March

Complainant,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
- versus -
ATTY. REYNALDO A. PINEDA,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
March 28, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
In a Complaint for Disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant
on September 6, 1994[1], herein complainant Remberto C. Kara-an charged
respondent-lawyer Reynaldo A. Pineda with gross misconduct as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar for violation of the lawyers oath, specifically his
failure to abide by his duties: (1) to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines;
(2) to observe and maintain the respect due the courts of justice and judicial
officers; and (3) not to delay any mans cause, for any corrupt motive or interests.
The antecedent facts:
Complainant Remberto C. Kara-an filed a Complaint for Injunction and
Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2078 against one Amado M. Bulauitan
and several John Does before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
150. Respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda entered his appearance as counsel for
the defendant. On July 12, 1994, the respondent moved for the resetting of the
hearing from July 13, 1994 to July 20, 1994 due to a prior professional
engagement. In the same pleading, the respondent manifested that he was still in
the process of preparing his formal written opposition to the case.[2] On July 20,
1994, the respondent failed to submit any answer or written opposition but instead
made an agreement with the judge and the complainant to reset the hearing
to August 1, 1994.[3] On August 1, 1994, as the respondent failed to appear, the
RTC deferred the hearing to August 15, 1994.[4] On this account, the complainant
filed a Motion for Contempt dated August 2, 1994 before the RTC.[5]
A little more than a month later, or on September 6, 1994, the complainant
filed this Complaint for Disbarment against the respondent, alleging therein that
the respondent failed to appear on August 1, 1994 before the RTC, despite his
agreement to set the hearing of the injunction case on the said date, to file his
answer or written opposition to the complaint for injunction. In his Comment filed
on November 16, 1994, the respondent posited that the complaint is but a form of
harassment in order to discourage him from pursuing cases against the
complainant; and that the same is premature since the RTC has yet to decide the
pending motion for contempt.[6] Per Resolution dated February 20, 1995, this
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and decision.[7]
Hearings were conducted after which, the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) through Investigating Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III
rendered a Report and Recommendation dated February 6, 2006, recommending
that the prayer for disbarment be denied, but that the respondent be reprimanded
for his failure to explain the cause of his absence in a hearing before the RTC and
his failure to appear in several hearings before the IBP-CBD.
On July 7, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting
and approving with modification the recommendation of Commissioner Soriano,
as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-371
Adm. Case No. 4306
Remberto C. Kara-an vs.
Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, for Respondents failure to
explain the cause of his absence in the hearing before the Regional Trial Court
and for his failure to appear in several hearings before the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda is REPRIMANDED with stern
Warning that a repetition of his actuation shall be dealt with severely.
We adopt the July 7, 2006 IBP Resolution. A perusal of the records shows
that the evidence adduced by the complainant is insufficient to warrant the
imposition of the supreme sanction of disbarment.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such,
the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing
and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less
severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end
desired.[8]
As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, the complainant
failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that the respondents failure to
appear in the hearing on August 1, 1994 before the RTC was made oppressively or
with ill-motives as to qualify the same to gross misconduct, willful disobedience or
improper conduct tending to obstruct the administration of justice.[9] Moreover,
the penalty of disbarment sought by the complainant is unduly harsh, taking into
account that this appears to be the respondents first offense.
However, it is worthy to note that respondent indeed fell short of his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice[10] due to his failure to
attend the August 1, 1994 hearing before the RTC and his subsequent failure to
attend some of the hearings before the IBP-CBD without giving any reasonable
explanation for his absences, which failure contributed to the delay of the
resolution of this case. The respondent should have been more conscientious in
complying with such duty as dictated by the Code of Professional Responsibility

and as required by his oath as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prayer for disbarment
is DENIED for lack of merit. Nevertheless, respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Pineda
is herebyREPRIMANDED with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with severely. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to the respondents personal records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp 1-10.
[2]
Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation and Ex-Parte Urgent Motion to Re-Set Hearing
Petitioners Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated July 12, 1994 for Civil Case
No. 94-2078.
[3]
RTC Order dated July 20, 1994, Rollo, p. 11.
[4]
RTC Order dated August 1, 1994, Rollo, p. 12.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 33-35.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 24-32.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 24-32.
[8]
Soriano v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 328, 343.
[9]
Report and Recommendation dated February 6, 2006, p. 8.
[10]
Canon 12, Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SECOND DIVISION
on
A.M. No. P-06-2154
ROBERT R. PASCUA,
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1217-P)
Complainant,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. ANGEL P. BELTRAN, CLERK OF

COURT VI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
OFFICE
OF
THE
CLERK
OF
COURT, TUGUEGARAO CITY,
CAGAYAN,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
March 22, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
When Robert R. Pascua, a utility aide in the Office of the Clerk of Court in
the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, discovered that he would not receive
his productivity bonus because Atty. Angel P. Beltran, Clerk of Court VI, evaluated
his performance as unsatisfactory for two consecutive semesters, July 1 to
December 31, 2000, and January 1 to June 30, 2001, as reflected in the
Performance Rating Form dated July 10, 2001,[1] he filed an administrative case
against
Atty.
Beltran. PascuasAffidavit/Complaint[2] dated October
7,
2001 charged Atty. Beltran with oppression and/or abuse of authority.
According to Pascua, Atty. Beltran could not have arrived at an objective,

honest and impartial evaluation of his performance because the latter seldom
reported for work and when he did, Atty. Beltran only stayed half a day before
hurrying home to Sto. Nio, Cagayan where he lived. Pascua stated that this was the
reason for Atty. Beltrans monicker, Phd. for palaging half day, or Attorney Cash
Bond, in reference to Atty. Beltrans reputation for demanding or extorting money
from bondsmen or the accused.[3]
In addition, Pascua averred that during these half days, Atty. Beltran would often
be seen playing mahjong; or attending to his family estate; or serving as director of
the Veridiano Academy, all in Sto. Nio. Aside from these activities, Atty. Beltran,
without filing the required leave of absence, would often go vacationing in Sampaloc,
Manila, where he had another home.
In his Answer,[4] Atty. Beltran denied all allegations and justified the
unsatisfactory rating he gave to Pascua. He explained that other than wash coffee
cups and teaspoons,Pascua had been remiss in his duties like dusting and cleaning
the office. He added that Pascua was dishonest, uncooperative, and lacked
initiative. He mentioned an incident when Pascua allegedly sold the newspapers
subscribed to by a co-worker to buy alcohol, and another incident
when Pascua surreptitiously entered in the logbook the filing of a motion that had
been belatedly filed for which a memorandum was issued.
Atty. Beltran explained that he was often out of the office and perceived
by Pascua to leave after lunch because unknown to the latter, he often had to
rush before lunch to the Land Bank in Tuguegarao to beat the cut-off time for
depositing checks received by the office; or accompany the sheriff on official
errands. And again, as the accountable officer, it was part of his function to
withdraw cash bond deposits from the Land Bank.
Atty. Beltran also averred he no longer played mahjong, denied involvement

in the family estate as his siblings took care of this, and claimed he only went to
Sto. Nio on weekends since he had a boarding house there.
Upon order of the Court,[5] Judge Vilma T. Pauig investigated, reported and
gave her recommendation on the matter.[6] She found that although Atty. Beltran
offered no evidence in his behalf, Pascua for his part, who carried the burden of
proving his accusation of oppression and grave abuse in the evaluation of his
performance, had not been able to substantiate his charges. Except for the
affidavits of the Mayor, the Municipal Secretary of Sto. Nio, a teacher
in Veridiano Academy, and the records of the sports activities of Atty. Beltran as
Southwestern Cagayan Athletic
Association
Chairman, Pascua had
not
convincingly shown that Atty. Beltrans time had been occupied by activities other
than his work as a government employee. According to Judge Pauig, the
accusations of unreliability, unfairness and bias in the evaluation
of Pascuas performance were not sufficiently proven by Pascua. Besides, the
investigating judge said, the evaluation was up to Atty. Beltrans discretion which
he justified in his Answer.
As to the affidavit and testimony of one witness, a certain Cesar

Cabalza,[7] Judge Pauig averred that these alone are inconclusive concerning the
truth of the allegation that Atty. Beltran extorted money.
What Judge Pauig found strange was the manner Atty. Beltran accomplished
the Performance Rating Forms. From her investigation, it appeared that Atty.
Beltran asked the employees to sign blank forms without discussing nor informing
them of the manner he arrived at the final ratings which he alone filled up. She
noted that the inclusive rating period should cover only January 1 to June 30,
2001 and not include July 1 to December 31, 2000, as erroneously reported by an
office clerk. Judge Pauig concluded that Atty. Beltran had been remiss in following
the procedure for accomplishing the Performance Rating Forms. Atty. Beltran did
not accomplish these in triplicate; did not have the concurrence of a higher
supervisor; did not give one copy to the ratee; but worse, distributed blank forms
among the employees, had the ratees sign them without his evaluation, point
scores and his signature. Accordingly, Judge Pauig recommended that the
appropriate penalties be imposed on Atty. Beltran.[8]
Upon evaluation of the investigation, report and recommendation of Judge

Pauig, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the findings of the
investigating judge and recommended to this Court the following: (1) the charges
of oppression and abuse of authority be dismissed; and (2) respondent Atty.
Beltran be found guilty of simple neglect of duty which carries a penalty of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months suspension.[9]
However, since Atty. Beltran had compulsorily retired, the OCA

recommends instead, that a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary be
imposed on Atty. Beltran, to be deducted from the P50,000 retained from his
retirement benefits (A.M. No. 11864 Retirement dated April 25, 2005), the
balance to be released to Atty. Beltran.[10]
We have gone over the records of this administrative case, and we find the
investigation, report and recommendations of Judge Pauig and the OCA all in
order. The manner in which Atty. Beltran accomplished the semestral
Performance Rating Forms in the Office of the Clerk of Court is an indication of his
cavalier attitude and his total lack of understanding of the seriousness of the
required performance evaluation by the Court and the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, second-guessing the evaluation of the performance of an employee is
a direct assault on the very core of what justice and fairness is all about.
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel stresses that employees of the
judiciary serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the peoples
confidence in it.[11] This Court has recently spent millions in training, seminars and
literature to uplift the professionalism of its employees, and cases, such as this one,
put all its efforts to naught. The accusations of incompetence, bias, neglect of duty,
extortion, and abuse of authority, by one employee against another, ought not to
be taken lightly, for they not only put the Court in a bad light but undermine the
whole efforts of the judiciary. We take this occasion to reiterate that the behavior
of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a
high degree of responsibility.[12]
WHEREFORE, the charges of oppression and abuse of authority filed against
respondent Atty. Angel P. Beltran are DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Respondent is, however, found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. We
hereby ORDER that a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary be imposed on Atty.
Beltran, to be deducted from the P50,000 retained from his retirement benefits
(A.M. No. 11864 Retirement dated April 25, 2005), and the balance thereof to be
released to him.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Rollo, p. 4.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 126-171.
Id. at 174-187.
Id. at 162-171.
Id. at 208.
[10]
[11]
[12]
Id.
Concerned Employee v. Generoso, A.M. No. 2004-33-SC, August 24, 2005, 467 SCRA 614, 622.
Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004, 440 SCRA 217, 223-224.
EN BANC
RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE

ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS
A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA
X----------------------------X
ATTY. ROBERTO C. PADILLA,
Complainant,
-versus-
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S.

ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent.
A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 20, 2007
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Cases
Before Us are two (2) administrative cases against Justice Elvi John
S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals [CA].
The first, docketed as A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, stems from an unsigned

letter dated February 17, 2006, addressed to Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, complaining that Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion has been
sitting on motions for reconsideration for six months to more than a year
unless the parties come across.[1] On July 18, 2006, the Court resolved to
refer the complaint to retired Supreme Court Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt
thereof.
Subsequently, on August 29, 2006, the Court also referred to

Investigator-designate Justice Pardo an unsigned letter dated August 17,
2006, allegedly from an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, fully
supporting the investigation of Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and citing
one particular case pending in his division that will show how he
operates.[2] The case mentioned in the letter is Bank of Commerce v. Hon.
Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, et al., CA-G.R. No. 91258, allegedly involving an
irregularly issued temporary restraining order [TRO].
The second administrative case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is based on a

verified complaint dated August 22, 2006[3] filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla
with the Office of the Court Administrator, charging Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion with culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the
administration of justice and gross ignorance of the law in connection with
CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled Philippine National Bank v. NLRC and
Erlinda Archinas. The Court likewise referred this complaint to Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo for investigation, report and recommendation.
On March 1, 2007, Justice Pardo submitted to this Court his Report

and Recommendation [Report] dated February 28, 2007.
Justice Pardo reports that he conducted an investigation of the cases

on August 10 and 30, September 14 and 27, October 4, 16 and 26,
December 8, all in 2006, and on January 18, 2007. On each of these
dates, the respondent was present, and in connection with A. M. No. 06-44CA-J, respondent Justice Asuncion was represented by counsel.
Justice Asuncions Antecedents
From the record, it appears that respondent Justice Elvi John S.

Asuncion was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on May
24, 1999, and assumed office on May 25, 1999. On July 5, 2004, he was
assigned as Chairman, 18th Division of the CA, stationed in Cebu City. In
an order dated July 7, 2004, CA Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia
directed that all Manila cases left by Justice Asuncion shall automatically
be assigned to Justice [Monina Arevalo] Zenarosa.[4] On November 3,
2004, Justice Asuncion was re-assigned to Manila, as Chairman,
17th Division, CA. From August 4, 2006 to date, he has been Chairman,
11th Division, CA, Manila.
The Investigation
A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA

The unsigned letter complaint, that gave rise to the instant case,
reads:
February 17, 2006
Hon. Artemio V. Panganiban
Chief Justice, Supreme Court
Padre Faura, Manila
Sir:
Please direct an immediate judicial audit on Court of Appeals
Justice Elvi Asuncion.
This magistrate has been sitting on motions for reconsideration for
six months to more than a year unless the parties come across.
This CA Justice is an unmitigated disgrace to the judiciary. How
he ever reached his lofty position is truly disconcerting. He is a thoroughly
CORRUPT person who has no shame using his office to extort money
from litigants. He is equally, if not more, deprave than Demetrio Demetria
who was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Asunciondeserves not only
dismissal but DISBARMENT as well. Because the law profession should
also be purged of CROOKS like him.
I hope you can terminate his service in the judiciary ASAP to save
the institution. Thank you.
Very truly yours,
AN AGGRIEVED PARTY
To the foregoing complaint, respondent Justice Asuncion filed his

Comment dated August 30, 2006[5] in which he strongly denied the charge
of deliberate inaction on pending motions for reconsideration in cases

assigned to him unless the parties came across. He adverted to the
unsigned letter as the work of the same group that previously instigated
false accusations which also resulted in my being investigated by the
Supreme Court through the Hon. Justice Carolina C. Grino-Aquino. He
admitted, however, to some delays in the resolution of some motions for
reconsideration, and cited the following justifiable reasons: (1) The heavy
caseload initially assigned to CA justices, coupled with the newly assigned
cases raffled daily and the re-raffled cases originally handled by promoted
or retired justices; (2) The reorganization of the CA and his assignment as
Chairman of the 18th Division based in Cebu City, which created
some confusion in the status of cases assigned to him; (3) The physical
transfer of his office, aggravated by a lapse in the monitoring system of my
office; and (4) The various administrative assignments, especially in
helping organize special events, given to him by the CA Presiding Justice,
which demanded time and attention.
On September 11, 2006, respondent filed his Comment[6] on the
unsigned letter dated August 17, 2006 of an alleged CA Associate
Justice. He denied that there was any irregularity in the issuance of the
temporary restraining order and of the subsequent writ of preliminary
injunction, stating that the same was done in the sound exercise of the
Courts discretion. The respondent stressed that the cited case, CA-G.R.
SP No. 91258, was still pending in his division and not germane to the ongoing investigation against him for supposed deliberate inaction on pending
motions for reconsideration.
In this connection, the Investigating Justice reports that after making

inquiries, he found that the Court of Appeals had not acted on the approval
of the injunction bond in this case, thus, no writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued to date.[7]
Meanwhile, in the August 31, 2006 investigation, Atty. Tessie L.

Gatmaitan, Clerk of Court, CA en banc, submitted to the designated
Investigator the list of cases raffled to respondent since his assumption of
office in 1999, as follows:
a) Master List of Criminal Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 11
June 1999 to 25 May 2006, consisting of 112 cases;
b) Master List of Heinous Crimes Raffled to J. Asuncion from 20
Nov. 2004 to 22 June 2006, consisting of 33 cases;
c) Master List of Civil Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 14 June
1999 to 16 August 2006, consisting of 625 cases; and
d) Master List of Special Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion from 14
June 1999 to 31 July 2006, consisting of 651 cases.
The Investigating Justice also required the respondent to submit a

report on the status of the cases contained in the handwritten list given to
the respondent on September 14, 2006. In his written compliance,[8] the
respondent reiterated his plea that justifiable reasons attended the delay in
the resolution of some cases.
Subsequently, on October 4, 2006, the respondent submitted a report

on the status of the cases in a new list given to him after the September 27,
2006investigation[9]
This, and earlier reports on the status of cases assigned to

respondent Justice Asuncion, would be the basis of the findings of the
Investigating Justice.
A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J

As mentioned above, this second case is based on a verified
complaint filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, charging Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion with culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the

administration of justice and gross ignorance of the law, in connection with
CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitledPhilippine National Bank vs. NLRC and
Erlinda Archinas.
The facts, as culled from the Investigating Justices Report [10], are as
follows:
On June 27, 2000, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) decided in her favor the claim of Ms. Erlinda Archinas for
reinstatement and payment of back wages against the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), affirming in toto the ruling of Labor Arbiter Celestino Daing
ordering her reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of
back wages.
On August 25, 2000, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of
the NLRC (CA-G.R. SP No. 60573).
Meantime, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment making final and
executory the decision of the labor arbiter as of July 17, 2000, pursuant to
Sec. 2[c], Rule VIII of the NLRC Rules. Ms. Archinas filed a motion for a
writ of execution for the uncontested amount of P1,096,233.97. PNB
opposed the motion. In view of the pending petition with the CA, the labor
arbiter deferred action on the motion for execution.
On May 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through respondent Justice
Asuncion, dismissed the petition of PNB and affirmed in toto the decision
of NLRC in favor of Ms. Archinas.
On June 13, 2001, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision, to which Ms. Archinas filed, on June 25,
2001, an opposition. OnJune 25, 2001, PNBs motion for reconsideration
was deemed submitted for resolution.
In the interim, on June 18, 2001, the labor arbiter granted Ms.
Archinas motion for execution of the uncontested amount of
P1,096,233.97, for which the Sheriff of the NLRC levied upon personal
property of the PNB and scheduled an auction sale on July 25,
2001. Upon motion of PNB, on July 24, 2001, respondent Asuncion
issued the questioned resolution, which granted a temporary restraining
order to stop the auction sale by directing the labor arbiter to temporarily
enjoin implementation of the writ of execution. It likewise ordered the
parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of PNBs motion for
reconsideration.
On October 30, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion issued another
resolution which reiterated the July 24, 2001 resolution ordering the
parties to maintain the status quo in this case pending resolution of PNBs
motion for reconsideration.
On November 5, 2001, Ms. Archinas filed with the Court of Appeals
a motion for reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution.
Despite Ms. Archinas filing with the Court of Appeals of numerous
motions for early resolution of the motion for reconsideration
dated November 5, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion failed to act and
resolve the motion.
Finally, on August 7, 2006, respondent Justice issued a resolution
denying PNBs motion for reconsideration dated June 13, 2001. It,
however, failed to directly address and resolve Archinas November 5,
2001 motion for reconsideration. At any rate, it is noted that the denial of
PNBs motion would render moot Mrs. Archinas motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated November 15,

2006 on the Padilla complaint, raising the following arguments: [1] That the
July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 60573
were collegial acts of the First Division, CA, duly concurred in by the two
other CA justices of the division; [2] That the July 24, 2001 resolution did
not grant PNBs motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order, and
the October 30, 2001 resolution is not tantamount to a preliminary
injunction issued ex parte; and [3] The delay in resolving the motion for
reconsideration was not deliberate or maliciously motivated. The
respondent restated therein the reasons he proffered in his Comment in
A.M. No. 06-8-08-CA.
The Findings of the Investigating Justice
In the first administrative case, A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, the Investigating

Justice submits the following findings:
After meticulous analysis of the record and the evidence
submitted, the investigation would show that, as related in the unsigned
letter of February 17, 2006, there were indeed several cases assigned to
respondent Justice Asuncion with motions for reconsideration still
remaining unresolved way beyond the ninety day period prescribed in
Rule 52, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, there were also
numerous motions for reconsideration which respondent Justice resolved
beyond the reglementary period.
The master lists of cases submitted by the Clerk of Court, CA, en
banc, disclose that, as of September 30, 2006, there were seventy
one motions for reconsideration still pending resolution; further, there
were one hundred seventy nine motions for reconsideration which were
resolved beyond the ninety-day period[11]
xxx
xxx
xxx
What is more, there are several cases assigned to respondent

Justice Asuncion which are still undecided, and those that were decided
beyond the one (1) year period prescribed in the 1987 Constitution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
As of September 30, 2006, the following eighty-two cases remain

undecided[12]:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Further, there were four hundred nine cases which had been
decided beyond the twelve month period prescribed in the 1987
Constitution (Article VIII, Section 15[1]), to wit[13]:
xxx
xxx
xxx
In his comments dated August 30, 2006, and November 15, 2006,
respondent Justice Asuncion admitted delay in the resolution of some
motions for reconsideration of cases assigned to him albeit with obvious
pride in his massive record of disposition of cases x x x In fact, respondent
Justice Asuncion listed only nine cases that were still unresolved and
pending as of his reassignment to the CA-Cebu Station.
However, the record would show that there were motions for
reconsideration filed as far back as 2000 that were still pending resolution,
as of the (sic) July 18, 2006, when the Supreme Court took cognizance of
the complaint. One was resolved on August 7, 2006, the PNB vs. NLRC
and Ms. Erlinda Archinas docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, which is
the subject of the verified complaint of Atty. Roberto C. Padilla (A. M. No.
06-44-CA-J). Such inaction in resolving motions for reconsideration for
years in contrast to the ninety day prescribed period in the Rules of Court
constitutes gross inefficiency and serious dereliction of duty that
undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary. x x x
There are also cases that were raffled to respondent Justice
Asuncion before July 7, 2004, that remained undecided. More so, there
were several cases that were ordered transferred to Justice Monina
Arevalo-Zenarosa but remained with, and unexplainedly decided by
respondent Justice Asuncion, albeit beyond the reglementary period. How
such cases supposedly transferred to Justice Zenarosa remained or
returned to Justice Asuncion is not explained, obviously in contravention
of Office Order No. 212-04-CG of the Presiding Justice, CA (Annex
E). Indeed, respondent Justice Asuncion should have acted in such a
manner as to avoid suspicion in order to preserve faith in the
administration of justice[14]
xxx
xxx
xxx
As excuses or justification, respondent Justice stated that the

delay in resolving cases is partly due to the heavy initial caseloads of CA
justices, the continuous raffling of new cases and the re-raffling of old
cases handled by promoted and retired CA justices. We find this position
unacceptable. It is necessary for newly-appointed justices to be assigned
initial caseloads. No one is exempted. Further, in the raffling and reraffling of subsequent cases, these are more or less equally distributed to
all justices. Hence, not only respondent Justice, but all CA Justices are
swamped with cases. This, however, is not a reason to violate the clear
mandate in the Constitution and the Rules of Court to decide cases
promptly and resolve motions for reconsideration within their reglementary
period. x x x
Again, respondent Justice attributes his admitted delay in resolving
pending motions for reconsideration to various administrative functions
assigned to him by the Court or Presiding Justice that took much of his
time and attention. x x x
We are not impressed or swayed that these administrative
functions greatly burdened respondent Justice to the extent that he failed
to discharge the basic duty of a justice with diligence and efficiency. It is
evident that such additional tasks are seasonal in nature, hence, need not
consume too much of his time to the detriment of pending cases. x x x
Consequently, respondent Justice Asuncion must be reminded

that decision-making is the primordial duty of a member of the bench. All
other tasks must give way thereto. What is alarming is that respondent
Justice seemed to have reveled in his extra-curricular activities of
spearheading various celebrations and events that are not judicial
functions. These cannot take precedence over decision-making.[15]
In the second case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, the findings of the

