Hoebel's Crucible: Information and Misinformation in Case Studies of Law

Author(s): Philip C. Parnell

Source: Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 6, No. 3/4, Historical Lessons for Contemporary
Problems (1982), pp. 379-398
Published by: Springer
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Law and HumanBehavior, Vol. 6, Nos. 3/4, 1982

Hoebel'sCrucible
Informationand Misinformationin Case Studies of Law
Philip C. Parnell*

The study of subgrouplaw throughrecordedand reconstructedcases presentsseveral analyticproblemsfor the

relationshipbetween case content and subgrouppractices.The greaterthe relative structuralstrengthof a social
system the greater the mythical content of its communicationsrelated to "outside" worlds. Constructing
structuralmodels of legal systems in contact, and typifying the informationcontent of cases in structural
situations, can inform analysis of case content as mythical, politically normative,or representativeof subgroup
behavioroutside of legal forums. Anthropologistsand Frenchstructuralhistorianscan work togetherto examine
structuralindicatorswhich signify analytic boundariesfor case analysis.

INTRODUCTION
One of the most perplexingproblemsof legal case analysislies in placing analytic
limitson documentedcase information.Establishinganalyticboundariesfor cases is
anespeciallypressingissue for studentsof the roleof law in societywho areinterested
in relationshipsamong case information,social patternsof behavior, and cultural
systemsof thought.How shouldthe analystgo aboutevaluatingthe reliabilityof case
informationas it relatesto behavioroutsidelegal forums?To whatextentdo actorsin
variouslegal forumsparticipatein makingor reinforcingmythandto whatextentdo
mythsconcoctedin themakingandenforcementof law influencechoicesmadeoutside
legal institutionsand processes?
Althoughsuch words as "extent" cannot be adequatelyoperationalizedthen
measured,relativedegreesof fit betweenbehaviorwithinandoutsidelegal processes
can be hypothesizedand tested for various types of legal systems. However, the
directionof legal studiesrendersgeneratingsuch hypothesesfrom availabledata a
morecomplicatedtaskthanthe volumeof datawouldsuggest.Studiesof linksamong
*Forensic Studies and Latin American Studies, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, Indiana47405.
379
0147-7307/82/1200-0379$03.00/0 ? 1982 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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PARNELL

380

systemsof controlacrosswhichthe informationwhichconstitutescase documentation

travelsarerarerby farthanthose studieswhicheitherplacelegal processesin detailed
but narrowsocial and culturalcontexts or which documenton a broad scale the
developmentof formalizedlegal systems over space and time.
Anthropologistsof law have studiedmost widely the links betweenlegal prochaveexplored
esses of smallergroupsandotheraspectsof grouplife. Anthropologists
links between law and society by placing law in context;and they have provided
detailedaccountsof law's contextsthroughholdingtightthe geographicandcultural
boundariesof individualstudies. Historiansof law, and less often anthropologists,
haveprovidedthe broaderaccountsof majoreventsin the developmentof centralized
stateand nationallegal systems. The anthropologisthas most often studiedthe lawways of subgroups,the historianthe largersystems of law which encompassthem.
Throughthe FrenchAnnales school of structuralhistory, the historianand the
aremovingclosertogetherthrougha commoninterestin subgrouplaw;
anthropologist
the historian,like the anthropologist,is narrowinganalyticboundariesin space and
time to obtaina closer look at humanbehavior.Yet the historianplacing subgroup
cases in social and culturalcontext faces a more limited field of methodological
optionsthanthe anthropologistof cultureswith living characters.The writtenword,
accountsfrommemory,andmaterialculturearethe foundationsof historicalcase data.
To a greatextent, these data are verbalizedor recordedby or for "outsiders."
In the field of law, writtenrecordsare most often producedby the largersocial
systemswhich encapsulatesubgroups.Historianswho study the law of subgroups
throughdocumentedcases are, in fact, studyinglegal systemsin contact.Overlapping
systemsof law cannotbe studiedin the same way as those which are autonomous.
Both anthropologistsandAnnaleshistorianswho use writtenand reconstructed
casesto studysubgrouplegal practicescan enrichtheirevaluationsof the relationship
betweencase information,social practices,and cognitive systems throughstudying
relationshipsamong case producers:among those who are parties to cases; who
recountthem;who recordthem;and, most importantly,amongthose who holdjurisof
dictionover cases which arisewithinthe subgroupswhich formthe infrastructure
the largersystems of law which recordand producethe bulk of documentedcase
information.
The following provides furtherdiscussion of some analytic problemsfacing
anthropologistsand historianswho wish to draw a relationshipbetween law and
societyon the basis of documentedandreconstructedcases. It also suggestsbuilding
structural
modelsof types of legal systemsin contact,with the goal of characterizing
the normativecontentof informationwhich travelsacross such systems. One such
modelis attemptedand the implicationsof similarfurtherattemptsevaluated.

"RECULERPOUR MIEUX SAUTER":

NARROWINGTHE MEANINGOF LAW
Thereliabilityof case datais directlyrelatedto two analyticdecisions:(a) what
political,geographic,cultural,and temporalboundariesare to confine the analytic
field, and(b) whatkindsof informationaboutlaw andlegal behaviorcantypesof case

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HOEBEL'S
CRUCIBLE

381

dataprovide?ManyAnnaleshistorians,like many social anthropologistswho study

law, favorthe smallerterritorialunit(Stoianovich,1976), forexample,a villagewhich
is a subunitof a largerpoliticalor culturalsystemof groups.Theyhaveaskedwhether
changeandstabilitywithina society's subgroupsproceedin responseto internalgroup
forces, independentof events in the largersociety, and how the culturalsystems of
subunitsundergochange or elaborationthroughthe daily workingof relationships
amongtheircomponentparts.
Annaleshistorianshave narrowedtheirunit boundaries,as did anthropologists
withtheriseof structural/functional
analysis(VanVelsen, 1967), in partto understand
largerencapsulatingsystems or nonsystemsthroughanalysisof theirparts, and, in
part,as a responseto an increasinginterestwithintheAnnalesschoolin structuralism,
functionalism,and the analyticinfluenceof ethnocentrism(Stoianovich,1976).
Structuralanalysisof social relationships,in one form, elicits rulesthatexpress
patternsof regularitiesamongsocial positionsand groups(Radcliffe-Brown,1952),
andrelatesthose patternsto types of purposivebehaviorsuch as economic,political,
andkin-relatedactivities(VanVelsen, 1967). Thoseruleswhichgovernrelationships
amongindividualsin specific types of social positionsmay be expressedas societal
ideals(or laws). Theirapplicationto daily life, or theirrelationshipsto practice,may
be furtherexaminedin cases of dispute(Epstein, 1967).
A functionalanalysisin the field of law, accordingto Hoebel(1954), "seeks for
the anatomyof empiricallyobservedsocial systems and the physiology of the dynamicsof the legal mechanismsthatare inseparablepartsof the functioningwhole"
(p. 6).
The relativistperspectiveinherentto structural/functional
analysisassumesthat
one field of activitycan only be understoodin relationto othercontingentor overlapping systemsof behaviorandthought.Gluckmanexplains, "If to understandfully a
case, we haveto be awareof social policies, values, idealnorms,rules, withinwhich
judgeshaveleewayor latitude,the approachto the studyof bothrulesandcases must
be froma studyof societyitself" (p. 619). He concludes,"We arecaughtin a circle,
in which law, it is true, can only be understoodthroughcases-but cases can be
understoodonly throughlaw, andbothhave to be set in the matrixof social process"
(p. 622).
Cases placed in context may providedata on a wide range of institutionsand
processes:the regularitiesof legal order(Epstein, 1967, p. 223), patternsof social
processes(Van Velsen, 1967, p. 141), patternsof intergrouprelationships(Epstein,
1967, p. 223), formsof judicialreasoning(Epstein,1967, p. 221), politicalcompetition and shiftingalliancesamonggroups(Turner,1957), and the processesthrough
whichbehavioralsystems are integrated.
Historicalstudiesof subgroupsencapsulatedby largersystemscan providevaluableinformationon how legal systemsandnonsystemsdevelop. Historyof subunits,
as opposed to "event"-based historical studies which span national epochs and
societallevels, allowsexaminationof "the principleof phenomenologicalrelativism,
or of the autonomyof phenomena,that is, of the existence of differentpatternsof
perceptionandbehaviorandof differentmindsets in differentsocieties" (Stoianovich,
1976, p. 34).
As Stoianovich(1976, p. 151)pointsout, reachingintothe infrastructure
of larger

