Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Laws Applicable: Rule 39, section 12, subdivision (k) of the Rules of
Court (old law)
FACTS:
life insurance
investment contract
contract by which the insurer, for a stipulated sum, engages to
pay a certain amount of money if another dies within the time
limited by the policy
contract for insurance for one year in consideration of an
advanced premium, with the right of assured to continue it
from year to year upon payment of a premium as stipulated
includes accident insurance, since life is insured under either
contract
includes all policies of insurance in which payment
of insurance money is contingent upon loss of life
"any life insurance"
applies to ordinary life insurance contracts, as well as to those
which, although intended primarily to indemnify for risks arising
from accident, likewise, insure against loss of life due, either to
accidental causes, or to the willful and criminal act of another,
which, as such, is not strictly accidental in nature
1. statutes of this nature seek to enable the head of the family to
secure his widow and children from becoming a burden upon the
community and, accordingly, should merit a liberal interpretation
1.
throw or drop (something) from an aircraft or ship.
"six aircraft jettisoned their loads in the sea"
o
noun
3
Issue: Whether or not the death of the victim comes within the
purview of the exception clause of the supplementary policy and,
hence, exempts the company from liability.
Held: NO. Basilio was a watchman of the Manila Auto Supply
which was a block away from the house of Atty. Ojeda where
something suspicious was happening which caused the latter to ask
for help. While at first he declined the invitation of Atty. Ojeda to go
with him to his residence to inquire into what was going on because
he was not a regular policeman, he later agreed to come along
when prompted by the traffic policeman, and upon approaching the
gate of the residence he was shot and died.
The circumstance that he was a mere watchman and had no duty to
heed the call of Atty. Ojeda should not be taken as a capricious
desire on his part to expose his life to danger considering the fact
that the place he was in duty-bound to guard was only a block away.
In volunteering to extend help under the situation, he might have
thought, rightly or wrongly, that to know the truth was in the
interest of his employer it being a matter that affects the security
of the neighborhood. No doubt there was some risk coming to him
in pursuing that errand, but that risk always existed it being
inherent in the position he was holding. He cannot therefore be
blamed solely for doing what he believed was in keeping with his
duty as a watchman and as a citizen. And he cannot be considered
as making an arrest as an officer of the law, as contended, simply
because he went with the traffic policeman, for certainly he did
not go there for that purpose nor was he asked to do so by the
policeman.
FACTS
Juan Biagtan was insured with Insular for P5k and a
supplementary contract Accidental Death Benefit clause for
another P5k if "the death of the Insured resulted directly from
4
bodily injury effected solely through external and violent means
sustained in an accident . . . and independently of all other causes."
The clause, however, expressly provided that it would not apply
where death resulted from an injury "intentionally inflicted by a
third party."
- One night, a band of robbers entered their house. Juan went out
of his room and he was met with 9 knife stabs. He died. The robbers
were convicted of robbery with homicide.
- The family was claiming the additional P5k from Insular under the
Accidental Death Benefit clause. Insular refused on the ground that
the death resulted from injuries intentionally inflicted by 3rd parties
and was therefore not covered.
- Biagtans filed against Insular. CFI ruled in favor of Biagtans.
5
proviso that excludes the (insurer's) liability, in case death or injury
is intentionally inflicted by any other person, applies to this case."
FACTS:
The Capital Insurance and Surety co., inc denied stating that
the death caused by his participation in a boxing contest was
not accidental
RTC: favored Simon
7
happens. It has also been defined as an injury which happens by
reason of some violence or casualty to the insured without his
design, consent, or voluntary co-operation. Herein, the incident that
resulted in Lim's
death was indeed an accident. On the other hand, the parties agree
that Lim did not commit suicide.
8
assessed in the sum of P2,610.86 as its contribution to the general
average. The insurance company, insisting that its obligation did not
extend beyond the insurance of the "absolute total loss of the
vessel only, and to pay proportionate salvage of the declared
value," refused to contribute to the settlement of the general
average.
The present action was thereupon instituted,and after trial the
court below rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and ordered
the company to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,610.86 as its part of
the indemnity The insurance company appealed to this court.
Issues:
1. WON the lower court erred in disregarding the typewritten clause
endorsed upon the policy, Exhibit A, expressly limiting insurer's
liability thereunder of the total loss of the wooden vessel
Pandanand to proportionate salvage charges
2. WON the lower court erred in concluding that defendant and
appellant, National Union Fire Insurance Company is liable to
contribute to the general average resulting from the jettison of a
part of said vessel's cargo.
Ratio:
1. One of the clauses of the document originally read as follows:
Touching the Adventures and Perils which the said National Union
Fire Insurance Company is content to bear, and to take upon them
in this Voyage; they are of the Seas, Men-of-War, Fire, Pirates,
9
Procedure provides that "when an instrument consists partly of
written words and partly of a printed form and the two are
inconsistent, the former controls the latter.
2. In the absence of positive legislation to the contrary, the liability
of the defendant insurance company on its policy would, perhaps,
be limited to "absolute loss of the vessel only, and to pay
proportionate salvage of the declared value."
But the policy was executed in this jurisdiction and "warranted to
trade within the waters of the Philippine Archipelago only." Here
the liability for contribution in general average is not based on the
express terms of the policy, but rest upon the theory that from the
relation of the parties and for their benefit, a quasi contract is
implied by law. Article 859 of the Code of Commerce is still in force
and reads as follows:
ART. 859. The underwriters of the vessel, of the freight, and of the
cargo shall be obliged to pay for the indemnity of the gross average
in so far as is required of each one of these objects respectively. The
article is mandatory in its terms, and the insurers, whether for the
vessel or for the freight or for the cargo, is bound to contribute to
the indemnity of the general average. It simply places the insurer on
the same footing as other persons who have an interest in the
vessel, or the cargo therein at the time of the occurrence of the
general average and who are compelled to contribute.
In the present case it is not disputed that the ship was in grave peril
and that the jettison of part of the cargo was necessary. If the cargo
was in peril to the extent of call for general average, the ship must
also have been in great danger, possibly sufficient to cause its
10
And, since the driver (Magalong) and security guard (Atiga) of the
armored vehicle were charged with three others as liable for the
robbery, Fortune denies Producers Bank of its insurance claim.
The trial court and the court appeals ruled in favor of recovery,
hence, the case at bar.
Issue: Whether recovery is precluded under the general exemption
clause.
Held: Yes, recovery is precluded under the general exemption
clause. Howsoever viewed, Producers entrusted the three with the
specific duty to safely transfer the money to its head office, with
Alampay to be responsible for its custody in transit; Magalong to
drive the armored vehicle which would carry the money; and Atiga
to provide the needed security for the money, the vehicle, and his
two other companions. In short, for these particular tasks, the three
acted as agents of Producers. A "representative" is defined as one
who represents or stands in the place of another; one who
represents others or another in a special capacity, as an agent, and
is interchangeable with "agent." 23
In view of the foregoing, Fortune is exempt from liability under the
general exceptions clause of the insurance policy.
11
The contract of insurance was not consummated by the parties.
The above quoted agreement clearly stated that the agreement
should NOT go into effect until the home office of the Company
shall confirm it by issuing a policy. It was nothing but an
acknowledgment by the Company that it has received a sum of
money agreed upon as the first years premium upon a policy to be
issued upon the application if it is accepted by the Company.
When an agreement is made between the applicant and the agent
whether by signing an application containing such condition or
otherwise, that no liability shall attach until the principal approves
the risk and a receipt is given by the agent, such acceptance is
merely conditional and is subordinated to the companys act in
approving or rejecting; so in life insurance a binding slip or receipt
does not insure itself.
who received the application and the money on the 9th of July,
1902.
Herdman sent the papers on July 24 to the office of the defendant
company in Shanghai, where they were received on August 11.
