Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Table of Contents
a.
b.
c.
d.
Definition of Law
Limitations upon the Authority of the Sovereign Prince
Difference between Form of State and Form of Government
The Question of Slavery
4. Bodins Economic Thought
.
Quantitative Theory of Money
a.
The States Finances and the Question of Taxation and Property Rights
5. Writings Concerning Religion
.
Colloquium heptaplomeres and the Question of Religious Tolerance
a.
The Question of True Religion and Bodins Personal Faith
6. On Witchcraft
7. Natural Philosophy
8. Other Works
. Juris universi distributio
a. Moral Philosophy
b. Writings on Education
c. Bodins Surviving Correspondence
9. Influence
10. References and Further Reading
. Primary Sources
i. Modern Editions of Bodins works
1. Collected Works
2. Individual Works
a. Secondary Sources
. Bibliography
i. Conference Proceedings and Article Collections
Charles death in 1574, during the reign of his brother, Henri III. In 1576, Bodin lost the favor of
King Henri III after he opposed, among other things, the kings fiscal policies during the States
General of Blois where Bodin served as representative for the third estate of Vermandois.
Bodin settled in Laon during the last two decades of his life. He had moved there shortly after
marrying the widow of a Laon official, Franoise Trouilliart (or Trouillard) in 1576. Bodin
sought employment with the Duke of Alenon, the kings youngest brother. The duke aspired to
marry Queen Elizabeth of England. During one of the dukes trips to London, Bodin
accompanied him. In 1582, Bodin followed Alenon to Antwerp, where Alenon sided with the
Low Countries in their revolt against Spain. Bodin was appointed Master of Requests and
counselor (matre des requtes et conseiller) to the duke in 1583. He retired from national
politics after Alenons sudden death in 1584. Following the death of his brother-in-law, Bodin
succeeded him in office as procureur du roi, or Chief Public Prosecutor, for Laon in 1587.
Bodin wrote two notable works toward the end of his life; his Colloquium of the Seven about
Secrets of the Sublime (Colloquium heptaplomeres de rerum sublimium arcanis abditis) is an
engaging dialogue in favor of religious tolerance. Bodins main contribution in the field of
natural philosophy, the Theater of Nature(Universae naturae theatrum) was first published in
1596, the same year that Bodin died of the plague. He was given a Catholic burial in the
Franciscan church of Laon.
reading history it is necessary not to believe too much or disbelieve flatly ()If we agree to
everything in every respect, often we shall take true things for false and blunder seriously in
administering the state. But if we have no faith at all in history, we can win no assistance from it.
(Bodin 1945, 42)
Of the ten chapters that constitute the Methodus, Chapter Six is by far the lengthiest, covering
more than a third of the book, and it may be considered as a blueprint for the Rpublique.
Chapters VII to IX seek to refute erroneous interpretations of history. Bodins first rebuttal
concerns the myth, based on a biblical prophecy, of the four monarchies or empires as it was
emphasized by many German Protestant theologians. Bodins second criticism concerns the idea
of a golden age (and the superiority of the ancients in comparison with moderns). Furthermore,
Bodin refutes the error of those who claim the independent origin of races. The final chapter of
the Methodus contains a bibliography of universal history.
statutes are set forth; who at length circumscribe the entire division of learning within its limits,
classify into types, divide into parts, point out with words, and illustrate with examples. (Bodin
1945, 4-6)
b. Theory of Climates
The Theory of Climates is among Bodins best-known ideas. Bodin was not the first to discuss
the topic; he owes much to classical authors like Livy, Hippocrates, Aristotle and Tacitus, who
are referenced by Bodin himself. He also borrows from his contemporariesespecially
historians, travelers, and diplomats like Commines, Machiavelli, Copernicus, and Jean Cardan.
Bodins observations on climate differed from that of his medieval predecessors, since Bodin
was first and foremost interested in the practical implications of a theory: a correct understanding
of the laws of the environment must be thought of as the starting point for all policy, laws and
institutions (Tooley 1953, 83). Bodin believed that climate and other geographical factors
influence, although they do not necessarily determine, the temperament of any given people.
Accordingly, the form of state and legislation needs to be adapted to the temperament of the
people, and the territory that it occupies.
Three different accounts of the Theory of Climates are found in Bodins writings. The earliest
version is in Chapter Five of the Methodus. Although this passage contains the general principles
of the theory, Bodin does not relate them to contemporary politics. It is in the first chapter of the
fifth book of the Rpublique that the theory of climates is further amplified, and its relationship
to contemporary politics established. Moreover, the Latin translation of the Rpublique contains
a few notable additions to the theory.
According to Bodin, no one who has written about states has ever considered the question of
how to adapt the form of a state to the territory where it is situated (near the sea or the
mountains, etc.), or to the natural aptitudes of its people. Bodin holds that, amid the uncertainty
and chaos of human history, natural influences provide us with a sure criterion for historical
generalization. These stable and unchanging natural influences have a dominant role in molding
the personality, physique, and historical character of peoples (Brown 1969, 87-88). This
naturalistic approach is, to some extent, obscured by Bodins belief in astrology and numerology.
Racial peculiarities, the influence of the planets and Pythagorean numbers were all part of
Renaissance Platonism. Bodin combined these ideas with geographic determinism that closely
followed the theories of Hippocrates and Strabo. (Bodin 1945, xiii)
Ptolemy divided the world into arctic, temperate, and tropic zones. In adopting the Ptolemaic
zones Bodin divided earth into areas of thirty degrees from the equator northward. Different
peoples have their capabilities and weaknesses. Southern people are contemplative and religious
by nature; they are wise but lack in energy. Northern people, on the other hand, are active and
large in stature, but lack in sagaciousness. The people of the South are intellectually gifted and
thus resemble old men while the Northern people, because of their physical qualities, remind us
of youth. Those that live in between these two regionsthe men of the temperate zonelack the
excesses of the previous two, while being endowed with their better qualities. They may
therefore be described as men in middle lifeprudent and therefore gifted to become executives
and statesmen. They are the Aristotelian mean between two extremes. The superiority of this
third group is stressed by Bodin throughout his writings.
Salic law, or law of succession to the throne, is discussed: Bodin holds that the rule of women is
against divine, natural, and human law. The Salic law, together with a law forbidding alienation
of the public domain, called Agrarian law in the Methodus (Bodin 1945, p. 253), is one of the
two fundamental laws, or leges imperii (Fr. loix royales), which impose legal limitations upon
the authority of the sovereign prince. Fundamental laws concern the state of the kingdom and are
annexed to the crown, and the sovereign prince therefore cannot detract from them.
The concluding chapter of the Rpublique is a discussion concerning the principle of justice in
the government of the state. Geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic justice are explained, as well as
their relation to the different forms of state. A strong Platonic influence may be detected in the
final chapter of the work: a wise ruler establishes harmony within the commonwealth, just as
God has established harmony in the universe he has created. Every individual has their proper
place and purpose in the commonwealth.
a. Concept of Sovereignty
The Rpublique opens with the following definition of a commonwealth: A Commonweale is a
lawfull government of many families, and of that which unto them in common belongeth, with a
puissant soveraigntie. (Bodin 1962, 1) (Fr. Rpublique est un droit gouvernement de plusieurs
mnages, et de ce qui leur est commun, avec puissance souveraine. (Bodin 1583, 1)
Lat.Respublica est familiarum rerumque inter ipsas communium summa potestate ac ratione
moderata multitude. (Bodin 1586, 1)) The meaning of sovereign power is further clarified in
Chapter Eight of the first book:
Maiestie or Soveraigntie is the most high, absolute, and perpetuall power over the citisens and
subiects in a Commonweale: which the Latins cal Maiestatem, the Greeks akra exousia, kurion
arche, and kurion politeuma; the Italians Segnoria, and the Hebrewes tomech shvet, that is to
say, The greatest power to command. (Bodin 1962, 84)
Having defined sovereignty, Bodin then defines the meaning of the terms perpetual and
absolute. A person to whom sovereignty is given for a certain period of time, upon the
expiration of which they once again become private citizens, cannot be called sovereign. When
sovereign power is given to someone for a certain period of time, the person or persons receiving
it are but the trustees and custodians of that power, and the sovereign power can be removed
from them by the person or persons that are truly sovereign. Sovereignty, therefore, Bodin
writes, is not limited either in power, charge, or time certaine. Absolute power is the power of
overriding ordinary law, and it has no other condition than that which is commanded by the law
of God and of nature:
But it behoveth him that is a soveraigne not to be in any sort subiect to the commaund of another
whose office it is to give laws unto his subiects, to abrogat laws unprofitable, and in their
stead to establish other: which hee cannot do that is himselfe subiect unto laws, or to others
which have commaund over him. And that is it for which the law saith, That the prince is
acquitted from the power of the laws[.] (Bodin 1962, 91)
From this and similar passages Bodin derives the first prerogative of a sovereign prince of which
he gives the following definition: Let this be the first and chiefe marke of a soveraigne prince,
to bee of power to give laws to all his subiects in generall and to everie one of them in particular
... without consent of any other greater, equall, or lesser than himselfe (Bodin 1962, 159). All
other rights and prerogatives of sovereignty are included in the power of making and repealing
laws, Bodin writes, and continues, so that (to speak properly) a man may say, that there is but
this only mark of soveraigne power considering that all other the rights thereof are contained in
this. The other prerogatives include declaring war and making peace, hearing appeals in the last
instance, instituting and removing the highest officers, imposing taxes on subjects or exempting
them, granting pardons and dispensations, determining the name, value, and measure of the
coinage, and finally, requiring subjects to swear their loyalty to their sovereign prince.
Sovereignty and its defining marks or attributes are indivisible, and supreme power within the
commonwealth must necessarily be concentrated on a single person or group of persons. Bodin
argues that the first prerogative of a sovereign ruler is to give law to subjects without the consent
of any other individual. It is from this definition that he derives the logical impossibility of
dividing sovereignty, as well as the impossibility of the existence of a mixed state: if
sovereignty, in other words, the power to give law, within the state were divided, for example,
between the prince, the nobility, and the people, there would exist in the commonwealth not one,
but several agents that possess the power to give law. In such a case, Bodin argues, no one can be
called a subject, since all have power to make law. Additionally, no one would be able to give
laws to others, since law-givers would be forced to receive law from those upon whom they wish
to impose laws. The state would, therefore, be popular or democratic. In the revised Latin edition
of the Rpublique the outcome of divided sovereignty is described as a state of anarchy since no
one would be willing to obey laws.
b. Definition of Law
Bodin writes that there is a great difference between law (Lat. lex; Fr. loi)
and right (Lat. jus; Fr. droit). Law is the command of a sovereign prince, that makes use of his
power, while right implies that which is equitable. A right connotes something with a normative
content; law, on the other hand, has no moral content or normative implications. Bodin writes:
We must presuppose that this word Law, without any other addition, signifieth The right
command of him or them, which have soveraigne power above others, without exception of
person: be it that such commaundement concerne the subiects in generall, or in particular: except
him or them which have given the law. Howbeit to speake more properly, A law is the command
of a Soveraigne concerning all his subiects in generall: or els concerning generall things, as
saith Festus Pompeius, as a privilege concerneth some one, or some few[.] (Bodin 1962, 156)
princes are subject to divine and natural laws, Bodin writes. To contravene the laws of God,
under the greatnesse of whome all monarches of the world ought to beare the yoke, and to bow
their heads in all feare and reverence, and nature mean treason and rebellion.
Contracts with Subjects and with Foreigners
Bodin mentions a few other things - besides the laws of God and of nature - that limit the
sovereign princes authority. These include the princes contracts with his subjects and foreign
princes, property rights of the citizens, and constitutional laws (leges imperii) of the realm.
Regarding the difference between contracts and laws, Bodin writes that the sovereign prince is
subject to the just and reasonable contracts that he has made, and in the observation of which his
subjects have an interest, whilst laws obligate all subjects but not the prince. A contract between
a sovereign prince and his subjects is mutually binding and it obligates both parties reciprocally.
The prince, therefore, has no advantage over the subject on this matter. The prince must honor is
contracts for three reasons: 1) Natural equity, which requires that agreements and promises be
kept; 2) The princes honor and his good faith, since there is no more detestable crime in a
prince, than to bee false of his oath and promise; and 3) The prince is the guarantor of the
conventions and obligations that his subjects have with each other it is therefore all the more
important that the sovereign prince should render justice for his own act.
Fundamental Laws
Two fundamental laws (leges imperii) are discussed in the Rpublique. The first one is the Salic
law, or the law of succession to the throne. The Salic law guarantees the continuity of the crown,
and determines the legitimate successor (see Franklin 1973, Chapter 5). The other fundamental
law is the law against alienation of the royal domain, which Bodin calls Agrarian law in
the Methodus. As Franklin has observed, The domain was supposed to have been set aside in
order to provide a king with a source of annual income normally sufficient to defray the costs of
government (1973, 73). If the domain is alienated, this signifies lesser income to the crown, and
possibly increased taxation upon the citizens. Fundamental laws are annexed and united to the
crown, and therefore the sovereign ruler cannot infringe them. But should the prince decide to do
so, his successor can always annul that which has been done in prejudice of the fundamental
laws of the realm.
Inviolability of Private Property
Finally, Bodin derives from both natural law and the Old Testament that the sovereign prince
may not take the private property of his subjects without their consent since this would mean
violating the law of God and of nature. He writes: Now then if a soveraigne prince may not
remove the bounds which almightie God (of whom he is the living & breathing image) hath
prefined unto the everlasting lawes of nature: neither may he take from another man that which is
his, without iust cause (Bodin 1962, 109; 110). The only exception to the rule, the just causes
that Bodin refers to in this passage, concern situations where the very existence of the
commonwealth is threatened. In such cases, public interest must be preferred over the private,
and citizens must give up their private property in order to guarantee the safety and continuing
existence of the commonwealth.
The preceding passage is one among many where the sovereign prince is described by Bodin as
the earthly image of God, Gods lieutenant for commanding other men, or the person to
whom God has given power over us. It is from this principle regarding the inviolability of
private property that Bodin derives that new taxes may not be imposed upon citizens without
their consent.
three types of statethe Parlement representing aristocracy, the Estates General democracy, and
the King representing monarchy.
earliest formulations of the Quantity Theory of Money. In its most elementary form, the Quantity
Theory of Money is the affirmation that money supply directly affects price levels. Chapter Two
of the sixth book of the Rpublique is a lengthy discussion of the possible resources of the state.
There is a partial overlap between the two works since Bodin included certain passages of
theResponse in his Rpublique, and then incorporated them again in a revised form into the
second edition of theResponse.
income for the commonwealth. He writes that throughout history sovereign princes and their
citizens have taken it as a universal rule that the public domain should be holy, inviolable and
inalienable. The inalienability of the public domain is of the utmost importance, Bodin writes, in
order that princes should not bee forced to overcharge their subiects with imposts, or to seeke
any unlawfull meanes to forfeit their goods. The seventh method of raising revenue on Bodins
list is by levying taxes on the subject, but it may be used only when all other measures have
failed and the preservation of the commonwealth demands it.
Bodin considers the inalienability of the public domain, together with the Salic law, to be one of
the fundamental laws (Lat. leges imperii; Fr. loix royales) of the state. Like many of his
contemporaries, Bodin held that the levying of new taxes without consent was a violation of the
property rights of the individual, and, as such, contrary to the law of God and nature. He was
particularly firm in opposing new taxation without proper consent and sought confirmation for
his opinion in French and European history. One of the main differences between a legitimate
ruler and an illegitimate one concerns the question of how each treats the private property of
their subjects. Property rights are protected by the law of God and of nature, and therefore,
violation of the private property of citizens is a violation of the law of God and of nature. A
tyrant makes his subjects into his slaves, and treats their private property as if it were his own.
from many different places and of various confessions, all pray for the one God that they have
faith in. The storm calms down eventually and the ship is brought safely to port. When Octavius
had finished his story, Coronaeus asked the following question: Finally, with such a variety of
religions represented [on the ship], whose prayers did God heed in bringing the ship safely to
port?
The matter of true religion is discussed in the final three books of the Colloquium heptaplomeres.
True religion, Bodin holds, is tolerant of all religions, and accepts different ways to approach
God. Leathers Kuntz has observed that no religion is true whose point of view is not universal,
whose expression is not free, whose center does not reflect the intimate harmony of God and
nature (Bodin 2008, xliii). The same opinion is expressed in the Dmonomanie and in Bodins
letter to one Jean Bautru des Matras, an advocate working in Paris. In the latter, Bodin writes that
different opinions concerning religion must not lead you astray, as long as you understand that
true religion is nothing else than the turning of a purged soul toward true God.
develops. The point seems to be, however, that regardless of Bodins approval or disapproval of
the religious views represented in the dialogue, he constantly stresses the need for toleration of
all religions (Bodin 2008, xliv). It has also been suggested that Bodins opinions and views
regarding religious faith are so full of compromise that they ultimately amount to a sort of
natural religion. Finally, it has been suggested that Bodins writings on the topic of religion
transcended the narrow bounds of confessional religion (Bodin 1980, 1).
Although Bodins understanding of true religion as something profoundly personal, for which no
church was required, made him an unorthodox believer in the eyes of many, it seems
inconceivable that he should be considered an atheist (Bodin 2008, xxix). In fact, he considered
atheism to be extremely dangerous to the commonwealth, as the following passage from
the Rpublique (4, VII), discussing the difference between atheism and superstition, proves:
And truely they (in mine opinion) offend much, which thinke that the same punishment is to be
appointed for them that make many gods, and them that would have none at all: or that the
infinitie of gods admitted, the almightie and everliving God is thereby taken away. For that
superstition how great soever it be, doth yet hold men in feare and awe, both of the laws and of
the magistrats; as also in mutuall duties and offices one of them towards another: whereas mere
Atheisme doth utterly root out of mens minds all the feare of doing evill. (Bodin 1962, 539)
Bodins reasons for combating atheism in this passage concern the stability of the state: atheists
must not be tolerated in the commonwealth since they hold neither moral nor ethical issues
regarding breaking the laws of the state. But Bodin had another reason to detest atheism: atheists
are blasphemous because they deny the existence of God.
6. On Witchcraft
Bodins De la dmonomanie des sorciers (On the Demon-Mania of Witches) was first published
in 1580 in French, and soon translated into Latin (1581), German (1581) and Italian (1587).
Because of its wide distribution and numerous editions, historians have held it accountable for
prosecutions of witches during the years that followed its publication. Many readers have been
perplexed by the intolerant character of theDmonomanie. Bodin had a strong belief in the
existence of angels and demons, and believed that they served as intermediaries between God
and human beings; God intervenes directly in the world through the activity of angels and
demons. Demonism, together with atheism and any attempt to manipulate demonic forces
through witchcraft or natural magic, was treason against God and to be punished with extreme
severity. The principal reason, therefore, to punish someone of witchcraft is to appease the
anger of God, especially if the crime is directly against the majesty of God, as this one is.
Bodin was given the incentive to write the Dmonomanie after he took part in the proceedings
against a witch in April 1578. His objective in writing the Dmonomanie was to throw some
light on the subject of witches, which seems marvelously strange to everyone and unbelievable
to many. Furthermore, the work was to serve as a warning to all those who read it, in order to
make it clearly known that there are no crimes which are nearly so vile as this one, or which
deserve more serious penalties. Finally, he wished to respond to those who in printed books try
to save witches by every means, so that it seems Satan has inspired them and drawn them to his
line in order to publish these fine books (Bodin 2001, 35-7). Among these protectors of
witches, as Bodin qualified them, was a German Protestant by the name of Johann Weyer, who
considered witches to be delusional and excessively melancholic, and recommended physical
healing and religious instruction as a remedy to their condition, rather than corporal or capital
punishment. Bodin feared that this might lead judges to consider witches as mentally ill, and, as
a consequence, permit them to go without punishment.
The Dmonomanie is divided into four books. Book One begins with a set of definitions. Bodin
then discusses to what extent men may engage in the occult, and the differences between lawful
and unlawful means to accomplish things. He also discusses the powers of witches and their
practices: whether witches are able to transform men into beasts, induce or inspire in them
illnesses, or perhaps even bring about their death. The final book is a discussion concerning ways
to investigate and prosecute witches. Bodins severity and his rigorousness in condemning
witches and witchcraft is largely based on the contents of the final book of theDmonomanie.
Bodin lists three necessary and indisputable proofs upon which a sentence can be based: (1)
Truth of the acknowledged and concrete fact; (2) Testimony of several sound witnesses; and (3)
Voluntary confession of the person who is charged and convicted of the crime. Certain other
types of evidence, such as public reputation or forced confession, are not regarded by Bodin as
indisputable proofs, but simply as presumptions, or circumstantial evidence, concerning the
guilty nature of the person being charged. Presumptions may serve in the conviction and
sentencing of witches in cases where clear proof is lacking.
There are fifteen detestable crimes that witches may be guilty of, and even the least of them,
Bodin affirms, merits painful death. The death penalty, however, must only be sentenced by a
competent judge and based on solid proof that eliminates all possibility of error. In cases where
sufficient proof is wanting, where there are neither witnesses, nor confession, nor factual
evidence, and where only mere presumptions, even strong ones, exist, Bodin is opposed to a
death sentence: I do not recommend that because of strong presumptions one pass sentence of
death but any other penalty except death...One must be very sure of the truth to impose the
death sentence. Bodin may have considered witchcraft an insult against God, and as such
meriting the penalty of death, but he nevertheless believed in the rule of law, as in this other
passage where he unequivocally states that it is better to acquit the guilty than to condemn the
innocent (Bodin 2001, 209-210).
7. Natural Philosophy
The Universae naturae theatrum, which was published in the year of his death in 1596, may be
considered as the most systematic exposition of Bodins vision of the world. It remains the least
studied of his works and has never been translated into English. Bodin himself informs us that
the Theatrum was written in 1590. The French translation of the work (Le Thtre de la nature
universelle) was published in 1597.
Ever since the beginning of his career Bodin sought to methodologically study all things, human
and divine. He writes:
Of history, that is, the true narration of things, there are three kinds: human, natural, and divine.
The first concerns man; the second, nature; the third, the Father of nature. // So it shall come
about that from thinking first about ourselves, then about our family, then about our society we
are led to examine nature and finally to the true history of Immortal God, that is, to
contemplation. (Bodin 1945, 15-16)
The Theatrum is the culmination point of Bodins systematic examination of things, and as such
it is a deeply religious work. Bodin turns to the study of nature in order to better know God:
And indeed the Theater of Nature is nothing other than the contemplation of those things
founded by the immortal God as if a certain tablet were placed under the eyes of every single one
so that we may embrace and love the majesty of that very author, his goodness, wisdom, and
remarkable care in the greatest matters, in moderate affairs, in matters of the least importance
(Bodin 2008, xxx)
Bodin believed that the French civil wars were occasioned, at least partly, by Gods
dissatisfaction God was punishing the French for their growing irreligious sentiment.
The Theatrum has been described as an attack against those arrogant and ungodly philosophers,
or naturalists, who wish to explain everything without reference to the creator and father of all
things that is God. God is the author of all existing things, and the contemplation of nature brings
us closer to Him. Furthermore, contemplating nature makes us love God for the care and
goodness that he shows us.
The Theatrum has been written in a pseudo-dialogue form; it is a discussion between an
informant, Mystagogus, and his questioner Theorus. The work opens with a short overview of
the text, in which Bodin stresses the importance of order for the study of things. This gives him
the opportunity to criticize Aristotle, who failed to discuss things in the right order; simpler
things must be discussed before more complex ones, and therefore matters of physics should
have been discussed after metaphysical things. Arranging all the material that is being considered
in a convenient order simplest notions to be studied first, and difficult ones later is one of the
distinctive characteristics of the Ramist framework of knowledge, as McRae has observed
(McRae 1955, 8). McRae considers that, together with the Juris universi distributio,
Bodins Theatrum is perhaps the most thoroughly Ramist of any of his works. Bodins two
main objectives in the first book of theTheatrum are to prove that there is only one principle in
nature, that is, God, and, that it is He who has created this world and He who governs it.
Other topics that Bodin discusses in Book One include matter, form and the causes of things.
Furthermore, movement, generation, corruption and growth are considered, as well as things
related to them: time and place, void, finitude and infinitude. In Book Two, Bodin examines
elements, meteorites, rocks, metals and minerals. Book Three is a discussion on the subjects of
the nature of plants and animals. The fourth book contains Bodins doctrine concerning soul;
angels are also discussed in Book Four. The final book of theTheatrum discusses celestial bodies
their natural movement, the admirable harmony that exists between them, and the structure of
the heavens. The final book attests of Bodins enmity toward Copernicus heliocentric system
(Bodin 1596, 554 and especially 574-583); Bodin relies on the writings of Ptolemy, Aristotle,
and the Holy Scripture in combating Copernicus. He dismisses Copernicus hypothesis
concerning the heliocentric system on the grounds that it is contrary to the evidence of the
senses, to the authority of the Scriptures, and incompatible with Aristotelian physics.
According to a recent interpretation by Blair, Bodins objective in writing the Theatrum was first
and foremost to combat three impious propositions of ancient philosophy: (1) The eternity of the
world; (2) The necessity of the laws of nature; and (3) The mortality of the soul.
Against the Eternity of the World
One solution to the conflict between Aristotelian philosophy of the eternity of the world and the
Judeo-Christian account of creationGod has created the world, therefore it is not eternal, had
been proposed by Thomas Aquinas. He argued that human reason alone cannot establish whether
the world is eternal or not; the problem can be solved only by an appeal to faith and to biblical
authority. Bodins argument differs from that of Aquinas. Bodin offers a rational demonstration
based on arguments for an all-powerful God, who knows no necessity and has complete free
will. Several scholars have observed that Bodins emphasis on divine free will is characteristic
of Christian nominalists like Duns Scotus and of Jewish philosophers like Maimonides (Blair
1997, 118) The concluding syllogism for the voluntary first cause that is God is as follows:
Nothing can be eternal by nature whose first cause is voluntary; but the first cause of the world
is voluntary; therefore the world cannot be eternal by nature, since its state and condition depend
on the decision and free will of another. (Blair 1997, 118)
Against Natural Necessity
The second conclusion is drawn from the unlimited freedom of Gods will: not only is it
impossible that the world should be eternal, but furthermore it is arranged according to a divine
plan. According to Bodin, providential divine governance is twofold: ordinary providence, where
laws that govern nature under so-called normal circumstances are chosen by God, and
extraordinary providence, where God is able to suspend those laws at will at any time he
chooses, in order to intervene in the world (Blair 1997, 120). Bodin offers the following
explanation for the existence of apparently useless or evil features of nature. He begins by
claiming that everything in creation is good, and evil is simply the absence of good; this same
idea is repeated in theParadoxon. Then he attempts to illustrate, through various examples, that
even things that are apparently evil in nature serve a useful purpose in Gods good and wise
plan (Blair 1997, 122).
