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Yulia Greyman
Literature and Medicine, Volume 30, Number 2, Fall 2012, pp. 378-382
(Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/lm.2012.0021
Access provided by University College London (UCL) (10 Nov 2014 14:35 GMT)
378
Blakey Vermeule. Why Do We Care about Literary Characters? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. 296 pp. Hardcover, $62.00;
Paperback, $30.00.
In her recent book, Blakey Vermeule poses a provocative question
right out of the gate with her title: Why Do We Care about Literary
Characters? If we stop to think before we start to read her book, it
doesnt make much sense that we respond emotionally to characters
who we know arent real. So why do we care? Vermeules general
answer is that literary characters are tools to think with (245)that
they teach us how to develop our mind-reading abilities, how to detect cheaters, and how to navigate the ins and outs of coalitions and
manipulative social systems. Socially, in other words, reading fiction
is good for us. Vermeules theories about the purpose of literature,
which draw on cognitive science and evolutionary psychology, may
dismay traditional humanists because they value literature for its utility
rather than its art, but they are worth considering if we are to keep
the Humanities alive and relevant in an age where every academic
subject must constantly justify its use.
The care in Blakeys Why Do We Care about Literary Characters?
is twofold: it refers to both attention and empathy. First, why do we
give our timea precious and limited resourceto people we know
do not exist? Second, why do we care about them if, unable to care
about us, they cannot provide a return on the investment of our affections? The book poses these questions to the mind sciences as well
as to literary theory, engaging with the work of literary critic Lisa
Zunshine on theory of mind and levels of intentionality, cognitive
psychologist Steven Pinker on literature as a space for exploring and
resolving hypothetical problems, and literary Darwinist Joseph Carroll
on the arts as an emotional compass. As a work of literary criticism,
Why Do We Care about Literary Characters? is grounded in eighteenthcentury British literature, but it expands its scope to find evolutionary
threads throughout a wide range of narratives, from Homers The
Iliad to Curious George. Vermeule sets out to explore exactly what
functions narrative serves and what those functions reveal about how
our minds work. She maintains that our minds are of ancient stock
(xiii) and the world around us has not succeeded in changing them:
The sheer profusion of narratives in all known human cultures suggests that storytelling is a human universal, that it has a function,
and that it is a human necessity (161). Vermeule sees literature as
more than just a pleasurable pastime or a byproduct of other sets of
Book Reviews
379
380
necessary and rather anxious pastime (9). The novel was fueled by
these anxieties: with its tropes of kind-hearted and gullible characters
deceived by rakes and liars, the early novel discourages blind faith
in other people. Instead, it shows readers how to develop the social
competence necessary for survival in their new environment.
Ultimately, the most useful habit of mind is one Vermeule calls
Machiavellian. With this term, she connects her work to Nicholas
Humphreys Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis, which holds that
the complexities of social groups have been more influential on the
evolution of human intelligence than nonsocial environmental problems
(3031). In other words, the problem of other minds puts a greater
stress on our intellect than questions of how to get food or shelter.
Our survival depends on orienting ourselves with respect to others,
negotiating for status and resources at every turn. Literature, which
teaches us how to navigate social environments, is thus a survival
toolkit, and its most important tool is mind reading, especially skeptical
mind reading. Vermeule stresses that, in the modern world, the most
important internal state to identify is that of a fraud. We think deeply
about fictional people so that we can improve our interpretation of
real-life people, guessing at their motives, determining whether they
mean us harm, and planning our interactions with them accordingly.
Machiavellianism, or social intelligence, is an incredibly powerful
source of literary interest because it is an incredibly powerful source
of human interest (31). We want to understand human cognition
because our social lives, and by extension our survival, depends on it.
In terms of the mind-reading benefits of reading fiction, Vermeule
engages with the work of Lisa Zunshine, who also views literature as a
kind of training ground for reading people. Like Zunshine, Vermeule
proposes that literature stimulates and experiments with our theory
of mind, neurological inference systems that enable us to guess at
the mental states of other humans. Unlike Zunshine, when Vermeule
discusses the cognitive basis of caring about literary characters, she also
considers simulation theory to explain how literary characters serve
as mind reading practice. Simulation theory holds that the guesswork
is actually based on imagination and empathy, rather than an innate
system. Because the theory emphasizes the imagination, Vermeule finds
it a more promising hypothesis for explaining our interest in fiction,
although she also states that both theories are necessary to account
for the phenomenology of the readers experience.
Vermeule extends her discussion of mind reading to explain why
the most Machiavellian literary characters are also the most popular.
Book Reviews
381
The characters that endure are those who, like Sherlock Holmes, possess lots of mind reading appeal because their perceptive powers lie
just slightly outside the limits of what ordinary humans are capable
of (52). We are drawn to unusually perceptive characters because
that is the quality we would most like to replicate. It follows, then,
that an omniscient character endowed with unlimited access to other
minds would fulfill our most fundamental mind-reading desires and
would thus be the most appealing. And in fact, Vermeule wonders
whether there are connections between the spirit of religion and the
spirit of gossip: she speculates that the gossip-shaped hole in our
souls certainly overlaps with the God-shaped hole in our souls (10).
No character has a more desirable theory of mind than God, nor is
any character better at meting out justice. As Vermeules students made
clear in their discussions of Disgraces sexually transgressing character
David Lurie, the question of judgment and justice is also intrinsic
to our reading (and gossip) strategies: if we cannot have access to
other minds, we can at least propagate and enact the idea that justice ultimately prevails, a myth that serves to deter those that would
hide information and use it for evil means. Schadenfreude stories, for
instance, are eternally fascinating for readers because they provide the
pleasure of detecting and punishing rules-violators and cheaters (7).
That untrustworthy characters get punishedcheating celebrities by
the public and villains by the plot of the moralistic authorfeeds into
our desire for fairness in a world where crucial social information is
unevenly distributed.
Vermeules commitment to integrating the study of literature
with cognitive science affects her approach to close readings. While
she includes formalist analysisincluding, for instance, chapters on
Jane Austen and J. M. Coetzee and the eighteenth-century novelshe
is careful to avoid formalism purely for formalisms sake. Instead, she
contextualizes form historically and cognitively, as when she argues that
the technique of free indirect discourse suited the eighteenth century
novelists desire to expose the psychology of character in new ways.
Vermeule feels that the founding gesture (or was it a sin?) of literary
criticism may have been to suppress a psychological interest in character in favor of more difficult topics, a gesture born of the modernist reading practices with which the ruse of criticism was historically
twinned (1415). For Vermeule, mainstream criticisms opposition to
the emotional and instinctual carries us away from understanding why
and how we relate to fiction. We must remember that art has always
competed with other forms of entertainment; its prevalence indicates
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