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382

PARNELL

societies, especially non-Westernsocieties, increases a researcher'sawarenessof

ethnocentricbiases andprovidesself-descriptivedataon a society which may aid in
the implicationsof Westernanalyticcategoriesandassumptions.Inevicircumventing
the more
tably, the moreintricatethe detailon a group'ssystemicinterrelationships
thatgroup'suniquenesswill be revealed.
The assumptionthat subgroupsmay have a life and cultureindependentof or
differentfromthatpresentedor documentedwithinthe largersociety may alone free
researchfrom imposing Westernjurisprudentialassumptionsabout the integrative
forceof lawon a groupwhich,in practice,thought,or both,usespracticein thefield of
law to bluntthe force of nationalor regionallaws and legal institutions.
Moore(1978, p. 11) explains:
The conceptof law as a 'system," as a consistentbody of rules, is a professionalproductof some
anthropologistsas well as of lawyers . . .in such approaches. . ethnographicevidence was
selectively inspectedand interpretedto show as much as possible the existence of interconnected
situations . . and integratedculturalpatterns.

Anthropologists,as they beganto focus on social organizationratherthanstructure, developeda new viewpoint:thateven withinrelativelyautonomousand small
subgroupsindividualsmayface choiceswhetherto applythe normsor interestsof one
level of society-economic, political,or kin-related-ratherthanthose of anotherin
the enactmentof interpersonnelrelationships(Pospisil, 1971).
Ratherthan abstractingstatic rules on relationshipsas legal or social systems
anthropologists
began to examinethe processeswithinwhich contradictionsamong
normativesystemsin a culturalor politicalgroupwere expressedand managed.Van
Velsen(1967) explains, "We seek to relatethe deviationsfromstructuralregularities
of a social systemin termsof conflicting
of a differentorder,namelythe interpretation
norms"(p. 147).
Forexample,in small-scaletribalsocieties, differentrulesfromwithinthe same
systemof relationships,suchas kinship,maybe appliedto evaluatethe samebehavior
and "one is likely to find thatan individualhas a choice as to which particularkin
relationshiphe wishes to utilize, dependingon his objectivesin the particularsituations" (VanVelsen, 1967, p. 131). In any society, individuals,includingjudges, may
face the decisionwhetherto invoke ideal or pragmaticnormsin the managementof
relationships,to takea case to a specificallylegal institution,to avoida dispute,or to
seek managementthroughofficial thirdparties.Eachchoice may producea different
evaluationof the same behavior.
Patternsof choice, andthe frequencywithwhichlitigantsappealto specifictypes
of thirdparties-elders, religiousofficials,judges-will varyfromsocietyto society.
Estimatedratiosof generalfrequencyof use of legal institutionsto otherresponsesto
disputesandcrisesfor Westernsocietiesareincomparableto non-Westernsocietiesor
even to Westernsubgroups.Those factorswhich influencechoice makingvary over
time and space. Only broaderknowledge of patternsof choice among all remedy
agentscan providea reliablegaugeof the relativeimportanceof legal institutionsand
cases in the life of a group.Case statisticsdo not have the same meaningin different
systemsof law. Collier (1973, p. 254) explains:
All butthe most restrictedsocial fields offer potentiallitigantssome rangeof choice in managinga
conflict, and it is throughanalysis of the constraintsand incentives channelingindividualchoices
thatthe patternsof claims, proceduresandoutcomesobservableon each level areto be understood.

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HOEBEL'SCRUCIBLE

383

Some generalistshave providedusefulhypotheseswhich suggestuniversalrelationshipsbetweensocial structures,the choices they generate,andthe disputesettlementprocesses,suchas mediationandadjudication,whichtheydevelopandmaintain
(Felstiner,1974). However, currentresearchsuggests a wide rangeof flexibility in
processesfrom case to case and from society to society (Gulliver, 1979). Variation
existsnot only acrosssocietiesthatrepresentdegreesin size andtechnologicaldevelopment,butalso withinsocietiesthatare similar,be they small-scalesimplesocieties
or largecomplex societies (Naderand Parnell, 1982). It is now most productiveto
suggestthatidealprocessualtypes may have little relationshipto processualpractices
(see Gulliver,1979;Witty, 1980). Anthropologists,partiallyas theresultof the fertile
practiceof using bodies of extendedcases to test generalizationaboutstructureand
process,to relatenormsandrulesto practice,aremovingfromgeneratingprocessual
modelsto detailedstudyof variationwithinandacrossprocesses.Onceagainthey are
moving inwardin time and space in orderto place cases in more detailed social
contexts.
Anthropologistsare again enacting sentimentsvoiced by Van Velsen (1967),
"reculerpour mieuxsauter" (p. 146). Much of legal anthropologyis synchronized
with the movementsof those Annales scholarswho, influencedby an interestin
relativisticstructuralism
andfunctionalism,seek a "people's" history,
contemporary
one thatreconstructsbehaviorand thoughtwithin the geographicallyand culturally
anchoredcommunitiesaroundwhich nationstates have grown.
Narrowingthe spatiotemporalfield facilitatesmoredetailedstudyof how legal
practiceinfluencesthelocalbehaviorof nation-statelaw. However,therelativistfocus
on relationshipsamongsubgroupsystemsandthoughtcreatesproblemsforthe historianof law who, unlikethe anthropologist,mustrelyon writtencase studies,documents
often recordedwithinor underthe influenceof state legal systems. Historianswho
reachdeeply into the past cannot employ some approachesto the study of social
contextwhichanthropologistsoften practice-most importantlyobservation,participation,and interviews-which can establisha broadperspectiveon local behavior.
Historians,of course, have othermeansof placinglocal viewpointsand experiences in an analyticcontext.Those who rely solely on recordedcases may limit the
goals of analysisto behaviorwithinlegal institutions,assumingno relationshipbetweenstatementselicitedin disputemanagementprocessesandbehavioroutsidelegal
institutions.They may find anthropologicaldescriptionsof some elements of such
disputemanagementprocessesas negotiation,mediation,and adjudicationuseful in
relatingthe structureand the normativeand descriptivecontentof litigantand third
partystatementsto the stagesandgoals of processes.Historiansmaydefineprocessual
patternsandpatternsin case statementsas the regularitiesof legal procedureandthe
idealor pragmaticnormsof speakers,butto do so mustdrawon nonlegalmaterialsto
establisha relationshipbetween grouppracticesand behaviorin the legal forum.
Using writtenrecordsproducedwithin centralizedlegal and political systems
which generatecontactbetween participantsin local groups and those institutions
complicatesthe relationshipbetweenwrittendocumentationand practicefor several
reasons:(a) the natureof the systemicrelationshipbetweensubgroupsandcentralized
systemscannotbe assumed,andit mayvaryfromsocietyto societyandfromgroupto
group;(b) languageused withinthe centralizedsystemmay not be the daily language
of the subgroupand its word and idioms may vary in meaning across litigants,

