OPERATION BARBAROSSA: THE INVASION OF THE SOVIET UNION

UNTERNEHMEN BARBAROSSA: DIE INVASION VON DER SOWJETUNION

( BARBAROSSA:

BY
J. MICHAEL MAULDWIN

MR. SHIPP
HIST 460
SEPTEMBER 11, 2008

(FIFTY-NINE PAGES)

Mauldwin 1
UNTERNEHMEN BARBAROSSA: Die Invasion von der Sowjetunion
(OPERATION BARBAROSSA: The Invasion of the Soviet Union)

When World War I ended in 1917 with Germanys surrender and the Allied
powers, in order to preserve peace and thwart future aggressive acts, imposed
many restrictions on Germany in the form of the Treaty of Versailles.1 The
articles of the treaty restricted Germanys potential, both militarily and
economically, in order to prevent another World War (Doughty 381). In reality,
according to Robert A. Doughty in his book American Military History and the
Evolution of Western Warfare the articles accomplished just the opposite of their
design by leading a large portion of the German populace to believe that their
army was still unbeaten in the field and that defeat had come as a result of
traitorous actions by Jews and Communists who had stabbed the front-line
soldiers in the back. (Doughty 381). Therefore, the treaty, rather than acting as
a basis for European peace, established a conduit which eventually manifested
itself in the form of German expansion into Eastern Europe, and the Second
World War.
In the 1930s many Germans believed , during the early days of the Weimar
Republic in Germany, this ideological vision was supported by the Nazi party
and facilitated the rise of Adolf Hitler into a position of power. Under the direction
of Adolf Hitler, Germans assumed the conviction that it was their destiny to rule
the world, or Europe at best. They considered themselves the superior race, the
Arian nation. However, German territories held at the time could not provide

Mauldwin 2
sufficient raw materials to support Germanys expansion. Therefore, plans were
set in motion to extend German control in Europe by extending its territories. In
1939, these plans led to the beginning of World War II and to the eventual
invasion of the largest country in Europe, and all of its material wealth, the Soviet
Union. This invasion was code named "Unternehmen Barbarossa", or Operation
Barbarossa.
In order to better understand Operation Barbarossa, you must first look at the
two opposing leaders: Adolf Hitler, the German Chancellor, and Joseph Stalin,
the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These two
individuals are directly responsible for the severe hardships and bloodshed that
took place, beginning on the morning of June 22, 1940 at 0415(D) which lasted
for nearly five years during Germanys invasion of the Soviet Union.2
Adolf Hitler was born April 20, 1889, in Braunau, Austria and was made
Chancellor of Germany, serving from 1933 until 1945, and then he assumed the
position of Fhrer (Leader) of Germany from 1934 until 1945. In 1909, when he
became of age, Hitler did not register for the Austrian military because he
despised Austria. In 1913 authorities caught up to him and while processing him
for the Austro - Hungarian Army, he was rejected for service due to medical
issues. However, with the outbreak of World War I, Hitler was able to join the
German Army, where he distinguished himself in combat.
Following World War I, Hitler took part in the Beer Hall Putsch on November
23, 1923 in an attempt to overthrow the Bavarian government.3 However, the
revolt fizzled out shortly after its initiation and he was arrested on November 26,

Mauldwin 3
1923. Following his arrest he was sentenced to five years in prison at the
Landsberg Castle in Munich, Germany. During his imprisonment, Hitler read
many books, one of which was written by the American car manufacturer, Henry
Ford, named The International Jew. Ford mentioned three things that struck
home with Hitler: there was a Jewish conspiracy to take over the world, a hostile
view of Communism, and a hostile view of trade unions (Hitler)
While in prison, Hitler was encouraged to write his autobiography, which he
entitled Mein Kampf. He did not however write it himself, but dictated it instead
to a ghost writer.4 The book is a mixture of autobiography, political ideas and
an explanation of the techniques of propaganda. Details within the book are often
inaccurate and it appears Hitler was attempting to promote a positive image of
himself rather than an accurate autobiography (Hitler). With the publication of
this book, Adolf Hitler broadcasted his intentions for a new German empire, as
well as outlined his political philosophy. Hitler believed that the Soviet Union
represented an amalgamation of Germanys greatest enemies, the Jews and the
Slavs. Within the pages of Mein Kampf, Hitler freely revealed his plans of
German expansion and the enslavement and / or destruction of both groups,
especially those living in the Soviet Union.5 He often referred to the Soviets as
Stalins Jewish-Bolsheviks and felt that Germany would not be safe until they
were destroyed (Hitler).
Although not widely read initially, some did recognize the warnings the book
contained (Shirer). Mein Kampf clearly identified Hitlers goal, which was not
merely the expansion of Germany, but the annexation of most of Europe,

Mauldwin 4
including the Soviet Union. Mein Kampf very plainly stated that Germany would
acquire vast territories throughout Europe and Hitler openly advertised that these
territories included the Soviet Union. After Hitler became Chancellor in January
1933, Mein Kampf became an instant best seller, selling more than seven and a
half million copies. Some people called it the Nazi bible (Shirer). Hitler would
lead Germany in his pursuit of German expansion, based on the ideals described
in Mein Kampf, against the Soviet Union led by Joseph Stalin.
Joseph Stalin was born on September 21, 1879 in Gori, Russia as Iosif
Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili.6 As a young revolutionary, he wrote Marxism and
the National Question which was published under the pseudonym "Stalin",
meaning "Man of Steel" (Answers). Stalin rose to his initial power in 1922 when
he served the Soviet Union as General Secretary of the Central Committee until
he assumed the position of de facto dictator of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s
(UKAsk).
Shortly after his rise to power, Stalin initiated the first of four purges as he led
the Soviet Union on its path to becoming an industrialized nation.7 Farms
throughout the country underwent collectivization as they became the property
of the state in order to feed the country as Stalin led the Soviet Union from an
economy based on agrarian production, to one based upon industrialization.
Approximately 25 million people were forced to work the state controlled
farms. The results of this economic shift were initially very costly. Estimates
vary, but on average approximately 14.5 million people were killed and a
reduction of agricultural output, as high as 25%, was experienced (CNN). Even

Mauldwin 5
with these large losses in citizens and food production, Stalin was successful in
transforming the Soviet Union into a world power with a newly established
industrialized economic base.
In the 1930s, fearing possible rivalries, Stalin again conducted what was to
become known as The Great Purge. He eliminated anyone he thought
opposed him politically, even those who had assisted in placing him into power. 8
In what would later prove to be very costly due to a lack leadership and
experience in the ranks of the Red Army, Stalin also purged the militarys
leadership. Nearly 30,000 members were executed and a large number of those
were officers (Spartacus). This eventually returned to haunt the Soviet Union in
the late 1930s when Germany began to expand its sphere of domination.
In March 1938, Hitler put his plan into operation when he annexed Austria
without any force. The world sat by and did nothing. Hitler then turned his
attention towards Czechoslovakia, demanding the return of Sudetenland, which
had been taken following World War I. England and France, wanting to avoid
another conflict, met with Hitler in Munich on September 29, 1938, along with
Benito Mussolini of Italy. The result of this meeting was the signing of the
Munich Pact which granted the return of the Sudetenland to Germany and the
Czech withdraw from that area by October 10, 1938. However, in March 1939
Germany occupied Czechoslovakia in its entirety and declared the country a
German protectorate. This action nullified the Munich Pact and set the stage for
future liberations.
Hitler did not intend on making the same mistake of fighting on two fronts as

Mauldwin 6
had been done during World War I. Therefore, on August 14, 1939, German
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop met Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov in Moscow to negotiate a peace between the two powers.
Two agreements emerged from this meeting; The first was an economic
agreement signed on August 19th which stated that the Soviet Union would
provide food products and raw materials to Germany and Germany in turn would
provide products such as machinery to the Soviet Union, the second agreement
was the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, signed on August 23rd, approximately
one week before World War II began.9
The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact stated that neither Germany nor the
Soviet Union would attack the other and that any disagreements would be
handled politically. More specifically, the agreement stipulated that if Germany
attacked Poland, the Soviet Union would not come to Polands aid. This further
meant that if England and / or France declared war on Germany following an
attack on Poland, the Soviets would not enter the war. This was a key point for
the Germans because it negated the possibility of opening a second front
Eastern Europe.10
On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. Within two days, the
Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand declared war on Germany. On
September 10th, Canada also declared war on Germany. These declarations
were of little concern to either Hitler or Stalin and on September 17th Soviet
forces crossed the Polish border and occupied its new territories in Eastern
Poland as outlined in the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.

