Parties in Political Transitions: Authoritarian Legacies

and Post-Authoritarian Challenges

Ellen Lust
Yale University
David Waldner
University of Virginia

This paper examines the ability of political parties and party systems to represent
constituents and to remain committed to democratic institutions and practices in political
transitions -- that is, to perform representative and constitutive functions of democracy. We
argue that there is a clear causal chain between strategies of rule under authoritarian regimes, and
the representative functions of parties and constitutive capacities of party systems in transitions.
Strategies of rule shape the representative capacity of post-authoritarian parties and the
constellation of parties that comprise the party system. This constellation of parties, in turn,
impacts the parties ability to play a constitutive function, which in turn affects the likelihood of
democratization. The paper considers transitions in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Tunisia,
demonstrating how authoritarian systems of rule influence the development of parties and party
systems, and their ability to perform representative and constitutive functions that ultimately
support or undermine democratic institutions.

Introduction
Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, and Libya all witnessed the toppling of long-standing dictatorships
and subsequent struggles to institute democratic institutions. To this end, new parties have
emerged and party systems taken shape. Yet, despite similar challenges, the ability of political
parties and party systems to represent constituents and to remain committed to democratic
institutions and practices -- that is, to play representative and constitutive functions of
democracy -- has varied significantly. In Iraq and Libya, parties are relatively weak and thus
perform both representative and constitutive functions poorly. In Egypt, parties have varied
abilities to perform representative functions and, partly as a result of this, are less capable of
performing constitutive roles by upholding democratic institutions. Parties have been most
successful at representing constituents and remained most committed to democratic institutions
as the site for political contestation in Tunisia.
We argue that authoritarian systems of rule explain these differences. Our argument
draws on three observations in the extant literature. First, we recognize the impact that historical
experiences have on transitions.1 Scholars have pointed to the effects of historical experiences on
citizens attitudes toward political participation, 2 elites willingness and ability to form parties, 3
the cleavages around which they mobilize, 4 and the skills they bring to negotiating new political
contexts. 5 Second, we agree with scholars who point to the role that parties and party systems
play as crucial agents of democratic development. Parties perform a representative role,
determining which cleavages form the basis of political contestation, 6 and a constitutive role,
engaging in drafting new democratic institutions such as electoral laws and constitutions, and by
extension, determining the degree to which parties seek to advance their goals under democratic

auspices or, alternatively, to advance their goals even at the expense of democracy. 7 Third,
parties can be both makers or breakers of democracy 8 and we aim to theorize the conditions
under which parties contribute to democratic development or subvert it.
We extend this work by explicitly theorizing the causal relationship between the
strategies autocrats adopted to manage their opposition, sometimes coopting them and at other
times and places coercing them, and the representative and constitutive functions of parties and
party systems in transitions. In this paper, we argue that there is a clear causal chain between
authoritarian strategies, representative functions of parties, and constitutive capacities of party
systems. Strategies of rule shape the representative capacity of post-authoritarian parties, and the
constellation of parties that comprise the party system. This constellation of parties, in turn,
impacts the constitutive function that parties play, which in turn affects the likelihood of
democratization.
Authoritarian strategies are distinguished along three dimensions: those that ruling
authoritarian elites adopted towards hegemonic parties, towards opposition parties, and towards
social movements; in a phrase, the patterned interaction between regime and opposition. 9 These
strategies left behind three types of parties: relic partiesformer ruling parties now stripped of
their hegemonic status and former loyal opposition partiesthat survived the transition intact or
regrouped with minimal change in organization and membership; novice parties formed by new
political entrepreneurs in the aftermath of the transition; and movement parties, derived from
social movements that sustained underground opposition during the authoritarian era. These
three types of party vary in their capacities to shape the politicization of cleavages, present
coherent policy platforms, and consequently form linkages with voters and survive electoral
competitionthat is, their ability to play a representative function.

Subsequently, parties and party systems also differ in their ability to perform constitutive
functions. Parties can be makers or breakers of democracy in two ways: as institution builders
and as strategic rivals. In new democracies, party leaders often play a leading role in designing
new electoral institutions and the broader set of constitutional provisions within which elections
and democratic governance will take place. Parties vary widely in how they participate in,
boycott, or even subvert the process of institutional selection and creation; indeed, tensions over
institutional selection have directly led to challenges to democracy. More broadly, parties can
adopt goals that elicit inter-party compromise or they can define goals that directly subvert
democracy in a variety of ways ranging from increasing the likelihood of anti-democratic coups
to initiating armed conflict.
Thus, representative and constitutive functions are causally related. The causal link is the
nature of the party system constituted by distinct mixtures of relic, novice, and movement
parties. These distinct constellations of parties can generate diverse mixtures of democracysustaining and democracy-subverting incentives by determining the probability of winning
elections and the costs of losing elections. Using this expected-utility framework, we show how
party systems shape the behavior of political parties and the subsequent process of democratic
development or backsliding, and even potential reversion to authoritarianism.
Organizationally, the article traces the logic of the causal chain. The first section below
looks at strategies of rule by authoritarian incumbents; the second section below looks at the
development of new party systems; the third section explores the implications of these party
systems for the development of democracy, or its absence. A final section concludes.
Throughout, our empirical focus is the four cases of recent democratic transitions in the Middle

East; but as should be clear, our theoretical arguments are not so tightly bound in time and space
and should have considerable external application.
Authoritarian Strategies of Rule
Strategies have three elements: did incumbent authoritarian elites build a ruling party?
Did they permit any opposition parties to operate publicly, albeit under strict constraints? And
did they tolerate or repress social movements that were capable of building grass roots support?
These strategies shape the emergence and development of post-transition parties and their
relative capacity to forge linkages with constituencies. First, and most obviously, only if ruling
parties, loyal opposition parties, or both exist in the authoritarian period can there be relic parties
in the transition period. Second, the strength of social movements in the authoritarian period
conditions the strength of movement parties in its aftermath. Third, strong relic parties,
movement parties, or both, pose formidable barriers to entry for effective novice parties.
As we shall see, the four countries examined here experienced very different strategies of
authoritarian rule. Egypt witnessed an inclusive strategy, with ruling and loyalist opposition
parties and tolerance of some social movements. This left a heterogeneous but unbalanced party
system in place that ultimately undermined democratization. Iraq and Libya experienced
exclusive political systems. Iraq developed a ruling Baath party while Libya developed a noparty system, but in both cases, opposition parties and social movements were heavily repressed,
leaving behind homogenous party systems. Finally, Tunisia had an inclusive system, with a
ruling party and loyalist opposition parties. It expressed less tolerance of social movements than
Egypt, however. The result was a heterogeneous but relatively balanced party system.
Egypt.

