Wittgenstein and Derrida on Meaning

Author(s): Mark Rowlands

Source: Behavior and Philosophy, Vol. 20/21, Vol. 20, no. 2 - Vol. 21, no. 1 (1993), pp. 37-47
Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies (CCBS)
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and Philosophy,

Behavior

WITTGENSTEIN

Issue

Double

1993, VoL

21, No.

20, No.2/VoL

AND DEEKEDA ON MEANING

Mark
The University

Rowlands
of Alabama

I
a theory of meaning
that he
According to this theory, people have thoughts, ideas or
an
and
is essentially
these
have a signified content.
Speaking
representations,
we
we
to these thoughts. When
communicate
speak,
activity of giving expression
the content of our thought, dress it in auditory garb, so to speak, and thus make

In "Signature Event
associates with Condillac.1

this

content

communicative

accessible
purpose

Context,"

Derrida

attacks

serves
same
this
Writing
essentially
but extends it in obvious ways. Both speaking and writing
the inner content; and the same inner content can be
to

others.

communicate,
through these distinct media.

transmit,

expressed
Derrida

work is
argues that the theory of meaning
implicated in Condillac's
case
most
The
mistaken.
mistake
is
obvious
in
the
of
written
importantly
language,
but it also applies to speech.
In order for a written mark to
Consider writing.
to Derrida,
it must,
remain readable
the
according
writing,
despite
?
?
was
the
the
context
in
of
it
absence
which
disappearance
originally produced
constitute

(Derrida, pp. 7ff). If, for example, I inscribe on paper "I think I am having a cardiac
arrest" and then subsequently die, my thoughts, ideas, representations,
experiences,
and my conscious
intentions die with me; they become absent.
the
Nevertheless,
And
it is precisely
inscription can exist and function apart from this context.
because
it can that we regard it as an example of writing.
The capacity of an
to
one
and
contexts
exist
in
function
other
than
the
in which
it was
expression
?
?
a capacity essential
to that expression
qua expression
originally produced

Derrida calls the iterabilityof the expression. Iterabilityis not simplyrepeatability:

?
(iter, again, probably comes from itara, other, in Sanskrit, and
iterability
can be read as the working out of the logic that ties alterity
that
follows
everything
to repetition)."
The
(Derrida, p. 10, pp. 46-47)
iterability of a sign involves, in
"Such

addition
of that

to repetition, a, perhaps small, but nonetheless

ineliminable,
with
sign as it breaks from one context and associates

transformation
another.

as a hybrid structure, made

iterability of a sign must be understood
are
repetition and alterity, where these
inextricably bound together.
Author's

up

The
of both

note:

Please
address
to, Professor
correspondence
of Alabama,
AL 35487.
Tuscaloosa,

Mark

Rowlands,

Department

of Philosophy,

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The University

WITTGENSTEIN

AND DERRTDA

There
in contexts of iteration.
is, in principle, no limit to the variations
If,
for example, the person for whom I intended the inscription died instead ofme, so
that she, and her conscious
thoughts, ideas, etc. were now absent, this does not
mean

that the inscription becomes unreadable.

Indeed, if the whole world, save for
the inscription, were suddenly obliterated, the inscription would still be readable
even if, in fact, it were unread.
This iterability of the inscription is essential to it

qua

token of writing.
same comments

The

also apply to spoken utterances.2

If, instead of inscribing
it on paper I had uttered the sentence, "I think I am having a cardiac arrest," my
utterance would not be rendered meaningless
by my subsequent demise. Thus, the
absence
utterance
absence

of my

conscious

meaningless.
of any states

to communicate

intention
Nor

the absence

would

would

not render my

of the intended

spoken
receiver, or the

of conscious

which
she might possess.
understanding
to
utterances
both
written
and
(Derrida, p. 9).
Iterability applies equally
spoken
is important here is not the rejection of Condillac's
What
theory ofmeaning,
but the iterability which forms the basis of that rejection. One obvious consequence
of the iterability of linguistic expressions
is that for a ? written or spoken ? mark
to count as a token of language itmust be capable of functioning in the absence of
the consciousness

and, in particular, in the absence of the

she means
(Derrida, pp. 8 ff.). Therefore,
of the expression cannot be located in, or derived

speaker's

of the sender/receiver,
conscious
intention to say what

according

to Derrida,

the meaning

consciousness,
from, any person's
intention to say what she means.
The
Derrida

and,

a fortiori, not

in or from her

conscious

iterability of written and spoken expressions has further consequences.

to count as an
argues
that, in order for a written or spoken mark

of any
of language, it must be capable of functioning in the absence
expression
feature which might be thought to be a determinant of its meaning
(Derrida, pp.
10-12). He argues, for example, that essential to a linguistic sign's being a sign is
of a "real" referent, in the absence of objective
is right
signification, and even in the absence of grammaticality. Whether Derrida
about this I do not propose to address here.
I shall focus, instead, on the way the
its capacity

to function in the absence

of a sign
concept of iterability is used to attack accounts which locate the meaning
in the conscious states of a sign user.
It could be replied that, although the inscription can be understood
in the
of any present intention on the part of the inscriber, we need, in order to
understand
the inscription, to know what the inscriber intended at the time (Searle,
This
1977).
reply, however, merely postpones the issue. Any intention, according
to Derrida,
is itself a relation to a sign. And, as such, it inherits the sign's
absence

iterability. Thus, iterability is just as essential to the inscriber's intention as it is

to the inscription which is its product.
Thus, the intention cannot be identified
with a conscious experience which might be, so to speak, before the mind of the

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WITTGENSTEIN

AND DERRIDA

person who has the intention; the iterability of the intention entails that this person
could have the same intention in the absence of that experience.
is not, at least not here, attacking the relevance
This point is crucial. Derrida
to meaning.

of intention

He

says,

invoke the
Event
that at no time does Sec [i.e."Signature
Context"]
Nor is there any break, simple or radical, with
and simple, of intentionality.
but their telos,
is not intention nor intentionality
the text questions
What
intentionality.
the movement
and possibility of a fulfillment, realization,
and
which orients and organizes
that would be present to and identical with itself (Derrida, pp.
actualization
in a plenitude
I must

first recall

absence,

pure

55-60).

is attacking neither intention nor intentionality but

this indicates, Derrida
a certain picture of these things. The view of intention as a conscious experience
As

one example of this picture. Any conscious experience

is, it is commonly
?
?
at
to its subject
the time of its occurrence.
present
thought, wholly accessible
But such a view of intention is untenable because of the iterability of intention:
provides

...intention

or attention,

directed

towards

something

iterable which

in turn determines

it

as being iterable,will strive or tend in vain to actualize or fulfillitself,for it cannot, by

virtue

ever achieve
it be fulfilled,
this goal.
In no case will
structure,
to its object and to itself. It is divided and deported
in advance,
from itself...
is a priori
in advance
Intention
others, removed
(Derrida, pp. 56).
differante: differing and deferring, in its inception

of its very

actualized,
totally present
by its iterability, towards
(at once)

and intention.3
of iterability entails a nominalist view ofmeaning
to distinguish token expressions
of a sign from the type of which those
tokens are instances.
distinct, they
Thus, while two sign tokens are numerically
same
this
of
The
in
the
be
instances
can, nonetheless,
way, provides a
type,
type.
The

notion

It is usual

distinct tokens. We might express Derrida's

for unifying numerically
are
the
"There
tokens," as long as we are careful to note two
only
position
things: Firstly, tokens should not be understood as instances of types (Derrida, pp.
56). Secondly, as will become clear, Derrida's
conception of a sign-token differs in
principle

thus:

important ways from the orthodox conception.

we can say this:
there are only
For Derrida
As a first approximation
or inscriptions, concrete particular uses of a sign.
individual, concrete, utterances
If we use a sign in one context and then use what we take to be the same sign in
a distinct context, this is not because of any common feature ?
essence, meaning,
? which the two individual
etc.
conscious
intention,
signs share. That
animating
a
For any sign S,
of
of
the
direct consequence
there is not is
iterability
signs.
feature one cites as being (allegedly) the feature which type-identifies the
or inscriptions of S, the iterabilility of S entails that any
token of S could exist and function as the sign it is in the absence of that feature.
The notion of iterability, therefore, records the fact that S can be used ?
repeated
?
on distinct occasions which have no common feature.
Iterability, in this way,
whatever
various

token utterances

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AND DERRIDA

WITTGENSTEIN
not only the repetition
on distinct occasions.

encompasses
alteration ?

of S but also

its alterity ?

for

its capacity

a revision in our understanding

of the notion of the
Iterability necessitates
a
is
not abandoned
time
of
of
The
idea
the
by
sign
sign.
identity through
Derrida.
Nor should it be, since iterability is, in part, constituted by the repetition
same

of the same

is retained, but reinterpreted, and records not literal

of
(type) identity but, rather, the fact that we take various concrete occasions
we
same
use
as
of
The
the
might say, is
sign,
linguistic
being expressions
sign.4
sign.

Identity

recognizably the same (where recognizable

identity does not imply literal identity).
to denote recognizable
Let us use the expression
identity in this sense.
'identity^
can
we
are to understand
we
not do so by appeal to
If
the
'identity^ relation,
Vertical1 connections between concrete uses of a sign and a unifying type. Such
appeals are ruled out by iterability, which ensures that, whatever vertical connection
is cited, the sign can exist and retain its
in the absence of that connection.
identityr
we can appeal only to "horizontal" connections
In constructing a notion of
identityr
between the use of a sign on a particular occasion and the use of what we take to
be the same
This
?
concepts
Since the
function

sign on different occasions.

feature of iterability allows the derivation of two other central Derridean
the trace, and differance. Consider,
first,Derrida's
concept of a trace.

of a sign S as it is used on a particular concrete

identityr
of the relations which obtain between S on that occasion

occasions
and

is a

(what

is

S on other occasions,
and since these relations will typically be
recognizably)
extended in time and space, Derrida claims that the identity (i.e.
of a sign
identity^
S on a given occasion of use is constituted by the trace of non-presence.
That is,
if I use a sign S on a given occasion, the
of that sign as S depends on its
identityr
to other uses

of S on other occasions, where these are absent from the

in
that
present
they are extended from it in both space and time. Thus,
what is present, the sign S, is dependent for its
on what is non-present.
identityr,
This trace-structure of the sign is, therefore, a consequence
of its iterability.5
consider the notion of differance, an amalgam
of difference and
Secondly,
relation

occasion

deferral. Each sign is constituted by difference in the sense that its identityr is, in
part, constituted by its relation to other signs which are distinct, or different from
it. Furthermore,
the iterability of a sign means
that the sign is constituted by
on
deferral. The
of each sign
any given occasion of use depends, in part,
identityr
on the use of what is recognizably that sign on other occasions. The
identity of the
sign is, thus, something which can be wholly constituted by any particular occasion
of use, but depends on repeated use, on what happens before and after it. It is
divided, spread out in time, or, in Derrida's
sense, deferred.

rest of this paper will argue that the three central Derridean
notions of
and
differance
also
in
feature
iterability, trace,
Wittgenstein's
approach to linguistic
meaning.
The

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AND DERRIDA

WITTGENSTEIN
n
theory of meaning
The
ofWittgenstein.

The

also provides a
by Derrida
to a conscious
assimilation
of meaning
attacked

focus for the

inner item is,

so
a
as
a
not
much
of
view,
theory
meaning
pre-theoretical picture
the starting point for much
which provides
theorizing and exerts a pervasive
influence over it. He subjects this picture to repeated analysis and criticism. I shall

writing
inWittgenstein's

focus on just one of his critical themes.

one reason why meaning
toWittgenstein,
cannot be assimilated
to
According
sort
conscious
item
is
that
the
of
of
item in
any particular conscious
any
presence
(so to speak) is not necessary for one to mean something by a sign. To
this
claimed, all we have to is look and see. Suppose,
point, Wittgenstein
appreciate
for example, my wife asks me where I have put the car keys (Malcolm, pp. 133-58).
I say,
I could form an image of the keys in the top drawer of the kitchen.
one's mind

That is the way it could have happened.

"The keys are in the kitchen drawer."
in countless other ways.
could
also
have
it
I am
However,
happened
Suppose
I could say,
writing a paper, and feel irritated by my wife's untimely interruption.
"The keys are in the kitchen drawer," while turning over a phrase inmy head. Or
Disturbed
suppose I have a mistress and am talking to her on the telephone.
by
are
in
I
could
"The
the
kitchen
wife's
say,
drawer,"
my
keys
unexpected appearance

sorts of
These
hoping that she doesn't ask who is on the telephone.6
cases
And
in
of
these
I
could
be
many
simply will
indefinitely.
multiplied
examples
or
kitchen drawer.
not form mental
Instead, I could form
images of the keys
all the while

images of other sorts, or no conscious image at all. Thus, although it is correct to

say that, in uttering "The car keys are in the kitchen drawer," I meant that the car
keys are in the kitchen drawer, there need be no feature ofmy conscious experience
this utterance.7
which regularly accompanies
one's meaning
A great variety of images, feelings, and so on may accompany
a
one
no
It is true that my
of these features is essential.
something by
sign. But
accompaniments.
something by a sign might have typical experiential
meaning
I utter, "The keys are in the kitchen drawer," I might typically form an image
When
of the keys in the drawer. But my image of the keys in the drawer, although an

cannot constitute my meaning

that the keys are in the
experiential accompaniment,
that even when I form no such image.
drawer, for I am capable ofmeaning
to
As this shows, there can be any number of experiential accompaniments

itself (Wittgenstein,
items cannot be the meaning
but these experiential
stems
from
to
this
#33-35).
concentrating upon the most
point
appreciate
and elevating this correlation into a necessity. This
typical kinds of accompaniment

meaning,

Failure

error, in turn, arises

of experience.
assumption.
accompaniment

from assuming

that meaning

must

consist

in a distinctive

sort

this theoretical
argues, undermines
introspection, Wittgenstein
If you look and see, you will find that there is no invariant
to meaning
something by a sign. Indeed, introspection often fails

But

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WITTGENSTEIN

AND DERRJDA

to identify any kind of experience when one means

something by a sign. We
or intend a sign in a particular way without any item "coming
sometimes mean
before our mind," when our mind is, so to speak, a blank.
look and see, then, we will realize that it is possible to mean something
by a sign in the absence of any particular conscious experience, indeed, even in the
absence of all conscious experience. The introduction of absence, here, indicates the
and Derrida.
And this reference to
first point of comparison between Wittgenstein
Ifwe

of more

is indicative

absence

profound similarities.
to look and see alerts

Wittgenstein's
Bewitched
by a certain
be some

us

to the iterability of signs.

view of language, we might expect there to

advice

(oversimplified)
feature running through all contexts in which a given sign has
or writer's
The
conscious
intention is one, historically
speaker's
as
common
to
what
this
feature
suggestion
might be. If, however, we

common

application.

important,
look and see, we will realize that our use of a given sign need not be grounded in
that it has in
any such common feature. The iterated sign can have the meaning
the absence of any iterated candidate for the essential common feature. In this way,
see alerts us to the iterability of linguistic signs. When
to
look and see, he is pointing out the multiplicity
and
Wittgenstein
?
?
the
contexts
of
and
in
it
situations
which
is
heterogeneity
alterity
appropriate
to use a given sign, i.e., in which the use of that sign can be repeated.
This line of comparison can be pushed further in a way which takes us to
to look and

the advice

tells us

the heart

ofWittgenstein's
thought.
Iterability is a function of both alterity and
later philosophy reflect these
repetition. Two structural elements ofWittgenstein's
two concepts. Further, both these elements are, in effect, pointed out by the advice
to look and
The

see.

first isWittgenstein's

notion of family resemblance

(Wittgenstein, #65-71).
term only if
Roughly described, the idea is this. A term T is a family resemblance
there is no common feature shared by all and only contexts, cases, or situations in
which

it would

example,

be appropriate
to apply T.
And, then, a concept C is a family
a
it
if
is
term. Consider, for
concept
expressed by
family resemblance
a
the concept of game. Wittgenstein
argues that there is no one feature

possessed

by all and only games.

resemblance

Look

for example
at board-games,
with their multifarious
Now
to
pass
relationships.
here you findmany correspondences
with the first group, but many
common
card-games;
features drop out, and others appear. When we pass to ball games, much
that is common
is retained, but much
is lost. Are they all 'amusing'?
chess with noughts and
Compare
crosses.
Or is there always winning
and losing, or competition
between players?
Think
of patience.
In ball games
there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball
at the wall and catches
it again,
this feature has disappeared...
And the result of this
we
see a complicated
is:
examination
of similarities
network
and
overlapping
sometimes
overall
sometimes
similarities
of detail
criss-crossing:
similarities,
# 66).
(Wittgenstein,
I

can

think

resemblance';

of no

better

for the various

to characterize
these similarities
than
expression
'family
resemblances
between members
of a family: build, features,

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AND DERRTDA

WITTGENSTEIN
colour

of eyes, gait,

I shall

say:

'games'

etc. etc. overlap

temperament,
form a family

(Wittgenstein,

and

criss-cross

in the same way.

And

#67).

term T, the contexts, cases, or situations in

Thus, for any family resemblance
use
to
T are not united by some common essential
which it would be appropriate
feature, and T, therefore, does not serve to pick out any such feature. The notion
or anti-essentialism
about
of family resemblance
expresses a form of nominalism
the notion alerts us to the alterity involved
certain terms or concepts. Furthermore,
this
in the use of certain signs. A family resemblance
sign straddles or encompasses
kind of alterity, or divergence, in the contexts, cases, or situations in which the sign
character of certain signs becomes
can be employed.
The family resemblance
once we

evident

look and

see.

The second structural feature ofWittgenstein's

approach to linguistic meaning
of the features of
One
is the concept of a custom, practice, or form of life.
wants
to
of
these labels is the
use
which Wittgenstein
highlight by way
language

A custom
regularity, the repetition, which is essential to the existence ofmeaning.
a
of
is something which is established
procedure.
through repeated application
on which
someone
that there should have been only one occasion
It is not possible
obeyed
on which a report
a rule.
that there should have been only one occasion
It is not possible
a report, to give
was made,
and so on. To obey a rule, make
an order given or understood;
an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)
#199).
(Wittgenstein,

On the contrary, I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign post only
# 198).
as there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom
(Wittgenstein,

So,

the connection

between

It is also
is pretty clear.
essential to language:

clear

in so far

custom and repetition inWittgenstein's

thought
thinks this sort of repetition is
that Wittgenstein

and
us imagine that the people
activities
in that country carried on the usual human
an articulate
their
If we watch
in the course of them employed, apparently,
language.
we
But when we try to learn their
it seems
find it intelligible,
behaviour
'logical.'
between what
to do so. For there is no regular connection
language we find it impossible

Let

are not
sounds
but still these
and their actions;
they make,
they say, the sounds
as with us;
it has the same consequences
for ifwe gag one of the people,
superfluous,
as I feel like putting
it. Are we to
fall into confusion ?
the sounds their actions
without
is not enough
orders, reports, and the rest? There
say that these people have a language:
regularity

for us

to call

it 'language'

notion
Wittgenstein's
the
existence
for
necessary
multiplicity

of situations

of a

(Wittgenstein,

custom

of meaning.

and

cases

#207).

in which

us

is
of the repetition which
we
the
see,
grasp
of a given sign is
the application

reminds
When

we

look and

it is
to speak of a multiplicity of cases and situations
in which
appropriate.
can
a
be repeated.
to use
given sign is to suppose that the sign
appropriate
Not only are the concepts of alterity and repetition central toWittgenstein's
the two.
there is an essential connection between
approach, but, as with Derrida,
But

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AND DERRJDDA

WITTGENSTEIN

thesis makes
grounding in the notion of a custom, the family resemblance
little sense. One problem itwould face is what I shall call the problem of wide open
texture. Anything
is similar to anything else in some respect or other. A fork is
similar to a knife in that they are both used for eating, but a knife is similar to a

Without

in that they are both metallic, but a screw driver is similar to an

is similar to a
in that they are both long and thin, but an umbrella
and so on. The problem here is not that family resemblance
concepts
parachute,
are blurred, that they have, in some sense, vague boundaries, but rather, that there
?
will be no boundaries whatsoever ?
precise or imprecise
separating concepts.
Since everything is similar to everything else in some respect, all family resemblance
screw

driver

umbrella

concepts will collapse into one. In order to avoid this problem, restrictions must be
placed on the types of similarity which are to be considered relevant. Wittgenstein's
claim is that these restrictions are constituted by custom, by community practice.
Part

to a given custom involves being trained to regard certain sorts

(in certain contexts) as relevant and certain other sorts as irrelevant.

of belonging

of similarity
In this way,
repetition

the alterity represented by the notion of family resemblance,

and the
represented by the notion of a custom are essentially connected.

of iterability is represented
in Wittgenstein's
philosophy by the interplay between the notions of family resemblance and custom.
a sign expresses a family resemblance concept if it can be applied
For Wittgenstein,
or
in situations
contexts which exhibit a mutual
And a
alterity or divergence.
Therefore,

Derrida's

notion

custom or practice is essential to a sign because the functioning of a sign essentially

involves repetition. Therefore, it seems that the logic which ties family resemblance
to form of life in Wittgenstein's
is the same logic as ties alterity to
philosophy
repetition

in the work

of Derrida.
in

The

notions

of trace and differance are also, I think, clearly applicable

to
work on meaning and intention. The concepts of trace and differance
Wittgenstein's
are consequences
of iterability in the sense that iterability necessitates
a certain

in our notion of identity as it applies to linguistic signs. The revised sense

?
of identity ?
the existence of any sign S, on any particular
makes
identityr
occasion of its use, dependent on other occasions of use of S which are extended in
revision

space and time from the present occasion.

Thus, S, on any occasion of use, is (at
least partly) constituted by the trace of what is not present on that occasion. And,
furthermore, since S is constituted by different occasions of use, where these extend
in space

and

time from the present, the existence of S as the type of

sign it is is
deferred', its existence and identityr is essentially spread out in time. Thus S is
characterized
I think the notions of trace and differance apply to
by differance.

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AND DERRIDA

WITTGENSTEIN

work in much
the same way.
That
is, they are consequences
Wittgenstein's
case
realized
in
this
the
relation
between
by
iterability,
family resemblance

of
and

custom.

from Zettel

The

following passage
times inWittgenstein's

many

If I have

two friends with

poses

the sort of question

occurs

which

writings:
the same

name

and am writing

one of them a letter, what

does

the fact that I am not writing it to the other consist in? In the content? But thatmight
fit either

(I haven't

yet written

the address)

#7).

(Wittgenstein,

the other
both my friends are named
'Bill,9 one lives in Baltimore,
Suppose
rather than Buffalo,
in Buffalo.
In what does my writing to the Bill in Baltimore,
consist?

We

will

other sort of mark

suppose that I have not yet written the address, nor made
any
that might determine who the letter is for, and we will assume

to both.
that the content of the letter is appropriate
letter meant or intended for Baltimore Bill?

In this case, what makes

the

treatment of this issue is, in effect, guided by the notion of

Wittgenstein's
The
that no fact
iterability.
iterability of the letter as a linguistic sign ensures
about myself, the writer,
rather than Buffalo, Bill.

is necessary

for the letter being meant

for Baltimore,
have a mental
image of Baltimore

I could, for example,

Bill as I write the letter,but the lettercould stillbe meant forBaltimore Bill in the
my

same

apply no matter what feature of

The
iterability of the letter (as a structured
that it could still be meant or intended for Baltimore
Bill

absence

of this image. The

conscious
life is picked

considerations

out.

linguistic sign) ensures

even in the absence of any particular
experiential blank.
The

behavior
Whatever
ensures

item, indeed, even

ifmy mind

is an

to identify the
attempt
letter with behavioral
facts about me.
No aspect of my
can be necessary for the letter being meant or intended for Baltimore Bill.
is cited, the iterability of the letter
behavior, actual or dispositional,

iterability
intentionality of the

of

conscious

the

that the letter could be

letter

also

blocks

the

intended for Baltimore

Bill

in the absence

of that

features
relative to certain contexts, psychological or behavioral
However,
can count as criteria for the letter being meant for Baltimore,
rather than Buffalo,
Bill. For example, I might remark to someone "I am [/have been/will be] writing
to Bill, I hope he still lives in Baltimore."
In this context, such an utterance would
behavior.

be criterial

for the letter being meant for Baltimore Bill. Or, I might have made
such utterance, but it is also true that if I had been asked to whom
I was
the
"to
I
Bill
in
would
have
Baltimore."
This
counterfactual
letter,
writing
replied,
no

fact about me, Wittgenstein

thinks, can,
letter being meant for Baltimore Bill.

in this sort of context, be criterial

for the

relation
to Wittgenstein,
at least a partial
is, according
of the meaning
of a sign. However,
it is distinct from the relations of
both inductive confirmation and logical entailment. The reason for this stems from
The

criterial

determinant

45

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AND DERRIDA

WITTGENSTEIN
the context-relative

character

For example, whether or not my uttering

is still in Baltimore" counts as a criterion for

of criteria.

I wonder If he
"I am writing to Bill.
the letter being meant for one Bill rather than the other only if the other Bill does
not also live in Baltimore.
In general, if the context changes, the criterial status of
claims that
So, on the one hand, Wittgenstein
change.
If X
of the meaning
of linguistic signs:
criteria are at least partial determinants
a
a
at
least
X
then
of
is
criterion
for
the
partial
sign S,
provides
application
of S. On the other hand, whether or not X counts as
determinant of the meaning

relative

to Y

can also

a criterion for S is a context-sensitive

It depends on facts extended

seems to be that what S means

matter:

in both

on any
inevitable conclusion
will depend not just on what happens on that occasion, but also on
of a sign is essentially
before and after that occasion. The meaning
out in space and time.

space and

time. The

given occasion
what happens
spread

If this

is so, then

the notions
to meaning.

Wittgenstein's
approach
in part be constituted by facts which
of S on that

differance will also apply to

the
Firstly,
meaning of S on any occasion will
are extended in space and time. The meaning
of trace and

therefore, is constituted,
that occasion.
S, therefore, has trace-structure.
in
this
sense,
is,
spread out in both space and
occasion,

in part, by what is not present on

of S
Secondly, since the meaning
sense
is
in
this
its
time,
meaning

deferred and, thus constituted by what is spatially and temporally different from S.
of S is, in this sense, characterized by differance.
The meaning
Conclusion
A

similar pattern of thought operates in the work of Derrida and

Derrida
identifies iterability as an essential feature of linguistic
Wittgenstein.
signs, and this entails a revision in the way we think about the identity of signs:
The identity of signs (evident in their repetition) cannot be divorced from their
Thus, the notion of literal identity must be
like
replaced by something
identity, identityr. And identityr entails
recognizable
that each linguistic sign is, on any occasion of use, characterized by the trace of
inevitable

what

contextual

alteration.

is not present,

and by differance, an amalgam of difference and deferral.

In
work, the notion of iterability is realized by the interplay between
Wittgenstein's
family resemblance
(representing the element of alterity) and custom
offers an
(representing the element of repetition). As a result, Wittgenstein
alternative account of the meaning
of linguistic signs which is based on the
notion of criteria.
The context-sensitivity of criteria entails that linguistic signs
forWittgenstein

are also

characterized

by the notions

of trace and differance.

46

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AND DERREDA

WITTGENSTEIN
REFERENCES
M.

Brand,

and Walton,

Derrida,

J.,

Malcolm,

N.

(Ed.).

D.

Limited

(1988).

(1977).

(1976) Action

(Eds.).

Inc..

(Northwestern

Thougfit and Knowledge

Wittgenstein,

L.

(1953).

Philosophical

Wittgenstein,

L.

(1967).

Zettel

Theory

(London:

D. Reidel)
Press)

University

(Cornell University

Investigations

(London:

(Dordrecht:

Press).

Blackwell)

Blackwell)

NOTES
iI will focus almost
in Graff, 1988.

on this paper

entirely

and

its offspring,

"Limited

Inc abc

...H Both

papers

appear

2Derrida oftenrefers to the iterabilityof linguisticsigns in a way which is likelytomislead the

uninitiated:

is prior to writing.
In making
to be making
this claim, Derrida
an
appears
Speech
claim about the relationship
between written and spoken
certainly false empirical
language.
so. His claim is a logical or conceptual
one. When
uses the word
Derrida
'writing,' he is

almost
Not

?
referringto the iterabilityof a sign

an essential
the claim

feature

that

of that

The

sign.
is a necessary

iterability

bothwritten and spoken?

claim

and claiming that this iterabilityis

that writing
is prior to speech, amounts
therefore,
condition of both written and spoken
language.

to

view. As I shall argue,

JThis is not to say that the notion of iterability is equivalent to a nominalist
the iterability of linguistic
for the nature of sign tokens which,
to some
signs has some consequences
from classical
nominalism.
it is
extent, distance Derrida
Thus, while
iterability entails nominalism,
not clear, to me at least, that the converse
holds.
entailment
would reject all property-exemplification
accounts
of particulars.
An example
of these
*Thus, Derrida
would be Jaegwon Kim's
of properties
view of events as exemplifications
See
by objects at times.
as an example
1976. Derrida would
to particulars
Brand & Walton,
of
regard this sort of approach
an error which he calls the metaphysics of presence.
can be seen as providing us with a less misleading
is to say, Derrida
account
of the identity of
account
of intention.
This
signs. He also, in effect, provides us with a less misleading
?
in character ?
to the dimension
of deconstruction
strategy
distinctly anti-revisionistic
corresponds
which Derrida
terms mimesis.
This connects up with Derrida's
"...ne veut
claim that deconstruction
rien dire." The comparison
this sort of anti-revisionism
between
and Wittgenstein's
claim that
5That

linguistic

philosophy
view in my

^he
with

"...leaves
"Leave

(In fact, I do pursue

everything as it is" is, in my view, worth pursuing.
the Bloody Thing Alone:
and Deconstruction,"
in progress.)
Wittgenstein

this

example is inspiredbyMalcolm, pp. 133-158, pp. 146-47. I have spiced the examples up a little,

just a hint

of sex and

violence.

7Two notes are in order here to avoid besmirching

my hitherto unsullied
image.
would
like me to point out that I do not, in fact, have a mistress.
And I would
I never get irritated ifmy wife interrupts my work.
Not me.
*I shall

assume,

I think with

some

foundation,

that Wittgenstein

used

these

Firstly, my wife
like to point out that

notions

47

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interchangeably.