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The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors

Gnes Murat Tezcr
Party Politics 2010 16: 69 originally published online 3 August 2009
DOI: 10.1177/1354068809339536
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V O L 1 6 . N o . 1 pp. 6988

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THE MODERATION THEORY REVISITED

The Case of Islamic Political Actors
Gnes Murat Tezcr
ABSTRACT

An influential political science literature argues that integration of radical

political parties within the political system leads to their moderation.
These parties trade off their ideological platforms for electoral viability
and political legality. Radicals become moderates through strategic
interests. In this article, I revisit this thesis and apply it to the Islamic
political actors in Iran and Turkey by employing the comparative method
of agreement. Three conclusions are reached. First, moderation helps
explain the evolution of Islamists into Muslim reformers. Second, moderation is a double-edged sword, especially in regimes with strong undemocratic characteristics. Moderation of radicals may result in their
domestication a situation that does not contribute to democratic transition or consolidation. Finally, change in the ideologies of political elites
is central in our understanding behavioural change. The data sources
include ethnography, primary language sources and historical narratives.

KEY WORDS
democratization
Iran
Islam
moderation
Turkey

Introduction
An influential body of scholarship argues that parties espousing radical positions have a strong incentive to moderate their positions once they operate
as vote-seeking electoral parties with centrist and accommodative platforms.
This process facilitates sustainable democratic transition and contributes to
democratic consolidation. Historical examples include the socialist parties
of Western Europe in the twentieth century. The moderation theory is also
relevant in evaluating the prospects of democracy in many Muslim majority
countries where Islamist opposition groups have broad appeal.
In the 1990s, Islamic groups with strong democratic credentials became
more visible in the Muslim world (Baker, 2003; Brumberg, 2001; Fuller,
1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068809339536]

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2003; Hefner, 2004; Yavuz, 2003). Muslim reformers can be defined as

political groups with salient Islamic identities that accept the inviolability
of political pluralism, competitive elections and human rights at base level
(Nasr, 2005). However, they represent diverse positions on issues such as
gender equality, the application of Islamic law, the socio-political status of
minorities, including non-Muslims, and relations with Western countries
(Brown et al., 2006).
The strongest Muslim reformers in the Middle East in the 1990s emerged
in the Islamist Iranian republic and the secularist Turkish republics, thus
presenting a historical puzzle. In Iran, Mohammad Khatami was elected
president in June 1997 on a platform of civil society, rule of law and republicanism, and again in 2001. Candidates aligned with the Reform Front
(Jebhe-ye Eslahat or Jebhe-ye Dovom Khordad RF) won the 2000 parliamentary elections. In Turkey, a group split from the Islamist movement and
in 2001 established the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma
Partisi JDP). The JDP swept to victory in the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections and has been in government since 2002. These were primarily
electoral parties seeking a popular mandate for change rather than fundamentalist parties aiming fundamentally to reorganize social and political
relations (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). The RF and JDP both faced stiff
opposition after coming to power. The RF could not translate its popular
mandate into governmental power and, consequently, authoritarian rule in
Iran remained unadulterated. The JDP had significantly more effective power
compared to the RF and external dynamics favoured the JDP. While the
party continued major political and economic reforms inaugurated by the
previous government, it wavered in its determination to achieve progress on
issues critical to the consolidation of the Turkish democracy. The irony was
that the rise of groups demonstrating the compatibility of Islamic values and
democratic commitments did not necessarily generate democratic transition
in Iran or consolidation in Turkey.
In this article, I suggest an analytical understanding of the evolution of
Muslim reformers in Iran and Turkey by revisiting the moderation theory.
I argue that moderation of these groups is not necessarily conducive to democratization, especially in consolidating democracies and semi-competitive autocracies. Primarily, I address three questions: (1) What does moderation entail?
(2) How are beliefs of political elites relevant to evolution of party behaviour? (3) What factors explain the similar evolution of Islamic opposition
in Iran and Turkey ruled by ideologically opposing regimes? The data sources
include historical narratives, ethnography and primary language sources.