Investigating Justice are, as follows:
Complainant Padilla contends that respondent Justice Asuncion
committed gross ignorance of the law in issuing the October 30, 2001
resolution which extended indefinitely the duration of the TRO issued on
July 24, 2001, by ordering the parties to maintain the status quo, pending
resolution of the PNBs motion for reconsideration, in violation of Rule 58,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Padilla further contends that
respondents failure to speedily resolve PNBs motion for reconsideration
dated June 13, 2001, Archinas motion for reconsideration dated
November 5, 2001 and her numerous motions for early resolution thereof
constitute culpable dereliction of duty. Atty. Padilla stressed that
respondent Justices reliance on Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[16] decided in 1988, to justify the issuance
of the two resolutions constitutes gross ignorance of the law, considering
that the ruling thereon was set aside by the Supreme Court in 1993 in the
case of Santiago v. Vasquez[17]. Further, he averred that the Eternal
Gardens ruling was superseded by Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which states that the petition [in the
Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals] shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case.
Respondent Justice Asuncion stressed that the July 24,
2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions were the collegial acts of the First
Division of the Court of Appeals, composed of three justices, unanimously
approved by them after due deliberation, and not the acts of respondent
justice alone. He denied that the July 24, 2001 resolution was, in fact, a
TRO and maintained that the purpose thereof was merely to remind the
parties to observe the status quo while PNBs motion for reconsideration
was pending resolution. He also claimed that complainant Padilla mistook
the October 30, 2001 resolution as extending the TRO, whereas there was
no indication in the July 24, 2001resolution that a TRO was ever

granted. Respondent Justice stressed that the admonition to the parties
to maintain the status quo was merely directory in view of the pending
motion in the CA, following the principle of hierarchy of
courts. Respondent justice cited Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation v. CA, Ibid., as basis for his action in issuing the July 24,
2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions, which directed the parties to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of PNBs motion for
reconsideration.
We are not convinced. The July 24, 2001 resolution was in fact
and in reality essentially a TRO and the October 30, 2001 resolution
effectively extended the same indefinitely. This dispositive portion of
the July 24, 2001 resolution clearly states:
WHEREFORE, to prevent irreparable injury,
the public respondent is temporarily enjoined from
implementing the
assailed Writ
of Execution dated June 19, 2001. The parties are
ordered to maintain the status quo in this case
pending the resolution of the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Technically, status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful
and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which
is existing at the time of the filing of the case[18] However, the Supreme
Court has ruled that a status quo ante order has the nature of a
temporary restraining order[19]. Thus, the decretal portion of the
resolution of July 24, 2001, specifically ordered that the public respondent
is temporarily enjoined from implementing the assailed writ of
execution. Respondent justice must be playing with words. When a judge
or justice uses technical or legal terms with a well-defined meaning, such
as a temporary restraining order or a status quo order, he must have
intended those meaning; he cannot impute a directory meaning to
confuse the parties. x x x On the other hand, he ought to know that a
temporary restraining order cannot exist indefinitely; it has a lifetime of a
non-extendible period of sixty days and automatically expired on the
sixtieth day[20]. No judicial declaration that it has expired is necessary[21],
and, the lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, have no discretion to
extend the same[22]. A second TRO by the Court of Appeals after the
expiration of the sixty day period is a patent nullity.[23]
Respondent
Justice
cannot
seek
refuge
behind
the Eternal Garden case
to
justify
the October
30,
2001 resolution. The Eternal Garden case involves a petition for
certiorari filed before the Supreme Court, which could issue a
temporary restraining order or a status quo order effective indefinitely

or until further orders (Rule 58, Section 5, par. 4, Rules of Court. On the
other hand, a temporary restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals
is effective only for sixty days. (Ibid.) Hence, when respondent Justice
Asuncion issued the October 30, 2001 resolution ordering the parties to
maintain the status quo pending the resolution of PNBs motion for
reconsideration, he extended the restraining order
until respondent could act on the PNB motion for reconsideration which he
did only as late as August 7, 2006, a glaring five years from
submission. His interest in the case is manifest in that, despite his
assignment to Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to
Justice Zenarosa. (Office Order No. 212-04-CG, dated July 7,
2004). Worse, he recalled the case upon his return to the
CA Manila station. (Underscoring supplied.)
We agree with complainant Padilla that the deliberate act of
respondent Justice Asuncion in extending indefinitely the temporary
restraining order or the status quoorder pending resolution of PNBs
motion for reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance of the law. x x x
x x x Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the
laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence
requires no less. Unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand. x x x When a
judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law is the
mainspring of injustice.[24] Worse, respondent justices ignorance of
procedural law is exacerbated by his sloth in resolving PNBs motion for
reconsideration (See Garchitorena case, 422 Phil. 246 [2001], on
reconsideration, 426 Phil. 01 [2002]) To compound matters, Ms. Archinas
motion for reconsideration date November 5, 2001, was not resolved at
all.[25]
THE COURTS RULING

We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice.
The Constitution mandates lower collegiate courts to decide or

resolve cases or matters within twelve months from date of
submission.[26] Section 3, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
motions for reconsideration to be resolved within ninety days. Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that (J)udges shall
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Indeed, the essence of the judicial function, as expressed in Section
1, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court is that justice shall be impartially
administered without unnecessary delay.
In Arap v. Judge Amir Mustafa,[27] We held that:

The Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that
justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence,
judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against them.
The record shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent

had not resolved seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration within the
prescribed ninety-day period, and he had resolved one hundred seventynine (179) motions for reconsideration beyond the reglementary period. As
of the same date, eighty-two (82) cases submitted for decision were still
undecided, even after the lapse of the twelve-month period prescribed by
the Constitution. He had also decided four hundred nine (409) cases
beyond the one-year period.
Notably, of the seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration pending

resolution, forty-six were filed in 2004 or earlier, with one dating all the way
back to 2000. Five were filed in 2001, sixteen in 2002, ten in 2003, and
thirteen in 2004. Respondents proffered justification is that the delay was
caused by the reorganization of the CA, his assignment to the CA Cebu

Station and his transfer back to Manila which, allegedly, caused some
confusion in the assignment of cases and a lapse in the monitoring
system. The explanation miserably fails to persuade because the CA
reorganization took place only in 2004, and at that time, there were at least
thirty-two (32) motions for reconsideration crying out for resolution..
This intolerable inaction is aggravated by misrepresentation. Upon

his assignment to the CA Cebu Station, respondent listed only nine (9)
cases allegedly unresolved by and pending with him. The findings of the
Investigator belie this assertion.
The excuse that respondent was burdened by a heavy caseload,

owing to the cases initially assigned to him, those raffled daily and those reraffled from among the cases originally handled by promoted or retired
justices, must also fall flat. As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice,
other CA justices are likewise subjected to such a heavy caseload, and yet,
have not incurred such inexcusable delay. As to respondents other
administrative assignments, including organizing special events, the
respondent should only be reminded that decision-making is the primordial
and most important duty of a member of the judiciary.[28]
The delay incurred by respondent Justice Asuncion in deciding or

resolving the numerous cases and matters mentioned above is, therefore,
unjustified. Even in the case of PNB v. NLRC and Archinas alone, the
respondents failure to resolve PNBs June 13, 2001 motion for
reconsideration until after the lapse of more than five (5) years, despite
Archinas four (4) motions urging immediate resolution of the same, truly
smacks of gross inefficiency and serious dereliction of duty. Worse, it
invites suspicion of malice, and casts doubt on the justices fairness and
integrity.
We have already ruled that the failure of a judge to decide a case

within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency[29] which, if the case
remains undecided for years, would become serious misconduct that would
justify dismissal from the service.[30]
In the case of respondent Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in

deciding or resolving such a staggering number of cases/matters assigned
to him, borders on serious misconduct which could subject the respondent
to the maximum administrative sanction.
In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, We agree with the Investigating Justice that

respondents deliberate act of extending indefinitely the temporary
restraining order or the status quo order pending resolution of PNBs
motion for reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance of the law.
As correctly put by Investigating Justice Pardo, Eternal Gardens is

totally inapplicable. The July 24, 2001 resolution, which temporarily
enjoined the public respondent from implementing the assailed writ of
execution, was a temporary restraining order, regardless of the
nomenclature Justice Asuncion used to characterize it. As such, its full life
span can only be sixty (60) days. Section 5, par. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court is explicit: the Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining
order only for a limited period of sixty days which cannot be renewed or
extended. After sixty days, the restraining order immediately ceases,
without need of any judicial order terminating it.
The October 30, 2001 resolution, which ordered the maintenance of

the status quo, effectively extended the temporary restraining order, in
complete defiance of the aforesaid Rule. It was not a writ of preliminary
injunction, because respondent Justice Asuncion himself disclaims that it
was such. Besides, in the event of an injunctive writ, an injunction bond is
required, unless exempted by the Court (Section 4, Rule 58, Rules of

