People v.

Cayat
Facts/Issue: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the
non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired
and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law
made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine
or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges
the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
Held: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel
for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian
tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area and more directly, to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the
non-Christian tribes.
The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order in and among nonChristian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the class evident from perusal thereof. That it may
be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other
liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with
an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be
imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of
the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the
constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less
capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish
and classify native non-Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that
distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary.
The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law,
then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the
contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon
a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by
their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no
equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their
culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in
view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
Facts:
The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic
Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage

in retail trade in our country. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA No.1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human
Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.
Held:
The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation,
or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country. But the nationals of
China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the
United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in
the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State
Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP
which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as
a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income
generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who
fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
Villegas v. Hiu CHiong
Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person
not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any
kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit
from
the
Mayor
of
Manila
and
for
other
purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
the
Constitution.
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of

application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00
pesos
is
not
a
regulatory
but
a
revenue
measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right
of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted he
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of
an alien employment permit fee.
Constitutional Limitations DUE PROCESS
Villegas vs Hsiu Chiong Tsai Pai 86 SCRA 270 (Supra)
The imposition of license fee on all aliens desiring to seek employment in Manila,
regardless of the nature of employment (whether causal, permanent or part-time or full time, lowly
paid or highly paid executive) is unconstitutional. It is discriminatory because it fails to consider
valid substantial differences in situation among aliens required to pay it. Classification should
be based on real and substantial differences having reasonable relation to the subject of legislation.
Tiu v Ca G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999
J. Panganiban
Facts:
On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227. This was
for the conversion of former military bases into industrial and commercial uses. Subic was one of
these areas. It was made into a special economic zone.
In the zone, there were no exchange controls. Such were liberalized. There was also tax incentives
and duty free importation policies under this law.
On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the
application of the tax and duty incentives. It said that
On Import Taxes and Duties. Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials,
capital goods and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ
On All Other Taxes. In lieu of all local and national taxes (except import taxes and duties), all
business enterprises in the SSEZ shall be required to pay the tax specified in Section 12(c) of R.A. No.
7227.
Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying
the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative.
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall
be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals
(Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital
goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free.
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to
equal protection of the laws. This was due to the limitation of tax incentives to Subic and not to the
entire area of Olongapo. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is
unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.
The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the
SSEZ to the "secured area" and not to include the "entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned
in Section 12 of the law.
Hence, this was a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 97-A confining the application of R.A. 7227 within the
secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or
not owing to a violation of the equal protection clause.

Held. No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of
Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the
Subic Naval Base. However, they claimed that the E.O. narrowed the application to the naval base
only.
OSG- The E.O. Was a valid classification.
Court- The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must
also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Inchong v Hernandez- Equal protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the
same class.
RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses. This
was really limited to the military bases as the law's intent provides. Moreover, the law tasked the
BCDA to specifically develop the areas the bases occupied.
Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free
importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign
exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident
status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers. The target
of the law was the big investor who can pour in capital.
Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to
have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to
productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. Hence, there was no reasonable basis to
extend the tax incentives in RA 7227.
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As
long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the
constitutional clause.
Besides, the businessmen outside the zone can always channel their capital into it.
RA 7227, the objective is to establish a "self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center. There will really be differences between it and the outside zone of Olongapo.
The classification of the law also applies equally to the residents and businesses in the zone. They are
similarly treated to contribute to the end gaol of the law.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING
FACTS:
The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and
other
temporary
residents.
The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign hires are also paid a
salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local hires. The School justifies the difference on two
significant economic disadvantages foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the dislocation
factor
and
(b)
limited
tenure.
The compensation scheme is simply the Schools adaptive measure to remain competitive on an
international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international

education.
Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Schools system of compensation is violative of the principle of equal pay
for equal work
RULING: Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article
135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to female employees
as against a male employee for work of equal value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in
an labor organization.
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should paid similar salaries. If an employer accords employees the same position and
rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic
and human experience. If the employer has discriminated against an employee, it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
INTL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) v. QUISUMBING
FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent International School. The school hires both local
and foreign hires. Foreign hires are granted with more benefits and higher salary. Respondent says
this is because of dislocation factor and limited tenure. Petitioners contested the difference in salary
rates between foreign and local hires. They claim that it is discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes
racial
discrimination.
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal work, persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility under similar conditions should be
paid similar salaries. If an employer accords the same rank and position, the presumption is that they
perform equal work. Here, both groups have similar functions which they perform under similar
conditions. There is no evidence that foreign hires perform 25% more efficient than local hires. The
dislocation factor and tenure are properly accorded by the benefits they received.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent
persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life.
a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of
which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In
case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on
nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry.
Provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other
alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it
unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process the subject of the Act is not
expressed in the title the Act violates international and treaty obligations the provisions of the Act
against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection
of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a
citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.
RATIO:

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in
the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It
is this domination and control that is the legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he
temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the
State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the
alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes
his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a
monopolistic control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
PT&T vs NLRC
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and
July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form
under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.
When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de
Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum,
was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She
was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision
on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to
regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage
is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the
labor code:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of
a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose
of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.
Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory
conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.
Dumlao, et. Al. v. COMELEC
Equal Protection Eligibility to Office
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for re-election to the same office for the 1980 local
elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes
of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His
petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits
of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding
the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring
persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against
them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general,
Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.
HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been
merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not
meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3 rd requisite
was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated
and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age
are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not
be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or
might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good
policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective
echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below
65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial,
city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which
he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

PT&T v. NLRC | 456 SCRA 264 | G.R. No. 147002. April 15, 2005
F: Agnes Bayao and Mildred Castillo were hired by the Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation
(PT&T) in November 1991 and August 1995, respectively, both as account executives stationed in
Baguio City.
Both Bayao and Castillo received a Memorandum dated May 21, 1998 coming from Ma. Elenita V.
Del Rosario, Vice-President of the Commercial Operations Group (COG) of PT&T, inviting them to
consider a two to three-month assignment to the provinces of Rizal and Laguna in view of PT&Ts
expansion in the aforesaid area. Bayao and Castillo refused the offer, on the ground that the transfer
would entail additional expense on their part and there were no clear guidelines and procedures for
its implementation.
Meanwhile, the expansion project of PT&T failed to materialize due to lack of capital. PT&T realized
that it needed to undertake measures against losses to prevent the company from going bankrupt,
particularly by reducing its workforce from 2,500 to 900 employees. Pursuant thereto, it implemented
a Voluntary Staff Reduction Program (VSRP) which was availed of by 478 employees. Failing to attain
its target, PT&T implemented an extended VSRP, but still not enough employees availed of the
program.
PT&T decided to implement a temporary retrenchment of some employees dubbed as Temporary
Staff Reduction Program (TSRP) lasting for not more than five and a half (5) months, to commence
from September 1, 1998 to February 15, 1999. Pursuant to the program, affected employees would
receive financial assistance equivalent to 15 days salary and a loan equivalent to two months salary
chargeable to the account of the employee concerned.
Bayao and Castillo received a Letter from Del Rosario, dated August 21, 1998, informing them that
the cumulative net losses of PT&T for the last four years had reached P293.4 million and that they
were among the employees affected by the TSRP.
When Bayao and Castillo reported for work on September 2, 1998, they were informed that the
position of account executive no longer existed; in its stead, the positions of Service Account
Representatives (SAR) and Service Account Specialists (SAS) were created per COG Bulletin Order
No. 98-014 effective August 21, 1998, and had already been filled up.
That same day, Bayao and Castillo promptly filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC,
Regional Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative Region, against PT&T and Delia Oficial in her
capacity as manager for Baguio City.
Labor Arbiter Monroe C. Tabingan rendered a Decision in favor of Bayao and Castillo. PT&T and
Oficial interposed their appeal to the NLRC. On October 12, 1999, the NLRC issued its Resolution
dismissing the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, deleting, however, the award
of legal interest, exemplary damages, indemnity and attorneys fees for lack of merit.
On July 31, 2000, the CA issued its Decision dismissing the petition and affirmed the findings of the
NLRC. The CA declared that there was no valid ground for retrenchment, considering that when
Bayao and Castillo returned, their positions were already filled up; at the same time, PT&T did not
inform its employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) of the scheduled
retrenchment at least one month before its implementation. A motion for reconsideration was filed,
but the same was denied by the CA. Hence this petition.
I: WON the retrenchment program implemented by petitioner PT&T is valid.
H: Retrenchment has been defined as the termination of employment initiated by the employer
through no fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter, resorted by management
during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls
occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production
program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation.[12] It is
a management prerogative resorted to by an employer to avoid or minimize business losses which is
consistently recognized by the Court.
The Court has previously ruled that financial statements audited by independent external auditors
constitute the normal method of proof of the profit and loss performance of a company. In this case,
to prove that the company incurred losses, the petitioners presented its audited financial statements
for the corporate fiscal years 1996 to 1998 and emphasized that, in the October 20, 1998 Audit Report
prepared by SGV & Co., the auditing firm declared that petitioner PT&T incurred a substantial loss of
about P558 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1998, resulting to a total deficit of about P574
million as of the same date; and that petitioner PT&T even negotiated with its creditors for the
suspension of payments of its outstanding balances until the completion of an acceptable
restructuring plan. The foregoing clearly indicates that the petitioner PT&T sufficiently complied with its
burden to prove that it incurred substantial losses as to warrant the exercise of the extreme measure
of retrenchment to prevent the company from totally going under.
While an employer may have a valid ground for implementing a retrenchment program, it is not
excused from complying with the required written notice served both to the employee concerned
and the DOLE at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. The purpose of this