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PARNELL

witnesses, and officials; (c) recordedcases alone are inadequateindicatorsof the

policies of documentation,that is, what is includedwithinand excludedfrom case
files, not to mentionthe relativeroles of official recordingerrors,time, andthe halo
effect in case documentation,all of which are best assessed throughobservation.
Furtheranalyticproblemslie in the fact thatvoicingnormsdoes not implya relationship betweenthose normsand practice.How normsare used is an aspectof group
culture(Comaroffand Roberts, 1977).
Priorunderstanding
of the relationshipbetweenrulesandpracticeis essentialto
the
evaluating reliabilityof case content.These relationshipscannotbe drawnfrom
of in-grouprelationshipsalone. An understanding
of the relationcase documentation
the
use
of
norms
in
between
ideal
and
norms,
cases,
practicemust precede
ship
formulationof assumptionsor hypothesesconcerningthe role of documentedcases in
the developmentof disputesand the lives of disputantsand theircommunities.

MOVINGFROM CASE CONTENTAND CONTEXTTO STATEMENTS

ABOUTNORMSAND PRACTICE
By categorizingcase contentas "rule" or "praxis," Gluckman(1973) reanalyzes a case drawnby Abel (1969) fromthe recordsof Kenyan"customary"courts
and informedby Abel's use of other sources on context. Gluckmanpresentsthis
exerciseto illustratethat "the backgroundof praxis-environmentalandecological,
a case as is
economic,social, etc., facts-properly analyzedis crucialto understanding
an
the
case
and
rules"
He
continues
with
of
aside
on the
(p. 635).
important
study
in
of
court
cases:
It
is
to
examine
analysis judgments Anglo-American
"illuminating"
"how far 'praxis,' whetherfactually accurateor as forensic presumptionsabout
'praxis,' enterinto the processof law" (p. 635).
Hoebel,discussing"projectiverecasting"of evidencewithincasesrelatedorally
frommemory,explains:
In the gross, we takecognizanceof the degree to which a culturesets up patternsof verbalizationof
norms.Wherethe tendencyis strong, we are morereadyto decreasethe discountrate. We attempt
to get a measurementof the degreeof developmentof mythfantasyin the culture.The morethereis
of this, the greaterthe caution needed in acceptance of case records.

Disputesettlementprocessesmayprovidecontextsforbothexpressiveandinstrumentalbehavior.Normativestatements,normativetales, andfactualstatementsabout
behaviorand practicemay dominatethese processes. Comaroffand
dispute-related
Roberts(1977, p. 79) have argued,"reportssuggestwide differencesin the degreeto
which norms are apprehendedand expressed" across societies which have been
studiedby anthropologists.CitingGulliver's(1963) descriptionof the Arusha,who
rely on normsexpresslyin the courseof a dispute,andFallers'(1969) descriptionof
the Soga, who seldom refer explicitly to normsin disputes,Comaroffand Roberts
explain, "The outcome of an Arusha dispute is rarely determinedby the single
applicationof one of the normsinvoked,whereasdecisionsin those amongthe Soga
demonstraterigid relianceon norms" (p. 79).
The Baralongboo Ratshidi,a southernTswanapeople amongwhom Comaroff
worked, varied in their use of norms from dispute to dispute, in some disputes

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HOEBEL'SCRUCIBLE

385

"expressly"employingthem in argumentand settlement,in othersinvokingnorms

"tacitlyby implication,"andin otherdisputesnot resortingto normsat all. Comaroff
andRoberts(1977, p. 79) concludethat across societies:
It is apparentthatno obvious universalrelationshipexists between the claritywith which abstract
norms are articulated,the way in which they are employed in argumentand their importancein
decision-making.

Whethersocial relationships,ratherthanwrittenlaws, referredto in case statementsare ideal, representative,allegorical,mythical,or factualstatementsmade in

processesof fact-finding,persuasion,or both, theymaybe importantelementsof case
analysis.Van Velsen (1967, p. 138) cites Devons (1956):
. . .although a formalrule of conduct, whetherin a businessconcern, in a voluntaryorganization,
or in the political field, may be ignoredin practiceandhave become myth, theoreticallythe rule is
still valid and part of reality.

Indeed,mythicalrelationshipsmaybe relatedto establisha normativecontext,or

parameters,for the goals of disputesettlementprocessesandmaybe the equivalentof
structuralgeneralizations.Dependingon the position of the speaker,statementsof
or signifiersof authority,may influencethe behaviorof
norms,as recommendations
disputantsandtheirrelationshipsto thirdparties.Thenormitselfmaybe less important
thanthe fact that it was stated.
However,analyticisolationof the role of normscontainedin documentedcase
informationand of their ideal and political componentsis a problemof available
resources.As Hoebel suggested, cases must be placed in the context of cultural
tendenciesin the oral andwrittenuse or presentationof events. It cannotbe assumed
thatall legal institutionsweave ideal andpragmaticnormsandfacts togetherin ways
similarto Anglo-Americancourts.
Barkun(1968, p. 92) defines law as
. . that system of manipulablesymbols that functions as a representation,as a model of social
structure.Its fact contentappearsat two levels. First, law contains statementsof modal behavior,
for it was from these that obligatory norms arose. Second, law contains perceptualcategories
through which events can be abstracted and similarly dealt with; it has the capacity for
generalization.