Immortality of the Soul
Bodins demonstration concerning the immortality of the soul is based on the souls intermediate
nature: the soul is both corporeal and immortal. Blair defines this particular demonstration as
possibly Bodins most noteworthy innovation and as a significant departure from the standard
or orthodox accounts [concerning the soul] (Blair 1997, 137; 142). In combating the mortality
of the soul, Blair writes, Bodin is reacting against all forms of impious philosophizing: against
Averroes for denying the personal immortality of the soul; against Pomponazzi for claiming that
philosophy shows the soul to be mortal; and against all those, like Pomponazzi or even Duns
Scotus, who deny the rational demonstrability of this central doctrine. But Bodin calls his
opponents only Epicureans, using the term to designate at first, generally, those who doubt the
immortality of the soul, then more specifically those who, barely above the level of brutes, take
pleasure and pain as the measure of good and evil and believe in the random distribution of
atoms. (Blair 1997, 138)
Bodins first argument in favor of the immortality of the soul is based on empirical evidence
concerning the ability of the soul to function independently of the body: during ecstatic
experiences, as these have been conveyed by many learned men, it has been reported that the
soul is able to hear, feel and understand while being temporarily transported outside the living
body. Two further demonstrations follow. First, Bodin affirms that extremes are always joined
by intermediates; passing from one extreme to another always necessitates passing through a
'middle' being and that there exists only two extremes in the world; (1) Form completely
separated from matter, meaning angels and demons, and (2) Form entirely concrete, inseparable
from matter, except by destruction, that is, natural bodies. Between these two extremes there
must necessarily exist some intermediate which joins the two. This intermediate is form
separable from matter, or, as Bodin states it, the soul. He concludes: if therefore the human soul
[mens] is separable from the dead body, it follows necessarily that it survives and carries out its
actions without the operation of the senses (Blair 1997, 139). Bodins final demonstration is as
follows:
Given the extremes, of which one is totally corruptible (natural elements or bodies) and one is
totally incorruptible (angels and demons), there must be an intermediate, which is corrupted in
one part of itself, but free from corruption in the other; but this is nothing other than man, who
participates in both natures: brute elements, plants, stones are far inferior to man in worth and
dignity, and since man alone associates with angels and demons, he alone can link the celestial to
the terrestrial, superior to inferior, immortal to mortal. (Blair 1997, 139)
Humans participate in both extremes and yet form an entity that is distinct from them. According
to the standard view, the corporeal body is connected with the incorporeal soul, but Bodins
demonstration is not built on this distinction because, for him, the soul is both
immortal and corporeal. As Blair has observed, for Bodin the human hypostasis mediates
between form separated from matter (disembodied souls and angels) and form fully embedded in
matter (as in all natural bodies), by virtue of its soul, which is corporeal, yet separable from the
material body (Blair 1997, 139-40). The following passage elucidates Bodins rather peculiar
demonstration:
The body of the soul is not material, but spiritual yet corporeal nonetheless: from which it
follows that human souls, angels and demons consist of the same corporeal nature, but not of
bone, nor of flesh, but of an invisible essence. Like air, or fire, or both, or of a celestial essence,
surpassing with its fineness the most subtle bodies: thus, even if we grant it is a spiritual body, it
is a body nonetheless. (Blair 1997, 140)
According to Blair, Bodin constructs a new type of natural philosophy that seeks to combine
religion with philosophy, a combination of philosophical research concerning causes with a
pious recognition of divine providence and the greatness of God.
Although Bodin often refers to Holy Scripture, he also constantly reminds us of the importance
of reason and reasoning so long as we do not infringe upon the limits of reason. Bodin uses
physics to serve religious ends and the fundamental principle behind Bodins strategy is the
Augustinian precept, later adopted by Aquinas in his synthesis of reason and faith, that truth is
one and that there is, indeed, unity of knowledge: a necessary agreement between philosophy and
religion exists, and therefore natural philosophy as a reasoned investigation can never contradict
true religion (Blair 1997, 143).
8. Other Works
a. Juris universi distributio
The Juris universi distributio (Fr. Expos du droit universel) was first published in 1578, but, as
the Dedicatory Epistle of the Methodus informs us, it already existed in manuscript form twelve
years earlier. Unlike later editions of the work that were published as books, the first edition of
the Distributio was in the form of a poster, measuring approximately 40 by 180 cm, to be hung
on the walls of universities.
Bodins objective in writing the Juris universi distributio was to arrive at a systematization of
universal law. He sought to realize this by the study of history, paired with a comparative method
which analyzes the different legal systems that either currently exist or have existed in the past.
Bodin uses the same method in his main political works, (Rpublique and Methodus), in which
comparative public law and its historical study permit Bodin to erect a theory of the state. Bodin
is interested in universal history, of which his Methodus is an example, in the same way that he
is interested in universal law, and it seems that the same type of historical and comparative
method may be used in discovering them.
According to Bodin, law is divided into two categories: natural (ius naturale) and human (ius
humanum). Bodin thus rejects the common threefold division based on the Digest natural law,
law of peoples and civil law because he considers dichotomy more convenient. The two
principal divisions of human law are ius civile (civil law) and ius gentium (law of peoples).
Bodin strongly criticizes law professors, or Romanists, for he writes that they have concentrated
almost exclusively on ius civile particularly the civil law of the Romans - and that, as a
consequence, the ius gentium has not been properly studied, and, therefore, has no proper
methodology. Bodins personal interest lies precisely in the ius gentium because it is concerned
with the universal laws that are common to all peoples. The methods of the Romanists are
inadequate for the study ofius gentium because the ius civile varies from state to state and no
universally valid truths can be derived from it; in this sense it is not even part of legal science. A
new critical method is therefore required; a method that is both historical and comparative.
Bodins system of universal law is a drastic rupture with the exegetical methods of the Middle
Ages. Medieval jurists applied Roman law to their own societies and saw no problem in doing
so. It is with the arrival of the so-called humanist scholars, in the sixteenth century, and their use
of the methods of classical philology, that the internal coherence and authority of the Corpus
juris civilis were challenged.
b. Moral Philosophy
Bodins Paradoxon quod nec virtus ulla in mediocritate nec summum hominis bonum in virtutis
actione consistere possit (Fr. Paradoxe de Jean Bodin quil ny a pas de vertu en mdiocrit ni
au milieu de deux vices) was first published in Latin in 1596, although Bodin had completed the
text in 1591. Two French translations were later published. Bodins own translation dates from
1596, but it remained unpublished until 1598. Bodins translation may be considered as a revised
version of the Latin text, rather than its simple translation. The Latin edition includes a preface
that does not exist in the French version.
The Paradoxon has been written in dialogue form, and is a discussion between a father and a
son. During the course of the dialogue, the son repeatedly refers to the authority of Aristotle. His
opinions are often refuted by the father, who refers to the writings of Plato and to the Holy
Scripture. The term paradox in the title refers to the fact that Bodin acknowledges his views to
be in contradiction with the moral opinions that were generally accepted in his day especially
concerning the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean.
The work opens with a discussion concerning the question of good and evil and that of divine
justice. This is followed by an outline of the basic structure of Bodins moral philosophy: God is
the sovereign good, or, that which is the most useful and the most necessary to every
imaginable creature. He is also the source of all other things that are good. Evil is defined as the
privation of good a definition that Bodin traces to St. Augustine. The same definition is found
in the Theatrum, where it is used to support the argument that everything in Creation is good
God has not created anything evil (Blair 1997, 122). The good of man and a contented life are
discussed, followed by a discussion concerning particular virtues and vices, as well as their
origins. Bodin refutes Aristotles doctrine of the mean. Discussion concerning moral and
intellectual virtues follows. Bodin then examines prudence; he then claims that prudence alone
helps us choose between good and evil. The final section discusses wisdom and the love of God.
The father affirms that wisdom is found in the fear of offending God. Fear of God is inseparable
from love of God together they form the basis of wisdom.
c. Writings on Education
Bodin wrote or compiled four works where he discusses the education of children: The Address
to the Senate and People of Toulouse on the Education of Youth in the Commonwealth, Eptre
son neveu, Sapientia moralis epitome, and Consilium de institutione principis aut alius nobilioris
ingenii. The earliest of them, theOratio, is a discourse that was given in Toulouse in 1559, and
published the same year. The three other works date from a later period; the Eptre is a letter
written to Bodins nephew, dated November 1586, and theEpitome was first published in 1588.
Evidence within the Consilia suggests that it was written sometime between 1574 and 1586,
although it remained unpublished until 1602.
Address to the Senate and People of Toulouse on the Education of Youth in the
Commonwealth
Bodins Oratio de instituenda in repub. juventute ad senatum populumque tolosatem (Fr. Le
discours au snat et au peuple de Toulouse sur lducation donner aux jeunes gens dans la
rpublique) is the most valuable single document that informs us of Bodins stay in Toulouse in
the 1550's. Furthermore, it is Bodins earliest surviving work on education and contains a
detailed portrayal of the humanist ideal that Bodin embraced during this period.
Nothing is more salutary to a city than to have those who shall one day rule the nation be
educated according to virtue and science. It is only by providing youth with proper education and
intellectual and moral culture that the glory of France, and that of its cities could be preserved.
Art and science are the auxiliaries of virtue, and one cannot conceive of living much less
leading a happy life without them. Bodin urges the people of Toulouse to participate in the
movement of the Renaissance. The town is well-known for its faculty of law, and he argues that
the study of humanities and belles-lettres should also be appended to the study of law.
In Bodin's time, the children of Toulouse were either given a public education in which case
they were most often sent to Paris or taught privately, in domicile. While both systems have
their inconveniences, Bodin considers that public schooling must be favored. In order to prevent
children from being sent to Paris to be educated, however, a collge must be built in Toulouse
and the children of Toulouse should be educated in their own hometown. Bodin proposes that all
children including gifted children belonging to the poorest classes be sent to public schools
where they shall be taught according to the official method.
Eptre de Jean Bodin touchant linstitution de ses enfants son neveu
This short work is Bodins response in the form of a letter dated November 9, 1586, to his
nephews enquiry concerning the education of children. Bodins nephew had welcomed a
newborn son to his family, and had turned to Bodin for advice on how to give him a proper
education. Bodins advice came in the form of a description of how he taught his own children
when they were three and four years old.
Bodin began by teaching his children the Latin names of things. Having observed that they have
a good memory and necessary mental capacities, Bodin asked them to repeat more abstract
words, and began informing them about such things as how old the world is (5,534 years), how
many planets there are, and the names of these planets. He taught them the names of body parts,
what senses we have, the virtues and vices, and so forth. Knowledge of different things was
acquired by a continuous daily exercise. Soon after, Bodin had his children interrogate each
other, thus allowing himself to retire from this task. The study of Latin grammar soon followed,
as well as the study of moral sentences in both French and Latin. The children would then begin
the study of arithmetic and geometry. This was followed by the translation of Ciceros writings
from Latin to French.
Sapientia moralis epitome
The Sapientia moralis epitome was published in Paris in 1588. It consists of 210 moral maxims
that have been arranged into groups of seven sentences. Each group is a discussion upon a
common topic: youth and education, nature, truth and opinion, virtue, war, liberty, marriage, etc.
The majority of the maxims are Bodins own formulations of ideas expressed by Ovid, Horace,
Juvenale and Lucretius.
Consilium de institutione principis
Bodins Consilium de institutione principis was first published in 1602 as part of a compilation
entitledConsilia Iohannis Bodini Galli et Fausti Longiani Itali de principe recte instituendo.
Although the determination of a precise date seems impossible, evidence within the work
suggests that Bodin composed it sometime between 1574 and 1586.
The Consilium is a collection of precepts for the young princes of the Saxon court. The content
of theConsilium is in many ways identical to the views that were expressed in the Eptre,
although the Consilium is more detailed. Young princes are to be taught in small groups, and
their eating and sleeping habits are to be observed, so that they remain alert and in good health.
Bodin particularly recommends the study of two texts: Peter Ramus Dialectica, and Pibrac du
FaursQuatrains. The education of the princes is to be completed by the study of law and the art
of government. Knowledge of practical matters should be acquired by studying the state of
the republica and its offices and the laws, customs and natures of various peoples. Knowledge
in practical matters is necessary in order to acquire prudence. According to Bodin, only a prudent
prince is worthy of his people (Rose 1980, 57-58).
reasons that made him a supporter of the Catholic League. A couple of letters from the
correspondence between Bodin and Walsingham, dating from 1582, have also survived.
9. Influence
As the works numerous editions and translations attest, Bodins Rpublique was widely read in
Europe after its publication, up until the mid-seventeenth century. It was subsequently forgotten,
however, and Bodins influence during the eighteenth century was only marginal. It was not until
the twentieth century that his works, slowly, but decisively, began to interest scholars again.
Growing interest in his works has assured Bodin the place he deserves among the most important
political thinkers of the sixteenth century. New translations and modern editions of his works
have made his ideas accessible to wider audiences.
Among Bodins best-known ideas is the Theory of Climate that is currently most often
associated with another French philosopher, Montesquieu (1689-1755). Bodins comparative and
empirical approach in the fields of historical methodology, jurisprudence, and religion
represented a break with medieval traditions. He was among the most influential legal
philosophers of his time, and his Colloquium heptaplomeres is one of the earliest works of
comparative religious studies. Bodins ideas concerning religious tolerance and the abolition of
slavery found an echo among European writers of both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Although the Colloquium heptaplomeres remained unpublished until the 1840s, scholars were
familiar with its ideas due to manuscript copies that circulated in Europe. The numerous editions
of his Dmonomanie, on the other hand, testify to an interest previously demonstrated toward his
ideas regarding witchcraft. Finally, BodinsResponse to the Paradoxes of Malestroit includes one
of the earliest formulations of the Quantity Theory of Money.
In political theory, Bodins most influential contribution remains his Theory of Sovereignty, and
the conceptualization of sovereign power. A majority of scholars have labeled Bodin as an
absolutist. For others, he favored a type of constitutionalism. Still others have observed that he
shifted from the perceived constitutionalism of his early writings toward a more absolutist theory
in the Rpublique. His writings were received in various ways in different parts of Europe, and
interpretations regarding them were often contradictory depending on the country. His Theory
of Sovereignty was used by royalists and parliamentarians alike to defend their widely differing
opinions. In France, for example, his political theory was largely absorbed into the absolutist
movement and the doctrine of the divine right of kings that became highly influential soon after
Bodins death; one needs only to think of Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIV. For example,
Jacques-Bnigne Bossuet (1627-1704), who was tutor to the oldest son of Louis XIV, argued in
favor of an absolute hereditary monarchy from Scriptural sources in his Politics Drawn from the
Very Words of Holy Scripture (Politique tire des propres paroles de l'criture sainte). Other
French writers who incorporated absolutist elements from Bodins theory in their own writings
are Pierre Grgoire de Toulouse (c. 1540-1597), Charles Loyseau (1566-1627), and Cardin Le
Bret (1558-1655).
The term monarchomachs (Fr., monarchomaques) denotes the writers Protestants or
Catholics who opposed the powers of the monarch. The term was first coined by the Scottish
jurist and royalist William Barclay (1546-1608) in his De Regno et Regali Potestate (1600).
Similar to what Bodin had done in hisRpublique, Barclay defended the rights of kings. Giovanni
Botero (1544-1617) was one of the earliest writers to have used the expression reason of state
(Fr., Raison dtat) in his work Della ragion di Stato (1589). Bodins political writings may have
been one of the sources used by Botero and his followers.
In Germany, Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) adopted Bodins theory of sovereignty in
his Politica methodice digesta (1603), but argued that the community is always sovereign. In this
sense, every commonwealth no matter what its form may be is popular. Dutch jurist Hugo
Grotius published his renowned De jure belli ac pacis in 1625; Grotius does not conceal his
admiration for Bodin, nor for the method used by French writers that consisted of combining the
study of history with the study of law.
Bodins Rpublique was among the works that introduced the idea of legislative sovereignty in
England. His considerable influence upon Elizabethan and Jacobean political thought in
England, one scholar has observed, was largely due to his precise definition of sovereignty.
Among the political writers who defended the powers of the king, Sir Robert Filmer (c. 15881653) drew heavily upon Bodins writings. One shorter text, in particular, The Necessity of the
Absolute Power of all Kings and in particular of the King of England, published in 1648, is
hardly anything more than a collection of ideas expressed in the Rpublique. John Lockes First
Treatise of Government (1689) may, therefore, be considered not only a refutation of Filmers
political ideas, but also a critical commentary upon Bodins political theory. Thomas Hobbes, in
his The Elements of Law (1640), cites Bodin by name and approves Bodins opinion according to
which sovereign power in the commonwealth may not be divided (II.8.7. Of the Causes of
Rebellion). This principle of indivisible sovereign power is also expressed in Hobbes later
political works De cive (1642) and Leviathan(1651).
a. Primary Sources
Oppiani De venatione (1555)
Oratio de instituenda iuventute (1559)
Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem (1566)
La rponse aux paradoxes de Malestroit (1568)
La harangue de Messire Charles des Cars (1573)
Les Six Livres de la Rpublique (1576; all references in this article are to the edition of 1583)
Apologie de Rne Herpin pour la Rpublique (before 1581)
Recueil de tout ce qui sest ngoci en la compagnie du tiers tat (1577)
Juris universi distributio (1578)
De la dmonomanie des sorciers (1580)
De republica libri sex (1586)
Sapientiae moralis epitome (1588)
Paradoxon (1596)
Universae naturae theatrum (1596)
Consilia de principe recte instituendo (1602)
Colloquium heptaplomeres (1841)
Eptre de Jean Bodin touchant linstitution de ses Enfans de 1586 (1841)
1. Collected Works
Bodin, Jean. Oeuvres philosophiques de Jean Bodin. Ed. Pierre Mesnard. Trans. Pierre Mesnard. Paris: PUF,
1951.
Includes the following Latin works, together with their French translations: Oratio de
instituenda in repub. juventute ad senatum populumque tolosatem, Juris universi distributio,
and Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem.
Bodin, Jean. Selected Writings on Philosophy, Religion and Politics. Ed. Paul L. Rose. Genve: Droz, 1980.
Includes the following seven works: Bodins letter to his nephew (1586), Consilium de
institutione principis (1574-86), Sapientia moralis epitome (1588), Latin dedicatory letter to
the Paradoxon quod nec virtus ulla in mediocritate nec summum hominis bonum in virtutis actione
consistere possit (1596) and the French translation of the text, Le Paradoxe de Jean Bodin
Angevin (1598), Bodins letter to Jean Bautru des Matras (1560s), as well as a letter to a friend in which
he gives reasons for supporting the Catholic League (1590).
2. Individual Works
Bodin, Jean. Method for the Easy Comprehension of History. Trans. Beatrice Reynolds. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1945.
Bodin, Jean. Six Books of the Commonwealth. Abr. ed. Trans. Marian J. Tooley. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1955.
Bodin, Jean. The Six Bookes of a Commonweal. Trans. Richard Knolles. Ed. Kenneth Douglas McRae.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
This is the only existing full English translation of the work; facsimile reprint of Knolles
English translation of 1606 that compares the French and Latin versions of the text. McRaes introductory
material discusses Bodins life, his career and his influence.
Bodin, Jean. Address to the Senate and People of Toulouse on Education of Youth in the Commonwealth.
Trans. George Albert Moore. Chevy Chase, Md: Country Dollar Press, 1965.
Bodin, Jean. Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime. Trans. Marion Leathers Kuntz. Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1975. Second edition. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 2008.
material.
First complete modern translation of the work, together with highly informative introductory
Bodin, Jean. On Sovereignty. Trans. Julian H. Franklin. Ed. Julian H. Franklin. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992.
Contains chapters 8 and 10 of the First book, and chapters 1 and 5 of the Second book of
the Rpublique. Concentrates on Bodins analysis of sovereignty. Franklins textual notes are informative.
Bodin, Jean. Response to the Paradoxes of Malestroit. Trans. Henry Tudor. Eds. Henry Tudor and R. W.
Dyson. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 1997.
Most recent English translation of the text, it is based on the first edition of the work, but
also included are the major changes that occurred between the first (1568) and second (1578) editions.
Includes a concise and useful introduction.
Bodin, Jean. On the Demon-Mania of Witches. Abr. ed. Trans. Randy A. Scott and Jonathan L. Pearl.
Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2001.
Abridged translation of Bodins Dmonomanie that contains about two-thirds of the original
text and informative notes.
b. Secondary Sources
Blair, Ann. The Theater of Nature. Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1997.
Indispensable study concerning the methods and practices of Renaissance science in the
light of Bodins Theatrum.
Brown, John L. The Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem of Jean Bodin. Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1939. Reprint. New York: AMS Press, 1969.
Central study that analyses the background and influence of Bodins Methodus. Brown
establishes that Bodins earlier work contains many of the political and legal principles that were further
developed in the Rpublique.
Franklin, Julian H. Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1973.
Heller, Henry. Bodin on Slavery and Primitive Accumulation. The Sixteenth Century Journal 25.1 (1994):
53-65.
Argues that Bodin conceived of slavery not only as something irrational and unnatural, but
as a permanent threat to the stability of the state.
McRae, Kenneth D. Ramist Tendencies in the Thought of Jean Bodin. Journal of the History of Ideas 16.3
(1955): 306-323.
Argues that several of Bodins writings reveal the influence of Ramist concepts; even
the Rpublique (in which the Ramist influence is less evident) can be described as Ramist in its structure.
OBrien, Denis P. Bodins Analysis of Inflation. History of Political Economy 32.2 (2000): 267-292.
A longer version of the introduction that OBrien wrote to the 1997 edition of
Bodins Response. Argues that Bodin should be regarded as the pioneer formulator of the quantity theory
of money.
Pearl, Jonathan L. Humanism and Satanism: Jean Bodins Contribution to the Witchcraft Crisis. Canadian
Review of Sociology and Anthropology 19.4 (1982): 541-548.
On Bodins influence on the witchcraft crisis. Pearl reminds us that the Renaissance
witnessed, not only a revival of the arts and the birth of modern science, but also the re-appearance of
the occult: magic, astrology and witchcraft.
Remer, Gary. Dialogues of Toleration: Erasmus and Bodin. Review of Politics 56.2 (1994): 305-336.
Examines two different types of dialogues of toleration; Erasmus' common truth and
Bodin's subjective. Erasmus traditional conception aims at the discovery of truth in religious questions;
Bodins conception, on the contrary, does not presuppose that a common truth may be discovered, since
every opinion is one part of the truth.
Rose, Paul Lawrence. Bodin and the Great God of Nature. The Moral and Religious Universe of a Judaiser.
Genve: Droz, 1980.
A valuable study concerning Bodins ideas on religion and ethics; many of Bodins lessknown works are considered. Rose argues that Bodin went through three religious conversions in his
lifetime.
Salmon, John Hearsey McMillan. The Legacy of Jean Bodin: Absolutism, Populism or
Constitutionalism? The History of Political Thought 17. Thorverton (1996): 500-522.
Discusses the ways in which Bodins ideas were understood and transformed in Frances
neighboring countries during the seventeenth century.
Tooley, Marian J. Bodin and the Mediaeval Theory of Climate. Speculum 28.1 (1953): 64-83.
Ulph, Owen. Jean Bodin and the Estates-General of 1576. Journal of Modern History 19.4 (1947): 289296.
Examines Bodins role, as deputy from the bailiwick of Vermandois, during the estatesgeneral at Blois in 1576.
Wolfe, Martin. Jean Bodin on Taxes: The Sovereignty-Taxes Paradox. Political Science Quarterly 83.2
(1968): 268-284.
Argues that Bodins main objective in writing about taxes was to push for reform in Frances
fiscal system.
i. Bibliography
Couzinet, Marie-Dominique, ed. Jean Bodin. Roma: Memini, 2001.
Indispensable for conducting serious research on Bodin. Contains references to over 1,500
articles, books and other documents.
Denzer, Horst, ed. Jean Bodin Proceedings of the International Conference on Bodin in Munich. Mnchen:
C.H. Beck, 1973.
Fine collection of twenty-four articles (in English, French and German) by the foremost
Bodin scholars. Part II contains discussions, and part III an exhaustive bibliography on Bodin from the
year 1800 onwards.
Author Information
Tommi Lindfors
Email: tommi.lindfors@helsinki.fi
University of Helsinki
Finland
Renaissance Philosophy
The Renaissance, that is, the period that extends roughly from the middle of the fourteenth
century to the beginning of the seventeen century, was a time of intense, all-encompassing, and,
in many ways, distinctive philosophical activity. A fundamental assumption of the Renaissance
movement was that the remains of classical antiquity constituted an invaluable source of
excellence to which debased and decadent modern times could turn in order to repair the damage
brought about since the fall of the Roman Empire. It was often assumed that God had given a
single unified truth to humanity and that the works of ancient philosophers had preserved part of
this original deposit of divine wisdom. This idea not only laid the foundation for a scholarly
culture that was centered on ancient texts and their interpretation, but also fostered an approach
to textual interpretation that strove to harmonize and reconcile divergent philosophical accounts.
Stimulated by newly available texts, one of the most important hallmarks of Renaissance
philosophy is the increased interest in primary sources of Greek and Roman thought, which were
previously unknown or little read. The renewed study of Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism,
and Skepticism eroded faith in the universal truth of Aristotelian philosophy and widened the
philosophical horizon, providing a rich seedbed from which modern science and modern
philosophy gradually emerged.
Table of Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Aristotelianism
Humanism
Platonism
Hellenistic Philosophies
New Philosophies of Nature
References and Further Reading
1. Aristotelianism
Improved access to a great deal of previously unknown literature from ancient Greece and Rome
was an important aspect of Renaissance philosophy. The renewed study of Aristotle, however,
was not so much because of the rediscovery of unknown texts, but because of a renewed interest
in texts long translated into Latin but little studied, such as the Poetics, and especially because of
novel approaches to well-known texts. From the early fifteenth century onwards, humanists
devoted considerable time and energy to making Aristotelian texts clearer and more precise. In
order to rediscover the meaning of Aristotles thought, they updated the Scholastic translations of
his works, read them in the original Greek, and analyzed them with philological techniques. The
availability of these new interpretative tools had a great impact on the philosophical debate.
Moreover, in the four decades after 1490, the Aristotelian interpretations of Alexander of
Aphrodisias, Themistius, Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius, and other Greek commentators
were added to the views of Arabic and medieval commentators, stimulating new solutions to
Aristotelian problems and leading to a wide variety of interpretations of Aristotle in the
Renaissance period.
The most powerful tradition, at least in Italy, was that which took Averroess works as the best
key for determining the true mind of Aristotle. Averroess name was primarily associated with
the doctrine of the unity of the intellect. Among the defenders of his theory that there is only one
intellect for all human beings, we find Paul of Venice (d. 1429), who is regarded as the founding
figure of Renaissance Averroism, and Alessandro Achillini (14631512), as well as the Jewish
philosopher Elijah del Medigo (14581493). Two other Renaissance Aristotelians who expended
much of their philosophical energies on explicating the texts of Averroes are Nicoletto Vernia (d.
1499) and Agostino Nifo (c. 14691538). They are noteworthy characters in the Renaissance
controversy about the immortality of the soul mainly because of the remarkable shift that can be
discerned in their thought. Initially they were defenders of Averroess theory of the unity of the
intellect, but from loyal followers of Averroes as a guide to Aristotle, they became careful
students of the Greek commentators, and in their late thought both Vernia and Nifo attacked
Averroes as a misleading interpreter of Aristotle, believing that personal immortality could be
philosophically demonstrated.
Many Renaissance Aristotelians read Aristotle for scientific or secular reasons, with no direct
interest in religious or theological questions. Pietro Pomponazzi (14621525), one of the most
important and influential Aristotelian philosophers of the Renaissance, developed his views
entirely within the framework of natural philosophy. In De immortalitate animae (Treatise on the
Immortality of the Soul, 1516), arguing from the Aristotelian text, Pomponazzi maintained that
proof of the intellects ability to survive the death of the body must be found in an activity of the
intellect that functions without any dependence on the body. In his view, no such activity can be
found because the highest activity of the intellect, the attainment of universals in cognition, is
always mediated by sense impression. Therefore, based solely on philosophical premises and
Aristotelian principles, the conclusion is that the entire soul dies with the body. Pomponazzis
treatise aroused violent opposition and led to a spate of books being written against him. In 1520,
he completed De naturalium effectuum causis sive de incantationibus (On the Causes of Natural
Effects or On Incantations), whose main target was the popular belief that miracles are produced
by angels and demons. He excluded supernatural explanations from the domain of nature by
establishing that it is possible to explain those extraordinary events commonly regarded as
miracles in terms of a concatenation of natural causes. Another substantial work is De fato, de
libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione (Five Books on Fate, Free Will and Predestination), which
is regarded as one of the most important works on the problems of freedom and determinism in
the Renaissance. Pomponazzi considers whether the human will can be free, and he considers the
conflicting points of view of philosophical determinism and Christian theology.
