Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

VOL.
200, AUGUST 5, 1991

271
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.*
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS
T. SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.*
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as
Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA,
JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.*
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS
T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
respondents.
Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.It is the considered opinion of the
Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend
to divest the legislature of its rightor the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the
omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments autonomy from congress and to break Congress control over local
governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy,
to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Same; Same; Local autonomy explained.It is noteworthy that under the Charter, local
autonomy is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a
local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the
_______________
* EN BANC.
272
272
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constitution places the local governments under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
Same; Same; Supervision and control, meaning of.The petitioners are under the impression
that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority. x x x Control has been defined as the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter.
Supervision on the other hand means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Same; Same; Suspension.The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is
the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the
possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings.
The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon
is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of
suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. x x x.
Same; Same; Same.The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, x x
x because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a
suspension, x x x is simply to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the
investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the
records and other evidence. It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a
case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed
sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is
otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have
achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
273
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
273
PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary
of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in
number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among
them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.1 The personalities
involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her
husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor;
Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pea Redondo,
members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The
complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals.2
We quote:
xxx xxx xxx

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office
of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs.
Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and
the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best
suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee.
To
_______________
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.
2 Hon. Bonifacio Cacdac, Jr., J.
274
274
make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien
to the complainants duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioners
act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to
resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform
task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was
padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause
since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around
treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was
the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected ViceMayor of Iloilo City and
complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pea
Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint
arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was
unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor
Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants
sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with his
fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong
denounced the petitioners actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold
office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to
witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together
with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the
bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former
mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and
no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City
upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing
injuries. He was released only the following day.3
The Mayor thereafter answered,4 and the cases were shortly
_______________
3 Rollo, id., 76-77.

4 Id., 77.
275
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
275
set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988
at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through
telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the
petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and
was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral
and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but
was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of
petitioners counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venueIloilo City. Again, the
petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse
that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to
postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled
hearings (Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioners counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on
August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a
postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner
were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement
which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm.
Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified
including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioners counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the
October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion
for change of venue was denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the
parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved
for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in
Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to
terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December
13 to 15, 1988.
276
276
The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or
cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the
petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.
On December 14, 1988, petitioners counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the
hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December
15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for
resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed
by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioners second preventive suspension
dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of
Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition
against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently,
he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of
Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor
Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,6
(Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing
Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In
a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a
_______________
5 Id., 77-78.
6 Id., 78. The first suspension was on the Cabaluna and Ortigoza complaints. CA-G.R. No. 16417
was on the Erbite complaint. CA-G.R. No. 20736 was a challenge on the designation of ViceMayor Malabor.
277
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
277
Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the
respondent Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary
from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of
Appeals two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of
January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that
the respondent Secretary had been biased, prejudicial and hostile towards him7 arising from
his (Mayor Ganzons) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party8 and
the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections;9 and
his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.10 He also alleges that he requested the
Secretary to life his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay
elections of November 14, 1988),11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the
hearingand meted out two more suspension ordersof the aforementioned cases.12 He
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in
order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request.13 He states that
he asked for postponement on valid and justifiable14 grounds, among them, that he was
suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his vital15 witness was also
hospitalized16 but that the latter
_______________
7 Id., 21
8 Id.
9 Id., 27.
10 Id., 28.
11 Id., 30.
12 Id., 31-32.
13 Id., 34-35.
14 Id., 36.
15 Id.
16 Id.
278
278
unduly denied his request.17
Mayor Ganzons primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local
Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an
argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzons charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in
what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary.
His claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that his
persecution was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not
appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his
word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore
that political feud has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-sos that Secretary Santos had
attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them at face
value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them,18 for the same
reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-sos were never corroborated by
independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an
official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of
contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzons contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the
hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court
finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from
further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.19
_______________
17 Id., 38.
18 Id.
19 By virtue of the Temporary Restraining Order the Court issued on June 26, 1990.
279
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
279
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any
compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing
reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a
matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzons above
story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos actuations deprived
Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
Presidents alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners argument that the 1987 Constitution20 no longer allows the President, as the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local
officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by
local government units and second, by deleting the phrase as may be provided by law,21 to
strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend,
that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:
_______________
20 CONST., art. X, sec. 4.
21 CONST. (1935), art. X, sec. 10(1). The 1973 Constitution contained no similar provision, but
see art. VII, sec. 18.
22 CONST. (1987), supra.
280
280
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.23
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of as may be provided by law) is significant, as their
argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is provided by law and (2) hence, no law
may provide for it any longer. It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under
question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal
provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of Local
Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to
submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the
hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the
respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election,
and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive suspension
has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.24
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.(1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of
Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if
the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of,
when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when
the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall
not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office
without prejudice to the continuation of
_______________
23 CONST. (1935), supra.
24 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 62.
281
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
281
the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of
the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in
computing the time of suspension.25
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution,
in deleting the phrase as may be provided by law intend to divest the President of the power
to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the
change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its rightor the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies nothing
more than to underscore local governments autonomy from congress and to break Congress
control over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake
of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as
in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although
Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to small
republics.26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not
control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitutionand as the
supervision clause itself suggestis to wean local government units from overdependence on
the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, local autonomy is not instantly self-executing, but
subject to, among other things,
_______________
25 Supra, sec. 63.
26 CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 64 (1987 ed.)
282
282
the passage of a local government code,27 a local tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29
and a national representation law,30 and measures31 designed to realize autonomy at the local
level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the
Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local
officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of
the local units.32
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of as may be provided by law was meant to stress, sub
silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional
control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.33
The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
_______________
27 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.
28 Supra, secs. 5, 6.
29 Supra, sec. 7.
30 Supra, sec. 9.
31 See supra, sec. 14, providing for regional development councils to be organized by the
President.
32 Supra, sec. 3.
33 G.R. No. 95245, id., 53; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
283
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
283
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,34
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had
occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of
our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are
two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case
the Court has made the following digression: In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in
Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. xxx35
xxx xxx xxx
Control has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for test of the latter.36 Supervision on the other hand means
overseeing or the power or authority of
_______________
34 Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id., 48-61), Justice Mendoza
cited this case.
35 Supra, 489-490.
36 Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).
284
284

