Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
TUVERA
Facts:
A number of presidential decrees had not been
published, thus, the petitioners herein invoked due process
for the disclosure of such decrees. The government argues
that said decrees need not be published, it was so when it
was unless otherwise provided as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were effective immediately
upon approval.
The decision of the lower court orders the
respondent to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuance that are of general application. Unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
Issue/s:
(1) Can laws take effect without publication?
(2) Do courts have the power to repeal or modify
the law?
Held:
Article 2 of the Civil code states that, Laws shall
take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the official Gazette unless it is otherwise
provided. This act shall take effect one year after such
publication.
It is very clear that publication is indispensable in
every case; however, the legislature has the discretion on
when the said law should take effect. Therefore, all statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen (15) days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the law.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Po Lay was accused of violating Circular No. 20 of
the Central Bank compelling those who had foreign currency
to sell the same to the Central Bank. Po Lay alleged that as
the circular had not yet been published in the Official
Gazette before he committed the act, the circular should
have no effect on his act and therefore, he should be
acquitted.
Issue/s:
Is Po Lays claim valid?
Held:
Yes. Po Lay is correct for the circular has the
force of law, and should have been published. Moreover, as
a rule, circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation
should be published before becoming effective. This is
based on the general principle and theory that before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, a regulation or circular must first be
published, and the people officially and specifically informed
of said contents and the penalties for violation thereof.
GARCIA v. RECIO
Facts:
On March 1, 1987, Roderick Recio, Filipino,
married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. Two years
after, they divorced. After becoming an Australian citizen in
1992, Roderick married Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan City.
On March 1998, Garcia filed for a declaration of nullity of
marriage. She claimed that Roderick was guilty of bigamy,
because according to Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code, Roderick was required to present his divorce decree
upon filing for a marriage license in 1994. Because he did
not present this decree, Garcia claimed that Recio was
considered to still be married to his first wife.
Respondent claimed that his first divorce decree
from Australia was valid and therefore, he was legally free to
PE v. PE
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one
Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957,
Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Ciagrette
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in
connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying
with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted
son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of
Lolitas father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their
SPOUSES YU v. PCIB
DONATO v. LUNA
QUIMIGING c. ICAO
Facts: Appellant Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao in the
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties
were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages
and attorney's fees.On the other hand, defendant Icao
moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and
after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter,
plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a
baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection,
ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff
appealed directly to this Court.
Issue: Can a conceived child, although not yet born, be
given legal personality?
Ruling: Yes, a conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee. Article 40 provides that "the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it", "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the fetus be alive
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb). Hence, the orders under appeal are reversed and
set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Geluz vs CA
Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant, Geluz,
for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot.
In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her
aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with Oscar Lazo, she again became pregnant. As
she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and
her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. She again
of
parental
FRIVALDO vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained
the highest number of votes in three successive elections for
the position of governor of Sorsogon but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office
due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have reassumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. On
the third repatriation, he already gained Philippine
citizenship. Raul Lee contends that, at the time Frivaldo filed
his certificate of candidacy, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Frivaldo also alleged that his repatriation shall be given
retroactive effect because hes a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he is a Filipino citizen at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy.
RULING:
The court allowed his repatriation to retroact at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy. According to the
court, the governing election contest must be liberally
construed to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed thru the ballot. The court also stated that
Frivaldos case is unique because Frivaldo sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of dictatorship. At the
first opportunity, returned to our country and sought to serve
the people. Also, the people of Sorsogon voted for him three
times and his determination to acquire his Filipino
citizenship. His loyalty and love for our country cannot be
lost on this court of justice and equity. He therefore deserves
every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in
his favor and to the popular mandate of the people of
Sorsogon.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
Facts:
On 8 March 1995, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed
her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, indicating that
she was a resident of said constituency for seven months.
Faced with petition for cancellation and disqualification by
the incumbent representative Cirilo Roy Montejo, Marcos
filed an amended certificate changing the entry seven
months to since childhood. The Commission on Elections,
on 24 April, ordered the disqualification of Marcos from
running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte. It appears however, that Marcos garnered the most
votes in the 8 May election. The Commission on Elections,
thus, suspended her proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement in the certificate of
candidacy (seven) determines whether an individual
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement, to warrant Marcos disqualification.
