the Court of Industrial Relations a petition was filed in case No. 36-V entitled "National Labor Union, versus
Metropolitan Service (Metran)," wherein petitioner alleged that it was a legitimate labor organization, thirty of whose
affiliated members were working and under the employ of the respondent; that the respondent is a semigovernmental transportation entity, popularly known as 'Metran,' and after several other allegations concluded with
the prayer that its nine demands at length set forth in said petition be granted. In behalf of the so-called respondent
an oral petition for dismissal of the case was made before the court on October 22, 1946, "on the ground that the
respondent belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and as such, it can not be sued" (Order of C. I. R. of
November 7, 1946, Annex C). By its aforesaid order, the court denied the motion to dismiss, citing in support of such
resolution a paragraph allegedly quoted from an opinion of Justice Ozaeta speaking for the Supreme Court "in the
case of the Manila Hotel," in the words of the order.
In behalf of the instant so-called petitioner a motion for reconsideration of that order was filed (Annex D) but it was
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations by its resolution dated December 3, 1946 (Annex E).
On December 7, 1946, a notice of appeal (Annex F) was filed by counsel, and the case is now submitted on appeal
under the provisions of Rule 44.
It appears that the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is not a corporation nor any of the juridical entities
enumerated in article 35 of the Civil Code. Rule 3, section 1 provides:
"SECTION 1. Who may be parties. - Only natural or judicial persons may be parties in a civil action."
"Action" is defined by Rule 2, section 1, as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Considering that the
very law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended), denominates the lower tribunal as a "court"
(section 1), considering the powers and duties conferred and imposed upon it (Chapter II), its incidental powers
(Chapter III), the fact that Chapter IV of said Act and Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provide for an appeal from an
award, order, or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations to the Supreme Court, unquestionably a court of justice,
and the fact that section 20 of said Commonwealth Act No. 103 confers upon the Court of Industrial Relations the
power to adopt its rules of procedure and "such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice" (italics
supplied), and considering finally the importance in the life and economy of the nation of the industrial relations
which have thus been placed under the jurisdiction of said Court of Industrial Relations, in the hearing and
determination of which cases thus submitted to it, said court administers justice between parties, we have no
hesitation in holding that it is a "court of justice" within the meaning of Rule 2, section 1.
In the case of Health vs. Steamer "San Nicolas" (7 Phil., 532), suit was brought by H. L. Heath against the Steamer
"San Nicolas." "No natural or juridical person was named as defendant in the complaint," commented this Court. Mr.
Justice Willard, speaking for the Court, stated the important question calling for decision therein as follows:
"The important question discussed in the briefs in this court, and to be decided, is whether such a proceeding as the
one in question, directed against the ship itself, without naming any natural or juridical person as defendant, can be
maintained in these Island." (Page 534 of cited volume.)
The Court, in resolving said question, inter alia, declared:
"The first question to be considered is whether this action was properly brought against the ship and whether an
action can now be maintained when the only defendant named is neither a natural nor juridical person. Under the
law in force prior to 1898 there was no doubt upon this subject. It was absolutely indispensable for the maintenance
of a contentious action in the courts of justice to have as defendant some natural or juridical person. A suit against a
ship, such as is permitted in the English and the American admiralty courts, was unknown to the Spanish law. It is
true that the Spanish Law of Civil Procedure contained certain provisions relating to voluntary jurisdiction in matters
of commerce, but none of these provisions had any application to a contentious suit of this character.
"It being impossible to maintain an action of this character against a ship as the only defendant a ship as the only
defendant prior to June, 1901, it follows that if such action can now be maintained it must be by virtue of some
provision found in the Code of Civil Procedure and which is the only new law now in force relating to this matter. An
examination of the provisions of the code will show that no such action is authorized. In cannot, therefore, be now
maintained and the demurrer of Borja should have been sustained on that ground." (Pages 537-538 of cited
volume.)

Under the foregoing doctrine, it is obvious that the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) could not be sued
in the Court of Industrial Relation. A corollary of this is that no award, order or decision could be rendered against it.
If so, how could it be said that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case?
Moreover, there is another vital reason why the Court of Industrial Relations lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
petition, much less to grant the remedies therein prayed for. It is beyond dispute that the Metropolitan Transportation
Service (Metran) is and was at the times covered by the petition in the Court of Industrial Relations an office created
by Executive Order No. 59 and operating under the direct supervision and control of the Department of the Public
Works and Communications. (Petition, par. 1, admitted by respondent judges' answer, par. 1 and by respondent
Union's answer, par. 1.) The said office not being a juridical person, any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it
were to produce any effect, would in practice be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, of which
the said Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is a mere office or agency. Any award, order or decision
granting any of the Union's demands, if attempted to be executed, would necessarily operate against the
government which is really the entity rendering the services and performing the activities in question through its
office or agency called Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran). The case is different from those of the socalled government corporations, such as the Philippine National Bank, National Development Company, the Manila
Hotel, etc., which have been duly incorporated under our corporation law or special charters, one of whose powers
is "to sue and be sued in any court" (Corporation Law, section 13 [a]), and which actually engage in business; while
in rendering the services and performing the activities here involved the Government has never engaged in
business nor intends to do so. Now, it is a well-settled rule that the government cannot be sued without its consent
(Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311) and here no consent of the government has been
shown. This is not even a case governed by Act No. 3083 which specifies the instances where this government has
given its consent to be sued (Compaa General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
45 Phil., 663). And the Manila Hotel case relied upon by the Court or Industrial Relations in its order Annex C, is
inapplicable for the reason that the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is not a corporation, nor any other
kind of juridical person for that matter. If the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) could not be sued and the
Court of Industrial Relations could not render any decision, judgment, award or order against it, all the proceedings
had in said court were null and void. A case very similar to the present was Salgado vs. Ramos (64 Phil., 724, 727),
from which we quote the following passage:
"* * * Consequently, while the claim is actually made against the Director of Lands, it is juridically against the
Government of the Philippine Islands of which the Director of Lands is a mere agent, in accordance with the
provisions of article 1727 of the Civil Code."
On the other hand, the instant proceedings should be considered, as we treat it, as having been instituted by the
Government itself, since the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) is a mere office or agency of said
government, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, incapable of not being sued but
using (Rule 3, section 1). The very allegations, arguments and contentions contained in the petition clearly show
that to all intents and purposes said petition was being presented in behalf of the Government as the real party in
interest. Rule 3, section 2, provides that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
And giving effect to the spirit of liberality inspiring Rule 1, section 2, and in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, we
believe that this is a proper case for applying the principle that "the law considers that as done which ought to have
been done." Parenthetically, however, we may say that were we to be more rigorous with petitioner herein in this
regard, we will have to be equally rigorous with petitioner in the Court of Industrial Relations on the same score, with
the practical result that any way the proceedings before that court will have to be dismissed.
It would be sophistical to say that the suit or action against the said office or agency of the government is not a suit
or action against the government itself, upon the ground that the prohibition only covers suits against the
government as a whole. A commonplace illustration will, we think, demonstrate the fallacy of such a theory: In order
that it may be said that a man has been attacked by another, the latter does not need to deliver blows or shower
shots all over the body of the victim injuring each and every part thereof, but if the blow or the shot is inflicted upon
the arm of any other part of his body, we say that the victim was attacked by the aggressor. The Bureau of Public
Works under whose supervision the Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran) has been organized and functions
is an integral part of the government, just as the said office or agency. And apart from the consideration that neither
said Bureau nor said office has any juridical personality to be used for reasons already set forth, any suit or action
attempted against either will necessarily be a suit or action against the government itself.
"* * * Accordingly it is well settled, as a general proposition, that, where a suit brought against an officer or agency
with relation to some matter in which defendant represents the state in action and liability, and the state, while not a
party to the record, is the real party against which relief is sought so that a judgment for plaintiff, although nominally
against the named defendant as an individual or entity distinct from the state, will operate to control the action of the
state or subject it to liability, the suit is in effect one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent.
Apparently for thus rule to apply the relief asked must involve some direct or substantial interest of the state, as a
distinct entity, apart from the mere interest a state may have in the welfare of its citizens of the vindication of its
laws. Within the inhibition of the rules, however, are suits wherein a state officer or agency is, or will be, required to
use state property or funds in order to afford the relief demanded * * *". (59 C. J., 307-309; italics supplied.)
In a republican state, like Philippines, government immunity from suit without its consent is derived from the will of
the people themselves in freely creating a government "of the people, and for the people"-a representative
government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for