The Egyptian strategy of rule evolved over several decades after the July 1952 coup to
one of including loyalist political parties and tolerating the growth of a strong social movement.
The Revolutionary Command Council that formed shortly after the July 1952 coup quickly
terminated the quarter-century experience of raucous party politics. 10 One week later, the
military junta made its first effort to create a ruling party that could mobilize a mass base, the
Liberation Rally. 11 A few years later, with virtually all political opposition eliminated, the
regime created a new party, the National Union, which was in turn replaced by the Arab Socialist
Union (ASU) in 1962. Of the three single parties, the ASU had the largest institutional presence
and political influence.
Upon assuming the presidency in 1971, Anwar Sadat sought to curtail the ASUs
influence. He introduced a veneer of multi-party politics in 1976, removing requirements of
compulsory membership in the ASU to obtain political and economic privileges and creating
right-wing, left-wing, and centrist proto-parties that competed in the parliamentary elections. 12
After Sadats assassination, his successor, Husni Mubarak, anointed the National Democratic
Party (NDP) the de facto ruling party of the government; subsequently, the NDP often garnered
more than 75 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections. 13 The regime dominated the political
arena but licensed legal opposition parties, including the Socialist Labor Party and the reestablished Wafd Party. These parties were heavily constrained and co-opted; institutional
incentives induced efforts to curry favor with the regime, not to check its power, and thus neither
the regime nor the population doubted their loyalty. 14
There was underground opposition as well. Islamist organizations, both the moderate
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and more radical offshoots, participated in politics. Strikingly, the
MB cooperated with the regime in its repression of more radical Islamist movements.

Recognizing its end of the bargain, the regime allowed the MB to participate more openly in
public politics. 15 Although prohibited from forming a political party, the MB ran its members
for parliament, first in coalition with legal opposition parties and later as independents. But the
MB and other Islamist organizations were more vitally active as social movements, creating
much tighter links to the population than either opposition parties or the ruling NDP.
Tunisia
Tunisia closely resembles the Egyptian experience, with the development of loyalist
opposition parties and tolerance, albeit to a lesser extent, of social movements. Tunisias single
party, the Neo-Destour, was founded during the French protectorate. By independence in 1956,
the partys infrastructure had expanded to cover the entire country, membership had increased
from under 30,000 to about 600,000, and party militants staffed the newly created or affiliated
Tunisian labor union and farmers union. 16 The party was partially marginalized in subsequent
decades by personalistic politics belonging to networks surrounding the presidency was more
important than formal position within the party -- yet the party retained some capacity to recruit
millions of members and to mobilize participation of millions of non-party members, however
desultory and dissimulative. Over time, dire economic conditions and political protest
occasioned a carefully stage-managed movement towards multi-party politics. After assuming
power in 1987, Ben Ali promised political opening, formed the Constitutional Democratic Rally
(RCD), and legalized political parties. However, the RCD preserved its hegemonic status and
opposition parties traded state subsidies, benefits and the allocation of parliamentary for the right
to voice significant criticism without sanction. 17
As in Egypt, the locus of genuine oppositional activity was an underground Islamist
movement. The Tunisian Jamaa Islamiyya, or Islamic Group, formed in the late 1960s by

recruiting members in mosques, secondary schools, and universities. In 1981, the groups leader,
Rachid Ghannouchi, publicly announced the formation of a political organization, the Islamic
Tendency Movement (MTI); the regime responded by imprisoning the movements leadership.
In the brief liberal moment following Ben Alis capture of power, the movements leaders staged
a comeback as An-Nahda, the Renaissance Party. The party won no seats in the 1989
parliamentary elections but was estimated to enjoy support of about 30 percent of the electorate.
This popularity, combined with the partys loud public claims of fraud, led to Ghannouchis exile
in 1989. The party was outlawed and its members were subject to surveillance, harassment, and
arrest. By the mid-1990s, Tunisias Islamists had no visible organization anywhere in the
country. 18 Thus, while post-authoritarian Tunisia would, like Egypt, inherit the raw ingredients
of a heterogeneous party system, Tunisias movement party would begin from a much weaker
position relative to Egypts Muslim Brotherhood.
Iraq
As in Egypt, Iraqi political parties proliferated during the monarchical period, but they
too offered little resistance to the creation of a single-party regime after 1968 and were quickly
eliminated. 19 Unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian dictatorships, the Iraqi dictatorship never
licensed loyal opposition parties to create a faade of multiparty democracy. Instead, opposition
to the Bathi dictatorship came from organizations representing distinct ethno-religious
communities. In the northeastern Kurdish region, the Kurdish Democratic Party and a splinter
party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led the Kurdish nationalist movement. 20 Both parties
were based heavily on the leadership of conservative landlords and tribal chiefs and neither party
represented a mass-mobilizing social movement. The withdrawal of international support led to
a massive military defeat at the hands of the Iraqi army in 1975. Only the Iraqi defeat in the

1991 Gulf War and the creation of an international safe haven in the north allowed the KDP and
the PUK to act as quasi-political parties in the Autonomous Zone. But the two organizations
remained more militias than parties, and civil war erupted between them in 1994. In the
predominately Shii southern provinces, a militant Shii Islamist movement, al-Dawa, formed in
the early 1960s as a response to the growing popularity of the Iraqi Communist Party among
young Shii men. Al-Dawa became an underground resistance movement after 1968, engaging
in guerilla warfare against the regime. A wave of repression in the late 1970s largely destroyed
the movement, and with the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, most of the organizations
remaining leaders and members moved to Iran, where, with Iranian support, the reorganized as
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). 21 In the 1990s, members of the
Al-Sadr family who were among Iraqs leading Shii clerics initiated a movement of resurgent
Shii religiosity and, implicitly, nationalism. That movement largely ceased activity with the
murder of its leader in 1998; but the Shii underclass that had been temporarily mobilized
remained available to support new leaders and parties following the dictatorships fall in 2003. 22
In short, by 1980, the dictatorship led by Saddam Husayn had eliminated virtually all
organized political opposition; the locus of opposition was in London, Damascus, and Teheran.
Consequently, Iraq developed a fractured political landscape, with multiple underground
movements mobilizing along sectarian and ethnic lines and accustomed to shifting between
political and military activities. After the fall of the dictatorship and the transition to electoral
politics, each of these movements would generate one or more novice political parties, each
claiming to represent one of Iraqs ethnic communities. 23
Libya

Finally, in Libya, Qadhafi entirely eliminated political parties and social movements. The
Libyan nationalist military officers who overthrew the monarchy in 1969 fashioned themselves
after Egypts Nasser; but within a few years, the dictatorship headed by Muammar Qadhafi
charted its own unique strategy of authoritarian rule. The post-independence monarchic period
was marked by family, factional, and tribal-based politics, and so the new rulers faced little
organized resistance to constructing a single-party regime. 24 But, also as in Egypt, the new
ruling group had limited organized support among the population. 25 Its initial response was to
form the Arab Socialist Union, modeled on Egypts single party. But instead of following Egypt
into a facade of multiparty politics, Qadhafi replaced the ASU with locally organized Popular
Committees2,400 were established within the first year. Political parties were prohibited, and
after 1973 party membership became a capital offense. Indeed, the practice of party engagement
was so abhorrent that to be a party member is to be a traitor became a popular slogan, and
ones failure to disclose knowledge of anothers engagement in parties was met with harsh
punishment. Technically, political participation was mobilized instead through the various
institutions of direct democracy, the so-called Jamahiriyya. In reality, the experiment in direct
democracy created an institutional void.26 Two factors made this period of no-party rule
possible: first, Libya was an oil-rich rentier state without the social basis for class-based
contestation. Second, Qadhafi was able to manipulate tribal rivalries and regionalism to solidify
his rule.
Unlike other members of the quartet, Libyas Islamists did not create a mass-based social
movement. Under the monarchy, the Muslim Brotherhood gained Libyan adherents, but
remained without significant support through 1969. Efforts to reestablish local networks and
garner support continued over the next four decades but failed, due to repression and the failure