Collier (1973), drawingon Leach (1964, xiii), values Barkun'sseparationof

"law as a symbolsystem" fromthe behaviorfromwhichlaw is drawnandto whichit
is applied.She arguesthatthe structuresof verbalcategoriesmay arise solely from
those categoriesratherthanthe structureor "disorder"of events. Collierexplains,
"Separatingthe two allows roomfor inquiryinto the relationshipbetweenthem. One
canaskhow sequencesof actionaregiven the labelsof legal languageandhow the fact
of being labeledaffects futurebehavior"(p. 2).
Documentedcasespresentthelanguageof thelegal settingas well as thelanguage
of specializedsituationallegal roles. The structureof legal relationshipsestablishedin
rulesintertwineswith processualpatterns,litigantand thirdpartygoals and perceptions, and culturaland political practicesto producewords and sentencesas case
variableswhich, in theirinteractionalone, producepatternsof expression.The novelties andregularitiesof disputes,and case-madelaw, may be influencedas much by
variablesinteractingwithinthe legal forumas by the dailypracticesof individualswho

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PARNELL

arenotbureaucrats
in the
of law. Practicecanprovide(a) informationas it is structured
or
the
legalforum, (b) analyticcategoryfor case informationas myth,law, custom,or
whatevercategories may be chosen to relate the language of legal processes to
behavior.
The methodologicaldirectionin case-basedresearchon the relationshipsamong
context,norms, and practicewhich is inherentto the relativistictendencyis to dig
furtherinto the social andculturalcontextof law with the ethnographer's
tools. And
this tendencyforebodesthat unless the historianwishes to analyzethe influenceof
structureson contentwithinnonlegalsourcesof contextualinformalanguage/media
civil records,etc.-and
tion-diaries, journals,newspapers,novels, autobiographies,
to establisha culturallyconsistentrelationshipbetweenstructureand contentwithin
such records,Stoianovich'sgoal that historymight become a "science of man" is
doomedto exist solely within the writtenrecord.
Theremaybe a way to approachtheproblemless nihilisticallythannarrowingthe
spatiotemporal
scopeof studyandbroadeningtherangeof behaviorwhichslidesunder
the microscopeof analysis.The relationshipbetweenlaw and practiceis basicallya
questionof how law is integrated,if at all, withinsociety.Eventsthattakeplacewithin
specializedlegal institutionsarerelatedto practicethroughthe linksthose institutions
maintainto othersystemsof relationships.The formsandfunctionstheselinksaccrue
will influencethe impact of law on society and the role of informationin cases.
Analysisof such links may providean index of reliabilityin relatingthe information
contentof cases to practice.

INFORMATIONAS A COMPONENTOF STRUCTURES

AND PROCESSES
In the contextof movementfrom interestin social structureto interestin social
organization,legal anthropologistshave focused primarilyon the relationshipsbetweensocial structureandprocess. However,relationshipsbetweensocial structure,
includingstatementsof law; social organization,includingpracticeandstatementsof
practice;and case content, includinginformationin statementsmade by litigants,
witnesses, and thirdparties should assume greaterpriorityin anthropologicaland
historicalcase analysesof the role of law in society.
Withincases of breachdocumentedby informantsor legal institutions,case
processandcontentmay, over time and space, have little influenceone on the other;
but social form, or structure,may influencebothprocessandcontent.As mentioned
above, Gulliver(1979) has illustratedthat, in disputingprocesses,relationshipsbetweengoals, normativecontent,andprocessmayvaryover spaceandtimeandthatno
structural/processual
relationshipsareuniversal.However,scientistsof law
particular
havenotyet establishedthe absenceor presenceof relationshipsbetweenstructureand
the confluenceof contentand practice.
Stoianovich(1976) explains, "One formof functionalism,knownas formalism,
strivestowardan absolutedistinctionbetweenformandcontent,attributingintelligibilityonly to formandregardingcontentas a residuewithouta signifyingfunction"
(p. 184). Similarly, anthropologistsof law have often typified case statementsin

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HOEBEL'SCRUCIBLE

387

relationto processualstagesandgoals (Gibbs, 1963;Spradley,1970;Gulliver,1979).

In theseanalyses,wordsplay a lesserrole, in relationto outcomeandsocial function,
thanprocess,the structurallydefinedroles of participants,time, andnonverbalsymbols of social relationships.Wordsderive theirfunctionsfrom the regularizationor
of process.Spokeninformationis viewedas a contributionto the function
ritualization
of theprocessand,whateverthe information,its impactis determinedby the structural
relationshipamong participantsin the process and by processualsteps or stages.
Contentfollows form.
Information,however, may alter the relationshipof those patternsto practice.
Althoughinformationmaynotdisruptmanifeststructuresof relationshipsor processes
of disputemanagement,it may dissociate general structuresand ordinarydispute
settlementprocessesfromdailypractice.Informationmayfunctionto weakenthe role
of some law in society:the greaterthe contradictionsamonginformationprovidedin
dispute settlementprocesses, the interpretationof information,and practice, the
weakerthe impactof legal processeson social relationships.Legalprocessesmay be
used to strengthennormativecontradictionsratherthanto maintainthem, elaborate
them, or find compromisesamongtheircontradictions.Informationmay be used for
the same rangeof purposes.
Dispute settlementprocesses may provide forums for the expressionof daily
normsorthenormsof politicalpragmatism.Althoughlaw andpoliticsareintertwined,
the use of disputes in political relationships,and the political functionsof legal
systems, varies across societies, groups, and disputes. Generalknowledge of the
natureof the normativecontentof case information,especiallythe ideal andpolitical
componentsof that information,is essential to relatingcase contentand impactto
practice.

SAUTERPOUR MIEUX RECULER:EXPANDINGTHE

MEANINGOF LAW
How types of politicalandlegal superstructures
influencerelationshipsbetween
which
and
the
encapsulatethem is a critical questionfor
subgroups
legal systems
of
which
maintain
written
law and producedocumentedcases. In
analysis systems
centralized
the
these
systems,
specializationof legal agencies and roles creates an
institutionalcontextwhich, to varyingdegrees, may vie with practiceand pragmatic
normsin case processesand in the applicationof case outcomes.
How types of systemsof relationshipswithina society or groupare linkedand
integratedwill influencethe integrationof norms developed and expressedwithin
those systems as well as the overall culturalrelationshipbetween ideal norms and
practice.Inmanysmall-scalesocietieswhich,to theWesternmindandcomparatively,
may appearto be integratedsimply throughfrequencyof interactionand use of
commonsymbols, such degreesand correlatesof systemsintegrationare difficultto
ascertainandabstract.Social andculturalfactorsof integrationshineclearerin larger
systems, such as centralizedlegal and political systems which, to varyingdegrees,
encapsulateand integratea numberof subgroupswithin a largersuperstructure.
In these largersystemstherewill inevitablyexist nonsystemicrelationshipsand
degreesof integrationacrossandwithingroups,betweenthe infrastructure
generated

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388

PARNELL

within the relationshipbetween practice and culture and the superstructure

often
symbolizedwithinthe languagesof politics,law, andreligion.Throughstudyof larger
political,legal, and geographicalunitsit may be possibleto suggestandtest hypotheses concerningthe relationshipbetween linkage and integrationand norms and
practiceandto refine approachesto these hypothesesfor theirapplicationto smaller
analyticunits.It mayprovemoreproductiveto approachtheseanalyticissuesthrough
the principle sauter pour mieux reculer.