Another philosopher who tried to keep Aristotles authority independent of theology and subject
to rational criticism, is Jacopo Zabarella (15331589), who produced an extensive body of work
on the nature of logic and scientific method. His goal was the retrieval of the genuine
Aristotelian concepts of science and scientific method, which he understood as the indisputable
demonstration of the nature and constitutive principles of natural beings. He developed the
method of regressus, a combination of the deductive procedures of composition and the
inductive procedures of resolution that came to be regarded as the proper method for obtaining
knowledge in the theoretical sciences. Among his main works are the collected logical
works Opera logica (1578), which are mainly devoted to the theory of demonstration, and his
major work on natural philosophy, De rebus naturalibus (1590). Zabarellas work was
instrumental in a renewal of natural philosophy, methodology, and theory of knowledge.
There were also forms of Aristotelian philosophy with strong confessional ties, such as the
branch of Scholasticism that developed on the Iberian Peninsula during the sixteenth century.
This current of Hispanic Scholastic philosophy began with the Dominican School founded in
Salamanca by Francisco de Vitoria (14921546) and continued with the philosophy of the newly
founded Society of Jesus, among whose defining authorities were Pedro da Fonseca (1528
1599), Francisco de Toledo (15331596), and Francisco Surez (15481617). Their most
important writings were in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of law. They played a key
role in the elaboration of the law of nations (jus gentium) and the theory of just war, a debate that
began with Vitorias Relectio de iure belli (A Re-lecture of the Right of War, 1539) and
continued with the writings of Domingo de Soto (14941560), Surez, and many others. In the
field of metaphysics, the most important work is Surez Disputationes
metaphysicae (Metaphysical Disputations, 1597), a systematic presentation of philosophy
against the background of Christian principlesthat set the standard for philosophical and
theological teaching for almost two centuries.
2. Humanism
The humanist movement did not eliminate older approaches to philosophy, but contributed to
change them in important ways, providing new information and new methods to the field.
Humanists called for a radical change of philosophy and uncovered older texts that multiplied
and hardened current philosophical discord. Some of the most salient features of humanist
reform are the accurate study of texts in the original languages, the preference for ancient authors
and commentators over medieval ones, and the avoidance of technical language in the interest of
moral suasion and accessibility. Humanists stressed moral philosophy as the branch of
philosophical studies that best met their needs. They addressed a general audience in an
accessible manner and aimed to bring about an increase in public and private virtue. Regarding
philosophy as a discipline allied to history, rhetoric, and philology, they expressed little interest
in metaphysical or epistemological questions. Logic was subordinated to rhetoric and reshaped to
serve the purposes of persuasion.
One of the seminal figures of the humanist movement was Francesco Petrarca (13041374).
In De sui ipsius et multorum aliorum ignorantia (On His Own Ignorance and That of Many
Others), he elaborated what was to become the standard critique of Scholastic philosophy. One
of his main objections to Scholastic Aristotelianism is that it is useless and ineffective in
achieving the good life. Moreover, to cling to a single authority when all authorities are
unreliable is simply foolish. He especially attacked, as opponents of Christianity, Aristotles
commentator Averroes and contemporary Aristotelians that agreed with him. Petrarca returned to
a conception of philosophy rooted in the classical tradition, and from his time onward, when
professional humanists took interest in philosophy, they nearly always concerned themselves
with ethical questions. Among those he influenced were Coluccio Salutati (13311406),
Leonardo Bruni (c.13701444) and Poggio Bracciolini (13801459), all of whom promoted
humanistic learning in distinctive ways.
One of the most original and important humanists of the Quattrocento was Lorenzo Valla (1406
1457). His most influential writing was Elegantiae linguae Latinae (Elegances of the Latin
Language), a handbook of Latin language and style. He is also famous for having demonstrated,
on the basis of linguistic and historical evidence, that the so-called Donation of Constantine, on
which the secular rule of the papacy was based, was an early medieval forgery. His main
philosophical work is Repastinatio dialecticae et
philosophiae(Reploughing of Dialectic and Philosophy), an attack on major tenets of Aristotelian
philosophy. The first book deals with the criticism of fundamental notions of metaphysics,
ethics, and natural philosophy, while the remaining two books are devoted to dialectics.
Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, humanists were unanimous in their
condemnation of university education and their contempt for Scholastic logic. Humanists such as
Valla and Rudolph Agricola (14431485), whose main work is De inventione dialectica (On
Dialectical Invention, 1479), set about to replace the Scholastic curriculum, based on syllogism
and disputation, with a treatment of logic oriented toward the use of persuasion and topics, a
technique of verbal association aiming at the invention and organization of material for
arguments. According to Valla and Agricola, language is primarily a vehicle for communication
and debate, and consequently arguments should be evaluated in terms of how effective and
useful they are rather than in terms of formal validity. Accordingly, they subsumed the study of
the Aristotelian theory of inference under a broader range of forms of argumentation. This
approach was taken up and developed in various directions by later humanists, such as Mario
Nizolio (14881567), Juan Luis Vives (14931540), and Petrus Ramus (15151572).
Vives was a Spanish-born humanist who spent the greater part of his life in the Low Countries.
He aspired to replace the Scholastic tradition in all fields of learning with a humanist curriculum
inspired by education in the classics. In 1519, he published In Pseudodialecticos (Against the
Pseudodialecticians), a satirical diatribe against Scholastic logic in which he voices his
opposition on several counts. A detailed criticism can be found in De disciplinis (On the
Disciplines, 1531), an encyclopedic work divided into three parts: De causis corruptarum
artium (On the Causes of the Corruption of the Arts), a collection of seven books devoted to a
thorough critique of the foundations of contemporary education; De tradendis disciplinis (On
Handing Down the Disciplines), five books where Vivess educational reform is outlined;
and De artibus (On the Arts), five shorter treatises that deal mainly with logic and metaphysics.
Another area in which Vives enjoyed considerable success was psychology. His reflections on
the human soul are mainly concentrated in De anima et vita (On the Soul and Life, 1538), a study
of the soul and its interaction with the body, which also contains a penetrating analysis of the
emotions.
Ramus was another humanist who criticized the shortcomings of contemporary teaching and
advocated a humanist reform of the arts curriculum. His textbooks were the best sellers of their
day and were very influential in Protestant universities in the later sixteenth century. In 1543, he
published Dialecticae partitiones (The Structure of Dialectic), which in its second edition was
called Dialecticae institutiones(Training in Dialectic), and Aristotelicae
animadversions (Remarks on Aristotle). These works gained him a reputation as a virulent
opponent of Aristotelian philosophy. He considered his own dialectics, consisting of invention
and judgment, to be applicable to all areas of knowledge, and he emphasised the need for
learning to be comprehensible and useful, with a particular stress on the practical aspects of
mathematics. His own reformed system of logic reached its definitive form with the publication
of the third edition of Dialectique(1555).
Humanism also supported Christian reform. The most important Christian humanist was the
Dutch scholar Desiderius Erasmus (c.14661536). He was hostile to Scholasticism, which he did
not consider a proper basis for Christian life, and put his erudition at the service of religion by
promoting learned piety (docta pietas). In 1503, he published Enchiridion militis
christiani (Handbook of the Christian Soldier), a guide to the Christian life addressed to laymen
in need of spiritual guidance, in which he developed the concept of a philosophia Christi. His
most famous work is Moriae encomium (The Praise of Folly), a satirical monologue first
published in 1511 that touches upon a variety of social, political, intellectual, and religious
issues. In 1524, he published De libero arbitrio (On Free Will), an open attack a one central
doctrine of Martin Luthers theology: that the human will is enslaved by sin. Erasmuss analysis
hinges on the interpretation of relevant biblical and patristic passages and reaches the conclusion
that the human will is extremely weak, but able, with the help of divine grace, to choose the path
of salvation.
Humanism also had an impact of overwhelming importance on the development of political
thought. WithInstitutio principis christiani (The Education of a Christian Prince, 1516), Erasmus
contributed to the popular genre of humanist advice books for princes. These manuals dealt with
the proper ends of government and how best to attain them. Among humanists of the fourteenth
century, the most usual proposal was that a strong monarchy should be the best form of
government. Petrarca, in his account of princely government that was written in 1373 and took
the form of a letter to Francesco da Carrara, argued that cities ought to be governed by princes
who accept their office reluctantly and who pursue glory through virtuous actions. His views
were repeated in quite a few of the numerous mirror for princes (speculum principis)
composed during the course of the fifteenth century, such as Giovanni Pontanos De
principe (On the Prince, 1468) and Bartolomeo Sacchis De principe (On the Prince, 1471).
Several authors exploited the tensions within the genre of mirror for princes in order to defend
popular regimes. In Laudatio florentinae urbis (Panegyric of the City of Florence), Bruni
maintained that justice can only be assured by a republican constitution. In his view, cities must
be governed according to justice if they are to become glorious, and justice is impossible without
liberty.
The most important text to challenge the assumptions of princely humanism, however, was Il
principe (The Prince), written by the Florentine Niccol Machiavelli (14691527) in 1513, but
not published until 1532. A fundamental belief among the humanists was that a ruler needs to
cultivate a number of qualities, such as justice and other moral values, in order to acquire
honour, glory, and fame. Machiavelli deviated from this view claiming that justice has no
decisive place in politics. It is the rulers prerogative to decide when to dispense violence and
practice deception, no matter how wicked or immoral, as long as the peace of the city is
maintained and his share of glory maximized. Machiavelli did not hold that princely regimes
were superior to all others. In his less famous, but equally influential, Discorsi sopra la prima
deca di Tito Livio (Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, 1531), he offers a defense of
popular liberty and republican government that takes the ancient republic of Rome as its model.
3. Platonism
During the Renaissance, it gradually became possible to take a broader view of philosophy than
the traditional Peripatetic framework permitted. No ancient revival had more impact on the
history of philosophy than the recovery of Platonism. The rich doctrinal content and formal
elegance of Platonism made it a plausible competitor of the Peripatetic tradition. Renaissance
Platonism was a product of humanism and marked a sharper break with medieval philosophy.
Many Christians found Platonic philosophy safer and more attractive than Aristotelianism.
The Neoplatonic conception of philosophy as a way toward union with God supplied many
Renaissance Platonists with some of their richest inspiration. The Platonic dialogues were not
seen as profane texts to be understood literally, but as sacred mysteries to be deciphered.
Platonism was brought to Italy by the Byzantine scholar George Gemistos Plethon (c.1360
1454), who, during the Council of Florence in 1439, gave a series of lectures that he later
reshaped as De differentiis Aristotelis et Platonis (The Differences between Aristotle and Plato).
This work, which compared the doctrines of the two philosophers (to Aristotles great
disadvantage), initiated a controversy regarding the relative superiority of Plato and Aristotle. In
the treatise In calumniatorem Platonis (Against the Calumniator of Plato), Cardinal Bessarion
(14031472) defended Plethon against the charge levelled against his philosophy by the
Aristotelian George of Trebizond (13961472), who in Comparatio philosophorum Aristotelis et
Platonis (A Comparison of the Philosophers Aristotle and Plato) had maintained that Platonism
was unchristian and actually a new religion.
The most important Renaissance Platonist was Marsilio Ficino (14331499), who translated
Platos works into Latin and wrote commentaries on several of them. He also translated and
commented on Plotinuss Enneadsand translated treatises and commentaries by Porphyry,
Iamblichus, Proclus, Synesius, and other Neoplatonists. He considered Plato as part of a long
tradition of ancient theology (prisca theologia) that was inaugurated by Hermes and Zoroaster,
culminated with Plato, and continued with Plotinus and the other Neoplatonists. Like the ancient
Neoplatonists, Ficino assimilated Aristotelian physics and metaphysics and adapted them to
Platonic purposes. In his main philosophical treatise, Theologia Platonica de immortalitate
animorum (Platonic Theology on the Immortality of Souls, 1482), he put forward his synthesis of
Platonism and Christianity as a new theology and metaphysics, which, unlike that of many
Scholastics, was explicitly opposed to Averroist secularism. Another work that became very
popular was De vita libri tres (Three Books on Life, 1489) by Ficino; it deals with the health of
professional scholars and presents a philosophical theory of natural magic.
One of Ficinos most distinguished associates was Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (14631494).
He is best known as the author of the celebrated Oratio de hominis dignitate (Oration on the
Dignity of Man), which is often regarded as the manifesto of the new Renaissance thinking, but
he also wrote several other prominent works. They include Disputationes adversus astrologiam
divinatricem (Disputations against Divinatory Astrology), an influential diatribe
against astrology; De ente et uno (On Being and the One), a short treatise attempting to reconcile
Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysical views; as well as Heptaplus (Seven Days of Creation), a
mystical interpretation of the Genesis creation myth. He was not a devout Neoplatonist like
Ficino, but rather an Aristotelian by training and in many ways an eclectic by conviction. He
wanted to combine Greek, Hebrew, Muslim, and Christian thought into a great synthesis, which
he spelled out in nine hundred theses published as Conclusiones in 1486. He planned to defend
them publicly in Rome, but three were found heretical and ten others suspect. He defended them
in Apologia, which provoked the condemnation of the whole work by Pope Innocent VIII. Picos
consistent aim in his writings was to exalt the powers of human nature. To this end he defended
the use of magic, which he described as the noblest part of natural science, and Kabbalah, a
Jewish form of mysticism that was probably of Neoplatonic origin.
Platonic themes were also central to the thought of Nicholas of Cusa (14011464), who linked
his philosophical activity to the Neoplatonic tradition and authors such as Proclus and PseudoDionysius. The main problem that runs through his works is how humans, as finite created
beings, can think about the infinite and transcendent God. His best-known work is De docta
ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance, 1440), which gives expression to his view that the human
mind needs to realize its own necessary ignorance of what God is like, an ignorance that results
from the ontological and cognitive disproportion between God and the finite human knower.
Correlated to the doctrine of learned ignorance is that of the coincidence of opposites in God. All
things coincide in God in the sense that God, as undifferentiated being, is beyond all opposition.
Two other works that are closely connected to De docta ignorantia are De coniecturis (On
Conjectures), in which he denies the possibility of exact knowledge, maintaining that all human
knowledge is conjectural, andApologia docta ignorantiae (A Defense of Learned Ignorance,
1449). In the latter, he makes clear that the doctrine of learned ignorance is not intended to deny
knowledge of the existence of God, but only to deny all knowledge of Gods nature.
One of the most serious obstacles to the reception and adoption of Platonism in the early
fifteenth century was the theory of Platonic love. Many scholars were simply unable to accept
Platos explicit treatment of homosexuality. Yet by the middle of the sixteenth century this
doctrine had become one of the most popular elements of Platonic philosophy. The
transformation of Platonic love from an immoral and offensive liability into a valuable asset
represents an important episode in the history of Platos re-emergence during the Renaissance as
a major influence on Western thought.
Bessarion and Ficino did not deny that Platonic love was essentially homosexual in outlook, but
they insisted that it was entirely honourable and chaste. To reinforce this point, they associated
Platonic discussions of love with those found in the Bible. Another way in which Ficino made
Platonic love more palatable to his contemporaries was to emphasise its place within an elaborate
system of Neoplatonic metaphysics. But Ficinos efforts to accommodate the theory to the values
of a fifteenth-century audience did not include concealing or denying that Platonic love was
homoerotic. Ficino completely accepted the idea that Platonic love involved a chaste relationship
between men and endorsed the belief that the souls spiritual ascent to ultimate beauty was
fuelled by love between men.
In Gli Asolani (1505), the humanist Pietro Bembo (14701547) appropriated the language of
Platonic love to describe some aspects of the romance between a man and a woman. In this
work, love was presented as unequivocally heterosexual. Most of the ideas set out by Ficino are
echoed by Bembo. However, Ficino had separated physical love, which had women as its object,
from spiritual love, which was shared between men. Bembos version of Platonic love, on the
other hand, dealt with the relationship between a man and a woman which gradually progresses
from a sexual to a spiritual level. The view of Platonic love formulated by Bembo reached its
largest audience with the humanist Baldesar Castigliones (14781529) Il libro del
cortegiano (The Courtier, 1528). Castiglione carried on the trend, initiated by Bessarion, of
giving Platonic love a strongly religious coloring, and most of the philosophical content is taken
from Ficino.
One of the most popular Renaissance treatises on love, Dialoghi damore (Dialogues of Love,
1535), was written by the Jewish philosopher Judah ben Isaac Abravanel, also known as Leone
Ebreo (c.1460/5c.1520/5). The work consists of three conversations on love, which he
conceives of as the animating principle of the universe and the cause of all existence, divine as
well as material. The first dialogue discusses the relation between love and desire; the second the
universality of love; and the third, which provides the longest and most sustained philosophical
discussion, the origin of love. He draws upon Platonic and Neoplatonic sources, as well as on the
cosmology and metaphysics of Jewish and Arabic thinkers, which are combined with
Aristotelian sources in order to produce a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic views.
4. Hellenistic Philosophies
Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism underwent a revival over the course of the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries as part of the ongoing recovery of ancient literature and thought. The revival
of Stoicism began with Petrarca, whose renewal of Stoicism moved along two paths. The first
one was inspired by Seneca and consisted in the presentation, in works such as De vita
solitaria (The Life of Solitude) and De otio religioso(On Religious Leisure), of a way of life in
which the cultivation of the scholarly work and ethical perfection are one. The second was his
elaboration of Stoic therapy against emotional distress in De secreto conflictu curarum
mearum (On the Secret Conflict of My Worries), an inner dialogue of the sort prescribed by
Cicero and Seneca, and in De remediis utriusque fortunae (Remedies for Good and Bad Fortune,
1366), a huge compendium based on a short apocryphal tract attributed at the time to Seneca.
While many humanists shared Petrarcas esteem for Stoic moral philosophy, others called its
stern prescriptions into question. They accused the Stoics of suppressing all emotions and
criticized their view for its inhuman rigidity. In contrast to the extreme ethical stance of the
Stoics, they preferred the more moderate Peripatetic position, arguing that it provides a more
realistic basis for morality, since it places the acquisition of virtue within the reach of normal
human capacities. Another Stoic doctrine that was often criticized on religious grounds was the
conviction that the wise man is entirely responsible for his own happiness and has no need of
divine assistance.
The most important exponent of Stoicism during the Renaissance was the Flemish humanist
Justus Lipsius (15471606), who worked hard to brighten the appeal of Stoicism to Christians.
His first Neostoic work wasDe constantia (On Constancy, 1584), in which he promoted Stoic
moral philosophy as a refuge from the horrors of the civil and religious wars that ravaged the
continent at the time. His main accounts of Stoicism were Physiologia Stoicorum (Physical
Theory of the Stoics) and Manuductio ad stoicam philosophiam(Guide to Stoic Philosophy), both
published in 1604. Together they constituted the most learned account of Stoic philosophy
produced since antiquity.
During the Middle Ages, Epicureanism was associated with contemptible atheism and hedonist
dissipation. In 1417, Bracciolini found Lucretiuss poem De rerum natura, the most informative
source on Epicurean teaching, which, together with Ambrogio Traversaris translation of
Diogenes Laertiuss Life of Epicurus into Latin, contributed to a more discriminating appraisal of
Epicurean doctrine and a repudiation of the traditional prejudice against the person of Epicurus
himself. In a letter written in 1428, Francesco Filelfo (13981481) insisted that, contrary to
popular opinion, Epicurus was not addicted to pleasure, lewd and lascivious, but rather sober,
learned and venerable. In the epistolary treatise Defensio Epicuri contra Stoicos, Academicos et
Peripateticos (Defense of Epicurus against Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics), Cosma
Raimondi (d. 1436) vigorously defended Epicurus and the view that the supreme good consists
in pleasure both of the mind and the body. He argued that pleasure, according to Epicurus, is not
opposed to virtue, but both guided and produced by it. Some humanists tried to harmonize
Epicurean with Christian doctrine. In his dialogue De voluptate (On Pleasure, 1431), which was
two years later reworked as De vero falsoque bono (On the True and False Good), Valla
examined Stoic, Epicurean, and Christian conceptions of the true good. To the ultimate good of
the Stoics, that is, virtue practiced for its own sake, Valla opposed that of the Epicureans,
represented by pleasure, on the grounds that pleasure comes closer to Christian happiness, which
is superior to either pagan ideal.
The revival of ancient philosophy was particularly dramatic in the case of Skepticism, whose
revitalisation grew out of many of the currents of Renaissance thought and contributed to make
the problem of knowledge crucial for early modern philosophy. The major ancient texts stating
the Skeptical arguments were slightly known in the Middle Ages. It was in the fifteenth and
sixteenth century that Sextus Empiricuss Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the
Mathematicians, Ciceros Academica, and Diogenes Laertiuss Life of Pyrrhostarted to receive
serious philosophical consideration.
The most significant and influential figure in the development of Renaissance Skepticism is
Michel de Montaigne (15331592). The most thorough presentation of his Skeptical views
occurs in Apologie de Raimond Sebond (Apology for Raymond Sebond), the longest and most
philosophical of his essays. In it, he developed in a gradual manner the many kinds of problems
that make people doubt the reliability of human reason. He considered in detail the ancient
Skeptical arguments about the unreliability of information gained by the senses or by reason,
about the inability of human beings to find a satisfactory criterion of knowledge, and about the
relativity of moral opinions. He concluded that people should suspend judgment on all matters
and follow customs and traditions. He combined these conclusions with fideism.
Many Renaissance appropriators of Academic and Pyrrhonian Skeptical arguments did not see
any intrinsic value in Skepticism, but rather used it to attack Aristotelianism and disparage the
claims of human science. They challenged the intellectual foundations of medieval Scholastic
learning by raising serious questions about the nature of truth and about the ability of humans to
discover it. In Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium et veritatis Christianae
disciplinae (Examination of the Vanity of Pagan Doctrine and of the Truthof Christian Teaching,
1520), Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (14691533) set out to prove the futility of pagan
doctrine and the truth of Christianity. He regarded Skepticism as ideally suited to his campaign,
since it challenged the possibility of attaining certain knowledge by means of the senses or by
reason, but left the scriptures, grounded in divine revelation, untouched. In the first part of the
work, he used the Skeptical arguments contained in the works of Sextus Empiricus against the
various schools of ancient philosophy; and in the second part he turned Skepticism against
Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. His aim was not to call everything into doubt, but rather to
discredit every source of knowledge except scripture and condemn all attempts to find truth
elsewhere as vain.
In a similar way, Agrippa von Nettesheim (14861535), whose real name was Heinrich
Cornelius, demonstrated in De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum atque artium (On the
Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences, 1530) the contradictions of scientific doctrines.
With stylistic brilliance, he described the controversies of the established academic community
and dismissed all academic endeavors in view of the finitude of human experience, which in his
view comes to rest only in faith.
The fame of the Portuguese philosopher and medical writer Francisco Sanches (15511623) rests
mainly onQuod nihil scitur (That Nothing Is Known, 1581), one of the best systematic
expositions of philosophical Skepticism produced during the sixteenth century. The treatise
contains a radical criticism of the Aristotelian notion of science, but beside its critical aim, it had
a constructive objective, which posterity has tended to neglect, consisting in Sanchess quest for
a new method of philosophical and scientific inquiry that could be universally applied. This
method was supposed to be expounded in another book that was either lost, remained
unpublished, or was not written at all.
world as a living organism and displays his keen interest in natural magic; Ateismus
triomphatus (Atheism Conquered), a polemic against both reason of state and Machiavellis
conception of religion as a political invention; and Apologia pro Galileo (Defense of Galileo), a
defense of the freedom of thought (libertas philosophandi) of Galileo and of Christian scientists
in general. Campanellas most ambitious work is Metaphysica (1638), which constitutes the most
comprehensive presentation of his philosophy and whose aim is to produce a new foundation for
the entire encyclopedia of knowledge. His most celebrated work is the utopian treatise La citt
del sole (The City of the Sun), which describes an ideal model of society that, in contrast to the
violence and disorder of the real world, is in harmony with nature.
In contrast to Telesio, who was a fervent critic of metaphysics and insisted on a purely empiricist
approach in natural philosophy, Patrizi developed a program in which natural philosophy and
cosmology were connected with their metaphysical and theological foundations.
His Discussiones peripateticae (Peripatetic Discussions) provides a close comparison of the
views of Aristotle and Plato on a wide range of philosophical issues, arguing that Platos views
are preferable on all counts. Inspired by such Platonic predecessors as Proclus and Ficino, Patrizi
elaborated his own philosophical system in Nova de universalis philosophia (The New Universal
Philosophy, 1591), which is divided in four
parts: Panaugia, Panarchia, Pampsychia, andPancosmia. He saw light as the basic metaphysical
principle and interpreted the universe in terms of the diffusion of light. The fourth and last part of
the work, in which he expounded his cosmology showing how the physical world derives its
existence from God, is by far the most original and important. In it, he replaced the four
Aristotelian elements with his own alternatives: space, light, heat, and humidity. Gassendi and
Henry More (16141687) adopted his concept of space, which indirectly came to influence
Newton.
A more radical cosmology was proposed by Bruno, who was an extremely prolific writer. His
most significant works include those on the art of memory and the combinatory method of
Ramon Llull, as well as the moral dialogues Spaccio de la bestia trionfante (The Expulsion of the
Triumphant Beast, 1584), Cabala del cavallo pegaseo (The Kabbalah of the Pegasean Horse,
1585) and De glheroici furori (The Heroic Frenzies, 1585). Much of his fame rests on three
cosmological dialogues published in 1584: La cena de le ceneri (The Ash Wednesday
Supper), De la causa, principio et uno (On the Cause, the Principle and the One) and De
linfinito, universo et mondi (On the Infinite, the Universe and the Worlds). In these, with
inspiration from Lucretius, the Neoplatonists, and, above all, Nicholas of Cusa, he elaborates a
coherent and strongly articulated ontological monism. Individual beings are conceived as
accidents or modes of a unique substance, that is, the universe, which he describes as an animate
and infinitely extended unity containing innumerable worlds. Bruno adhered to Copernicuss
cosmology but transformed it, postulating an infinite universe. Although an infinite universe was
by no means his invention, he was the first to locate a heliocentric system in infinite space. In
1600, he was burned at the stake by the Inquisition for his heretical teachings.
Even though these new philosophies of nature anticipated some of the defining features of early
modern thought, many of their methodological characteristics appeared to be inadequate in the
face of new scientific developments. The methodology of Galileo Galilei (15641642) and of the
other pioneers of the new science was essentially mathematical. Moreover, the development of
the new science took place by means of methodical observations and experiments, such as
Galileos telescopic discoveries and his experiments on inclined planes. The critique of
Aristotles teaching formulated by natural philosophers such as Telesio, Campanella, Patrizi, and
Bruno undoubtedly helped to weaken it, but it was the new philosophy of the early seventeenth
century that sealed the fate of the Aristotelian worldview and set the tone for a new age.
Schmitt, C. B., & al., eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988).
Skinner, Q., The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1, The Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978).
Yates, F. A., Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Rouledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).
Author Information
Lorenzo Casini
Email: lorenzo.casini@filosofi.uu.se
Uppsala University
Sweden
God and prime matter. However, this hierarchy also has negative consequences for the
qualitative character of human existence on account of the souls proximity to matter. Finally,
thePlatonic Theology lays down the basic principles of Ficinos animistic natural philosophy,
according to which a World Soul is imminent in the material world, imparting motion, life, and
order.
In addition to the Platonic Theology, Ficino also composed extensive commentaries on Plato and
Plotinus, wrote a practical medical treatise, and carried on a voluminous correspondence with
contemporaries across Europe. There are noteworthy elements in his writings that are less
traditional and orthodox by some contemporary philosophical standards. For example, he was
deeply influenced by the Hermetic tradition, and describes a species of knowledge, or natural
magic, that draws down the intellectual and moral virtues of the heavens to the terrestrial world.
Ficino also endorses an ancient theological tradition that included, to name a few, Hermes
Trismegistus, Pythagoras, and Orpheus among its ranks. He held that this pagan tradition
espoused a pious philosophy that in fact presaged and confirmed Christianity.