Revisiting the Moderation Theory

Radical or anti-system parties can be defined as organizations that oppose
the regime on principle and consider several aspects of the ruling regime as
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illegitimate (Sartori, 1976: 1323). While they usually tend to have weak
democratic credentials, they may be staunch advocates of democratization
in authoritarian regimes. Robert Michels, who conducted one of the earliest
studies of how radical parties behave in elections, and best known for the
iron law of oligarchy, argues that socialist parties, despite their ideological
commitments to working class democracy, are controlled by a small group
of leaders who develop strategies with minimum input from the masses.
The objective . . . of the mass based elite is to replace the power of one
minority with that of another, themselves (Michels, 1915/1962: 18).
A second and hitherto obscure aspect of his theoretical framework provides valuable insights into radical party behaviour in elections. Michels
suggests that conservative tendencies that characterize the inner workings
of political parties also shape their behaviour. He identifies two causal mechanisms by which revolutionary socialist parties lose their radical orientations
and are domesticated: (a) pursuit of votes, and (b) organizational survival
(pp. 33341). When party elites decide to participate in an electoral contest,
they quickly realize that the espousal of ideological policies alienates large
segments of the electorate. Consequently, socialist parties transform into pragmatic, vote-maximizing electoral parties in order to remain politically viable.
This causal process is based on the assumption that vote-maximization entails
developing centrist political platforms rather than radical platforms that
have little public appeal.
Party elites concern with organizational survival tames their ideological
commitments. Participation in elections exposes a partys formerly clandestine networks to state authorities and renders the party vulnerable. As a
result, the higher the partys electoral organizational capacity, the more timid
are its policies. The party doctrines are whenever requisite, attenuated and
deformed in accordance with the external needs of the organization (p. 336).
Party organization acquires a life of its own at the expense of revolutionary principles. Under the dynamics of electoral competition and the constant
threat of state repression, revolutionary parties modify their original ideological commitments and affirm their revolutionary credentials only in theory
and on paper, i.e. not on lines which interest the police (p. 336).
Note that Michels theory is based on a single case study, and his conclusions are not necessarily applicable in other institutional and historical settings
(Hallas, 1971). His theory of moderation should not be taken as a consequence of some unalterable characteristics of human nature or political competition. Under a different set of circumstances, political elites can achieve
moderation without necessarily losing their reformist orientation.
Other prominent scholars share Michels insights. Schumpeter observes
that socialist parties abandoned Marxist internationalism when they realized
that adherence to its maxims would be costly in elections (1950/1975: 283,
3522). Parties that hoped to attain electoral majorities had to eschew
exclusivist platforms and organizational strategies that deterred potential
voters (Kirchheimer, 1966/1990; Lipset, 1959; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967;
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Neumann, 1956/1990). The unintended consequence of socialist participation in democratic politics was their transformation from radical movements into parties that represented the interests of working classes within the
established political system (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986: 18, 24, 1823).
A similar argument was made with regard to Catholic parties (Kalyvas,
1996: 264).
This vast and rich literature on how radical parties evolved in Europe has
a common thread: the inclusion of these parties in a parliamentary system
brought their moderation. The trade-off between participation and radicalism also applies in the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991: 169;
for an opposite view, see Bermeo, 1997). As a result, democracies may emerge
even in the absence of committed democrats (Waterbury, 1997). Opposition
leaders become moderates not as a result of ideological metamorphosis or
civic learning, but because of strategic interests (Kalyvas, 2000; 2003).
Moderation is a double-edged sword that may or may not be conducive
to sustainable democratization. Under certain conditions, moderation of
radical parties implies that they lose their capacity to reform the authoritarian characteristics of the regimes. Factors that define the nature of moderation include characteristics of the ruling regime and organizational capacities
of the radical party. A regime holding regular and competitive elections for
the chief executive office may still have strong undemocratic aspects. It may
impose restrictions on political pluralism, violate minority rights and exacerbate the prevailing socio-economic inequalities. Conversely, a radical party
in opposition may espouse reformist platforms that aim at rectifying these
policies. The German Social Democratic Party (SDP) in Imperial Germany
at the turn of the twentieth century exemplifies this situation. Michels argues
that electoral concerns and the constant threat of state repression undermined the reformist impulse of the SDP; he uses the term domestication when
describing the evolution of the SDP.
The moderation theory mainly focuses on how institutional and organizational factors shape the behaviour of radical parties. Behavioural moderation
is thought to precede and beget ideological moderation. While this focus
renders the theory applicable in a variety of historical and cultural contexts
with similar institutional frameworks, the exclusive focus on elite interests
as the primary causal factor may leave party behaviour unexplained in some
contexts. Political elites may respond differently to similar institutional constraints and opportunities. A full understanding of why radical parties behave
differently under similar organizational resources and institutional conditions
requires better specification of the linkages between elite behaviour and
belief systems (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2004). After all, political leaders are more
likely to be guided in their actions by their beliefs than are ordinary people
(Dahl, 1971: 12532). Elite behaviour may change as a result of political
learning, even in the absence of institutional incentives and constraints.
Studies of Islamist parties demonstrate that these parties may develop democratic credentials even in authoritarian Arabic regimes (Schwedler, 2006;
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Wickham, 2004). Consequently, the process of ideological change deserves

careful conceptualization.