Centralizedlegal systemswhichproducespecializedlegal institutionsinfluence

practiceto the extentthatthey integratesociety'scomponentgroups,the writtenlaw,
andpositionswithinwrittenlaw systems.Two factorswhichinfluenceintegrationare
informationexchangeamongsocialgroupsandlegal institutions,andthe distribution
in legal processessuchas themaking,interpreof groupmembershipandparticipation
tation,andenforcementof law. Barkun(1968) argues,"the degreeto whicha worldof
groupsoverlapsin membershipwill in largemeasuredeterminethe corporatenessof
the groupsandthe intensitywith whichthey pursuetheirdivergentaims." Overlapin
membership,theexistenceof ties whichcross-cutgroups,will influencewhethertheir
aims divergeor converge(Nader, 1965; Van Velsen and Van Wetering, 1960).
Case informationassumesgreaterinfluencein the relationshipbetweenlaw and
practicein loosely integratedpolitico/legalsystemsthanin those in whichlegal rules
are embeddedin the matrix of daily interactionand reciprocity.The weaker the
integrationof law and society-the weakerthe links providedby such factorsas the
sharingof goals andlanguageandcross-cuttingties amongparticipantsin institutions
and groups-the more reliancelegal officials place on such factorsas information
elicitedin case processing,proceduralrules, and the principleswhich underlyideal
normsas theyassesstheproceduralstatusof a case andformulateits disposition.They
cannotrely on the force of practiceto bringlife to the writtenlaw.
In loosely integratedsystemsof law, legal officialswill experienceless abilityto
evaluatethe reliabilityof information,the relationshipbetweencontentandpractice;
anddisputantsandothercase participantsmay experiencegreaterlatitudein choice of
information
theyrender.The analyticpossibilityincreasesthatthe contentof information will be mythical,consciouslyformulatedto coincidewith principlesof mythical
ideal norms,at times law.
The assumptionthatnormsand the force of normsarerelativeto the contextof
relationsinternalto a group, an assumptionupheldin legal studieswhich have narrowedthe spatiotemporal
scope of analysis,impliesthatoutsideforces in the field of
law will be only poorly integratedinto group-basedlaw. Subgroupstudies have
thepointthatcentralizedstructuresof law thataresystemicon papermay
strengthened
become,in practice,nonsystems.For informationto be functionalacrossthe componentsof nonsystems,those that are not integratedinto a common social or cultural
or be treatedas misinformation,
distinctfromgroup
system,it mustbe misinformation
of
but
behavior
which
can
maintain
the
practice part exchange
nonsystemiccharacter
of the applicationof writtenlaw.
Two structureswhichtheninfluencethe informationcontentof cases are (a) the
structureof relationshipsamong levels of law and (b) the structureof relationships
amonggroupswhicharethe componentsof politico/legalsystems.Here,case content
is viewed in relationto the largerpolitical and legal environmentsof subgroups;

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studyingrelationshipsinternalto subgroupsas if they were isolatedwill not provide

factorsrelevantto thetypeof informationwhichtravelsoutsideof subgroups
important
andhow thatinformationis usedto manageintragrouprelationshipsandrelationships
amonglegal levels.
It may be useful to generatemodels of structuresof relationsin the field of law
from studies of legal systems which have a regional perspective,which consider
relationshipsamongnumbersof groupsand a commonpolitico/legalsuperstructure.
Analysisshouldrelatethesemodelsto the importanceof informationandmisinformationin themaintenanceof whatlaw does anddoes notdo. Generatingsuchmodelsmay
directattentionto those links amonginstitutionsandgroupswhichinfluencerelationships amonglaw, information,and practice.
Barth(1966, p. 30) states:
We have been altogethertoo ready in social anthropologyto produce special explanations for
everything, in the form of appeals to the culturallyunique and specific backgroundfor every
variationof characteristicswe observe. Instead, I hold it might be the object of our analysis to
reducethis appeal to uniquenessto a minimum, and rathersee how a few specialized differences
are necessaryand sufficient to explain, or generate, the gross differences in social form which we
observe.

Barth'sargumentrequiresmediation.As analystsof law limitthepoliticalboundaries of theirresearchfields, they will inevitablystrengthentheir argumentsto the
importanceof context,the situationsof group-basedpractices,in analyzingthe role of
law in society. Their abilities to explain, throughdata, how groups maintainthe
autonomyof theirsystemsof relationshipswill, however,weaken.A responseto this
weaknessis to arguefrompreferenceratherthanto formthe importanceof small-scale
relativismandto arguea naturalrelationshipbetweenrelativisticstudiesandhomogehasbeenrelatedto socialandculturalhomogeneity.
neousgroups,justas structuralism
However,it is bestto specializeresearchtools in relationto the developmentof social
systems,for some analyststo move inwardand othersto move outwardat the same
time, andfor all to relatetheiranalysesto evaluatingthe influenceof a wide rangeof
socialandculturalcontextson the relationshipsbetweenlaw and society. Otherwise,
the hypothesesof relativistscan never be tested.
Modelsarebuiltto be tested. A few examplesfromthe literatureon legal systems
illustratehow structuresof relationshipsin the field of law, the generaldynamicsof
interlevelrelationships,may providegeneralguidepostsfor evaluatinghow information which travels across those levels may be used, and how use influences the
relationshipsbetweencase information,normativecontent, and practice.
Here,the largerquestionis: How can we discoverthe politicalandlegal meaning
of wordsvoicedin disputesettlementprocesses,thatis, the intentionof the speakerto
contribute"facts" or to mislead, to express sincere regret or cooperation,or to
conformas an actorwith proceduralexpectationsin orderto reacha goal in conflict
with the ends of legal procedure?
Do wordsso tied that they form sentenceshave an a priori relationshipto the
subjectsandactionstheyinterrelateto the extentthatsentencesvoicedin a legal forum
canbe related,withoutobservation,to any behaviorotherthanthatwhichtakesplace
withinthe legal forum?Answersto thesequestionslie in findingmeansto placelimits
on the analyticprocessof interpretation.

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PARNELL

A DUAL SYSTEMSMODELIN A LEGALFIELD

It is suggestedabove that models of legal systems can point out those factors
which influencethe relationshipbetween law and practice-the type of symbiotic
relationshipsthat exist between law and behaviorand between the practitionersof
writtenlaw and actors in their jurisdictions.The presenceor absence of specific
factors,or combinationsof them, indicatewhat validity can be attributedto case
information.
Barkun(1968) appliesa modelsuggestedby Falk(1959) to comparisonof issues
in international
law andlaw in statelesssocieties"organizedaccordingto the principle
of segmentarylineage" (Barkun,1968, p. 24). He distinguishes"unicentric"and
"multicentric"structuresof relationshipsamonggroupsin the analyticfield. Unicentricstructures
develop"vertical"systemsof law andmulticentricstructures"horizontal" systems of law. In a multicentricsociety power is distributedamong "many
autonomousgroups" or "multiple loci"; in a unicentricsocial system power is
centralizedand generatesa hierarchicalrelationshipamong groups. Barkun(1968)
social structureis morehighly integrated
states, "By definition,a unicentric/vertical
structure"(p. 44). The multicentricsocietyconsistsof
thana multicentric/horizontal
"zonesof integrationandzones of conflict. . . the legal systemfunctionsdifferently
in differentzones" (p. 52).
distinctionfour models of
It is possibleto generatefrom the vertical/horizontal
writtenlegal systems,andperhapsmore,althoughno legal systemcanbe eitherpurely
verticalor purelyhorizontal:(a) the verticalwrittensystemin which the structureof
relationsamonggroupsis unicentric,no matterwhattypesof groupsor levels of law it
integrates;(b) the horizontalwritten system establishedto maintainan equitable
distributionof power and responsibilityin the field of law among its component
groups,one which is decentralizedin law; (c) the verticalwrittensystem which, in
practice,is horizontalas a resultof the overlappingof a unicentricsystemof law anda
multicentricsocial structure;and(d) the horizontalwrittensystemwhichis verticalin
practiceas a resultof the overlappingof a multicentricwrittensystemwitha unicentric
social structure.
Types(c) and(d) aboveareduallegal systems,ones in whichlaw andpracticeare
not merelyout of step but are distinctivelydifferent.The languageof law in such
systemswill not be predicatedto expresspracticesotherthanthose of legal institutions. Casesmayrecordthe mythicalandceremonialnatureof writtenlaw. Theymay
representcompromisesbetweenthe writtensystemof law andthe groupsor levels of
law whichit organizesin writingbutdoes not representor recognizein writing.Cases
fromanyof the abovetypesof legal systemsarelikely to representmovementtoward
one of the structuraltypes or oscillationsbetween structuraltypes, in type (c) for
example,oscillationsproducedby tensionbetweenthe verticalstructureof law andthe
horizontalstructureof practice.
Segmentarylineage systems in stateless societies are, accordingto Barkun
(1968), multicentricsystems with horizontallegal structures.In segmentarylineage
systems, interactionand conflict appearto be related in three differentways: as
interactionincreasesintegrationincreases;as interactionincreasesthe frequencyof