Held:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement. It must be
noted again that residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, while domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. Residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
FAMILY CODE
PT&T VS. NLRC (G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997)
Facts:
Grace de Guzman was hired by petitioner company
as a reliever for another employee who went on maternity
leave. She was a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed
period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991. Under the
areement she signed, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. On
September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked
to join the company as a probationary employee, the
probationary period to cover one hundred fifty (150) days. In
the job application form, she indicated that she was single
although she had contracted marriage on May 26, 1991.
Thereafter, she was sent a memorandum asking her to explain
the discrepancy. She was also reminded about the company's
policy of not accepting married women for employment.
Private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's
policy regarding married women at the time, and all along she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. PT&T was not
convinced and dismissed her from the company. The Labor
Arbiter handed a decision that Grace de Guzman was illegally
dismissed by the petitioner. NLRC affirmed the decision and
ordered a three (3)-month suspension for Grace de Guzman.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Was the private respondent illegally dismissed when she
contracted marriage, which is contrary to PT&Ts policy?
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the policy of PT&T strikes
at the very essence, ideas, and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable institution and the family as a foundation of the nation
as provided in Article 1 of the Family Code. While it is true that
the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same
should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. The petitioner's policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit with double
costs against petitioner.
ART 2 SEC 12, CONSTITUTION
ESTRADA vs ESCRITOR
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor and Luciano Quilapio are both
separated in fact but met each other for they are both part of
Jehovahs witnesses religious group. Under the laws of such
religious group, when a couple has been living together for 10
years, they are allowed to execute a declaration of pledging
faithfulness. Alejandro Estrada wrote to the presiding judge
where Escritor was working. In that letter, Estrada alleged that
Escritor is living with a man other than her husband. The judge
asked the office of the court administrator to investigate the
alleged immorality. After the investigation, the office of the court
administrator recommended the removal of Escritor from
government services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritor should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct.
RULING:
The court ruled that Escritors marriage should be
covered by the constitutional right of religious freedom. Since
marriage is a special contract protected by the State, the
presumption of validity should always be in favor of the
marriage. In this case, Escritors marriage under the rule of
ENRIQUEZ v. VELEZ
Cosca vs Palaypayon
Facts:
Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr. solemnized
marriages of 6 couples without marriage license as the
license numbers were not reflected in the contracts. He
petition of
COSCA v. PALAYPAYON
MARIATEGUI VS. CA (G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992)
Facts:
On June 26, 1953, Lupo Mariategui contracted
three marriages. He had four children with first wife Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904. They were
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo.
Baldomera died but, was survived by her eight (8) children.
Ireneo also died and left a son.
With Flaviana Montellano, Lupo had a daughter
named Cresencia who was born on May 8, 1910. And with
Felipa Velasco, Lupo had three children. Lupo died on June
26, 1953, without a will and left certain properties that he
acquired when he was single.
His descendants by his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of some lots. Upon
learning of such deed, Lupos descendants by his third
marriage filed a complaint claiming that such deed deprived
them of their shares in the lots. They prayed for partition of
the estates of their father and annulment of the deed
executed by their co-heirs.
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui
Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint
as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit
as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and
rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the
parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits.
The defendants, now petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
prescription. They argued that the complaint was for
recognition of natural children. It was dismissed and denied
by the court.
Issue/s:
Did prescription bar their right to demand the
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui?
Held:
Prescription did not bar the petitioners claim since
they filed the complaint barely two months after learning of
such deed. The evidence also proved that the petitioners
were legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui.
REPUBLIC v. DAYOT
ANTONIO v. REYES
overseas, he was told that Janet had given birth to their son.
Fifteen (15) days later, Janet left Antique, and her whereabouts
remained unknown. Nolasco returned to Antique nine (9)
months later where he claimed to have searched for his wife,
then proceeded to London to look for her there. In 1988,
Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death
for his wife before the trial court of Antique, where his petition
was granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court though the Office of the Solicitor General contended
that there was no well-founded belief that Janet Monica Parker
was already dead, since Nolasco did not diligently search for
his missing wife.
Issue:
Is there a well-founded belief that Janet Monica
Parker is already dead?