Mauldwin 7
Throughout 1940 Germany and the Soviet Union continued to attack smaller
European states and occupy them with little effort. Allied forces could barely hold
their own ground as they were significantly weakened by losses sustained during
World War I. On June 20, 1940, Hitlers battle against France came to an end
with the French signing an armistice.11
On July 10, 1940, Hitler launched Operation Sea Lion and focused his
efforts against Britain. Although Britain was weakened and its military was nearly
1/3 of Germanys strength, Britain fought valiantly. Due to continued losses and
few results, Hitler indefinitely postponed the invasion of London on September
17, 1940. Estimates place German losses at approximately 1,100 aircraft and
British losses at 650. The failure of Operation Sea Lion was due in part to Hitlers
shift of attention towards Western Europe and the Jews and the Slavs of the
Soviet Union.
"Unternehmen Barbarossa" or Operation Barbarossa was the German code
name for the planed attack against the Soviet Union. Planning for the operation
began in June of 1940 with a strategic survey conducted by Lieutenant General
Friedrich von Paulus and the details drafted by Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg.
The resultant document consisted of a thirty page outline (Rice 47). Following
the survey, von Paulus main advice to Hitler was to deny the Soviets the
capability of withdraw into the interior of Russia and he recommended that victory
would be won by conducting successive encircling movements, known as
Kesselschlachten, the German Army could destroy the Red Army in multiple
engagements.

Mauldwin 8
The Weimar Truppenamt, German General Staff, accepted Hitlers
assumption that they would be victorious over the Soviets within one year. The
primary focus of the German plan was to catch and destroy the Soviet Army
along its border regions. Although many of Hitlers staff knew that if the Red
Army wasnt destroyed along the border, there would be negative effects on the
course of the entire operation. This was a primary concern because once away
from the border areas, the terrain broadened almost immediately. This would not
only spread the Germans forces out but would also allow the Soviets time and
space. The duration of the campaign season in 1941 left little room for error
since nature would act as a blockade against any winter offensive the Germans
might launch. Furthermore, the General Staff conducted war games and they
realized they would have logistical problems if they had to supply their forces
beyond a line extending beyond Estonia to Smolensk and into the central
Ukraine ( (Doughty 422).
Had the Germans had a joint plan the invasion of the Soviet Union, and
World War II, may have had a different ending. However, planning was not a
joint effort. The Oberkommando des Heeres (HKH), Germany's Army High
Command, focused on the strategic goal of Moscow, while the Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht (OKW), Germanys High Command of the Armed Forces, relied
heavily on conquering the Baltic States all the way to Leningrad and the
occupation of the Ukraine. Both the OKH and the OKW agreed that Moscow
should be where the forces were concentrated and the overall objective. The
issues concerning Leningrad and the Ukraine would have been easily worked

Mauldwin 9
out, but it was compounded by the fact that Hitler did not listen to his military
advisors and chose his own course. Hitler could have achieved victory over the
Soviet Union had he concentrated on a single, decisive goal, such as Moscow
(Rice 356).
Hitler did not believe that Moscow played as significant a role as his advisors
felt it did. Similarly, he agreed that the invasion had to be successful in the Baltic
States. Specifically in two key objectives: in the north Leningrad, home of the
Bolshevik revolution and the birthplace of Soviet Communism; in the south, the
breadbasket of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine. This area also contained nearly
60% of the Soviets industry and the bulk of Soviet oil reserves which the
Germans required for their military endeavors. Moscow was an objective since it
was the capital of the Soviet Union and where Stalin directed the country, but it
held no significant place in Hitlers plans at the onset of the invasion.
Even though the General Staff voiced concerns about the objectives and the
difficulties which could arise should the Soviets withdraw from the borders, Hitler
dictated the objectives of the invasion and the direction his army would advance.
Although the staff plans varied, and issues obscured a quick victory, Colonel
General Franz Halder, chief of the Armys General Staff, completed the final plan
in accordance with Hitlers desires. However, he chose not to address issues
presented by the General Staff, with the hopes that after the initial stages of the
invasion, the Army leadership could persuade Hitler to attack Moscow (Doughty
423).
Ultimately, the Germans deployed three Army Groups for the invasion. Army

Mauldwin 10
Group South was commanded by Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt and
consisted of Panzergruppe 1 (First Panzer Group), the 6.Armee Oberkommando,
11.Armee Oberkommando and 17.Armee Oberkommando (Sixth, Eleventh, and
Seventeenth armies. The Southern element totaled five panzer, four motorized
infantry, twenty-eight infantry, two mountain, four light and three security
divisions. Army Group Centre was commanded by Field Marshall Fedor von
Bock and consisted of Panzergruppe 2 and 4 (Second and Fourth Panzer
Groups), the 16.Armee Oberkommando and 18.Armee Oberkommando (Fourth
and Ninth armies). The Centre totaled nine panzer, six and one-half motorized
infantry, thirty-seven infantry, and one cavalry divisions. Finally, Army Group
North was commanded by Field Marshall von Leeb. This group consisted of the
Panzergruppe 4 (Fourth Panzer Group), the 16.Armee Oberkommando and
18.Armee Oberkommando (Sixteenth and Eighteenth armies). This group
totaled three panzer and motorized infantry, nineteen infantry, and four security
divisions (See Enclosure 01).
On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 21 (See Enclosure 02).
This eleven page document detailed the attack plan of the German military forces
for the invasion of the Soviet Union, including their axis of advance and specific
objectives; Leningrad, then Kiev, and finally Moscow. However, the Directive
failed to present a clear and concise sequence of events. It did not detail
whether one elements action were to be completed before anothers. It also
failed to specify primary or secondary courses of action (Gilbert 214).12
As stated earlier, German planning directives for the invasion produced more

Mauldwin 11
questions for field commanders that it provided guidance (Doughty 422). For
example; Army Group South was to capture Kiev, and then continue to the
Dnieper bend.13 Army Group Centre was to advance to and capture Smolensk.
The Eleventh Army was to be further dispatched to cover Romania and its oil
fields. Meanwhile, Army Group Norths objective was to clear the Baltic States
(Northern Russia). Other than these specific tasks, very little else was
disseminated to the field commanders. The Directive was so vague that Field
Marshall von Bock, Army Group Centre, was unsure whether his first objective
was to encircle Soviet forces around Minsk or bypass them and move directly to
Smolensk (Doughty 422).
Regardless of how vague Directive No. 21 was, the army of Germany that
invaded the Soviet Union was a very highly trained military force. The doctrine
on which it relied had been developed by senior leaders of the Weimar
Truppenamt in 1924, following World War I. This new doctrine was known as Die
Truppenfuhrung and it emphasized: decentralization and mission oriented
orders; speed, exploitation, commander initiative; close integration, cooperation
between the branches; and commanders leading from the front. It was designed
to defeat the static trench warfare which was prevalent along the Western Front
during World War I and expanded the use of Attack in Position Warfare
developed in 1918.14
On June 6, 1941, Hitler issued, in no vague terms, his Commissar Order.
This order was given to his generals and directed them to persecute and then
execute all Soviet political commissars.15 The Commissar Order was to be

Mauldwin 12
carried out by the Wermacht and by the Einsatzgruppens which were special
action groups that accompanied each Army Group and was given the duty of
special security matters" and they were empowered to carry out executive
measures against the civilian population."16 While German forces were likely the
most professional army in existence at the time even though Germany was
woefully unprepared for the logistical nightmare the invasion would bring to life.
A prime example of this was armament. The Germans possessed very
antiquated equipment and the surplus they did posses was very limited.
Therefore, many items such as weapons, ammunition, support vehicles, and
repair parts were obtained through the assimilation of captured equipment and
through battlefield recovery.
Likewise, German intelligence was not as accurate as Hitler would have
desired as evidenced by continued poor analysis produced in regards to Soviet
capabilities prior to the invasion.17 This under evaluation was true not only of the
Soviet reserve forces or the Soviet citizens resolve, but especially in regards to
Soviet industrial flexibility and advancement (Doughty 423).18
While Germany planned the invasion with somewhat obscured information,
Soviet Intelligence was uncovering far more reliable information. As early as
December 1940, Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy working for Red Orchestra in
Japan, obtained information that Adolf Hitler was involved in negotiations with
Japan and the prospects of an invasion.19 Sorge transmitted a message to
Moscow which stated that the Germans would attack in May, 1941. However,
Stalin ignored the transmittal believing that the British and / or the French were

Mauldwin 13
attempting to draw the Soviet Union into a war with Germany. Additional
information later solidified Sorges report.
On July 9, 1940, the Chief of Foreign Intelligence of the Glavnoe Upravlenie
Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (GUGB), of the State Security Directorate known
as the Narodny Komissaryat Vnutrennikh Del, or NKVD, sent a memo to the
Glavnoye Razvedovatel'noye Upravlenie (GRU), the main intelligence directorate
of the Red Army, asking their opinion of another agents reports about German
preparations for war against the Soviet Union (Bellamy 136). The report listed
several creditable references: First, former British King Edward VIII and his wife,
along with Wallis Simpson, had met with Hitler in Madrid where they discussed
cooperation against the Soviet Union and a separate peace amongst
themselves. Second, the Germans were preparing to attack Great Britain. Third,
the German Attach in Bucharest had discretely mentioned the severance of
Bessarabia and Soviet Moldova from the Soviet Union.20 Fourth, the Germans
told the Soviets that they were moving large quantities of cement and stone into
the territory of former Poland in order to construct autobahns (Strategic
highways). The construction of these highways ran alongside Soviet borders.
Fifth, two German steamers were on their way to Knigsberg, while thirty-seven
troop trains had been seen moving from Bohemia to former Poland. In both
cases, it was reported that reinforcements were being transported. Sixth,
German fortifications were being constructed between Silesia and Poland.
Seventh, within Bohemia and Moravia, both of which had been declared a
Protectorate of Germany, all individuals who spoke Russian, Serbian, Croatian,