the common good and general welfare. In so agreeing, the citizens have solemnly undertaken to surrender some of
their private rights and interest which were calculated to conflict with the higher rights and larger interests of the
people as a whole, represented by the government thus established by them all. One of those "higher rights," based
upon those "larger interests" is that government immunity. The members of the respondent Labor Union themselves
are part of the people who have freely that government and participated in that solemn undertaking. In this senseand a very real one it is-they are in effect attempting to use themselves along with the rest of the people represented
by their common government-an anomalous and absurd situation indeed.
The case is radically different from a dictatorship, or an aristocratic, oligarchical, autocratic, or monarchical
government, where any similar immunity will be the creature of the will of one man or of a powerful few. The
principle is further grounded upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public functions
from being harrassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits. (See also McClellan vs. State, 170, p. 662;
35 Cal. App., 605, 606) Where the government is "of the people, by the people, and for the people," such immunity
from suit will only be the reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the people themselves as represented by their
government in the face of the obvious impossibility of constituting the entire people into one single body to exercise
the powers and enjoy the immunities of that sovereignty.
Upon the whole, we are clearly of opinion that the proceedings had in the Court of Industrial Relations and now
subject to this appeal are null and void, particularly said court's order of November 1, 1946 (Annex C) and its
resolution of December 3, 1946 (Annex E), with the necessary consequence that said court should be, as it is
hereby, enjoined from taking any further action in the case inconsistent with this decision.
No costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61
and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders
dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil
Case No. 90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183,
while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of
petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and
265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later,
Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties
was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
I
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to
sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell
was made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers
clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr.
Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the
sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill
their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the
squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that
the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the
eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square
meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven
days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8) private respondent sent the earnest
money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to
private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and
another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled,
transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to
it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of
the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private respondent is willing and able to
comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse
project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.

Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the
one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the
agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to
the motion was filed by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding
that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 2021).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion
for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional
Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing
be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private respondent
opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until
after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming
that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it
"adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments
relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance with the resolution
of this Court, both parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The
general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the
movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of
exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to
dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service
Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the
parties to undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the Department of
Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in
a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant
is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to
whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn,
asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In
England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of
submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign
Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office
conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA
130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a
telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at
Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in
a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to
be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in
support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents
through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command,
80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases
where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own
determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state
enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not
anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a
commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was
considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under
the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in International Law became controversial
(Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and
sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive
foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to International
Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See
absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international
relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy
See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons the
Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must
be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125
[1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity
organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the
Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic
Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an
"international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication that it is possible
for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international
personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law
308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the
name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international
person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through
its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957
(Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles
of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as
part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations (United States
of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law
194 [1984]).
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be
considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which
defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The
Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that
by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character."
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign
immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive
theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure
gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist
states which took control of nationalized business activities and international trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1)
the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil.
312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States
of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162
SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as
acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a
bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American
servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding
for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA
644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit
as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the
discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity
from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as
constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such
an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity
in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular
act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely
the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition
and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its
mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the
creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the
Philippines on November 15, 1965.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory
of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this
immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the
sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still
occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in
its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the
pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case
was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the
department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title
I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the
Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from
local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this
country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is
entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International
Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino,
48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we
abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the
facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and
unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask
his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the
Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its
claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations
between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign
States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the
Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or international
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its right to ensure, in
the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,

vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo
City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties
when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question
is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval
Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base,
which includes the said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the
Philippines, 3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both employed as
gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been hired in 1971 and
the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this
conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S.
Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings
for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the
hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision."
7

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with
the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the
statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers
have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though
the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where
others not involved in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly
corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the
Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting
concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction,"
presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a
for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained
libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of
the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity.
However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction
over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9 on
the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not
personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad
faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by
the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines.
Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in a default by the trial
court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of
the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent
court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court, on the
contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities
when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.

It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him
from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued
in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious, decided
to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by
the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of
jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September
26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the court a quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the
pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor
the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant
who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience.
Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the
Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he
was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not
given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order
of the lower court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed
forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The United States had also not
waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial
by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and several of its
officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not
personal. In these and several other cases 13 the Court found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings
after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the
doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in
their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter
he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding
the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights
in reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin effect a direct attack against him-that Special Services was
practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the
conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even
commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed
by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the
department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private
respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government,
and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible
for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United
States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a
suit against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held
ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions
where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign
states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority
which makes the law on which the right depends. 16 In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the
principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that
a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed
in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state.
To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to
compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; 18 or to
restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the
national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal
revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a
judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act
to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may
directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally
required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a
bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess
of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it
into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly
impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The government
of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy
any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform
the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the
presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly
committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well settled . 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal
laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, 26 let alone the fact
that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have overstated
their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in
the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem
only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming
under the internal administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they were
arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While these decisions do have
persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have
developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became
independent in 1946.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from Spain
and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue
and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come
to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments We live in a different ambience and must
decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as
a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance
with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses
were committed. Even assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to
give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and
September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our
Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. ALFREDO LIM, GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT.
NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC
ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT. JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL PANFILO
ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT)
NOLITO NOGATO, 3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO LUNA, 3CT
BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR.,
MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT. ROMEO
PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL,
JOHN DOE, RICHARD DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO,
ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA
GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO
CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNICO, in their
capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA,
DANTE EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO)
respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA,
NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN
CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO
DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO,
BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS,
TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA,
JOSE FERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORIANO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL,
ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA
ALONUEVO, EMMA ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO,
RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO
GONZALES, ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY
SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO,
ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA ROBALE, respondents.
G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993
ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA
GRAMPA, AMELIA GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL ARABE, TERESITA
ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO
DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C. CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ,
DIONESIO GRAMPA, ANGELITO GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO
ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively;
and (names of sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON
BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO,
JOY CRUZ, HONORIO LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO
TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE, GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA
CRUZ, ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS,
ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS, FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER,
RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO
TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA,
ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES, ERNESTO
GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS,
EMIL SAYAO, BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIENZO, CARLO
MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, respondents.
The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines.
Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners in 84645 & private respondents in
84607.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some
journalists called it a Black Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell twelve (12)
rallyists. But for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may now just as well be a chapter in our history books.
For those however, who have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just that. They seek
retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back to life again.

Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao group), instituted this petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Orders of respondent Judge Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988, dismissing the complaint for damages of
herein petitioners against the Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351.
Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy, docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set
aside the Order of respondent Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled "Erlinda Caylao, et al.
vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as follows:
With respect however to the other defendants, the impleaded Military Officers, since they are being
charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, if at all, would not result in
financial responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit can not conveniently
and correspondingly be applied to them.
WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant Republic of the Philippines is hereby dismissed.
As against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is denied. They are given a period of ten
(10) days from receipt of this order within which to file their respective pleadings.
On the other hand, the Order 3, dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by both parties, for a reconsideration
of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding no cogent reason to disturb the said order.
The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of encampment by members of the militant
Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at the
Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along Elliptical Road in Diliman, Quezon City.
The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The
KMP, led by its national president, Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a)
giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop amortizations of land payments.
The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987. The two days that followed
saw a marked increase in people at the encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to
meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the Minister can only meet with him the following
day. On January 20, 1987, the meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the minimum
comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do
his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting on January 21,
1987.
Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day of encampment, barricaded the MAR
premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with the
Philippine flag.
At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to
instead wait for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement its
comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying that he did not believe in the
Constitution and that a genuine land reform cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated
discussion ensued between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a
negotiating panel from each side to meet again the following day.
On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to Malacaang to air their demands. Before the
march started, Tadeo talked to the press and TV media. He uttered fiery words, the most telling of which were:
". . . inalis namin ang barikada bilang kahilingan ng ating Presidente, pero kinakailangan alisin din niya ang barikada
sa Mendiola sapagkat bubutasin din namin iyon at dadanak ang dugo . . . ." 4
The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later
joined by members of other sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod
(KPML).
At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached Liwasang Bonifacio where they held a brief program. It was at this point
that some of the marchers entered the eastern side of the Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars
surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they joined the march to Malacaang. At about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M.
Recto Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the Capital Regional Command
(CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to Mendiola to break through the police lines and rush towards
Malacaang, CAPCOM Commander General Ramon E. Montao inspected the preparations and adequacy of the
government forces to quell impending attacks.

OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno
was deployed at the vicinity of Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District under
Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CPP/NPA elements and that an
insurrection was impending. The threat seemed grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro
Escolar University would be forcibly occupied.
In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked to investigate the facts surrounding the
incident, Commission for short) stated that the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a
formation of three phalanges, in the following manner:
(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the
Chinatown detachment of the Western Police District. Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy
Superintendent of the Western Police District, was designated as ground commander of the CDC
first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements were positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and
Legarda Streets after they were ordered to move forward from the top of Mendiola bridge. The WPD
forces were in khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment aluminum shields,
truncheons and gas masks.
(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards behind the WPD policemen were the elements
of the Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force stationed at Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and
62nd INP Field Force, who carried also the standard CDC equipment truncheons, shields and gas
masks. The INP Field Force was under the command of Police Major Demetrio dela Cruz.
(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance Control Battalion composed of the first
and second companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort Bonifacio. The marines were all
equipped with shields, truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their backs, under the
command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin. The Marine CDC Battalion was positioned in line formation
ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field Force.
At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks, occupying the entire width of Mendiola
street, followed immediately by two water cannons, one on each side of the street and eight fire
trucks, four trucks on each side of the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of Manila under
Fire Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco, were to supply water to the two water cannons.
Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each
composed of two tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier, a driver and the team
leader.
In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of Malacaang stood the VOLVO Mobile
Communications Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP, General Ramon E. Montao.
At this command post, after General Montao had conferred with TF Nazareno Commander, Colonel
Cezar Nazareno, about the adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed that Police General
Alfredo S. Lim would designate Police Colonel Edgar Dula Torres and Police Major Conrado
Francisco as negotiators with the marchers. Police General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC
elements already positioned at the foot of Mendiola bridge to relay to Police Colonel Torres and
Police Major Francisco the instructions that the latter would negotiate with the marchers. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded
toward the police lines. No dialogue took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this moment
that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission "pandemonium broke loose". The Commission
stated in its findings, to wit:
. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel bars,
wooden clubs and lead pipes were used against the police. The police fought back with their shields
and truncheons. The police line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The demonstrators
disengaged from the government forces and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic
firing continued from the government forces.
After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo Paquinto and Lt. Laonglaan Goce sped
towards Legarda Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still grouped in the vicinity of
Mendiola. After dispersing the crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs, proceeded
to Liwasang Bonifacio upon order of General Montao to disperse the rallyists assembled thereat.
Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white
head bands, who were armed with long firearms. 6 (Emphasis ours)