Table of Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
Biography
The Platonic Academy of Florence
The Ancient Theology and Pious Philosophy
Platonic Theology
a. Metaphysics
b. Epistemology
c. The Dignity of Humanity and the Human Condition
d. The Immortality of the Soul
5. Ethics and Love
6. Legacy
7. References and Further Reading
. Primary Sources
a. Secondary Sources
1. Biography
Marsilio Ficino was born in Figline, not far from Florence, in 1433. He was the son of a
physician, and Cosimo deMedicione of the richest and most powerful patrons of the fifteenth
centurywas among his fathers patients. While the precise details of his early life and
education remain largely unclear to us today, it can safely be said that he studied Scholastic
philosophy and medicine at the University of Florence, and that he was exposed to the
burgeoning educational movement of Italian Humanism. Ficinos earliest philosophical writings
are largely Scholastic in their consideration of metaphysical, logical, and natural philosophical
questions. In particular, Thomas Aquinas had a strong influence on significant aspects of his
early thought, and this influence is thought to have persisted in his later philosophical writings.
The biographical contours of Ficinos early life become clearer in the 1450s. He lectured on
Platos Philebus; he also taught for a short time at the university in Florence, and privately as a
tutor. As a young man Ficino fell under the influence of the Roman poet Lucretius. A manuscript
copy of his didactic Epicurean poem, On the Nature of Things, was rediscovered in a monastery
in 1417. After its recovery the poem was copied, disseminated, and eventually found its way into
print and vernacular languages. Ficino was among the first generation of philosophers with direct
access to the actual text of On the Nature of Things, which is thought to have played an
important role in the development of early modern philosophy and science. During the late
1450s, Ficino composed a short commentary on Lucretius, the first since antiquity, as well as a
treatise on pleasure. In this treatise he praises the Epicurean definition of pleasure as the removal
of pain from the body and disturbance from the soul, and argues that Epicureanism is superior to
the vulgar hedonism of someone like Aristippus. Ficino suggests that he experienced an
intellectual or spiritual crisis during this time, and as a result ultimately rejected Epicurus and
Lucretius as incompatible with deeply held philosophical and religious commitments. In a letter,
Ficino reports that he burned his youthful commentary on Lucretius. Despite this Epicurus and
Lucretius left an enduring stamp on Ficinos thought that is visible in the mature philosophical
writings, and historians of Renaissance philosophy are still assessing this influence today.
During the 1450s Ficino began to study Greek. In time, his knowledge of classical Greek
culminated in one of his most lasting philosophical and scholarly achievements and
contributionshis translation of Platos complete works into Latin. In 1462, Cosimo deMedici
commissioned Ficino to translate a manuscript copy of Platos extant writings. Around the same
time, Cosimo also gave him the proceeds from a small property, as well as a villa in Careggi, not
far from Florence. The conditions of the 1460s provided Ficino with the perfect opportunity to
fully dedicate himself to translating Platos complete writings into Latin. His edition marked the
first time that Platos extant corpus was translated into a Western language. Ficinos work on
Plato, however, was quickly interrupted when Cosimo requested that he also translate the Corpus
Hermeticum into Latin. At the time, the Hermetic corpus was believed by many to be an ancient
collection of theological writings that contained sacred wisdom. It was, however, written in the
early years of Christianity. In 1464, Ficino read his translations of Platos dialogues to Cosimo as
the aging patron lay dying.
In the late 1460s, after completing his translation of Plato, Ficino started working on his Platonic
Theology: On the Immortality of the Soul. This book was finished in 1474, but it did not find its
way into print until 1482. The Platonic Theology is Ficinos longest and most systematic
philosophical work. In 1473, he was ordained a priest, and after completing his Platonic
Theology, dedicated himself primarily to translation, commentary, and correspondence. During
this time Ficino also wrote the bulk of his commentaries on Platos dialogues. The last two
decades of Ficinos life were especially productive. In the 1480s, he translated theEnneads of the
second-century Neoplatonist Plotinus, and also wrote commentaries on them. An edition of
Plotinus was published in 1492. During this time Ficino completed his Three Books on Life, a
medical and astrological treatise. After its 1489 publication it became one of his most popular
and influential books. The third book presents Ficinos theory of natural magic, which has since
become the definitive Renaissance consideration of the subject.
Throughout his life Ficino carried on a steady correspondence with philosophers, poets, and
politicians across Europe. This choice of philosophical expression shows the influence that
Humanism had on him. In many letters, Ficino clarifies his understanding of certain Platonic
concepts, such as poetic furor; but on a whole his correspondence is not strictly philosophical in
nature, at least not by academic standards today. Even so, it contains information that is central
to an accurate appreciation of his thought. Ficino conceived of philosophy as a way of life that
purified and prepared those who practice it correctly for a life well lived. Ficinos
correspondence contains a good deal of practical advice, and he is often found giving counsel on
how to cope with the deaths of children, spouses, and friends, or on how to extend ones life; he
also lends sundry medical advice, and even discusses the astrological placement of planets that
contribute to ones character traits. The letters serve both to clarify the content of his philosophy,
as well as to shed a different light on what he perceived his role to be as a philosopher and an
advocate of Platonism. These sources teach us that Ficino did not define philosophy narrowly.
Instead, he saw himself as a doctor of sorts that was concerned with questions that concerned the
health of bodies, minds, and souls. This practical concern is clearly displayed in his
correspondence, and his Three Books on Life. Ficino edited and published his correspondence in
1494. He died in 1499.
such academy ever really existed. It seems unlikely that Ficino headed a formal educational
institution in any real sense. More plausible is the hypothesis that Ficinos occasional reference
to the revival of Platos academy in Florence actually designated the presence of a manuscript
copy of Platos dialogues in Florence, to Platos teachings and philosophy, and his own efforts to
revive Plato in Florence through his translations and commentaries. Whether or not Ficino
actually headed a Platonic Academy in Florence, he was nonetheless instrumental as an advocate
of Platonism during the Renaissance.
4. Platonic Theology
The Platonic Theology is Marsilio Ficinos philosophical magnum opus. Its overall aim is to
defend the immortality of the soul, and to this end Ficino avails himself of a wide variety of
arguments. For Ficino, this question is at the heart of human self-interest and well-being. In the
first chapter, he argues that if human beings were merely mortal, then there would be no animal
more miserable than man. Ficinos core argument is that the natural human desire for
immortality must be vindicated by an afterlife. Were it not, this desire would be empty, vain, and
this would call into question both the perfection of nature and Gods wisdom and goodness.
While arguing for the souls immortality Ficino elaborates on many of those positions and
arguments that are distinctive of his philosophy. He presents and defends the basic principles of
his metaphysics. While he is deeply indebted to earlier metaphysical traditions, especially the
Neoplatonic and Scholastic traditions, elements of these traditions are generally adapted to his
own philosophical aims and purposes. Ficino also presents his case for the inherent dignity of
humanity. This defense depends in large part on his own restructuring of the Neoplatonic
hierarchy of being, according to which the soul is located centrally between God and matter. The
souls metaphysical position also ensures its immortality. Ficino argues that the souls troubled
a. Metaphysics
Ficinos metaphysics is a blend of elements drawn from Platonism, Neoplatonism, and medieval
Scholasticism. Broadly speaking, he maintains a Platonic division between the intelligible and
sensible realms or between being and becoming. Throughout the Platonic Theology, he is found
employing the hylomorphic terminology of the Scholastics in his detailed analysis of the nature
of things. Ficino embraces and uses the metaphysical hierarchy developed by the Neoplatonist
Plotinus, according to which the progressive levels of being emanate from a single source.
In the preface, Ficino explains that a central aim of the Platonic Theology is to demonstrate to
materialist philosophers that matter is less real than those incorporeal entities (such as souls and
forms) that transcend the senses. To accomplish this aim Ficino relies primarily on Platos
dialogues, because in his estimation they most successfully demote the reality of the material
world, while at the same time grounding and elevating the metaphysical priority of souls and
forms. Furthermore, he believes that Platonism provides the most solid philosophical foundation
for Christianity. Throughout the Platonic Theology, Ficino embraces the metaphysical
distinction, prominent in Platos dialogues, between being and becoming or between the
intelligible and sensible realms. He argues that the former is more real than the latter, and is
therefore more worthy of our enduring attention, devotion, and study. Along these lines he
maintains that forms are the perfect archetypes of all material things and exist unchangeably in
the divine mind. They are in fact the genuine cause of the sensible qualities and properties of the
material world. By contrast, the world of matter is shadowy and deceptive. It engenders
confusion and imprisons the minds of many people.
Ficinos metaphysics is overwhelmingly Platonic. But his theory of material substances is
indebted to Scholasticism for many of its most salient features. While Ficinos philosophy is
clearly otherworldlyin the sense that he maintains the existence and metaphysical priority of
realities apart from the material worldthis does not prevent him from speculating about the
metaphysics of matter and body in the early books of thePlatonic Theology. In fact, he believes
that doing so is in keeping with the broader aims of the book. By and large, Ficino analyzes
material substances along traditional hylomorphic lines, according to which they are constituted
by three principles: matter, form, and privation. Matter functions as the passive substrate of the
forms that are active in making something what it is, and privation is what a substance can
potentially become. The matter of a thing is relative to the level of organization under
consideration; the matter of a statue is marble, but the marble itself is not without its own form
and matter. When all qualities, both substantial and accidental, are stripped from a substance
there is at bottom a single formless prime matter that is one and the same for all things. He holds
that prime matter exists in a chaotic and confused state of potency. For Ficino, it is something
that is ontologically basic and epistemically impenetrable. It is therefore difficult, if not
impossible, to say anything directly about it other than that it must exist as the substratum of
form. Here Ficino is echoing Plotinus who compared understanding matter to the eye seeing
darkness.
Even though Ficino employs the basic terms of the Scholastics, he makes significant
modifications to this framework. These changes are consistent with his broader philosophical
commitments and the overall objectives of the Platonic Theology. First, it is noteworthy that he
embraces a theory of seminal reasons, according to which seeds are spread throughout matter,
and are the cause of things coming to be at appointed times. Unlike the Scholastics, Ficino
judges that the qualities or properties of material things are protean, not self-sufficient, unstable,
and parasitic on incorporeal forms for any reality and causal efficacy in the world of matter. Here
his underlying Platonism becomes apparent. Ficino says that material forms are corrupted and
contaminated when they are embedded in the bosom of matter. He poetically describes
material qualities as mere shadows that come and go like the reflections of lofty trees in a
rushing stream (I.III.15). Ficino sees the basic elements of the world as existing in a constant
and chaotic state of change, and he holds that whatever stability they exhibit is on account of
their cause, that is, their incorporeal archetypes. According to Ficino, this is not merely true of
the elements, but of all qualities of material things across the board, both those that are
substantial and those that are accidental. In this way, Ficino traces back all of the qualities of this
world to something eternal and incorporeal as their cause, and this is the basic unit of reality for
him. He accepts a metaphysical principle that there is a first in each genus (primum) that is the
fullest and most perfect expression of any particular species quality. It does not include anything
that does not properly belong to that genus. The first in each genus is ultimately the cause of
every particular expression of that quality. Ficino, therefore, demotes the reality of material
forms or qualities while at the same time buttressing the reality of incorporeal forms. Although
he analyzes material substances along hylomorphic lines, he at the same time alters this
framework in an effort to ground his Platonic metaphysics, and ultimately the immortality of the
soul.
There are prominent Neoplatonic elements at the core of Ficinos metaphysics. He inherited from
Plotinus a particular approach to metaphysics that is a hierarchical superstructure, with distinct
levels or hypostases, all of which draw their being from an overflowing singular source. The
source of all being is the One for Plotinus and God for Ficino. He considers all being to be a
progressive emanation from the divine, and although each hypostasis is distinct, what is above
serves as a dynamic bridge to what is below. Everything in Ficinos cosmos has its own unique
place and degree of perfection, beginning with God at the summit and descending through the
celestial spheres, angels, and souls, all the way down to the elements of the terrestrial sphere. In
it there is nothing that is vain or superfluous, and Ficino thinks that everything is drawn to its
good or end by a natural appetite.
Ficino generally recognizes five distinct levels of reality. But he at times changes the precise
arrangement and structure of the hypostases of this hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is God,
which is the source of all being and perfection. The first hypostasis that God produces is angelic
mind. It contains the archetypes and forms of all things in a timeless and immutable state. These
forms are the essences of all possible entities, and they are responsible for the qualities and
properties of material things. Next in this progression comes the rational soul, which imparts
motion and vitality to the cosmos. Ficino posits a World Soul (anima mundi) that is immanent in
all of nature, and individual souls that animate sundry entities in the world, including the
celestial spheres, living creatures, and even the elements. Mind is eternal and unmoving; soul is
likewise eternal, but differs because it is in a perpetual state of motion. Soul stands at the
metaphysical node or bond between what is above and below; while it is drawn to forms and the
divine above, it is responsible for the governance of what comes below. Beneath rational soul is
the hypostasis of quality, which is representative of the material forms found in nature. The
patterns of qualities are grounded in the second hypostasis, mind; the source of its motion and
alteration comes from soul. Finally, the hierarchy of being is extinguished with the lowest level
of realitybody or corporeal matter. Ficino defines body as matter that is extended in length,
breadth, and depth. It functions as the bearer of qualities, but contributes nothing of its own to
the nature of things.
Even though Ficino generally marks a distinction between being and becoming, or between the
incorporeal and corporeal, he is no simple dualist. His view of soul, and the role that it plays in
the material world, is fundamentally different from, for example, the strict dualism of the
seventeenth-century philosopher Ren Descartes. Matter and soul are entirely distinct from one
another, according to Descartes, and these two basic substances share no qualities in common. In
his treatise on physics, The World, Descartes distinguishes himself from earlier approaches to
natural philosophy when he explains that he uses the word nature to signify matter itself, and
not some goddess or any other sort of imaginary power (AT XI 37). According to Descartes, a
natural philosopher does not need to appeal to anything other than matter in order to properly
explain the natural world. On the contrary, according to Ficino, the material world is not
something that can be adequately explained by turning to matter and motion alone; nature is an
active power that suffuses matter and provides it with its life, activity, and order. On this
account, nature is a dynamic force operating on material things from within, and this is the
proper or genuine cause of things changing, as well as their generation and corruption. Soul,
therefore, has a paramount role to play in Ficinos natural philosophy.
Like Plato and his Neoplatonic interpreters, Ficino makes competing claims about the relative
goodness of the material world. In his Timaeus, Plato argues that the sensible world is on a
whole good and beautiful because it is modeled on eternal forms. In other dialogues, such as
the Phaedo and Republic, the sensible world is a shadowy and deceptive prison. Plotinus
recognizes this tension in Plato and comments on it in his Enneads. Ficino inherits this ambiguity
about the goodness of the world, even if negative appraisals are more frequent and prominent in
the Platonic Theology than positive ones. Like Plato, Ficino asserts that the creator is a
benevolent and wise architect, and that these qualities are reflected in Gods creation; however,
he also maintains that the world of matter is shadowy, evil, and to some degree unreal.
Furthermore, Ficino blames matter and body for the minds tendency to be confused and
deceived about what is real and good. On a whole, therefore, Ficinos overall assessment of the
material worldat least as far as the human condition is concernedis negative.
In his metaphysics, Ficino is not drawn to austere and desert-like frameworks, and he was not
reductionistic in his thinking. As such, he belongs to a tradition of metaphysicians, including the
seventeenth-century Platonist G. W. Leibniz, that embrace a rich and expansive ontology. Ficino
lays out a tapestry of entities that comprise the world. In nature alone he countenances the
existence of matter, qualities, and a cavalcade of souls, including a World Soul, that impart
motion and vital powers to all aspects of the material world. Ficino claims that nature is in fact
replete with souls; there are souls that belong to the elements, to non-human animals, as well as a
soul that is responsible for the growth of rocks and trees from the earths surface.
b. Epistemology
In the Platonic Theology, Ficino does not address epistemological issues as directly or with the
same degree of frequency as he does metaphysical ones. Nonetheless, the broad contours of a
view can be sketched by paying close attention to the occasional discussion of the origin, nature,
and value of knowledge. Throughout this work Ficino makes scattered remarks about the minds
capabilities, what exactly it apprehends when it knows, and the effect that knowledge has on
those who possess it. Generally these comments arise when Ficino is either discussing the nature
and powers of the human mind and distinguishing them from the body, or when he speculates
about the divine mind and draws a comparison with finite minds.
Ficino holds that knowledge is rooted in forms, not matter. However, the metaphysics of matter
described above has certain implications for what exactly stands as the object of knowledge. He
argues that the degradation of forms in matter requires that the mind grasps something other than
sensible forms when it knows. If it did not, he argues, then knowledge would not be stable and
fixed; instead, it would vary and change as the qualities of material things do. Rather, when the
mind knows it apprehends intelligible forms, and not the sensible forms that include the
individual traits that are distinctive of particular objects. These forms are stable and unchanging,
and as such Ficino claims that they produce stable and unchanging knowledge.
Knowledge does not, according to Ficino, come about in stages, or as a result of a gradual
process. The mind does not take gradual steps and build upon its experiences to arrive at
universals. On the contrary, he describes knowledge as coming about in an instantaneous flash,
and not in a progressive or abstractive manner. Ficino claims that philosophical reflection on the
nature of things prepares and purifies the mind of falsehood until it is ready to receive the clarity
of truth. This arrival is simple and immediate. Ficino explains that speculative virtue does not
proceed stage by stage from one part of itself to another, but blazes forth wholly and suddenly
(VIII.III.6). Ficino even holds that intelligible forms are distinct from, and discontinuous with,
sensible forms, even if our experience of particular material things can be the root cause of the
minds coming to know something. Furthermore, he makes some interesting suggestions about
the existence of primary truths that contain other truths within them, and he claims that the
knowledge of one primary truth can elicit knowledge of others. While Ficino mentions that such
primary truths exist, he does not elaborate as to what exactly these truths are or what one would
look like.
There are several Platonic epistemic themes that are prominent in the Platonic Theology. Ficino
maintains that the mind is nourished by truth, and he sees it as edifying of the overall condition
of the human soul. He also claims that there is much to recommend the Platonic doctrine of
reminiscence, even if he rejects the transmigration of souls as heretical. Also, his description of
learning calls to mind Platos Theaetetus, where Socrates describes himself as a midwife of sorts.
In this vein, Ficino holds that the mind already has within itself the intelligible forms that it will,
if it is diligent, come to know, or remember. These forms exist latently in the mind, and learning
is a process of drawing out from the mind what is, in a certain sense, already there.
conclusion that it is not distinct from it. This is the cause of the common sense materialism that
most people uncritically accept, and that says something is not real unless it is a body. A pivotal
consequence of this situation is that the soul forgets its own privileged nature and divinity, and in
many cases concludes that it is nothing distinct from matter. Thus, there is a disconnect in
Ficinos philosophy between the metaphysical nature of the soul, and its subjective experience
when joined with matter. This is the cause, according to Ficino, of the wretchedness of the
human condition, which is characterized by a certain confusion regarding what is real and
worthy of its pursuit.
passions all conspire to impede and frustrate the soul in its search for knowledge and goodness.
Much like Plato in the Phaedo, Ficino argues that the souls overall condition improves the
farther it is removed from the material world, and the soul knows best when it does not draw
upon the senses. These dissimilarities establish, Ficino thinks, the souls essential otherness from
matter and body. Ficinos metaphysics of matter is also tailored to provide support for
immortality. He provides what he calls a Platonic definition of body, according to which it is
composed of matter and extension. Both matter and extension are passive and inert, and cannot
give rise in any way to the essential functions of the soul. Therefore, Ficino concludes that it is
only on account of the presence of something incorporeal, namely forms and souls, that material
things are at all substantial.
6. Legacy
Ficino left an enduring impression on the history of Western philosophy. His philosophical
writings, and his translations of Platonic and Hermetic texts, exercised both a direct and indirect
influence on the form and content of philosophy in subsequent centuries. The Platonic
Theology was instrumental in elevating the defense of the immortality of the soul to
philosophical prominence in the early modern period. It contributed to the Lateran Council of
1512 requiring philosophers to defend the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. In
the letter of dedication to his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes refers to the Lateran
Council to explain, in part, the proofs of Gods existence and immortality found therein. Ficinos
influence can also be seen in many of the most noteworthy philosophers of the sixteenth century,
most notably Giordano Bruno, and Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, who held a chair of Platonic
philosophy at the University of Ferrara. He indirectly influenced generations of philosophers
who encountered Platonism and Hermeticism through his translations and commentaries.
The fortune of Ficinos philosophical legacy has waxed and waned over the centuries. His
influence on intellectual life in the sixteenth century was especially strong, but his brand of
Christian Platonism was certainly not without its critics in subsequent centuries. The sixteenthcentury theologian and historian Johannes Serranus criticized Ficinos mode of translating and
commenting on Platos dialogues, which he thought lacked clarity, brevity, and precision. The
self-proclaimed Platonist G. W. Leibniz complains that Ficinos definitions lack the rigor of
Platos, and he says that his Neoplatonism incorporates too many pagan elements and is
therefore prone to heresy. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, G. W. F. Hegel gives
Ficino a minor and subordinate role to play in the development of modern philosophy. Hegel
argues that Ficinos revival of Platonic philosophy was ultimately a misguided and childish
fascination with a dead philosophy. Perhaps more importantly, however, is the fact that Ficinos
philosophy stands in stark contrast to the methods and explanations employed by the new science
in the seventeenth century. Hobbes and Descartes, for example, wanted to explain nature in
purely materialistic and mechanical terms. The new philosophy and science, therefore, repudiates
the vital core of Ficinos metaphysics, especially his belief in a World Soul and his vitalistic
natural philosophy. Hobbes outright rejects an incorporeal soul, and Descartes completely expels
it from nature. Both philosophers, therefore, aspired to explain nature in such a way that it did
not include many of the core features of the Ficinos thought.
For a longtime Ficino remained a marginal figure and a footnote in histories of philosophy. It
was not until nearly the middle of the twentieth century, when Paul Oskar Kristeller published
his seminal book, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, that historians of philosophy started to reexamine and reconsider Ficinos importance to the history of Renaissance and early modern
philosophies. Kristellers book examined the formal structure of Ficinos philosophy, and he
painted a picture of a sophisticated and systematic metaphysician. More recently a number of
articles and books have been published on other aspects of Ficinos thought. Since Kristeller,
later scholarssuch as D. P. Walker, Frances Yates, and Michael J. B. Allenhave focused less
on the systematic and formal philosophy, and more on the magical and creative elements of
Ficinos thought. The critical examination of Ficino, and an assessment of his influence,
continues today.
a. Primary Sources
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Ficino, Marsilio. The Letters of Marsilio Ficino. Trans. The Language Department of the London School of
Economics. 8 vols. London: Shepheard-Walwyn Ltd., 1975-2010.
Ficino, Marsilio. The Philebus Commentary. Ed. and trans. Michael J. B. Allen. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1975.
Ficino, Marsilio. Commentaries on Platos Symposium on Love. Trans. Sears Jayne. Dallas: Spring
Publications, 1985.
Ficino, Marsilio. Three Books on Life. Ed. and trans. Carol Kaske and John Clark. Tempe, Arizona: MRTS,
1998.
Ficino, Marsilio. Platonic Theology. Trans. Michael J. B. Allen, and ed. James Hankins. 6 vols. Cambridge:
The I Tatti Renaissance Library, Harvard University Press, 2001-2006.
Ficino, Marsilio. Commentaries on Plato: Phaedrus and Ion. Cambridge: The I Tatti Renaissance Library,
Harvard University Press, 2008.
Ficino, Marsilio. All Things Natural: Ficino on Platos Timaeus. Trans. Arthur Farndell. London: ShepheardWalwyn Ltd., 2010.
Kristeller, Paul Oskar. Supplementum Ficinianum. 2 vols. Florence: Olschki, 1938.
b. Secondary Sources
Allen, Michael J. B. Icastes: Marsilio Ficinos Interpretation of Platos Sophist. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1989.
Allen, Michael J. B. Synoptic Art: Marsilio Ficino and the History of Platonic Interpretation. Florence:
Olschki, 1998.
Celenza, Christopher. Pythagoras in the Renaissance: The Case of Marsilio Ficino. Renaissance
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Author Information
James G. Snyder
Email: james.snyder@marist.edu
Marist College
U. S. A.
Table of Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
Life
The Philosophical Project of the Essays
Skepticism
Relativism
1. Life
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne was born at the Chteau Montaigne, located thirty miles east of
Bordeaux, in 1533. His father, Pierre Eyquem, was a wealthy merchant of wine and fish whose
grandfather had purchased in 1477 what was then known as the Montaigne estate. Montaignes
mother, Antoinette de Loupes de Villeneuve, came from a wealthy marrano family that had
settled in Toulouse at the end of the 15th century. Montaigne describes Eyquem as the best
father that ever was, and mentions him often in the Essays. Montaignes mother, on the other
hand, is almost totally absent from her sons book. Amidst the turbulent religious atmosphere of
sixteenth century France, Eyquem and his wife raised their children Catholic. Michel, the eldest
of eight children, remained a member of the Catholic Church his entire life, though three of his
siblings became Protestants.
Eyquem, who had become enamored of novel pedagogical methods that he had discovered as a
soldier in Italy, directed Montaignes unusual education. As an infant, Montaigne was sent to
live with a poor family in a nearby village so as to cultivate in him a natural devotion to that
class of men that needs our help. When Montaigne returned as a young child to live at the
chteau, Eyquem arranged that Michel awake every morning to music. He then hired a German
tutor to teach Montaigne to speak Latin as his native tongue. Members of the household were
forbidden to speak to the young Michel in any language other than Latin, and, as a result,
Montaigne reports that he was six years old before he learned any French. It was at this time that
Eyquem sent Montaigne to attend the prestigious Collge de Guyenne, where he studied under
the Scottish humanist George Buchanan.
The details of Montaignes life between his departure from the Collge at age thirteen and his
appointment as a Bordeaux magistrate in his early twenties are largely unknown. He is thought
to have studied the law, perhaps at Toulouse. In any case, by 1557 he had begun his career as a
magistrate, first in the Cour des Aides de Prigueux, a court with sovereign jurisdiction in the
region over cases concerning taxation, and later in the Bordeaux Parlement, one of the
eight parlements that together composed the highest court of justice in France. There he
encountered Etienne La Botie, with whom he formed an intense friendship that lasted until La
Boties sudden death in 1563. Years later, the bond he shared with La Botie would inspire one
of Montaignes best-known essays, Of Friendship. Two years after La Boties death
Montaigne married Franoise de la Chassaigne. His relationship with his wife seems to have
been amiable but cool; it lacked the spiritual and intellectual connection that Montaigne had
shared with La Botie. Their marriage produced six children, but only one survived infancy: a
daughter named Lonor.
In 1570 Montaigne sold his office in the Parlement, and retreated to his chteau, where in 1571
he announced his retirement from public life. Less than a year later he began to write
his Essays. Retirement did not mean isolation, however. Montaigne made many trips to court in
Paris between 1570 and 1580, and it seems that at some point between 1572 and 1576 he
attempted to mediate between the ultra-conservative Catholic Henri de Guise and the Protestant
Henri, king of Navarre. Nonetheless, he devoted a great deal of time to writing, and in 1580
published the first two books of his Essays.
Soon thereafter Montaigne departed on a trip to Rome via Germany and Switzerland. Montaigne
recorded the trip in the Journal de Voyage, which was published for the first time in the
18th century, not having been intended for publication by Montaigne himself. Among the
reasons for his trip were his hope of finding relief from his kidney stones in the mineral baths of
Germany, his desire to see Rome, and his general love of travel. The trip lasted about fifteen
months, and would have lasted longer had he not been called back to Bordeaux in 1581 to serve
as mayor.
Montaignes first two-year term as mayor was mostly uneventful. His second term was much
busier, as the death of the Duke of Anjou made the Protestant Henri de Navarre heir to the
French throne. This resulted in a three-way conflict between the reigning Catholic King Henri
III, Henri de Guise, leader of the conservative Catholic League, and Henri de Navarre.
Bordeaux, which remained Catholic during the religious wars that engulfed France for most of
the 16th century, found itself in close proximity to Navarres Protestant forces in southwest
France. As a mayor loyal to the king, Montaigne worked successfully to keep the peace among
the interested parties, protecting the city from seizure by the League while also maintaining
diplomatic relations with Navarre. As a moderate Catholic, he was well-regarded by both the
king and Navarre, and after his tenure as mayor Montaigne continued to serve as a diplomatic
link between the two parties, at one point in 1588 traveling to Paris on a secret diplomatic
mission for Navarre.