Badger executed a promissory note for $14.90, the balance of the
first premium, which was sent to Herdman on July 17, 1902. On the
31st of July, Mrs. Badger, acting for her husband, sent to Herdman
$14.90, cash, in payment of said note. Badger died on the 1st day of
August, 1902, of cholera. No policy was ever issued upon his
application.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover the sum of $5,000,
alleging that a contract of insurance had been made by the
company with Badger. Judgment was rendered in the court below in
favor of the defendant to the effect that no such contract was ever
made, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed.
The only person who acted in any way for the company in this
transaction was Herdman. The only evidence in the case to show
what his powers were is found in an admission in the answer which
states that he was "a special agent and cashier of the defendant
company in Manila," and in his evidence, testifying as a witness, he
said that at the time of the trial on September 6, 1905, he was the
agency director of the defendant company in the city of Manila.
The action can not be maintained unless the plaintiff proves a
contract between the company and Badger, made by a person
authorized to act for the company. The authority of this person
must, of course, be proven. There is no evidence in the case to show
12
that Herdman had any authority to make any contract, either parol
or in writing, that would bind the company. There is no evidence to
show that he had any policies in his possession.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
13
Moreover, there is evidence in the case in addition to that already
referred to, showing that the company expressly refused to be
bound until the application had been accepted either by its office in
Shanghai or its office in New York. In the application which Badger
signed on the 5th day of July it is said:
policy issued thereon by the resident board, and the full premium
has actually been paid to and accepted by the company or its
authorized agent during the lifetime and good health of the person
upon whose life the insurance is applied for. The company reserves
the absolute right of disapproval of such application."
The other form contains the statement that "the company shall
incur no liability under the application until it has been received,
approved at the house office of the company, and a policy issued
thereon." This is then followed by the words of the first form. Upon
both of these forms are printed the words "conditional receipt."
14
Issue:
Whether or not the insurance contract was perfected.
Held:
NO.
The contract for life annuity was NOT perfected because it had NOT
been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application
ever came to the knowledge of the applicant. An acceptance of an
offer of insurance NOT actually or constructively communicated to
the proposer does NOT make a contract of insurane, as the locus
15
The policy which the company issued was received by its agent in
Tarlac. The agent delivered the policy to Felicidad Estrada upon her
payment of the balance of the first years annual premium. The
agent asked Felicidad Estrada if her nephew was in good health and
she replied that she believed so. He gave her the policy. The agent
learned of the death of Arturo Sindayen and the aunt to return the
policy. He did not return or offer to return the premium paid. The
aunt gave him the policy.
The company obtained from the beneficiary, the widow of Arturo
Sindayen, her signature to alegal document entitled ACCORD,
SATISFACTION AND RELEASE In consideration of the sum of P40.06
paid to her by a check of the company, she discharged the company
for all claims . The said check for P40.06 was never cashed but
returned to the company. The widow brought action to enforce
payment of the policy. The first premium was already paid by the
insured covering the period from December 1, 1932. It is to
December 1, 1933. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON the said policy never took effect because of paragraph 3
of the application for at the time of its delivery by the agent the
insured was not in good health.
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The application which the insured signed in Tarlac, contained
among others the following provisions:
3. That the said policy shall not take effect until the first premium
has been paid and the policy has been delivered to and accepted by
me, while I am in good health.
There is one line of cases which holds that the stipulation contained
in paragraph 3 is in the nature of a condition precedent, that is to
say, that there can be no valid delivery to the insured unless he is in
good health at the time. A number of these cases, on the other
hand, go to the of holding that the delivery of the policy by the
agent to the insured consummates the contract even though the
agent knew that the insured was not in good health at the time, the
theory being that his knowledge is the companys knowledge and
his delivery of the policy is the companys delivery.
We are inclined to the view that it is more consonant with the well
known practice of life insurancecompanies and the evidence in the
present case to rest our decision on the proposition that Mendoza
was authorized by the company to make the delivery of the policy
when he received the payment of the first premium and he was
satisfied that the insured was in good health.