Held:
The court believed that Nolasco was not that diligent
in searching for his missing wife, as he did not even contact
local authorities and authorities in London that his wife was
missing. There were no other testimonies supporting Nolascos
claim that Parker could already be dead. In this case, since
Nolasco did not comply with the third requirement for a
declaration of presumptive death (that the present spouse has
a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead), the court
reversed the earlier decision, thereby denying Nolascos
petition for a declaration of presumptive death.
LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. L-8492, February 29,
1956)
Facts:
Lourdes Lukban filed for a declaration of presumptive
death for her husband, Francisco Chuidian who had been
missing for more than twenty (20) years. Seventeen (17) days
after their marriage, Chuidian left Lukban in 1933 and had
never been heard from since then. Lukban wished to remarry,
but the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
denied her petition on the grounds that such declaration was
not authorized by law.
Issue:
Is it necessary to obtain a declaration of presumptive
death for a missing spouse in order for the present spouse to
remarry?
Held:
Considering the year that this case was filed, i.e., in
1956, the New Civil Code only required that the missing
spouse be absent for seven (7) consecutive years before the
present spouse can remarry. Such length of time was
sufficient to assume that the missing spouse is dead and
therefore, Lukban is already allowed to remarry.
CALISTERIO VS. CALISTERIO (G.R. No. 136467, April 6,
2000)
Facts:
Marietta Calisterio married James Willam Bounds in
1946. James disappeared the following year. Eleven (11)
years later, Marietta married Teodorico Calisterio, without first
obtaining a declaration of presumptive death for James.
Teodorico died without a will in 1992, and his estate was
challenged by his sister, Antonia Armas, who claimed that she
was Teodoricos legal heir, as he and Marietta were not validly
married. Marietta appealed on the grounds that a declaration
of presumptive death is required only in the Family Code, while
it was the New Civil Code that was in force at the time of her
marriage to Teodorico in 1958.
Issue/s:
(1) Which Code should be applied to the marriage of
Teodorico and Marietta celebrated in 1958, the Family Code
which was implemented in August 3, 1988, or the Civil Code
which was implemented in August 30, 1950?
(2) Having established the above question, was a
declaration of presumptive death then necessary for Mariettas
marriage to Teodorico to be considered valid?
(3) Who is Teodoricos legal heir, Antonia, the sister,
or Marietta?
Held:
The Civil Code was the law in force at the time of
Mariettas marriage to Teodorico, which did not require a
declaration of presumptive death in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, so long as all the other requirements
are present. Teodoricos marriage to Marietta is considered
valid and therefore, she is the legal heir to his estate.
REPUBLIC v. CALLEJO
Sin v Sin
Facts: After a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence
and respondent Philipp T. Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were
married at St. Jude Catholic Parish Manila. Afterwards,
Florence filed a complaint for "declaration of nullity of marriage"
against Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective documentary and testimonial evidence. After which
the Trial Court dismissed Florences petition. Florence filed with
Potenciano vs. CA
Facts: Erlinda Ilusorio filed a petition for habeas corpus to gain
custody of her old and sick husband, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Erlinda contends that her daughters, private respondents
herein, were illegally restraining her husband so that they can
take advantage of his weak state and gain properties for
Whether or not Erlinda can be considered as a coowner in the purchase of riceland and house and lot.
RULING:
Ruling: The court held that the said debt did not redound to
the benefit of the family. Furthermore, the court did not agree
that the terms redounded to the benefit and for the benefit
of are the same. The former require that actual benefit must
be realized, while the latter requires only that the transaction
should be one which normally would produce benefit to the
partnership, regardless whether or not actual benefit
accrued. Moreover, the alleged benefits that the petitioners
assert that private respondent will acquire or has acquired
are not one directly resulting from the loan but is a byproduct or a spin-off of the loan itself. The petition was
denied for lack of merit.
Ayala Investments vs. CA
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from Ayala Investments and
Development Corporation, with Alfredo Ching, its Executive
Vice-President as surety, making himself jointly and severally
liable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. The former failed to
pay, hence, the latter filed a suit for sum of money against
PBM and Ching. After the trial, the 2 defendants were held
jointly liable for the indebtedness. A writ of execution was
issued where conjugal properties of Ching and his wife were
levied upon.