10

to create a service-based constituency, given Libyas oil-financed, welfare state. 27 Consequently,

the authoritarian era in Libya bequeathed no remnants of a ruling party, loyal opposition or
Islamist movement capable of mobilizing mass support. 28 Novice parties would dominate posttransition Libyan politics.
Early Transition Parties and Representation
Given their strategies toward political forces, authoritarian regimes bestow three types of
parties in the transition landscape: Relic parties, movement-parties, and novice parties. Each has
a different capacity to form linkages with voters, that is to say, to perform representative
functions. Relic parties are relatively well-known but do not have strong linkages with the
population; movement parties are well-known to all, highly trusted by significant segments of the
population but similarly distrusted by others, and enjoy strong organizational roots; and novice
parties are little known and weakly organized. In this section, we demonstrate how the
authoritarian system shaped the parties linkage capacities and hence how it affects their ability
to perform their representative functions.
Relic Parties
Relic parties are organizational descendants of parties that existed under the authoritarian
period. They come in two denominations: old ruling and loyalist opposition parties. Like all
relics, the power of these parties is found more in what they accomplished in the past than in
what they can do in the present.
Indeed, in the transition period, former ruling parties are doubly disadvantaged. First,
under the authoritarian regime, ruling parties discarded and discredited their own ideological
principles over time, becoming instead a tool to control masses and political elites. 29 The
socialist, populist principles underpinning the Iraqi Baath, Tunisian RCD, and Egyptian

11

National Democratic Party were sacrificed on the alter of personality cults and opportunism. 30
Second, under pressure from the populist movements that overthrow dictatorships, they are
excommunicated, forced to reassemble themselves, often in a more decentralized format. The
NDP, RCD and Baath parties were all banned early in the transition period, and lustration laws
were set in place prohibiting former ruling party elites from participating in politics. Small
parties led by those close to local elites from old parties nevertheless emerged, but their
organizational strength and popular legitimacy was much diminished. Importantly, these parties
stand in contrast to ruling parties in transitions initiated from above, as in much of sub-Saharan
Africa and Eastern Europe, where elites could benefit from their clientelistic relations, increase
public support by leading reform, and be resurrected.
Relic parties derived from opposition parties face problems of weak organization and
limited ties to constituents. These stem from restrictions they faced under the authoritarian
regime: they could win seats, but not too many; challenge regime policies, but not too harshly; be
political players, but not serious contenders. 31 Participation had rewards, including financial
subsidies for parties, access to parliamentary perquisites and state resources for those who win
seats, 32 but the rewards were realized by demonstrating loyalty to the regime, not by developing
strong, mass-based organizations.33 Consequently, they invested little in party organization
(particularly in rural and poor urban areas), and in the development of internal, democratic
structures. Of course, these parties could choose to forego these benefits and pressure the regime
for change, but they were reluctant to do so when regimes appeared invincible, as they did until
nearly their end in the cases considered here. Indeed, as protesters took to the streets in 2011,
Tunisias foremost loyal opposition party, the MDS, published articles denouncing the protesters
and foreign intervention, leading one commentator to ask, But where has the MDS gone, the

12

Tunisian party of opposition?34

Rather than seeing these parties as aggregators of political preferences, citizens view
them as cliques of rent-seekers, more concerned with political machinations and personal gain
than with formulating a compelling vision for change or solving citizens mounting problems.
Public opinion polls conducted nearly one year after the parliamentary elections in Egypt and
Tunisia found, in the eyes of most citizens, relic parties were organizationally weak and fail to
help citizens in need. As shown in Table 1, only 4% of Egyptians believed the Wafd party
helped citizens in need, and 2% agreed with that the Wasat party did so. Tunisian parties fared
slightly better, likely because the closed-list, PR electoral systems, both under Ben Ali and in the
founding elections, strengthened political parties in comparison to the Egyptian electoral systems,
under Mubarak and in the transition, that allowed independent candidates. Potential voters also
do not see the parties as representing clear platforms. For example, only 13% of Egyptians
thought the Wafd party platform was mostly or totally clear, and only 5% held this view of the
Islamic-oriented Wasat party. Even in Tunisia relic parties were less well known and seen in
worse light than their movement counterparts.

Table 1: Public Attitudes toward Relic, Movement and Novice Political Parties in Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia.
Type of
Party

Relic
Party

13

Country

Egypt

Party Name

Al-Wafd
Wasat
Tagammua

%Who
Know
Name of
Party
Leader

17%
NA
NA

% Who
See Party
Platform
as Clear

13%
5%
4%

%Who View
Party as
Organizationally
Capable

% Who
Think
Party
Helps
Citizens in
Need

21%
8%
5%

4%
2%
2%

PDP
Ettakatol/MRJ
S

31%
39%

17%
21%

15%
22%

15%
19%

Freedom and
Justice Party
Al-Nour
EnNahda

33%

33%

63%

36%

6%
72%

24%
37%

44%
39%

25%
33%

Justice and
Construction
Party

44%

14%

25%

19%

Libya

Egypt

Free Egyptians

2%

7%

9%

3%

Popular
Petition
CPR
National
Forces
Alliance**
National Front
Party
Union for
Homeland
Homeland
Party
National
Centrist Party
Taghyeer
Party

42%

14%

15%

14%

47%
69%

25%
7%

25%
49%

23%
39%

24%

19%

20%

16%

16%

18%

12%

11%

13%

21%

10%

10%

NA

19%

9%

8%

NA

17%

10%

9%

Tunisia

Egypt
Movement
Party

Tunisia

Tunisia

Novice
Party
Libya

Sources: The Egyptian Post-Election Survey (EPES), Tunisian Post-Election Survey (TPES), and
Second National Libyan Survey. 35

The problem citizens face in distinguishing relic parties platforms is also clear when
they are asked to place the parties ideological positions, first on the role of religion in the state,
and second on the role of the state in the economy. As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, few
respondents were capable of placing relic parties positions; for instance, only 57% were able to
place the Egyptian Wafd party and Tunisians Ettakatol on the salient question of religion and
politics. And, the variance in these answers for relic parties is higher than that for movement
parties. The same pattern holds with regard to the role of state and the economy.

14

Figure 1. Placement of Parties regarding extent to which they want to see religion play a major
role in the state.