Mauldwin 14
Bulgarian and Romanian were being registered with the Army. At the same time
Ukrainian emigrants in the Prague had been ordered to increase anti-Soviet
rhetoric. These were the issues that the NKVD asked the GRU to provide their
opinion on (Bellamy 136).21
Following the July 9th report, on July 14th and 15th, German forces were
again reported to be concentrating on the Lithuanian and Belarusian borders. On
September 18, 1940, the Peoples Commissariat for Defense reported to the
Central Committee of the Communist Party that Germany had approximately 226
infantry divisions, including eight motorized divisions and between fifteen and
eighteen panzer divisions, totaling approximately 243 in all massed along the two
borders. Additional reporting showed that 85 infantry, and possibly nine panzer
divisions, were deployed eastward facing the Soviet Union in the Balkans. The
Commissariat further estimated the strength of German forces, should they
attack the Soviet Union, to be 173 divisions consisting of 10, 000 tanks and
13,000 aircraft. This was in addition to fifteen Finnish divisions, thirty Romanian
divisions, and fifteen Hungarian divisions. The additional forces from these
German allies were estimated to be 550 tanks and 2100 aircraft. The
Commissariat further estimated that if Germany attacked, the attack would be in
the North with 123 divisions and an additional fifty supporting an attack in the
Ukraine (Bellamy 137).
Based on this overwhelming intelligence, Stalin maintained a position of not
wishing to appear aggressive towards the German activities. When the German
attack date reported by Agent Sorge did not occur in May 1941, Stalin became

Mauldwin 15
more convinced that it was a trick following the Germans invasion of Yugoslavia
in April 1941.22 Stalins delivery of raw materials to the Germans under the
provisions of their economic agreement reached their highest amount since
1939. Stalin sent 208,000 tons of grain, 90,000 tons of fuel oil, 8,300 tons of
cotton, 6,3440 tons of copper/tin/nickel/and other materials, and 4,000 tons of
rubber (Gilbert 179).
On June 16, 1941, four days and a few hours before the invasion, Stalin
received two reports, the first sent by Corsican and the second sent by
Starshina, or Sergeant-Major.23 Both agents were operating in Berlin. The
report sent by Sergeant-Major plainly stated Germanys intentions.

A source, working in the headquarters of German aviation [the Air

Ministry], informs us:
1. All military measures by Germany in preparation for an armed attack
on the USSR are fully complete, and an attack may be expected at any
moment.
2. In air staff circles the TASS communiqu of 6 June [an error the
reference is to the widely reported communiqu of 14 June] has been
received very ironically. They underline that in practice it has no
significance.
3. Targets for German air attacks in the first instance will be: the SvirZ electric power station, Moscow factories, making parts for aircraft

Mauldwin 16
(electrical, ball bearings, tyres), and also auto repair shops.
4. Hungary will play a major part in military action on the German side.
Part of the German Air Force, mainly fighters has already left for
Hungarian airfields.
5. Important German aircraft repair shops are deployed in Konigsberb,
Gdynia, Grudziaz, Breslau, Marienburg. The aviation repair shops in
Poland are at Milicz in Warsaw and, especially important, - at
Heiligenkeil (Starshinas Communiqu)

Stalins response was one of continued denial even in the face of the pending
invasion:

To Comrade Merkulov.
You can tell your source from the German Air Headquarters that he
can go fuck his mother. This is not a source, but a disinformant.
I.ST. (Stalin)

On June 21, 1941, around 1930D, the unidentified Deputy Prime Minister
who was in charge of the Merchant Navy, informed Stalin that he was receiving
reports from various harbormasters that German ships were departing without

Mauldwin 17
unloading (Spartacus). It was only after the Moscow fire brigade informed Stalin
that the German embassy was burning documents that he finally ordered
Moscows air defenses to be brought to 75% alert. Stalin still refused to believe
that the Germans would attack. At approximately 2000C, a German soldier
defected to nearby Soviet forces and informed them that the German Army would
attack the following morning (See Enclosure 03). The information was relayed to
Stalin. Despite all of these warnings, coupled with more than 180 German
intrusions into Soviet airspace, some more than 150km deep, Stalin remained
blinded with his obsession of not provoking Hitler into armed conflict.
On Sunday, June 22, 1941, Stalins obsession evaporated as German forces
launched a three pronged surprise attack at 0415C that spanned 2,000 miles in
breadth (Rice 48). Approximately 148 divisions (114 infantry, fifteen motorized,
and nineteen panzer divisions), consisting of approximately three million men,
3,600 tanks, 47,000 artillery guns, 5,000 planes, and approximately 750,000
horses advanced into the frontier of the Soviet motherland (Service 261).
Additionally, 67,000 German Norwegian troops, 500,000 Finns, and 150,000
Rumanians were recruited to take part in the invasion. Whether by coincidence
or purposeful planning, exactly one year prior, the French had surrendered at
Compigne and 179 years earlier, Napoleon had crossed the Neman River
heading towards Moscow.
The Soviet Unions only prospect was to impede the German onslaught
along its border. Occupying the Stalin Line, were approximately 10,000 Soviet
tanks, 2,300 aircraft, and approximately 2,300,000 troops. However, the majority

Mauldwin 18
of the Soviet equipment was obsolete and the men facing the German Goliath
were inexperienced green soldiers that comprised the Red Army in June 1941.
On the same day, Chief of the General Staff Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
issued Directive of Peoples' Commissariat of Defence No. 3 which was the
counter-offensive order to all elements of the Red Army. The order specified
certain areas that the Red Army was to encircle and destroy German forces, all
of which was to be accomplished no later than June 26th. The order proved to
be catastrophic as 600,000 Soviet troops were captured when Kiev fell. In his
memoirs published in 2002, then Marshall Zhukov, claimed that Stalin had made
him sign the Directive against his will.
As the German ground forces began their attack, the Luftwaffe commenced
the air bombardment of Kovno, Minsk, Rovno, Odessa, Sevastopol, and the
naval base at Libava. The Soviet forces had been instructed not to prepare any
defensive positions under Stalins non-aggression treaty. In fact, other than
placing the Moscow Air Defenses at 75% alert, no other preparations had been
conducted to meet the German advance. Brigade Commissar (Colonel) Nikolay
Popel, Chief Political Officer of the VIII Mechanized Corps notified Moscow that
artillery was falling to the front of his Corps. Popel was told Do not fall for
provocation. Do not open fire on German aircraft. Wait for orders! (Bellamy
162). Shortly afterward, two waves of German aircraft flew over his position
executing a precision bombing run against nearby railway stations, approach
roads, and an oil refinery.24
For the next week, the Soviet Union fought on without direction. It is believed

Mauldwin 19
by some that Stalin suffered a mental breakdown (Duncan 315). Stalin knew that
he and his staff had failed and supposedly he cursed his leadership for
jeopardizing the great Soviet Union that Lenin had left in his care (Service 260).
Whatever the reason, it was not until June 28th that Stalin reappeared and
announced a decree calling on all Soviets to fight for the motherland. In his
broadcast to the nation, he called the Soviets brothers and sisters sounding
almost Christian. These were terms which he had never used and would never
use again (Rayfield 389). However, this broadcast did serve to unite the Soviets
under the banner of patriotism in the defense of the Motherland.
From June through August, German forces enjoyed successes along each of
their lines of advance as they continued to expand their control across the Soviet
frontier capturing cities such as Minsk, Smolensk, and Novogrod. However, with
winter fast approaching and Soviet determination growing, the German advance
soon stalled along all but Army Group Souths axis of advance (See Enclosure
04). By September, along with the coming of winter, the Germans had failed to
complete all of their objectives with the exception of the capture of Kiev (See
Enclosure 05).