an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.37 As we held,38 however,
investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser power than
altering.
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Courts pronouncements in at least three cases,
Lacson v. Roque,39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,41 and possibly, a fourth one,
Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control
powers but only supervision as may be provided by law,43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron,
and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President may not . . . suspend an elective official
of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
decision of the corresponding provincial board.44 However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor
Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary
authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to
exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers
is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always
controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional
limitations.45
In Hebron, we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same
must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision
to the
_______________
37 Supra, 147.
38 Ganzon v. Kayanan, supra.
39 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
40 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
41 Supra.
42 No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.
43 Lacson v. Roque, supra, 463.
44 Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
45 Lacson v. Roque, supra, 462.
285
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
285
contrarywhich does not exist with respect to municipal officers ...46
In Mondano, the Court held:
x x x The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written
charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer
(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by
one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Section 86 of the Revised
Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
Department Head over the administration of x x x municipalities x x x. If it be construed that it
does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by
section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed
to have been abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution.47
xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials
except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code.48
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was
not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited
power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law
gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining
him.49
_______________
46 Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.
47 Mondano v. Silvosa, supra, 148.
48 Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
49 G.R. No. 95245, id., 50-51; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
286
286
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the
Constitutional Commission to defeat the Presidents powers. The Court believes that the
deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo
would exclude the power of removal from the President,50 Commissioner Blas Ople would
not.51
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local
Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, supervision and removal are not incompatible
terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local
autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the
Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.52
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.53 The
Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to liberate
the local governments from the imperialism of Manila. Autonomy, however, is not meant to
end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not
taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance selfgovernment.
As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national administration

but not powerto the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration
_______________
50 Id., 23.
51 Id., 53.
52 Bagabuyo v. Davide, G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.
53 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.
54 Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
287
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
287
when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order
to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more
responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general
supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.55
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another
matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the
Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days
of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of
course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of
misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension,
which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:56
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office
does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all
this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected
precisely to do so. As of October 26,
_______________
55 Supra, 794-795.
56 Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 536.
288
288
1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right
of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be
established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however,
for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be
in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had
elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted
continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in
sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.57
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons,58
and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole
objective of a suspension, as we have held,59 is simply to prevent the accused from hampering
the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible
witnesses60 or to keep him off the records and other evidence.61 It is a means, and no more,
to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local
Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly
sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought
to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
_______________
57 Supra, 541.
58 See supra.
59 Lacson v. Roque, supra.
60 Supra, 469.
61 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 63.
62 Supra.
289
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
289
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is
held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a
presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be
imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a longer suspension is unjust and
unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspensionwhich is not a remote possibility

on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in
inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayors guilt has not been
proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his
suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that
justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive
suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the
necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor-without suspending him a day longer.
What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the
Mayor piecemealapparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that
power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future
suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made
to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the
_______________
63 Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
290
290
possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of
the Local Government Code)which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to
suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears
to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs. We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the
Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are
concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this
Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzons usual remedies of
appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding
the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints,
notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
In resum, the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration,
not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the
manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but
to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative
regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law,
and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. Supervision and investigation are not inconsistent terms; investigation does not signify
control (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no
longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
291
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991
291
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time
of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits
another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the
petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of
any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to
August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative
cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petitions dismissed. Suspension of petitioners affirmed.
Note.Complaints against elective provincial or city officials should be filed before the
Minister of Local Government. (Regidor, Jr. vs. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507.)
o0o
292
Copyright 2014 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals,
200 SCRA 271(1991)]

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

VOL.

200, AUGUST 5, 1991

xxx xxx xxx

3 Rollo, id., 76-77.

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national administration

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspensionwhich is not a remote possibility

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi