SUPREME COURT

GARCILLANO v. HOUSE [G.R. NO. 170338 : December 23, 2008]

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a
wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of
the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented
public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that
placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line,
and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The
tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly
contained
the
President's
instructions
to
COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were
to become the subject of heated legislative

hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of

Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then
Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege
speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and
Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees).
During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia
and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong
submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged

"original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped

conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the
committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of
the House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to

suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to
prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He
prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from
using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other
purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the
inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist
from further using the recordings in any of the House
proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and
debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson
roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The
Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator
Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished
truth the what's, when's, where's, who's and why's" of the

alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived

willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in
nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson's
speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who
had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral
duties.7
In the Senate's plenary session the following day, a lengthy
debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern
on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if
the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On
August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a
privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the
Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the
role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine
National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal
wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They
argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates
R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate
proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on
September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,

Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M.
Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio
F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25,
2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the
ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate
to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R.
NOS. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectivesthe first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their
subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second
seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on
the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants
the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-IBefore delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first
resolve the issue on the parties' standing, argued at length in
their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "' [l]egal standing'
or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a

case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3)
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a
"liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25
even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed
to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to
challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National
Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case,
echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments
to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that
greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court's duty
under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to
initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in

the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the
members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in
the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano
stands to be directly injured by the House committees' actions
and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing
to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their
standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers,
and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any
attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the
country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public
funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public
hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws
and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse
constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative
inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in
the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being
citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court's ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada's and
Agcaoili's and intervenor Sagge's allegation that the continuous
conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will

necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be

noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the
Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this
case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights
as taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a
class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal profession
which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that
the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public
but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal
attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent
case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of
petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.

Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in

which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot
when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge
in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court,
as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit
the respondent House Committees from playing the tape
recordings and from including the same in their committee report.
He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of
the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings
were already played in the House and heard by its members.39
There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports
on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be
dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a
preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be
done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.41
- III -

- II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot
and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the
principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is
limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and
controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount
to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.36

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same.
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or

otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of

which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15
days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring

Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a
continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four
members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term
of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every
three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue
into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935
Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a
quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators
continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the
Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every
expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same

question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations,46 we said:

The

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court

sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that
the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved
as an entity with each national election or change in the
composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its dayto-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules
of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the

Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG's
explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the
Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a
different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its
Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

subject

was

explained

with

greater

lucidity

in

our

Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same

case, viz.:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be
taken up at the next session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the

expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the
succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it
is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to
take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a
rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the
succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be
bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they
had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect
to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be
deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will,
as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the
same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution
and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate's
main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office,
the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate
committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which
should be presented at least one day before its consideration,

and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session
shall be required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account
the new composition of the Senate after an election and the
possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start
of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin
their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption
until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not
explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until
they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the
language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed
that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the
rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the
duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent
upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in
each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses

or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on

notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public at the Senate's internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the
rules cannot justify the Senate's defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the
Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of

procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not

these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any
custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpio's response to the same argument raised by the
respondents is illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the

Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of
publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory

to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of

Procedure put a person's liberty at risk. A person who violates
the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the
Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is
all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent
of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other
words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence
(for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in
the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While
we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not
cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the
instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could
not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of
the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and

the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of
prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any
inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.

LAZATIN v. DESIERTO [G.R. NO. 147097 : June 5, 2009]

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office
of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated September
18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal cases filed
against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as
OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of
Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a)
and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by
then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was
both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his
CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the
disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant,
eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner
Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A.

Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his

CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending the filing against
herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of
Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said
Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twentyeight (28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to
26114 were filed against herein petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were
granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The
Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the
cases against petitioners.
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its
Resolution3 dated September 18, 2000. It recommended the
dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency
of evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs
(OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum4 dated
October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution
be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial
of the cases against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby
disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and
ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The
cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation
of criminal proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners allege that:

implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo

victims.
I.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
II.
THE
QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION
WAS
BASED
ON
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES
AND CONJECTURES.5
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the
Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution
dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section
13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed
only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the
filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not
granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the
Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP
(formerly the Tanodbayan), which was intended by the framers to
be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the
Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the OSP.
Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any
liability because the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin
allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his
personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is

stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770
granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and
placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity.
The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the
Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop
v. Office of the Ombudsman.6
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the
Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph
8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall
"exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by
law." Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from
the Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission [referring
to the Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to
recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe
such other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x
x As finally approved by the Commission after several
amendments, this is now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
xxx
Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other
functions or duties as may be provided by law.

Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other

powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote
Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by
Commissioner Rodrigo:
xxx

MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by law, I suppose.
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct.

MR. RODRIGO:
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated
functions of the Ombudsman is: "to exercise such powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." So,
the legislature may vest him with powers taken away from the
Tanodbayan, may it not?cralawred
MR. COLAYCO:

MR. RODRIGO:
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that
can be performed by the Ombudsman are "such functions or
duties as may be provided by law." The sponsors admitted that
the legislature later on might remove some powers from the
Tanodbayan and transfer these to the Ombudsman.
MR. COLAYCO:

Yes.

Madam President, that is correct.