Figure 2. Placement of Parties regarding extent to which they want to see the state play a role in
the economy.
15

Not surprisingly, when Egyptians were asked in an April 2011 poll whether they would
support an existing political party or a new party, 68% responded that they would support a new
party, 14% stated that they would support a relic party, and 18% stated that they did not know.
Even if one assumes the 18% were supporters of the former ruling NDP, less than 1/3 of
respondents could be seen as supporting the old ruling or loyalist opposition parties. Moreover,
the same poll found that Egyptians were highly undecided over whom they would support in
upcoming elections; 65% stated that they did not know whom they would support. The Wafda
long-standing independence party dating from the 1920sreceived the highest percent of
support, at only 6%. 36
Movement Parties
While relic parties are but empty vessels, striving to regain vestiges of their old privilege,
movement parties are organizationally powerful, translating wide and deep social support into
political advantage. Their primary goal is social change, but they can exploit the opportunities
that the transition periods create, using political means to achieve these goals. 37 Consequently,
they form political parties that that capitalized on their reputation for caring about citizens needs,
their constituents devotion, and strong organizational capacities.
In the competition to form strong bonds with constituents, movement parties are doubly
advantaged. They capitalize on social principal, not privilege, and they are important social
service providers. In some cases, this allowed them more political latitude under the
authoritarian regime, while in others, it created bonds that allowed them to survive
subterraneanly. For example, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was granted space to mobilize
because its tenants were not incompatible with the NDPs ambiguous ideology and its social
services provided critical aid in Egypts poorer economic conditions, while social movements in

16

Tunisia, Iraq and Libya were more highly constrained. Strong principles also led them to recruit
intensively. Ascension to full membership often took years, requiring demonstrated dedication
both to the organization and its beliefs. Members were converted to the movements cause as a
way of life, not simply a political act. 38 When political fortunes changed, these parties enjoyed
widespread popular support and could draw on networks of dedicated cadres to mobilize
politically. Untainted by cooptation or collaboration with the ousted authoritarian regime, able
exploit their years of reputation building through social services and opposition, they quickly
gained enormous electoral clout. 39
Public opinion polls demonstrate the movements advantages, as shown in Table 1.
Egyptians, Libyans and Tunisians were two to three times more likely to know the names of
party leaders and to view them as organizationally capable than they were to do so for relic
parties. 40 Importantly, this difference is not due to the Islamist basis of these parties; respondents
did not view the Wasat party, an Egyptian relic party with Islamists roots, with as much
enthusiasm as they did the Muslim Brotherhoods Freedom and Justice and Al-Nour parties.
Finally, perhaps most strikingly, Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that citizens are much more likely
to recognize movement parties positions on issues of religion and the economy, and there is
much less variance in these positions. Quite simply, movement parties are better at spreading
their message.
Novice Parties
Novice parties multiply rapidly, but most have weak ties to voters and quickly disappear.
They have three distinct origins: civil society activists, previously exiled or quieted political
party leaders (including those who managed to move from alliance with the regime to opposition
in time to salvage their reputation), and formerly disengaged political entrepreneurs. The parties

17

they form are untainted by association with the previous authoritarian regime. However, they
have weak ties to constituents at a national level.
These parties weaknesses vary. Returning exiles often enjoy widespread visibility, are
associated with relatively clear political tendencies, and can exploit material benefits from
abroad. However, they often suffer from weak ties to constituents, particularly in rural and poor
urban areas. Through decades of authoritarianism, these citizens came to see elections as
mechanisms for clientelism, and even in transitions, expect the same. 41 They are seen as
unknown entities, no matter how attractive their political platforms and experience, and as less
likely to respond to their needs than those they know. 42 On the other hand, local activists, civil
society organizations, and local political entrepreneurs often enjoy strong ties with local
constituents, but have difficulty mobilizing support at the national level. These parties and elites
are often engaged in constituent service and seek local development, but lack a compelling
vision that connects with, and mobilizes, the masses.
Again, the novice parties challenges are reflected in public opinion data. As Table 2
shows, novice parties were sometimes better known than relic parties, but not considerably more
likely to be seen as helping people in need or having clear political platforms. 43 So too, as
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, citizens were generally unable to place parties platforms on issues
of religion and the economy, and their placements varied considerably.
Certainly, the ability to mobilize on a national level can be achieved by coordinating
local parties. 44 For instance, PR systems with electoral thresholds and national lists can provide
incentives for coalitions to form national parties or electoral lists. Yet, three factors make these
coalitions difficult to sustain. First, the time leading up to the first elections is often short, giving
actors little time to coordinate. Second, the failure to develop ideological or programmatic

18

platforms results in coalitions that are broad-based and primarily strategic. Third, strategic
coalitions depend on parties beliefs that these coalitions are a key to success. High uncertainty
over the parties relative strength often leads parties to overestimate their success, and thus to
demand greater concessions from coalition partners or underestimate the need for coordination.
Consequently, coalitions are often stillborn or short-lived.
From Representation to Constitutive Functions
Authoritarian strategies foster not only different types of parties, but also different
constellations of relic, movement and novice parties in post-rupture party systems. At one
extreme, Libyas dictatorship prohibited all organized political groups and thus left a party
system based primarily on fragmented novice parties that find it difficult to perform democratic
representative and constitutive functions. At the other extreme, Egypts institutional legacy
created the basis for multiple relic and social movement, fostering a high degree of competition
between the strong, social movement parties that derived from the Muslim Brotherhood and
Salafis, on the one hand, and secular-oriented relic parties. Tunisia and Iraq are located
somewhat in between these two poles. Both had repressed political parties and movements more
than Egypt, but had allowed such forces to exist, unlike Libya. Thus Tunisia and Iraq saw the
emergence of relic and movement parties that were weaker than those in Egypt but more
organized than in Libya.
These different constellations affect party behavior and the ability of parties to perform
constitutive functions. The willingness of a given party to create and sustain democratic
institutions may be powerfully conditioned by its relationship to other members of the newly
formed party system. The basic logic of this claim can be stated in terms of an expected utility
function: the probability of winning an election and the costs of losing an election and tolerating

19

ones opponents implementing its preferred policies. 45 For a given party, its probability of
winning elections is a function of its capacity to form linkages with and mobilize constituents,
relative to its rivals. The costs of toleration are highest when movement parties either espouse
projects of societal transformation that are antithetical to rival parties or they champion
communal interests that sharply conflict with communal interests represented by other parties.
Thus, democracy is most threatened when powerful movement parties confront relatively weak
relic and novice parties. But short of this extreme threat to democracy, other configurations of
high costs of toleration and low costs of winning elections can induce party behavior that does
not fully sustain democracy.
Importantly, the critical factor is not the presence or absence of any single type of party;
the focal point of the analysis is the constellation of parties. It is the party system that constrains
individual parties to a greater or lesser degree, permitting them or preventing them from
achieving their goals and defending their interests and hence conditioning their expectations
about the expected utility of democratic institutions and practices.
Egypt exemplifies what we call an imbalanced heterogeneous system. It is
heterogeneous because each type of party, relic, novice, and movement, is represented by one or
more organizations; it is imbalanced because movement parties have higher capacity to politicize
cleavages and mobilize supporters against opponents; imbalance creates an environment that
unsettles weaker parties and emboldens stronger parties, making compromise far less likely.
Tunisia, in contrast, represents a balanced heterogeneous system: all types of parties have similar
capacities to create an organizational hierarchy, forge programmatic platforms, and mobilize
supporters along a structure of conflict; this creates an environment that facilitates compromise
and negotiated settlements. Homogeneous systems in Iraq and Libya confront significant