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HOEBEL'SCRUCIBLE

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conflict increases;and, as interactionincreasesthe intensityof conflict decreases.

Barkun(1968, p. 52) states:
As we move outwardinto areasof increasedperceiveddistancefromourcenter, contactsdiminished, and with them the excuses for conflicts. In such settings, conflicts rarely begin, but, the
evidence tends to show, they are exceedingly intense and exceedingly difficult to de-escalateafter
they have begun. The legal system is requiredless, but its capacity is strainedin instances that
requirethe legal system.

Disputesbetweenindividualsexpandintodisputesamonggroupsalonga princiof
ple corporateresponsibilityand "generally,fightsexpanduntilthe forcesengaged
areroughlyequivalent"(Barkun,1968, p. 21). Severalfactorscharacterizedispute
developmentin this multicentricsystem:Frequencyof interactioninfluencesthe exandintergroupdisputes,withmostdisputesremainingin groups
pansionof intragroup
and few expandinginto the largersystem of grouprelationships.Disputesgrow in
intensityas they expandto includeothergroups,anddisputeswhich expandinto the
largersystemof intergrouprelationsare the most difficultto manage.
It also appearsthatintegrationof interestsis highestwhereinteractionis highest
or social distanceis perceivedto be shortenedby common interestsand identity.
Factorsthatinfluenceinteraction,suchas topographyof the land,physicalproximity,
andperceivedproximity(Barkun,1968), then also influenceintegration.Integration
amonggroupsis highestwhereinterestsare perceivedto be similarandinteractionis
nothinderedby physicalbarriersor customaryruleson the maintenanceof boundaries
amonggroups.
As disputesin a multicentricsystemexpandoutsideof areasof frequentinteractionamongindividualswho perceivethemselvesto be sociallyclose, politicalrelationshipsandconflictsof interestamonggroupsbecomeincreasinglyimportant.Similarly, disputinglanguagewill increasein its politicallynormativecontent,thatpertaining
to relationshipsamong groupsratherthan individuals,or the languagewill simply
expressdirectlythe dynamicsof intergroupratherthanin-grouprelationships.Where
integrationis lowestthe ideallegal andpoliticalcontentof the languagethroughwhich
disputesareenactedwill increasewhenthosedisputesarisewithinsmallerunitsof the
largersystem. The language of disputingwill be furtherremoved from in-group
whereideals and
practiceand will expressideals in thatcontextof interrelationships
most
distinct.
are
practice
Collier(1973) has studiedlaw withinZinacantecoIndiansettlementsin the state
of Chiapas,Mexico, and has describeda system which approximatesa multicentric
social structureencapsulatedby a verticalsystem of writtenlaw, one in which the
above dynamicsof the multicentricsystem may influencethe developmentof the
writtensystemwhich, withinits institutions,is generallynot responsiveto subgroup
practices.
Lawwithinthe statehasbecomemulticentricas a resultof Zinacantecochoicesin
the managementof theirdisputes.Mostoften, they chooseto managedisputeswithin
smallersettlements,all referredto hereas villages, whereinteractionamongindividualsis frequentandinterestsandidentitiesareperceivedto be most similar.Although
theoptionto takea disputeto staterunlegal institutionsis alwaysavailable,it is rarely
exercised.

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PARNELL

Zinacantecochoices to maintain,in practice, a horizontallegal system in the

verticalwrittenlaw environmentare influencedby several "misunderstandings"
in
communicationbetweenauthoritiesof writtenstatelaw andZinacantecos.One source
of misunderstandings
is language:the Zinacantecolanguageis Tzotzil and the lanof
state
is Spanish. Collier (1973, p. 41) explains, "even
institutions
guage
legal
carefultranslationproducesdistortions."
Anotherculturalsourceof misunderstanding
lies in namingpatterns,"to which
Mexicanauthoritiesare not responsiveor 'wise' " (Collier, 1973, p. 41). The Zinacantecosystem"allows one personto be identifiedby severalnamesand,conversely,
a single 'legal' namein the Spanishpatterncanbe appliedto severalpersons"(p. 42).
Collierillustrateswith the following cases:
Onecontroversialleaderwho hadbeen accusedof murderunderthreenames ... "proved" thathe
was not the wanted man by producinga birthcertificategiving his name in the Spanish fashion,
with his mother'ssurnameat the end. In anothercase a man accusedof murderwas freedwhen the
corpse of his supposed victim could not be firmly linked to a single name (p. 42).

Two other sources of misunderstandings

are (a) perceptionof purposein the
processof disputemanagementwhichis relatedto (b) local andstatestyles of managing disputes.Zinacantecosattemptto achievea compromiseamongdisputants;courts
of writtenlaw are orientedtowarddeterminingguilt and innocence. The "facts"
presentedby Zincacantecosto state legal officials may be relatedless to the dispute
thanto the desireto achievea favorablecompromisethroughbargainingdownclaims
andcharges.
WrittenMexican state law presentsdiffering conceptionsof causality in the
namingof criminalcases thanthosewhicharepartof Zinacantecoculture.Differences
betweenstatecase recordcontentandpracticeare illustratedwell by a case involving
deathresultingfromfright. Collier(1973, p. 41) explainsthata Zinacantecofamily
wentto a regionalstatecourtto accuseseveralmenof breakingintotheirhouse. Three
days afterthe break-ina child in the family died. Zinacantecosbelieve that "severe
frightcan cause soul loss leadingto death"andthe familywas "essentiallyaccusing
the attackersof murder."The deathwas mentionedseveraltimes in courttestimony,
butwasnotincludedin finalcourtrecordsof thecase. Thecase was labeledandtreated
as damageto another'spropertyand the suspectswere released. Authoritiesnever
questionedthe family aboutthe child's death.
It is doubtfulthe findingof innocenceby writtenlaw authoritieshadmucheffect
on the relationshipbetweenthe litigants,if not thatof increasingthe intensityof the
of the informationpresentedmaintained,if not increased,
dispute.Misunderstanding
thedistancebetweenwrittenlaw andpractice.Thecase recorddidnotindicatethatthe
crux of the disputewas "fright."
In Chiapas,the paucityof Zinacantecocases in courtrecordsrendersthe relationbetween
writtenlaw andsubgroups,or otherlevels of law, fairlyclear;althoughit
ship
offerslittleindicationof otherways to interpretcases thatareavailable.Courtdockets
andcasesareunreliablerecordsof disputesthatactuallytookplaceor of the frequency
with which varioustypes of disputesarose within villages.
As cases developin multicentricsystems, such factorsas the absenceof interaction amonggroups,interactionbetweengroupsandthe largersystemof relationships
whichencapsulatesthem,perceivedsocialdistanceamonggroupsandrepresentatives