requirement is not only to give employees some time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs and
their corresponding income, look for other employment and ease the impact of the loss of their jobs
but also to give the DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged cause of termination.
In the case at bar, the memorandum of Del Rosario, the vice-president of the COG, to respondents
Bayao and Castillo informing the latter that they were included in the TSRP to be implemented
effective September 1, 1998 was dated August 21, 1998. The said memorandum was received by
Castillo on August 24, 1998 and Bayao on August 26, 1998. The respondents had barely two weeks
notice of the intended retrenchment program. Clearly then, the one-month notice rule was not
complied with. At the same time, the petitioners never showed that any notice of the retrenchment
was sent to the DOLE.
The petitioners adherence to the above pronouncement of the Court is misplaced. The particular
issue involved in the said decision was the duration of the period of temporary lay-off, and not the
compliance with the one month notice requirement.
The requirement of notice to both the employees concerned and the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) is mandatory and must be written and given at least one month before the
intended date of retrenchment. In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners were given notice of
the temporary lay-off. There is, however, no evidence that any written notice to permanently
retrench them was given at least one month prior to the date of the intended retrenchment. The
NLRC found that GTI conveyed to the petitioners the impossibility of recalling them due to the
continued unavailability of work. But what the law requires is a written notice to the employees
concerned and that requirement is mandatory. The notice must also be given at least one month in
advance of the intended date of retrenchment to enable the employees to look for other means of
employment and therefore to ease the impact of the loss of their jobs and the corresponding
income. That they were already on temporary lay-off at the time notice should have been given to
them is not an excuse to forego the one-month written notice because by this time, their lay-off is to
become permanent and they were definitely losing their employment.
There is also nothing in the records to prove that a written notice was ever given to the DOLE as
required by law. Interestingly enough, the evidence on record indicates that respondents Bayao
and Castillo were not merely temporarily laid-off. The October 26, 1998 Letter of Del Rosario
addressed to the respondents clearly stated that the latter were to be considered separated from
the company effective August 31, 1998 and that they were each being extended a separation
package.
It must be stressed, however, that compliance with the one-month notice rule is mandatory
regardless of whether the retrenchment is temporary or permanent. This is so because Article 283
itself does not speak of temporary or permanent retrenchment; hence, there is no need to qualify the
term. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (when the law does not distinguish, we must
not distinguish).
However, the employers failure to comply with the one month notice requirement prior to
retrenchment does not render the termination illegal; it merely renders the same defective, entitling
the dismissed employee to payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Based on
prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of indemnity is pegged atP30,000.00.
Finally, since petitioner PT&T was able to establish that it incurred serious business losses, justifying the
retrenchment, the final requisite is the payment of separation pay. Pursuant to Section 283 of the
Labor Code, as amended, the retrenchment having been effected due to serious business losses,
respondents Bayao and Castillo are each entitled to one month pay or to at least one-half month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be
considered one whole year. Petition partially granted.
Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City