In the case of MeLaurin vs. Mutual Life Insurance Co. -It is plain,
therefore, that upon the facts it is not necessarily a case of waiver
or of estoppel, but a case where the local agents, in the exercise of
the powers lodged in them, accepted the premium and delivered
the policy. That act binds their principal, the defendant.
The evidence in the record shows that Mendoza had the authority,
given him by the company, to withhold the delivery of the policy to
the insured until the first premium has been paid and the policy
has been delivered to and accepted by me (the insured) while
16
I am in good health. Mendozas decision that the condition had
been met by the insured and that it was proper to make a delivery
of the policy to him is just as binding on the company as if the
decision had been made by its board of directors.
It is the interest not only the applicant but of all insurance
companies as well that there should be some act which gives the
applicant the definite assurance that the contract has been
consummated. A cloud will be thrown over the entire insurance
business if the condition of health of the insured at the time of
delivery of the policy may be required into years afterwards with
the view to avoiding the policy on the ground that it never took
effect because of an alleged lack of good health, at the time of
delivery.
When the policy is issued and delivered it is plainly not within the
intention of the parties that there should be any questions held in
abeyance or reserved for future determination. It would be a most
serious handicap to business if the very existence of the contract
remains in doubt even though the policy has been issued and
delivered with all the formalities required by the law. The delivery
of the policy to the insured by an agent is the final act which binds
the company and insured in the absence of fraud or other legal
ground for rescission. The fact that the agent to whom it has
entrusted this duty is derelict or negligent or even dishonest in
the performance of the duty which has been entrusted to him
would create a liability of the agent to the company but does not
resolve the companys obligation based upon the authorized acts of
the agent toward a third party who was not in collusion with the
agent.
17
18
19
GREPALIFE V. CA
89 SCRA 543
Facts:
> On March 14, 1957, respondent Ngo Hing filed an application
with Grepalife for a 20-yr endowment policy for 50T on the life of
his one year old daughter Helen Go.
> All the essential data regarding Helen was supplied by Ngo to
Lapu-Lapu Mondragon, the branch manager of Grepalife-Cebu.
Mondragon then typed the data on the application form which was
later signed by Ngo.
> Ngo then paid the insurance premium and a binding deposit
receipt was issued to him. The binding receipt contained the
following provision: If the applicant shall not have been insurable
xxx and the Company declines to approve the application, the
insurance applied for shall not have been in force at any time and
the sum paid shall be returned to the applicant upon the surrender
of this receipt.
> Mondragon wrote on the bottom of the application form his
strong recommendation for the approval of the insurance
application.
> On Apr 30, 1957, Mondragon received a letter from Grepalife
Main office disapproving the insurance application of Ngo for the
simple reason that the 20yr endowment plan is not available for
minors below 7 yrs old.
> Mondragon wrote back the main office again strongly
recommending the approval of the endowment plan on the life of
Helen, adding that Grepalife was the only insurance company NOT
selling endowment plans to children.
> On may 1957, Helen died of influenza with complication of
broncho pneumonia. Ngo filed a claim with Gepalife, but the latter
denied liability on the ground that there was no contract between
the insurer and the insured and a binding receipt is NOT evidence of
such contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the binding deposit receipt, constituted a
temporary contract of life insurance.
Held:
NO.
The binding receipt in question was merely an acknowledgement on
behalf of the company, that the latters branch office had received
from the applicant, the insurance premium and had accepted the
application subject for processing by the insurance company, and
that the latter will either approve or reject the same on the basis of
whether or not the applicant is insurable on standard rates.
Since Grepalife disapproved the insurance application of Ngo, the
binding deposit receipt had never became on force at any time,
pursuant to par. E of the said receipt. A binding receipt is manifestly
merely conditional and does NOT insure outright. Where an
agreement is made between the applicant and the agent, NO
liability shall attach until the principal approves the risk and a
receipt is given by the agent.
20
The acceptance is merely conditional, and is subordinated to the act
of the company in approving or rejecting the application. Thus in
life insurance, a binding slip or binding receipt does NOT insure by
itself.