After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead, although according to Tadeo, there were
thirteen (13) dead, but he was not able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were wounded
by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds and twenty (20) suffered minor physical
injuries such as abrasions, contusions and the like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O.
11, for brevity) dated January 22, 1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed
of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria
and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11 stated that the Commission was created precisely for the
"purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of
Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the afternoon of January 22, 1987".
The Commission was expected to have submitted its findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so.
Consequently, the deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the
Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it submitted its report, in accordance
with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on February 11, 1987.
In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:
(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime Tadeo, together with the other sectoral groups,
was not covered by any permit as required under Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly
Act of 1985, in violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under paragraph (a), Section 14 of
said law.
(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the military were armed with .38 and .45
caliber handguns, and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under paragraph 4(g), Section 13,
and punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP Field Force, the Marines and supporting
military units, as well as the security officers of the police and military commanders were in civilian
attire in violation of paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.
(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military crowd dispersal control units in
dispersing the marchers, a prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and punishable under
paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts, lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and
guns by the marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts punishable under paragraph (g),
Section 13, and punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880.
(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with the MAR officials and were determined to
march to Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by the inflammatory and incendiary utterances of
their leader, Jaime Tadeo "bubutasin namin ang barikada . . Dadanak and dugo . . . Ang
nagugutom na magsasaka ay gagawa ng sariling butas. . .
(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the government forces. Upon approaching the
intersections of Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the police lines and penetrated
and broke through the first line of the CDC contingent.
(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and shields. They stood their ground but the CDC
line was breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not clear who started the firing.
(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water cannons and tear gas were not put into
effective use to disperse the rioting crowd.
(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because (a) there was no order to
use them; (b) they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out of range of the marchers.
(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had
dispersed and the wounded and dead were being carried away, the MDTs of the police and the
military with their tear gas equipment and components conducted dispersal operations in the
Mendiola area and proceeded to Liwasang Bonifacio to disperse the remnants of the marchers.
(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but no official reason was given for its absence.
8

From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal prosecution of four unidentified,
uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. In connection with

this, it was the Commission's recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be tasked to
undertake investigations regarding the identities of those who actually fired their guns that resulted in the death of or
injury to the victims of the incident. The Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the
Western Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be prosecuted for violation of
paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's
recommendation also included the prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but
whose identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he should be prosecuted
both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and
for violation of Article 142, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following
officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3) Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4)
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col. Cezar Nazareno; and (5) Maj. Felimon Gasmin, for their failure to make
effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola, administrative sanctions
were recommended to be imposed.
The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased and wounded victims of
the Mendiola incident to be compensated by the government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group)
invoke in their claim for damages from the government.
Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims. Thus, on
July 27, 1987, herein petitioners, (Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the
Government. 10 This formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive Secretary to the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987. The House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10,
1988, recommended the expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11
After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were constrained to institute an action for
damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the
Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-43351.
On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued
without its consent. Petitioners opposed said motion on March 16, 1988, maintaining that the State has waived its
immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the
International Law on Human Rights.
Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the complaint as against the Republic of the
Philippines on the ground that there was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated August 8, 1988.
Consequently, Caylao and her co-petitioners filed the instant petition.
On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel impleaded as
defendants in the court below, filed its petition for certiorari.
Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically identical issues, the two (2) petitions were
consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or not the State has waived its immunity
from suit.
Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from
suit. It is their considered view that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to
indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public addresses made by then President
Aquino in the aftermath of the killings, the State has consented to be sued.
Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI,
Section 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of
public policy that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be
subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the
means required for the proper administration of the government. 13
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and
the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the
State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have
a body that will conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." 14 In the exercise of
its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is relevant to Our discussion reads:
1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable cause for the commission of any offense and
of the persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on

preliminary investigation and the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the proper
court. 15
In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the
event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The
Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State
immediately, such recommendation not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it being
a fact-finding body.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not
tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after
the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow the words of
petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely
on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rallyists. By this
alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has
consented to the suit.
Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given
considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 16
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not
to the officer but to the government.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government. Although
the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident
occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission
findings, there was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover, the members of
the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was
unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. 19
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public
agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this
doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and
non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and
police forces were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety
of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that
they fired at the unruly crowd to disperse the latter.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions
cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers
to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government. The
principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires
no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to
the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act
only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a
"high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another." 23
The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident.
Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court in
Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their
authority, may be held liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in
issuing the questioned orders, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