20

challenges as well. The problem is less the imbalance in linkage capacity than the balanced
representation of centrifugal cleavages. In Iraq, multiple novice parties capitalize on the loyalty
of their co-communal constituencies to gain access to local and national office; leaders of these
parties, having experienced decades of inter-communal conflict, perceive compromise and
negotiation to be antithetical to their interests. In Libya, in contrast, novice parties are weak
institutions, unable to become the primary drivers of political contestation.
As we shall see, only in Tunisia, where a balanced heterogeneous party system developed
out of the authoritarian past, did parties compromise, creating a propitious but not unblemished
foundation for democratic development. In the other three cases, authoritarian legacies
bequeathed party systems in which at least one major party and often more adopted strategies
that have directly challenged the very existence of democracy.
Egypt
Egypt experienced an embarrassment of institutional riches, but the strong movement
parties combined with relatively weak relic parties undermined the parties constitutive
performance. Relic parties, novice parties, and movement-parties jockeyed for power. Social
movements including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis took advantage of their stronger
linkages with society and relatively established positions at least with regard to issues of religion
and the state and formed parties that were not a monolithic bloc but established a strong Islamist
presence. Juxtaposed against the movement parties were relic parties that had relatively limited
capacity, as well as burgeoning novice parties typically found in transitions. Although the
strong presence of parties initially created an impetus for developing electoral and party laws that
strengthened democratic institutions, ultimately imbalanced electoral results driven by the
unequal strength of these parties pushed parties to undermine the democratic process.

21

Initially, Egypt had a significant set of political forces intent on establishing an election
law that would promote party system development. Political parties large and small, of Islamist
or secularist tendencies, intent on more or less radical change engaged in the debate with an
expectation that parties were a primary mechanism for political engagement. The question was
the extent to which the various parties could mobilize voters, and the type of system (e.g., district
sizes, PR or majoritarian) that would benefit them the most. The high level of uncertainty
inevitable in transitions made it extremely difficult for the parties to predict the impact of
alternative laws accurately. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood was against individual
constituencies, but it ultimately gained a greater proportion of the IC seats than those contested
on PR lists. 46 Despite the uncertainty and missteps, the rich party system that Mubaraks legacy
left in Egypt was oriented toward developing democratic institutions that would resolve political
conflict. The party law in which 2/3 of the seats were elected on lists with 1/3 through
individual constituencies arguably both reflected this commitment and was a toward
strengthening the party system.
However, the imbalance of the political parties strength undermined their ability and
willingness to play a constructive role in democratization. As discussed above, the movement
parties combined clear political positions and linkages with constituents built over decades of
mobilization and were poised to far outperform the relic and novice parties in the first elections.
Survey evidence suggests that the Egyptian polity was fairly evenly divided between those who
held consistent secularist and Islamist positions. Yet, in Egypts crowded but unbalanced
party system, movement parties and especially the Freedom and Justice and Nour parties -out-campaigned their counterparts, 47 leading the Freedom and Justice Party to take 213 seats
(43% of the seats) and the Nour party to gain 107 seats (21%) in Egypts first post-Mubarak

22

parliamentary elections. (See Table 2.)

Table 2. Results of First Transitional Elections
Egypt, 2011-2012 Parliamentary Elections (List and Individual Constituency Seats)
Party name
% List
# List
% Seats % IC
# IC
% IC
Votes
Seats
Won
Votes
Seats
Seats
Won
Won
Won
Won
Won
Democratic Alliance
37.5
127
38.25
37.5
108
65.1
for Egypt
Islamist Bloc
27.8
96
28.91
27.8
27
16.27
New Wafd
9.2
37
11.14
9.2
4
2.41
Egyptian Bloc
8.9
33
9.94
Al-Wasat
3.7
10
3.01
The Revolution
2.8
7
2.11
Continues
Independents
21
12.65
Tunisia, 2011 Constituent Assembly Elections (All List Seats)
Party name
% Votes
# of
% Seats
Won
Seats
Won
EnNahda Movement
37.04
89
41.01
Congress for the
8.71
29
13.36
Republic
Popular Petition
6.74
26
11.98
Democratic Forum for
7.03
20
9.22
Labor and Liberties
Progressive Democrat
3.94
16
7.37
Party
The Initiative
3.19
5
2.30
Democratic Modernist
2.79
5
2.30
Pole
Libya, 2011 General National Assembly Elections* (List and Individual Constituency
Seats)
Party name
% Votes
% List
# List
% All
Received
Seats
Seats
Seats
Won
Won*
National Forces
48.14
48.75
39
19.5
Alliance
Justice and
10.27
21.25
17
8.5
Construction
National Front
4.08
3.75
3
1.5
Union for the
4.50
2.5
2
1
Homeland
23

National Centrist Party 4.00

2.5
2
Other
29.01
21.25
37
Iraq, 2005 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections (All List Seats)
Electoral Alliances
% of Votes # Seats
% of
Received
Won
Seats
Won
128
48
United Iraqi Alliance 41
(Shia List)
22
53
20
Kurdistan Alliance
(Kurdish)
8
25
9
Iraqi National List
(Sunni/Secular)
15
44
16
Iraqi Accord Front
(Sunni)
4
11
4
Iraqi National
Dialogue Front
(Sunni)
1
5
1.9
Kurdistan Islamic
Union (Kurdish)
<1
1
.4
Turkmen Front
Yazidi Movement

<1

1
68.5

.4

Sources: for Egypt: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/100/32384/Elections/News/Egypts-postMubarak-legislative-life-begins-amid-te.aspx

http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/26/who-are-the-non-islamists-in-egyptsnew-parliament
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/146347; for Tunisia: http://www.tunisialive.net/2011/11/14/tunisian-election-final-results-tables/; for Libya: Source:
http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/07/18/party-results/#axzz2ub5K98ic
http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Libyan-Party-List-Results.pdf
* Note: this does not include IC seats won by contestants who either were affiliated with the
political grouping before the election, or chose to join its alliance after the election. These
affiliations are difficult to determine accurately. Moreover, because these members elections are
not linked to their affiliation with the political group, their allegiance to the group is likely to be
weak.
Those in relic and novice parties became increasingly leery that the movement parties
could capture the playing field, reneging on democracy. The problem was exacerbated by,
although not solely due to, ideological differences between the primarily secular-oriented relic
parties and the Islamist orientation of movement parties. As the Islamists won first the
24