21
Concurring: J., Antonio
In a contract of insurance, each party must communicate to the
other, in good faith, all facts within his knowledge which are
material to the contract, and which the other has no means of
ascertaining. As a general rule, the failure by the insured to disclose
conditions affecting the risk of which he is aware makes the
contract voidable at the option of the insurer.
The reason for this rule is that insurance policies are traditionally
contracts uberrimae fidei, which means most abundant good
faith, absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty,
absence of any concealment or deception however slight. Here
the CA found that the insured deliberately concealed material facts
about her physical condition and history and/or concealed with
whoever assisted her in relaying false information to the medical
examiner. Certainly, the petitioner cannot assume inconsistent
positions by attempting to enforce the contract of insurance for the
purpose of collecting the proceeds of the policy and at the same
time nullify the contract by claiming that it was executed through
fraud or mistake.
NOTE: Art. 1332: When one of the parties is unable to read or if the
contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or
fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that
the terms thereof have been fully explained to him.
22
same was denied allegedly because at the time of Aleja's death, the
policy was not yet effective and the latter was, therefore, not
covered by insurance. Hence, the institution of this case and the
consequent promulgation of the decision by the lower court which
is the subject of the present appeal.
In denying plaintiffs-appellants' claim, the GSIS contends that
although Aleja became a permanent employee and entitled to
membership in the System 6 months after his original appointment,
or on January 8, 1959, yet as specified in the policy issued to him,
the same shall become effective only on February 1, 1959. And this
latter date was fixed in accordance with the provisions
of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended byRepublic Act 660, which
read:
SEC. 4. Scope of application of System.- (a) Membership to the
System shall be compulsory upon all regularly and permanently
appointed employees, including those whose tenure of office is
fixed or limited by law; upon all teachers except only those who are
substitutes; ... .
SEC. 8. (a) Compulsory membership insurance.- An employee whose
membership in the System is compulsory shall be automatically
insured on the first day of the seventh calendar month following the
month he was appointed or on the first day of the sixth calendar
month if the date of his appointment is the first day of the month:
Provided, That his medical examination, if required, has been
approved by the System.
23
right to constitutional guarantees of equality if it is not
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. To be reasonable, the
classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; must be germane to the purposes of the law; must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
each member of the class, under similar conditions. 1
In the instant case, it may be true that the disputed provision must
have been incorporated in the law to promote efficiency and
convenience in office procedure of the System. Taking into account
the volume of business that the System handles, the providing of
this measure which ultimately may redound to the benefit of the
members in the form of efficient and prompt service, cannot be
considered capricious or arbitrary.
Furthermore, it appears that the policy issued and accepted by Aleja
during his lifetime specifically provides that the effective date of the
insurance contract is February 1, 1959. Additionally, it is not denied
that the first premium on said insurance contract was deducted
from Aleja's salary only on January 31, 1959 or after his death.
Clearly, at the time of his said death, there was no existing contract
between him and the appellee GSIS, there being no consideration
for the risk sought to be enforced against the insurance system. The
offer of the latter to refund the amount collected after Aleja's
death, is proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court appealed from is
hereby modified in the sense that the defendant-appellee shall
return to the plaintiffs the amount deducted from the deceased's
salary in the form of premium. No costs. So ordered.
Areola vs. CA
G.R. No. 95641
24
Facts:
> Appeal consolidates two cases.
> Asia life insurance Company (ALIC) was incorporated in Delaware.
> For the sum of 175.04 as annual premium duly paid to ALIC, it
issued Policy No. 93912 whereby it insured the life of Arcadio
Constantino for 20 years for P3T with Paz Constantino as
beneficiary.
First premium covered the period up to Sept. 26, 1942. No
further premiums were paid after the first premium and
Arcadio died on Sept. 22, 1944.
> Due to Jap occupation, ALIC closed its branch office in Manila
from Jan. 2 1942-1945.