CARMEN FESTEJO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ISAIAH FERNANDO, Director of Public Works, defendant-appellee.
B. D. Eloy Bello in representation of the appellant.
Attorney General Pompey Mr. Diaz and Mr. Antonio A. Torres Attorney for appellee.
Diokno, J.:
Carmen Celebration, owner of a sugar lands, for a total of about 9 hectares of superfice, sued "Isaias Fernando
Director Bureau of public Works, as such Director of Public Works is responsible for systems and irrigation projects
and is the official responsible for the construction of irrigation systems in the country, "claiming that The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority Obtained first from the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without first Obtaining a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of
the plaintiff, and express objection unlawfully Against Her took possession of portions of the three parcels of
land Described above, and an irrigation canal Caused to be Constructed on the portion of the three parcels
of land on or about the month of February 1951 the aggregate Being 24.179 square meters area to the
damage and prejudice of the plaintiff. ----- R. on A., p. 3.
causing her many damages. Asked, in consequence, judgment convicting the defendant:
. . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and
Appropriated in the aggregate area of 24.179 square meters and to return the land con sus former condition
under the expenses of the defendant. . . .
In the remote event That the portions of land unlawfully occupied and Appropriated can not be returned to
the plaintiff, then a to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P19,343.20 as value of the
portions totaling an area of 24.179 square meters; ---- R. on A., p. 5.
and also to pay P5,000 P9,756.19 damages and attorney fees, the costs on R. A., pp. 5-6.
The defendant, through the Attorney General, presented motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that the court
has no jurisdiction to give judgment validates against, since in court the claim is against the Republic of the
Philippines, and this has not been submitted their consent to demand. The lower court estimated the motion and
dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice and without costs.
On appeal, the applicant maintains that it was a mistake to consider the claim as one against the Republic and
dismiss thereunder demand.
The motion against "Isaias Fernando, Director of Public in charge and responsible for the construction of irrigation
systems in the Philippines Works" is a directed personally against, for acts assumed to run on their official concept.
The law does not exempt him from responsibility for the abuses they commit or have committed in the performance
of their official duties. A similar case is that of Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933) 18 minn. 584 NW 49, 90 ALR 1472. There
the Commissioner of Highways, to improve a piece of the road or appropriated occupy contiguous land to the right
of way. The State Supreme Court stated that the owner is personally liable for damages caused. Further stated that
the ratification of what made his subordinates was equivalent to an order to them. Here is what the Court said.
We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding That trespass in the plaintiff on
defendant's land-committed acts outside the scope of His authority. When He Went outside the boundaries
of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged or destroyed it an STI former condition dusefulness, I
must be held to Have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim
That I just thus invaded plaintiff's land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys Clearly marked
the limits of the land Appropriated for the right of way de esta trunk highway construction before Began. . . .
"Ratification May be equivalent to command, and cooperation May be inferred from acquiescence Where
there is power to restrain." It is Unnecessary to consider on other cases cited,. . ., For as before Suggested,
the jury Could find or infer That, in so far as there now was trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's land as a
dumping place for the rock to be removed from the additional Appropriated right of way, defendant planned,
approved , and Ratified what was done by His subordinates. - Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 ALR, 1472, 1476,
1477.
The doctrine on the liability of officials in similar cases is summarized as follows:
Ordinarily the officer or employee Committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and May be sued as any
other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from His tortious act. - 49 Am Jur
289...

. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of His office, excede the power conferred on him by law, I can
not shelter himself under the plea That I is a public agent. - 43 Am Jur 86...
It is general rule That an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial ministerial, or Otherwise WHO acts
outside the scope of His jurisdiction without authorization of law and thereby render himself amenable May
staff to liability in a civil suit. If I Exceed the power conferred on him by law, I can not shelter himself by the
plea That I is a public agent acting under the Color of His office, and not personally. In the eye of the law,
His acts are then a wholly without authority. - 43 Am Jur 89-90...
Article 32 of the Civil Code says in turn:
ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private single, lowest Directly or Indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any Manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person Shall
be liable for damages to the Latter:
xxxxxxxxx
(6) The right Against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxxxxxxx
In any of the cases Referred to this article, whether or not the defendant's acts or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right ot commence an Entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action Shall proceed Independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the Latter be Instituted), and May be PROVED by a preponderance of evidence.
The inmdemnity Shall include moral damages Exemplary damages May Also be adjudicated.
See also Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil, 784.; Syquia vs. Almeda, No. L-1648, August 17, 1947; Marquez vs.
Nelson, No. L-2412, September 1950.
The appealed order is revoked and continued processing of the application under the regulations provide ordering.
No special pronouncement as to costs. So it is ordered.

TRADERS ROYAL BANK

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HON. GREGORIO S. CENDANA, in his capacity as
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL MEDIA PRODUCTION CENTER (NMPC)
FACTS:
On April 9, 1981, Traders, a banking institution operating under Philippine laws, entered into a loan agreement with
the National Media Production Specialists Inc. (NMPC), a government instrumentality tasked with the function of
disseminating government information, programs and policies, represented by Director Gregorio S. Cendana and
the Production Specialist Inc. (PSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws.
Traders approved a credit accommodation in the amount of two million five hundred twenty thousand pesos (P2,
520, 000) in favor of the NMPC and PSI through a domestic stand-by letter of credit to guarantee payment of the
coverage or broadcast rights for the 1981 season of the PBA.
As of July 27, 1981, the PBA had actually drawn against the said letter of credit the total amount of P340, 000.
Inasmuch as the NMPC and PSI did not make any payments on their obligation, Traders filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a complaint against NMPC and PSI to collect the whole amount of P2, 520, 000
(Civil Case No. 9303-P) alleging therein that the defendants were selling or disposing of substantial portions of their
asset. The lower court issued the writ of preliminary attachment after Traders filed a bond of P2, 520, 000.
A few months later, the NMPC through the office of the Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction as the NMPC, being an entity under the Office of the President performing
governmental functions cannot be sued without its consent. But the lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the
strength of the ruling in Harry Lyons, Inc vs. The United States of America that the state maybe sued without its
consent if it entered into contract with a private person. The NMPC filed a cross-claim against PSI alleging that it
merely acted as a guarantor of PSI in the loan agreement considering that it had appointed PSI as production
manager and exclusive marketing manager for the 1979-1981 PBA season.
NMPC through private counsel, filed another motion to dismiss reiterating the stand of the office of the Solicitor
General on NMPCs immunity to suit. The lower court issued an order stating that to maintain the authoritative
dignity of the court, the order of September 21, 1982 denying the motion to dismiss should be respected.
Consequently, NMPC filed before the then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus alleging that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss and in failing
to dissolve the writ of attachment on the grounds that government property cannot be attached, removed concealed
or disposed of and that the attachment bond of Traders was not renewed.
The appellate court granted the petition in its decision of July 17, 1984. It found that as an instrumentality of the
government under the supervision of the office of the President, the NMPC which had not been duly incorporated so
as to assume a separate juridical personality of its own, may not be sued without its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NMPC, being a government entity, is immune from suit