parliamentary elections and then the presidency, their opponents became increasingly skeptical
of their intentions. This gave both sides incentives to undermine liberal political institutions. 48
Secularists remained complacent as the higher court decided in June 2012 to disband the
Islamist-led parliament on technical grounds; Islamists ignored their oppositions refusal to
engage in the constituent assembly in fall 2012, ultimately ramrodding the constitution through
in a snap referendum by the end of the year; and their opposition in turn took to the streets,
ultimately leading to the removal of the elected president Morsi in June 2013. The stark
imbalance between the abilities of movement and relic parties to mobilize voters created political
tensions that undermined their ability to play constitutive roles necessary for democracy.
Tunisia
In comparison to Egypt, the Tunisian party system was relatively balanced between relic
parties, novice parties, and movement parties. Like Egypt, Tunisia enjoyed reasonably strong
organizations capable of representing interests and engaging in political negotiations. However,
given greater repression under the Ben Ali regime, the Tunisian movement party, En-Nahda, did
not have an enormous advantage in mobilizational capacity of its Egyptian counterparts. Parties
had fewer incentives to renege on democracy and thus were better able to play a positive,
constitutive role in developing democratic institutions and practices.
In part, this was reflected in the establishment of a fully closed-list, PR system. This
reinforced the role of political parties, and it also contributed to a relatively equal distribution of
seats in the Constituent Assembly. As shown in Table 2, En-Nahda won a clear plurality
(37.04% of the votes and eighty-nine seats), but it did not win a majority. The next 6 parties
shared 101 seats, forcing En-Nahda to establish a coalition. The relative balance of political
forces in the Constituent Assembly, gave all sides incentive to use the assembly to iron out

25

differences. The Assembly effectively established a parliamentary government ruled by a troika

comprised of En-Nahda and the secular-oriented Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol
parties. The alliance both gave assurances to various sides that no party could unilaterally make
binding decisions and also gave all incentives to remain engaged in the institutional process.
This is not to suggest that the path to democracy is smooth in Tunisia, or that the public
has undying faith in the political parties. June and October 2013 surveys show Tunisians are
tiring of the constitutional debate and postponed elections; more than 70% of those surveyed said
that Tunisia has a flawed democracy or no democracy at all. The percentage that believed
Tunisian political parties were doing nothing to address the needs of citizens had risen to 61% in
October 2013 (from 42% in June 2013), and those who thought that parties were only interested
in political power and personal gain rose to 57%. (One-third believed that parties could play an
important role but had not yet done so.) 49 Moreover, political gridlock and heightened
opposition in the summer and fall of 2013 ultimately led the Islamist Prime Minister Ali
Laaraydah to step down, making way for a caretaker government. Given the relatively strong
and balanced political parties inherited from the authoritarian past, Tunisias parties function
reasonably well in helping consolidate democratic institutions.
Libya
Post- Qadhafi Libya stood in stark contrast with Egypt and Tunisia, lacking wellestablished domestic political parties and social movements necessary for consolidating
democracy. In the absence of either relic parties or movement parties, political entrepreneurs
quickly formed a plethora of small, local-based groups. (Many eschewed the name party
because the label was delegitimized under Qadhafi.) By August 2012, there were at least 200
groups, many formed by locally prominent personalities to meet regional demands. The party

26

system that emerged was thus highly fragmented and populated with novice parties with
embryonic institutional structures and low representative capacities. This has lead to difficulties
in performing constitutive functions.
Indeed, the plethora of weak parties created a balanced system, but one in which party
elites find it difficult to create institutions that allow them to strengthen political party
institutions and to engage in successful policymaking that will expand their popular support.
Local elites unaffiliated with political parties became primary drivers in negotiations over the
2012 law governing the General National Council (GNC) elections. These elites often had no
desire to form political parties and used their support from local constituents, reinforced at times
by tribal mechanisms and local militias, to rally for increasing the number of independent seats.
They succeeded, ultimately agreeing on 120 individual constituency (IC) seats contested through
majoritarian, individual constituencies and 80 proportional representation (PR) seats contested
through on lists that could be formed from electoral coalitions, not necessarily organized political
parties. 50
The result was a fragmented council, which only further undermined the parties ability
to strengthen democratic institutions and processes. (See Table 2.) The NFA itself an alliance
of more than 50 liberal-leaning groups affiliated with leading figures from the revolution won
nearly half of the PR seats, and the Islamist JCP won 17 of them. Yet, because a minority of
seats was reserved for PR lists, the majority of seats went to other forces. Given the distribution
of IC and PR seats in the GNC, it was often difficult to coordinate effectively on policymaking
within the GNC, or to focus on national interests. (Even in the best circumstances, of course, it
is difficult to shift the emphasis from local issues, to national ones.)
This fragmentation of the GNC further hindered parties ability to perform constitutive

27

functions. The GNC suffered from high absenteeism, as many members were focused more on
local issues than national concerns. Given that the GNC sessions are televised, this ultimately
undermined confidence in the GNC as well as political parties. The GNC also found it difficult
to make effective decisions and formulate policies. Of course, Libyan representatives face
extraordinary challenges in decision-making: the civil war, continued conflict between pro- and
anti-Qadhafi forces (as well as other groups), and the high stakes and vulnerabilities created by
oil should not be underestimated. Indeed, surveys conducted by JMW Consulting and NDI found
that although more than 80% of respondents supported democracy, two-thirds expressed distrust
for the GNC and nearly 85% of respondents distrust political parties. With parties unable to play
representative and constitutive roles, conflicts in the transition period have been frequently
fought on the streets, prolonging instability and undermining democratic institutions.
Iraq
On April 16th, 2003, the Coalitional Provisional Authority issued its first order
Disestablishment of the Iraqi Baath Party, eliminating all party structures and prohibiting
party members from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. 51 With no relic
parties blocking their path, novice parties proliferated rapidly. While many novice parties
represented little more than the ambitious locally influential leaders in a rapidly decentralized
polity, the more important post-authoritarian development was the emergence of novice parties
representing Iraqs major ethnic and religious communities. These parties quickly dominated
Iraqi electoral politics. As Table 2 demonstrates, virtually all votes cast in the December 2005
parliamentary elections went to parties that were strongly identified with a party representing
Iraqs Sunni Arabs, Shii Arabs, or Kurds.
None of Iraqs novice parties had a clear mobilizational advantage over rivals. A

28

minority of the parties the two Kurdish parties and a party organized by followers of Mutada
al-Sadr, usually referred to as al-Sadriyuun, could exploit their prior experience as oppositional
organizations that had cultivated substantial loyalty among sectors of the population. But given
that all parties sought votes almost exclusively from among co-ethnics, electoral fortunes were
largely determined by Iraqs ethno-cultural demographics and by the degree of intra-ethnic
rivalry between parties. 52
The relative balance between the linkage capacity of novice ethnic parties was not,
however, a propitious foundation for democratic development. Each party made claims on
behalf of its constituents that would be seen as antithetical to core interests of the other
communities. 53 All of the major parties can best be described as ethnic chauvinist groups, some
of which seek hegemony in a centralized political system and others which seek to radically
curtain the strength of the central state on behalf of regional autonomy, bordering on quasisovereignty. Most significantly, Kurdish and Shii political leaders wanted constitutional
provisions and other arrangements that would reverse decades of political marginalization and
vulnerability to Sunni Arab domination; but such claims by any one community inevitably
intruded on either rival communal claims or nationalist sentiments. 54
Consequently, parties viewed one another with great hostility; given communal voting
and demographics, electoral politics was not a viable means for advancing a partys goals. On
average, then, the probability of winning elections was not high while the costs of ceding power
to ones rivals were quite significant. Consequently, party leaders rationally refrained from
basing their political strategies exclusively on formal party competition. Leaders made minimal
investments in building strong party organizations, opting instead for three major forms of nonelectoral politics, each of which contributed to the weakening of Iraqs democracy. First were