MR. MONSOD:

xxx

Yes.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The Tanodbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as provided by law."

MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a
constitutional body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory
powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the
hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:

MR. COLAYCO:
I agree with the Commissioner.
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
MR. RODRIGO:

Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can

later on be implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to
the legislature?

Ombudsman and for Other Purposes") is unconstitutional and

void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x

xxx
x x x
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas
Ople):
xxx
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we
would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its form at
the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such
powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance
with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We
do not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we
leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may
need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order
that he be more effective.rbl rl l lbrr
This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not
an irreversible disability.7
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which
subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor as among the offices under the Office of
the Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing
for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the

x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then

existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove
any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D.
No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred
by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that
by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers
or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law," it is
indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office
of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In
the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers
granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to
the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor
such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may
deem fit and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A.
No. 6770.8
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag
v. Guerrero.9 More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop
and Camanag, declared that the OSP is "merely a component of

the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman"
and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively
suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized
by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision
in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It
is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress
was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers
to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the
constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be
revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this
contention deserves scant consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare

decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has

been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.14 rbl rl l lbrr
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine
Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,15 the Court expounded
on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions,
thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and
necessary judicial practice thatwhen a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by
the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.16
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that
the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment thereof must be based
only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming
virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be
immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the stability
of the solemn pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only upon
showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case
override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the

doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting

aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling
reason to convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis
should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully
demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion
for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with
the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove
or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the
Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending
dismissal of the cases is based on misapprehension of facts,
speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is really
whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough
evidence to support a finding of probable cause. That issue,
however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be
stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been emphasized in

First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of

Appeals,18 to wit:

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and

evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in
the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari . An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the

extraordinary writ of certiorari . Certiorari will not be issued to

cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of
the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and
its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses
or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.19
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a
finding of probable cause would necessitate an examination and
re-evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based
its disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for
Certiorari should not be given due course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,20
imparting the value of the Ombudsman's independence, stating
thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and
RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the
power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a
public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has been the
consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers as long as his rulings are supported by substantial
evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and
preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in
exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the three
branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is
insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.21
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove
that said public official acted with grave abuse of discretion. In
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,22 the
Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. x x x23
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the
Ombudsman acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the
Ombudsman was acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and
properly exercised its power of control and supervision over the
OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated September 18,
2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any
order or action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it
should not have been included as a respondent in this petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ v. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES [G.R. NO.

154464, September 11, 2008]
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court
assailing the Resolutions dated May 10, 20021 and July 31, 20022
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which
denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein
petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the public

respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself

from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by this Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought
permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before
the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law
student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court3 that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner
to secure a written permission from the Court Administrator
before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a
party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina,
Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which
petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to
Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge
Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama `yung marunong pa
sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to
Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Inhibit,4 praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares.
The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the
respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred
from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pretrial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark,
reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that
justice will not be served.5
In an Order6 dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the
motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of
partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her
voluntary inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the

start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration7 of

the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.8
In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or
conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his
appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration,9 petitioner reiterated that the
basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of
Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are
applicable to different circumstances, but the respondent judge
denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order10 dated
July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court,
the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER'S
BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE
138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR
THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE
THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN
INHIBITION IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE'S FAITH
AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the

respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of
the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to
inhibit herself from trying the case.
This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent
jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an
absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the
application therefor will be directed.11 A becoming regard of the
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed
with the Court of Appeals.12 The hierarchy of courts is
determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for
compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it.13
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of
Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the
Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the
petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing
directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when the issue
raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We
will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial
hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns
before us.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138,
Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who

has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal,
board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and
control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions,
briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for
himself and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with
Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner's appearance, the court a quo
tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this
Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in
a recognized school's clinical legal education program and is
under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance
was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice
of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have
to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It

recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any

case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may
conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney,
and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly
authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation.14 Considering
that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the
same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
practice law,15Petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk
of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance.
Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally
conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be
acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his
right to represent himself.
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the
petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject to the
conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying
Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner's claim is Section 34
of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law
student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule
138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never
intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for
limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an
addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in
courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule
138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional
right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel,16 this
Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be
waived.17 The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v.
Holgado,18 where we declared that "even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly

in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be

convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know
how to establish his innocence."

of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not
inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as

plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution
accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not
obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who
insists that he can, without a lawyer's assistance, effectively
undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the
chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law
student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to
litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils
incident to this decision.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for
bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify
a judge from participating in a particular trial,20 as voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to
the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she
should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before
her.21 Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by

virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the
supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a
law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in
court. We should grant his wish.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed

Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,
Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,
Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of
petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
No pronouncement as to costs.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent

judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there
is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged
negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku,
masama `yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that
by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested
conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing
petitioner's and his co-plaintiff's loss of faith and confidence in
the respondent's impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed
an administrative case19 against the respondent for violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of
merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court's findings

SO ORDERED.