In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which imposes a (1%) per export sale to the US and other foreign
countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the
export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is
not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid
the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose
a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the
same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the
ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax
impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city.
ISSUE: WON there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Ormoc Sugar Company. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and no other. At the
time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. was the only sugar central in
the city of Ormoc. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax.
As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Equal Protection
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to
a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of
sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to
impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or
out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of
an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the
ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax
impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had
already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax
goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal
protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported
by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Basco v. PAGCOR
Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy imperium in imperio
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and four
others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds
among others particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional provision on
local autonomy.
Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose
taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise
holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or
levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and
limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes.
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and
abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to
tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its
shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
Basco v. PAGCOR
GRN

91649,

14

May

1991)

FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the
government, to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to be beneficial
not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed
revenue
for
the
cash-strapped
Government.
Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to
morals,
public
policy
and
public
order,
among
others.
ISSUES:
Whether
PD
1869
is
1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;

unconstitutional

because:

2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that
the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;
3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru
PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other
vices; and
4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony
economy
and
toward
free
enterprise
and
privatization.
HELD:
1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of
gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in the exercise of its police power,
wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.
2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its
charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.
3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who
may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The
clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate.
4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches of
government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
** Himagan v People 237 SCRA 538 (1994)
F: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp Catitigan, Davao
City was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe
Machitar. After the informations for murder and attempted murder were filed w/ the RTC, the trial
court issued an order suspending petitioner until termination of the case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA
6975, w/c provides:
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case.-- Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807, that his
suspension should be limited to 90 days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. SB, and Layno v. SB. The
motion and the subsequent MFR were denied. Hence, this petition forcertiorar i andma nda mus.
HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of merit.
(1) The language of the first sentence is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. xxx The second
sentence xx providing the trial must be terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment does not qualify or
limit the first sentence. The 2 can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The 2nd deals w/ the time frame w/in w/c the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the 90-day period, should the suspension of accused be
lifted? Certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the phrase "be terminated
w/in 90 days," there is nothing in the law that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused
will be lifted if the trial is not terminated w/in that period. But this is w/o prejudice to the administrative
sanctions, and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability of the
judge. Should the trial be unreasonably delayed w/o the fault of the accused, he may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should this be refused, he can compel its dismissal bycer tiorari, prohibition
orma nda mus, or secure his liberty by
(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it
refers to the lifting of the preventive suspension in pending admin. investigation, not in crim. cases, as
here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975 w/c states that the CS law and its implementing rules shall apply to
members of the PNP insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent w/ RA 6975.
(3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019 upon w/c the
preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based was silent w/ respect to the
duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a
prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case.
Petitioner is charged w/ murder under the RPC and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec.
47 RA 6975 w/c categorically states that hissuspension shall last until the case is terminated.
(4) The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill
that became RA 6975 reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of
the PNP charged w/ grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of
imprisonment and w/c suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
Equal Protection Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies
Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of
Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe.
Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The
law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and
one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD
807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims
that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and
would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity.
It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged

with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination
of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each
other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the
trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass
or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his
case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat
and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the
suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of
accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be
terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless,
the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil
liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of
his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should
the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
Valmonte vs. De Villa
Facts:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National
Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their
safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a
supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood
by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to
speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches
and seizures
Held:
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning
the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has
been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military,
indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure
of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search w/c is, however,

reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community
The Checkpoints Case :
Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
I.

THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of
Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the
people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make
searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
II.

THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures?
III.

THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police
and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and
the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what
one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal

times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.
Guanzon v. De Villa
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were
conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific
target house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents
were rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents
were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to
their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that they're homes
were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of maulings,
spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture
to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all
lies. Respondents contend that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said
drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead
for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and
record
such
event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or
the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it
appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the
squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought
by a taxpayer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary
restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of
Manila.
Bache and Co. v. Ruiz
Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting
the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation
to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to
the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At
that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned
him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for
perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search
was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him
to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As
ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former

Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and
securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.
Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (prosecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner
and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the
residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus, he filed a petition with the
Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from
being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the
writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both
premises
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and
whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights have been impaired can validly object
the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right
to object belongs to the corporation for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from
the offices and the premises).
Stonehill v. Diokno
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally,
and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective
residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners
then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of
the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June
29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.
Held:
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general
warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized.
The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace
officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee.
However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of
the corporation.
Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By
the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation.
The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question
may be split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government
blunders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot
assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the
proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of
the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and
seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere
allegation that Stonehill et al. committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found
the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned
applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the
things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the
accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.
PASEI [Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc] v. Drilon [GR L-81958, 30 June 1988]
Facts: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement." It challenged the
Constitutional validity of DOLEs Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of "Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers," in
a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or
females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and (3) for being an invalid exercise of the law
making power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI also invoked
Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as Department Order
No. 1, as contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It also claimed that it violated
the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced. On 25 May 1988, the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA, filed a Comment informing the Court
that on 8 March 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,
Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the
validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine
State.
Issue: Whether Department Order 1 unduly discriminates against women.
Held: Department Order 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. Equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
(4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The classification made the preference for
female workers rests on substantial distinctions. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by
migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning
workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty,
the Court sustains the Government's efforts. There is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
instances, Filipino men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Discrimination in
this case is justified.
Further, the impugned guidelines are applicable to all female domestic overseas workers, not all
Filipina workers. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary, due to the fact that not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What
the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another
person or group of persons. Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real
difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule is to recognize its
validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable
treatment.
International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) vs. Quisumbing [GR 128845, 1 June 2000]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 2 concur, 1 on official leave, 1 on leave
Facts: The International School, Inc., pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary

residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its
standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending
their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine
whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire, i.e. (a) What is one's
domicile? (b) Where is one's home economy? (c) To which country does one owe economic
allegiance? (d) Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines? The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and
home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.
The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to
endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The compensation scheme is
simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of
attracting competent professionals in the field of international education. The compensation
package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. There are foreigners
who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. When negotiations for a
new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, the International School Alliance of
Educators (ISAE), "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This
issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate
bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. On 7 September 1995, ISAE filed
a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to
a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute. On 10 June 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) an Order resolving the parity and
representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
subsequently denied ISAE's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 19 March 1997. ISAE sought
relief from the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the School unduly discriminated against the local-hires.
Held: That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution
and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise
proscribes discrimination. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 all embody the general
principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws. In the workplace, where the
relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. If an employer accords employees the
same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This
presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than
the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more.
That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for
the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. Herein, the International School has
failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities,
which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice
foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the
principle of equal work for equal pay. The point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School
to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and localhires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy.
NPC (NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION) vs DE GUZMAN
FACTS:

RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government", took effect on January 2, 1991. RA 6975 provides
for a uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39 reads: "SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement.
Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six
(56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy
director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of
one (1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are
all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six. Private
respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of an ex parte
restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age of retirement set
at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by
Sec. 89 thereof which provides: "Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the
transition period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, the following members of the INP
shall be considered compulsorily retired: "a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year
of the effectivity of this Act. "b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of
the effectivity of this Act. "c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the
effectivity of this Act. "d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the
effectivity of this Act."
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National
Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided in Section 89
applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in
the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for the PC had already been
set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by a writ of injunction. He declared
that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine
National police, irrespective of the original status of the present members of the Philippine National
police before its creation and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative
after the lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction issued is made
permanent. Moreover, he observed, among others, that it may have been the intention of Congress
to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define who or what
constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the source of the "INP" as courts are
permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine
National police, irrespective of the original status of its present members and that Section 39 of RA
6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after the lapse of the four-year transition period.
HELD:
From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of the term INP is not
synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform
reference to the members of the whole Philippine National police (PNP) for retirement purposes and
not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as
used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent
judge that the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined
the same. Thus "SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. Upon the effectivity of this Act, the
present National police Commisdion and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall
cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National police shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Integrated National police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National police, shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new police
force shall be establish and constituted pursuant to this Act."
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the members of
the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the
application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the local police forces for it would
be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six
(56).Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have be labored on the supposed
dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without
recourse in determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail
themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a provision
of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be
adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the
legislative intent.

The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only
to the local police force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this
is reasonableness such that it must conform to the following requirements:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
[1939]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED
and the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.