Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56077 February 28, 1985
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES PRUDENCIO MAXINO and TARCIANA MORALES,
PEDRO GONZALES, ROGELIO AQUINO, Minor represented by his father, Manuel Aquino,
and ALEJANDRO, SOCORRO, MERCEDES, CONCHITA, REMEDIOS and FLORA, all
surnamed CONSOLACION, respondents.
Silvestre Loreria, Jr. for respondent spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land located in
Mulanay, Quezon.
In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the Court of First Instance at Gumaca, Quezon, Judge
Vicente del Rosario on March 21, 1961 rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said
land, Lot 1, allegedly located at Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in the names of the
spouses Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Morales, less 200 hectares which should be registered
in the names of the Heirs of Lorenzo Consolacion (72, Record on Appeal). The decision
became final and executory. A decree and an original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, or on June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the
Gumaca court an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the ground that
they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest.
Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only
29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was verified by the Acting Director of
Forestry.
The Maxinos opposed the petition. After a hearing on the merits, Judge Agana denied the
petition in his order of September 8, 1970. That order was served upon the assistant provincial
fiscal on September 16, 1970 and on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo of the Bureau of
Forestry, on November 26, 1970.
A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's Office only
on September 2, 1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the order. Twenty-two days
thereafter or on September 24 the Solicitor General appealed from that order and filed a motion
for extension of time within which to submit a record on appeal. The appeal was given due
course.

In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court through Justices Asuncion, Porfirio
V. Sison and Sundiam dismissed the petition because the 1970 order had allegedly long
become final and unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed to this Court.
That is the issue to be resolved first: whether the appeal of the State from the trial court's 1970
order of denial was seasonably made. The Appellate Court held that the service of the order on
Dispo, as special attorney, was binding on the Solicitor General's Office. Consequently, the
record on appeal, which was filed after thirty days from the service of the order upon Dispo, was
filed out of time.
We hold that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time the
Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the time the
special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order. These representatives of the Solicitor
General had no power to decide whether an appeal should be made. They should have referred
the matter to the Solicitor General.
In the designation of Dispo as special counsel by Solicitor General Barredo, approved by
Secretary of Justice Teehankee, it was specified that he should consult the Solicitor General on
all questions, legal and factual, regarding the case. The question of whether an appeal should
be made could only be decided by the Solicitor General's Office.
The 1969 petition to annul the decision, decree and titles was filed by Solicitor General Felix V.
Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Alicia Sempio-Diy.
Consequently, the Solicitor General's Office should be served with the final order disposing of
the petition and should not be bound by the service on his surrogates, the special counsel and
the fiscal (Republic vs. Polo, L-49247, March 13, 1979, 89 SCRA 33; Republic vs. Mendoza, L49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539).
The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on time, the Solicitor General's Office was late
in filing the amendments to it is of no moment. In exceptional cases, like the instant case, the
interest of justice may warrant waiver of the rules (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, L-31303-04,
May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453).
In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly because public forestal
land was registered and the State sought to declare the decision void, the Government should
not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents (Gov't. of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst.
of Pampanga, 50 Phil. 975, 980; Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Unson, 50 Phil. 981, 990; Go Tian An
vs. Republic, 124 Phil. 472, 475; Republic vs. Aquino, L-33983, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA
186, 191-192).
Now, as to the merits of the case. It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered
by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of
private appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry
Florencio Tamesis on July 6, 1940, as per Land Classification Map No. 1386, Tayabas Project
No. 16-E of Mulanay, Exhibit C-Annulment, and as shown in the report and testimony of
Lorenzo R. Tria, a forest station warden (Exh. B-Annulment; 7, 10-15 tsn March 5, 1970). Tria
recommended that the title of the Maxino spouses be annulled (Exh. B-Annulment).
The certification was reiterated by the Director of Forestry on May 20, 1948 as per Land
Classification Map No. 1516, No. 16-E of Mulanay, Quezon, Exhibit 1-A-Director of Forestry,