> On Aug. 1, 1938, ALIC issued Policy no. 78145 covering the lives of
Spouses Tomas Ruiz and Agustina Peralta for the sum of P3T for 20
25
years. The annual premium stipulated was regularly paid from Aug.
1, 1938 up to and including Sept. 30, 1940.
Effective Aug. 1, 1941, the mode of payment was changed
from annually to quarterly and such quarterly premiums were
paid until Nov. 18, 1941.
Last payment covered the period until Jan. 31, 1942.
Tomas Ruiz died on Feb. 16, 1945 with Agustina Peralta as his
beneficiary.
> Due to Jap occupation, it became impossible and illegal for the
insured to deal with ALIC. Aside from this the insured borrowed
from the policy P234.00 such that the cash surrender value of the
policy was sufficient to maintain the policy in force only up to Sept.
7, 1942.
> Both policies contained this provision: All premiums are due in
advance and any unpunctuality in making such payment shall cause
this policy to lapse unless and except as kept in force by the grace
period condition.
> Paz Constantino and Agustina Peralta claim as beneficiaries, that
they are entitled to receive the proceeds of the policies less all sums
due for premiums in arrears. They also allege that non-payment of
the premiums were caused by the closing of ALICs offices during
the war and the impossible circumstances by the war, therefore,
they should be excused and the policies should not be forfeited.
> Lower court ruled in favor of ALIC.
Issue:
May a beneficiary in a life insurance policy recover the amount
thereof although the insured died after repeatedly failing to pay the
stipulated premiums, such failure being caused by war?
Held:
NO.
Due to the express terms of the policy, non-payment of the
premium produces its avoidance. In Glaraga v. Sun Life, it was held
that a life policy was avoided because the premium had not been
paid within the time fixed; since by its express terms, non-payment
of any premium when due or within the 31 day grace period ipso
fact caused the policy to lapse.
When the life insurance policy provides that non-payment of
premiums will cause its forfeiture, war does NOT excuse nonpayment and does not avoid forfeiture. Essentially, the reason why
punctual payments are important is that the insurer calculates on
the basis of the prompt payments. Otherwise, malulugi sila.
It should be noted that the parties contracted not only as to peace
time conditions but also as to war-time conditions since the policies
contained provisions applicable expressly to wartime days. The
logical inference therefore is that the parties contemplated the
uninterrupted operation of the contract even if armed conflict
should ensue.
26
27
Establecido y convenido que el nombramiento de Gomez era de
temporero, la cuestion que tenemos que resolver essi al tiempo de su
muerte tenia tales cualificaciones quepodia ser considerado como
empleado regular y permanente para los efectos del cobro del importe de
su poliza de seguro por la beneficiaria. Decidimos que si, tenia tales
cualificaciones.
Resulta establecido en autos, sin discusion, que Gomez, acogiendose a las
disposiciones del articulo 672 del Codigo Administrativo tal como fue
enmendado por la ley del Commonwealth No. 177, se sometio a examen
de 2.ogrado enel servicio civil el 16 de Octubre, 1937, y fue aprobado
enaquel examen, si bien este favorable resultado no se anunciosino
despues ya de su muerte. Es obvio que los efectos de la aprobacion deben
retrotraerse a la fecha del examen. La prueba de la competencia, de la
idoneidad del examinando, se realizo antes de su muerte; por tanto, hay
que darle efectividad desde la fecha en que tuvo lugar laprueba. Hasta
parece superfluo que esto se discuta.
Sin embargo, se arguye que no cabe dar efecto retroactivo a la aprobacion
de Gomez en su examen, puesto que el articulo 663 (d) del Codigo
Administrativo Revisado, tal como ha sido enmendado, dispone que "a
period of trial service shall be required before appointment or
employmentis made permanent;" y es claro que Gomez, habien domuerto
despues del examen y antes de que su resultado seanunciara, mal pudo ser
sometido a dicho periodo de pruebapor 6 meses.
