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The Divisibility Argument"

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Tommi Pikkujamsa"

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PHL 360"
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Dr. Torin Alter"
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August 28, 2014"
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In his Sixth Meditation, Descartes attempts to justify his theory of dualism by

proving the real distinction of mind and body, which would allow for their independent
existence. Earlier in Meditations, Descartes had established that thinking comprised the
sole essence of the mind and extension comprised the sole essence of the body. In
reality, he had only substantiated that thinking was essential to the mind while extension
was essential to the body. This is not sufficient to infer that the properties of thinking and
extension comprise the entire essence of mind and body, respectively. To prove his
dualism theory, through the real distinction of mind and body, Descartes needed to
prove that extension cannot also be an essential property of the mind."
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In his Divisibility Argument, Descartes writes: the body is by its very nature

always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible.1 For example, a body part can
easily be severed, but the mind cannot be separated into parts. Thus, Descartes
concludes that the mind is distinct from the body.2 When put into simple logical form,
Descartes argument is as follows:"
P1: The body is by its nature divisible."
P2: The mind is by its nature indivisible."
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C: The mind is completely different from the body."
Scott Calef points out that Descartes employs Leibnizs Law namely the
indiscernibility of identicals to prove his conclusion.3 While this is true, it should be

1Descartes,

Meditations, 18

The minds distinction is not explicitly stated but is implied by the conclusion of completely
different.
3

Scott Calef, Dualism and Mind, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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noted that Descartes uses the contrapositive of Leibnizs Law. Leibnizs Law states that
if two things are the same, they must have all of the same properties the
contrapositive of which is if two things do not have all of the same properties, they
are not the same. Because divisibility can be established as a property of the body but
cannot be established as one of the mind, the indiscernibility of identicals indicates that
the mind cannot be the same as the body. With this formulation, it seems Descartes has
only proven the mind to be different from the body,4 not that the mind necessarily lacks
extension. "
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Prior to this argument, Descartes established extension as the essence of the

body. The essence of a thing is synonymous to its nature, which means the nature of
the body is to be extended. Because extension constitutes the nature of the body and
Descartes states that the body is divisible by its very nature,5 he is establishing
divisibility as an essential property of extended things and arguing that to be an
extended thing is to be divisible. Considering this, his argument can be reformulated6
as:"
P1: All extended things are divisible."
P2: The mind is not divisible."
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C: The mind is not an extended thing."

Justin Skirry, Ren Descartes: The Mind-Body Distinction, Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy
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6

Descartes, Meditations, 18

A version of this reformulation was done by Martin Curd in Descartes Arguments for Dualism,
Purdue University

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This formulation allows Descartes to justify the real distinction of mind and body by
showing that the mind cannot possibly have extension as a property, proving his theory
of dualism. "
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The Divisibility argument is logically valid but premise two renders it unsound. To

support his claim of the minds indivisibility, Descartes states that if a foot or arm or
any other part of the body if cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the
mind.7 Furthermore, the faculties of willing, of understanding, [and] sensory perception
cannot be termed parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, and
understands and has sensory perceptions.8 However, something will certainly be taken
away from the mind if a portion of the physical brain is removed, as is the case with
prefrontal lobotomy patients who lose their speech capability or long term memory.
Moreover, when a cerebral commissurotomy is performed and the brain is split into two
distinct halves through the severing of the corpus callosum, some patients develop two
completely separate consciousnesses altogether;9 which means there is no longer one
and the same mind that has the faculties of willing, understanding, and sensory
perception."
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In his defense, Descartes correctly understood mental states to be non-extended

things. However, he is arguing that the thing that has these states is not spatially
extended.10 Neurobiology provides evidence showing that mental states depend on
7

Descartes, Meditations, 19

Ibid., 19

M.L. Manning and R.L. Manning, Split-Brain Studies and Splitting of Consciousness, Legion
Theory
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This distinction was pointed out by Martin Curd in Descartes Arguments for Dualism,
Purdue University

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neurotransmitter levels, modulated by physical aspects of the brain mainly receptor
state and functionality. Brains are divisible, extended things; meaning premise two is
justifiable only if the mind is already assumed to be an immaterial, non-extended thing.
This suggests an inconspicuous petitio pricipii in Descartes argument."

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References"
Curd, Martin. "Descartes' Arguments For Dualism." Purdue University. Accessed ""
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August 25, 2014. http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~curd/110WK13.html."

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Descartes, Ren. "Sixth Meditation." In Meditations on First Philosophy, edited " "
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and translated by John Cottingham, 13-20. Cambridge: Cambridge ""
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University Press, 1986. "

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Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Dualism and Mind, by Scott Calef, "
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Accessed August 25, 2014, http://www.iep.utm.edu"

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Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Ren Descartes: The Mind-Body "

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Distinction, by Justin Skirry, Accessed August 25, 2014, http://"
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www.iep.utm.edu"

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Manning, M.L., and R.L. Manning. "Split-Brain Studies and Splitting of "
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Consciousness." Legion Theory. Last modified 2008. Accessed August 25, "
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2014."