Discipline of Lawyers (see Rule 138)

Nature of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers:

In re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654. February 18, 1970 - disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and
does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers (citing In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577). Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio
(citing State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274; 286 and Fairfield Country Bar vs. Taylor, 22 Atl. 441). Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney (citing
Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33, 34).
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, Adm. Case No. 4017, September 29,
1999 Resp. Atty was charged with estafa for misappropriation of clients funds. He was
acquitted on reasonable doubt but was held civilly liable for the amount involved which he
collected from his client under the pretense of depositing the same with the SC as legal fees.
He was charged for misconduct before the IBP. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
his acquittal of the criminal charge of estafa. The Court, in denying this motion, cited
Almacen and declared: Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The
burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly
preponderant evidence" is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in
the administrative proceedings.
Note, however, that in Gerona v. Datingalin [Adm. Case No. 4801, Feb 27, 2003] where Atty
was alleged to have knowingly notarized a falsified document and was criminally charged for
falsification of public documents, the Court decided to defer the administrative disciplinary
proceedings and await the outcome of the criminal case in order to avoid contradictory
findings. Nevertheless, the Court reiterated that a conviction in a criminal case is not
necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding, citing
Calub v. Suller, A.C. No. 1474. January 28, 2000.
Grounds for disciplinary action
Rules of Court, Rule 138, sec.27- Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to

do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (As amended by Resolution of the
Supreme Court, Feb. 13, 1992)
Re Atty. Leon G. Maquera, Bar Matter No. 793, July 30, 2004--The issue here is May a
member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same
sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction? The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February
28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of
Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired
his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. The Superior Court of Guam
found that the attorney-client relationship was not yet fully terminated when Maquera
transferred the clients property to him. The fact that he was able to sell the property at a
price much higher than what his services merited was indication he had taken advantage of
the relationship. The Philippine Supreme Court disagreed with the IBP that he did not breach
any ethical rule in the Philippines. Instead, it applied the grounds enumerated in Rule 138,
sec. 27 to determine Maqueras professional liability. Thus, the Court invoked a Supreme
Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992 stating that: The disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency
shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. The Court
ordered Maquera to show cause why he should not be disciplined.
Nature and extent of sanction:
As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total
removal or disbarment. The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable
sanction is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court... Disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired. (see In re Almacen,
where attorney was suspended from the practice of law until further notice)
Because of the sui generis nature of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, that it is not an
ordinary civil action, a disbarment case is not the proper forum for claiming damages against
the lawyer (Roldan v. Panganiban, AC No.4552, Dec 14, 2004).
In re Tionko, March 17, 1922Atty. Tionko was charged with (1) neglect of the interests of
his clients Alvarado and Casion; and (2) failure to turn over the fees advanced to him by his
clients to their new attorney, Hilarion Z. Elumba. The first was proved, the 2nd was not.
Justice Malcolm set the following doctrine in acquitting Tionko of the 2nd charge: The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in
accordance with his oath.