RULING:
The court held that the NMPC, in this case, is not immune from suit.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit is constitutionally recognized and is germane to the concept of sovereignty.
As such, the doctrine may be waived by general or special law. Immunity from suit may also be waived by an
implied consent to be sued as when, through its officers and agents, the state enters into a contract in furtherance of
a legitimate aim and purpose. By doing so, the state descends to the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued
is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. A problem usually arises when a government entity,
through unincorporated and therefore not possessed of a distinct juridical personality, enters into contract which, by
its nature is proprietary in character. Should this transpire, the test of state suitability is this: If said governmental
function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver, thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity. In other words, if the transaction, contract or operation
undertaken by the government entity is a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, said entity is
immune from suit.
In the present case, when NMPC entered into an agreement with the Traders through the PSI, it had waived its
consent to be sued.
The court reversed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it considers that NMPC as immune
from suit. The writ of attachment issued by the lower court in Civil Case No. 9303-P against the NMPC deposits with
Traders Royal Bank is immediately lifted and said court is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case
No, 9303-P.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (PETITIONER) VS. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO ET.AL (GR NO. 76607)
VS. HON. RODOLFO RODRIGO, ET AL (GR NO. 79470)
VS. HON. JOSEFINA CEBALLOS, ET AL (GR NO. 80018)
VS. HON. CONCEPCION VERGARA, ET AL (GR NO. 80258)
----RESPONDENTS--FACTS:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of STATE IMMUNITY. The United States
of America was not sued in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect
suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air
Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. On
February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids
for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were
private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar (RESPONDENTS). They
had been concessionaires inside Clark for several years already. The bidding, however, was won by Ramon Dizon
who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included
in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) which explained through its
representatives, petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse that the Civil Engineering concession had not
been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this
concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the expiration of the contract had been extended from
June 30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be
available only by the end of June and the private respondents would be notified.
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual
petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to
allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending
litigation.
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on
the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its nonsuability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit. On the
same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo
Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the
John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla
and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators
conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball,
Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was to file his
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the individual petitioners.
On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint,
alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit
for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States,
which had not given its consent to be sued. This motion was denied by the respondent judge on June 4, 1987. The
petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court seeking for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark
Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi
J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, information for
violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge,
Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual
petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.
The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance for the defendants and
moved for an extension within which to file an "answer and/or other pleadings" ( an alleged move of the office that
the United States government submitted to the jurisdiction of the Philippine court). Within the extended period, the
defendants filed their answer.
On May 7, 1987, the representatives of the defendants filed a motion to withdraw the answer and dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained
of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States without its consent. The motion

was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11, 1987, which held that the claimed immunity
under the Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come
under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer. Following the filing of the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the court issued on October 14, 1987, a temporary restraining order.
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners
(except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the
defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them
which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and
claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting
arrest. The defendants stress that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical
center for treatment of their wounds.
In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the United States of America and the individually named defendants argued
that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued. The
defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of
their official functions.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in its order dated August 10, 1987 and so was the motion for
reconsideration. The defendants submitted their answer as required but subsequently filed their petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction with this Court. The court issued a temporary restraining order on October
27, 1987.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners may invoke State Immunity from suit
RULING:
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, the court found that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United
States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United
States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as
required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar
indulgences. And all for a fee. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint
filed by the private respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the
conclusion reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
In G.R. No. 79470, the Court assumed that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the
nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such
services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces
of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it
is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of
whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility pay for the
privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are concededly reasonable and
relatively low, such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that
they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that
matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into
the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
However, the court still held that the complaint against the petitioners in the court below must still be
dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot
be allowed on the strength of the evidence before the court, which was carefully examined. The petitioners acted
quite properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act. It is surprising
that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.
In G.R. No. 80018, the individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him
at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were
charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and
prosecuting those guilty of such acts. It cannot, for a moment, be imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging
their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded (sued) for acts imputable (attributable)
to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
In G.R. No. 80258, the contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study of what actually happened to the
plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had
actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, the Court cannot

directly decide the case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it
shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will the
Supreme Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable. Accordingly, this case
must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
Wherefore, after considering the above premises, the court herbey renders judegment as follows:
(1) In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing
and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
(2) In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case is DISMISSED.
(3) In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order
dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.
(4) In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing
and decision of Civil Case. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
[right]

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avancea for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered
to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely
disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of
P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision
between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and
(c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was
going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to
twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern
intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning
toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or
horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from
the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who
examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a
depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood
issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was
had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the
operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live.
His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it
might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most
serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed
a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of
the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and
nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental
condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor,
especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition
prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his
physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability
that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings
and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost
50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders
and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to
dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from
making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he
had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.

The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000,
the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the
time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify
us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the
plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months
and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere
fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months
was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the
inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing
the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of
Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of
damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommended that an Act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said
questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any,
to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine
Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said
Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its
liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor
of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also
admitted that the instant case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render
judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions
submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We
have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an
employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must
look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the
United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and
scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice
Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be

subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9
Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal
injuries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the
legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to
educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being
objects similar to those sought by the public school system. In passing upon the question of the state's liability for
the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or
unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter
vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158;
Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out
of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which
authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County,
Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the
purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or
its duly authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish
hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower
end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in
the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for
the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is
difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It
simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate.
Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall
depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be
settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but
left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had
intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state,
it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in express terms.
(Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not
allowed by the state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein
contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction,
and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits,
except as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both
it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none
existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the
statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State,
121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing
this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass., 28), said:

The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore
unrecognized class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized
existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York,
jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the
negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not
previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent
acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or
negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by
his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of
the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the
contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service
serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the
state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where
the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of
Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or
negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that
where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or
indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation
upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage,
because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or
negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in
the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons
mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are
found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special
agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this
kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902
respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or
negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the
state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said
article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an
executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain
property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so
that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided
to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur.
Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision,
among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is
based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office

who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility.
Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions
of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the
above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether
the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff
has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating
sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not
with the courts.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendantsappellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing
the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as
shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3272 (T3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation
or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow,
unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and
the formal construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of
her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who
disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to
Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon
motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land
traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum
of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the
sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint
and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having
been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which
might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the
claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had
not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used
the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court
proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that
it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion
of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither
original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long
prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion
of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its
consent. We there said: .
... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use
were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at
the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed
by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it

"have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public
use defined in the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would
not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure
to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if
not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to
be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use,
which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes
manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of
immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she
has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the
owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and
has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the
price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land
from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government
should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the
determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No
pronouncement as to costs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT), petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.
Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for respondent Tantoco, Jr.