Conceptualizing Ideological Change

Beliefs and ideas often do not directly influence action by determining its ends.
Rather, they predispose actors to behave in certain ways and discourage them
from acting in others (Elkins and Simeon, 1979; Swidler, 1986). As a result,
actors are unlikely to behave in ways that cannot be justified by institutionally and culturally established norms (March and Olsen, 1984). The response
of actors in novel situations depends on how novel they are and on the
cultural heritage of the actors. Their cultural heritage will, in many instances,
determine the success or lack of success of the actors to adapt their behavior
to changing circumstances (North, 2005: 18).
Beliefs and ideas change due to a variety of reasons, including new life
experiences and exposure to new ideas (Axelrod, 1986). Similarly, beliefs
and ideas evolve as actors engage in meaning-making practices that create
a dynamic relationship between social reality and culture (Weeden, 2002).
Actors may deliberately reject cultural resources that are at odds with their
life experiences in favour of beliefs and norms that are more relevant to
their experiences and interests. In this regard, great religious traditions may
sanction different maxims of conduct in different situations, and which is
thus elastic and susceptible of accommodation (Weber, 1922/1993: 209).
The conceptualization of how beliefs and ideas set the boundaries of behaviour is a fruitful way of thinking about radical party behaviour. Their integration into the political system will not result in moderation unless party
leaders have enough intellectual resources to reorient their ideological world
views. In this sense, ideological evolution remains a precondition for behavioural change. The existence of these intellectual resources ultimately
depends on party leaders life experiences and exposure to new ideas, or the
rise of a newer generation of activists who challenge the party hierarchy.

Comparing Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey

The theoretical framework developed in this article provides valuable insights
into the transformation of Islamic politics in Iran and Turkey since the early
1990s. Comparing between Muslim reformers in these two countries follows
the logic of the method of agreement (Lijphart, 1971; Skocpol and Somers,
1980). The comparative approach adapted in this study overcomes several
problems of causal inference. There is variation in the dependent variable
as the focus of inquiry, the behaviour of Muslim reformers, varies over time
(King et al., 1994). Besides, the theory is tested with independent observations that are not used in its construction (Muck and Snyder, 2007). The
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comparison also aims to clarify causal mechanisms connecting the beliefs,

interests and behaviour of Muslim reformers by relying on primary data
(Goldthorpe, 2001; Tilly, 2001).
Finally, the method of agreement is particularly useful in identifying or
ruling out the necessary causal factors (Collier et al., 2004: 21321; Dion,
1998; Mahoney, 2007). Neither of Iran nor of Turkey can specific factors
be considered necessary for the rise of Muslim reformers. First, Islam being
Sunni in Turkey and historically lacking an autonomous clerical establishment does not automatically make religious movements in this country any
less or any more democratic than in Iran, where Shii Islam is the predominant religious denomination, with its powerful clerical establishment. Next,
neither the secularist nature of politics in Turkey, nor the theocratic rule in
Iran, has prevented the rise of discourses that synthesize Islamic values with
democratic commitments. Furthermore, Turkey has been much more exposed
to the West, with more extensive linkages to the West than Iran (Levitsky
and Way, 2006). The Iranian economy was highly regulated, oil-based and
characterized by heavy state involvement in all aspects of production. In
contrast, Turkey had an open and diverse economy beset by erratic growth
rates. Business interests advocated democratic reforms as necessary to limit
arbitrary state intervention.
This comparative study is based on four hypotheses. First, behavioural
moderation is accompanied by ideological change. Politicians who continued to adhere to rigid Islamist world views remained unresponsive to institutional incentives. A typical example of ideological ossification was the
Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi FP) in Turkey. The leaders of both
the RF and the JDP were products of post-ideological thinking among
Islamic cadres (Bayat, 2007). Disillusion with the authoritarian practices of
the Islamic Republic in Iran and with the performance of the Islamist leadership in Turkey generated extensive soul-searching among younger generations of Islamist politicians and intellectuals. They reinterpreted Islamic
traditions and abandoned ideology-driven utopian goals in favour of a pragmatic, pluralistic and moderate discourse. At the same time, their discourses
reflected the boundaries drawn by the ruling regimes. The RF had to appear
more Islamist than it actually was the JDP, more secular.
Second, participation in relatively competitive and pluralistic politics reinforces moderate tendencies at the expense of radical voices. In this regard,
the relatively competitive nature of politics in Iran and Turkey, in contrast
to Arab countries, had decisive influence on the rise of Muslim reformers.
The RF and the JDP chose the electoral way to power over confrontational
and violent strategies, and defeated Islamists at the ballot box. Once the path
of electoral politics had been taken, that of subversive or contentious politics
became increasingly remote (for the notion of path dependency, see Pierson,
2000; Thelen, 2003). Yet, not all electoral Islamist groups are faced with
a trade-off between organizational survival and pursuit of revolutionary
goals. Some states lack the capacity to dismantle their grassroots and militias.
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Examples include Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah in Lebanon,