In 1588, Montaigne published the fifth edition of the Essays, including a third book with material
he had produced in the previous two years. It is a copy of this fifth edition (known as the
Bordeaux Copy), including the marginalia penned by Montaigne himself in the years leading
up to his death, which in the eyes of most scholars constitutes the definitive text of
the Essays today. The majority of the last three years of his life were spent at the chteau. When
Navarre succeeded Henri III as king of France in 1589, he invited Montaigne to join him at
court, but Montaigne was too ill to travel. His body was failing him, and he died less than two
years later, on September 13, 1592.
body, death, politics, the nature and power of custom, and the colonization of the New World.
There rarely seems to be any explicit connection between one chapter and the next. Moreover,
chapter titles are often only tangentially related to their contents. The lack of logical progression
from one chapter to the next creates a sense of disorder that is compounded by Montaignes
style, which can be described as deliberately nonchalant. Montaigne intersperses reportage of
historical anecdotes and autobiographical remarks throughout the book, and most essays include
a number of digressions. In some cases the digressions seem to be due to Montaignes streamof-consciousness style, while in others they are the result of his habit of inserting additions
(sometimes just a sentence or two, other times a number of paragraphs) into essays years after
they were first written. Finally, the nature of Montaignes project itself contributes to the
disorderly style of his book. Part of that project, he tells us at the outset, is to paint a portrait of
himself in words, and for Montaigne, this task is complicated by the conception he has of the
nature of the self. In Of repentance, for example, he announces that while others try to form
man, he simply tells of a particular man, one who is constantly changing:
I cannot keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and staggering, with a natural
drunkenness. I take it in this condition, just as it is at the moment I give my attention to it. I do
not portray being: I portray passing. I may presently change, not only by chance, but also by
intention. This is a record of various and changeable occurrences, and of irresolute and, when it
so befalls, contradictory ideas: whether I am different myself, or whether I take hold of my
subjects in different circumstances and aspects. So, all in all, I may indeed contradict myself
now and then; but truth, as Demades said, I do not contradict. (F 610)
Given Montaignes expression of this conception of the self as a fragmented and ever-changing
entity, it should come as no surprise that we find contradictions throughout the Essays. Indeed,
one of the apparent contradictions in Montaignes thought concerns his view of the self. While
on the one hand he expresses the conception of the self outlined in the passage above, in the very
same essay - as if to illustrate the principle articulated above - he asserts that his self is unified by
his judgment, which has remained essentially the same his entire life. Such apparent
contradictions, in addition to Montaignes style and the structure that he gives his book,
complicate the task of reading the Essays and have understandably led to diverse interpretations
of its contents.
The stated purposes of Montaignes essays are almost as diverse as their contents. In addition to
the pursuit of self-knowledge, Montaigne also identifies the cultivation of his judgment and the
presentation of a new ethical and philosophical figure to the reading public as fundamental goals
of his project. There are two components to Montaignes pursuit of self-knowledge. The first is
the attempt to understand the human condition in general. This involves reflecting on the beliefs,
values, and behavior of human beings as represented both in literary, historical, and
philosophical texts, and in his own experience. The second is to understand himself as a
particular human being. This involves recording and reflecting upon his own idiosyncratic
tastes, habits, and dispositions. Thus in the Essays one finds a great deal of historical and
autobiographical content, some of which seems arbitrary and insignificant. Yet for Montaigne,
there is no detail that is insignificant when it comes to understanding ourselves: each particle,
each occupation, of a man betrays and reveals him just as well as any other (F 220).
A second aim of essaying himself is to cultivate his judgment. For Montaigne, judgment
refers to all of our intellectual faculties as well as to the particular acts of the intellect; in effect, it
denotes the interpretive lens through which we view the world. In essaying himself, he aims to
cultivate his judgment in a number of discrete but related ways. First, he aims to transform
customary or habitual judgments into reflective judgments by calling them into question. In a
well-known passage from Of custom, and not easily changing an accepted law, Montaigne
discusses how habit puts to sleep the eye of our judgment. To wake up his judgment from
its habitual slumber, Montaigne must call into question those beliefs, values, and judgments that
ordinarily go unquestioned. By doing so, he is able to determine whether or not they are
justifiable, and so whether to take full ownership of them or to abandon them. In this sense we
can talk of Montaigne essaying, or testing, his judgment. We find clear examples of this in
essays such as Of drunkenness and Of the resemblance of children to their fathers, where he
tests his pre-reflective attitudes toward drunkenness and doctors, respectively. Another aspect of
the cultivation of judgment has to do with exercising it through simple practice. Thus Montaigne
writes that in composing his essays, he is presenting his judgment with opportunities to exercise
itself:
Judgment is a tool to use on all subjects, and comes in everywhere. Therefore in the tests
(essais) that I make of it here, I use every sort of occasion. If it is a subject I do not understand
at all, even on that I essay my judgment, sounding the ford from a good distance; and then,
finding it too deep for my height, I stick to the bank. And this acknowledgment that I cannot
cross over is a token of its action, indeed one of those it is most proud of. Sometimes in a vain
and nonexistent subject I try (jessaye) to see if [my judgment] will find the wherewithal to give
it body, prop it up, and support it. Sometimes I lead it to a noble and well-worn subject in which
it has nothing original to discover, the road being so beaten that it can only walk in others
footsteps. There it plays its part by choosing the way that seems best to it, and of a thousand
paths it says that this one or that was the most wisely chosen. (F 219)
The third fundamental goal of essaying himself is to present his unorthodox way of living and
thinking to the reading public of 16th century France. He often remarks his intense desire to
make himself and his unusual ways known to others. Living in a time of war and intolerance, in
which men were concerned above all with honor and their appearance in the public sphere,
Montaigne presents his own way of life as an attractive alternative. While he supports the
monarchy and the Catholic Church, his support is measured and he is decidedly tolerant of other
views and other ways of life (see, for example, Of Cato the Younger). He vehemently opposes
the violent and cruel behavior of many of the supporters of the Catholic cause, and recognizes
the humanity of those who oppose them. Espousing an openness antithetical to contemporary
conventions, he openly declares his faults and failures, both moral and intellectual. Finally, he
emphasizes the values of private life and the fact that the true test of ones character is how one
behaves in private, not how one behaves in public. In other words, Montaigne challenges the
martial virtues of the day that he believes have led to cruelty, hypocrisy, and war, by presenting
himself as an example of the virtues of gentleness, openness, and compromise.
Just as Montaigne presents his ways of life in the ethical and political spheres as alternatives to
the ways common among his contemporaries, so he presents his ways of behaving in the
intellectual sphere as alternatives to the common ways of thinking found among the learned. He
consistently challenges the Aristotelian authority that governed the universities of his day,
emphasizing the particular over the universal, the concrete over the abstract, and experience over
reason. Rejecting the form as well as the content of academic philosophy, he abandons the rigid
style of the medieval quaestio for the meandering and disordered style of the essay. Moreover,
he devalues the faculty of memory, so cultivated by renaissance orators and educators, and
places good judgment in its stead as the most important intellectual faculty. Finally, Montaigne
emphasizes the personal nature of philosophy, and the value of self-knowledge over
metaphysics. His concern is always with the present, the concrete, and the human.
Rather than discursively arguing for the value of his ways of being, both moral and intellectual,
Montaigne simply presents them to his readers:
These are my humors and my opinions; I offer them as what I believe, not what is to be
believed. I aim here only at revealing myself, who will perhaps be different tomorrow, if I learn
something new which changes me. I have no authority to be believed, nor do I want it, feeling
myself too ill-instructed to instruct others. (F 108)
Yet while he disavows authority, he admits that he presents this portrait of himself in the hopes
that others may learn from it (Of practice). Thus the end of essaying himself is simultaneously
private and public. Montaigne desires to know himself, and to cultivate his judgment, and yet at
the same time he seeks to offer his ways of life as salutary alternatives to those around him.
3. Skepticism
Montaigne is perhaps best known among philosophers for his skepticism. Just what exactly his
skepticism amounts to has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. Given the fact that
he undoubtedly draws inspiration for his skepticism from his studies of the ancients, the
tendency has been for scholars to locate him in one of the ancient skeptical traditions. While
some interpret him as a modern Pyrrhonist, others have emphasized what they take to be the
influence of the Academics. Still other scholars have argued that while there are clearly
skeptical moments in his thought, characterizing Montaigne as a skeptic fails to capture the
nature of Montaignes philosophical orientation. Each of these readings captures an aspect of
Montaignes thought, and consideration of the virtues of each of them in turn provides us with a
fairly comprehensive view of Montaignes relation to the various philosophical positions that we
tend to identify as skeptical.
The Pyrrhonian skeptics, according to Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism, use skeptical
arguments to bring about what they call equipollence between opposing beliefs. Once they
recognize two mutually exclusive and equipollent arguments for and against a certain belief, they
have no choice but to suspend judgment. This suspension of judgment, they say, is followed by
tranquility, or peace of mind, which is the goal of their philosophical inquiry.
In Apology for Raymond Sebond, Montaigne expresses great admiration for the Pyrrhonists
and their ability to maintain the freedom of their judgment by avoiding commitment to any
particular theoretical position. We find him employing the skeptical tropes introduced by Sextus
in order to arrive at equipollence and then the suspension of judgment concerning a number of
theoretical issues, from the nature of the divine to the veracity of perception. In other essays,
such as the very first essay of his book, By diverse means we arrive at the same end,
Montaigne employs skeptical arguments to bring about the suspension of judgment concerning
practical matters, such as whether the best way to obtain mercy is by submission or defiance.
Introducing historical examples that speak for each of the two positions, he concludes that truly
man is a marvelously vain, diverse, and undulating object. It is hard to found any constant and
uniform judgment on him (F 5). We cannot arrive at any certain conclusion regarding practical
matters any more than we can regarding theoretical matters.
If there are equipollent arguments for and against any practical course of action, however, we
might wonder how Montaigne is to avoid the practical paralysis that would seem to follow from
the suspension of judgment. Here Sextus tells us that Pyrrhonists do not suffer from practical
paralysis because they allow themselves to be guided by the way things seem to them, all the
while withholding assent regarding the veracity of these appearances. Thus Pyrrhonists are
guided by passive acceptance of what Sextus calls the fourfold observances: guidance by
nature, necessitation by feelings, the handing down of laws and customs, and the teaching of
kinds of expertise. The Pyrrhonist, then, having no reason to oppose what seems evident to her,
will seek food when hungry, avoid pain, abide by local customs, and consult experts when
necessary all without holding any theoretical opinions or beliefs.
In certain cases, Montaigne seems to abide by the fourfold observances himself. At one point in
Apology for Raymond Sebond, for instance, he seems to suggest that his allegiance to the
Catholic Church is due to the fact that he was raised Catholic and Catholicism is the traditional
religion of his country. In other words, it appears that his behavior is the result of adherence to
the fourfold observances of Sextus. This has led some scholars, most notably Richard Popkin, to
interpret him as a skeptical fideist who is arguing that because we have no reasons to abandon
our customary beliefs and practices, we should remain loyal to them. Indeed, Catholics would
employ this argument in the Counter-Reformation movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. (Nonetheless, the Essays would also come to be placed on the Catholic Churchs
Index of Prohibited Books in the late seventeenth century, where it would remain for nearly two
hundred years.)
Yet, for all the affinities between Montaigne and the Pyrrhonists, he does not always suspend
judgment, and he does not take tranquility to be the goal of his philosophical inquiry. Thus
Montaigne at times appears to have more in common with the Academic Skeptics than with the
Pyrrhonists. For the Academics, at certain points in the history of their school, seem to have
allowed for admitting that some judgments are more probable or justified than others, thereby
permitting themselves to make judgments, albeit with a clear sense of their fallibility. Another
hallmark of Academic Skepticism was the strategy of dialectically assuming the premises of
their interlocutors in order to show that they lead to conclusions at odds with the interlocutors
beliefs. Montaigne seems to employ this argumentative strategy in the Apology for Raymond
Sebond. There Montaigne dialectically accepts the premises of Sebonds critics in order to
reveal the presumption and confusion involved in their objections to Sebonds project. For
example, Montaigne shows that according to the understanding of knowledge held by Sebonds
secular critics, there can be no knowledge. This is not the dogmatic conclusion that it has
appeared to be to some scholars, since Montaignes conclusion is founded upon a premise that he
himself clearly rejects. If we understand knowledge as Sebonds critics do, then there can be no
knowledge. But there is no reason why we must accept their notion of knowledge in the first
place. In this way, just as the Academic Skeptics argued that their Stoic opponents ought to
suspend judgment, given the Stoic principles to which they subscribe, so Montaigne shows that
Sebonds secular critics must suspend judgment, given the epistemological principles that they
claim to espouse.
While many scholars, then, justifiably speak of Montaigne as a modern skeptic in one sense or
another, there are others who emphasize aspects of his thought that separate him from the
skeptical tradition. Such scholars point out that many interpretations of Montaigne as a
4. Relativism
One of the primary targets of Montaignes skeptical attack against presumption is ethnocentrism,
or the belief that ones culture is superior to others and therefore is the standard against which all
other cultures, and their moral beliefs and practices, should be measured. This belief in the
moral and cultural superiority of ones own people, Montaigne finds, is widespread. It seems to
be the default belief of all human beings. The first step toward undermining this prejudice is to
display the sheer multiplicity of human beliefs and practices. Thus, in essays such as Of some
ancient customs, Of Custom, and not easily changing an accepted law, and Apology for
Raymond Sebond Montaigne catalogues the variety of behaviors to be found in the world in
order to draw attention to the contingency of his own cultural norms. By reporting many
customs that are direct inversions of contemporary European customs, he creates something like
an inverted world for his readers, stunning their judgment by forcing them to question which way
is up: here men urinate standing up and women do so sitting down; elsewhere it is the opposite.
Here incest is frowned upon; in other cultures it is the norm. Here we bury our dead; there they
eat them. Here we believe in the immortality of the soul; in other societies such a belief is
nonsense.
Montaigne is not terribly optimistic about reforming the prejudices of his contemporaries, for
simply reminding them of the apparent contingency of their own practices in most cases will not
be enough. The power of custom over our habits and beliefs, he argues, is stronger than we tend
to recognize. Indeed, Montaigne devotes almost as much time in the Essays to discussing the
power of custom to shape the way we see the world as he does to revealing the various customs
that he has come across in his reading and his travels. Custom, whether personal or social, puts
to sleep the eye of our judgment, thereby tightening its grip over us, since its effects can only be
diminished through deliberate and self-conscious questioning. It begins to seem as if it is
impossible to escape customs power over our judgment: Each man calls barbarism whatever is
not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the
example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in (F 152).
Montaignes concern with custom and cultural diversity, combined with his rejection of
ethnocentrism, has led many scholars to argue that Montaigne is a moral relativist, that is, that he
holds that that there is no objective moral truth and that therefore moral values are simply
expressions of conventions that enjoy widespread acceptance at a given time and place. Yet
Montaigne never explicitly expresses his commitment to moral relativism, and there are aspects
of the Essays that seem to contradict such an interpretation, as other scholars have noted.
These other scholars are inclined to interpret Montaigne as committed to moral objectivism, or
the theory that there is in fact objective moral truth, and they point to a number of aspects of
the Essays that would support such an interpretation. First, Montaigne does not hesitate to
criticize the practices of other cultures. For instance, in Of cannibals, after praising the virtues
of the cannibals, he criticizes them for certain behaviors that he identifies as morally vicious.
For a relativist, such criticism would be unintelligible: if there is no objective moral truth, it
makes little sense to criticize others for having failed to abide by it. Rather, since there is no
external standard by which to judge other cultures, the only logical course of action is to pass
over them in silence. Then there are moments when Montaigne seems to refer to categorical
duties, or moral obligations that are not contingent upon either our own preferences or cultural
norms (see, for example, the conclusion of Of cruelty). Finally, Montaigne sometimes seems
to allude to the existence of objective moral truth, for instance in Of some verses of Virgil and
Of the useful and the honorable, where he distinguishes between relative and absolute values.
Thus Montaignes position regarding moral relativism remains the subject of scholarly dispute.
What is not a matter of dispute, however, is that Montaigne was keenly interested in
undermining his readers thoughtless attitudes towards members of cultures different from their
own, and that his account of the force of custom along with his critique of ethnocentrism had an
impact on important later thinkers (see below).
making an argument on the basis of truth claims as he is simply changing the subject, diverting
the attention of his readers away from the realm of the transcendent and its categorical
obligations to the temporal realm and its private pleasures. Still others hold that politics does not
occupy the central place in the Essays that some might think, and that the political content of
the Essays is neither dogmatic nor rhetorical, but rather is part and parcel of his fundamental
project of seeking self-knowledge for himself and inspiring that same desire in others. On this
interpretation, Montaignes political project is much more modest. He is simply offering a new
moral and political figure to be considered, inviting readers to reflect for themselves on their own
beliefs and practices in an effort to act as a Socratic gadfly to the slumbering French body
politic. While it must be left to the reader to decide the extent to which a full-fledged political
doctrine can be discovered in the Essays, as well as whether Montaigne is attempting to exert
direct influence over his readers, it is nonetheless possible to identify a number of attitudes,
values, and commitments that are central both to Montaignes moral and political thought and to
modern liberalism.
First and foremost is Montaignes commitment to tolerance. Always amazed at the diversity of
the forms of life that exist in the world, Montaigne consistently remarks his tolerant attitude
toward those whose ways of life or fundamental beliefs and values differ from his own; he is not
threatened by such disagreements, and he does not view those who are different as in need of
correction:
I do not share that common error of judging another by myself. I easily believe that another man
may have qualities different from mine. Because I feel myself tied down to one form, I do not
oblige everybody else to espouse it, as all others do. I believe in and conceive a thousand
contrary ways of life (faons de vie); and in contrast with the common run of men, I more easily
admit difference than resemblance between us. I am as ready as you please to acquit another man
from sharing my conditions and principles. I consider him simply in himself, without relation to
others; I mold him to his own model. (F 169)
While radical skepticism does not in and of itself entail a tolerant attitude towards others, it
seems that Montaignes more modest skepticism, if combined with a commitment to an objective
moral order the nature of which he cannot demonstrate, might explain his unwillingness to
condemn those who are different.
Montaignes commitment to toleration of difference produces a fairly robust distinction between
the private and public spheres in his thought. When discussing his tenure as mayor in Of
husbanding your will, for example, he insists that there is a clear distinction to be made between
Montaigne the mayor and Montaigne himself. He performs his office dutifully, but he does not
identify himself with his public persona or his role as citizen, and he believes that there are limits
to what may be expected from him by the state. Similarly, he makes a sharp distinction between
true friendship and the sort of acquaintances produced by working relationships. While he
believes he owes everything to his friends and he expects the same in return, from those with
whom he is bound by some professional relationship, he expects nothing but the competent
performance of their offices. Their religion or their sexual habits, for example, are no concern of
his (see Of friendship).
In part, Montaignes tolerance and his commitment to the separation of the private and public
spheres are the products of his attitude towards happiness. Aristotelianism and Christianity, the
two dominant intellectual forces of Montaignes time, emphasize the objective character of
human happiness, the core content of which is fundamentally the same for all members of the
human species. These conceptions of happiness each rest on the notion of a universal human
nature. Montaigne, so impressed by the diversity that he finds among human beings, speaks of
happiness in terms of a subjective state of mind, a type of satisfaction which differs from
particular human being to particular human being (see That the taste of good and evil depends
in large part on the opinion we have of them, Apology for Raymond Sebond, and Of
experience). Convinced of the possibility that the content of happiness differs so significantly
from one person to the next, Montaigne wishes to preserve a private sphere in which individuals
can attempt to realize that happiness without having to contend with the interference of society.
Another distinctively modern feature of Montaignes moral thought is the fact that when he treats
moral issues, he almost always does so without appealing to theology. This is not to say that he
does not believe that God underwrites the principles of morality (an issue which cannot be
decided on the basis of the text), but simply that Montaignes moral discourse is not underwritten
by theology, but rather by empathetic concerns for the well being of the other and the
preservation of the social bond. Thus he identifies cruelty to other living beings as the extreme
of all vices (see Of cruelty), while dishonesty comes second in Montaignes ordering of the
vices, since as human beings we are held together chiefly by our word (see Of giving the lie).
Other vices he treats in terms of the degree to which they clash with society. So, for instance, he
finds that drunkenness is not altogether bad, as it is not always harmful to society and it provides
pleasures that add greatly to our enjoyment of life (Of drunkenness).
Montaigne has been thought by some to have been a hedonist, and while others would disagree
with this interpretation, there is no doubt that he thinks pleasure is an integral part of a happy
human life, and a very real motivating force in human actions, whether virtuous or vicious.
Much of his ethical reflection centers around the question of how to live as a human being,
rather than as a beast or an angel, and he argues that those who disdain pleasure and attempt to
achieve moral perfection as individuals, or who expect political perfection from states, end up
resembling beasts more than angels. Thus throughout the Essays the acceptance of imperfection,
both in individual human beings and in social and political entities, is thematic.
This acceptance of imperfection as a condition of human private and social life, when combined
with his misgivings about those who earnestly seek perfection, leads Montaigne to what has
appeared to some as a commitment to political conservatism. Yet this conservatism is not
grounded in theoretical principles that endorse monarchy or the status quo as good in and of
itself. Rather, his conservatism is the product of circumstance. As he writes in Of custom, and
not easily changing an accepted law, he has witnessed firsthand the disastrous effects of
attempts at political innovation, and this has led him to be generally suspicious of attempts to
improve upon political institutions in anything more than a piecemeal fashion. Yet this rule is
not without its exceptions. In the next breath he expresses the view that there are times when
innovation is called for, and it is the work of judgment to determine when those times arise.
6. Influence
Montaignes influence has been diverse and widespread. In the seventeenth century, it was his
skepticism that proved most influential among philosophers and theologians. After Montaignes
death, his friend Pierre Charron, himself a prominent Catholic theologian, produced two
works, Les Trois Vritez (1594) and La Sagesse (1601), that drew heavily from the Essays. The
former was primarily a theological treatise that united Pyrrhonian skepticism and Christian
Montaigne, Michel de. The Complete Essays. Translated by M.A. Screech. New York: Penguin, 1991.
Montaigne, Michel de. Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Works. Translated by Donald M. Frame.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.
Includes the Travel Journal from Montaignes trip to Rome as well as letters from his
correspondence.
b. Secondary Sources
Brush, Craig B. Montaigne and Bayle: Variations on the Theme of Skepticism. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
Frame, Donald M. Montaigne: A Biography. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965.
Friedrich, Hugo. Montaigne. Edited by Philippe Desan. Translated by Dawn Eng. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1991.
Gauna, Max. Montaigne and the Ethics of Compassion. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000.
Hallie, Philip. The Scar of Montaigne: An Essay in Personal Philosophy. Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press, 1966.
Hartle, Ann. Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
La Charit, Raymond C. The Concept of Judgment in Montaigne. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
Langer, Ullrich, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005.
Levine, Alan. Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaignes Politics of the Self. Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2001.
Nehamas, Alexander. The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998.
Popkin, Richard. The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003.
Quint, David. Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy: Ethical and Political Themes in the Essais. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998.
Argues that Montaignes primary concern in the Essays is to replace the martial conception of
virtue prevalent during his time with a new conception of virtue more conducive to the preservation of
public peace.
Regosin, Richard. The Matter of My Book: Montaignes Essays as the Book of the Self. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1977.
A literary study examining the relation between Montaignes text and his conception of the
self.
Sayce, Richard. The Essays of Montaigne: A Critical Exploration. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972.
Schaefer, David Lewis. The Political Philosophy of Montaigne. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Argues that the Essays are more systematic than they initially appear, and that Montaignes
primary project in writing them was to transform the political and social orders of his time.
Interprets Montaignes ranking of cruelty as the worst vice as both a radical rejection of the
religious and political conventions of his time and a foundational moment in the history of liberalism.
Starobinski, Jean. Montaigne in Motion. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985.
A postmodern reading the Essays that deals with major themes such as the body, friendship,
the public and the private, and death.
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989.
Author Information
Christopher Edelman
Email: edelman@uiwtx.edu
University of the Incarnate Word
U. S. A.
Neo-Stoicism
Neo-Stoicism (or Neostoicism) is the name given to a late Renaissance philosophical movement
that attempted to revive ancient Stoicism in a form that would be acceptable to a Christian
audience. This involved the rejection or modification of certain parts of the Stoic system,
especially physical doctrines such as materialism and determinism. The key text founding this
movement was Justus Lipsiuss De Constantia ("On Constancy") of 1584. After Lipsius the
other key exponent of Neostoicism was Guillaume Du Vair. Other figures that have been
associated with this movement include Pierre Charron, Francisco de Quevedo, and Michel de
Montaigne.
Table of Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
practice simply reflected the predominance of moral themes within the available sources, namely
the Latin works of Seneca and Cicero. However, at least some knowledge of Stoic physics was
readily accessible in works such as Cicero's De Natura Deorum ('On the Nature of the
Gods), De Divinatione (On Divination), and De Fato (On Fate). The existence of a forged
correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul, accepted as genuine by St. Augustine and St.
Jerome, may well have contributed to the thought that it was possible to combine Stoic ethics
with Christian teaching.
In marked contrast, the attempt to revive Stoic pantheistic physics by David of Dinant ended
with declarations of heresy and the burning of books. His identification of God with primary
matter led to his condemnation in 1210 and he was forced to flee France. Consequently none of
his works survive except as brief quotations in the hostile polemics of St. Albert the Great and
St. Thomas Aquinas. Although medieval Christian authorities were apparently open to the use of
Stoic ethics as a supplement to Christian teaching, they certainly remained suspicious of Stoic
physics, which was at best pantheistic and at worst materialist and atheistic.
This, then, was the background to the late Renaissance attempt to revive Stoicism. Stoic ethics
was thought to contain much that could be commended to the Christian, but only if carefully
disentangled from Stoic physics. In attempting this careful operation, the remarks of the Church
Fathers proved to be especially influential. These impeccable Christian authorities could be cited
without fear of reproach from the Church.
Another Stoic doctrine that aroused some controversy was the ideal of impassiveness (apatheia).
As we have already seen, it was with reference to this notion that Calvin criticised the 'new
Stoics' (novi Stoici) of his day. Christian discussion of this Stoic idea dates back at least to St.
Augustine who initially appears to have been sympathetic (e.g. De Ordine) but later became
more critical. The issue is closely bound with judgements concerning the power of reason. For
the Stoics, the wise man or sage (sophos) can overcome all unwanted emotions by rational
analysis of his judgements. For a Christian, however, this should only be possible with the help
of Gods grace. It is the love of God, rather than the exercise of philosophical reason, that frees
the Christian from mental disturbances. This is the position that St. Augustine affirms in his later
works (e.g. De Civitate Dei). It is thus possible, using St Augustine alone, to cite a Church Father
both for and against this Stoic doctrine.
The Neostoic must be careful here. Lipsius's entire project in De Constantia is primarily
philosophical. His concern is to promote rational reflection concerning emotional distress in
order overcome it. Following the Stoic Epictetus, Lipsius affirms that the philosophers school
should be conceived as a doctors surgery (Const.1.10), a place where one can find medicine for
the soul. Thus Lipsius affirms the power of philosophical analysis to enable one to overcome the
emotions. This conflicts with the attitudes of both the mature St. Augustine and Calvin. Although
Neostoicim includes numerous concessions to Christian teaching, this affirmation of the power
of reason shows that its philosophical commitment to Stoicism took priority over a strict
adherence to the Christian faith. Neostoics were later criticised for precisely this by Christian
authors such as Pascal.