FIRST UNITED v. PORO POINT [G.R. NO. 178799 : January 19,

2009]
First United Constructors Corporation (FUCC) filed this special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking to annul (i) the
re-bidding of the contract for the Upgrading of the San Fernando
Airport Project, Phase I, held on May 8, 2007; (ii) the Notice of
Award1 dated May 23, 2007 to Satrap Construction Company, Inc.
(SCCI); and (iii) Notice to Proceed2 dated May 29, 2007 also to

SCCI. FUCC also seeks to permanently enjoin the Special Bids

and Awards Committee (SBAC) and Poro Point Management
Corporation (PPMC) from implementing the Contract3 in favor of
SCCI.

In addition to the "NO REVERSIBLE ERROR FINDING," there

exists a PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF OFFICIAL ACTION
OF A PUBLIC OFFICER. In the case at bar, such presumption
applies. The burden of proof lies with the FUCC. On this score,
FUCC failed to even just scratch the surface of the same.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On January 26, 2007, PPMC approved the Contract for the
Upgrading of the San Fernando Airport Phase I. The SBAC then
issued invitations to reputable contractors to pre-qualify for the
project.
FUCC and two (2) other contractors - C.M. Pancho Construction,
Inc. (C.M. Pancho) and EEI-New Kanlaon Construction, Inc. Joint
Venture (EEI-New Kanlaon JV) responded to the invitation and
were pre-qualified to bid for the project. However, upon
evaluation, none of the pre-qualified bidders was chosen. C.M.
Pancho was disqualified because it did not possess the required
minimum years of experience in airport projects, while EEI New
Kanlaon JV was disqualified because it did not submit a special
license to bid as joint venture. FUCC's technical proposal, on the
other hand, obtained a failing mark because it failed to submit the
automated weather observation system (AWOS) and its
authorized representative did not sign some pages of the
narrative construction method and the tax returns. FUCC sought
reconsideration of the SBAC decision, but it was denied.4
FUCC then filed a protest5 with the PPMC. On March 26, 2007,
Atty. Felix S. Racadio, PPMC Head, resolved FUCC's protest, viz.:
In sum, based on the issues raised and [the] arguments
presented by FUCC, this OFFICE finds NO REVERSIBLE ERROR
committed by SBAC, both on its findings of 06 March 2007 (giving
FUCC the FAILED rating) and 12 March 2007 (denial of FUCC's
Motion for Reconsideration).

The proceedings and findings of SBAC, in the Pre-Qualification

stage not having been put into issue by the PROTEST, then,
FUCC had opted to leave them as they were, thus, let them remain
UNDISTURBED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the PROTEST filed by
FUCC which is under consideration is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
The FILING FEE paid by FUCC, the protestant, via Metro Bank
Cashier's Check No. 0600018513, dated March 19, 2007, in the
amount of Four Million Seven Hundred Twenty-One Thousand
Pesos (P4,721,000.00), Philippine Currency, which is equivalent to
one [percent] (%) of the ABC being NON-REFUNDABLE (Sec. 55.1,
IRR-A, RA 1984), the same is hereby ordered FORFEITED in favor
of PPMC.
SO ORDERED.6
SBAC then scheduled a re-bidding and issued new invitations to
bid for the project. To enjoin the re-bidding set on May 8, 2007,
FUCC filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO) with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7274.
On May 2, 2007, the RTC issued a TRO which, however, was lifted
on May 4, 2007 because under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8975,7 no court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue a TRO or
injunction or prohibit the bidding or award of a government

infrastructure project. SBAC thus proceeded with the re-bidding

of the project on May 8, 2007 and awarded the project to SCCI as
the lowest qualified bidder.8 The Contract9 for the project was
signed, and a notice to proceed10 was served on SCCI on May 29,
2007.
FUCC filed an amended petition with the RTC to enjoin the
implementation of the project. The Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) moved to dismiss the petition for lack
of jurisdiction.
Pending resolution of OGCC's motion to dismiss, FUCC moved
for the dismissal of its amended petition, which was granted by
the RTC on July 4, 2007, to wit:
Acting on the above-stated notice of dismissal, this Court hereby
confirms the dismissal of the amended petition, in effect the
dismissal of the whole action, without prejudice, pursuant to Sec.
1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
Claiming that there is no appeal, or any speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, FUCC comes to us via this
petition. It also asks for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the
implementation of the project, asserting that SCCI is not qualified
to undertake the project and the award clearly poses a real threat
to the public welfare and safety. In its November 12, 2007
Resolution, this Court denied FUCC's application for the issuance
of a TRO for lack of merit.
FUCC filed this petition praying for the following relief, viz.:

(a) That upon receipt of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining

Order (TRO) be issued enjoining the implementation of the
contract for the Upgrading of the San Fernando Airport Project,
Phase I with respondent [SCCI] as the contractor;
(b) That after proper proceeding, judgment be rendered: (1)
permanently enjoining the implementation of the contract for the
Upgrading of the San Fernando Airport Project, Phase I with
respondent [SCCI] as the contractor; (2) declaring the re-bidding
of the contract for the Upgrading of the San Fernando Airport
Project, Phase I on 08 May 2007 illegal and nullifying the results
thereof; (3) annulling the Notice of Award dated 23 May 2007, the
Contract for the Upgrading of the San Fernando Airport, Phase I
entered into, by and between respondent PPMC and respondent
[SCCI] on 29 May 2007, and the Notice to Proceed dated 29 May
2007; and (4) directing respondent SBAC and/or respondent
PPMC and/or respondent Atty. Recadio to reconsider the "Failed"
rating of the bid of FUCC, open the Financial Proposal Envelope
submitted by FUCC during the original bidding, declare FUCC as
the winning bidder, and forthwith award the contract to FUCC, as
the winning bidder and being the only qualified contractor for the
project.12
It asserts that SBAC and PPMC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying its bid, in denying its protest, in
conducting a re-bidding and in awarding the project to SCCI. It
insists that it is the only qualified contractor for the project and
prays that it be declared the winning bidder.
We dismiss the petition.
Republic Act (RA) No. 9184, or the Government Procurement
Reform Act, outlines the procedure to assail decisions of the
SBAC in this wise:

SEC. 55. Protests on Decisions of the BAC. - Decisions of BAC in

all stages of procurement may be protested to the head of the
procuring entity and shall be in writing. Decisions of the BAC may
be protested by filing a verified position paper and paying a
nonrefundable protest fee. The amount of protest fee and the
periods during which the protests may be filed and resolved shall
be specified in the IRR.
SEC. 56. Resolution of Protests. - The protests shall be resolved
strictly on the basis of records of the BAC. Up to a certain amount
specified in the IRR, the decisions of the Head of the Procuring
Entity shall be final.
SEC. 57. Non-interruption of the Bidding Process. - In no case
shall any protest taken from any decision treated in this Article
stay or delay the bidding process. Protests must first be resolved
before any award is made.
SEC. 58. Resort to Regular Courts; Certiorari. - Court action may
be resorted only after the protest contemplated in this Article
shall have been completed. Cases that are filed in violation of the
process specified in this Article shall be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The regional trial court shall have jurisdiction over
final decisions of the head of the procuring entity. Court actions
shall be governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This provision is without prejudice to any law conferring on the
Supreme Court the sole jurisdiction to issue temporary
restraining orders and injunctions relating to Infrastructure
Projects of Government.
FUCC challenged the decision of SBAC in a protest filed with
Atty. Racadio of the PPMC who affirmed the SBAC decision.
Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, as provided in Section 58,
FUCC filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with

the RTC. FUCC, however, later moved for its dismissal theorizing
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over petitions for injunction.
Thereafter, it filed this petition for certiorari with this Court.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a special civil action for certiorari shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from the notice of the judgment, order or
resolution.13 FUCC admitted that it received the PPMC decision on
March 27, 2007.14 However, it filed this petition assailing the said
decision only on July 30, 2007. It is, therefore, too late in the day
for FUCC, via this petition, to assail the PPMC decision which
rated its bid as failed.
Besides, FUCC violated the doctrine of judicial hierarchy in filing
this petition for certiorari directly with this Court. Section 58 is
clear that petitions for the issuance of a writ of certiorari against
the decision of the head of the procuring agency, like PPMC,
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for certiorari is concurrent
with this Court. However, such concurrence does not allow
unrestricted freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
this writ should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.15
In the present case, FUCC adduced no special and important
reason why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. Thus,
we reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a
direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to
the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari .
Similarly, the RTC is the proper venue to hear FUCC's prayer for
permanent injunction. Unquestionably, RA No. 897516 enjoins all
courts, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary

restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary

mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit
or compel the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the
national government. The proscription, however, covers only
temporary restraining orders or writs but not decisions on the
merits granting permanent injunction. Therefore, while courts
below are prohibited by RA No. 8795 from issuing TROs or
preliminary restraining orders pending the adjudication of the
case, said statute, however, does not explicitly proscribe the
issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a court of law
arising from an adjudication of a case on the merits.17
As we explained in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.:18
x x x Republic Act No. 8975 merely proscribes the issuance of
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction. [It] cannot, under pain of
violating the Constitution, deprive the courts of authority to take
cognizance of the issues raised in the principal action, as long as
such action and the relief sought are within their jurisdiction.
Clearly, except for the prayer for the issuance of a TRO or
preliminary injunction, the issues raised by FUCC and the relief it
sought are within the jurisdiction of the RTC. It is a procedural
faux pas for FUCC to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court
over the issuance of a writ of certiorari and permanent injunction.
In any event, the invitation to bid contains a reservation for PPMC
to reject any bid. It has been held that where the right to reject is
so reserved, the lowest bid, or any bid for that matter, may be
rejected on a mere technicality.19 The discretion to accept or
reject bid and award contracts is vested in the government
agencies entrusted with that function. This discretion is of such
wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith or direct
the committee on bids to do a particular act or to enjoin such act
within its prerogatives unless it is apparent that it is used as a

shield to a fraudulent award;20 or an unfairness or injustice is

shown;21 or when in the exercise of its authority, it gravely abuses
or exceeds its jurisdiction. Thus, where PPMC as advertiser,
availing itself of that right, opts to reject any or all bids, the losing
bidder has no cause to complain or right to dispute that choice,
unless fraudulent acts, injustice, unfairness or grave abuse of
discretion is shown.
FUCC alleges that SBAC and PPMC, along with the SCCI and five
(5) other bidders, colluded to rig the results of the re-bidding so
that SCCI would emerge as the so-called lowest bidder. The
record, however, is bereft of any proof to substantiate the
allegation. Neither is there any evidence offered to establish
unfairness, injustice, caprice or arbitrariness on the part of the
SBAC or the PPMC in awarding the contract to SCCI, the lowest
bidder. The presumption of regularity of the bidding must thus be
upheld.
As we explained in JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:22
The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is
vested in the Government agencies entrusted with that function.
The discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such
wide latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it
is apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award
(Jalandoni v. NARRA, 108 Phil. 486 [1960]). x x x The exercise of
this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates prior inquiry,
investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task
can best be discharged by the Government agencies concerned,
not by the Courts. The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a
branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its
constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with
executive or legislative discretion exercised within those
boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy decisionmaking.