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393

of largerstructures,and culturaldifferencesinfluencecase contentin a numberof

ways. They increasethe politicalnormativecontentof cases whichincludethe larger
structuresof law, decreasethe "factual" contentand the importanceof "facts" in
thosecases, decreasethereliabilityof writtenrecordsas indicesof disputefrequencies,
in the processingof cases and in the
and increase the role of misunderstanding
recordingof cases, be it throughmemoryor writtenrecords.In relationto practice,
case recordsare likely sourcesof misinformationaboutsubgrouppractices.
Case recordsin verticalsystemsof law thatencapsulatemulticentricsocial systemsmaynot be clearindicatorsof the duality.As mentionedearlier,misinformation
may be used to maintainthat duality, a version of "renderingunto Caesarwhat is
Caesar's,"withoutlettingCaesarknow thatit is counterfeit.Parnell(1979, n.d.) has
also studieda dualMexicanlegal system, one thatis verticalin writingandhorizontal
in practice,for it encapsulatesa multicentricsocial structure.Withinthis system of
law, locatedin Oaxaca,Mexico, andincluding41 ZapotecIndianvillages, officialsof
writtenstatelaw initiate,at times, case ex oficio. They travel,at times, to villages to
initiatecivil cases. Villagerswho are allies of the stateprovidethem, at times, with
case information.
Thetotalof 43 districtvillageshosta populationof approximately
35,000. During
theyears1963to 1973around40 cases wereinitiatedeachyearin the statecourtof first
instancewhich holds jurisdictionover those villages, but many more were takento
statelegal officials and were managedwithoutenteringinto courtrecords.Headsof
state agencies used, at times, a system of sharingcases. Also, court investigation
frequentlyproducedextensive records, includingdescriptivetestimonyby litigants
and witnesses.
Thedynamicsof thatsystemaretoo variedfor presentdiscussion,butthe system
can be generallycharacterizedby factorsdiscussedabove in relationto multicentric
socialstructureswithinverticalwrittenlegal systems. Culturaldifferencesandpolitical competitionfor jurisdictionin the field of law dominatedrelationshipsbetween
villagesandinstitutionsof the writtenlaw. Thosecases thatdevelopedto includestate
institutionsintroducedpolitical norms into dispute settlement.But, in this system,
thosenormswere, at times, expressedcovertlythroughthe languagepatternsof legal
institutions.Villages had developedthe abilityto providecogent cases which maintainedthedualityof thelegal system,just as a lawyermightmanagestyle in courtroom
proceedingsin orderto win a case. In the Mexicancontext, a village won a case that
involvedjurisdictionalconflictthroughprovidingproceduralclosureto officialsof the
writtenlaw.
In small social systems, such as tightly knit subgroupsof larger structures,
individualsmayshareknowledgeof thepragmaticworkingsof thelaw in the sameway
thata lawyerknowsthe courtroom.If law is a subjectof culturalinterest,all members
of the subgroupmay be expertsin the law of the groupand the rules in intergroup
relationships.Culturaldifferencesmay producethe sameresultwithoutintensesocial
interaction:
insider/outsider
rulesbecomethe culturalloreof identitygroups.The role
of thatlore in the field of law may be strengthenedby symbolizationof identitiesand
intereststhroughculturalmarkingssuch as language,dress, and behavioralstyle.
WithintheOaxacandistrict,providingmisinformation
to the statewas a subgroup
strategyfor maintaininglegal duality,or the multicentricsocial structureandhorizon-

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PARNELL

tal legal systemwithina verticalsystem of law. Providingmisinformationinvolved

controlover the travel of informationfrom one group to another-misinformation
requiredno clarification.
Some villages are more capablethanothersin the controlof information.The
abilityto controlinformationwas directlyrelatedto abilityto maintainthe separation
of writtenlaw and practiceand assertlocal authorityin the field of law.
An importantelementin the maintenanceof the dual legal system was village
structure.Village structurewas directlyrelatedto abilityto controlthe flow of information,andthe typeof informationthatflowed, outsidevillageboundariesto the state
legalsystem.Table1 illustratestherelationshipbetweenvillagestructureandinformation control.Those villages which have greatercontrol over informationare more
capableof providingmisinformationto state legal institutions.
As Table 1 indicates,there are severaltypes of village structures.Convergent
villages host populationswhich are predominantlymixturesof migrantsfrom other
villages.Mostsettlein thesevillages for economicreasons,suchas scarcityof landor
employmentin theirnativevillages, or for politicalreasons.Convergentvillageshave
a relativelylow potentialforcohesionbecauseof thehistoryof competitiveandhostile
relationshipsamongthe nativevillagesof migrantsandbecauseof culturaldifferences
amongmigrants.These factorsweakeninformationcontrol.
Severalfactorsgeneratedecisionsamongthe populationgroupsof the stratified
convergentvillage: descent, place of birth, political allegiance, and occupational
heterogeneity.Occupationaland politicaldifferencesoverlapwith differencesbased
on descentandplaceof birth.Thisoverlapmilitatesagainstthe developmentof crosscuttingties amongpoliticalgroups;those groupsdevelopmutuallyexclusive leadership structures.Controlover informationflow in intergroupconflicts is relatively
weak.
The synthesizedconvergentvillage has experiencedan influx of migrantsin
searchof landandrefugefrompoliticalproblems.Thereis occupationalhomogeneity
and villagershave not organizedthemselves into groups based on place of birth.
Villagersareled by alignedpoliticalbosses. Controloverinformationflow is relatively strong.
The historicalconvergentvillage was developedby migrantsand continuesto
acceptoutsiders.It, however,has a populationbase whichhas enduredover generaTable 1
Village Structure

Village Leadership

Tendency to Appeal

a. Stratifiedconvergent
village
b. Synthesizedconvergent
village
c. Historicalconvergent
village
d. Divergentvillage
e. Homeostaticvillage