Court). Furthermore, there would have been no cause to issue such a writ,
because earlier, on May 28, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion had
already dismissed the principal action for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Yet, the purpose was clear; the October 30, 2001 resolution was
intended to extend the effectivity of the July 24, 2001 restraining order. It
was, as the Investigating Justice would characterize it, a renewed or
second temporary restraining order proscribed by the rule and extant
jurisprudence.
Such failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and
the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is
excused, and surely not a judge.[31] In Genil v. Rivera,[32] We declared that
judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence they are expected
to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules.
While a judge is presumed to act with regularity and good faith in the
performance of judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and
unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars
enjoining strict compliance therewith, upends this presumption and subjects
the magistrate to administrative sanctions.[33]
Citing Castanos v. Escano, Jr.,[34] this Court, in Macalintal v.
Teh,[35] had occasion to state:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic
and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions,
a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title
he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In
both cases, the judges dismissal is in order.
The respondent Justice would seek to extricate himself from any

liability by invoking the convenient excuse that the resolutions of July 24,
2001 andOctober 30, 2001 were the collegial acts of the First Division of
the Court of Appeals, composed of three justices, and not the acts of
respondent justice alone. This, in fact, was the only significant subject dwelt
on by respondents lawyer in the cross-examination of the complainant
Atty. Padilla. What respondent Justice Asuncion, in effect, is saying is that
if he, as ponente in PNB v. NLRC and Archinas, were to be adjudged guilty
of gross ignorance of the law, then the two other justices in the Division
should be held equally culpable. Perhaps, under ordinary circumstances,
such logic would be impeccable.
However, what We said in Guerrero v. Villamor[36] is instructive:
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must
not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some
other like motive.[37] x x x
Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering
an unjust judgment will not prosper against a judge acting in good
faith. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous judgment cannot be
the basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not
being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.[38]
Using this pronouncement as the norm, We now must consider the

totality of the charges against the respondent, as well as the convergence
of attendant and subsequent events. On May 28, 2001, with respondent
Justice as ponente, the First Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the
PNB petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, affirming in its entirety the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission. On June 13, 2001, PNB filed a motion for
reconsideration. On June 25, 2001, Archinas (private respondent in the
petition for certiorari) filed her opposition to PNBs motion for

reconsideration. On July 24, 2001, acting upon PNBs urgent motion for
issuance of a TRO, respondent issued the resolution enjoining the public
respondent from implementing the Writ of Execution. On October 30,
2001, the resolution ordering the maintenance of the status quo was
issued. On November 5, 2001, Archinas filed her motion seeking
reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution. Archinas filed four (4)
urgent motions for early resolution of the pending motion/s for
reconsideration, on December 28, 2001, June 13, 2002, September 24,
2002, and August 23, 2005, Meantime, on July 5, 2004, respondent
Justice Asuncion was assigned to CA Cebu Station. With this transfer,
respondents caseload was assigned to Justice Zenarosa. On November
3, 2004, respondent was reassigned back to Manila. It was only on August
7, 2006 that respondent finally resolved the PNB motion for
reconsideration.
From this sequence of events, a number of questions arise. If the

respondent could issue the resolutions of July 24, 2001 and October 30,
2001 why did respondent not simply resolve the PNB motion for
reconsideration of June 13, 2001? After all, he finally did so on August 7,
2006, with a mere three-page resolution. Why did it take more than five
years to resolve this PNB motion? Why were the four motions for early
resolution never addressed? If the Manilacases of respondent Justice
Asuncion were automatically assigned to Justice Zenarosa, how did
Justice Asuncion continue to hold on to this case upon his reassignment
in Manila?
The Investigating Justice supplies the answer in his Report thus: His
(respondents) interest in the case is manifest in that, despite his
assignment in Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to
Justice Zenarosa (Office Order No. 212-04-CG). Worse, he recalled the
case upon his return to the CA Manila station.
To the Court, these are badges of bad faith and manifest undue
interest attributable only to the respondent, and not to the other two justices
of the CA Division. Accordingly, only the respondent must be made to
suffer the consequences.
Besides, the five-year delay in the resolution of the PNB motion for
reconsideration would already constitute serious misconduct that would
justify dismissal from the service[39]
Administrative Penalties
In A. M. No. 06-6-08-CA, respondent is charged with undue delay in

rendering a decision or order. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court,[40] undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less
serious charge which may be penalized by (1) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.
On the other hand, gross ignorance of the law, for which respondent
is being faulted in A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is considered a serious charge,
and carries the penalty of (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or
part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or controlled corporations: provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding
P40,000.
The Investigating Justice recommends the maximum penalty for

each of the two offenses.
WHEREFORE, in A. M. No. 06-6-08, for having incurred undue delay

in the disposal of pending motions for reconsideration in several cases, as
recommended by the Investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is SUSPENDED from office without pay,
allowances and other monetary benefits for a period of THREE MONTHS.
In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, for gross ignorance of the law and manifest

undue interest, Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of
Appeals is hereby ordered DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits.
This Decision is final and immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES
SR.
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
ROMEO
CALLEJO,
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
Received in the Office of the Chief Justice on March 2, 2006.

Annex J, Report and Recommendation of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo.
[3]
Annex M, Report.
[4]
Office Order No. 212-04-CG, issued by the Presiding Justice, CA.
[5]
Annex K, Report.
[6]
Annex N, Report.
[2]
J.
[7]
Report, pp. 7-8.

Annexes Q, Q-1 to Q-3, Report.
[9]
Annexes T and T-1, Report.
[10]
Report, pp. 54-56.
[11]
Report, p. 12.
[12]
Report, p. 25.
[13]
Report, p. 30.
[14]
Report, citing Ubarra v. Tecson, 219 Phil. 04, 08 (1985).
[15]
Report, pp. 51-52.
[16]
G.R. No. L-50054, 164 SCRA 421 (1988).
[17]
G.R. No. 99289-90, 217 SCRA 633 (1993).
[18]
Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Domingo Samut & Antonio Samut, G.R. No. 154407, 451 SCRA 275, 289 (2005).
[19]
Nilo Dojillo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166542, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 484, 503.
[20]
Cf Golangco v. Villanueva, 343 Phil. 937, 946 (1997), Johannesburg Packaging Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 95509, 216 SCRA 439 (1992).
[21]
Ibid., at p. 946.
[22]
Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101344, 214 SCRA 400, 406 (1992), citing Golden Gate
Realty Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 685 (1987), Delbros Hotel Corporation v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72566, April 12, 1988, Paras v. Judge Roura, A.C. No. 3180, 163 SCRA
01 (1988).
[23]
Cf. Carbungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78265, Janaury 20, 1990, 181 SCRA 313, 315, cited in Justice
Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1993, p. 116.
[24]
Boiser v. Aguirre, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 430, 439.
[25]
Report, pp. 56-60.
[26]
Sec. 15(1), Article VIII, Philippine Constitution.
[27]
A.M. No. SCC-01-7, 379 SCRA 1, 5 (2002), citing Sanchez v. Vestil, 298 SCRA 1 (1998) and Bernardo v.
Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189, 307 SCRA 28, 35 (1999).
[28]
Rivera v. Lamorena, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1391, 280 SCRA 633 (1997).
[29]
Medina v. De Guia, A.M. No. RTJ-88-216, 219 SCRA 153 (1993).
[30]
Sabado v. Cajigal, A.M. No. RTJ-91-666, 219 SCRA 800 (1993).
[31]
Guillen v. Canon, 424 Phil. 81 (2002).
[32]
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1619, January 23, 2006.
[33]
Caguioa v. Lavina, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1553, 345 SCRA 49, 61 (2000).
[34]
A.M. No. RTJ-93-955, 251 SCRA 174 (1995).
[35]
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375, 280 SCRA 623 (1997).
[36]
A.M. No. RTJ-90-483 & RTJ-90-617, 296 SCRA 88 (1998).
[37]
Citing Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062, 235 SCRA 597 (1994).
[38]
Id.
[8]
[39]
[40]
Sabado v. Cajigal, A.M. No. RTJ-91-666, 219 SCRA 800 (1993).

As amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10, September 11, 2001.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
NAPOLEON CAGAS,
Complainant,
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1979

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2268-RTJ]
Present:
- versus -
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
JUDGE ROSARIO B.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
TORRECAMPO,
CALLEJO, SR.,
Presiding Judge,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
Regional Trial Court,
NACHURA, JJ.
Branch 33, Pili,

Camarines Sur,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
March 14, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint[1] dated April 12, 2005 of

Napoleon Cagas (complainant)
charging
Judge
Rosario
B. Torrecampo (respondent), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
33, Pili, Camarines Sur with Serious Neglect of Duty, Falsification of Public
Documents, Incompetence, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment, and
Infidelity to the Canons of Legal Ethics and Moral Standards relative to Criminal
Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 entitled People of the Philippines v. GenuivalCagas,
Wilson Butin and Julio Astillero.
Complainant
alleges:
He
is
the
brother
of
accused Genuival Cagas (Genuival). In 1992, criminal charges for murder were
filed against Genuival, Wilson Butin (Wilson),and Julio Astillero, and they were
arrested and detained without bail. The trial was terminated in June 2000 and
the cases were submitted for decision. For almost 11 years, the accused had
lingered in jail but no decision was rendered. Respondent failed to resolve the
cases submitted for decision for over four years, prompting Genuival to file
motions to resolve the cases. An organization called CAMJUST wrote
Hon. Hilario Davide,
Jr.
and
explained
the
situation
of
the
accused. Meanwhile, Wilson died in incarceration. The remaining two accused
filed another plea to resolve the cases. On January 11, 2005, counsel for the
accused filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking the constitutional rights of the accused
to a speedy disposition of cases considering hibernation for about five years from
the date said cases were submitted for resolution in 2000. The motion was set for
hearing on January 19, 2005. Counsel for the accused received an Order setting
the promulgation of the Decision on January 18, 2005, convicting the accused,
one day ahead of the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss. The promulgation of the
decision set one day ahead of the hearing of the motion to dismiss will hostage
the hearing of the motion and render it moot and academic. From June 2000 to
January 2005, 55 months had elapsed before respondent wrote her
decision. Each time respondent makes a certification that she has no pending
cases for resolution, respondent must be criminally charged for falsification. If
respondent is not guilty of serious negligence for failing to decide the cases
against the accused in a span of almost five years, it follows that she is
incompetent. Respondent ought to know that a resolution of a bail hearing is not
a decision, and that denial of bail is not that degree of evidence required for a
court to pronounce the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Yet, respondent
merely adopted the resolution of the bail hearing and on that basis convicted the
accused. Respondent failed to mention in her decision that the trial resumed only
six years later and the witnesses were placed on the stand only at that
time. Respondent failed to mention that witnesses testified more than six years
after the occurrence of the alleged murder.
In her Comment[2] dated July 25, 2005, respondent contends: The records of
Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 were remanded to the lower court sometime
in the middle part of 1997. She had just assumed her duties as presiding judge
of RTC, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur. Due to postponements at the instance of
the accused, they were finally arraigned on January 5, 1998. The pre-trial was
held on August 10 and September 2, 1998. After several hearings, the cases were
deemed submitted for decision onDecember 8, 2000. On November 14, 2001,

she requested time to finalize the decision in several cases including Criminal Case
Nos. P-2196 to P-2201, due to illness hounding her family. On January 15, 2002,
she requested for another extension of 30 days to decide some cases including
Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 due to lower back pains which prevents her
from sitting down for a long period of time. On June 10, 2003, she requested for
another extension to decide Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 due to health
problems, resulting to her hospitalization on February 17 to 19, 2003 for
hypertension and pulmonary Kock's disease. She took a two-month leave of
absence on doctor's advice and returned to duty in May 2003. On August 13,
2003, the Court granted her request for extension of 30 days to decide cases
including Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201. During the early part of 2004 to
date, she has been on treatment for enlarged thyroid gland. The foregoing
circumstances which were beyond her control adversely affected and hampered
her capacity to perform and not neglect of duty on her part. It is not correct,
fair, nor just to say that she had not studied the cases. She spent time poring
over the records of the cases. The court has only one computer and the final
draft consisting of 53 pages was completed and filed with the office of the clerk of
court on January 10, 2005. The Motion to Dismiss was filed on January 13,
2005. The monthly report of cases would readily show that Criminal Case Nos. P2196 to P-2201 were disclosed and reported as among the cases pending
decision. There cannot, therefore, be falsification of public documents under the
circumstances. Her inability to decide the cases within the required period was
due to illness and other circumstances beyond her control. A judgment, to be
unjust, must be one that is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence, or
both. The same is said to be rendered knowingly when it is made deliberately and
with malice. It is a fact that the evidence presented during the bail hearing shall
be automatically reproduced at the trial. The findings and discussions contained
in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) are very material to the
determination of the issues. She made it clear, under the findings of facts, that
she adopted both the Order of Judge Panga and the Resolution of the CA after she
reviewed the records of the hearing and the application for bail. She consistently
performed her duties with all candor and fidelity to her oath. If ever there were
delays in the rendition of the decisions, the same happened because of
circumstances beyond her control. She has shared a major part of her life as an
educator and public servant and lived simply and honorably.
In the Agenda Report[3] dated January 23, 2006, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION: It is to be noted that respondent had already been sanctioned for