ARMY GROUP SOUTH: BATTLE OF KIEV

Army Group South pushed rapidly in search of its main objectives; to
conquer the Ukraine and secure the oil-rich Caucasus.25 The Ukraine was the
breadbasket of the Soviet Union although it only comprised 3% of its land mass.
Sixty percent of Soviet coal reserves and 30% of its iron ore were also produced

Mauldwin 20
in the Ukraine. German planners believed that if they could
The German Army Group South was comprised of 52 divisions. Opposing
Army Group South was the Soviet South and South-West Fronts comprised of 64
divisions. This was the only German force which secured its primary objective
even though it met the strongest organized resistance from its initial surge of
advance.
Four days after the invasion began, as North and Centre sat idly at their
objectives awaiting their infantry units to catch up, Field Marshal von Rundstedt
moved his forces towards the town of Brody in Blitzkrieg fashion. The Soviets
had massed and counterattacked Rundstedts forces on June 26th with over
1,000 tanks. The objective of the Soviet forces was to exploit the flanks of the
1st Panzer Group and encircle the Germans. This engagement was the fiercest
fought during the entire invasion, lasting four complete days. It was during this
battle that the German tank and anti-armor crews learned that the new Soviet T34 tanks were nearly impervious to their weapons.
Even though the Soviets possessed superior tanks, they failed to coordinate
or concentrate their attacks. This made it easy for the Germans to isolate and
subsequently immobilize individual tanks by blowing off their treads; after which
the disabled tank could be destroyed much easier. The counter-attack failed and
the last viable Soviet tank force in the Ukraine had been destroyed, but at an
extensive cost of German Panzers (WW2T). Up until that point, the Battle at
Brody was one of the largest tank battles of the Second World War.
The Germans continuously encountered tougher and tougher resistance as

Mauldwin 21
they pushed deeper into the Ukraine. Unable to contain the Germans, General
Mikhail Kirponos, Commander of the South-West Front, ordered his troops to
withdraw to the pre-1939 Soviet-Romanian border. Unfortunately, the position
proved to be inadequate and did not provide any acceptable defensive positions.
The Soviet forces launched two more counteroffensives on July 9th as the
Germans continued their advance towards Kiev. Although this slowed the
Germans down, it did little to stop their advance. On July 10th the Germans
launched a general offensive catching the Soviets by surprise and threatening
Kiev. Like the Leningrad and Moscow objectives, Field Marshal Rundstedt
planned for the encirclement of Kiev rather than a direct engagement which
would have caused the German casualty rate to rise drastically. In early August
the Germans captured the city of Uman south of Kiev and along with it 100,000
Soviet troops. This positioned Army Group South in a position to execute what is
sometimes called the largest encirclement battle in history, the Battle of Kiev.
The Battle of Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, was fought from August 15
September 19, 1941. 665,000 Soviet troops were captured when the city fell.
The Germans could have experienced success with fewer casualties had they
occupied the Ukraine as liberators. However, like most of their occupied lands,
they arrested priests, imposed censorship, and enslaved the populace.
On September 13, 1941, following the swift move by Field Marshal
Rundstedts panzer groups to complete their encirclement of Kiev, Marshall
Semeon Mikhailovich Budyenny, who had been tasked with the defense of Kiev,
requested permission to abandon Kiev. Stalin refused and then relived

Mauldwin 22
Budyenny (Gilbert 232). A new commander was not appointed; therefore, Soviet
forces were commanded by their individual corps and division level commanders.
By September 16th Rundstedt completed his 120 mile diameter encirclement
of Kiev. (Bellamy 342) The Soviet defenders had no armor forces or supreme
commander to direct their defense and there was no chance of a break-out.
Over the next several days three German Armies continually reduced the Kiev
defense, aided by the panzer groups. The Soviet Armies continued to defy the
German assault even though they endured bombardment by artillery, tanks, and
aircraft.
By September 19th Kiev had been reduced to rubble and it had fallen, yet the
battle continued. The last remnants of the Soviet defenders surrendered on
September 26th just east of Kiev. The fall of Kiev marked the last significant
resistance in the Southern theater. This enabled Army Group South to overrun
the Donets Basin.26 Even though Army Group South achieved its goals and
secured its objectives, the Ukraine did not turn out to be the decisive victory that
would end the war as Hitler had hoped. In fact, the Battle of Kiev proved to be
detrimental to the Germans. While the Soviet forces suffered terrible losses, they
bought nearly four weeks preparation for the defense of Moscow.
The Soviets learned valuable lessons from previous encirclements and, in
particular, from the Battle of Kiev. During the Battle of Moscow, the Soviets
avoided being encircled by the German forces.27 The Soviets would later utilize
the technique of encirclement during future offensive operations against the
Germans.

Mauldwin 23

ARMY GROUP CENTRE: BATTLE OF MOSCOW.

Army Group Centre, like Army Group North, was relatively successful during
the early months of the invasion. Centre had divided its attack on Soviet forces
commanded by General Dmitry Pavlov at Bialystok early during the offensive.
Field Marshall von Bock deployed his Panzers in a pincer movement, a classic
Blitzkrieg maneuver, and they were successful in encircling twenty Soviet
divisions. By July 6th, only sixteen days into the operation, Centre had captured
nearly 400,000 Soviets. Additionally, Centre either captured or destroyed 2,500
tanks, 1,400 artillery pieces, and 250 aircraft. The German success was so high
that Stalin called Pavlov back to Moscow and had him executed for treason and
incompetency. While other executions were ordered, General Pavlov was the
only top Soviet commander to be executed during the war (WW2T).
Like Army Group North, Centres victory was incomplete. First, the
encirclement by the panzer divisions, as in Army Group Norths area, was not
complete since the infantry had not been able to keep up with the advance and
were far behind. As a result, approximately 250,000 Soviet troops were able to
escape towards the east. Secondly, Hitler ordered a halt to the advance in Army
Group Centres area and its primary objective of Moscow. This halt had the
same profound effect by allowing the Soviets more time to prepare a defense
and it also permitted Soviet refugees to enter the city and thus provided
additional support for Soviet troops against German offensive operations
(WW2T).

Mauldwin 24
The Germans decided to launch a final decisive offensive against Moscow,
code named Operation Typhoon (See Enclosure 06). Hitler shifted divisions from
Army Group North and South to provide sufficient forces to Army Group Centre
during their thrust towards Moscow which began on October 2, 1941. The initial
assault deployed by Field Marshall von Bock was comprised of fourteen panzer
divisions and three infantry armies and it completely surprised the Soviets who
had not anticipated an offensive so late in the winter.
Army Group Centre had one million men, 1,700 tanks, 19,500 artillery guns,
and 950 combat aircraft to support its attack. Field Marshall Bock controlled 50%
of the German troops, 75% of all German tanks, and 33% of Luftwaffe located in
the Soviet Union. The Soviet forces opposing this German leviathan in defense
of Moscow were comprised of fewer than 500,000 men, less than 900 tanks, and
barely 300 aircraft (HLS). Hitlers intention was to level Moscow and killing all
living things within its confines.
Two days after the initial assault, snow began to fall, announcing the arrival
of the one of the coldest winters in over fifty years. Temperatures dropped to
22oF below zero. The German Army was not prepared for the extreme cold.
Most of the German soldiers still wore summer uniforms, and many suffered from
typhus and frostbite. German tankers had to burn fires beneath their tanks in
order to start them, sometimes for up to four hours (Rice 54).
That same day, Stalin addressed the Soviet people The German Invaders
want a war of extermination against the peoples of the Soviet Union. Very well
then! If they want a war of extermination, they shall have it! Our cause is just.

Mauldwin 25
Victory will be ours! (Fischer 472). Following this speech, Stalin dispatched
eighteen divisions from the Far East Command to defend Moscow and placed
Marshall Zhukov as commander of the Moscow forces.28
Within one week of the initial assault towards Moscow, nine Soviet Armies
had been encircled and trapped by the Germans in the towns of Vyazma and
Bryansk.29 These nine Armies caused major problems for the Germans in their
assault against Moscow, not because of their sizes, but because the Germans
could not bypass them without exposing their rear areas as they advanced
further east. Therefore, the Germans had to reduce these threats, which delayed
the German advance, allowing Marshall Zhukov the time he required to
reorganize the Red Army and its defenses along a 135 mile defensive line
between Kalinin to the Oka River west of Tula known as the Mozhaysk Line
(See Enclosure 07) (Ziemke 297).
As the surrounded elements were dealt with, the Germans resumed their
attack on Moscow on October 10th and managed to break through the Soviet
lines in multiple locations, some pushing as close to within 45 miles of Moscow.
However, the Soviets were able to halt the German advance and a stalemate
soon developed during which neither the Germans nor the Soviets gained any
ground.30
On the morning of November 7th, threatened by German armor and infantry
elements, Stalin hosted a parade in Red Square, located in the historic merchant
quarter known as Kitay-gorod, near the heart of Moscow. The parade was held
in celebration of the 24th Anniversary of the Communist Revolution. Stalin