It is only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion that

the Courts will set aside the award of a contract made by a
government entity. Grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power (Filinvest
Credit Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 65935, 30
September 1988, 166 SCRA 155). The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as to act
at all in contemplation of law, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
(Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., et al[.], L-40867, 26 July
1988, 163 SCRA 489).
Accordingly, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion,
FUCC has no valid ground to demand annulment of the contract
between PPMC and SCCI.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision
of the PPMC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R.

No. 110571 March 10, 1994]
Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction is the novel question of
where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board of
Investments (BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the
conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive
Order No. 226, also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called
for.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision dated
December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No. 92-005 granted petitioner First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate
of registration by changing the scope of its registered product
from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, oppositor
Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI
decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move
to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its
bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 191.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Acting on the petition, respondent court required the BOI and
petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause
why no injunction should issue. On February 17, 1993,
respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI from
implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order
lapsed by its own terms on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after
its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual
law
library
On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss
Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that
respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No.
92-005, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion to dismiss the petition
is
hereby
DENIED,
for
lack
of
merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent is hereby given an inextendible period of ten

(10) days from receipt hereof within which to file its comment to
the petition. 1chanrobles virtual law library
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993,
petitioner decided not to file any motion for reconsideration as
the question involved is essentially legal in nature and
immediately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioner posits the view that respondent court acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution
of May 25, 1993, for the following reasons:
I. Respondent court has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's
appeal from the BOI's decision in BOI Case No. 92-005, which has
become final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly

with this Court, to wit:
Judicial relief. - All orders or decisions of the Board
(of Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code
shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or
decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay
such an order or decision; Provided, that all appeals shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision.
On the other hand, Mariwasa maintains that whatever "obvious
inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have
been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question
of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of
the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991
or
four
(4)
years
after
E.O.
226
was
enacted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein quoted below:

II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this

Honorable Court cannot be amended or superseded by Circular
No. 1-91. 2chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner then concludes that:
III. Mariwasa has lost it right to appeal . . . in this case.
3
chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner argues that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the
Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final
Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that

1. Scope. - These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or

decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to
appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial
agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these agencies
are the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board,
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board,
National Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of Agrarian
Reform and Special Agrarian Courts under RA 6657, Government
Service
Insurance
System,
Employees
Compensation
Commission,
Agricultural
Inventions
Board,
Insurance
Commission
and
Philippine
Atomic
Energy
Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

2. Cases not covered. - These rules shall not apply to decisions

and interlocutory orders of the National Labor Relations
Commission or the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the
Labor Code of the Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, and other quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal
to
the
courts
is
prescribed
or
allowed
by
statute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. - The appeal of a party
affected by a final order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Tax
Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency shall be taken to the Court
of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact or of law or mixed
questions of fact and law. From final judgments or decisions of
the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari
to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of
Appeals, to wit:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, awards of Regional Trial Courts
and
quasi-judicial
agencies,
instrumentalities,
boards
or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1)
of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any
and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases

falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the

power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Clearly evident in the aforequoted provision of B.P. 129 is the
laudable objective of providing a uniform procedure of appeal
from decisions of all quasi-judicial agencies for the benefit of the
bench and the bar. Equally laudable is the twin objective of B.P.
129 of unclogging the docket of this Court to enable it to attend to
more important tasks, which in the words of Dean Vicente G.
Sinco, as quoted in our decision in Conde v. Intermediate
Appellate Court 4is "less concerned with the decisions of cases
that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of
particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of
national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the
delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon
fundamental rights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 5this
Court noted that B.P. 129 did not deal only with "changes in the
rules on procedures" and that not only was the Court of Appeals
reorganized, but its jurisdiction and powers were also broadened
by Section 9 thereof. Explaining the changes, this Court said:
. . . Its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari and habeas corpus, which theretofore could
be exercised only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, was
expanded by (1) extending it so as to include the writ of quo
warranto, and also (2) empowering it to issue all said
extraordinary writs "whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." Its appellate jurisdiction was also extended to cover

not only final judgments of Regional Trial Courts, but also "all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of . . .
quasi-judicial
agencies,
instrumentalities,
boards
or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1)
of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948," it being
noteworthy in this connection that the text of the law is broad and
comprehensive, and the explicitly stated exceptions have no
reference whatever to the Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed, the
intention to expand the original and appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals over quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards, or commissions, is further stressed by the last paragraph
of Section 9 which excludes from its provisions, only the
"decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code
of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals." 6chanrobles virtual law library
However, it cannot be denied that the lawmaking system of the
country is far from perfect. During the transitional period after the
country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking power
was lodged on the Executive Department. The obvious lack of
deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the
deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure
which
B.P.
129
sought
to
promote.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 provides that all appeals shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt
of
the
order
or
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court
entertains ordinary appeals only from decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is