Despite these difficulties, Neostoicism could point to the Stoic affirmation of virtue over
pleasure (in opposition to unquestionably heretical Epicureanism) and to the Stoic attitude of
indifference towards material possessions. Thus it became commonplace for Christians with
Neostoic leanings to affirm the benefit that could be gained from the study of Stoic texts. The
first translation of Epictetus's Enchiridion ('Handbook) into English (in 1567) was prefaced with
the remark that "the authoure whereof although he were an ethnicke, yet he wrote very godly &
christianly". Similarly, a translation of a Neostoic text into English began with the claim that
"philosophie in generall is profitable unto a Christian man, if it be well and rightly used: but no
kinde of philosophie is more profitable and neerer approaching unto Christianitie than the
philosophie of the Stoicks".
4. Selected Neostoics
Neostoicism was never an organized intellectual movement. Thus modern scholars do not always
agree upon a fixed list of 'Neostoics'. When used in its most restricted sense, the term is reserved
only for Justus Lipsius and Guillaume Du Vair (see below). When used in its widest sense, it is
applied to almost any sixteenth or seventeenth century author whose works display the influence
of Stoic ideas. The following are some of the more obvious candidates after Lipsius himself.
Bible. Noting that the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, was of Semitic origin, Quevedo claimed that
the biblical account of Job's heroic endurance in the face of adversity was the inspiration behind
Stoic philosophy. The doctrines of Epictetus are thus, suggests Quevedo, simply formal ethical
principles extrapolated from the actions of Job. Yet despite this bold, if untenable, vindication of
Stoicism, Quevedo remains wary of calling himself a Stoic. Thus he concludes the essay by
saying "I would not myself boast of being a Stoic, but I hold them in high esteem".
5. Conclusion
Neostoicism was an important intellectual movement at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of
the seventeenth centuries. Yet it is little known to many historians of philosophy. The themes
with which it dealt can be seen to form the background to a number of themes in seventeenth
century philosophy, especially the accounts of the passions in Descartes and Spinoza.
Moreover, the term 'Neostoicism' is useful to refer to Christian authors inspired by Stoic ethical
ideas, for Christian Stoicism is, strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. Although Stoicism
may be characterized as a pantheist philosophy, it is also a materialist and determinist
philosophy. The orthodox Christian can never, at the same time, be a Stoic. However he can
admire certain parts of Stoic ethics and the Neostoic movement indicates that in the late
Renaissance many indeed did.
Two Bookes Of Constancie, Englished by Sir John Stradling, Edited with an Introduction by Rudolf Kirk
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1939)
References to other works by Lipsius and studies concerned directly with him can be found at the
end of the IEP article Justus Lipsius.
b. Other Neostoics
CHARRON, P., De la sagesse livres trois (Bordeaux: Simon Millanges, 1601) and later editions - translated
as Of Wisdom, Three Books, Made English by George Stanhope, 2 vols (London, 1697)
DU VAIR, G., De la sainte philosophie, Philosophie morale des Stoques, ed. G. Michaut (Paris: Vrin, 1945)
- part translated in The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks, Englished by Thomas James, Edited by Rudolf Kirk
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951)
MONTAIGNE, M. de, Essais, ed. F. Strowski, sous les auspices de la commission des archives municipales,
5 vols (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Nouvelle F. Pech, 1906-33) - translated as The Complete Essays, trans. M. A.
Screech (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991)
QUEVEDO, F. de, 'Stoic Doctrine', trans. L. Deitz & A. Wiehe-Deitz, in J. Kraye, ed., Cambridge
Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts 1: Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 210-225.
c. Studies of Neostoicism
COPENHAVER, B. P., & C. B. SCHMITT, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992)
ETTINGHAUSEN, H., Francisco de Quevedo and the Neostoic Movement (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1972)
LAGRE, J., Juste Lipse et la restauration du stocisme: tude et traduction des traits stociens De la
constance, Manuel de philosophie stocienne, Physique des stociens (Paris: Vrin, 1994)
MOREAU, J.-P., ed., Le stocisme au XVIe et au XVIIe sicle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1999)
MORFORD, M., Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1991)
OESTREICH, G., Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, trans. D. McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982)
ZANTA, L., La renaissance du stocisme au XVIe sicle (Paris: Champion, 1914)
COLISH, M. L., The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1985;
rev. edn 1990)
LAPIDGE, M., 'The Stoic Inheritance', in P. Dronke, ed., A History of Twelfth-Century Western
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 81-112.
OSLER, M. J., ed., Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
REYNOLDS, L. D., The Medieval Tradition of Seneca's Letters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965)
SPANNEUT, M., Le Stocisme des Pres de l'glise: De Clment de Rome Clment dAlexandrie (Paris:
Seuil, 1957)
SPANNEUT, M. Permanence du Stocisme: De Znon Malraux (Gembloux: Duculot, 1973)
VERBEKE, G., The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1983)
Author Information
John Sellars
Email: john.sellars (at) wolfson.ox.ac.uk
University of the West of England
United Kingdom
Table of Contents
1. Biography
2. Philosophy
a. Knowledge of Philosophy
b. Epistemology
c. Influence
3. References and Further Reading
. Primary Sources
a. Secondary Sources
1. Biography
John Calvin, (1509-1564) was born in Noyon, the son of a notary, Gerard Cauvin, and his wife,
Jeanne LeFranc. Although Calvin's father displayed no particular piety, his mother is recorded as
having taken him to visit shrines, and on one such occasion he is supposed to have kissed a
fragment of the head of St. Ann. Calvin was the fourth of five sons in a family that was definitely
not of the aristocracy. Normally, this would have worked against his chances of receiving a
thorough education,but through the good fortune of his father's professional relationship to a
family of the local nobility, he received a private education with that family's children. Having
distinguished himself at an early age, Calvin was deemed worthy of receiving the support of a
benefice, a church-granted stipend, at the age of 12, so as to support him in his studies. Although
normally benefices were granted as payment for work for the church, either present or in the
future, there is no record that Calvin ever performed any duties for this position. Later on he held
two more benefices, for which he also did no work. Thus supported by the Church, at age 14,
Calvin was enrolled at the College de la Marche in the University of Paris, though he quickly
transferred to the College de Montaigu.
In Paris, Calvin first came into contact with the new humanistic learning while preparing for a
career as a priest,. Though all the contacts which Calvin made cannot be traced, it seems clear
that he met many of the leading humanists of his day. Calvin earned his masters degree at the age
of 18. However, he did not proceed with his original plan to prepare for a clerical career. Gerard
Cauvin, recently excommunicated in a dispute with the cathedral chapter at Noyon, ordered his
son to enroll instead at Orleans in the law faculty. Calvin obeyed, and applied himself, finishing
his doctorate in law sometime before 14 January 1532. In that same year, his first published book
appeared, a commentary on Seneca's De Clementia. Significantly, it contains no overt evidence
of an awareness of, let alone a preoccupation with, the contemporary events in the religious
world.
Around 1533, Calvin experienced a "subita conversione," a sudden conversion. As Calvin is
notoriously reticent about revealing his personal life, his writings do not grant much insight as to
the exact time or cause of this event. Ganoczy relates it to the prosecution of Cop for heresy,
during which Calvin fled Paris, and at which time his apartment was searched and his papers
confiscated. In any case, on May 4, 1534, he appeared in Noyon, and surrendered his clerical
benefices. Probably from that point on, Calvin no longer had a personal attachment to the church
of Rome.
Writing rapidly, Calvin finished the first edition of his Institutes of the Christian Religion in
1536. It enjoyed a wide popular demand, and the original supply was exhausted within a year.
Instead of simply reprinting it, Calvin revised it, and the edition of 1539 expanded substantially
the original work. This would be Calvin's pattern throughout the subsequent Latin editions of
1543, 1550, and 1559. French editions were printed in 1545 and 1560, and Calvin's French is
easily as influential as Luther's German for the formation of the modern vernacular. Each Latin
edition was a rearrangement of earlier material, as well as the addition of new components. If
this had been the sole gift from Calvin's pen, it might seem enough. But Calvin also wrote
commentaries on almost every book of the Bible, issued numerous tracts, and preached almost
every day in Geneva.
Geneva was to be Calvin's triumph and tribulation. In 1536, Guillaume Farel shamed Calvin into
sharing the leadership of Geneva. This period of Calvin's life lasted until the city council threw
him out in April of 1538. Calvin was too rigid for their taste. He settled in Strasbourg, and
pastored a congregation. It was here that he began his other life work: commenting upon the
books of the Bible. Beginning with the Romans commentary, written at least partially and
published in Strasbourg in 1540, Calvin would comment upon most of the books of the scripture.
However, Geneva called him back in 1541. Calvin, believing that Geneva was his particular call,
returned. He was to live there, alternately supporting and berating the council, until his death in
1564. It was in this period that Calvin made his other great contribution to the Church, preparing,
and then forcing the city council to ratify, his Ecclesiastical Ordinances of the Church of Geneva.
In this, all the principles of Reformed polity are found. In 1564, debilitated by a series of
illnesses, Calvin died in Geneva. By the terms of his will, he was buried in an unmarked grave,
so as to avoid any possibility of idolatry.
Calvin's thought is marked by a constant dialectic between the perspective of a wholly pure and
good creator (God) and the corrupted created being (humanity). His anthropology and
soteriology shows his dependence on Augustine, with the will being somewhat limited in human
application, and powerless to effect change in its status vis--vis salvation. However, Calvin
balances that with a hearty emphasis on human response to God's love and mercy in the created
order, by correct action both in the human world and the world of nature.
2. Philosophy
a. Knowledge of Philosophy
Given Calvin's occasional antipathy for philosophers, it is all too tempting to dismiss him as
someone who knew very little philosophy, striking out at that which he did not know. However
tempting that may be, it simply is untrue. In the Institutes, his treatises, and the commentaries,
Calvin continually demonstrates a familiarity with both general and specific philosophical
knowledge which seems to have been gained through his own study of their writings. What
seems most significant about Calvin's use of philosophy is that in general, he refuses to accept a
philosophical system. Instead, he considers philosophy as the history of human wisdom's attempt
to search out answers to the questions of human existence. Thus, philosophers and their theories
become paradigms for consideration, rather than structures for the organization of thought.
Hence, Calvin's effort at using philosophy must be understood as part of his humanism, rather
than a tool of the coherence of systematization of his thought. Calvin placed logic in the
curriculum of the Genevan Academy. He could illustrate faith with the four-fold causality of
Aristotle. He can use the thoughts of the philosophers as aids to training the mind, and believed
that not many pastors, and certainly no doctor of the church could be ignorant of philosophy.
However, that respect lived in constant tension with his irritation at the efforts of philosophy
(and philosophers) at exceeding their proper place.
b. Epistemology
As noted, Calvin can seem overly harsh about philosophy. Concerning the knowledge of God,
Calvin states that it is at this point that it becomes clear "how volubly has the whole tribe of
philosophers shown their stupidity and silliness! For even though we may excuse the others (who
act like utter fools), Plato, the most religious of all and the most circumspect, also vanishes in his
round globe." (Institutes of Christian Religion I.v.11) Calvin finds that even the most wise
philosophers do not compare to the "sacred reading," which has within itself the power to move
the very heart of the reader. (ICR I.viii.1) The power of the scripture is that it carries the gospel,
ensured by the Holy Spirit's presence, so that its words can transport the soul. God's purpose,
Calvin states, in the scriptural teaching of his infinite and spiritual essence, is to refute even
subtle speculations of secular philosophy. (ICR I.viii.1) Even those who have attained the
intellectual first rank, cannot reach the eminence which is natural to the Gospel. (Commentary on
I Corinthians 2.7).
However, Calvin is not anti-philosophical, hating the works of philosophers and philosophy in
general. If so, would he have required logic in the Genevan Academy? Rather, he wished to turn
the question of wisdom and philosophy clearly towards obedience to Christ. Thus, in the
commentary on I Corinthians, Calvin writes that
"For whatever knowledge and understanding a man has counts for nothing unless it rests upon
true wisdom; and it is of no more value for grasping spiritual teaching than the eye of a blind
man for distinguishing colours. Both of these must be carefully attended to, that (1) knowledge
of all the sciences is so much smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ; and (2) that man
with all his shrewdness is as stupid about understanding by himself the mysteries of God as an
ass is incapable of understanding musical harmony."
The interesting point about this passage is that Calvin is neither denigrating human philosophy,
nor human reason. He is, rather, discussing what the true purpose of that knowledge or
understanding should be, and what the real foundation of human knowledge is. Here, Calvin is
not moving back to an Aristotelian self-evident principle; his foundation is instead true wisdom.
For Calvin, the phrase "true wisdom" (vera sapientia) hearkens immediately to the beginning
sentence of the Institutes. (ICR I.i.1) It was that basis of "true and sound wisdom" (vera ac solida
sapientia) which Calvin was seeking, the only place from which epistemology could be safely
grounded. Reason, and the fruits of reason, have their place. However, that place does not
command a privilege over revealed wisdom.
This instrumental view allows Calvin to give high praise to the fruits of reason. Human reason
can even occasionally ascend to consider the truths which are more properly above its grasp, but
cannot provide the necessary controls to make sure that its investigations are carefully and
correctly considered. "Reason is intelligent enough to taste something of things above, although
it is more careless about investigating these." (ICR II.ii.13). Calvin divides reason, giving it
various depths of penetration according to its subject matter. He could write "this then, is the
distinction: that there is one kind of understanding of earthly things; another of heavenly. I call
'earthly things' those which do not pertain to God or his Kingdom, to true justice, or to the
blessedness of the future life; but which have their significance and relationship with regard to
the present life and are, in a sense, confined within its bounds." (ICR II.ii.13)
Thus, Calvin is simply fulfilling his own division when he comments from I Corinthians 3 that
"The apostle does not ask us to make a total surrender of the wisdom which is either innate or
acquired by long experience. He only asks that we subjugate it to God, so that all our wisdom
might be derived from His Word." (Commentary on I Corinthians 3.18). Calvin is wishing, quite
explicitly, to consider the various arts as maid-servants. He cautions against making them
mistresses.
There can be no doubt that Calvin made this move for at least two reasons. The first is that for
Calvin, the effects of sin are far more drastic than for some other Christian thinkers. Sin has
corrupted not only the will, but also the intellect. After the introduction of sin into the world,
human possibility is radically limited, and no un-aided intellect, not even the sharpest, will be
able to penetrate into the mysteries of God's truth and Gods current will for humanity.
As important as that insight is another which many have failed to grasp. Calvin's theology
involves a radical notion of Gods accommodation to human capacity, or more truly, human
frailty. Even before the Fall, humans were only able to know God because of God's selfdisclosure; humans were only able to please God because of Gods prior guidance in the form of
rules. There was never a moment when humans were able truly to initiate either the knowledge
of God or the movement toward God. That is immeasurably more true after the establishment of
sin in the world, and its effects. Calvin thus dismisses all efforts at going beyond the scriptures
(and a great deal of classical metaphysics), as pure speculation, both wrong and sinful.
c. Influence
Perhaps strangely, Calvin's legacy on the subordinate position of philosophy in the search for
divine truth is neither clear, nor lasting. During his own lifetime, Genevan theologians such as
Theodore Beza were far more sanguine about grasping the tools of scholastic theology and
philosophy, and seem to have been moving away from that hierarchy upon which Calvin
insisted. Within the next century, some of the foremost Protestant scholastic theologians would
teach at the Genevan Academy, or at least have their ideas taught there.
A modern theological and historiographical struggle exists over what that change entails, and
what its significance must be. Some, like Brian G. Armstrong, have argued that this shift towards
scholastic models of thought represent an inevitable shift in the content of Reformed theology,
and thus a falling away from Calvin's theological project. Others, notably Richard Muller, have
contended that there was not an original time without scholastic theology, and that scholastic
method is content neutral. In any case, what is clear is that by the mid-17th century, the caution
which Calvin so frequently expressed about the use of philosophy, had been lost. With its loss
came the loss of Calvin's distinctive appropriation of philosophy.
a. Primary Sources
Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia. 59 volumes. Edited by Wilhelm Baum, Edward Cunitz, & Edward Reuss.
Brunswick: Schwetschke and Sons, 1895.
Opera Selecta. 5 volumes. 3rd ed. Edited by Peter Barth and Wilhelm Niesel. Munich: Christian Kaiser,
1967.
This represents a modern effort to provide true critical editions of Calvin's exegetical works,
the first volumes present fine texts.
Registres du Consistoire de Genve au Temps de Calvin. Tome I (1542-1544). Edited by Thomas A. Lambert
and Isabella M. Watt. Geneva: Droz, 1996.
Along with later volumes, this allows a far greater contextualization of Calvin than
previously possible.
Institutes of the Christian Religion. 2 volumes. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles, edited by John T.
McNeill. Library of Christian Classics. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.
Calvin's Commentaries, translated by the Calvin Translation Society, 1843-1855; reprint, Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Baker, 1979, 22 volumes.
Calvin's New Testament Commentaries, 12 volumes. Edited by David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960.
Calvin's Old Testament Commentaries, Rutherford House Translation, ed. D. F. Wright. Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1993-.
The standard English translation of Calvin's final Latin edition of the Institutes.
Probably the most widely read edition of Calvin's New Testament commentaries.
b. Secondary Sources
Bieler, Andre. The Social Humanism of Calvin. Translated by Paul T. Fuhrmann. Richmond: John Knox
Press, 1961.
Bouwsma, William. John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
framework.
Breen, Quirinus. John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism. 2nd ed. New York: Archon Books, 1968.
Cottret, Bernard. Calvin: A Biography. Translated by M. Wallace McDonald. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2000.
The newest biography of Calvin, written from a historian's viewpoint, and supplying rich
contextual detail for consideration of Calvin's influences.
Davis, Thomas J. The Clearest Promises of God: The Development of Calvin's Eucharistic Teaching. New
York: AMS Press, 1995.
Dowey, Edward A. Jr. The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans, 1994.
The clearest setting out of Calvin's eucharistic teaching and its development.
Essentially unchanged from its appearance in 1952, still indispensable for its categories and
its vital grasp of the Reformer's thought.
Gamble, Richard C. Articles on Calvin and Calvinism, 9 vols. New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1992.
Gathers together most of the significant articles on Calvin, other fine collections exist, but
this is the most comprehensive.
Ganoczy, Alexandre. The Young Calvin. Translated by David Foxgrover and Wade Provo. Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1987.
Kingdon, Robert. Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France, 1555-1563. Geneve: Librairie
E. Droz, 1956.
This seminal work demonstrated the importance of solid historical work to undergird any
effort at understanding Calvin's world.
McGrath, Alister E. A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture. Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell Publishers, 1990.
Millet, Olivier. Calvin et la dynamique de la parole: Etude de Rhtorique rforme. Geneve: Editions
Slatkine: 1992.
Not yet translated, but too important to leave off the list - this magisterial work opens new
vistas of research into rhetoric, the early use of theological French, and Calvin's linguistic skills.
Muller, Richard. The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
A conscious effort at returning Calvin studies toward the texts and thought-worlds of the
sixteenth century.
Naphy, William. Calvin and the Consolidation of the Genevan Reformation. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1994.
Parker, T.H.L. Calvin's New Testament Commentaries. 2nd ed. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1993.
Calvin's Old Testament Commentaries. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986.
Together, these two volumes serve as a fine introduction to Calvin's major life work - the
exposition of the scripture.
Probably the best place to begin in considering Calvin's knowledge of Greek and Latin
philosophy.
Schreiner, Susan E. The Theater of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin.
Studies in Historical Theology. Durham: Labyrinth Press, 1991.
The best textually-argued source for considering Calvin's appropriation of the created order.
This set of essays argues convincingly for understanding Calvin always within the stream of
tradition he inherited.
Thompson, John. The Daughters of Sarah: Women in Regular and Exceptional Roles in the Exegesis of
Calvin, His Predecessors, and His Contemporaries. Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1992.
Demonstrates the promise of considering new questions through solid history of exegetical
models.
Wendel, Franois. Calvin: Origins and Development of His Religious Thought. Translated by Philip Mairet.
Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1987.
Zachman, Randall C. The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin.
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993.
A sensitive study of how the different grasp of a critical concept led to quite different
outcomes in the thought of two giants of the Reformation.
Author Information:
R. Ward Holder
Assistant Professor of Theology
St. Anselm College
U. S. A.
Sir Francis Bacon (later Lord Verulam and the Viscount St.
Albans) was an English lawyer, statesman, essayist, historian, intellectual reformer, philosopher,
and champion of modern science. Early in his career he claimed all knowledge as his province
and afterwards dedicated himself to a wholesale revaluation and re-structuring of traditional
learning. To take the place of the established tradition (a miscellany of Scholasticism, humanism,
and natural magic), he proposed an entirely new system based on empirical and inductive
principles and the active development of new arts and inventions, a system whose ultimate goal
would be the production of practical knowledge for the use and benefit of men and the relief of
the human condition.
At the same time that he was founding and promoting this new project for the advancement of
learning, Bacon was also moving up the ladder of state service. His career aspirations had been
largely disappointed under Elizabeth I, but with the ascension of James his political fortunes
rose. Knighted in 1603, he was then steadily promoted to a series of offices, including Solicitor
General (1607), Attorney General (1613), and eventually Lord Chancellor (1618). While serving
as Chancellor, he was indicted on charges of bribery and forced to leave public office. He then
retired to his estate where he devoted himself full time to his continuing literary, scientific, and
philosophical work. He died in 1626, leaving behind a cultural legacy that, for better or worse,
includes most of the foundation for the triumph of technology and for the modern world as we
currently know it.
Table of Contents
1. Life and Political Career
2. Thought and Writings
a. Literary Works
b. The New Atlantis
c. Scientific and Philosophical Works
d. The Great Instauration
e. The Advancement of Learning
When the coup plot failed, Devereux was arrested, tried, and eventually executed, with Bacon, in
his capacity as Queens Counsel, playing a vital role in the prosecution of the case.
In 1603, James I succeeded Elizabeth, and Bacons prospects for advancement dramatically
improved. After being knighted by the king, he swiftly ascended the ladder of state and from
1604-1618 filled a succession of high-profile advisory positions:
1604 Appointed Kings Counsel.
1607 Named Solicitor General.
1608 Appointed Clerk of the Star Chamber.
1613 Appointed Attorney General.
1616 Made a member of the Privy Council.
1617 Appointed Lord Keeper of the Royal Seal (his fathers former office).
1618 Made Lord Chancellor.
As Lord Chancellor, Bacon wielded a degree of power and influence that he could only have
imagined as a young lawyer seeking preferment. Yet it was at this point, while he stood at the
very pinnacle of success, that he suffered his great Fall. In 1621 he was arrested and charged
with bribery. After pleading guilty, he was heavily fined and sentenced to a prison term in the
Tower of London. Although the fine was later waived and Bacon spent only four days in the
Tower, he was never allowed to sit in Parliament or hold political office again.
The entire episode was a terrible disgrace for Bacon personally and a stigma that would cling to
and injure his reputation for years to come. As various chroniclers of the case have pointed out,
the accepting of gifts from suppliants in a law suit was a common practice in Bacons day, and it
is also true that Bacon ended up judgingagainst the two petitioners who had offered the fateful
bribes. Yet the damage was done, and Bacon to his credit accepted the judgment against him
without excuse. According to his own Essayes, or Counsels, he should have known and done
better. (In this respect it is worth noting that during his forced retirement, Bacon revised and
republished the Essayes, injecting an even greater degree of shrewdness into a collection already
notable for its worldliness and keen political sense.) Macaulay in a lengthy essay declared Bacon
a great intellect but (borrowing a phrase from Bacons own letters) a most dishonest man, and
more than one writer has characterized him as cold, calculating, and arrogant. Yet whatever his
flaws, even his enemies conceded that during his trial he accepted his punishment nobly, and
moved on.
Bacon spent his remaining years working with renewed determination on his lifelong project: the
reform of learning and the establishment of an intellectual community dedicated to the discovery
of scientific knowledge for the use and benefit of men. The former Lord Chancellor died on 9
April, 1626, supposedly of a cold or pneumonia contracted while testing his theory of the
preservative and insulating properties of snow.
during his last five years that he was able to concentrate exclusively on writing and produce, in
addition to a handful of minor pieces:
Two substantial volumes of history and biography, The History of the Reign of King
Henry the Seventh and The History of the Reign of King Henry the Eighth.
De Augmentis Scientiarum (an expanded Latin version of his earlier Advancement of
Learning).
The final 1625 edition of his Essayes, or Counsels.
The remarkable Sylva Sylvarum, or A Natural History in Ten Centuries (a curious hodgepodge of scientific experiments, personal observations, speculations, ancient teachings,
and analytical discussions on topics ranging from the causes of hiccups to explanations
for the shortage of rain in Egypt). Artificially divided into ten centuries (that is, ten
chapters, each consisting of one hundred items), the work was apparently intended to be
included in Part Three of the Magna Instauratio.
His utopian science-fiction novel The New Atlantis, which was published in unfinished
form a year after his death.
Various parts of his unfinished magnum opus Magna Instauratio (or Great Instauration),
including a Natural History of Winds and a Natural History of Life and Death.
These late productions represented the capstone of a writing career that spanned more than four
decades and encompassed virtually an entire curriculum of literary, scientific, and philosophical
studies.
a. Literary Works
Despite the fanatical claims (and very un-Baconian credulity) of a few admirers, it is a virtual
certainty that Bacon did not write the works traditionally attributed to William Shakespeare.
Even so, the Lord Chancellors high place in the history of English literature as well as his
influential role in the development of English prose style remain well-established and secure.
Indeed even if Bacon had produced nothing else but his masterfulEssayes (first published in
1597 and then revised and expanded in 1612 and 1625), he would still rate among the top
echelon of 17th-century English authors. And so when we take into account his other writings,
e.g., his histories, letters, and especially his major philosophical and scientific works, we must
surely place him in the first rank of English literatures great men of letters and among its finest
masters (alongside names like Johnson, Mill, Carlyle, and Ruskin) of non-fiction prose.
Bacons style, though elegant, is by no means as simple as it seems or as it is often described. In
fact it is actually a fairly complex affair that achieves its air of ease and clarity more through its
balanced cadences, natural metaphors, and carefully arranged symmetries than through the use of
plain words, commonplace ideas, and straightforward syntax. (In this connection it is noteworthy
that in the revised versions of the essays Bacon seems to have deliberately disrupted many of his
earlier balanced effects to produce a style that is actually more jagged and, in effect, more
challenging to the casual reader.)
Furthermore, just as Bacons personal style and living habits were prone to extravagance and
never particularly austere, so in his writing he was never quite able to resist the occasional grand
word, magniloquent phrase, or orotund effect. (As Dr. Johnson observed, A dictionary of the
English language might be compiled from Bacons works alone.) Bishop Sprat in his
1667 History of the Royal Society honored Bacon and praised the society membership for
supposedly eschewing fine words and fancy metaphors and adhering instead to a natural lucidity
and mathematical plainness. To write in such a way, Sprat suggested, was to follow true,
scientific, Baconian principles. And while Bacon himself often expressed similar sentiments
(praising blunt expression while condemning the seductions of figurative language), a reader
would be hard pressed to find many examples of such spare technique in Bacons own writings.
Of Bacons contemporary readers, at least one took exception to the view that his writing
represented a perfect model of plain language and transparent meaning. After perusing the New
Organon, King James (to whom Bacon had proudly dedicated the volume) reportedly
pronounced the work like the peace of God, which passeth all understanding.
the preliminary description and plan for an enormous work that would fully answer to his earlier
declared ambitions. The work, dedicated to James, was to be called Magna Instauratio (that is,
the grand edifice or Great Instauration), and it would represent a kind of summa or
culmination of all Bacons thought on subjects ranging from logic and epistemology to practical
science (or what in Bacons day was called natural philosophy, the word science being then
but a general synonym for wisdom or learning).
Like several of Bacons projects, the Instauratio in its contemplated form was never finished. Of
the intended six parts, only the first two were completed, while the other portions were only
partly finished or barely begun. Consequently, the work as we have it is less like the vast but
well-sculpted monument that Bacon envisioned than a kind of philosophical miscellany or grabbag. Part I of the project, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (Nine Books of the Dignity
and Advancement of Learning), was published in 1623. It is basically an enlarged version of the
earlier Proficience and Advancement of Learning, which Bacon had presented to James in 1605.