Nonaligned political bosses

Appeal to state

Aligned political bosses

Village control

Representativeelected officials

Village control

Representativeelected officials
Political bosses

f. Homeostaticvillage
g. Dualistic village

Elected officials
Nonaligned political bosses

Village control
Village control
with appeal
Village control
Appeal to state

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HOEBEL'S
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395

tions. It is structurally
homeostaticandis not factionalizedon the basis of population
Ties
groupings.
amongindividualscross-cutits groups.Its leadershipis an elected,
representative
government(see Nader, 1964, p. 208). Controloverinformationflow is
very strong.
The divergentvillage is one which has spawnedsmallervillages. These "new"
villageshavebeen formedby occupantsof largervillageswhichhavesplit awayfrom
theirnativevillagesbecauseof overpopulation,politicaldifferences,orthe scarcityof
landclose to the village nucleus.The potentialfor dissensionwithinthese villages is
lessenedwith the exodusof residentsto formnew settlementswhich, in practice,are
autonomous.Controlover informationflow is relativelystrong.
The residentsof homeostaticvillages are united by cross-cuttingties (Nader,
1964) whichtend to controldissensionwhich mightthreatenthe village's cohesiveness. Homeostaticvillagesareunitedundereithera politicalboss or an electedvillage
government,or both. Powerfulpoliticalbosses withinhomeostaticvillagescontrolall
writtencommunicationsbetweenthe villages and state agenciesthroughtheircommandof Spanishas well as theirpoliticalpower.Theyappointalliesto positionswithin
villagegovernments.Thereis little movementinto the village. Controlover information flow is relativelystrong.
The dividedvillage consistsof two basicallyendogamousneighborhoodswhich
arealso politicalfactionsled by politicalbosses who arenot aligned.The villagehas a
nonrepresentative
government.Controlover informationflow is relativelyweak.
As Table1 illustrates,therelativetendencyto appealcasesto writtenlaw courtsis
directlyrelatedto the abilityof villages as politico/legalunitsto controlinformation
flow beyondvillage boundariesand into "outside" institutions.All villages, on the
basisof cultureandlaw, arepoorlyintegratedinto the statelegal system;all compete
with the statefor jurisdictionin the field of law. Tendencyto appealis also directly
relatedto abilityto providemisinformationto statelegal institutions.The probability
thatrecordedcases, even thoserecordedin the village, will containmisinformationis
greaterfor thosevillageswhichtendnot to appealcases to the statethanfor thosewith
a tendencyto appeal. However, even those with a tendencyto appealmay act out
politicalconflictsin appealedcases. For all villages, it is probablethat information
exchangein cases will be used to expresspoliticalnorms;informationmay express
politicalpracticeswithinthe idiom of disputerelationships.
Withinthe largernonsystemiccontextof dual legal institutions,severalfactors
appearto influencethe abilitiesof subgroupsto controlinformationandto supply,to
the largersystem, misinformation.These factorsare relatedto the developmentof
subgroupsocial structureseffectivein social control.They includegeographicmobility, availabilityof land, patternsof descentand marriage,the developmentof crosscuttingties amongthe units of subgroups,occupationalhomogeneity/heterogeneity,
andthe degreeto whichthose factorsoverlapwith politicaldifferencesandleadership
structures.
The structuralprinciplewhich applies to informationcontrol within the dual
Mexicanlegal system is similarto the principleof "parityof forces" describedby
Barkun(1968). Informationwhich accuratelydepicts a disputeceases to enterinto
statelegal institutionswhen those structuralfactorswhichcontributeto village cohesiveness influencedisputantsand other villagers to assert allegianceto the village

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PARNELL

ratherthanchallengevillage authorityandjurisdictionthroughopting for the state.

These factors, strengthenedby topographyand culture, provide villages structural
can musterthroughapplying
strengthgreaterthanthatwhichstatelegal bureaucracies
limitedsocial and politicalresources.
As in the duallegal system, every systemof law has two institutionalstructures:
thatwhich exists in writingand that which develops within the patternsof choices
madeby participantsin legal institutionsand processes. The structurethatdevelops
throughpracticemay, in relationto writtencodes, appearto be nonsystematic;however, patternsof choice that endureover time and space may representwrittenlaw,
procedural,substantive,or both, mythicalnormsand guidelines.
Thecontentof case informationwieldsthegreatestinfluencein duallegal systems
in whichwrittenlaw andlegal practicecoexist withina symbioticrelationshipbased
moreon whatthe writtenlaw does not do thanon what it does. Maintenanceof the
structureof legal practicemay dependon the maintenanceof writtenlaw as mythand
the maintenanceof procedurewithin institutionsof writtenlaw as ceremonial.
In dual legal systems officials of the writtenlaw have a weakenedability to
distinguishbetween informationand misinformationor to engage in maintenance
activitiesby not attemptingto make such distinctions.Misinformationis functional
withinthe dualisticstructure;informationis disruptiveto the symbioticrelationship
betweenlaw andpractice.In duallegal systemsall informationwhichentersinto the
facilitatedby
writtenstructuremay becomemisinformation
throughmisinterpretation
theseparationof writtenlaw andpractice.Recordedinformationbecomesmisinterpretationof practice.

CONCLUSIONS
The relationshipsbetween law and practicemay have greaterlimits than the
relationshipsbetween law and culture. These limits exist within the structuresof
societies.The greaterthe relativestructuralstrengthof a social systemthe greaterthe
mythicalcontent of its communicationsrelatedto "outside" worlds. Analysis of
subgroupstructuresand structuralcorrelatescan indicatepossible relationshipsor
continuitiesamong subgrouppractices, cultures, and communicationsto and with
outsiders.
The aboveanalysissuggeststhatthe morehomogeneousa groupthe morelikely
its communications
with regionalor centralizedsystemsof law will containinformation aboutlocal practiceswhich is mythicalor politicallynormative.But common
cultureis not alone an indicatorof homogeneityin the fields of law and politics.
Commonplace of birth, intermarriage,economic exchange, and other sources of
cross-cuttingties amongthe social componentsof subgroups;the availabilityof ecological and social resourceswhich can sustain the subgroupstyle life or provide
nondisruptive
optionswhen resourcesare scarce;local continuitiesin the social and
culturalhistoriesof subgroupresidents;the relationshipamongvalues, beliefs, and
practicesin thedistributionof economicresourcesandpower;andsubgroupparticipationin the legal andnonlegalinstitutionsof "outsiders"will influencethe strengthsof
subgroupsocial structures.The behaviorthroughwhichthatstrengthis expressed,in

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HOEBEL'SCRUCIBLE

397

relationto the structuralstrengthsandpracticesof regionalor centralizedlegal institutions, will regulatethe types of informationcontainedin cases thattraveloutsidethe
subgroupas well as the "representative"qualitiesof those cases.
It wouldthereforebe analyticallyuseful for anthropologistsand historianswho
utilizerecordedandreconstructed
cases of law in orderto studysubgrouplaw, culture,
andbehaviorto place theircases in the analyticcontextof the contactsituation-to
develop a study of the flow and contentof informationin communicationsacross
systemsof socialcontrol.Thesestudiescouldbe generalizedas structural
typifications
of systemsin contactandtypificationsof informationcontentas it developsin typesof
structuralsituations.Models so constructedand tested would informwhat are now
assumptionsaboutthe integrativeforceof law andthe integrativepotentialsof typesof
legal systems.
Equallyas important,thosewho move outwardto contactsituationsin the region
or statecanprovideaddedstrengthor usefulqualificationsfor the studiesof thosewho
move inwardto examinethe relativityof law-ways. Each is a valid approachto the
studyof law-ways, but the validity of both approacheswill increaseas they move
together.

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