her failure to decide cases within the prescribed period.
In Administrative Matter No. 03-7-427-RTC (Re: Report on Judicial Audit

conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 33), the Court issued a
Resolution on 13 August 2003 imposing upon respondent a fine in the amount
of P1,000.00 for her failure to decide cases within the reglementary period with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. Respondent was granted in the same resolution a thirty (30) day period within
which to decide a number of cases, including the subject criminal cases.
While we consider the predicament of the respondent and are inclined to be

compassionate, we also realize that compassion has its limits. We cannot close our eyes
to the fact that the[sic] she had been sanctioned for her failure to decide cases
seasonably as required by law. The subject criminal cases were submitted for decision
as early as December 2000. Respondent decided them only on 10 January 2005 or after
five (5) years from the date of their submission for decision. It took her more than one
(1) year to comply with the extension of time granted to her to decide them in the
Courts 13 August 2003 Resolution. Now, respondent seeks the Courts understanding
once again giving the same reasons that she had stated in her earlier requests for
extension of time her recurring health problems. The Court may grant compassion
but only to a certain extent.
In fact, in case of poor health, the judge concerned needs only to ask the Court
for an extension of time to decide cases (Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
MTCC, Branch 5,Bacolod City, A.M. No. 04-3-63-MTCC, November 23, 2004). Also, the
Court allows a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them a reasonable
extension of time to decide and resolve cases upon proper application by the judge
concerned upon meritorious grounds (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge
Francisco Joven, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1646, March 11, 2003). In the instant case, the Court
had already given respondent the extension of time she needed.
The neglect of duty committed by respondent lies particularly in failing to decide

the subject criminal cases within the reglementary period compounded by the fact that
she again failed to decide them within the extended period granted to her by the
Court. For such delay, respondent must be accountable lest requests for extension of
time may be subject to abuse.
From the records of the OCA, OAS-Leave Division, the only available certificates
of service of respondent were for the months of December 2003; February 2004 to June
2004; and October 2004 to December 2004. These available certificates were not
properly accomplished by the respondent. She did not provide a list of the case
numbers and titles of the cases submitted for decision that she was asking for extension
of time to decide. She merely put a check mark on the item illness of judge among
others, as one of her reasons for requesting an extension.
Nevertheless, the submission of the monthly report which includes the subject
criminal cases as among those cases submitted for decision but not yet decided, negates
respondents alleged intent to falsify her certificate of service.
The imputation that the decision rendered by the respondent was unjust is an
issue which is judicial in nature and is best left to the Court of Appeals to which the
accused have taken recourse through a Notice of Appeal that they filed on 24 January
2005.
Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision or Order is classified under Section 9, Rule

140 of the Revised Rules of Court as a less serious offense. Section 11 (B) of the same
Rule provides the imposable penalty for such offense as follows: (1) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully submitted for the consideration of the

Honorable Court the following recommendations:
1. The
present
administrative
complaint
against
Judge
Rosario
B. Torrecampo be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and
2. The respondent be declared GUILTY of undue delay in rendering a decision

within the reglementary period and be FINED in the amount of Eleven Thousand
Pesos (P11,000.00).
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, with

modification as to the recommended penalty.
In the Resolution of March 6, 2006, the Court required the parties to
manifest their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings
filed. The Court, in its Resolution of January 17, 2007, deemed the case submitted
for resolution for failure of the parties to manifest their willingness to submit the
case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
The Constitution provides that all lower courts must decide or resolve cases
or matters brought before them three months from the time a case or matter is
submitted for decision,[4] in view of the right of all persons to the speedy
disposition of their cases.[5] Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
also directs judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. For it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice
denied. Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering decisions
and acting upon cases before them not only causes great injustice to the parties
involved but also invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the judge.[6] If
public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved, judges must perform their
official duties with utmost diligence.[7] There is no excuse for delay nornegligence
in the performance of judicial functions.
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Cases in the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
54, Bacolod City,[8] citing Office
of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Aquino,[9] we held that members of the judiciary
have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. For failing to do
so, respondent Judge has to suffer the consequences thereof. Any delay in the
disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the
judiciary. The Court has consistently impressed upon members of the judiciary the
need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept
that justice delayed is justice denied.[10] It is the duty of every judge to resolve
cases filed before him with good dispatch. Undue delay in the disposition of
cases x x x erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and
unnecessarily blemishes its stature.[11]
Records reveal that the criminal cases subject of herein complaint were
submitted for decision on December 8, 2000. The Court granted respondent's
requests for several extensions of 30 days, i.e., November 14, 2001, January 15,
2002, and June 10, 2003, within which to decide said cases, due to recurring health
problems, such as hypertension and pulmonary Kock's disease. However, despite
all the extensions granted by the Court, respondent still failed to seasonably render
decision on the subject cases. Record further reveals that the decision on the
criminal cases subject of herein complaint was rendered only on January 10, 2005,
or more than four years after the same were submitted for decision on December 8,
2000. This, to our mind, is a clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
the Constitution requiring the early disposition of cases so as not to erode the
people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
While we commiserate with the misfortunes that befell respondent and her
family, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that respondent miserably failed to
abide by the high standards set forth by the Code of Judicial Conduct. It cannot be
gainsaid that inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court has constantly reminded judges to
decide cases promptly. Delay not only results in undermining the peoples faith in
the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated
and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the
wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, and worse, it invites suspicion of ulterior
motives on the part of the judge.[12] Failure to decide cases on time constitutes
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.[13]
Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should
administer justice impartially and without delay. She should be imbued with a
high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of her obligation
to promptly administer justice. It need not be overemphasized that any delay in
the determination or resolution of a case no matter how insignificant is, at the
bottom line, delay in the administration of justice in general.[14] Prompt disposition
of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If they do not possess these traits, delay in the disposition of cases is
inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with
a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to
promptly administer justice.[15]
Anent the charge that respondent falsified her certificate of service by stating
that she has no pending cases for resolution, we find the same not supported by
substantial evidence and, perforce, must fail.
As correctly observed by the OCA, the available certificates of service of
respondent were for the months of December 2003; February to June 2004; and
October to December 2004. Although these certifications were not properly
accomplished by respondent, as she failed to indicate the case numbers and titles of
the cases submitted for decision that she was asking for extension of time to
decide, the monthly report of cases includes the subject criminal cases as among
those submitted for decision but not yet decided.
On the imputation that the decision rendered by respondent was unjust, we

find it unnecessary to delve into due to the fact that the questioned decision is the
subject of an appeal with the CA and is best left to the sound judgment of the
latter, it being judicial in nature.[16]
On the allegation that respondent rendered a decision promulgated a day
ahead of the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss, implying that respondent purposely
did so in order to preempt the resolution of the Motion, we find the same without
merit.
Records show that the Motion of complainant dated January 11, 2005 was
received by the RTC on January 13, 2005,[17] or three days after the Decision was
finalized on January 10, 2005 and forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
promulgation on January 18, 2005, thus negating the allegation of complainant that
respondent purposely did so to render his Motion moot and academic. Malice or
bad faith on the part of respondent is not alleged and shown by complainant.
For administrative liability to attach, respondent must be shown to have been
moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other motive. There exists no
competent evidence that respondent in disposing of the criminal cases has been
moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other motive. Moreover, a judge
enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her function no less
than any other public officer. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. [18] The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive.[19]
On the allegation that respondent merely adopted the resolution of the bail
hearing and on the basis thereof convicted the accused, we find the same
untenable. Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides, inter alia, that the
evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial. In this case, respondent explained that the findings and
discussions contained in the CA Resolution are very material to the determination
of the issues and she adopted both the Order of Judge Panga and the CA
Resolution after reviewing the records of the hearing and the application for
bail. We find nothing irregular in the act of respondent in adopting the Order and
Resolution of Judge Panga and the CA, respectively.
In sum, we find respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering decision in
Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 for her failure to resolve the same within
the reglementaryperiod and should be penalized accordingly.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge
which carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a
fine of more thanPhp 10,000 but not exceeding Php 20,000.
Considering that respondent was priorly fined[20] in the amount
of Php 1,000.00 for her failure to decide cases within the reglementary period and
warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely, and considering the illness that beleaguered her, we find it proper to
impose a fine of Php 10,000.00 with stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Rosario B. Torrecampo, RTC,
Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur, guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision
within
thereglementary period
and
is FINED in
the
amount
of Php 10,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chairperson
(On leave)
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
On leave
Rollo, pp. 1-7.
Id. at 117-124.
Id. at 364-368.
Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)and (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Art. III, Sec. 15(1) and (2) of the 1987Constitution.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Quizon, 427 Phil. 63, 78-79 (2002).
Office of the Court Administrator v. Ulibarri, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1869, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 135,
141.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-4-219-RTC, November 2, 2006.
389 Phil. 518, 523-524 (2000); Office of the Court Administrator v. Butalid, 355 Phil. 337, 349 (1998).
Id.
Gonzales v. Judge Hidalgo, 449 Phil. 336, 340 (2003).
Report on the On-the-Spot Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 45 and
53, Bacolod City, A.M. No. 00-2-65-RTC, February 15, 2005, 451 SCRA 303, 315.
Re: Report of DCA Bernardo Ponferrada Re Judicial Audit Conducted in Branch 21, RTC, Cebu CityJudge Genis B. Balbuena, Presiding, 434 Phil. 731, 739 (2002); Re: Report on the Monitoring of Cases in
the RTC, Branch 64,Labo, Camarines Norte, 444 Phil. 4, 11 (2003).
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 3, 5, 7, 60 and
61, Baguio City, A.M. No. 02-9-568-RTC, February 11, 2004, 422 SCRA 408, 419.
Atty. Omaa v. Judge Yulde, 436 Phil. 557 (2002).
Bello III v. Judge Diaz, 459 Phil. 214, 222 (2003); Pesayco v. Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-041889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450, 460.
Rollo, pp. 360-361.
Magsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).
Id.
Re: Report on Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch
33, A.M. No. 03-7-427-RTC, August 13, 2003.