Mauldwin 26
reviewed a military procession as it moved through the square from his position
atop the Lenin mausoleum. Afterward he addressed those assembled, many of
whom were bound for the front, and urged them to emulate past Soviet heroes.31
Army Group Centre commanders met at the town of Orsha, approximately
420 miles northeast of Moscow, on November 13th and decision was made to
conduct a second assault against Moscow. What they failed to realize was that
during the stalemate, Stalin had ordered an additional 100,000 men to defend
Moscow along with an additional 300 tanks and 2,000 artillery pieces (HLS).
Additionally, Moscows defenders and refugees had constructed 422 miles of
anti-tank ditches and approximately 30,000 firing positions along its defensive
line as well as emplaced 812 miles of barbed wire (HLS).
The Soviet defense of Moscow now consisted of five Fronts, each with a
specific task. The West Front who was responsible for securing all direct
approaches and to repel any armored assaults to the west of the city of Kalinin
and at Tula proper. The Kalinin and Southwest Fronts were responsible for
keeping the flanks of Army Group Centre occupied so that they could not be
used to reinforce an attack against Moscow. The South and Leningrad Fronts
were ordered to prepare for offensive operations near the cities of Rostov and
Tikhvin in order to draw German reserves away from the German main effort
(Ziemke 300).
On November 14th the Soviets attacked east of Serpukhov with little result.
The Germans responded by launching their second assault against Moscow on
November 15th. On November 17th Zhukov requested and received another two

Mauldwin 27
armies to defend Moscow. At this time, the Germans had one million men and
1,700 tanks while the Soviets strength was bolstered to 1.25 million men,
supported by approximately 1000 tanks. Although the Germans gained some
ground, a few elements were able to move to within eighteen miles of Moscow.
German forces were unable to occupy Moscow due to the tenacity of the Soviet
defenders and the onset of severe winter weather. By the end of November
German momentum stalled at gates of Moscow and the Soviet forces had
occupied their final defensive positions 13.5 miles from Moscow.
On November 30th, Zhukov submitted a West Front plan for a two-stroke
counteroffensive north and south of Moscow. Stalin approved the attacks on
December 4th and that night the temperatures dropped to -25oF. The two
counter-attacks were executed on December 5th and 6th.32 The Soviet forces
were well equipped for the cold weather and they feverously attacked the
German forces that were all but paralyzed by the cold and lack of logistical
support.33 The German situation was perilous (HLS).
Within twenty days of the Soviet counteroffensives the Germans lost nearly
155,000 men and had only a handful of reserves. The Soviets on the other hand
had 58 Infantry and Cavalry divisions in reserve. On December 16th, Hitler
issued orders which prohibited any withdraw without his explicit permission and
he also called for fanatical resistance.34 German forces were unable to retain the
ground they occupied and by January 1942 the threat to Moscow had passed
with the German forces having been pushed back between 60 and 155 miles in
some places.

Mauldwin 28
ARMY GROUP NORTH: THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD.
Army Group North launched its attack towards Leningrad at the beginning of
the invasion and in a little more than one month, they had positioned themselves
within striking distance of their objective, Leningrad. On August 10th, Army
Group North launched their final push towards Leningrad meeting little resistance
and by August 14th they sat on the outskirts of the great city. However, the
German forces were plagued with logistical problems. Due to the rapidity of the
advance, neither the logistical supplies nor the infantry had been able to keep up.
Aware of this, Hitler halted the advance in order to permit the infantry to catch up.
He announced that Moscow would become the primary objective and he
subsequently reassigned General Hoepner's IV Panzer group to support Army
Group Centres attack (HLS). This delay gave the Soviets time to regroup and
establish a defensive perimeter around Leningrad. While this served to
congregate the Soviet forces in Leningrad, it also permitted fleeing citizens to
move into Leningrad and bolster the population with potential combatants
(Bellamy 122). Prior to the invasion Leningrad boasted a population of 2,500,000
citizens. However, with the German advance 100,000 additional refugees sought
refuge in the city (HLS). Army Group Norths objective of Leningrad was
incomplete as they had been unable to capture the city.
The Siege of Leningrad, named Operation Nordlicht (North Light),
commenced on September 4, 1941 when German artillery began to rain down on
the city. On Sept 19th the worst air bombardment of the siege took place when
276 German bombers of the German Luftwaffe began its bombardment of the

Mauldwin 29
city and its inhabitants (Cavallerano). The death toll quickly claimed more than
1000, many of which had been located at one of the hospitals when it was struck.
Two days later, 180 additional bombers struck the Leningrad naval docks at
Kronstadt, which were the Leningrads principle defense platform. By September
8th, German forces had advanced to within ten miles of Leningrad and had
effectively sealed off the city from any outside land contact.35 Minimal resupplies
arrived sporadically by air or along the river, although these means were under
German observation and constant attack. The Soviets residing inside the city
banded together in a display of Soviet patriotism and embraced a determination
to fend off the Germans. Over two hundred thousand people volunteered for
military duty in the first week (Suny 318).
The Leningrad refugees were forced to endure a lifestyle vividly pronounced
by poverty, famine, disease, and some of the worst living conditions during this
epoch (Cavallerano). A system of rationing was implemented, and ration cards
issued (See Enclosure 08). Ration priority went to soldiers, manual laborers,
office workers and finally non-working adults and children. Food rationing was
not sufficient to extend the food supplies and the inhabitants had to turn to
alternate means of nutrition. Bread substitutes were devised in order to retain a
stock of oats to feed the animals, cats and sheep intestines were stewed and
flavored with oil of cloves and the liquid from the stew became a substitute for
milk. Seaweed was made into broth and yeast was made into soup. Even
through ingenuity, people only received about 10% of the recommend daily
caloric intake (HLS). The bombardment was relentless and it quickly cut all

Mauldwin 30
electrical supply to the beleaguered city. Fuel supplies dwindled rapidly and the
refugees soon found themselves without heat as winter approached. Although
the occupants of Leningrad were under constant bombardment, their
determination did not falter and the German attack failed. Field Marshall von
Leeb appealed to Hitler to permit a siege of the city. On September 29, 1941,
Hitler conceded to a siege of Leningrad.
Starvation claimed thousands of lives as people died from lack of nutrition.
They collapsed on factory floors and in the streets. Mass burials were organized
and when grave diggers could be found, the citizens used explosives to blow
holes into the ground. Bodies were thrown into holes and left under the
assumption that the snow would cover them.36
One survivor recalled, "I watched my father and mother die - I knew perfectly
well they were starving. But I wanted their bread more than I wanted them to stay
alive. And they knew that about me too. That's what I remember about the
blockade: that feeling that you wanted your parents to die because you wanted
their bread." (HLS). In some instances, refugees reverted to cannibalism as a
means of survival.
Two transportation lifelines were eventually utilized by the occupants of
Leningrad; the Road of Life and Lake Lagoda. The Road of Life was a road
that was constructed across Lake Lagoda to serve not only as an escape route,
but as a life line for the inhabitants of Leningrad. Literally thousands of the
Leningrad occupants participated in the construction of the road. The road was
more than 200 miles long, linking Leningrad to the city of Zaborie, and was

Mauldwin 31
completed in a mere 27 days. Although it was not wide, it did suffice as a form of
transit. On December 6th the city officials announced that the Road of Life was
to be utilized for the first time. Over 300 vehicles embarked on the maiden
journey, but breakdowns and the harsh winter limited the maximum distances
travelled on any given day to just twenty miles
On December 9th Leningrad received word via Radio Moscow, that the city
of Tikhvin, along with its precious railhead, had been retaken by Soviet forces.
German forces occupying the town had been ill prepared for the Soviet winter
since initial plans had led them to believe the invasion would last no more than a
few months. Over 7,000 Germans were killed and the rest were forced to
withdraw more than 50 miles from the town.
Although the winter was extremely cold, it was not cold enough to freeze
Lake Lagoda completely and support the weight of the Soviet trucks, called
Lorries.37 However, the lake was sufficiently frozen to stop all river transports
from delivering supplies to the various locations along its banks. The thickness
of the lake, in order to support a Lorrie, had to be 200mm. The lake normally
only froze to this thickness in November. On November 26, 1941, eight Lorries
departed and returned with 33 tons of food. While this boosted morale, the city
required 1,000 tons of food per day. As the ice thickened, more food was
transported which eventually exceeded 100 tons per day (HLS).
Death was a part of everyday life in Leningrad. During the month of
December nearly 5, 200 people died. On average there were approximately
1,600 deaths per day. These estimates are based on city records of individuals

Mauldwin 32
who were buried and did not account for individuals who died at home, or on the
street, and their bodies were never found.
The siege continued until the German forces were routed on January 27,
1944, 872 days in duration (Gilbert 495). The official death toll recorded by city
officials during the siege was 632,000 although many believe the figure to be
closer to one million. Even if this low figure is correct, it means that at a
minimum, 742 died every day during the siege of Leningrad.38
From June 1941 till January 1942, the German military flexed its might and
operated off of its legacy. The German plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union
was based on extermination from its inception, just as it had been in every
country they occupied during WWII. The most widely known atrocity occurred on
September 29th - 30th, 1941. Nearly 34,000 Jews were brought to a ravine
known as Babi Yar, located near a Jewish Cemetery outside of Kiev. Men,
women, and children were systematically machine-gunned in a two-day
execution spree. It was the largest single mass killing that the German army was
responsible for during Operation Barbarossa.39 This mass killing was carried out
by the mobile SS unit, the Einsatzgruppen (Wette 112). This event became
known as the Massacre of Babi Yar.
Operation Barbarossa, from a German standpoint, was a complete failure
and along with it the worlds perception of the invincible Wehrmacht changed. By
January 31, 1942, German losses - including killed, wounded, captured, and
missing totaled nearly 918,000 men, 28.7% of the 3.2 million soldiers that
initially began the campaign (Rice 55). The Germans were never able to recover

Mauldwin 33
from this defeat.
German occupation continued until July 24, 1944 when the Red Army
recaptured Brest-Litovsk while driving the Germans back towards Berlin. The
Soviets continued their offensive drive which resulted in their arrival in Berlin on
April 23, 1945. While Hitler thought that the Soviet Union would be the beginning
of German domination and the fulfillment of his dream, in reality, it was the
beginning of the end of German terror in the European theater.