and as shown in paragraph 6 of the report of Forester Emerson B. Abraham who recommended
that the opposition to the registration entered by the Director be sustained (Exh. 1-Director of
Forestry; Exh. Q, Report of Land Investigator Serapion Bauzon).
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, Exhibit G, a gratuitous composition
title or adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal
Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de animales) allegedly
bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks. *
There is a monstrous and bewildering discrepancy between the area of 29 hectares and the
actual area of the land bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks which is 970
hectares as surveyed in 1959 (Exh. D). We have no hesitation in saying that the composition
title erred in stating the boundaries. The trial court grievously erred in applying to this case the
rule that the area comprised in the boundaries should prevail over that stated in the moniments
of title.
Tria averred in his report and testimony that the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks mentioned in
the composition title really refer to the Banguian and Mamba creeks. This would mean that the
actual area claimed by Maxino was only 371 hectares, not 970 (Exh. B-Annulment; 27-30 tsn
March 5, 1970).
That would also explain why in the document, Exhibit H, presented by the Maxinos, mention is
made of "paligawang 'Manba' ".
The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition title is evident from the sale executed by the
heirs of Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh. F).
Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived by his two children Maria and Lucila. On
September 24, 1935 the two heirs, without executing an extrajudicial settlement of Prudencio's
estate and adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves, executed an " absolute sale" of
the land in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino (Exh. F), the wife of applicant Prudencio Maxino
who was Maria's son and the grandson of Prudencio Tesalona.
That curious document is not a sale at all. It is a "quit-claim". It is stated therein that in
consideration of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases and forever quitclaim unto the said
Vendee" the 29-hectare land described in the composition title (Exh. F).
As an indication that the Tesalona "vendors" were not certain that their title was good, it was
stipulated as an "express condition" that the said vendors had no obligation of warranty for "the
premises hereby sold by them, the Vendee hereby expressly releasing the Vendor(s) from all
duty of defending the Vendee against all persons now claiming, or who may hereafter claim, to
have a better right and title thereto, and assuming all the risk of eviction by superior title" (Exh.
F).
It was further stipulated "that in the event that any third person shall succeed in establishing
right or title to said premises or to any portion thereof superior to that of the grantor and in
lawfully dispossessing the Vendee therefrom the Vendee shall not be entitled to reimbursement
from the Vendor of the sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS which constitutes the consideration for
these presents, or of any part thereof, or to damages" (Exh. F).

The Maxinos contend that Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title (as
distinguished from anonerous adjustment title) should prevail in determining the Identity of the
disputed land. This assertion is untenable in the light of the notorious discrepancy between the
area of 29 hectares stated in the title and the 970 hectares now claimed as the real area (885
hectares for Lot 1 and 84 hectares for Lot 2 which is not involved in this case).
The most that can be said for Tesalona is that his gratuitous adjustment title granted him
possessory rights over pasture land with an area of 29 hectares but not ownership over 970
hectares of grazing land. As to the requirements for an adjustment proceeding under the Royal
Decree of December 26, 1884, where the area in hectares, not the boundaries, is important, see
Ventura, Land Registration and Mortgages, pp. 1719.
The Maxinos have the burden of proving that the title justified the considerable increase in area.
They have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for 970 hectares. The
boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that a different land was
covered thereby. The title states that the 29-hectare land was located in Barrio Yamay. In his
tax declarations it is stated that the land was located in Barrio Cambuga, now Anonang.
His 1906 tax declaration is for a parcel of land whose boundaries are not the Yamay and
Campalacio Creeks but it was bounded by the Yamay Creek and the lands of Maximo
Tesalona, Emiterio Tesalona and Felix Aguilles, with an area of 120 hectares (Exh. I). On the
other hand, his 1919 and 1921 tax declarations are for land with the same boundaries but with
an area of 36 hectares only (Exh. I-2 and I-3).
The 1948, 1958 and 1961 tax declarations use the boundaries Campalacio and Yamay Creeks
but the area of the pasture land is 100 hectares only, a far cry from the 970 hectares as
surveyed (Exh. I-4, I-5 and I-6).
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title
be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title (Director of
Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594 and Alinsunurin vs. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975,
68 SCRA 177, 194-5; Director of Lands vs. Salazar, G. R. No. 50340, December 26, 1984).
Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director
of Forestry vs. Munoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1199; Director of Lands vs.
Salazar, supra).
The oral evidence does not bolster the case at all for the applicants. Applicant Prudencio
Maxino testified that the lot he was seeking to register has an area of more than seventy
hectares (8 tsn Jan. 11, 1961). He purchased the lot from his aunt and mother, as shown in the
deed of September 24, 1935, Exhibit F (9).
He testified that the Mamba Creek is also known as Yamay Creek (13). The land was grazing or
pasture land (15). Thirty-one squatters occupied the land (5 tsn March 6, 1961). He did not
know that the land had an area of 29 hectares in 1935 when he bought it (6). He came to know
the area of the land when it was surveyed. He was not present when it was surveyed (6).
Another witness, Fortunato Naadiego, 76, testified that the land was possessed during the
Spanish regime by his stepfather, Pedro Tesalona, the owner, not Prudencio Tesalona, the
holder of the adjustment title (11).