29

extra-electoral bargains between leaders of Iraqs Kurdish and Shii communities that excluded
Sunni parties and interests. This Kurdish-Shii condomimium predated the overthrow of the
dictatorship and led Iraqs Sunni Arabs to boycott the first round of elections. 55 Second, parties
sought to colonize the state, taking over entire ministries and using them for partisan advantage,
to ensure that their communities interests were not solely tied to its electoral fortunes. Finally,
each party was affiliated with a militia that provided extra-constitutional means to pursue
communal interests. Hence, Iraq had a democratic transition and a civil war occurring
simultaneously.
Conclusion
We are not claiming that all features of party systems are shaped by authoritarian legacies,
and we are not claiming that party systems are the exclusive source of incentives to support or
subvert nascent democracies. Parties and party systems both reflect and refract the conditions of
their formation. Our claim is that insofar as we view parties and their leaders as important
sources of democratic deepening in Europe, we must consider that under different historical
conditions, parties and their leaders may be important sources of democratic subversion.
Furthermore, identifying which dynamics will be dominant, democratic deepening or subversion,
requires careful attention to a causal chain anchored in authoritarian legacies.
This essay identifies one set of causal pathways that generates and propagates the causal
influence of authoritarian legacies. We claim that in authoritarian strategies of rule bequeath
particular types of party organizations to the post-authoritarian period which generate incentives
for parties to support or subvert democracy. In Egypt, an unbalanced heterogeneous system
prompted Islamist political leaders to assert themselves in ways that threatened poorly
represented secularists; secularists responded to this threat by withdrawing their support from

30

democracy. In Tunisia, a similarly heterogeneous system exhibited greater balance between

parties, creating incentives for compromise and negotiated settlements. In Iraq, novice parties
representing particular communities acted chauvinistically, aggressively defending particularistic
interests via practices that undermined democracy without (yet) a direct and decisive assault on
formal democratic institutions. The same was true in Libya, where parties were yet weaker and
often overshadowed by militias engaging in extra-institutional politics.
In conclusion, we underscore one critical theme: while we are ultimately interested in the
final outcome of post-authoritarian transitions, our analytic and empirical focus in this essay has
been on the political dynamics triggered by authoritarian legacies. It is not sufficient, in our
judgment, to point to final outcomes, understood dichotomously as democracy or dictatorship or
according to a continuous measure of democracy, and correlate those outcomes with some set of
initial conditions and independent variables. Our project, rather, is to identify the large set of
intermediary actions that connect initial conditions to outcomes, to understand better the
incentives generated by institutions and how the behavior they induce produces political
dynamics. Thus, democracy is clearly imperiled in Egypt, Iraq, and Libya; but distinct practices
and processes imperil it. Our effort has been to shine analytic light on those practices and
processes and to better understand their roots in the authoritarian era.

Jason Wittenburg, What is a Historical Legacy, Paper presented at the American Political

Science Association Annual Meeting, 2013, available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2303391.
2

Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of

California, 1992); Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua Tucker, Communist Legacies and Political
31

Value and Behavior: A Theoretical Framework with an Application to Political Party Trust,
Comparative Politics, 69 (4), November 2011, 908-926.
3

Henry Hale, Why Not Parties? Electoral Markets, Party Substitutes and Stalled

Democratization in Russia, Comparative Politics, 37, January 2005, 147-66; Henry Hale, Why
Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); Barbara Geddes, A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in
Eastern Europe, in Beverly Crawford and Aaron Lijphart, eds., Liberalization and Leninist
Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Institutions (Berkeley: University of
California, 1997), 142-183.
4

Herbert Kitschelt, The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe, Politics and

Society, 20 (1), 1992, 7-50;

5

Anna Gryzmala-Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2002); Anna Seleny, Communisms Many Legacies in East-Central Europe, Journal of
Democracy, 18 (3), July 2007, 157-170.
6

Jakub Zielinski, Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of New

Democracies, World Politics 54 (January 2002), 201.

7

Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A

New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond, Comparative Political Studies, 43
(August/September 2010), 931-968.
8

Jason Seawright, Party-System Collapse: The Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela (Stanford,

CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

9

Adapted from Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents,

Opponents, and Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

32

10

Michele Penner Angrist, Party Building in the Modern Middle East (Seattle: University of

Washington Press, 2006), 64-67.

11

Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2007), 51.

12

Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypts Political Soul (London:

Tauris, 1990), 110-111; Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents,
Opponents, and Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 119-125.
13

Lisa Blaydes, Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubaraks Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2010).

14

Lust-Okar, 2005, 144-152.

15

Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab

World. (Princeton University Press, 2008), 84.

16

Angrist, 40-41.

17

Willis, p. 131-135. See also Christopher Alexander, Authoritarianism and Civil Society in

Tunisia: Back from the Democratic Brink, Middle East Report (October/December 1997), 3448.
18

Ibid., ch. 5; Christopher Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb

(New York: Routledge, 2010), ch. 2.

19

On the NDP, see Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology

(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); on the ICP, see Elizabeth F. Thomson,
Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2013), ch. 7; on the rise to power of the Baath party and its campaign

33

against the ICP, see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), ch. 5.
20

David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997); David

Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity

(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 183-221.
21

Amatzia Baram, Two Roads to Revolutionary Shiite Fundamentalism in Iraq, in Martin E.

Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Accounting For Fundamentalisms, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004), 531-588.
22

Patrick Coburn, Muqtada: Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shii Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq.

(New York: Scribner, 2008), 78-109.

23

Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),

265-67.
24

Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1990

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 257.

25

Ibid. 261.

26

Vandewalle, 172-73.

27

Alison Pargeter, Qadhafi and Political Islam in Libya, in Dirk Vandewalle, ed., Libya Since

1969: Qadhafis Revolution Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 85-92.
28

Hanspeter Mattes, Formal and Informal Authority in Libya since 1969, in Dirk Vandewalle,

ed., Libya Since 1969: Qadhafis Revolution Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),
55-82.
29

Mohamed El Hedef, Tunisia amends RCD election ban, Magharebia, April 29, 2011;

Saddam Husseins Baath Party. See also David Baran, Iraq: the party in Power, Le Monde
34

Diplomatique, December 2002.