NARVASA, J.:p
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago together with Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are
defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint
which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages,"
and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF
OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3, 1987. 1 The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, 2 and the movants, a reply to the
opposition. 3 By order dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and
accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific
certain allegations. 4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court"
dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." 5 Basically, they sought an answer to the question:
"Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the
complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago as defendants in the . . case?" 6 The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike
out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose
thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any
guise." 7
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint. 8
As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a
Manifestation dated April 11, 1988. 9
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of
particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis. Also denied was
the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter
alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are adequate allegations . . which clearly
portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged participation of defendants-movants in the transactions described
in detail in said Complaint," and "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which should
be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue
and without leave of court is premature . . (absent) any special or extraordinary circumstances . . which would justify
. . (the same)."
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18, 1988. 11 In
response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim " 12
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13 On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL. 14 The
pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs on
or before that date. 15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to
Plaintiff," 16 and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' 17 as well as a Motion for Production
and Inspection of Documents. 18
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's amended
complaint, through such questions, for instance, as
1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or properties does
the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago for being illgotten?
3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or acts . . were
committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with" defendant Ferdinand Marcos
and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate
ill-gotten wealth?"

5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged plan to
conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?
7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that Tourist
Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned by either or
both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago,
as well as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said
defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda R. Marcos?
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination and copying of
1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the Amended
Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"
2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and . . marked
as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and
3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the decision
(of the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.
By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents (production being scheduled on
September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively.
On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989 (allowing
production and inspection of documents). It argued that
1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on September 11, 1989
anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and 15, are purposeless and unnecessary;"
2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly described . . (in)
plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"
3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG and/or its
Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.:
(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.
(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19 which the Sandiganbayan
treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of August 21, 1989 (admitting the Amended
Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that
1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are propounded . .," or "who in the
PCGG, in particular, . . (should) answer the interrogatories;"
2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had already been decreed . . as part of the proof of the
Complaint upon trial . .;"
3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about "matters of fact . . which defendants . . sought to . .
(extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"
4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and irregularly utilized . .
(since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence."
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the
permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG). 20
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be nullified because rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. More particularly, it claims
a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:
1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom they
are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG;
2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in denying the
movants' motion for bill of particulars) had already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial;
and
3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in
contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances; and
b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:
1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;
2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court
and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even
offered objections thereto and made comments thereon; and
3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either
(a) privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is
proscribed by the immunity provisions of Executive Order No. 1, or
(b) non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion and fear.
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from
enforcing its questioned resolutions of September 29, 1989 in Civil Case No. 0008. 21
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the Solicitor General withdrew "as
counsel for plaintiff . . with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the provisions of
Executive Order No. 292, as well as the decisional law of 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' (G.R. No.
92561, September 12, 1990) 22 to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this . . Court if
called for by circumstances in the interest of the Government or if he is so required by the Court." 23 This, the Court
allowed by Resolution dated January 21, 1991. 24
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from which the Solicitor
General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the following private
attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later
authorize." 25
The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their respective positions, the
Court now proceeds to decide the case.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the Rules of Court:
interrogatories to parties , 26 and production and inspection of documents and things. 27 Now, it appears to the
Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even
outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet
unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them which is a great pity for the intelligent and
adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the experience of
other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up adjudication.
28 Hence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function is
accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the
evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the
application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the
facts are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that adjudication is made on the basis of
incomplete facts, to that extent there is faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of
lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is attained; that is to say, that there no suppression,
obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of any fact material a relevant
to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial. 29

Seventy-one years ago, in Alonso v. Villamor, 30 this Court described the nature and object of litigation and in the
process laid down the standards by which judicial contests are to be conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather a contest in which
each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then brushing aside
as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested right in
technicalities. . . .
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue-fully and fairly;
i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor
preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from
also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by the parties; but
that, only in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of
the facfual basis of a party's claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the
party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts."
31
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or "not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive
pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered by the court
on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more particular or definite the
ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said
evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the
issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is
the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial should
discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but
also those known to adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the
dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules
24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation,
accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials
thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that
the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . ." 32
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and
cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore
performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing
under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the
facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized
privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said
trials are carried on in the dark. 33
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the
interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant,
whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much
to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for
use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) 34 which generally allows
the examination of a deponent
1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action,
whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for
trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts
themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No
longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the
time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . . 35
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of
discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b)
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without
leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is
not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. 36 It is only
when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property
subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that
at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. 37
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or
things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be
granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes
serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part
thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or
agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel
discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out
pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. 38
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without
judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person
subject to the inquiry. 39 And . . . further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege." 40
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise
relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery mechanism, in relation of course to the
particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved.
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court
cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories"
dated February 1, 1988 41 that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery
was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating
of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of
court." 42 But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 1989 43) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just
as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
1. The petitioner's first contention that the interrogatories in question are defective because they (a) do not name
the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are
"fundamentally the same matters . . (private respondents) sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . for
Bill of Particulars" are untenable and quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party
served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation or a partnership or
association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is
absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the
PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o
officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule
states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."