the Sadr Movement and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
(SCIRI) in post-Saddam Iraq. Consequently, the moderation theory does not
predict that these organizations will eventually be domesticated and evolve
in a similar manner to the RF and the JDP.
The third hypothesis concerns the impacts of state repression on the behaviour of radicals-turned-reformers in relatively pluralistic political environments. The greater the threat of state repression, the more cautious and
risk-averse are the reformers. The threat of state repression was a recurrent
concern for both the RF and the JDP. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the
secularist Turkish republic were characterized by guardianship that restricted
the power of parliamentarians and elected governments (Tezcr, 2007). In
Iran, the Guardian Council (Shura-ye Negahban GC) repeatedly vetoed
bills and legislation enacted by the reformist president and parliament. It
also disqualified many RF members from running in the 2004 parliamentary elections. In Turkey, the military had enormous leverage over governments and had veto power in issues including state regulation of Islam and
Kurdish discontent. The Constitution Court banned Islamic parties in 1998
and 2001. While the RF and the JDP occasionally challenged the guardians
interference in politics, they generally preferred non-confrontational policies
that accommodated the priorities of the guardians.
Finally, as Michels argues, reformers are prisoners of their organizational
resources. Once they commit to an electoral strategy, it becomes very hard
to pursue alternative and complementary strategies. The RF lacked strong
organizational capacities and robust vertical links with citizens. The Iranian
party system was underdeveloped and the RF could not build extensive grassroots. When the electoral strategy failed, the RF could not uniformly act and
lacked the organizational capacity for mass mobilization. The JDP had a
more developed organizational basis. Yet, power distribution was personalized and asymmetrical, and fostered patronclient relations despite the party
leaderships declared goal of fostering democratic practices. The internal
mechanisms that make the leader accountable to grassroots were absent
and the party structure was built on charismatic linkages (Kitschelt, 2000).
The lack of internal party democracy eroded the reformist agenda of the JDP
and sustained a culture of corruption similar to that of previous mainstream
Turkish parties.

The Rise and Fall of the RF

By 1982, after the Marxist and liberal forces had been eliminated, politics
in the Islamic Republic of Iran gradually took the form of conflict between
two elite factions (Akhavi, 1987; Baktiari, 1996: 1008; Moslem, 2002:
4782; Vakili-Zad, 1994). After the death of Khomeini and selection of
Khamenei as the new faqih, the tensions between factions erupted into open
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conflict, and by the early 1990s this had resulted in total marginalization
of the leftist faction. The leftist resistance to the alliance between President
and the rightist faction was effectively broken by the 1992 parliamentary
elections (Baktiari, 1996: 21424). When the GC disqualified about onethird of all applicants from running in the elections, the rightists and the
followers of Rafsanjani gained control of parliament (Sarabi, 1994).
Political defeat led to a deal of soul-searching among the leftists. Meanwhile, many intellectuals and clerics who had been ardent supporters of the
revolution became disillusioned with the increasing gap between revolutionary ideals and the reality of the Islamic republic. The democratic revolutions
in the East European countries, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
global prestige of the liberal democracy in the early 1990s contributed to
the rise of a discourse of pluralism, civil society, human rights and popular
rule in Iran. Deprived of any real possibility of challenging the rightist dominance of the existing political institutions, the leftists joined disillusioned
revolutionaries at various think-tanks, newspapers and magazines and articulated platforms that called for greater political pluralism and competition
in society (Brumberg, 2001: 185230). The leftists came to appreciate the
importance of personal liberties and protections against arbitrary political
power. Consequently, revolutionaries of the 1980s transformed into democrats throughout the 1990s. In line with the expectations of the moderation
theory, their pluralistic discourse resonated well with the public who both
resented governmental economic policies and demanded greater social and
cultural freedoms. The ex-leftists capitalized on widespread public discontent with the government by taking advantage of the opportunities offered
by the electoral contestation.
The reform candidate Khatami won the June 1997 presidential elections
by a landslide, which opened up a new era in Iranian politics. The Islamic
Iran Participation Front (Jebhe-ye Moshakerat-e Iran-e Eslami IIPF), established in 1998, became the main organization representing the reformist
agenda. IIPF and 17 other reform-oriented organizations formed an electoral
coalition under the rubric of Dovom Khordad. This coalition was victorious
in the 2000 elections and gained control of parliament.
The central idea of the RF was recovery of the democratic spirit of the revolution.1 The RF accused the current power-holders of betraying the republican promises of the revolution and Khomeinis legacy (Vaqa-ye Ettefaqieh,
2004). In a manifesto before the 2000 elections, IIPF declared that they were
following Khomeinis path and would recapture the democratic promise of
the 1979 revolution (Reuters, 2000). In general, RF politicians made a systematic effort to redefine the revolution as a process toward democracy and
to recreate Khomeini as a democratic leader (Brumberg, 2001).2 Meanwhile, they deliberately preferred a legal strategy to grassroots mobilization
and agitation toward achieving their goals.
Shortly after Khatami assumed the post of the presidency, he found himself
confronted by well-entrenched forces. These hardliners had no qualms about
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denouncing the supporters of the RF as the champions of American-style