reclusion perpetua or higher. Judgments of regional trial courts

may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review
on certiorari within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being
the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that
"(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for
certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court." Thus, the right of appeal provided in E.O. 226 within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order or decision is clearly not in
consonance with the present procedure before this Court. Only
decisions, orders or rulings of a Constitutional Commission (Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections or Commission
on Audit), may be brought to the Supreme Court on original
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 by the aggrieved party within
thirty (30) days form receipt of a copy thereof. 7chanrobles virtual
law library
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its
Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P.
129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals
to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court
of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate
unnecessary
contradictions
and
confusing
rules
of
procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual
law
library
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not
strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of
law according to settled jurisprudence. 8In Inciong v. de Guia, 9a
circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction
on a judge who violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24,
1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979, requiring raffling

of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating

Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that
assigning cases instead of raffling is a common practice and
holding that respondent could not go against the circular of this
Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or nonobservance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or
practice to the contrary." 10chanrobles virtual law library
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly
repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive
right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified,
diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rulemaking powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent
correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of
appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting
such right, it also provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by
virtue
of
its
constitutional
rule-making
powers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The case of Bustos v. Lucero 11distinguished between rights
created by a substantive law and those arising from procedural
law:
Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights
is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J.,
980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which
give rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains a redress for their invasion. 12chanrobles virtual law
library

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from

decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to
procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to
appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains
and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred
the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent
Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e.,
fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the
substantive right to appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasijudicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of
Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to
appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second
sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall
also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasijudicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such
statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words
"(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there
are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the
Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More
importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions
listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final
decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from
the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations
Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-judicial
agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or
allowed by statute. Since in DBP v. CA 13we upheld the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals
despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies
reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded
from

Circular
1-91,
which
is
but
implementary
of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

said

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82

of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the
right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals
from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously
allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now
be
brought
to
the
Court
of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued
on
July
19,
1993
is
hereby
LIFTED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

SARAH P. AMPONG v. CSC [G.R. NO. 167916 : August 26, 2008]

CAN the Civil Service Commission (CSC) properly assume
jurisdiction over administrative proceedings against a judicial
employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher, committed
prior to her appointment to the judiciary?cra lawlibrary
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the CSC's
exercise of administrative jurisdiction over petitioner.
The Facts
The following facts are uncontroverted:

On November 10, 1991, a Professional Board Examination for

Teachers (PBET)2 was held in Davao City. A certain Evelyn JunioDecir3 applied for and took the examination at Room 16, Kapitan
Tomas Monteverde Elementary School. She passed with a rating
of 74.27%.4
At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P.
Ampong (nee Navarra) and Decir were public school teachers
under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS).5 Later, on August 3, 1993, Ampong
transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani
Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir
went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao
City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility. During
the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that
the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in the
Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was confirmed
that the person claiming the eligibility was different from the one
who took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampong who took
and passed the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.
The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined
the existence of a prima facie case against Decir and Ampong for
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. On August 23, 1994, they were
formally charged and required to file answers under oath. The
formal charge reads:
That sometime before the conduct of the November 10, 1991
Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET), a certain
Ms. Evelyn B. Junio (now Decir) took the said examination at Rm.
16 Kapitan Tomas Monteverde Elementary School, Davao City,
with a passing rate of 74.27%; That on July 5, 1994 she appeared
before the CSC Region XI Office to get her Guro Certificate; That
upon verification, it was found out that the picture attached in the
Picture Seat Plan, marked as Annex "A" and "A-1," respectively,

were not the same compared to the picture attached in the CSC
Form 212 of Evelyn Junio-Decir marked herein as annex "B," "B1," respectively. There was also a marked difference in the
signatures affixed in the said annexes; That further investigations

revealed that it was the pictures of Ms. Sarah Navarra, wife of her
husband's first cousin, who took the said examination in behalf of
Ms. Evelyn Junio-Decir, a provisional teacher; That the said act of
Mesdames Decir and Navarra are acts of dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; that in (sic) taking
the CS examination for and in behalf of another undermines the
sanctity of the CS examinations; All these contrary to existing
civil
service
laws
and
regulations.
(Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
In her sworn statement dated November 3, 1994, Decir denied the
charges against her. She reasoned out that it must have been the
examination proctor who pasted the wrong picture on the PSP
and that her signatures were different because she was still
signing her maiden name at the time of the examination. In her
Answer, Decir contended that:
2. The same accusation is denied, the truth being:
A. When I took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers
(PBET) in the year 1991, I handed my 1x1 I.D. picture to the
proctor assigned in the examination room who might have
inadvertently pasted in the Seat Plan [the] wrong picture instead
[of] my own picture;
b. With respect to the marked difference in my signature both
appearing in the aforesaid Seat Plan and also with the Form 212,
the disparity lies in that in the year 1991, when I took the
afroresaid examination, I was still sporting my maiden name
Evelyn B. Junio in order to coincide with all my pertinent
supporting papers, like the special order (s.o.), appointment and
among others, purposely to take said communications. However,
immediately after taking the PBET Examination in 1991, I started
using the full name of Evelyn Junio-Decir.6

Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily

appeared at the CSRO on February 2, 1995 and admitted to the
wrongdoing. When reminded that she may avail herself of the
services of counsel, petitioner voluntarily waived said right.
On March 13, 1995, petitioner gave another admission in the
following tenor:
Q:
Now, what is then your intention in coming to this Region
inasmuch as you are still intending to file an answer to the formal
charge?cra lawlibrary

I came here because I want to admit personally. So that I will

not be coming here anymore. I will submit my case for
Resolution.
A:

Q: So, you intend to waive your right for the formal hearing and
you also admit orally on the guilt of the charge on the Formal
Charge dated August 24, 1994?cra lawlibrary
A:

Yes, Ma'am.