30

Saddam Husseins Baath Party, An Interview with Prof Joseph Sassoon, Musings on Iraq

Blog, April 29, 2013, http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.ca/2013/04/saddam-husseins-baath-partyinterview.html; Reeva Spector Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins
of Tyranny (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 164; Joseph Sassoon, Saddam
Husseins Baath Party, Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 40-46, 61; Alaa Al-Din Arafat, Hosni Mubarak and the Future of Democracy in
Egypt (New York: Palgrave, 2009), 39-40; Kirk Beattie, Prospects for Democratization in
Egypt, American Arab Affairs, 36 (1991) cited in Ninette S. Fahmy, The Politics of Egypt:
State-Society Relationship (New York: Routledge, 2010), 36.
31

For more discussion on the limits of loyalist opposition, see Lust-Okar, 2005.

32

Egypts Law on Political Parties 1979 had granted each party an annual stipend of 17,500USD

for 10 years, with additional subsidies for parliamentary seats and, after 2005, for presidential
candidates. Marcin Walecki et al, Public Funding Solutions for Political Parties in MuslimMajority Societies (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2009), 58
and see also Samer Shehata, Egyptian Parliamentary Campaigns, in Ellen Lust-Okar and
Saloua Zerhouni, eds., Political Participation in the Middle East and North Africa (Boulder:
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2008), 100-101. Similarly, in Tunisia, state subsidies had been
increased in order to allow political parties to play a greater part in national political life;
State subsidies to political parties to increase 44% as of January 2006, Magharabia, January
30, 2006. More generally, see Ellen Lust-Okar, Legislative Elections in Hegemonic
Authoritarian Regimes: Competitive Clientelism and Resistance to Democratization, in Staffan
Lindberg, ed., Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition? (Baltimore: Johns
35

Hopkins University Press, 2009).

33

Saleh, cited in Walecki et al, p. 57; Maria Cristina Paciello, Egypt: Changes and Challenges

of Political Transition, MEDPRO Technical Report, No. 4 (May 2011), 4. See also Lust-Okar,
2005.
34

Salah Horchani, Mais ou est pass le MDS, Parti Tunisian dOpposition? Le Monde

Edition Abonnes, February 2, 2011

35

The Egyptian Post-Election Survey (EPES) was a household survey conducted October -

November 2012 of 4080 Egyptians drawn from a PPS sample of 21 governorates with a
response rate of 67%, conducted by the Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies
(ACPSS) in collaboration with Lust, Soltan and Wichmann with support from the Danish
Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI ). The Libyan survey was conducted in collaboration with
the National Democratic Institute, JMW Consulting, and DIWAN Market Research, with
funding from the Danish Government, implemented by DIWAN Research in collaboration with
JMW Consulting, Benstead, Lust and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and funded by the
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It included 1200 randomly selected citizens interviewed at
the household level May-June 2013. The Tunisian survey was conducted by Benstead, Lust and
Malouche, with support from the National Science Foundation, Portland State University,
Princeton University, and Yale University. More information on these studies is available at
www.transitionalgovernanceproject.org.
36

International Republican Institute and Williams and Associates, Egyptian Public Opinion

Survey, April 14-27, 2011, (June 5, 2011), 21.

37

Some movements, such as the Egyptian Salafis, avoided politics, seeing it as a dirty, earthly

game that drew energies away from spreading the call. Others, such as the Egyptian Muslim
36

Brotherhood, engaged in politics at times, but as a means to social change. Hisham Al- Awadi, In
Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982-2000 (London: Tauris, 2004),
206.
38

On the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, see Eric Trager, The Unbreakable Muslim

Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a Liberal Egypt, Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2011),
Rosefsky, 2002. Regarding En-Nahda, see Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Politicisation of
Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), ch. 1.
39

Regarding Egypt, see Ellen Lust, Gamal Soltan, and Jakob Wichmann, Islam, Ideology, and

Transition: Egypt after Mubarak, Manuscript, (2013); on the Sadrists in Iraq, see Tripp, ch. 7.
40

An important exception in Libya is the recognition of the National Forces Alliance leadership,

which was due to the leading role the NFA played throughout the transition period.
41

Author interviews with voters in Egypt, November-December 2011 and Tunisia, November

2011. Surveys find that while citizens support democracy, they equate it with economic welfare
and equality. See Lindsay Benstead, Ellen Lust and Jakob Wichmann, Its Morning in Libya:
Why Democracy Marches On, ForeignAffairs.com, August 6, 2013.
42

Ellen Lust, Social Networks and Elections in the Arab World, Report prepared for the

UNDP (January 2013).

43

Tunisias Popular Petition at first appears an exception to the rule with far higher recognition

and perceptions of helping people in need. Importantly, this party, formed only 7 months before
elections by a businessman and media mogul many linked to the former regime, came under
attack for expending resources to mobilize support in the poor, interior areas near Sidi Bouzid
(the birthplace of the revolution), and subsequently came under scrutiny of the higher electoral
commission, ultimately having disqualified lists. The influx of funds largely explains the
37

partys exceptionalism.
44

Gary Cox, Making Votes Count (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

45

Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern

Europe and Latin America. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

46

See Ellen Lust, The pitfalls and possibiliites of first elections in Arab transitions, Brookings

Doha Center Stanford CDDRL-ARD Working Paper Series, May 2012 available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/05/09-arab-democracies-lust;
47

Lust, Soltan and Wichmann, ch. 5

48

Lust and Waldner, 2013 and Lust, Soltan and Wichmann, 2013.

49

IRI and Williams and Associates, Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, June 18-30, 2013,

(August 29, 2013),16 and 27; IRI and Williams and Associates, Survey of Tunisian Public
Opinion, October 1-12, 2013, 17 and 31.
50

For more on the debate over the electoral law, see Alexander Kjaerum, Ellen Lust, Line Fly

Pedersen, and Jakob Mathias Wichmann, Libyan Parliamentary Election Study, (Washington,
DC: National Democratic Institute, June 2013); National Democratic Institute, Come to the
People Citizen Views of Libyas Political Transition: Findings from Focus Groups in Libya
(Washington, DC: NDI, October 2013), 17-20; Youssef Mohammed Sawani, Dynamics of
Continuity and Change, in Jason Pack, ed., The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the
Post-Qadhafi Future (New York: Palgrave, 2013), ch. 2.
51

Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1: De-Baathification of Iraqi

Society, (May 16, 2003).

52

Sunni Arabs boycotted the January 2005 elections to a Constituent Assembly; but participated

fully in the December 2005 elections. Average turnout was 70%; turnout rates were slightly
38

higher in majority Kurdish provinces and slightly lower in majority Sunni provinces. But
because seats were allocated to provinces, each of the three major ethnic groups received a share
of seats roughly commensurate to its share of the population. See Anthony H. Cordesman, The
Impact of the Iraqi Elections: A Working Analysis. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, December 21, 2005), 7-9.
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0512cordesman.pdf, accessed May 9, 2014.
53

David Waldner, The Limits of Institutional Engineering: Lessons from Iraq, Special Report

#222 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 2009).

54

Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 2006).

55

Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq; Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2007), 85-88.

39