reforms3 and trampling upon the blood of martyrs.4 Elements within the
security forces murdered a number of dissident intellectuals in 1998, student
demonstrations were brutally suppressed in 1999, the judiciary constantly
harassed leading figures of the RF and reformist publications were repeatedly
banned (Tabari, 2003). The GC used its veto power to strike down parliamentary legislation and presidential bills (Samii, 2001). Hardline activities
reached their climax with the GCs disqualification of many RF candidates
from running in the 2003 local council and 2004 parliamentary elections.
The ratio of disqualified candidates rose from 8 per cent in 2000 to 29 per
cent in 2004 (Samii, 2004). Accusations of fraud overshadowed the 2005
presidential elections won by the hardline candidate Mahmood Ahmedinejad
(Iran, 2005).
Through its electoral mandate, the RF pursued a moderate and accommodative strategy to overcome institutional obstacles and to undermine vested
interests blocking Irans democratization.5 This strategy entailed the empowerment of publicly elected and accountable politicians over the guardians
controlling the GC, the judiciary and parastatal institutions such as paramilitary forces6 and bonyads (Buchta, 2000: 738; Esfehani and Taheripour,
2002). The most critical moment of the reform strategy was Khatamis two
bills that would end the GCs supervisory role in the electoral process and
enhance the authority of the president vis--vis the other organs of government. Not surprisingly, the GC rejected these bills in 2003, and Khatami
had no choice but to withdraw them in March 2004.
The loose organizational structure of the RF seriously restricted the availability of alternative strategies. When the GC disqualified reformist candidates from running in the 2004 elections, the RF could not pursue a unified
strategy. A large group of parliamentarians affiliated to the RF protested the
GCs decision by staging a sit-in in parliament. When that strategy failed to
produce results, the IIPF announced that the elections would be illegitimate
and called for a boycott. In a rare act of public defiance, RF parliamentarians sent an open letter to Khatami. However, the other main reform-oriented
party, led by the speaker of the parliament, decided to take part in the elections (AFP, 2004). President Khatami publicly encouraged citizens to vote
in order to prevent an extremist takeover of parliament (BBC, 2004). The
irony was that reformists were prevented from fielding candidates in almost
half of the races (Reuters, 2004). At their post-electoral meeting, the IIPF
leaders grudgingly accepted their inability to muster public support and
opted for a more grassroots-oriented strategy (Iran, 2004). In the 2005 elections, the RF failed to mobilize behind a single candidate and no reform
candidate made it to the run-offs.
Although the RF failed to trigger democratization, it made Iranian politics
more pluralistic and open. It fundamentally changed the parameters of the
Iranian political discourse and left a lasting legacy. For instance, all presidential candidates in the 2005 presidential elections, with the exception of
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Ahmedinejad, adopted the themes and promises of the Khatami era. The
rise of Khatami also galvanized women and youth political participation,
and ethnic minorities strongly supported his movement. In particular, the
Khatami government increased the political visibility of the Kurds and eased
restrictions on the Kurdish language and culture. Nonetheless, the RF failed
to provide lasting leadership to nascent forces of democracy in Iran. Four
factors brought the eventual collapse of the RF. First, most of the reformers
were former revolutionaries who matured into democrats in the second
decade of the Islamic republic. Despite their dislike of the hardliners, the
reformers were generally loyal to the Islamic revolution and the constitution.
Hence, they were reluctant to formulate confrontational and potentially
violent strategies. Next, while elections introduced a degree of uncertainty
and pluralism, ultimate power lay in the hands of the unaccountable and
non-elected forces and their allies controlling vast institutional resources
(Chehabi, 2001). Electoral success did not put reformers in control of the
state in such a rigid political system. In this regard, the RF was in a more
disadvantageous position compared to the Turkish JDP. The Iranian reformers continued to be the subject of periodic harassment. In addition to
heavy state repression, the RFs organizational structure made non-electoral
strategies infeasible. The RF lacked the organizational capacity to build
sustainable links with the public. This partially reflected the rudimentary
nature of the Iranian political system. Iranian parties were a loose collection of influential individuals pursuing factional goals with little grassroots
participation (Fairbanks, 1998). Voters lacked strong party identifications.
As a result of its organizational weakness, the RFs ability to capitalize on
public discontent was at best tenuous. Finally, the RF became the victim of
its very own electoral success. The RF was in control of both the presidency
and the parliament from 2000 to 2004 and received the lions share of the
public blame for economic problems and pervasive corruption, albeit lacking
effective authority. Public enthusiasm for the reformist movement gradually
waned and was eventually replaced by widespread apathy and disenchantment. According to a random sample survey conducted in Tehran in August
2003, more than half of the respondents evaluated the political system as
not being responsive to their demands. Forty-five per cent argued that the
state had completely failed in achieving the goals deemed important by
citizens.7 Yet, only around one-third perceived the reformers as capable of
solving Irans problems. In the 2005 elections, a hardliner, Ahmedinejad, won
on a populist platform and by promising to rekindle the equalitarian spirit
of the revolution.
Hence, the RF exhibited the same disadvantages characterizing the legal
oppositions in competitive authoritarian countries (Levitsky and Way, 2002).
The RF participated in the regime-controlled elections and won victories
despite its inferior resources. However, it was incapable of an alternative
strategy when the hardliners effectively blocked the possibility of reform
through legal means by taking advantage of their huge institutional and
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organizational means (Gheissari and Nasr, 2006: 13642). The non-electoral