Issues: The basic issued were the following: (1) What debts
and obligations contracted by husband alone are considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which are
chargeable against the conjugal partnership? (UNDER ART.
94 & 121) (2) Is a surety agreement entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of
the said provision?
Held: If the husband is the principal obligor in the contract
that contract falls under obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It was shown that Ching signed as surety. It is
incumbent upon PBM to prove that Chings acting as surety
redounded as benefit of the conjugal partnership. Absent
such proof, the conjugal partnership is not liable.
AGAPAY vs. PALANG
FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted a subsequent bigamous
marriage with Erlinda Agapay. Miguel refused to cohabit with
6.
Mondequillo v. Breva
Manacop v. CA
JISON v. CA
LIYAO v. LIYAO
ECETA v. ECETA
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twentysecond day of July, two thousand three.
Republic Act No. 9255
February 24 2004
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the Family
Code cannot be applied retroactively in the present case.
Ruling: The CA did not err in its decision to grant the decree of
adoption. If the provision on joint adoption under the Family
Code would retroact to the present case, the welfare of the
child Jason Condat will be affected and the vested right of
Bobiles under the Child and Youth Welfare Code will be
impaired.
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, a 10-year old, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle, causing her death. During this time Adelberto
was staying with his natural parents, but prior to the incident, a
petition to adopt Adelberto was filed by the spouses Rapisura,
which was subsequently granted after the shooting incident.
Jennifers parents then filed a complaint for damages against
the natural parents of Adelberto. The latter avers that they are
not liable since parental authority has already shifted to the
adopting parents, the Rapisuras, as a result of the adoption.
Issue: Whether or not the adopting parents may be held liable
for acts committed by their adopted child when the latter was
still under the custody of his natural parents.
Ruling: Adoption has the effect of transferring parental
authority from the natural parents to the adopting parents.
However in this case, parental authority had not yet shifted to
the Rapisuras since Adelberto was still in the custody of his
natural parents at the time of the shooting. Art. 221 of the
Family Code states that parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority x x x.
Hence it is Adelbertos natural parents who are civilly liable for
Jennifers death.
Javier vs. Lucero
Facts:
In an action for alimony, respondent Judge Antonio
Lucero ordered Alfredo Javier to give a monthly allowance to
his wife Salud and their son Alfredo Junior. Javier challenged
the order, saying that Salud forfeited her right to support when
she accused him of bigamy, a charge from which he was
eventually acquitted. Furthermore, he contends that Alfredo Jr.
is no longer entitled to support since the latter is already over
21 years of age and thus no longer entitled to support.
Issue:
Is the contention of Javier correct?
Ruling: Javiers contention is incorrect. His acquittal from the
bigamy charges is no different from an acquittal on reasonable
doubt, which is not a ground for the forfeiture of his wifes right
to support. As regard his son Alfredo Jr., the latter is still
entitled to support even if he is already over 21 years of age
since he is still studying, and Art. 194 of the Family Code
mandates the continuation of support for the childs education
even if the latter is beyond the age of majority.
DE ASIS VS. DE ASIS (G.R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999)
Facts: Vircel Andres filed an action for maintenance and
support against Manuel De Asis, the alleged father of Glen De
Asis, a minor. In a reply sent by the respondent Manuel de
Asis, he denied the allegations and he claimed that he has no
obligations to the said minor. Both plaintiff and defendant
agreed to move for dismissal of the case.
On September 7, 1995, Glen de Asis as represented
by her mother filed a complaint for maintenance and support
against his alleged father, Manuel de Asis. Manuel moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that judgment from the
previous case has barred such case from prospering. But the
court ruled that renunciation of future support is prohibited by
law. Manuel filed a motion for reconsideration and it was
likewise dismissed. Then he filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and it was likewise dismissed.
Issue: Can the action for maintenance and support be barred
by res judicata?
Held: The manifestation sent by Vircel in her first case was a
renunciation of the right of Glen. The agreement between her
and Manuel is in a nature of a compromise agreement that
ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or
induce child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a
child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards
a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods
or other pecuniary benefit to a child with
intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom,
whether as manager or owner of the establishment
where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna,
disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or
establishment serving as a cover or which engages
in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the
license has been issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. There is
an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5,
paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a
relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the
room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension
house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle
or any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child
is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.