Spanish titles are not indefeasible (Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, supra, p. 1198). The instant
case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114,
where an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was fraudulent and it
covered public forestal land not subject to registration. As to void composition or patent issued
in 1898, see Testagorda vs. Commanding General, 6 Phil. 573.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. 892 effective February 16, 1976
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the order of Judge Agana, the decision of the Appellate Court and the decision
of Judge Del Rosario dated March 21, 1961 are reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of Lot 1, Psu-175880 is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 73085 June 4, 1990
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PABLO, JUAN, JR., JULIAN, RUFINA, LEONOR,
GLORIA TERESITA, ANTONIO, DOLORES, BERNARDO, JR., and MARIA VIOLETA, all
surnamed MERCHAN,respondents.
Alfredo L. Raya for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court*,
dated December 2, 1985, in AC-G.R. CV No. 67964 affirming the appealed decision of the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon, Branch II, Lucena City.
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
Claiming that they acquired the property by virtue of a document which they alleged to be a Spanish
title originally issued in the name of Bernardo Merchan, the private respondents filed a complaint
dated August 7, 1974 against petitioner Republic of the Philippines for quieting of title over said
property located in Sitio de Malapianbato alias Arras, Bo. de Ayuti, Lucban, Quezon, containing an
area of one million six hundred and sixty thousand (1,660,000) square meters, more or less, or 166
hectares. The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the land is part of a forest reserve
established by Proclamation No. 42 dated October 14,1921, and by Proclamation No. 716 dated
May 26,1941 which declared the area as part of the "Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park."
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court.
The private respondents filed a motion to declare the petitioner in default for failure to file its answer
within the reglementary period and for the appointment of a Commissioner to receive their evidence,
which was granted.
The petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of default which was denied by the trial court. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial.
Meanwhile, Judge Manolo L. Maddela rendered a decision on December 18, 1975, declaring the
private respondents as owners of the land subject of the litigation.
On April 21, 1976, the trial court, presided over by Judge Delia P. Medina, issued an order declaring
as moot and academic petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to lift
the order of default in view of this Court's resolution declaring null and void all judicial acts,

decisions, orders and resolutions performed, promulgated and issued after January 2, 1976, by then
Judge Manolo L. Maddela. In the same order, Judge Medina required the petitioner to file a reply to
the private respondents' opposition to its motion to set aside the decision of December 18, 1975.
The petitioner filed its reply on May 10, 1976.
Petitioner's motion to set aside the decision dated December 18, 1975 of the trial court which
rendered judgment in private respondents' favor was granted by the court on July 23, 1976, thereby
vacating and setting aside the questioned decision and the order of default. In the same order, the
petitioner was required to file its answer to the complaint which it did.
The private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the motion to set
aside the decision dated December 18, 1975, which was denied.
On September 16, 1976, the private respondents filed a manifestation assailing the jurisdiction of the
court to hear the case contending that it properly belonged to another branch of the court but this
was denied.
On September 27, 1976, the private respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Medina. The appellate court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from further proceeding with Civil
Case No. 7840. The appellate court further required the petitioner to file its answer, which was duly
submitted.
Meanwhile, on December 29, 1976, the private respondents, six months after the effectivity of P.D.
No. 892, filed an application for the registration of the parcel of land involved in Civil Case No. 7840.
This was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-1055.
On November 29, 1977, the appellate court denied the aforesaid petition for certiorari and lifted the
restraining order.
The trial court, this time presided by Judge Benigno M. Puno, issued an order setting the case for
pre-trial. For failure of petitioner's counsel to attend the scheduled hearing, the trial court issued an
order declaring the said failure as a waiver to present evidence and to cross-examine the private
respondents' witnesses and declared the case submitted for decision.
On March 3, 1980, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the private respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant:
(1) Declaring the plaintiff the rightful co-owners and possessors of the land in
question as well as the improvements thereon since time immemorial by themselves
and/or their predecessors-in-interests;
(2) Ordering the defendant Bureau of Forestry, as represented by the Director of
Forestry, to desist from disturbing the peaceful possession and ownership of the
plaintiffs over the land in question;
(3) Ordering the defendant to recognize the right of possession and ownership of the
plaintiffs over the land described in paragraph 7 of the complaint which is particularly