strategies of mass disobedience that brought down the authoritarian regimes
in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine were simply not available to the RF (Bunce
and Wolchik, 2006; McFaul, 2005). Furthermore, competitive politics was not
the indicator of incumbent weakness in Iran that it was in post-communist
authoritarian regimes (Way, 2005). Consequently, electoral competition in
Iran created cycles of political change that affected factional balance but did
not trigger democratic breakthroughs. In essence, this resembled regime
cycles in post-Soviet Eurasia, where patrimonial presidentialism created
fairly regular cycles of elite defection (Hale, 2005).

Maturation of the JDP

Unlike the situation in most of the Middle Eastern countries, conspiracy and
mass agitation were not central to the strategies of Turkish Islamic political parties. The first political party to openly espouse Islamism in Turkey
was established in 1970, but Islamists remained on the margins of electoral competition throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Their understanding of
democracy reflected a belief in majoritarianism rather than a commitment to
pluralism and basic freedoms. However, as the moderation theory would
expect, the Welfare Party (Refah PartisiWP), established in 1983, gradually
developed policies with broader public appeal under the dynamics of electoral competition. The party gained parliamentary representation and made
a strong showing in urban peripheries for the first time in the 1991 elections.
In the early 1990s, the WP abandoned its espousal of the state-led economic
development programme in favour of policies that promoted private investment and entrepreneurship; put forward a bold critique of the Turkish states
repressive treatment of its Kurdish citizens; and developed a programme of
social justice (Sen, 1995). All these changes signified the growing importance
of a younger generation of politicians and intellectuals within the party who
would later form the JDP (Gle, 1997; Yavuz, 2003: 2257). Meanwhile,
membership in the party grew, women actively took part in the partys wellorganized vote canvassing (White, 2002) and the WP went beyond religious
mobilization (Glalp, 1999). The party significantly increased its appeal
among citizens who were disillusioned with the incompetent leadership of
the centrist parties. The WP formed a coalition government in summer 1996.
The WP successfully capitalized on the opportunities presented by the
highly fragmented and volatile Turkish elections. It proved to be ideologically and organizationally more innovative and adaptive than its predecessors. However, the partys rise triggered a strong reaction from the armed
forces, the judiciary, the media and civil society organizations. The National
Security Council, an institution that represented the influence of armed forces
over elected governments, declared political Islam (irtica) as the existential
threat to the Turkish republic in February 1997. The Constitution Court
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banned the WP and in 1998 forbade its chairman, Necmettin Erbakan, from
taking part in political activity. In the same year, the popular mayor of
Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was also barred from political activity and
spent four months in prison in 1999.
Similar to the experience of the Iranian reformers, state persecution had
a lasting impression on the WP cadres. As Michels might have predicted,
organizational survival became the main priority of the Virtue Party (Fazilet
PartisiVP), which was established in 1997 instead of the WP. The VP
adopted a pro-European Union (EU) stance, hoping that the EU process
would make Turkey more democratic (nis, 2006; Tanyc, 2003). Although
it may be more moderate, the VP could not sustain the WPs popularity and
received around 15 per cent of the vote in the 1999 elections. Electoral defeat
intensified the discontent of the younger generation (yenilikiler), who were
already disillusioned with Erbakan and his coterie.
By that time, the younger generation had realized the ideologically driven
platforms had both limited public appeal and rendered their parties vulnerable to state repression. They therefore pursued a dual strategy of moving
to the centre of Turkish politics and of accommodating the secularist forces.
First, they were convinced that victory at the ballot box required developing
centrist platforms with cross-cutting appeals. Second, they realized that they
had to give unambiguous and clear signals to the military, the judiciary,
secular civil society and the media to neutralize their hostility. The dual
strategy pursued by the younger generation was similar to the dual game
played by the Christian Democratic party in Peru after 1980 (Mainwaring,
2003). However, in Turkey, vote-maximization and political survival reinforced one another. After the Constitution Court banned the VP in June
2001, the old guard established the Felicity Party in July, and the younger
generation the JDP in August 2001.8
From the beginning, the party leadership emphasized that their party
would pursue centrist and conciliatory politics (Yaks, 2002). Hseyin elik,
the minister of education in the Erdogan government (personal communication, 6 July 2002), explained that he joined the JDP because of its broad
appeal, which went beyond the mosque crowd. Gl (personal communication, 28 June 2002) articulated: We believe that modernity and being Muslim
complement each other. We accept the modern values of liberalism, human
rights and market economy. Abdllatif Sener, who later became one of the
vice-prime ministers, argued along similar lines: There are now no more
demands for Sharia from people. Political Islam is now discredited. . . . Now
people come for jobs and bread but not with Sharia demands (personal communication, 4 July 2002). The JDP chairman, Erdogan, described his party
as a continuation of the centreright Democrat Party which ruled Turkey
from 1950 to 1960, and rejected any affiliation with Erbakans agenda
(Milliyet, 2003; Radikal, 2004).
Erdogan utilized vernacular Islamic idiom to make his conciliatory stance
accessible and meaningful to the crowds who listened to him. Whereas, for
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Erbakan, Islam was a holistic ideology that was in an inevitable struggle