Part II, the Novum Organum (or New Organon) provides the authors detailed explanation and
demonstration of the correct procedure for interpreting nature. It first appeared in 1620. Together
these two works present the essential elements of Bacons philosophy, including most of the
major ideas and principles that we have come to associate with the terms Baconian and
Baconianism.
principal aim is not new knowledge or deeper understanding but endless debate cherished for its
own sake.
Delicate learning (vain affectations) was Bacons label for the new humanism insofar as (in
his view) it seemed concerned not with the actual recovery of ancient texts or the retrieval of past
knowledge but merely with the revival of Ciceronian rhetorical embellishments and the
reproduction of classical prose style. Such preoccupation with words more than matter, with
choiceness of phrase and the sweet falling of clauses in short, with style over substance
seemed to Bacon (a careful stylist in his own right) the most seductive and decadent literary vice
of his age.
Here we may note that from Bacons point of view the distempers of learning share two main
faults:
1. Prodigal ingenuity i.e., each distemper represents a lavish and regrettable waste of
talent, as inventive minds that might be employed in more productive pursuits exhaust
their energy on trivial or puerile enterprises instead.
2. Sterile results i.e., instead of contributing to the discovery of new knowledge (and thus
to a practical advancement of learning and eventually to a better life for all), the
distempers of learning are essentially exercises in personal vainglory that aim at little
more than idle theorizing or the preservation of older forms of knowledge.
In short, in Bacons view the distempers impede genuine intellectual progress by beguiling
talented thinkers into fruitless, illusory, or purely self-serving ventures. What is needed and
this is a theme reiterated in all his later writings on learning and human progress is a program
to re-channel that same creative energy into socially useful new discoveries.
insists, lie within our power; they require only the cooperation of learned citizens and the active
development of the arts and sciences.
j. The Idols
In Book I of the New Organon (Aphorisms 39-68), Bacon introduces his famous doctrine of the
idols. These are characteristic errors, natural tendencies, or defects that beset the mind and
prevent it from achieving a full and accurate understanding of nature. Bacon points out that
recognizing and counteracting the idols is as important to the study of nature as the recognition
and refutation of bad arguments is to logic. Incidentally, he uses the word idol from the
Greek eidolon (image or phantom) not in the sense of a false god or heathen deity but
rather in the sense employed in Epicurean physics. Thus a Baconian idol is a potential deception
or source of misunderstanding, especially one that clouds or confuses our knowledge of external
reality.
Bacon identifies four different classes of idol. Each arises from a different source, and each
presents its own special hazards and difficulties.
1. The Idols of the Tribe.
These are the natural weaknesses and tendencies common to human nature. Because they are
innate, they cannot be completely eliminated, but only recognized and compensated for. Some of
Bacons examples are:
Our senses which are inherently dull and easily deceivable. (Which is why Bacon
prescribes instruments and strict investigative methods to correct them.)
Our tendency to discern (or even impose) more order in phenomena than is actually there.
As Bacon points out, we are apt to find similitude where there is actually singularity,
regularity where there is actually randomness, etc.
Our tendency towards wishful thinking. According to Bacon, we have a natural
inclination to accept, believe, and even prove what we would prefer to be true.
Our tendency to rush to conclusions and make premature judgments (instead of gradually
and painstakingly accumulating evidence).
2. The Idols of the Cave.
Unlike the idols of the tribe, which are common to all human beings, those of the cave vary from
individual to individual. They arise, that is to say, not from nature but from culture and thus
reflect the peculiar distortions, prejudices, and beliefs that we are all subject to owing to our
different family backgrounds, childhood experiences, education, training, gender, religion, social
class, etc. Examples include:
Sophistical Philosophy that is, philosophical systems based only on a few casually
observed instances (or on no experimental evidence at all) and thus constructed mainly
out of abstract argument and speculation. Bacon cites Scholasticism as a conspicuous
example.
Empirical Philosophy that is, a philosophical system ultimately based on a single key
insight (or on a very narrow base of research), which is then erected into a model or
paradigm to explain phenomena of all kinds. Bacon cites the example of William Gilbert,
whose experiments with the lodestone persuaded him that magnetism operated as the
hidden force behind virtually all earthly phenomena.
Superstitious Philosophy this is Bacons phrase for any system of thought that mixes
theology and philosophy. He cites Pythagoras and Plato as guilty of this practice, but also
points his finger at pious contemporary efforts, similar to those of Creationists today, to
found systems of natural philosophy on Genesis or the book of Job.
k. Induction
At the beginning of the Magna Instauratio and in Book II of the New Organon, Bacon
introduces his system of true and perfect Induction, which he proposes as the essential
foundation of scientific method and a necessary tool for the proper interpretation of nature. (This
system was to have been more fully explained and demonstrated in Part IV of the Instauratio in a
section titled The Ladder of the Intellect, but unfortunately the work never got beyond an
introduction.)
According to Bacon, his system differs not only from the deductive logic and mania for
syllogisms of the Schoolmen, but also from the classic induction of Aristotle and other logicians.
As Bacon explains it, classic induction proceeds at once from . . . sense and particulars up to the
most general propositions and then works backward (via deduction) to arrive at intermediate
propositions. Thus, for example, from a few observations one might conclude (via induction) that
all new cars are shiny. One would then be entitled to proceed backward from this general
axiom to deduce such middle-level axioms as all new Lexuses are shiny, all new Jeeps are
shiny, etc. axioms that presumably would not need to be verified empirically since their truth
would be logically guaranteed as long as the original generalization (all new cars are shiny) is
true.
As Bacon rightly points out, one problem with this procedure is that if the general axioms prove
false, all the intermediate axioms may be false as well. All it takes is one contradictory instance
(in this case one new car with a dull finish) and the whole edifice tumbles. For this reason
Bacon prescribes a different path. His method is to proceed regularly and gradually from one
axiom to another, so that the most general are not reached till the last. In other words, each
axiom i.e., each step up the ladder of intellect is thoroughly tested by observation and
experimentation before the next step is taken. In effect, each confirmed axiom becomes a
foothold to a higher truth, with the most general axioms representing the last stage of the process.
Thus, in the example described, the Baconian investigator would be obliged to examine a full
inventory of new Chevrolets, Lexuses, Jeeps, etc., before reaching any conclusions about new
cars in general. And while Bacon admits that such a method can be laborious, he argues that it
eventually produces a stable edifice of knowledge instead of a rickety structure that collapses
with the appearance of a single disconfirming instance. (Indeed, according to Bacon, when one
follows his inductive procedure, a negative instance actually becomes something to be welcomed
rather than feared. For instead of threatening an entire assembly, the discovery of a false
generalization actually saves the investigator the trouble of having to proceed further in a
particular direction or line of inquiry. Meanwhile the structure of truth that he has already built
remains intact.)
Is Bacons system, then, a sound and reliable procedure, a strong ladder leading from carefully
observed particulars to true and inevitable conclusions? Although he himself firmly believed in
the utility and overall superiority of his method, many of his commentators and critics have had
doubts. For one thing, it is not clear that the Baconian procedure, taken by itself, leads
conclusively to any general propositions, much less to scientific principles or theoretical
statements that we can accept as universally true. For at what point is the Baconian investigator
willing to make the leap from observed particulars to abstract generalizations? After a dozen
instances? A thousand? The fact is, Bacons method provides nothing to guide the investigator in
this determination other than sheer instinct or professional judgment, and thus the tendency is for
the investigation of particulars the steady observation and collection of data to go on
continuously, and in effect endlessly.
One can thus easily imagine a scenario in which the piling up of instances becomes not just the
initial stage in a process, but the very essence of the process itself; in effect, a zealous foraging
after facts (in the New Organon Bacon famously compares the ideal Baconian researcher to a
busy bee) becomes not only a means to knowledge, but an activity vigorously pursued for its
own sake. Every scientist and academic person knows how tempting it is to put off the hard work
of imaginative thinking in order to continue doing some form of rote research. Every investigator
knows how easy it is to become wrapped up in data with the unhappy result that ones intended
ascent up the Baconian ladder gets stuck in mundane matters of fact and never quite gets off the
ground.
It was no doubt considerations like these that prompted the English physician (and neoAristotelian) William Harvey, of circulation-of-the-blood fame, to quip that Bacon wrote of
natural philosophy like a Lord Chancellor indeed like a politician or legislator rather than a
practitioner. The assessment is just to the extent that Bacon in the New Organon does indeed
prescribe a new and extremely rigid procedure for the investigation of nature rather than describe
the more or less instinctive and improvisational and by no means exclusively empirical
method that Kepler, Galileo, Harvey himself, and other working scientists were actually
employing. In fact, other than Tycho Brahe, the Danish astronomer who, overseeing a team of
assistants, faithfully observed and then painstakingly recorded entire volumes of astronomical
data in tidy, systematically arranged tables, it is doubtful that there is another major figure in the
history of science who can be legitimately termed an authentic, true-blooded Baconian. (Darwin,
it is true, claimed that The Origin of Species was based on Baconian principles. However, it is
one thing to collect instances in order to compare species and show a relationship among them; it
is quite another to theorize a mechanism, namely evolution by mutation and natural selection,
that elegantly and powerfully explains their entire history and variety.)
Science, that is to say, does not, and has probably never advanced according to the strict,
gradual, ever-plodding method of Baconian observation and induction. It proceeds instead by
unpredictable and often intuitive and even (though Bacon would cringe at the
word) imaginative leaps and bounds. Kepler used Tychos scrupulously gathered data to
support his own heart-felt and even occult belief that the movements of celestial bodies are
regular and symmetrical, composing a true harmony of the spheres. Galileo tossed unequal
weights from the Leaning Tower as a mere public demonstration of the fact (contrary to
Aristotle) that they would fall at the same rate. He had long before satisfied himself that this
would happen via the very un-Bacon-like method of mathematical reasoning and deductive
thought-experiment. Harvey, by a similar process of quantitative analysis and deductive
logic, knew that the blood must circulate, and it was only to provide proof of this fact that he set
himself the secondary task of amassing empirical evidence and establishing the actual method by
which it did so.
One could enumerate in true Baconian fashion a host of further instances. But the point is
already made: advances in scientific knowledge have not been achieved for the most part via
Baconian induction (which amounts to a kind of systematic and exhaustive survey of nature
supposedly leading to ultimate insights) but rather by shrewd hints and guesses in a word
by hypotheses that are then either corroborated or (in Karl Poppers important
term) falsified by subsequent research.
In summary, then, it can be said that Bacon underestimated the role of imagination and
hypothesis (and overestimated the value of minute observation and bee-like data collection) in
the production of new scientific knowledge. And in this respect it is true that he wrote of science
like a Lord Chancellor, regally proclaiming the benefits of his own new and supposedly
foolproof technique instead of recognizing and adapting procedures that had already been tested
and approved. On the other hand, it must be added that Bacon did not present himself (or his
method) as the final authority on the investigation of nature or, for that matter, on any other topic
or issue relating to the advance of knowledge. By his own admission, he was but theBuccinator,
or trumpeter, of such a revolutionary advance not the founder or builder of a vast new
system, but only the herald or announcing messenger of a new world to come.
exists mainly for human use and benefit, and who furthermore endorse his opinion that scientific
inquiry should aim first and foremost at the amelioration of the human condition and the relief
of mans estate, generally applaud him as a great social visionary. On the other hand, those who
view nature as an entity in its own right, a higher-order estate of which the human community is
only a part, tend to perceive him as a kind of arch-villain the evil originator of the idea of
science as the instrument of global imperialism and technological conquest.
On the one side, then, we have figures like the anthropologist and science writer Loren Eiseley,
who portrays Bacon (whom he calls the man who saw through time) as a kind of Promethean
culture hero. He praises Bacon as the great inventor of the idea of science as both a communal
enterprise and a practical discipline in the service of humanity. On the other side, we have
writers, from Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Lewis Mumford to, more recently, Jeremy
Rifkin and eco-feminist Carolyn Merchant, who have represented him as one of the main culprits
behind what they perceive as western sciences continuing legacy of alienation, exploitation, and
ecological oppression.
Clearly somewhere in between this ardent Baconolotry on the one hand and strident
demonization of Bacon on the other lies the real Lord Chancellor: a Colossus with feet of clay.
He was by no means a great system-builder (indeed his Magna Instauratio turned out to be less
of a grand edifice than a magnificent heap) but rather, as he more modestly portrayed himself,
a great spokesman for the reform of learning and a champion of modern science. In the end we
can say that he was one of the giant figures of intellectual history and as brilliant, and flawed, a
philosopher as he was a statesman.
Author Information
David Simpson
Email: dsimpson@condor.depaul.edu
DePaul University
U. S. A.
Table of Contents
1. Biography
2. Theology
a. Theological Background: William of Occam
b. Theology of the Cross
1. Biography
Martin Luther was born to peasant stock on November 10, 1483 in Eisleben in the Holy Roman
Empire in what is today eastern Germany. Soon after Luthers birth, his family moved from
Eisleben to Mansfeld. His father was a relatively successful miner and smelter and Mansfeld was
a larger mining town. Martin was the second son born to Hans and Magarete (Lindemann)
Luther. Two of his brothers died during outbreaks of the plague. One other brother, James, lived
to adulthood.
Luthers father knew that mining was a cyclical occupation, and he wanted more security for his
promising young son. Hans Luther decided that he would do whatever was necessary to see that
Martin could become a lawyer. Hans saw to it that Martin started school in Mansfeld probably
around seven. The school stressed Latin and a bit of logic and rhetoric. When Martin was 14 he
was sent to Magdeburg to continue his studies. He stayed only one year in Magdeburg and then
enrolled in Latin school in Eisenach until 1501. In 1501 he enrolled in the University of Erfurt
where he studied the basic course for a Master of Arts (grammar, logic, rhetoric, metaphysics,
etc.). Significant to his spiritual and theological development was the principal role of William of
Occams theology and metaphysics in Erfurts curriculum. In 1505, it seemed that Hans
Luthers plans were about to finally be realized. His son was on the verge of becoming a
lawyer. Hans Luthers plans were interrupted by a thunderstorm and vow.
In July of 1505, Martin was caught in a horrific thunderstorm. Afraid that he was going to die,
he screamed out a vow, Save me, St. Anna, and I shall become a monk. St. Anna was the
mother of the Virgin Mary and the patron saint of miners. Most argue that this commitment to
become a monk could not have come out of thin air and instead represents an intensification
experience in which an already formulated thought is expanded and deepened. On July
17th Luther entered the Augustinian Monastery at Erfurt.
The decision to enter the monastery was a difficult one. Martin knew that he would greatly
disappoint his parents (which he did), but he also knew that one must keep a promise made to
God. Beyond that, however, he also had strong internal reasons to join the monastery. Luther
was haunted by insecurity about his salvation (he describes these insecurities in striking tones
and calls them Anfectungen or Afflictions.) A monastery was the perfect place to find assurance.
Assurance evaded him however. He threw himself into the life of a monk with verve. It did not
seem to help. Finally, his mentor told him to focus on Christ and him alone in his quest for
assurance. Though his anxieties would plague him for still years to come, the seeds for his later
assurance were laid in that conversation.
In 1510, Luther traveled as part of delegation from his monastery to Rome (he was not very
impressed with what he saw.) In 1511, he transferred from the monastery in Erfurt to one in
Wittenberg where, after receiving his doctor of theology degree, he became a professor of
biblical theology at the newly founded University of Wittenberg.
In 1513, he began his first lectures on the Psalms. In these lectures, Luthers critique of the
theological world around him begins to take shape. Later, in lectures on Pauls Epistle to the
Romans (in 1515/16) this critique becomes more noticeable. It was during these lectures that
Luther finally found the assurance that had evaded him for years. The discovery that changed
Luthers life ultimately changed the course of church history and the history of Europe. In
Romans, Paul writes of the righteousness of God. Luther had always understood that term to
mean that God was a righteous judge that demanded human righteousness. Now, Luther
understood righteousness as a gift of Gods grace. He had discovered (or recovered) the doctrine
of justification by grace alone. This discovery set him afire.
In 1517, he posted a sheet of theses for discussion on the Universitys chapel door. These NinetyFive Thesesset out a devastating critique of the churchs sale of indulgences and explained the
fundamentals of justification by grace alone. Luther also sent a copy of the theses to Archbishop
Albrecht of Mainz calling on him to end the sale of indulgences. Albrecht was not amused. In
Rome, cardinals saw Luthers theses as an attack on papal authority. In 1518 at a meeting of the
Augustinian Order in Heidelberg, Luther set out his positions with even more precision. In
the Heidelberg Disputation, we see the signs of a maturing in Luthers thought and new clarity
surrounding his theological perspective the Theology of the Cross.
After the Heidelberg meeting in October 1518, Luther was told to recant his positions by the
Papal Legate, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan. Luther stated that he could not recant unless his
mistakes were pointed out to him by appeals to scripture and right reason he would not, in fact,
could not recant. Luthers refusal to recant set in motion his ultimate excommunication.
Throughout 1519, Luther continued to lecture and write in Wittenberg. In June and July of that
year, he participated in another debate on Indulgences and the papacy in Leipzig. Finally, in
1520, the pope had had enough. On June 15th the pope issued a bull (Exsurge Domini Arise
OLord) threatening Luther with excommunication. Luther received the bull on October 10th. He
publicly burned it on December 10th.
In January 1521, the pope excommunicated Luther. In March, he was summonsed by Emperor
Charles V to Worms to defend himself. During the Diet of Worms, Luther refused to recant his
position. Whether he actually said, Here I stand, I can do no other is uncertain. What is known
is that he did refuse to recant and on May 8th was placed under Imperial Ban.
This placed Luther and his duke in a difficult position. Luther was now a condemned and wanted
man. Luther hid out at the Wartburg Castle until May of 1522 when he returned to Wittenberg.
He continued teaching. In 1524, Luther left the monastery. In 1525, he married Katharina von
Bora.
From 1533 to his death in 1546 he served as the Dean of the theology faculty at Wittenberg. He
died in Eisleben on 18 February 1546.
2. Theology
3. Relationship to Philosophy
Given Luthers critique of philosophy and his famous phrase that philosophy is the devils
whore, it would be easy to assume that Luther had only contempt for philosophy and reason.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Luther believed, rather, that philosophy and reason had
important roles to play in our lives and in the life of the community. However, he also felt that it
was important to remember what those roles were and not to confuse the proper use of
philosophy with an improper one.
Properly understood and used, philosophy and reason are a great aid to individuals and society.
Improperly used, they become a great threat to both. Likewise, revelation and the gospel when
used properly are an aid to society, but when misused also have sad and profound implications.
The proper role of philosophy is organizational and as an aid in governance. When Cardinal
Cajetan first demanded Luthers recantation of the Ninety-Five Theses, Luther appealed to
scripture and right reason. Reason can be an aid to faith in that it helps to clarify and organize,
but it is always second-order discourse. It is, following St. Anselm, fides quarenes
intellectum (faith seeking understanding) and never the reverse. Philosophy tells us that God is
omnipotent and impassible; revelation tells us that Jesus Christ died for humanitys sin. The two
cannot be reconciled. Reason is the devils whore precisely because asks the wrong questions
and looks in the wrong direction for answers. Revelation is the only proper place for theology to
begin. Reason must always take a back-seat.
Reason does play a primary role in governance and in most human interaction. Reason, Luther
argued, is necessary for a good and just society. In fact, unlike most of his contemporaries,
Luther did not believe that a ruler had to be Christian, only reasonable. Here, opposite to his
discussion of theology, it is revelation that is improper. Trying to govern using the gospel as
ones model would either corrupt the government or corrupt the gospel. The gospels
fundamental message is forgiveness, government must maintain justice. To confuse the two here
is just as troubling as confusing them when discussing theology. If forgiveness becomes the
dominant model in government, people being sinful, chaos will increase. If however, the
government claims the gospel but acts on the basis of justice, then people will be misled as to the
proper nature of the gospel.
Luther was self-consciously trying to carve out proper realms for revelation and philosophy or
reason. Each had a proper role that enables humanity to thrive. Chaos only became a problem
when the two got confused.One cannot understand Luthers relationship to philosophy and his
discussions of philosophy without understanding that key concept.
CD-Rom.
Of all the major works of Luther, this is the best edition in English. It will soon be out on
Luthers earliest lectures. These are important because we begin to see themes that will
eventually become the Theology of the Cross.
The patterns of the Theology of the Cross become a bit more evident. Many scholars
believe that Luther made his final discovery of the doctrine of Justification by Faith while giving these
lectures.
The seminal document of the Reformation in Germany. These theses led to the eventual
break with Rome over indulgences and grace.
The best example of Luthers emerging Theology of the Cross.He contrasts human works to
Gods works in and through the Cross and shows the emptiness of human achievement and the importance
of grace.
Luthers ethics, in which he explains that A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, subject
to none. A Christian is perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.
A call for reform in Germany, it highlights some of the complexity of Luthers thought on
church and state relations.
In a debate with Erasmus about human freedom and bondage to sin. Luther argues that
humanity is bound to sin completely and only freed from that bondage by Gods Grace.
1531, Dr. Martin Luther's Warning to His Dear German People (LW:45).
His anthropology, but also gives a glimpse of his understanding of the proper role of
philosophy and reason.
b. Secondary Sources
Brecht, Martin. Martin Luther. Three Volumes. Translated by James L. Schaaf. Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1985-1993.
Cargill Thompson,W.D.J. The Political Thought of Martin Luther. Edited by Philip Broadhead. Totowa, NJ:
Barnes & Noble Books, 1984.
Edwards, Mark U., Jr. Luthers Last Battles: Politics and Polemics, 1531-1546.Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983.
One of the few books to focus on the older Luther. It is an excellent study in Luther after
the Diet of Augsburg.
Forde, Gerhard, O.On Being a Theologian of the Cross: Reflections on Luthers Heidelberg Disputation,
1518. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997.
The Theology of the Cross is a fundamental doctrine in Luther. Forde takes an new look at
the doctrine in light of Luther's role as pastor.
This is an excellent introduction to Luther and puts his thought in dialogue with other major
reformers, i.e., Zwingli and Calvin.
Lindberg, Carter. The European Reformations Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1996.
The best introduction to the Reformation era, it covers not only the reformers but the
context and culture of the era as well.
Loewenich, Walter von. Luthers Theology of the Cross, trans. Herber J.A. Bouman. Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1976.
Lohse, Bernhard. Martin Luther:An Introduction to his Life and Work. Translated by Robert C.
Schultz.Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986.
McGrath, Alister E. The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation. Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1987.
This book covers the scholastic and nominalist background of the reformation.
Oberman,Heiko. The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought.
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986.
A classic that places the reformation era within the wider context of the late medieval era
and the early modern era.
Luther: Man between God and the Devil. Translated by Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart. New York: Image
Books, Doubleday:1982.
An excellent biography of Luther that examines Luther in light of his quest for a gracious
God and his fight against the Devil.
Ozment, Steven. The Age of Reform:1250-1550:An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and
Reformation Europe. New Haven:Yale University Press, 1980.
Ozment places the reformation in a wider context and sees the impetus for reform
stretching back into what is normally considered the High Medieval Era.
Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine. Volume
4: Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Part of a five volume history of doctrine, Pelikan looks at the doctrinal issues at work in the
reformation. He is not as concerned with history as he is with theological development.
Watson,Philip S. Let God be God!: An Interpretation of the Theology of Martin Luther. London: Epworth
Press, 1947.
Author Information
David M. Whitford
Claflin University
U. S. A.
Table of Contents
1. Background
2. Life
3. Works
a.
Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex
b.
De Constantia Libri Duo
i.
Form
ii.
Analysis of Contents
iii.
Definition of constantia
iv.
Four Arguments Concerning Public Evils
v.
Four Modifications of Ancient Stoicism
vi.
Summary
c.
Later Stoic Works
4. Conclusion
5. References and Further Reading
1. Background
Justus Lipsius's philosophical reputation rests upon his status as the principal figure in the
Renaissance revival of Stoicism. Stoicism was one of the great Hellenistic schools of philosophy
and dominated ancient intellectual life for at least 400 years. Founded by Zeno of Citium around
300 B.C.C., the school developed under Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panaetius, and Posidonius. In the
first century B.C. it appealed to high-ranking Romans including Cicero and Cato. In the first two
centuries C.E. it reached its height of popularity under the influence of Musonius
Rufus and Epictetus. In the second century C.E. it found its most famous exponent in the form of
the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius. However, after the second century Stoicism was soon
eclipsed in popularity by Neoplatonism.
Despite this decline in late antiquity, Stoicism continued to exert an influence. Its ideas were
discussed by Church Fathers such as St. Augustine, Lactantius, and Tertullian. In the Middle
Ages its impact can be seen in the ethical works of Peter Abelard and his pupil John of Salisbury,
transmitted via the readily available Latin works of Seneca and Cicero. In the fourteenth century
Stoicism attracted the attention of Petrarch who produced a substantial ethical work entitled De
Remediis Utriusque Fortunae ('On the Remedies of Both Kinds of Fortune') inspired by Seneca
and drawing upon an account of the Stoic theory of the passions made by Cicero. With the
rediscovery of the works of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus by famous Humanists such as Perotti
and Politian in the fifteenth century, interest in Stoicism continued to develop. However, the
Renaissance revival of Stoicism remained somewhat limited until Justus Lipsius.
2.Life
Justus Lipsius (the Latinized version of Joest Lips) was born in Overyssche, a village near
Brussels and Louvain, in 1547. He studied first with the Jesuits in Cologne and later at the
Catholic University of Louvain. After completing his education he visited Rome, in his new
position as secretary to Cardinal Granvelle, staying for two years in order to study the ancient
monuments and explore the unsurpassed libraries of classical literature. In 1572 Lipsius's
property in Belgium was taken by Spanish troops during the civil war while he was away on a
trip to Vienna (a trip that would later be used as the backdrop for the dialogue in De
Constantiaover a decade later). Without property, Lipsius applied for a position at the Lutheran
University of Jena. This was the first of a number of institutional moves that required Lipsius to
change his publicly professed faith. His new colleagues at Jena remained sceptical of this radical
transformation and Lipsius was eventually forced to leave Jena after only two years in favour of
Cologne. While at Cologne he prepared notes on Tacitus that he used in his critical edition of
1574.
In 1576 Lispius returned to Catholic Louvain. However after his property was looted by soldiers
a second time he fled again in 1579, this time to the Calvinist University of Leiden. He remained
at Leiden for thirteen years and it is to this period that his two most famous books - De
Constantia Libri Duo (1584) and Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex (1589) belong.
However, Lipsius was by upbringing a Catholic and eventually he sought to return to Louvain,
via a brief period in Lige. In 1592 Lipsius accepted the Chair of Latin History and Literature at
Louvain. To this final period belong his editorial work on Seneca and his two detailed studies of
Stoicism, the Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam and Physiologia Stoicorum. The two studies
were published first in 1604 and the edition of Seneca in 1605. Lipsius died in Louvain in 1606.
Among Lipsius's friends was his publisher, the famous printer Christopher Plantin, with whom
he often stayed in Antwerp. Among his pupils was Philip Rubens, brother of the painter Peter
Paul Rubens who portrayed Lipsius after his death in 'The Four Philosophers (c. 1611, now in
the Pitti Palace, Florence). Among his admirers was Michel de Montaigne who described him as
one of the most learned men then alive (Essais2.12).
3. Works
Lipsius was a prolific author, publishing his first work Variarum Lectionum Libri IV ('Four
Books of Various Readings') - a collection of philological comments and conjectures in 1569,
while still in his twenties. His reputation today is primarily as a Latin philologist and stands upon
his critical editions of Tacitus and Seneca. He also produced a number of philological studies and
a large correspondence, some of which he published. His principal philosophical works are De
Constantia Libri Duo and Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex, complementing his
editions of Seneca and Tacitus respectively.
not to create terror. If a Prince forgets this last point and turns into a tyrant, there may be grounds
to challenge his position. However Lipsius emphasizes that there is nothing more miserable than
civil war which should be avoided at all costs.
i. Form
The work takes the form of a dialogue between Lipsius and his friend Langius (Charles de
Langhe, Canon of Lige). This no doubt fictional conversation is set within the context of a visit
to Langius by Lipsius during the course of a trip to Vienna that Lipsius had actually undertaken
in 1572. While some distance from his troubled homeland, the dialogue's character Lipsius
reflects upon the nature of public evils (mala publica) and is guided by the older and wiser
Langius into whose mouth the positive content of the dialogue is placed.