Q:

What else do you want to tell the Commission?cra lawlibrary

A: x x x Inasmuch as I am already remorseful, I am repenting of

the wrong that I have done. I am hoping that the Commission can
help x x x so that I will be given or granted another chance to
serve the government.
x

Q: Now inasmuch as you have declared that you have admitted

the guilt that you took the examination for and in behalf of Evelyn
Junio Decir, are you telling this to the Commission without the
assistance of the counsel or waiver of your right to be assisted by
counsel.
Yes, Ma'am. I am waiving my right.7 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
A:

Petitioner reiterated her admission in her sworn Answer dated

March 16, 1995:

meted the penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties.

The PBET rating of Decir is revoked.9

3. That, during the commission of the act, I was still under the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as Teacher incharge of San Miguel Primary School, Malungon North District,
way back in 1991, when the husband of Evelyn Junio-Decir, my

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the
issue of jurisdiction.10 She argued that the exclusive authority to
discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme Court;
that the CSC acted with abuse of discretion when it continued to
exercise jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty as a judicial
employee. She contended that at the time the case was instituted
on August 23, 1994, the CSC already lost jurisdiction over her.
She was appointed as Interpreter III of the RTC, Branch 38, Alabel,
Sarangani Province on August 3, 1993.

husband's cousin came to me and persuaded me to take the

examination in behalf of his wife to which I disagreed but he
earnestly begged so that I was convinced to agree because I pity
his wife considering that she is an immediate relative, and there
was no monetary consideration involved in this neither a
compensatory reward for me, as I was overcome by their
persuasion;
4. That, despite the fact that I was a teacher, I was not aware that
the acts I was charged, is a ground for disciplinary action and
punishable by dismissal;
5. That I should not have conformed to this anomalous
transaction considering that I was born in a Christian family, and
was brought up in the fear of Lord, and had been a consistent
officer of the Church Board, had been a religious leader for so
many years, and had been the organizer of the Music Festival of
the Association of Evangelical Churches of Malungon, Sarangani
Province, thus I was devoted to church work and was known to
be of good conduct; and that my friends and acquaintances can
vouch to that, but I was just forced by circumstances to agree to
the spouses Godfre and Evelyn Decir.8 (Emphasis added)
CSC Finding and Penalty
On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir
guilty of dishonesty, dismissing them from the service. The
dispositive part of the CSC resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby finds Evelyn J. Decir and
Sarah P. Navarra guilty of Dishonesty. Accordingly, they are

The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration.11 According to

the Commission, to allow petitioner to evade administrative
liability would be a mockery of the country's administrative
disciplinary system. It will open the floodgates for others to
escape prosecution by the mere expedient of joining another
branch of government. In upholding its jurisdiction over
petitioner, the CSC differentiated between administrative
supervision exercised by the Supreme Court and administrative
jurisdiction granted to the Commission over all civil service
employees:
Moreover, it must be pointed out that administrative supervision
is distinct from administrative jurisdiction. While it is true that this

Commission does not have administrative supervision over

employees in the judiciary, it definitely has concurrent
jurisdiction over them. Such jurisdiction was conferred upon the
Civil Service Commission pursuant to existing law specifically
Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provides as follows:
"(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or

through it directly or on appeal, including contested appointment,

and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it x x x."

The fact that court personnel are under the administrative

supervision of the Supreme Court does not totally isolate them
from the operations of the Civil Service Law. Appointments of all
officials and employees in the judiciary is governed by the Civil
Service Law (Section 5(6), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
CA Disposition
Via Petition for Review under Rule 43, petitioner elevated the
matter to the CA.12 She insisted that as a judicial employee, it is
the Supreme Court and not the CSC that has disciplinary
jurisdiction over her.
In a Decision dated November 30, 2004,13 the CA denied the
petition for lack of merit.
The CA noted that petitioner never raised the issue of jurisdiction
until after the CSC ruled against her. Rather, she willingly
appeared before the commission, freely admitted her wrongdoing,
and even requested for clemency. Thus, she was estopped from
questioning the Commission's jurisdiction. The appellate court
opined that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a
court, tribunal or body will estop such party from assailing its
jurisdiction.
The CA further ruled that a member of the judiciary may be under
the jurisdiction of two different bodies. As a public school teacher
or a court interpreter, petitioner was part of the civil service,
subject to its rules and regulations. When she committed acts in
violation of the Civil Service Law, the CSC was clothed with
administrative jurisdiction over her.
Issue
Petitioner, through this petition, assigns the lone error that:

The Honorable Court of Appeals-First Division decided a question

of substance in a way not in accord with law and jurisprudence,
gravely erred in facts and in law, and has sanctioned such
departure and grave error because it ignored or was not aware of
Garcia v. De la Pea, 229 SCRA 766 (1994) and Adm. Matter No.
OCA I.P.I. 97-329-P (CSC v. Ampong) dated January 31, 2001,
which reiterate the rule that exclusive authority to discipline
employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme Court, in issuing
the questioned decision and resolution; which grave error
warrant reversal of the questioned decision and resolution.14
Put simply, the issue boils down to whether the CSC has
administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the Judiciary for
acts committed while said employee was still with the Executive
or Education Department.
Our Ruling
The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but We
rule against the petition on the ground of estoppel.
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil
service. As defined under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and
government-owned or controlled corporations.15 Pursuant to its
administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to
"control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service
examinations."16 This authority grants to the CSC the right to take
cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the
examinations.17
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is
given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
judicial personnel.18 By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It
may take the proper administrative action against them if they

commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude

into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.19 Thus, this Court ruled that the
Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court
supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.20

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC
does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the
Supreme Court.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,21 this Court held that

impersonating an examinee of a civil service examination is an
act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial
employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court
validated.

Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its

complaint against a judicial employee before the OCA. Records
show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in the present
case.

A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton,22

involving judicial employees who also impersonated civil service
examinees. As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary
charges before the OCA because respondents were judicial
employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty and meting
the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that "respondents'
machinations reflect their dishonesty and lack of integrity,
rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public
servants and employees of the judiciary."23
Compared to Sta. Ana and Bartolata, the present case involves a
similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee.
But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the
offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time
of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the
administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil
service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously
took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person.
When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty
in a civil service-supervised examination.

The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court

employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether
the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.

However, We are constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC

based on the principle of estoppel. The previous actions of
petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the
CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an
affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape a penalty.24 As this Court declared in Aquino v. Court of
Appeals:25
In the interest of sound administration of justice, such practice
cannot be tolerated. If we are to sanction this argument, then all
the proceedings had before the lower court and the Court of
Appeals while valid in all other respects would simply become
useless.26
Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to
adopt a different theory on appeal to impugn the court's
jurisdiction.27 In Emin v. De Leon,28 this Court sustained the
exercise of jurisdiction by the CSC, while recognizing at the same
time that original disciplinary jurisdiction over public school
teachers belongs to the appropriate committee created for the
purpose as provided for under the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.29 It was there held that a party who fully participated in

the proceedings before the CSC and was accorded due process is
estopped from subsequently attacking its jurisdiction.

petitioner's admission was substantial enough to support a

finding of guilt.

Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and

adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed with it
her answer to the charges leveled against her. When the CSC
found her guilty, she moved for a reconsideration of the ruling.
These circumstances all too clearly show that due process was
accorded to petitioner.

The CSC found petitioner guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as

"an act which includes the procurement and/or use of
fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to
ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating,
collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which
amounts to any violation of the Civil Service examination."33
Petitioner impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure that
the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing
a deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably
involve dishonesty.34

Petitioner's admission of guilt stands. Apart from her full

participation in the proceedings before the CSC, petitioner
admitted to the offense charged - that she impersonated Decir
and took the PBET exam in the latter's place. We note that even
before petitioner filed a written answer, she voluntarily went to
the CSC Regional Office and admitted to the charges against her.
In the same breath, she waived her right to the assistance of
counsel. Her admission, among others, led the CSC to find her
guilty of dishonesty, meting out to her the penalty of dismissal.
Now, she assails said confession, arguing that it was given
without aid of counsel. In police custodial investigations, the
assistance of counsel is necessary in order for an extra-judicial
confession to be made admissible in evidence against the
accused in a criminal complaint. If assistance was waived, the
waiver should have been made with the assistance of counsel.30
But while a party's right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in
proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such requirement in
administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea,31 this Court
ruled that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is under
no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of
counsel is not an absolute requirement.32
Petitioner's admission was given freely. There was no
compulsion, threat or intimidation. As found by the CSC,

This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie,

cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray."35 Petitioner's dishonest act as a civil servant renders her
unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that
petitioner should not have been appointed as a judicial employee
had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she
committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may,
petitioner's present status as a judicial employee is not a
hindrance to her getting the penalty she deserves.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a
heavy burden or responsibility. The image of a court, as a true
temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise,
of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the
least and lowest of its personnel.36 As the Court held in another
administrative case for dishonesty:
x x x Any act which diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of
the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. We have
not hesitated to impose the utmost penalty of dismissal for even
the slightest breach of duty by, and the slightest irregularity in the

conduct of, said officers and employees, if so warranted. Such

breach and irregularity detract from the dignity of the highest
court of the land and erode the faith of the people in the judiciary.
x

As a final point, we take this opportunity to emphasize that no

quibbling, much less hesitation or circumvention, on the part of
any employee to follow and conform to the rules and regulations
enunciated by this Court and the Commission on Civil Service,
should be tolerated. The Court, therefore, will not hesitate to rid

its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an

effective and efficient system of justice.37 (Emphasis added)
We will not tolerate dishonesty for the Judiciary expects the best
from all its employees.38 Hindi namin papayagan ang pandaraya

sapagkat inaasahan ng Hudikatura ang pinakamabuti sa lahat

nitong kawani.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.