known as Cad. Lot No. 4292 (portion) of Cadastral Survey No. 340-D, Case No. 4,
situated at the barrio Ayuti, Municipality of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Island of
Luzon;
(4) Ordering the defendant to agree in, and cause the segregation of the land in
question within the perimeter of the Mt. Banahaw San Cristobal National Park, it
being private property of the plaintiffs; and
(5) The applicants in Land Registration Case No. 1055 are hereby directed to take
immediate measures for the early and prompt hearing and/or disposition of said
case, otherwise, the Court will be constrained to dismiss the same for lack of interest.
(Rollo, pp. 113-114).
The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.
Hence, this petition.
On August 10, 1987, the Court gave due course to the petition and granted the parties a period of
thirty (30) days from notice within which to file memoranda (Rollo, p. 112). The petitioner filed its
memorandum on September 18, 1987 (Rollo, p. 113), while the private respondents submitted for
consideration their comment to the petition dated August 25, 1986, and their rejoinder to the reply of
the petitioner dated June 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 135).
The main issue in this case is whether or not the subject parcel of land which was declared a part of
the forest reserve in 1921 and later a national park in 1941 may be subject of private appropriation
and registration.
The petitioner contends that being part of a forest reserve, and later as a national park, the subject
parcel of land cannot be the subject of appropriation as private property. As reservation for a
national park, the land cannot be registered because public reservations are outside the commerce
of man and cannot be disposed of or registered as private property.
The petitioner further argues that the document itself dated July 29, 1870 which private respondents
allege to be a Spanish title negates their claim. The supposed Spanish title plainly reveals that it is a
mere instrument executed by Bernardo Merchan, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
claiming possession over the land described therein which he sought to be recognized by the
government during the Spanish regime. The document does not say it is a title, nor does it state that
Bernardo Merchan has acquired ownership over the land. The document does not contain the
specific area of the land which is claimed to be owned by private respondents.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The land in question was proclaimed part of a forest reserve by virtue of Proclamation No. 42 dated
October 14, 1921. This proclamation was superseded by Proclamation No. 716 dated May 26, 1941
establishing the Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park. It is already a settled rule that forest
lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however
long, can not convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 41
Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v.
Munoz, 132 Phil. 637 [1968]; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221 [1975]; Director of Lands v.
Reyes and Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89
SCRA 648 [1979]; Republic v. Animas, 56 SCRA 499 [1974]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,

133 SCRA 701 [1984]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; Director of Lands v.
Rivas, 141 SCRA 329 [1986]) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable by the Director of Forestry (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476 [1987]).
In this case, there is no proof of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is
disposable or alienable.
Furthermore, with the passage of Presidential Decree No. 892, effective February 16, 1976, Spanish
Titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership. Under the same decree, lands not
under the Torrens System shall be considered as unregistered.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the appellate court is hereby REVERSED, and Civil
Case No. 7840 and Registration Case No. N-1055 are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN,
HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE
AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND; CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST
EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN
OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES ON CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY. A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT ACQUIRED. This
Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184)
that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
the ground that the ares covered by the patent and title was not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void
ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES; BURDEN OF PROVING
THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE
APPLICANT. In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the

burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth

Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he
has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an
imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least
thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the
Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to
titling in favor of private persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of
imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The
parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral
Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the
application for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in
G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades
Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of
Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the
names of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot
No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to
said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever
rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also
filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his
name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters
to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was

adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective
appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have
been shown to have a better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion
of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the
rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but the last
question that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these
two (2) private litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of
the opposition and evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was
filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during
that period, the land was a classified forest land so much so that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose
Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the
area; and this can only mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained
its ground that it was a forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to
above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was converted
into a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing
of the application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District
Forester that that could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so
that having these in mind and remembering that even under Republic Act 1942
which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed
in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable
title he must have shown.
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing of the application;
the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants
or oppositors had shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years
prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him to have shown a registerable title
for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had been
in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that
period of thirty (30) years and even before and applicants and their predecessors
had made implicit recognition of that; the result must be to deny all these

applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the
same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves
as to who of them had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court
foresees that this litigation will go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always
better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest Court to
pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the
application as well as all the oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of
Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons for
over thirty years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot
could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of a
private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act.
On the other hand, another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute
sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The
complaint was dismissed on the basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the
disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties
over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of
the public domain classified as forest land.chanrobles law library : red
The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin
in their petition depends on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that
is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in
the names of the private applicants.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although
conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and
third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot
885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings
because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public
interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such

classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA
1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on
the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable public
land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void
ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant
petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative
Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its being classified as
forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The appellate court found that
in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio Berebers
witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly
forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of
Forestry was strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses had
to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that
the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as
"public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the
land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest
therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title
such as those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit
in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S

never ceased to be classified as forest land of the public domain.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even
before the Spanish conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The
evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
(Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of
the public domain, classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass
upon the other issues raised by petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as
such issues are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.