The core of De Constantia is the series of four arguments concerning the nature of public evils.
These are outlined in Const. 1.13 and then developed, in turn, in Const. 1.14, 1.15-22, 2.6-17,
and 2.18-26. It is argued that public evils are (a) imposed by God; (b) the product of necessity;
(c) in reality profitable to us; (d) neither grievous nor unusual.
The first argument claims that all public evils form part of God's divine plan. They derive form
the same source as all those profitable parts of nature and it would be impious to take only part
of Gods creation and criticise Him for the remainder. We are born into Gods creation and it is
our duty to obey Him by accepting all of His works. In any case, even if one does not follow
Gods will freely, one will nevertheless be drawn along forcibly (echoing the famous Stoic
donkey and cart analogy reported in Hippolytus Refutatio 1.21). Thus the only option is to obey
God (deo parere).
The second argument claims that the continual cycle of creation and destruction are the
inevitable consequence of the necessary laws of Nature. If even the stars in the heavens are
subject to the processes of creation and destruction, then it is only natural that man-made cities
will rise and fall, for "all things run into this fatal whirlpool of ebbing and flowing"
(Const. 1.16). However Lipsius is careful here to distance himself from Stoic materialism and
outlines four points where Stoic doctrine must be modified in the light of Christian truth (see the
next section).
The third argument is merely a variation upon traditional Christian responses to the problem of
evil. Those terrible things that happen must in some sense be good if they are part of God's
divine plan and Lipsius attempts to show this by claiming that public evils constitute exercise
(exercendi) for the good, correction (castigandi) for the weak-willed, and punishment (puniendi)
for the bad.
The fourth argument focuses upon the particular public evils that Lipsius wanted to avoid,
namely the religious civil wars in the Low Countries. He argues that these wars are neither
particularly grievous nor uncommon. In order to place these present conflicts into perspective
Lipsius, drawing upon his extensive classical learning, cites numerous examples of wars,
plagues, and acts of cruelty from Jewish, Greek, and Roman history. The conflict from which
Lipsius has fled is neither excessively brutal nor particularly unusual. What would be unusual
would be an individual insulated and exempted from the cycles of birth and death, creation and
destruction. It is the human lot to suffer at the hands of this continual change; the philosophical
task, however, is to decide how one will face that suffering. One can do so either with sorrow
(dolor) or with constancy (constantia).
Atticae 7.2.3). Thus, as Cicero notes, the Stoic doctrine of fate, conceived as an order and
sequence of material causes, is "not the fate of superstition but rather that of physics" (De
Divinatione 1.126). By rejecting this doctrine, Lipsius attempts to disengage the Stoic ethical
ideas to which he is drawn from their foundations in Stoic physics. This is absolutely essential if
he is to be able to present Stoic ethics in a form acceptable to a Christian audience.
vi. Summary
The central theme of De Constantia - that public evils are the product of the mind and thus must
be treated rather than fled contrasts sharply with Lipsius's own earlier behaviour when faced
with the religious wars then raging. Perhaps experience had taught him that, no matter how many
geographical moves he made, he would not be able to escape the evils surrounding him until he
examined himself. Only wisdom and constancy the products of philosophical reflection can
bring true peace of mind.
4. Conclusion
Lipsius has been described as the greatest Renaissance scholar of the Low Countries after
Erasmus. The role that he played in the revival of interest in Stoicism during the late Renaissance
was similar to that performed by Marsilio Ficino with regard to Platonism and Pierre Gassendi
with regard to Epicureanism. As such, he stands as a key figure in the history of Renaissance
philosophy and the Renaissance revival of ancient thought.
b. Studies
ANDERTON, B., 'A Stoic of Louvain: Justus Lipsius', in Sketches from a Library Window (Cambridge:
Heffer, 1922), 10-30.
GERLO, A., ed., Juste Lipse (1547-1606), Travaux de l'Institut Interuniversitaire pour ltude de la
Renaissance et de lHumanisme IX (Brussels: University Press, 1988)
LAGRE, J., Juste Lipse et la restauration du stocisme: tude et traduction des traits stociens De la
constance, Manuel de philosophie stocienne, Physique des stociens (Paris: Vrin, 1994)
LAGRE, J. 'Juste Lipse: destins et Providence', in P.-F, Moreau, ed., Le stocisme au XVIe et au XVIIe
sicle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1999), 77-93.
LAGRE, J. 'La vertu stocienne de constance', in P.-F, Moreau, ed., Le stocisme au XVIe et au XVIIe
sicle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1999), 94-116.
LAUREYS, M., ed., The World of Justus Lipsius: A Contribution Towards his Intellectual Biography,
Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome LXVIII (Brussels & Rome: Brepols, 1998)
LEVI, A. H. T., 'The Relationship of Stoicism and Scepticism: Justus Lipsius', in J. Kraye and M. W. F.
Stone, eds, Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000), 91-106.
MARIN, M., 'L'influence de Snque sur Juste Lipse, in A. Gerlo, ed., Juste Lipse: 1547-1606 (Brussels:
University Press, 1988), 119-26.
MORFORD, M., Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1991)
MORFORD, M. 'Towards an Intellectual Biography of Justus Lipsius - Pieter Paul Rubens', Bulletin de
lInstitut Historique Belge de Rome 68 (1998), 387-403.
OESTREICH, G., Neostoicism and the Early Modern State, trans. D. McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982)
SAUNDERS, J. L., Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of Renaissance Stoicism (New York: The Liberal Arts
Press, 1955)
ZANTA, L., La renaissance du stocisme au XVIe sicle (Paris: Champion, 1914)
References to further works dealing with Neostoicism may be found at the end of the IEP
article Neostoicism.
Author Information
John Sellars
Email: john.sellars (at) wolfson.ox.ac.uk
University of the West of England
United Kingdom
Middle Knowledge
If Aristotle had not been a student of Plato, then would Aristotle have chosen to start his school
at Lyceum? If you believe God knows the answer to this question, you probably believe God has
middle knowledge.
Middle knowledge is a form of knowledge first attributed to God by the sixteenth century Jesuit
theologian Luis de Molina (pictured to the left). It is best characterized as Gods prevolitional
knowledge of all true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. This knowledge is seen by its
proponents as the key to understanding the compatibility of divine providence and creaturely
(libertarian) freedom (see Free Will).
Middle knowledge is so named because it comes between natural and free knowledge in God's
deliberations regarding the creative process. According to the theory, middle knowledge is like
natural knowledge in that it is prevolitional, or prior to God's choice to create. This, of course,
also means that the content of middle knowledge is true independent of God's will and therefore,
He has no control over it. Yet, it is not the same as natural knowledge because, like free
knowledge, its content is contingent. The doctrine of middle knowledge proposes that God has
knowledge of metaphysically necessary states of affairs via natural knowledge, of what He
intends to do via free knowledge, and in addition, of what free creatures would do if they were
instantiated (via middle knowledge). Thus, the content of middle knowledge is made up of truths
which refer to what would be the case if various states of affairs were to obtain.
Table of Contents
a.
i.
b.
.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
c.
.
i.
ii.
.
a.
1. Assumptions
2. Scientia Media
3. Objections to Middle Knowledge
Rejection of Libertarian Freedom
Libertarian Responses
The Truth of Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom
Objections to the Principle of Conditional Excluded Middle
Molinist Responses
Molinism and Determinism
The Grounding Objection
Molinist Responses
The Usefulness of Middle Knowledge
Viciously Circular
Not True Soon Enough
Molinist Responses
4. References and Further Readings
Books
Articles
1. Assumptions
Before an examination of the theory of middle knowledge can be offered, several assumptions
must be set forth. Each of these assumptions is important for an understanding of the doctrine of
middle knowledge and its usefulness for theological reflection.
First, it is assumed that for an action to be free, it must be determined by the agent performing
the action. This means that God cannot will a free creature to act in a particular way and the act
still be free. Free actions must be self-determinative. This assumption may appear self-evident to
some, and quite controversial to others. While it must be admitted that God could
certainly desire a creature act in a particular way and the choice remain free, it is difficult to see
how He could cause the choice and it still be free in a meaningful way. Proponents of middle
knowledge do not deny that God may influence a free choice or persuade an agent to act in a
particular way, but such influence and persuasion cannot be determinative if the action
performed is to be free. In addition, middle knowledge requires freedom of a libertarian nature.
That is, free creatures have the ability to choose between competing alternatives, and really could
choose one or the other of the alternatives.
Second, it has become customary to speak of a logical priority in divine thoughts. This is not to
deny the simplicity or omniscience of God, or to say that He gains knowledge that He did not
previously possess. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that dependency relationships exist
between certain kinds of knowledge. It is also to acknowledge that something analogous to
deliberation may take place in the divine mind. For example, in order for God to know that one
plus one equals two, He must first comprehend the meaning of the concepts represented by the
numbers, mathematical symbols, and formulaic expressions; they serve as a basis by which the
truthfulness of the formula may be evaluated. But this is not to say that there was a time when
God did not know 1+1=2. Thus, a relationship of logical priority, but not necessarily temporal
priority exists between some of the content of divine knowledge.
Third, proponents of the doctrine of middle knowledge believe that things could have been
different than they, in fact, are. There is much that is not necessary about the way the world is.
For example, I could have married someone other than Stefana, the woman I did marry. Of
course, that would depend upon my falling in love with someone else and that woman agreeing
to my proposal of marriage. Although I find it difficult to imagine my falling in love with
someone else (I love my wife very much), the point is that there is nothing about my marrying
Stefana that is necessary. Stefana was free to reject my offer of marriage, I was free to never ask
her out, we may never have existed, etc. Or, for another example, God could have made things
differently. The sky could be yellow instead of blue, or the grass pink. God could have chosen to
not create at all. Although this assumption should be self-evident, it is also supported by the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Things could have been different.
2. Scientia Media
Molina's doctrine is called scientia media, or middle knowledge, because it stands in the
middle of the two traditional categories of divine epistemology as handed down by Aquinas,
natural and free knowledge. It shares characteristics of each and, in the logical order of the divine
deliberative process regarding creation, it follows natural knowledge but precedes free
knowledge.
Natural knowledge is that part of God's knowledge which He knows by His very nature or
essence, and since His essence is necessary, so is that which is known through it. That is, the
content of natural knowledge includes all metaphysically necessary truths. For example, the
statement, "All bachelors are unmarried" is both necessary and part of natural knowledge. Other
examples include other tautologies, mathematical certainties (e.g., 1+1=2), and all possibilities
(since all possibilities are necessarily so). Natural knowledge can therefore be thought of as
including a virtually infinite number of propositions of the form, It is possible that p, as well as a
number of propositions of the form, It is the case that p. Thus, natural knowledge, properly
conceived, is that part of God's knowledge which could not have been different from what it is. It
follows from this fact that the content of God's natural knowledge is independent of His will;
God has no control over the truth of the propositions He knows by natural knowledge. Consider,
for example, the mathematical truth, 1+1=2. No matter what God wills, it will always be true that
the concepts represented by the symbols 1, 2, +, and =, when arranged in a formulaic expression,
one plus one equals two. It is important to note that, because natural knowledge is independent
from God's will and, to some extent, places limits upon the kinds of things God can do, natural
knowledge informs(ed) God's decision(s) regarding His creative work. This also means that
natural knowledge is prevolitional.
Free knowledge is that part of God's knowledge which He knows by His knowledge of His own
will, both His desires and what He will, in fact, do. The content of this knowledge is made up of
truths which refer to whatactually exists (or has existed, or will exist). For example, the
statement, "John Laing exists," although certainly true, is dependent upon God's choice to create
me (or, more properly, to actualize a world where I am brought about), and hence, is part of
God's free knowledge. Free knowledge can therefore be thought of as including a number of
propositions of the form, It is the case that p (Note that propositions of the forms, It was the case
that p, and It will be the case that p, can be reduced to a proposition which refers to the present).
Since free knowledge comes from God's creative act of will, two things follow. First, the content
of that knowledge is contingent; it could have been different from what it, in fact, is. That is, free
knowledge includes only metaphysically contingent truths, or truths that could have been
prevented by God if He chose to create different situations, different creatures, or to not create at
all. Second, free knowledge is postvolitional; it is dependent upon God's will.
As previously noted, middle knowledge is so named because it comes between natural and free
knowledge in God's deliberations regarding the creative process. According to the theory, middle
knowledge is like natural knowledge in that it is prevolitional, or prior to God's choice to create.
This, of course, also means that the content of middle knowledge is true independent of God's
will and therefore, He has no control over it. Yet, it is not the same as natural knowledge
because, like free knowledge, its content is contingent. The doctrine of middle knowledge
proposes that God has knowledge of metaphysically necessary states of affairs via natural
knowledge, of what He intends to do via free knowledge, and in addition, of what free creatures
would do if they were instantiated (via middle knowledge). Thus, the content of middle
knowledge is made up of truths which refer to what would be the case if various states of affairs
were to obtain. For example, the statement, "If John Laing were given the opportunity to write an
article on middle knowledge for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he would freely do
so," although true, is certainly not necessarily so. I could easily have refrained from writing, if I
were so inclined (or too busy, etc.). Likewise, its truth does not seem to be dependent upon God's
will in the same way that "John Laing exists" is. Even if God chose to not create me, the
statement regarding my writing the article could still be true. In fact, its truth does not seem to be
dependent upon God's will at all, but rather upon my will. One of the basic assumptions of the
doctrine of middle knowledge outlined above is that God cannot will a creature to freely choose
anything. Thus, the content of middle knowledge can be thought of as including a virtually
infinite number of propositions of the form, If person, P, were in situation, S, then P would freely
perform action, A (or P(SA)).
The theory of middle knowledge presents a picture of divine omniscience which includes not
only knowledge of the past, present and future, but also knowledge of conditional future
contingents (propositions which refer to how free creatures will choose in various
First, some theologians/philosophers have objected to the assumption that God cannot will the
free actions of creatures. This argument will often be based on an appeal to mystery or the
transcendence of God. God, it is said, works on a plane above that of creatures, and therefore can
will an action of an individual while not impinging on his freedom. Second, and more
commonly, some have objected to the concept of libertarian freedom and instead advocate
compatibilist freedom. Whereas libertarian freedom is seen as the ability to choose between
competing alternatives, compatibilist freedom is seen as the ability to choose in accordance with
one's desires. It is argued that libertarian freedom is radically indeterministic or even
incoherentif one's desires are not determinative for his decision, then it appears that no
decision can be made.
i. Libertarian Responses
Proponents of libertarian freedom have responded that it is the individual's will which is
determinative for the choice made. They have also pointed out that proponents of compatibilist
freedom must believe that God possesses libertarian freedom in order to avoid theological
fatalism: either God was able to choose to create or not create, for example, or He had to create.
Since most theologians want to avoid the claim that God could always act in only one way, they
must admit the coherence of libertarian freedom. At this point, then, the complaint with
libertarian creaturely freedom can only be one of veracitythat it simply does not accurately
explain the creaturely decision-making process. Proponents of libertarian freedom have pointed
out that this claim cannot be proven, and that from an existential standpoint, it seems to be false.
It should be noted that the majority of philosophers hold to libertarian freedom and these
objections have been primarily entertained in the theological arena.
excluded middle can be shown to be false, then the contention that one of a pair of
counterfactuals must be true, cannot be sustained.
David Lewis has provided an example of two conditional statements which (he claims) seem
equally true:
(3) If Verdi and Bizet were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian;
(4) If Verdi and Bizet were compatriots, Bizet would not be Italian.
It is unclear which statement is correct, yet according to CEM, one must be true. (3) could be
true. After all, if Bizet were Italian, he and Verdi would be compatriots. However, (4) could also
be true (if Verdi were French). It seems just as likely for Verdi to have been French as Bizet to
have been Italian and therefore, neither (3) nor (4) is true. The principle of conditional excluded
middle fails, and so does middle knowledge.
The second approach to arguing that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom cannot be true has
come in the form of an assertion that Molinism leads to determinism and therefore, the
counterfactuals do not refer to free actions. Several forms of this argument have been offered.
The first form has been to question the amount of risk God takes. Since middle knowledge
affords God comprehensive knowledge of the future (when taken with His free knowledge), and
of how creatures will exercise their freedom when faced with decisions, and since that
knowledge is used by God in determining how He will providentially guide the world, all risk on
God's part is removed; He cannot be surprised and further, He specifically planned for
everything that will occur. Yet, the objectors argue, true creaturely freedom requires risk on the
part of God. Molinism removes the risk, but is doing so, abrogates creaturely freedom.
The most common response by Molinists to this form of the argument is simply that it begs the
question of compatibilism. It is based on the questionable presuppositions that divine risk is
necessary for creaturely freedom to exist, and that risk is eliminated by divine foreknowledge.
But these presuppositions seem to assume incompatibilism (of creaturely freedom and divine
foreknowledge), which is what the argument is supposed to prove. In addition, Molinists have
also argued that it is dependent upon a particular view of risk that may be questioned as well.
The second form of the argument contends that the individual referred to in a counterfactual of
creaturely freedom does not have the power to bring about the truth or falsity of that
counterfactual and therefore, does not have the required freedom to perform, or not perform, the
given action. The reason it is argued that individuals do not have the power to bring about the
truth of counterfactuals about them is that some counterfactuals are true regardless of what the
individual actually does. Consider the example given earlier in this article:
(1) If John were to ask Stefana to marry him, she would accept; and
(2) If John were to ask Stefana to marry him, she would not accept.
(1) is true, but according to this argument, Stefana does not bring about its truth because it is true
whether or not she accepts. Suppose John never proposesin that case, Stefana neither accepts
nor rejects the offer because it was never made. That is, the counterfactual is true independent of
Stefana's action and, therefore, she does not make it true. So, the argument goes, since Stefana
does not have the power to bring it about that the counterfactual is true, then she does not have
the power to bring it about that the counterfactual is false. But since the counterfactual is true, it
seems that she therefore does not have the power to not accept the proposal if it is made and
therefore, she is not free with respect to the marriage proposal.
The proponents of middle knowledge have responded to this form of the argument with a variety
of answers, most of which are rather complex discussions of the concepts of individual power
and entailment, relative similarity among possible worlds, and bringing about. The upshot of
these arguments is that it is not at all clear (at least to the Molinists) that individuals do not have
the power to bring about the truth (or falsity) of counterfactuals which refer to them. In fact,
most Molinists have argued for the validity of the concept of counterfactual power over the past
(power of an individual to act in such a way that certain things in the past would have been other
than they were, if the person were going to act in that way, which they were not).
The third form of the argument builds upon the first and the second, specifically with reference
to the way that God makes use of middle knowledge and the fixity of the past. Since God's
knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom informs His decision about which possible
world to actualize, that knowledge and the true counterfactuals are part of the causal history of
the actual world and therefore, are part of the fixed past. The problem this causes for Molinism is
due to the fact that genuine freedom requires that the individual has the ability to either act in the
specified manner or not act in the specified manner. In other words, if God considered (1) in his
decision regarding actualization of this world, once He did actualize this world (in which (1) is
true), then (1) became part of the history of this world and part of the fixed past. This leads to the
suggestion that Stefana did not really have the ability to not accept the offer of marriage, if John
were to propose (that is, to bring it about that (2) is true instead of (1)).
Molinists have responded to this objection by denying the central claim that events which had
causal consequences in the past are hard facts about the past. Most Molinists believe that free
agents havecounterfactual power over the past (power to act such that, if one were to act in that
way, the past would have been different from how it, in fact, was). If this sort of power is
accepted as plausible, then the objection fails.
v. Molinist Responses
Molinists have responded to the grounding objection in a variety of ways, five of which will be
surveyed here. The first response to the grounding objection has been to simply state that
counterfactuals of freedom do not need to be grounded and that no satisfactory explanation of the
grounding relation can be given. The upshot of this response is that counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom seem to be brute facts about the possible worlds in which they are true or brute facts
about the creatures to whom they refer.
The second response is similar in that it turns the grounding objection against the detractor of
middle knowledge. Some of the proponents of middle knowledge have suggested that the
grounding objection is based on the assumption that a causal connection must exist between the
antecedent and consequent of a counterfactual of creaturely freedom in order for it to be true.
This assumption, however, is problematic because it assumes libertarian freedom to be false. The
grounding objection, then, begs the question of compatibilism.
The third Molinist response has been to compare contingent propositions which refer to the
actual future (or futurefactuals) with contingent propositions which refer to counterfactual states
of affairs, specifically regarding statements which include how free creatures will decide
and would have decided. Those propositions which refer to the actual future are either true or
false now, even though there is nothing in the present that can be pointed to as grounding their
truth. In a similar fashion, counterfactuals are either true or false, even though there is nothing in
the present that can be pointed to as grounding their truth.
The fourth response by proponents of middle knowledge builds upon the third and utilizes the
standard possible worlds semantics. It may be argued that the truth of futurefactuals of creaturely
freedom are grounded in the future occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event. In a similar
fashion, the truth of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom may be grounded in the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of the event in the closest possible-but-not-actual world to the actual world. Thus,
there is something (an event) that may be pointed to as grounding the truth of the statement.
The fifth and final response of Molinists has been to build upon the suggestion that
counterfactuals are brute facts about particular individuals, by arguing that the truth of
counterfactuals are grounded in the individuals to which they refer as they exist in the
precreative mind of God as ideas. Since the grounding is in the individual, contingency remains,
yet since it is as the individual exists in the mind of God as an idea, the problems associated with
grounding in the individual are avoided.
Although some of these responses may be deemed more successful than others, and while some
may be seen as more of a shifting of the burden of proof than an answer to the specific objection,
they do demonstrate that the demand for grounding is somewhat unclear. However, it must also
be conceded that the efforts to answer the objection show that some sort of idea of grounding is
at least conceivable.
i. Viciously Circular
Proponents of this objection point out that, according to Molinism, the truth of counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom must be prior to God's creating activity because they inform His creative
decision. However, under the standard possible worlds analysis, which counterfactuals are true is
dependent upon which world is actual (counterfactuals are true if they are true in the closest
possible-but-not-actual world to the actual world). Thus, which world is actual (and presumably,
how close all possible worlds are to it) must be prior to God's knowledge of the true
counterfactuals. But this means that Gods creative decision must be prior to God's creative
decision! Thus, middle knowledge is circular.
a. Books
Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience.
New York: Brill, 1990.
Craig, William Lane. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to
Suarez. New York: Brill, 1988.
Flint, Thomas P. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account.. Ithaca: Cornell, 1998.
Hasker, William. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell, 1989.
Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso.
Ithaca: Cornell, 1988.
Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974.
b. Articles
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "An Anti-Molinist Argument" In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5, Philosophy of
Religion, ed. by James E. Tomberlin, 343-53. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 991.
Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil." American Philosophical
Quarterly 14:2 (April 1977): 109-17.
Hasker, William. "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited." Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995):
223-36.
Hasker, William. "A New Anti-Molinist Argument." Religious Studies 35:3 (September 1999): 291-97.
Author Information
John D. Laing
Email: jlaing@swbts.edu
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary
U. S. A.
Renaissance Humanism
The time when the term "Humanism" was first adopted is unknown. It is, however, certain that
both Italy and the re-adopting of Latin letters as the staple of human culture were responsible for
the name "Humanists."Literoe humaniores was an expression coined in reference to the classic
literature of Rome and the imitation and reproduction of its literary forms in the "new learning";
this was in contrast to and against the Literoe sacroe of scholasticism. In the time of Ariosto,
Erasmus, and Luther, the term umanisa was in effect an equivalent to the terms "classicist " or "
classical scholar."
Table of Contents
1. Italian Humanism
2. Character of the Movement
3. Erasmus
1. Italian Humanism
Dante had an admiration for ancient letters. At first, he intended to compose his great epic in
Latin verse. Petrarch considered his Africa a fair effort to reproduce Vergil. In the exordium of
his chief work Petrarc h appeals to the Heliconian Sisters as well as to Jesus Christ, Savior of the
world. He also reviews the epics of Homer (although he never learned Greek), Statius, and
Lucan. He was overwhelmed with the friendships of many prestigous men of his day, a mong
whom Cardinal Stephen Colonna was prominent. Petrarch is the pathfinder as well as the
measure of the new movement. He idealized the classical world. His classicist consciousness and
his Christian consciousness are revealed in his writings. Th e experiences of life constantly
evoke in him classic parallels, reminiscences, associations. Julius Caesar, Papirius Cursor,
are nostri, "our people"; Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Massinissa are externi, "foreigners." His epistles
provide the b est revelation of his soul. Of course, the craving for pure Latinity and the elevation
of such practical power of imitation and reproduction involved an artificiality of which neither
Petrarch nor his successors were aware. Boccaccio was not only a hu manist, but he, with
appalling directness, revealed the emancipation of the flesh as one of the unmistakable trends of
the new movement. Both he and Poggio, Valla, Beccadelli, Enea Silvio dei Piccolomini (in his
youth) show that the hatred of the cle rical class instigated literary composition. At the same time
in the caricatures of foulness which these leaders of the new learning loved to draw, there is no
moral indignation, but clearly like satyrs they themselves relish these things. For this reason the
Humanists of Italy, as such, were not at all concerned in the efforts for a reformation of the
church as attempted in the councils of Constance or of Basel. Poggio, apostolic secretary, came
to Constance with the pope, but spent most of his time in ransacking the libraries of Swiss
monasteries for Latin codices. The defense of Jerome of Prague before the Council reminded
him of Cato of Utica. His correspondent Lionardo Bruni at Florence warns him to be more
circumspect in his praise of a heretic. In the Curia itself a semipagan spirit was bred by the
Humanists. In 1447 Parentucelli, an enthusiast for codices, became pope as Nicholas V. On
Easter, the eminent humanist Filelfo wrote to him from Milan to congratul ate him on his
elevation. Filelfo expressed a general satisfaction of scholars, citing also the humanitas of Christ
himself, as well as writing somewhat hypocritically of fucata gentilium . . . sapientia. Some time
later, in 1453, Filelfo personally appeared at the papal court. Nicholas kept the vile "Satyrae" of
the humanist until he had perused them, and gave Filelfo a purse of 500 ducats when he
departed. Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini ascended the papal throne in 1458 as Pius II., another
humanist pope.
3. Erasmus
Erasmus of Rotterdam in his person and career marks the point where the "new learning" had
arrived at the parting of the ways. He felt an affinity for Lucian; his Encomium Morioe, a
vitriolic satire, dealt not gently with clerical corruption. He edited the New Testament and
dedicated it to Leo X. He had no desire to abandon the old Church, considering the bounties and
pensions which he received were all derived from princes or clerics who adhered to the papacy.
He pretended that he could not read the German writings of Luther. Erasmus wrote that "Luther's
movement was not connected with learning," and, at the same time he wrote to Pope Hadrian
VI.: "I could find a hundred passages where St. Paul seems to teach the doctrines which they
condemn in Luther. "Other utterances show his unwillingness to serve the Reformation or to be
held responsible for any part of it: I have written nothing which can be laid hold of against the
established orders. . . . I would rather see things left as they are than to see a revolution which
may lead to one knows not what. Others may be martyrs, if they like. I aspire to no such honor. .
. . I care nothing what is done to Luther, but I care for peace. . . . If you must take a side, take the
side which is most in favor." His keen sense of actual dependencies in the movement of things
led him to see situations and realities with wonderful clearness; but his genius, like that of many
scholars, was essentially negative. When he was fifty-one, not long before 1517, he wrote to
Fabricius at Basel: "My chief fear is that with the revival of Greek literature there may be a
revival of paganism. There are Christians who are Christians but in name, and are Gentiles at
heart." In the fall of 1525, when central Germany had been affected by the Peasants' War, he
wrote: "You remember Reuchlin. The conflict was raging between the Muses and their enemies,
when up sprang Luther, and the object thenceforward was to entangle the friends of literature in
the Lutheran business, so as to destroy both them and him together."
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