FOOTNOTES

The Treaty provided the following terms: 1) Germany lost 13.5% of its

territory including Alsace-Lorraine 2) Rhineland demilitarized & occupied by Allies

x 15 years 3) Article 231 placed the blame for the entire war squarely on the
shoulders of Germany 4) Germany lost most of its Navy (It destroyed it rather
than give it to England) and retained only 100K men in Army 5) Germany was
tagged with $32B in reparations 6) League of Nations formed but the U.S. didnt
join even though it was President Wilsons design 7) Nine new European nations
emerged.
2

Greenwich Mean Time, or GMT, is the solar time, recorded as Zulu Time

or merely Z, at the Royal Observatory in Greenwich, London. It is the basis

used to establish world time. There are 25 international times zones in the world
and they are identified as A thru Z. A thru M incrementally increases from Z,
while N thru Y incrementally decreases. Therefore, D would be GM, + 4 hours,

Mauldwin 34

making the time 0430D.

By 1923, the fledgling Nazi Party led by Adolf Hitler was comprised of

approximately 3,500 members (Three years earlier, 1920, the party had only 40
members). The headquarters for the Party was located in Munich. Many of the
German right wing parties had moved to Bavaria in southern Germany. This
permitted them to be far away from Berlin, without totally isolating themselves
from the German people.
On November 8, 1923, the Bavarian Prime Minister, Gustav Kahr, was
addressing a meeting at a beer hall in Munich. Kahr was joined by some of the
most senior men in Bavarian politics including Seisser, Bavarias police chief,
and Lossow, the local army commander.
Kahr, Lossow and Seisser were taken into a side room. Here, threatened
by guns, Kahr is said to have agreed to support Hitler in his attempt to take-over
the government in Berlin. Hitler promised Kahr that he would get a key position in
the new national government and Lossow was promised a senior post in the
German Army.
4

Initially, Emile Maurice, Hitler's chauffeur, was to write the book, but his

writing skills left much to be desired. Therefore, Rudolf Hess, a student at

Munich University took over the assignment. Originally entitled Four Years of
Struggle against Lies, Stupidity, and Cowardice. Hitler's publisher, Max Amnan,
reduced it to My Struggle (Mein Kampf). The book is a conglomeration of
autobiography, political ideas, and an explanation of the techniques of

Mauldwin 35

propaganda. (Spartacus).

The whole organization of education, and training which the People's State

is to build up must take as its crowning task the work of instilling into the hearts
and brains of the youth entrusted to it the racial instinct and understanding of the
racial idea. No boy or girl must leave school without having attained a clear
insight into the meaning of racial purity and the importance of maintaining the
racial blood unadulterated. Thus the first indispensable condition for the
preservation of our race will have been established and thus the future cultural
progress of our people will be assured.
A reform of particular importance is that which ought to take place in the
present methods of teaching history. Scarcely any other people are made to
study as much of history as the Germans, and scarcely any other people make
such a bad use of their historical knowledge. If politics means history in the
making, then our way of teaching history stands condemned by the way we have
conducted our politics. But there would be no point in bewailing the lamentable
results of our political conduct unless one is now determined to give our people a
better political education. In 99 out of 100 cases the results of our present
teaching of history are deplorable. Usually only a few dates, years of birth and
names, remain in the memory, while a knowledge of the main and clearly defined
lines of historical development is completely lacking. The essential features
which are of real significance are not taught. It is left to the more or less bright
intelligence of the individual to discover the inner motivating urge amid the mass

Mauldwin 36

of dates and chronological succession of events.

The subject matter of our historical teaching must be curtailed. The chief
value of that teaching is to make the principal lines of historical development
understood. The more our historical teaching is limited to this task, the more we
may hope that it will turn out subsequently to be of advantage to the individual
and, through the individual, to the community as a whole. For history must not be
studied merely with a view to knowing what happened in the past but as a guide
for the future, and to teach us what policy would be the best to follow for the
preservation of our own people. (Adolf Hitler. Mein Kampf, 1925).
6

Dzhugashvili was a member of the Bolshevik party and moved to

Petersburg in 1913 where he gained acceptance onto the Bolshevik Central

Committee and became editor of the Pravada. He visited Lenin in Poland and,
following Lenins suggestion, wrote Marxism and the National Question which
was published later in the year under the pseudonym "Stalin" meaning "Man of
Steel".
7

Stalins purges rid him of any outspoken opposition, politically and militarily.

The purges began in December 1934, with the assassination of popular

Leningrad party leader, Sergei Kirov, Stalins close friend. In 1935 Stalin
purged the key Soviet institutions (Communist Party, the Army, the NKVD
(secret police), scientists, and engineers). In 1936 various leading political
figures against Stalin were arrested and sentenced to death. In 1937-38, Stalin
directed what would become known as The Great Purge which included
members of the Communist Party, Red Army (Over 30,000 executed), and the

Mauldwin 37

NKVD. The Red Army purges were possibly bolstered by Reinhard Heydrich,
who took advantage of Stalins paranoia by supplying information that led to the
execution of many top Red Army leaders.
8

Soviet nuclear physicist and academician Andrei Sakharov estimated that

more than 1.2 million party members were arrested between 1936 and 1939.
600,000 died by torture, execution or perished in the Gulag.
9

This pact is also referred to as the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Stalin had agreed to send raw materials to
Germany to support its military exploits.
10

A second protocol was also signed shortly after the main pact. This

protocol gave the Soviets the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It
also divided Poland between the Germany and the Soviet Union along the
Narew, Vistula, and San rivers. A total of three secret protocols were signed and
amended to the pact.
11

Hitler had the railway carriage in which the 1918 German Armistice was

signed moved from its location in a museum to the exact spot it had occupied in
1918. Hitler sat in the same chair as Marshal Ferdinand Foch had sat when the
Germans offered their surrender. Three days later, Hitler had the car burned and
its remnants scattered and buried.
12

Hitler would issue a total of seven directives relating to Operation

Barbarossa. (See Appendix A)

13

The Dnieper is one of the longest rivers in Europe. It begins in the Valdai

Hills, west of Moscow and flows generally south past Smolensk, through Belarus,

Mauldwin 38

past Mogilev, then through Ukraine, past Kiev, Cherkasy, Kremenchuk,

Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya (site of the Dniprohes dam), Nikopol, and
Kherson, finally into the Black Sea. Between Kremenchuk and Nikopol the
Dnieper makes a vast bend to the east and this was a key piece of terrain to
control logistical transportation from the Ukraine to the Soviet Union since it is the
main river of Ukraine. Since the construction of the Dniprohes dam in 1932, the
Dnieper is navigable for virtually its entire course.
14

The Attack in Position warfare utilized Sturmtruppen, or Stormtroops,

which were infantry that would punch a hole in an opponents defense line, push
forward, bypassing enemy positions, with a goal of reaching a specific objective
deep within the enemy rear. Tanks and reserve forces would follow closely
behind in order to exploit this defensive breach and destroy pockets of
resistance. This technique was the predecessor to the German Blitzkrieg.
15

"The war against Russia cannot be fought in knightly fashion. The struggle

is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be waged with
unprecedented, unmerciful, and unrelenting hardness. All officers will have to get
rid of any old fashioned ideas they may have. I realize that the necessity for
conducting such warfare is beyond the comprehension of you generals, but I
must insist that my orders be followed without complaint. The commissars hold
views directly opposite to those of National Socialism. Hence these commissars
must be eliminated. Any German soldier who breaks international law will be
pardoned. Russia did not take part in the Hague Convention and, therefore, has
no rights under it." Hitler, June 6, 1941.