with the West, it has become a source of moderation and conciliation in
the discourse of Erdogan. For the latter, Islam has been a cultural source
through which he could justify his ideological moderation and communicate it to the voters. Like Khatami, Erdogan articulated Islam as a language
of peace and political pluralism.
The early elections of November 2002 provided a golden opportunity for
the JDP. The party system remained highly fragmentary, i.e. reflecting deepseated differences in voter preferences (Baslevent et al., 2004). Yet, almost all
the major parties were discredited mainly because the country was experiencing its worst economic crisis of the post-World War II period in 2001.
The JDP emerged triumphant from the elections in capturing a plurality of
the votes. Vote-maximization entailed centrist moderate platforms as would
be predicted by the moderation theory. The JDP came to power at a time
when EUTurkey relations had reached a critical threshold. In contrast to
Iran, where tensions with the United States translated into intolerance for
opposition, external dynamics was highly conducive to the JDPs reform
agenda. The party oversaw one of the most ambitious reform periods in
modern Turkish history (Tepe, 2005). Political reforms included broader
rights to non-Muslim minorities and the Kurds, increasing the scope of individual liberties, abolishing the state security courts and reducing the role of
armed forces in policy-making through institutional changes. Consequently,
the EU decided to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey in December
2004. The government was also successful in achieving high and sustainable
growth rates and in reducing inflation. Meanwhile, the JDP back-pedalled
on issues related to Islamic education and identity when confronted with
the secularist opposition (Radikal, 2003).
Two of the most salient obstacles to democratic consolidation in Turkey
involve the undemocratic nature of the political parties and political representation of the Kurds. The JDPs approach to these two issues was inconsistent and timid. Major Turkish political parties exhibited strong authoritarian
tendencies (arkoglu et al., 2000). Closed-list proportional representation,
used since the 1991 elections, reinforced hierarchical power structure within
parties. Patronage distribution was central to party organizational structures. At its inception, the JDP declared that the party would eschew authoritarian practices that characterized the WP and VP. However, they quickly
failed to fulfil these promises. In May 2002, any public criticism of the
party leadership and members was made a reason for permanent expulsion (Radikal, 2002). Two parliamentarians were expelled on this basis
(Hrriyet, 2006). The party leadership had complete control over candidates running under the party ticket in the 2002 and 2007 elections. In
2006, popularly elected provincial branch chairpersons who defeated the
candidates favoured by the party leadership were summarily dismissed and
provincial congresses were annulled (Milliyet, 2006). Changes in party bylaws consolidated the power of the chairperson over delegates and made
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it practically impossible to challenge the chairperson in party congresses

(Sabah, 2006).
The struggle against corruption was a major theme of the JDP platform.9
However, the JDP government soon succumbed to corrupt practices and
favouritism in bureaucratic appointments and in the allocation of public bids.
The JDP-controlled municipalities were hit by corruption scandals,10 which
the party leadership preferred to cover up (Radikal, 2006c). The JDP rapidly
matured into a patronage distributing leader party with very limited pluralism and deliberation within its ranks. Once organized as a vote-maximizing
party replicating hierarchical tendencies in other centreright parties, the
leadership lost the opportunity to build more democratic forms of representation. As a result, the party could not provide an alternative avenue for
more deliberative, autonomous and broader public participation in politics.
Another crucial issue that confronted the JDP government was the Kurdish
problem and the illegal activities of the security forces. The origins of these
groups went back to the extra-legal tactics that had been employed by the
Turkish state since the early 1990s in its struggle against the Kurdish insurgency (Kalkan, 2006). While many of these groups were exposed in the late
1990s, they continued to operate with impunity, because they enjoyed protection at high levels of the state bureaucracy and from the armed forces
(Savas, 1998). Their elimination became a precondition for the establishment
of the rule of law and public accountability of politicians and the security
forces. The JDP had only limited progress in eliminating these groups. In
2005, members of the Turkish armed forces engaged in a bombing campaign
to intimidate and pacify the civilian population in the southeastern province
of Hakkari. The government promise to thoroughly investigate the forces
behind the attacks11 turned out to be hollow. A public prosecutor who
accused the chief of the land forces of protecting one of the assailants was
expelled from the profession. The report of the parliamentary investigatory
commission produced no tangible results (TBMM, 2006).
Integration of the JDP into the political system also brought its domestication, because this failed to generate a consistent and substantial Kurdish
policy. The party hoped that the EU-related reforms would meet Kurdish
demands for greater cultural rights and political representation, and recognized Kurdishness as a sub-identity of Turkish citizenship but categorically
rejected ethnic, regional and religious nationalism.12 Erdogan and his party
garnered the overwhelming support of the Kurds in the 2007 elections. In
this sense, both Irans and Turkeys Kurds saw in Khatami and Erdogan the
potential to alleviate their plight and end discriminatory state policies. However, the legal and administrative reforms did not necessarily translate into
practical improvements. The JDP categorically rejected calls for decreasing
the 10 per cent threshold, which would have given more substantial parliamentary representation to the Kurds. By the summer 2005, the party had
lost the initiative to push through a peaceful solution and armed conflict
restarted. The JDP was too insecure to assert civilian control over the armed
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forces and interfere in security affairs that were historically considered the
realm of the army. Moreover, the continuing conflict between the Turkish
army and Kurdish militants and developments in Northern Iraq polarized
the political atmosphere and severely restricted the options available to the
JDP government in the autumn of 2007. Consequently, the JDP achieved
little in terms of increasing Kurdish political rights and improving security
conditions in the Kurdish populated areas.

Conclusions
This article has demonstrated that moderation of the Islamists can take place
in diverse settings, i.e. in Islamist Iran and secularist Turkey. A similar process
through which Islamists develop democratic credentials can also be seen in
such very different contexts as Egypt and Indonesia. Ideological transformations are accompanied by behavioural change guided by strategic interests.
The RF dramatically broadened the scope of Iranian political discourse
and the JDP undertook substantial reforms. Meanwhile, moderation that
integrates Islamists is not necessarily conducive to democratization. Once
Islamists are integrated to the competitive political system, they develop
electoral strategies and pursue conciliatory policies. Electoral calculations,
fear of state repression and organizational constraints all make them politically risk-averse. Consequently, they seek accommodation with authoritarian aspects of the regimes.
The process of moderation is not deterministic. Political movements are
products of particular historical, cultural and institutional conditions. Political leaders make strategic choices under these conditions. While moderation of Iranian and Turkish Muslim reformers led to their domestication, this
should not be taken as a result of an unavoidable and universal process. The
RF would probably have been more successful if the leadership had developed a more grassroots-oriented strategy and built organic links with society.
The groups that formed the core of the RF continued to act as factions
striving for little power under the dynamics of highly restrictive Iranian elections. They could not mature into mass parties. A fundamental factor that
curtailed the reformist impulses of the JDP was the way in which the party
was organized. A more democratic and participatory organizational design
would have made the party more representative of and more responsive to
social demands. The JDP crystallized into a leader party. In this sense, it
replicated the chronic problem of mainstream Turkish political parties. As
identified by Michels more than a century ago, organizational strategies and
resources remain central to the success of parties and movements that strive
for political change. Muslim reformers failures primarily stemmed from their
organizational weaknesses rather than ideological deficits.
These findings also imply that the crucial variable affecting prospects for
sustainable democratization in hybrid or authoritarian regimes in the Muslim
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world is the institutional characteristics of the ruling regimes rather than

ideological commitments of the opposition (also see Bellin, 2004; Lust-Okar
and Jamal, 2002). The transformation of Islamist opposition groups into
electoral parties is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic
transition and consolidation.

Notes
1 For instance, see the interviews Khatami gave to the Iranian daily, Entekhab
(1999), and his speeches broadcast by the Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Network 1, on 28 May and 14 June 2001 and 27 May 2004.
2 For example, see the speech of Mohammed Reza Khatami at the fifth conference
of the IIPF; IRNA, 17 October 2003.
3 The statement issued by the Revolutionary Guards, reported by AFP on 1 July
2000.
4 Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi quoted by Reuters (2000).
5 For example, see the interview with the general-secretary of Moshakaret, Reza
Khatami, in the Iranian daily, Sharq (2004). Also, see the interviews with leading
reformers in the Iranian daily, Aftab-e Yazd (2004).
6 See the interview with the commander of Basij in the Iranian daily, Kayhan (2002).
7 For more information on the survey, see Tezcr et al. (2006).
8 For the official presentation of the JDPs ideology, see Akdogan (2004).
9 Erdogans speech at the partys first congress on 12 October 2003.
10 See, for example, Radikal (2006a, b, d).
11 Erdogans address to the JDP parliamentary group, 22 November 2005.
12 Erdogans speech in Diyarbakr reported by Milliyet (2005).

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GNES MURAT TEZCR, b. 1979, PhD in Political Science (University of Michigan

2005). Assistant Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago (2005).
His work focuses on political roles of religion, constitutionalism and judicial activism
and dynamics of ethnic conflicts. Author of The Paradox of Moderation (University
of Texas Press, Spring 2010).
ADDRESS: Loyola University Chicago, 6525 N Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626,
USA. [e-mail: gtezcur@luc.edu]

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