That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior motion for bill of particulars
addressed to the PCGG's amended complaint and denied for lack of merit is beside the point. Indeed, as
already pointed out above, a bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-called evidentiary facts. The latter
are without doubt proper subject of discovery. 44
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance at them
disproves the argument. The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded
complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to
object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are
being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it. 45 But until such an objection is presented and
sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.
2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground
for suppressing them either. As already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper
litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the
stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.
3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers
witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances. In the first place, there is nothing at all
wrong in a party's making his adversary his witness .46 This is expressly allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. A party may . . . call an adverse party
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and
impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus
called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be
cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.
The PCGG insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishing expedition," apart from the fact that
the information sought is immaterial since they are evidently meant to establish a claim against PCGG officers who
are not parties to the action. It suffices to point out that "fishing expeditions" are precisely permitted through the
modes of discovery. 47 Moreover, a defendant who files a counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules
to implead persons (therefore strangers to the action) as additional defendants on said counterclaim. This may be
done pursuant to Section 14, Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:
Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. When the presence of parties other than those to the original
action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or crossclaim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be
obtained."
The PCGG's assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action "for anything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated by . . (Executive) Order (No. 1)," is not a ground to refuse to answer the
interrogatories. The disclosure of facto relevant to the action and which are not self-incriminatory or otherwise
privileged is one thing; the matter of whether or not liability may arise from the facts disclosed in light of Executive
Order
No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of defense in the action.
The apprehension has been expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may be utilized as foundation for a
counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and officers. They will be. The private respondents have made no
secret that this is in fact their intention. Withal, the Court is unable to uphold the proposition that while the PCGG
obviously feels itself at liberty to bring actions on the basis of its study and appreciation of the evidence in its
possession, the parties sued should not be free to file counterclaims in the same actions against the PCGG or its
officers for gross neglect or ignorance, if not downright bad faith or malice in the commencement or initiation of such
judicial proceedings, or that in the actions that it may bring, the PCGG may opt not to be bound by rule applicable to
the parties it has sued, e.g., the rules of discovery.
So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial . . proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," has no application to a judicial proceeding it
has itself initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving
evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions,
including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that
while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge
and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is
axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit,

descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State,
even while assuming to represent or act for the State. 48
The suggestion 49 that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts
in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction
without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary
The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
manifested either through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the State
itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract. 50
The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own
courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants.
In short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties, the state surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against
the state. . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet.
150, 8 L. ed. 899)" 51
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private
property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner. 52
The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the nullity of the
Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its
possession.
The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already
been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed,
scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or
confidential about these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private
respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the
trial for any purpose allowed by law.
The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can allege in response to the corresponding
question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently established that the
denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has already been dealt with. The
PCGG is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional or
statutory.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection
of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some of the documents are, according to the
verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others,
admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely
allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only
other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their
relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.
One last word. Due no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and operation of the
modes of discovery earlier
mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said modes is a complicated
matter, unduly expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For example, as will already have
been noted from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter
setting forth a list of least questions with the request that they be answered individually. 55 That is all. The service of
such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the questions
"separately and fully in writing underoath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of the interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for refusing to make
discovery have already been mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex
than the service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific facts therein
set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in writing. 58 That is all.
Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving
the party requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted." 59 The

taking of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written interrogatories) while
somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary restraining order issued
on October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants.

YAP, J.:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the
order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the
complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground
of non-suability of the State.
The background of the present controversy may be briefly summarized as follows:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in
the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in
question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute
Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco
Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase
of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be
surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November
1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the
administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in
the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the
Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while
located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should
therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in
question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his
predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all
awards to the settlers.
The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer, raising by way of affirmative defenses lack of
sufficient cause of action and prescription.
On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an
area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff, "being covered by a possessory information title
in the name of his predecessor-in-interest" and declaring said lot excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation.
The court declared the rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.
A motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was filed by eighty-six (86) settlers, together
with the barrio council of Pag-asay, alleging among other things that intervenors had been in possession of the land
in question for more than twenty (20) years under claim of ownership.
On January 25, 1971, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and directed the intervenors to
file their corresponding pleadings and present their evidence; all evidence already presented were to remain but
plaintiff, as well as the Republic of the Philippines, could present additional evidence if they so desire. The plaintiff
presented additional evidence on July 30, 1971, and the case was set for hearing for the reception of intervenors'
evidence on August 30 and August 31, 1971.
On August 30, 1971, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for intervenors, the latter did not appear but
submitted a motion for postponement and resetting of the hearing on the next day, August 31, 1971. The trial court
denied the motion for postponement and allowed plaintiff to offer his evidence "en ausencia," after which the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. On the following day, August 31, 1971, Judge Sison rendered a decision
reiterating his decision of August 29, 1970.
A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But before this motion was acted upon,
plaintiff filed a motion for execution, dated November 18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this time
through Judge Miguel Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the order
denying intervenors' motion for postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present their
evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of Judge Navarro's order, the plaintiff went to the Intermediate
Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari. Said petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court,
and petitioners brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 36163, which was denied on May 3, 1973 Consequently,
the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by
the plaintiff.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the questioned order dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of nonsuability of the State and also on the ground that the existence and/or authenticity of the purported possessory
information title of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate, the
same is not evidence of title, or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by prescription and laches.
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for
certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order of Judge
Lising and remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. Hence this petition.
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping
a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. 1 It is an
action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The
complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or
by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. 2 There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, 3 and on
this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a
quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts
sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings." 4
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it
established the reservation " subject to private rights, if any there be. " We do not agree. No such consent can be
drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation
established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver
of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris. 5
Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Neither is there merit in respondent's submission, which the respondent appellate court sustained, on the basis of
our decision in the Begosa case, 6 that the present action is not a suit against the State within the rule of State
immunity from suit, because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its funds. It is
contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the plaintiff, hence
the Government is not being divested of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved in this argument,
since the character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is
directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. In
other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that he is the owner of the land in question based, incidentally, on an
informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks to establish his claim of ownership by suing the Republic of
the Philippines in an action in personam.
The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage Law was a means
provided by the law then in force in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States of America, to record a claimant's actual possession of a piece of land, established through an ex parte
proceeding conducted in accordance with prescribed rules. 7 Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facie
evidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a
claim of right as set forth in his application. 8 The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after
the lapse of 20 years (later reduced to 10 years), upon the fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in Article 393 of the
Spanish Mortgage Law.
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been converted
into a record of ownership. Such possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of
possession. Using this possessory information, the respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under the Public Land Act, which is an action in rem. However, having failed to do so, it is rather late
for him to pursue this avenue at this time. Respondent must also contend, as the records disclose, with the fact
admitted by him and stated in the decision of the Court a quo that settlers have been occupying and cultivating the
land in question since even before the outbreak of the war, which puts in grave doubt his own claim of possession.

Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the
Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo
Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was
lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. 10 These circumstances raise grave
doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding
to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares,"
11 whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064
hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old
Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing
the complaint filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines. No costs.
SO ORDERED.