Mauldwin 39

16

The function they were to perform was two-fold: (1) to implement the Nazi

agenda of "cleansing" these regions of Jews and (2) to establish and secure
immediate political order by liquidating all persons perceived as enemies of the
Reich. These non-Jewish "enemies" were political functionaries, communists,
intellectuals and other such influential people of any former regime. Anyone who
could stir public sentiment against the Nazi agenda could very well consider
themselves an enemy of the Reich. As the Wermacht would mobilize to press on,
the Einsatzgruppen squads would roll-in to handle these non-combatants and
mass shootings of Jews were their specialty. (Datasyc)
17

German Intelligence had also greatly misjudged the strength and

determination of Great Britains Royal Air Force (RAF) prior to the onset of the
Battle of Britain, 10th July and 31st October 1940.
18

During the initial stages of the invasion, factories, along with their skilled

workers, were transported by rail to secure locations, such as Urals, beyond the
reach of the German army and the threat from the Luftwaffe's tactical bombers.
Despite the loss of raw materials and the chaos of an invasion, the Soviets
managed to build new factories in sufficient numbers to allow the mass
production of needed war machines. The Soviet government was never in
danger of collapse and remained at all times in tight control of the Soviet war
effort.
19 Red

Orchestra was a Soviet spy network established in Europe in 1939

by the NKVD. It was an organized underground operation conducted in

Germany, France, Holland and Switzerland. The German-Japanese Pact. In

Mauldwin 40

Sorge's view, the pact was directed against the Soviet Union but it was not until
December, 1940, that he was able to send Molotov full details of Operation
Barbarossa.
20

Both Bessarabia and Soviet Moldova had just become part of the Soviet

Union on July 3, 1940, six days prior.

21

FSB Archives. Vol 1, Bk 1, Doc. 103, 09 July 1940. Pis mo Nacdhalnika

Vneshney Razvedki GUGB NKVD SSR No. 5/8175 v Razvedyvatelnoye

Upravleniye RKKA s Prosboy dat otsenku poluchennym agenturnym materialam
o podgotovke Germannii k Voyne protivc SSSR, pp. 215-16.
22

Hitler expected to take Yugoslavia with minimal force. However, the

Yugoslavs put up much heavier resistance than expected and Operation

Barbarossa had to be postponed until June, 1941 (Spartacus).
23

This report was sent by Harro Shulze Boysen, code name Starshina,

(1909-1942). Boysen was an Oberleutnant on the Air Force Staff.

24

The Luftwaffe supported the operation with air fleets known as Luftflottes.

Each Luftflottes was assigned to support each of the German Army Groups. To
make it easier for these units to move between bases within their assigned
areas, they were released from their parent unit administrative and logistical
requirements. The area of responsibility of each Luftflotte was further divided into
several Luftgaue, or Air Districts, each with a headquarters responsible for the
provision of men for administrative, supply and second-line technical support, at
the airfields within their area. The Luftgau provided the necessary billeting at
airfields, to enable incoming flying units to go into action from their new bases

Mauldwin 41

with a minimum of delay.

25

There were two important locations in the Caucasus: Maikop, and in

particular Baku, which were literally floating on oil. Germany could double, or
even triple its current oil production rate if it could obtain these two locations. At
the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Germanys only major source of crude oil
was from the Ploesti oil fields in Romania. Although German scientists had
discovered a way of making oil through synthetic methods it was impractical due
to the high cost.
26

The Donets Basin was a major industrial region of eastern Ukraine and

southeast Russia producing 87% of Russian coal and 74% of all Soviet pig iron.
It was one of the densest industrial concentrations in the world and was
developed in the late 1870s.
27

By the time of the Battle of Stalingrad was fought; it was the Soviets who

were encircling the Germans.

28

The divisions of the Far East Command were tasked to defend the Soviet

Union from a Japanese attack. Stalin, weighing the possibilities, chose to leave
his eastern borders exposed in order to defend Moscow and defeat the
Germans. Had the Japanese attacked the Soviet Union at this time, the entire
Soviet Union would have been lost.
29

On October 12th Field Marshall Bock received another communiqu from

Hitler which reaffirmed his decision that there would be no acceptance of

surrender from Moscow, even if it were offered (Spartacus).
30

Large parts of the Red Army had been encircled at Vyazma (19th, 24th,

Mauldwin 42

29th, 30th, 32nd and 43rd Armies) and at additional locations near Bryansk (3rd,
13th and 50th Armies).
31

Heroes such as Alexander Nevskiy who defeated the Teutonic Knights in

the thirteenth century; Dimitry Danskoi who defeated the Tarters in the fourteenth
century; and Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov who served the Tsars
against Napoleon.
32

The main counter-attack was conducted by the First Shock Army and

Twentieth Army attacking north of Moscow followed by the Tenth Army attacking
from the south, past Tula.
33

According to Ziemke, the temperatures were so cold that on the morning of

December 5th, German tanks would not start; machine guns, personal weapons,
and artillery pieces failed to operate because the lubricants had congealed; and
German forces reported numerous cases of frostbite and deaths due to the subzero temperatures.
34

"The troops must be compelled by the personal influences of their

commanders, commanding officers, and officers, to resist fanatically on their

present positions, without regard to enemy breakthroughs on the flanks and in
the rear. Only by leading their troops in this way can the necessary time be
gained for movement of reinforcements from the homeland and the West which I
have ordered to be carried out." Hitler (HLS).
35

The last rail connection to Leningrad was severed on August 30, when

Germans reached the Neva River.

36

In 1942, more than 650,000 died of starvation.

Mauldwin 43

37

The Lorrie is a light to medium truck. The Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod,

or GAZ, was the primary truck in the Soviet Union from 1935 to 1956. The GAZM1 was an upgrade of the GAZ and was used between 1935 to 1943. The
official name was augmented with imeni Molotova (literally, named after
Molotov).
38

Sixty-five years later, in 2008, bodies are still being discovered in and

around Leningrad. The graves of those who died during the siege continue to be
filled.
39

In a report filed by Lieutenant General Hans Leykauf, who was assigned to

inspect armaments in the Ukraine, it is confirmed that in regards to the settling

the Jewish question in the Ukraine over the last six months in reference to the
details of the operations in which units of police shot Jews, It took place in full
public view, with reinforcements from the Ukrainian militia, and unfortunately in
many cases with the voluntary participation of members of the Wehrmacht. In
terms of the number of the executions the operation is more gigantic than any
similar measure undertaken in the Soviet Union previously. A total of some
150,000 to 200,000 Jews (have been) executed so far in part of the Ukraine
belonging to the Reich Commissariat. (Wette 358).

Mauldwin 44

Works Cited
Bellamy, Chris. Absolute War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.
Cavallerano, J. "The 900-Day Siege of Leningrad." 03 May 2002. St. Lawrence
University. 28 August 2008
<http:it.stlawu.edu/~rkreuzer/pcavallerano/leningradweb.htm>.
CNN. "Joseph Stalin." 1998. Knowledge Bank: Profiles. 23 August 2008
<http:www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/profiles/stalin/>.
Datasyc. The SS Einisatzgruppen. 16 August 2005. 3 September 2008
<http://www.datasync.com/~davidg59/einsatz.html>.
Doughty, Robert A. American Military History and the Evolution of Warfare in the
Western World. Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996.
Duncan, Peter J. S. Church, Nation, and State in Russia and Ukraine: Orthodoxy
and Russian Nationalism in the USSR, 1917-88. Ed. Geoffrey A. Hosking.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
Fischer, Klaus P. Nazi Germany: A New History. New York: Continuum
International Publishing Group, 1996.
Gilbert, Marin. The Second World War. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc,
1989.
Hitler, Adolf. "Nazi Germany: Mein Kampf." 18 May 2007. Spartacus Educational.
15 August 2008 <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERmein.htm>.
HLS. "Operation Barbarossa." 11 March 2008. History Learning Site: World War
Two. 27 August 2008
<http://www.historyleanringsite.co.uk/operation_barbarossa.htm>.

Mauldwin 45
Rayfield, Donald. Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for
Him. New York: Random House, 2004.
Rice, Earle Jr. The Third Reich: Demise of the Nazi Dream. San Diego: Lucent
Books Inc, 2000.
Service, Robert. A History of Twentieth-Century Russia. Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1998.
Shirer, William. CBS Broadcast from New York, 14 July 1939: Mein Kampf. 18
May 2007. 15 August 2008
<http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERmein.htm>.
Spartacus. Operation Barbarossa, Russia. 12 May 2007. 25 August 2008
<http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSbarbarossa.htm>.
Stokes, Phillip. "Dates: Time Line." 15 February 2008. Second World War. 28
August 2008 <http://www.secondworldwar.co.uk/dates.html>.
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Soviet Experiment. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998.
Trevor-Roper, H.R. Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hitler's Wartime Directives 1939-1945.
New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1964.
UKAsk. Joseph Stalin. 29 June 2008. 14 August 2008
<http://www.uk.ask.com/web?siteid=38364255&sbc=1&qenc=&qsrc=999&I=
dis&x=0&y=0&q=joseph+stalin>.
Wette, Wolfram. The Wehrmacht. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2006.
WW2T. "Operation Barbarossa." 03 May 2008. World War 2 Today. 2008 August

Mauldwin 46
2008 <http://www.worldwar2today.com/barbarossa.html>.
Ziemke, Earl Frederick. The Red Army, 1918-1941. New York: Taylor & Francis
Books, 2004.