Esta manera de interpretar la ley tiene el defecto deser demasiado literal,
y "la letra mata (a veces), mientrasque el espiritu vivifica." Tengase en
cuenta que Gomez habia servido como tasador provincial delegado por 25
aos consecutivos hasta el dia de su muerte. Cuando portan largo tiempo
pudo superar la prueba de su competencia, en el ejercicio cotidiano de sus
deberes, hay que presumir que sus superiores estaban satisfechos de su
idoneidad. Por tanto, el periodo de prueba de 6 meses no rezabacon el.
28
maslos intereses legales desde la interposicion de la demanda, y las costas
del juicio. Asi se ordena.
Moran, Pres., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason ,
MM., estan conformes.
DECISION
BUTTE, J.:
29
the policies themselves, are made a part of the contract. The
applicant was examined on October 17, 1932, by Dr. G. Ocampo,
one of the physicians of the company. He was again examined on
December 28, 1932, by Dr. M. Llora, a physician of the company
sent out from the home office for that purpose. In connection with
his first application for policy No. 47726, among the numerous
questions with relation to specific diseases, the following questions
and answers appear in the report of Dr. Ocampo (Exhibit
B):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" Ha padecido V.2 alguna vez de las siguientes enfermedades . . .
del pulmon, pleuriesia, pulomia, asma? No.
" Ha escupido V. sangre? Por quecausa? No." No doubt is
raised as to the correctness of any other statements of the
applicant.
The report of Dr. Ocampo is a detailed account of the complete
examination made by him. Item No. 30 of his report is as follows:"
Encuentra V., despues de una cuidadosa interrogacion y
reconocimiento, algn sintoma de padecimiento actual o anterior . .
. de los pulmones? to which the doctor answered "No." Item 33 of
his report is as follows:" Ha revisado V. cuidadosamente todas las
contestaciones de este reconocimiento y esta V. seguro de que son
claras y completas?" to which the doctor answered "Si." Item 34 is
as follows:" Cree V. que los informes dados por le solicitante son
verdaderos y completos en todos los conceptos?" to which the
doctor answered "Si." Item 35 is as follows:" Recomienda V., como
representante fiel de la compaia, que se acepte este riesgo como
excelente, bueno, o que no se acepte?" to which the doctor
30
31
consider the death certificate signed by Dr. Tablante. This certificate
(Exhibit J) states that Suva died in the Chinese General Hospital of
Manila on September 23, 1933; that the cause of the death was
pulmonary tuberculosis; that the duration of the disease was one
year and five months. The source information of the latter
statement is not mentioned. Suva entered the hospital in August
1933, and the certificate itself recites that Dr. Tablante treated him
only from August 18, 1933, to September 23, 1933. The plaintiff did
not offer Dr. Tablante as a witness and none of the hospital records
were put in evidence. The statement of Dr. Tablante as to the
duration of the disease is apparently hearsay and, under the
circumstances, we cannot give that recital in the certificate of death
the conclusiveness which the plaintiff claims for it. (U.S. v. Que Ping,
40 Phil., 17.)
Felicidad Cruz appeals from that part of the judgment which holds
that the insured, Benito Patrocinio Suva, having renounced in his
application the right to change the beneficiary in policy No. 47726,
his wife, Isabel Simbulan, acquired a vested interest in the policy
which neither the insured nor the company could take from her
without her consent. The conclusion of the trial court is sustained
by our decision in the case of Gercio v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada (48 Phil., 53), and the American authorities therein cited.
(We think that the attempted change of beneficiary made by the
insured on August 16, 1933, and endorsed by the company on the
back of the policy on August 24, 1933, was due to a mutual mistake.
The application in which the insured, over his personal signature,
renounced the right to change the beneficiary, should prevail over
the printed phrase "WITH RIGHT OF REVOCATION" which occurs in
the policy. It is to be noted that the application itself is made a part
of the contract.
In view of the premises, the judgment is affirmed with costs against
the appellant insurance company as to the appellee Maria Narcisa
Suva and without special pronouncement as to costs in the appeal
of Felicidad Cruz.