Mauldwin 47
Enclosures
Enclosure 01: Order of Battle, June 21, 1941.
December 18, 1940.
Enclosure 02: Hitlers Directive No. 21 for Operation Barbarossa, issued
Enclosure 03: Final Plan for Operation Barbarossa
Enclosure 04: Diagram of German Axis of Advance, June 22 - September 1,
1941
Enclosure 05: Diagram of German Axis of Advance, 01SEP1941.
Enclosure 06: Operation Typhoon: September 30 - December 5, 1941.
Enclosure 07: Diagram of Mozhaysk Line.
Enclosure 08: Leningrad Bread Ration Card.

Mauldwin 48
Enclosures
Enclosure 01: Order of Battle, June 21, 1941.
December 18, 1940.
Enclosure 02: Hitlers Directive No. 21 for Operation Barbarossa, issued
Enclosure 03: Final Plan for Operation Barbarossa
Enclosure 04: Diagram of German Axis of Advance, June 22 - September 1,
1941
Enclosure 05: Diagram of German Axis of Advance, 01SEP1941.
Enclosure 06: Operation Typhoon: September 30 - December 5, 1941
Enclosure 07: Diagram of Mozhaysk Line.
Enclosure 08: Leningrad Bread Ration Card.

Mauldwin 49
(Enclosure 01: Order of Battle, June 21, 1941.)

Mauldwin 50
(Enclosure 02: Directive No. 21)
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander

Fuehrer Headquarters

of the Armed Forces

December 18, 1940

9 copies

Directive No. 21
"Operation Barbarossa"

The German Armed Forces must be prepared, even before the conclusion of the war against
England, to crush Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign ("Operation Barbarossa").
The Army will have to employ all available formations to this end, with the reservation that
occupied territories must be insured against surprise attacks.
The Luftwaffe will have to make available for this Eastern campaign supporting forces of such
strength that the Army will be able to bring land operations to a speedy conclusion and that
eastern Germany will be as little damaged as possible by enemy air attack. This build-up of a
focal point in the East will be limited only by the need to protect from air attack the whole combat
and arsenal area which we control, and to ensure that attacks on England, and especially upon
her imports, are not allowed to lapse.
The main efforts of the Navy will continue to be directed against England even during the Eastern
campaign.
In certain circumstances I shall issue orders for the deployment against Soviet Russia eight
weeks before the operation is timed to begin.
Preparations which require more time than this will be put in hand now, in so far as this has not
already been done, and will be concluded by 15th May 1941.
It is of decisive importance that our intention to attack should not be known.
The preparations of the High Commands will be made on the following basis:
I. General Intention
The bulk of the Russian Army stationed in western Russia will be destroyed by daring operations
led by deeply penetrating armored spearheads. Russian forces still capable of giving battle will be
prevented from withdrawing into the depths of Russia.
The enemy will then be energetically pursued and a line will be reached from which the Russian
Air Force can no longer attack German territory. The final objective of the operation is to erect a
barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.
The last surviving industrial area of Russia in the Urals can then, if necessary, be eliminated by
the Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its bases and will then
no longer be capable of action.
The effective operation of the Russian Air Force is to be prevented from the beginning of the
attack by powerful blows.
II. Probable Allies and their Tasks
1. On the flanks of our operations we can count on the active support of Romania and Finland in
the war against Soviet Russia.
The High Command of the Armed Forces will decide and lay down in due time the manner in
which the forces of these two countries will be brought under German command.
2. It will be the task of Romania to support the attack of the German southern flank, at least at the
outset, with its best troops; to hold down the enemy where German forces are not engaged; and
to provide auxiliary services in the rear areas.
3. Finland will cover the advance of the Northern Group of German forces moving from Norway
(detachments of (Group XXI) and will operate in conjunction with them. Finland will also be
responsible for eliminating Hango.
4. It is possible that Swedish railways and roads may be available for the movement of the

Mauldwin 51
German Northern Group, by the beginning of the operation at the latest.
III. Conduct of Operations
A. Army (in accordance with plans submitted to me)!
In the theater of operations, which is divided by the Pripet Marshes into a Southern and a
Northern sector, the main weight of attack will be delivered in the Northern area. Two Army
Groups will be employed here.
The more southerly of these two Army Groups (in the center of the whole front) will have the task
of advancing with powerful armored and motorized formations from the area about and north of
Warsaw, and routing the enemy forces in White Russia. This will make it possible for strong
mobile forces to advance northwards and, in conjunction with the Northern Army Group operating
out of East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, to destroy the enemy forces operating in
the Baltic area. Only after the fulfilment of this first essential task, which must include the
occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, will the attack be continued with the intention of
occupying Moscow, an important center of communications and of the armaments industry.
Only a surprisingly rapid collapse of Russian resistance could justify the simultaneous pursuit of
both objectives.
The most important task of Group XXI, even during these eastern operations, remains the
protection of Norway. Any forces available after carrying out this task will be employed in the
North (Mountain Corps), at first to protect the Petsamo area and its iron ore mines and the Arctic
highway, then to advance with Finnish forces against the Murmansk railway and thus prevent the
passage of supplies to Murmansk by land.
The question whether an operation of this kind can be carried out with stronger German forces
(two or three divisions) from the Rovaniemi area and south of it will depend on the willingness of
Sweden to make its railways available for troop transport.
It will be the duty of the main body of the Finnish Army, in conjunction with the advance of the
German North flank, to hold down the strongest possible Russian forces by an attack to the West,
or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, and to occupy Hango.
The Army Group operating South of the Pripet Marshes will also seek, in a concentric operation
with strong forces on either flank, to destroy all Russian forces west of the Dnieper in the Ukraine.
The main attack will be carried out from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, while
forces in Romania will carry out a wide enclosing movement across the lower Pruth. It will be the
task of the Romanian Army to hold down Russian forces in the intervening area.
When the battles north and south of the Pripet Marshes are ended the pursuit of the enemy will
have the following aims:
In the South the early capture of the Donets Basin, important for war industry.
In the North a quick advance to Moscow. The capture of this city would represent a decisive
political and economic success and would also bring about the capture of the most important
railway junctions.
B. Luftwaffe
It will be the duty of the Luftwaffe to paralyze and eliminate the effectiveness of the Russian Air
Force as far as possible. lt will also support the main operations of the Army, i.e. those of the
central Army Group and of the vital flank of the Southern Army Group. Russian railways will either
be destroyed or, in accordance with operational requirements, captured at their most important
points (river crossings) by the bold employment of parachute and airborne troops.
In order that we may concentrate all our strength against the enemy Air Force and for the
immediate support of land operations, the Russian armaments industry will not be attacked during
the main operations. Such attacks will be made only after the conclusion of mobile warfare, and
they will be concentrated first on the Urals area.
C. Navy
It will be the duty of the Navy during the attack on Soviet Russia to protect our own coasts and to
prevent the breakout of enemy naval units from the Baltic. As the Russian Baltic fleet will, with the
capture of Leningrad, lose its last base and will then be in a hopeless position, major naval action
will be avoided until this occurs.
After the elimination of the Russian fleet the duty of the Navy will be to protect the entire maritime
traffic in the Baltic and the transport of supplies by sea to the Northern flank (clearing of
minefields!).

Mauldwin 52
IV. All steps taken by Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive must be phrased on the
unambiguous assumption that they are precautionary measures undertaken in case Russia
should alter its present attitude towards us. The number of officers employed on preliminary
preparations will be kept as small as possible and further staffs will be designated as late as
possible and only to the extent required for the duties of each individual. Otherwise there is a
danger that premature knowledge of our preparations, whose execution cannot yet be timed with
any certainty, might entail the gravest political and military disadvantages.
V. I await submission of the plans of Commanders-in-Chief on the basis of this directive.
The preparations made by all branches of the Armed Forces, together with timetables, are to be
reported to me through the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Signed: ADOLF HITLER

(Trevor-Roper, 49-52.)

Mauldwin 53
(Enclosure 03: Final Plan for Operation Barbarossa)

Mauldwin 54
(Enclosure 04: Diagram of German Axis of Advance, June 22 - September 1,
1941.)

Mauldwin 55
(Enclosure 05: Diagram of German Axis of Advance, September 1, 1941.)

Mauldwin 56
(Enclosure 06: Operation Typhoon: September 30 - December 5, 1941.)

Mauldwin 57
(Enclosure 07: Diagram of Mozhaysk Line.)

Mauldwin 58
(Enclosure 08: Leningrad Bread Ration Card.)