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JULIO B. VERZOSA,
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1636

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-1662-MTJ]
Complainant,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,JJ.
JUDGE MANUEL E.
Promulgated:
CONTRERAS, Municipal Trial
March 12, 2007
Court, Ocampo, Camarines Sur,

Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Verified Complaint[1] dated December 30, 2004 of Julio

B. Verzosa (complainant) charging Judge Manuel E. Contreras (respondent),
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with Grave Abuse of
Authority, Grave Misconduct (Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 2071, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Rodrigo E. Candelaria.
Complainant alleges: he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Protected Area Office. On April 14, 2004, while
conducting
surveillance
on
treasure
hunting
activities
in Mt. Isarog Natural Park, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers
discovered an open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of
Republic Act No. 7586. They likewise found and confiscated in favor of the
Government two metal chains used to overturn huge stones in the treasure hunting
site. He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose
Credo
(Credo) a.k.a.
Labaw
and Basilio Sumalde (Sumalde) a.k.a. Moren. The Executive Director of the
DENR Region V Office thereafter ordered the complainant to continue monitoring
the said treasure hunting site. Because of his involvement in the treasure hunting
activities and on the basis of the testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an
accessory in Criminal Case No. 2071 against Rodrigo Candelaria (Candelaria), et
al. for robbery. The said case arose from the alleged information relayed by
respondent
to
the
Philippine
National
Police
(PNP)
Officers
of Ocampo, Camarines Sur in the morning of April 18, 2004, which led to the
arrest of the principal accused. Respondent did not inhibit himself from
conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven bias against all of the
accused, in apparent violation of the guiding principles of Judicial Ethics and
Responsibilities. Complainant was not among the persons on board the truck when
the same was apprehended by members of the PNP on April 18, 2004. On the
basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, respondent hastily issued an order for
complainant's arrest. After the information reducing the charge from robbery to
simple theft was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
32, Pili, Camarines Sur, Judge NiloMalanyaon, in an Order dated September 13,
2004 dismissed the case due to lack of probable cause. Respondent is the
mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities inOcampo, Camarines Sur and
the robbery case for which complainant was implicated as an accessory was a way
of harassing anybody who opposes the activities.
In his Comment,[2] respondent contends: on the latter part of March 2004, he
went on mountain hiking at Mt. Isarog with the Tinablanan River as his
destination. While atMt. Isarog, he received an information that Candelaria,
known confidant of the personnel of the DENR and by the CARE Philippines, was
looting by dismantling the tower antennae of the Philippine Long Distance and
Telephone
Company
(PLDT)
used
as
a
relay
station
but
already inoperational. The PLDT Tower is already a government property and
declared by the provincial government as a tourist attraction and destination being
strategically located at the towering heights of Mt. Isarog. The activity of looting
the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower had been going on since January
2004. He directed the police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur to investigate the looting
of the steel trusses and bars of the PLDT Tower. The second time that he went on
mountain hiking at Tinablanan River on April 18, 2004, he was again informed
that the steel trusses and bars of thePLDT Tower were already being loaded in a
truck bound for the junkshop in Naga City. With the use of a binocular, he was
able to personally confirm the report. He immediately called the PNP Regional
Intelligence Group and in a checkpoint set up by the police, the truck was
apprehended with Candelaria and several men aboard. On April 19, 2004, the
OIC-Chief of Police of Ocampo, Camarines Sur filed a criminal complaint for
robbery before the MTC of Ocampo, Camarines Sur docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2071 for preliminary investigation. Upon conclusion of the preliminary
investigation and finding probable cause against the accused for robbery,
respondent forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Camarines Sur for appropriate action. However, the provincial prosecutor
modified the charge of robbery to theft, and the corresponding information was
filed with the RTC, Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No.
P-3647, presided by Judge Malanyaon. The latter, finding no probable cause,
dismissed the case against complainant and likewise ordered the arresting officer to
adduce additional evidence against the remaining accused for determination of
judicial probable cause. Having failed to do so, Judge Malanyaon dismissed
Criminal Case No. P-3647. Persons motivated with ill-will against him were just
making a failed and porous connection to the alleged treasure hunting activity. If
respondent
was
subsequently
seen
at
Zone
2,
Del
Rosario, Ocampo, Camarines Sur after the apprehension of those involved in the
looting at the PLDT Tower, it was because he was then conducting the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071 having inquisitorial authority to extend
his investigation on the area. The complainant's surmise that he is the mastermind
of the alleged treasure hunting of the group of Sumalde was based on the alleged
information
relayed
to
complainant
by
Myrna Dacer,
Daisy
Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria,
and
Mary
Ann Candelaria. Complainant imputed bias against him when he did not inhibit
from conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071 despite
prior knowledge of the looting at the PLDT Tower. Prior knowledge of the
commission of a crime is not a mandatory ground for a first level court judge
to recuse himself from conducting preliminary investigation. It was just incidental
that he caused the apprehension of the truck loaded with stolen trusses and bars of
the PLDT Tower. Preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial function of an MTC
judge. The matter of issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary and judicial in
nature which is authorized under the rules. If ever complainant perceived that
irregularities attended the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, he has all
available judicial remedies, such as filing a motion to quash warrant of
arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was availed of by
complainant despite being represented and assisted by a retained counsel. Under
the Rules, the result/recommendation of the investigating judge during the
preliminary investigation is subject to review or appropriate action by the
provincial prosecutor. The finding of probable cause against the accused in
Criminal Case No. 2071 was sustained by the provincial prosecutor
of Camarines Sur upon review, although the recommended charge of robbery was
modified to theft. The dismissal by JudgeMalanyaon of the information for theft
finding that no probable cause exists should not militate or be taken against
him. He discharged his duties as investigating judge regularly with faithful
adherence to the law and the rules, and he acted in good faith and without malice in
his
conduct
of
the
preliminary
investigation. The Sangguniang Bayan ofOcampo, Camarines Sur, rendered a
committee report stating that an ocular inspection had been conducted on the
alleged site of treasure hunting and they were able to confirm that it was indeed a
fishpond loaded with so many growing fish and not a site of treasure hunting.
In the Agenda Report,[3] the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
EVALUATION:
xxxx
The complainant, in branding the respondent Judge as the

mastermind of the alleged treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur,
relied heavily on the narrations of and affidavits executed by Myrna Dacer, Daisy
Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza and Mary Ann Candelaria. Clearly, these
narrations/affidavits are not based on the complainant's own personal knowledge
but rather on the personal knowledge of the said persons. The same are, thus,
considered hearsay because their probative force depends, in whole or in part, on
the
competency
and
credibility
of
some
persons
other tha[n]
the
complainant. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001). For
being hearsay, the same are insufficient and inconclusive to determine the
participation of the respondent Judge in the alleged treasure hunting activities
in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. In this light, the complainant failed to submit
substantial evidence to support his imputation that the respondent Judge is the
mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the issuance of warrant of arrest, such issue is

judicial and may be best resolved through judicial adjudication. As correctly
pointed out by the respondent Judge, if there are irregularities in the issuance of
warrant against the complainant, the latter has all available judicial remedies, such
as filing a motion to quash, an action for habeas corpus, or a special civil action
for certiorari. However, the complainant chose not to avail of any judicial
remedy.
To merit disciplinary sanction, the error or mistake committed by a

judge should be patent, gross, malicious, deliberate, or done in bad faith and
absent a clear showing that the judge has acted errantly; the issue becomes
judicial in character and would not properly warrant the imposition of
administrative punishment (Godinez vs. Alano, 303 SCRA 259).
At any rate, the respondent Judge followed the letter of the law,
specifically Rule 112, Section 6, paragraph b, when, prior to the issuance of
warrant of arrest against the complainant, he personally conducted preliminary
examination in the form of searching questions and answers on witness Jose
Credo and upon finding probable cause and the necessity to place the complainant
under custody in order [not] to frustrate the ends of justice.
Anent the respondent Judge's failure to inhibit himself in

conducting the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 2071, he violated
Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (now Canon 3, Section 5 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct) for taking part in a proceeding where he has personal
knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts. Respondent Judge admitted having
prior
knowledge
of
the
looting
and
dismantling
of
the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. As a matter of fact, he was able to
visually confirm the said activities which he later relayed to the local PNP and led
to the arrest of the principal accused in the said case. [The] Judge still conducted
the preliminary investigation.
It should be noted, however, that while no motion for inhibition of

respondent judge was filed by the complainant during the preliminary
investigation stage of the case, this does not mean that respondent can freely act
on the same despite the lingering doubt created in the minds of the parties that he
would not be impartial in his judgment.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify

himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above. While the first paragraph of Article 137 provides for the specific grounds
for disqualification and gives the judicial officer no discretion to sit in a case, the
second paragraph leaves the matter of inhibition to the sound discretion of the
judge (People vs. Serrano, 203 SCRA 17).
It does not explicitly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition

but provides a broad policy-oriented ground for disqualification of judges for just
and valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first paragraph (Geotina vs.
Gonzales, 41 SCRA 66).
The judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify

himself from sitting in a case for just and valid reasons (Parayno vs. Meneses, 231
SCRA 807) other than those mentioned in Rule 137, Section 1. The ultimate test
in determining the validity of the court's inhibition is whether or not the petitioner
is deprived of fair and impartial trial (Associacion de Agricultures de TalisaySilay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294) and the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of

the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:
1. The instant matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case;
2. Judge
Manuel
E.
Contreras,
Municipal
Trial
Court
of Ocampo, Camarines Sur be admonished for violation of Canon
3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning

that repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
On September 5, 2006 and September 26, 2006, complainant and respondent

manifested their willingness to submit the case for decision/ resolution based on
the pleadings filed, respectively.
We agree with the findings of the OCA except that respondent should be
reprimanded instead of being merely admonished.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.[4]
The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed
to his sound discretion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court, which provides that a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other than those
mentioned in the first paragraph.[5]
However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule
3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 3.12. - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others,
proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts

concerning the proceeding.
In Oktubre v. Velasco,[6] citing Perez v. Suller,[7] we held that the rule on

disqualification of judges under Rule 3.12 and Section 1, Rule 137 [S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is
not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not
handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and
partiality. The rule is intended to preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the
courts of justice.[8]
True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently

construe and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act and
behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his
impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of
partiality is proscribed.[9]
Records reveal that respondent had prior knowledge of the looting and
dismantling at the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and he was
instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers. Respondent should have been
aware of the impropriety of conducting the preliminary investigation considering
that Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge from
taking part in proceedings where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. Respondent ignored said rule, warranting disciplinary sanction from
this Court.
Respondent's averment that prior knowledge of the commission of a crime is
not a mandatory ground for the first level court judge to recuse himself from
conducting preliminary investigation, holds no water. As a judge, respondent must
keep himself abreast with the law. He should have known that it is well
entrenched in the Code of Judicial Conduct, prevailing at that time, that personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding disqualifies
him from taking part in such proceeding as the same would necessarily spawn a
perception that he is bias and impartial. It is of no moment that the finding of
probable cause was sustained by the provincial prosecutor. What is of paramount
importance is the perceived bias and impartiality by the complainant against
respondent in his conduct of the preliminary investigation due to respondent's prior
knowledge of the looting at the PLDT Tower, respondent being instrumental in the
apprehension of the robbers.
Although respondent should have inhibited himself from conducting the
preliminary investigation, it did not render as void the act of respondent in issuing
a warrant of arrest. He acted within the bounds of the then existing Section 6(b),
Rule 112[10] of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that without waiting
for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he
finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause
exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The OCA rightly observed that respondent followed the letter of the existing
Rule, when, prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest against complainant,
respondent personally conducted preliminary examination in the form of searching
questions and answers on witness Credo. The purpose of issuing the warrant of
arrest was to place the respondents under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.[11] Whether it is necessary to place the accused in
custody is left to the judges sound judgment.[12]
Moreover, the OCA correctly sustained respondents claim that if ever
complainant perceived that irregularities attended the issuance of warrant of arrest
against him, he has all available judicial remedies,[13] such as filing a motion to
quash warrant of arrest, habeas corpus proceedings, or certiorari, but none was
availed of by complainant.
In Lumbos v. Baliguat,[14] we held that as a matter of policy, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be
subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts,
no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[15] To hold, otherwise,
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts
or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.[16] An inquiry into the administrative liability of a judge may be
resorted to only after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with
finality.[17] For until there is a final declaration by the appellate court that the
challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to
conclude whether respondent is administratively liable.[18] The Court has to be
shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. [19] Thus, not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties
renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate
intent to do an injustice.[20] Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge x x x can find
refuge.[21]
Anent the allegation that respondent is the mastermind behind the treasure
hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur, we find the allegation to be devoid
of merit.
In Espaol v. Mupas,[22] we held that in administrative proceedings,
complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on second-hand
information to prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is reduced
into a bare indictment or mere speculation.[23] The Court cannot give credence to
charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. In this case, complainant failed to
discharge that burden. As aptly observed by the OCA, complainant has no
personal knowledge of the treasure hunting by respondent as he relied only on the
information relayed to him by the relatives of the accusedCandelaria in the robbery
case.
Furthermore, we find that the affidavits of Myrna Dacer, Daisy
Moran, Salvacion Candelaria, Analiza Candelaria, and Mary Ann Candelaria relate
to the incident surrounding the arrest of Dante Dacer, one of the accused in the
robbery case. The police blotter which is not even a certified true copy is an
alleged threat made by respondent against Mary Ann Candelaria. Nowhere in the
said documents do we find that respondent was being tagged as the mastermind of
the treasure hunting. Taken all together, these documents have no prima
facie evidentiary value as to warrant further investigation on the matter.
In Mataga v. Rosete,[24] we held that any administrative complaint leveled
against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent
judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of
judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never
be countenanced.[25] If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence
against him should be competent.[26]
In fine, we find that respondent is merely guilty of violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct in not recusing himself from conducting preliminary
investigation.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Manuel E. Contreras,
MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur guilty of violation of Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is REPRIMANDED with warning that a

repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(On Leave)
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
On Leave.
Rollo, pp. 1-8.
Id. at 48-66.
Id. at 429-433.
Sec. 1, Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, July 22, 2004, 434 SCRA 636.
320 Phil. 1 (1995).
Id. at 8; Oktubre v. Velasco, supra note 6, at 647.
Id.
Subsequently amended by SC Resolution dated October 10, 2005 in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC whereby the
conduct of preliminary investigation is removed from Judges of first level courts.
Id.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
Sesbreo v. Aglugub, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1581, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 365, 373.
Bello III v. Judge Diaz, 459 Phil. 214, 221 (2003).
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1641, July 27, 2006.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Balsamo v. Judge Suan, 458 Phil. 11, 23 (2003).
Id. at 24.
Id.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 13.
Id. at 37.
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004, 440 SCRA 217.
Id. at 221.
Id.
THIRD DIVISION
RUFA C. SUAN,
A.C. No. 6377
Complainant,
Present:
- versus -
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ.
ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
March 12, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant administrative complaint filed by Rufa C. Suan charges

respondent Atty. Ricardo D. Gonzalez with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, perjury and forum shopping, and prays for his suspension or
disbarment. Complainant is a Director and Vice President of Rural Green Bank of
Caraga, Inc., a rural banking corporation with principal place of business
at Montilla Blvd., Butuan City, while respondent is one of its stockholders.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On February 11, 2004, respondent filed a case for Mandamus, Computation

of Interests, Enforcement of Inspection, Dividend and Appraisal Rights, Damages
and Attorneys Fees against the Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. and the
members of its Board of Directors before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan
City, Branch 33, praying, inter alia, that a temporary restraining order be issued
enjoining the conduct of the annual stockholders meeting and the holding of the
election of the Board of Directors.
On February 14, 2004, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO) conditioned upon respondents posting of a bond. Thereafter, respondent
submitted JCL Bond No. 01626 issued by Stronghold Insurance Company,
Incorporated (SICI) together with a Certification issued by then Court
Administrator, now Associate Justice, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that, according to
the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Butuan City, SICI
has no pending obligation and/or liability to the government insofar as
confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases are concerned.
Based on the foregoing, Suan filed this complaint alleging that respondent
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct when he submitted
the certification to the RTC despite knowing that the same is applicable only for
transactions before the MTCC; and that the bond was defective because it was
released by SICI despite respondents failure to put up the required P100,000.00
collateral.
Suan also claimed that in the complaint filed by respondent, together with
Eduardo, Purisima, Ruben, and Manuel, all surnamed Tan, before the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) against Ismael E. Andaya and the members of the Board
of Directors of the Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. for alleged gross violation of
the principles of good corporate governance, they represented themselves as the
banks minority stockholders with a total holdings amounting to more or less P5
million while the controlling stockholders own approximately 80% of the
authorized capital stock.
Suan averred that respondent committed perjury because the above

allegations were allegedly inconsistent with respondents averments in the
complaint pending before the RTC where he claimed that the majority
stockholders own 70% ( and not 80%) of the outstanding capital stock of the
Rural Green Bank of Caraga, Inc. while the minority stockholders stake amounted
to P6 million (and not P5 million).
Complainant finally claimed that respondent is guilty of forum shopping

because the causes of action of the cases he filed before the RTC and the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas are the same.
Respondent denied the allegations against him. He alleged that it was the
bonding company which inadvertently attached the certification pertaining to the
MTCC; that when he discovered the inadvertence, he immediately filed with the
RTC an ex-parte motion to replace the certification with the one pertaining to the
RTC; that he had satisfactorily complied with the requirements of SICI as shown in
the letter of Ms. Evelyn R. Ramirez, SICIs Officer-in-Charge, dated March 19,
2004; that there is no inconsistency in the allegations contained in the complaints
pending before the RTC and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas thus he could not be
held liable for perjury; that there is no forum shopping because the causes of
action and the reliefs prayed for in the cases pending before the trial court and
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas are different; and that it is complainant who is
guilty of forum shopping since this is the second disbarment suit that she filed
against him.
In her Reply, complainant insisted that she is not guilty of forum shopping;
that she only filed one disbarment suit against respondent while the other two
suits were filed by Joseph Omar Andaya and Dr. Arturo Cruz based on different
acts committed by the respondent.
On December 1, 2004, the instant administrative complaint was referred to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. After the mandatory conference, the parties were directed to
submit
their
respective
position
papers. In
a Report
and
Recommendation dated September 20, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed because
complainant failed to prove by strong and substantial evidence the imputations of
dishonesty against the respondent.
In its Resolution dated December 17, 2005, the Board of Governors of the
IBP approved the dismissal of the complaint.
Complainant is now before us on appeal praying for the reversal and setting
aside of the assailed Resolution arguing that it failed to state clearly the facts and
the reasons on which it is based and that the evidence she presented were
ignored and not considered.
Complainant maintains that contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondents

act of submitting a wrong certification to the RTC, relative to SICIs capacity to
issue bonds, was deliberate and with intent to mislead, thereby constituting a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She claims that respondent
who is interested in the issuance of a temporary restraining order is expected to
examine all the documents as well as the attachments, hence there is no reason
why he would inadvertently attach the certification intended for the MTCC.
We are not persuaded.
Complainants insistence that respondent deliberately attached the MTCC

certification instead of the RTC certification lacks merit. We are inclined to
believe the findings of the IBP that the MTCC certification was inadvertently
attached and that it was not deliberate. Indeed, respondent as well as every
litigant is expected to examine all the documents he files in court. However, not
every mistake or oversight he commits should be deemed dishonest, deceitful or
deliberate so as to mislead the court. Respondent has nothing to gain by
submitting the wrong certification. On the contrary, he runs the risk that his
complaint be dismissed or denied outright.
There is no reason for respondent, or even the bonding company, to attach

the wrong certification as the latter was equally qualified to issue bonds in civil or
criminal cases pending before the RTC. Further, what militates against
complainants insistence that the filing of the wrong certification was deliberate
and with intent to deceive was the fact that after respondent knew of the
inadvertence he immediately filed a manifestation with motion that the same be
replaced with the certification applicable to the RTC.
It is well-settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests

upon the complainant and the case against the respondent must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence
of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has

consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.[1] In the instant case, complainant Suan
failed to show that respondent willfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood
and unlawful and dishonest conduct. She failed to show not only the dubious
character of the act done but the motivation as well.[2]
Complainant next claims that the injunction bond was wrongfully released
to respondent by SICI as the latter failed to put up the required collateral, as
shown in theFebruary 28, 2004 letter of Evelyn R. Ramirez which the IBP allegedly
ignored. She also insists that protesting the propriety of the bond before the trial
court is not a pre-requisite to the filing of the instant administrative
complaint. Besides, she argues that it would have been futile to file a protest
before the trial court considering that she knew of the defects in the issuance of
the injunction bond long after the bond has expired.
The argument is without merit.
The IBP correctly disregarded the February 28, 2004 letter of Ramirez
considering that on March 19, 2004, Ramirez wrote another letter to the trial
court informing the latter of respondents compliance with the required
collateral.
Anent the allegation of perjury, the same is likewise bereft of merit. In the
case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice,[3] the Court held that a mere assertion of
a false, objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough to warrant a finding of perjury,
thus:
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made
by the defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant
did not believe those statements to be true.
xxxx
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory

sworn statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be false by other evidence than
the contradicting statement.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is necessary that there must be contradictory statements for perjury

to exist. In the instant case, we find that respondent made no contradicting
statements. Indeed, he alleged in the complaint before the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas that the minority stockholders own more or less P5 million while the
controlling stockholders ownapproximately 80% of the authorized capital
stock. These figures are mere estimates and in no way contradict respondents
allegations in the complaint pending before the RTC that the minoritys stake
is P6 million while the majoritys stockholdings is 70% of the outstanding capital
stock.
Besides, for perjury to prosper it is necessary that complainant prove the

falsity of the statements and that respondent did not believe any of the
statements to be true. We find that complainant failed to meet the required
standard of proof to sustain the charge of perjury. The IBP correctly noted that
no malice was shown when respondent made the foregoing allegations and that
respondents failure to allege the exact shareholdings was due to the banks
refusal to allow respondent to inspect the books.
We agree with the findings of the IBP that there is no forum shopping. The
essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.[5] There is forum shopping when,
between an action pending before this Court and another one, there exist: a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which
party is successful amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; and
said requisites also constitutive of lis pendens.[6]
The filing of the intra-corporate case before the RTC does not amount to
forum-shopping. It is a formal demand of respondents legal rights in a court of
justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law with respect to the
controversy involved.[7] The relief sought in the case is primarily to compel the
bank to disclose its stockholdings, to allow them the inspection of corporate
books and records, and the payment of damages. It was also prayed that a TRO
be issued to enjoin the holding of the annual stockholders meeting and the
election of the members of the Board, which, only courts of justice can issue.
On the other hand, the complaint filed with the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas was an invocation of the BSPs supervisory powers over banking
operations which does not amount to a judicial proceeding. It brought to the
attention of the BSP the alleged questionable actions of the banks Board of
Directors in violation of the principles of good corporate governance. It prayed
for the conduct of an investigation over the alleged unsafe and unsound business
practices of the bank and to make necessary corrective measures to prevent the
collapse of the bank.
As such, the two proceedings are of different nature praying for different
relief. Likewise, a ruling by the BSP concerning the soundness of the bank
operations will not adversely or directly affect the resolution of the intracorporate controversies pending before the trial court.
Furthermore, to merit disciplinary action, forum shopping must be willful

and deliberate.[8] Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that, should
there be any pending action or claim before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency, a complete statement of its status should be given. The Certification of
Non-Forum-shopping attached by respondent substantially complied with this
requirement by providing therein that he has also filed a Complaint before the
BSP. Likewise, such disclosure negates the allegation that he willfully and
deliberately committed forum-shopping.
It bears stressing that disbarment proceedings are matters of public

interest, undertaken for public welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts
of justice from the official ministration of the persons unfit to practice
them.[9] However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution and
only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, we AFFIRM the Resolution dated December 17, 1005, of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommending the dismissal of the instant
complaint for disbarment/suspension against respondent ATTY. RICARDO D.
GONZALEZ for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
Concepion v. Fandio, Jr., 389 Phil. 474, 481 (2000).

Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho, Adm. Case No. 6403, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 202, 208.
[3]
G.R. No. 162187, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495.
[4]
Id. at 514.
[5]
Tiboli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, 442 Phil. 499, 507 (2002).
[6]
Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 131247, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA
74, 83-84.
[7]
Supena v. De La Rosa, 334 Phil. 671, 677 (1997).
[8]
SECTION 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
[9]
Urban Bank, Inc. v. Pea, 417 Phil. 70, 77 (2001).
[10]
Resurreccion v. Sayson, 360 Phil. 313, 321 (1998).
[2]
EN BANC
FRANCISCO PALON, JR.,
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1530
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
JUDGE PLACIDO B. VALLARTA,
Promulgated:
Municipal Circuit Trial Court,

Cabiao-San Isidro, Nueva Ecija,
Respondent.
March 7, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On 8 December 2000, Carlos Pangilinan (Pangilinan) filed a complaint for

Frustrated Murder against Francisco Palon, Jr. (Palon) before the Regional Trial
Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1982000. Upon preliminary investigation before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Cabiao-San Isidro, Nueva Ecija (MCTC-Cabiao-San Isidro), respondent Judge
Placido B. Vallarta (respondent judge) issued an Order dated 29 May 2001 for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest of Palon.[1]
It appears that Palon is the offended party in another case, Criminal Case
No. 66-01, for Attempted Homicide filed against accused Arturo Mendoza
(Mendoza) and Pangilinan. On 7 June 2001, respondent judge issued a warrant
for the arrest of Mendoza and Pangilinan. Respondent judge did not sign the
warrant of arrest.[2]
Palon filed the instant complaint for Ignorance of the Law, Dereliction of
Duty, and Partiality claiming that respondent judge failed to evaluate the
Information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija and
likewise failed to sign the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 66-01.
Palon asserts that respondent judge refused to act on the information

because respondent judge is related by affinity within the fourth civil degree to
Pangilinan, one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 66-01. Palon further alleges
that he filed a motion[3] to remand Criminal Case No. 198-2000 to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija on the ground that the offense charged is
cognizable by the regional trial court and that respondent judge is related to
Pangilinans sister. However, respondent judge ignored the motion.
Palon also claims that in the scheduled preliminary investigation of Criminal

Case No. 198-2000, he and his co-accused, with their counsel, were present but
the hearings were postponed at the instance of respondent judge. However, on
the only occasion that the accused requested for postponement of the hearing
because their counsel could not attend, respondent judge allegedly retorted,
Wala akong paki-alam kung hindi darating ang abogado ninyo; magsumbong na
kayo kahit saan. When respondent judge stepped down from his rostrum, he
approached the father of Palon and told him, Kapitbahay, ang magiging bail
ninyo ay P20,000 bawat isa; kaysa ibayad ninyo ito sa bail ay ibayad na lang ito
kay Carlos Pangilinan, at kung kukulangin man, ay ako na ang bahala, at hulugan
ninyo nalang ito.[4]
Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint despite the notice

sent to him.[5] He is therefore deemed to have waived his right to file the same.
Further, it appears that per Certification by the Clerk of Court of MCTC-CabiaoSan Isidro, respondent judge filed a letter of resignation on 10 June 2002. The
Certification was noted in this Courts Resolution dated 19 July 2004.
On 16 February 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest, within ten
days from notice, if they were willing to submit the case for resolution based on
the pleadings filed. Complainant filed his manifestation stating that respondent
judge did not file his answer or any responsive pleading and in fact, he had
resigned from the service. Complainant manifested that he was submitting the
case for the Courts appropriate resolution. Respondent judge did not file any
manifestation.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that respondent judge
was given an opportunity to explain his side but he chose not to comply with the
Courts directives. His refusal to controvert the allegations against him is deemed
an admission of the truth of the charges.
Upon verification, the OCA found that respondent judge filed a letter of
resignation as municipal judge of MCTC-Cabiao-San Isidro on 10 June 2002.[6] The
OCA would have recommended the dismissal of respondent judge had he not
resigned during the pendency of this case. Instead, the OCA recommended that
the benefits and privileges that respondent judge might be entitled to be forfeited
with prejudice to reinstatement or re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
agencies or corporations.
Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint or file any responsive

pleading or manifestation despite receipt of notice to do so. He, instead, filed a
letter of resignation. The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an
unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is against human nature to
just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence,
silence in this case is an admission of the truth of the charges.[7] Respondent
judge is deemed to have admitted the charges against him.
Every officer or employee in the judiciary has the duty to obey the orders
and processes of this Court without delay.[8] A resolution of this Court requiring
comment on an administrative complaint is not a mere request from the Court. It
cannot be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents in
administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations
against them in the administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve
the integrity of the judiciary. The Court will not tolerate indifference of
respondents to administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment
on such administrative complaints.
There is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting
standards of judicial conduct and integrity. It is gross misconduct, even disrespect
to the highest Court of the land, for a respondent judge to exhibit indifference to
the resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the
complaint.[9] Indifference or defiance to this Courts orders or resolutions is
punishable with dismissal, suspension, or fine as warranted by the
circumstances.[10]
Complainant further alleged that respondent judge failed to evaluate the

information or sign the warrant of arrest because the latter is related by
affinity within the fourth civil degree to one of the accused in the criminal case.
The rule is that a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity to a party is disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all
parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered in the records.[11] Rule
3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct[12] provides:
Rule 3.12 A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include proceedings
where:
xxxx
(d) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within

the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; x x x
The rationale of the rule on disqualification of judges springs from the longstanding precept that a judge should not handle a case where there is a
perception, rightly or wrongly, that he is susceptible to bias and partiality because
of relationship or some other ground.[13]
On the utterances made by respondent judge, we stress that as a dispenser

of justice, a judge should demonstrate sensitivity in his choice of words as
normally expected of men of his stature. Here, respondent judge used language
hardly the kind of circumspect words expected of a magistrate.
Judges must observe judicial decorum, which requires a magistrate to be at

all times temperate in his language, refraining from vilification or inflammatory
rhetoric.[14] It is essential that judges live up to the high standards demanded by
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice
and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Belligerent behavior has no
place in the judiciary where its judges and personnel should act at all times with
self-restraint and civility even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.
This is not the first infraction of respondent judge. In A.M. No. MTJ-02-1398
entitled Enriquez v. Vallarta,[15] we found respondent judge guilty of ignorance of
the law and delay in the disposition of cases. We fined him P2,000, with a warning
that repetition of similar infractions would merit more severe sanctions.
In another case, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541 entitled Jacinto v. Vallarta,[16] the

Court found respondent judge guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and fined
him P5,000.
Another administrative case, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1531 entitled Pastora dela

Cruz v. Judge Placido B. Vallarta for Gross Inefficiency, Gross Negligence, and
Gross Ignorance of the Law, is pending before this Court.
With the previous warning, respondent judge deserves the maximum

administrative penalty, which is dismissal from the service. However, since
respondent judge has resigned from the service, we can only order the forfeiture
of all his benefits, except accrued leave benefits.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta guilty as charged.

We declare the FORFEITURE of all benefits due him, except accrued leave
benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in the government service,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. This judgment is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVALGUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
Rollo, p. 16.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 5.

Associate Justice
[5]
The registry return receipt showed that the notice was received by a certain Gloria B. Vallarta on
November 2001 (back of page 32 of the rollo).
[6]
Per Certification of Yolanda L. Batoon, Clerk of Court II. Rollo, p. 43.

Grefaldeo v. Judge Lacson, 355 Phil. 266 (1998).
Chan v. Castillo, A.M. No. P-94-1055, 25 November 1994, 238 SCRA 359.
Martinez v. Judge Zoleta, 374 Phil. 35 (1999).
Guerrero v. Deray, 442 Phil. 85 (2002).
Lazo v. Judge Tiong, 360 Phil. 359 (1998).
Amended as Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, effective 1 June 2004.
Urbanes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112884, 30 August 1994, 236 SCRA 72.
Negros Grace Pharmacy, Inc. v. Judge Hilario, 461 Phil. 843 (2003).
428 Phil. 13 (2002).
10 March 2005, 453 SCRA 83.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
Judiciary,
THIRD DIVISION
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA,
A.C. No. 7204
Complainant,
Present:
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
- versus -
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY.
ERNESTO
MACABATA,
M.
March 7, 2007
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against

respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross
Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek

the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from
Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11,
2004 (copy attached as Annex I) to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon
City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel
and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner,
respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car,
respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very
tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent
at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the
complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride,
which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering
(sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At
along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and
forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her
breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal
attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing

him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back
the case folder from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular
phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant
At 5:33:46
pm
replied by respondent
at 6:16:11 pm
forget the case. I decided to refer it

with
other
lawyer
- does this mean I can not c u

anymore
(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant
I feel bad. I cant expect that u will

take advantage of the situation.
wrong to kiss a girl especially in the

lips if you dont have relationship
with her.
at 6:17:59 pm
Follow-up message
Sent by complainant
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent
At 6:32:43 pm
Follow up message
- Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage

of the situation, 2 put it rightly it s
an expression of feeling. S sri (Im
very sorry. Its not taking
advantage of the situation, to put
it rightly it is an expression of
feeling)
Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c

me s I can show u my sincerity
by respondent
at 6:42:25 pm
(Im so sorry. Ill not do it again.

Will you still see me so I can show
you my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to

complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying I dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. Im realy
sri. Puede bati na tyo. (I dont know what to do so you may forgive me. Im really
sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied talk to my lawyer in due time. Then another message was
received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me.
(Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear
manifestation of admission of guilt.[2]
In his answer,[3] respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal

services to the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005
and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which
complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and
Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode
with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the
former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and
Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts
imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a

criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent
pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name
of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a
certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage
was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was
living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to
discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills
every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
(IBP)
at
the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa

submitted his Report and Recommendation,[4] recommending the imposition of
the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20

March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of
conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A.
Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.[5]
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts
that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with
respondents actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of
our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society
today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-deceitful conduct.
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility

forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar
in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite
condition for remaining in the practice of law.[6] In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,[7] we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession
is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but
also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest

standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers
of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. [8] We explained
in Barrientos v. Daarol[9] that, as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[10]
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[11] good moral character was defined as what a
person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four
ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public
image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.[12]
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,[13] respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She
offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face
towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and
I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and
plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no
lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very
spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying sexual harassment.
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona
Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following
events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along
the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting
each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and
Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so
I said she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like
that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to
Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about
her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for
you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine.
After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or
beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I
stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed
me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me at
the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we
had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she
went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I
kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her
face towards me and when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her on the
lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, thats it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment.
So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she
said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened
the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the
use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly
on the lips and thats it. x x x.[14] (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to

what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.[15]
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,[16] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as

such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to
the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore,
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be
immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense
of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly

immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,[17] a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law,

when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,[18] a lawyer was disbarred after complainant

proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship
with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain
the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,[19] respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships

with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the
complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of
appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the
documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the
high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,[20] it was ruled that it was highly immoral of

respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position
as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said
college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under
the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[21] respondent lawyer was disbarred when he

abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into
marrying him and misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[22] respondent entered into multiple marriages

and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that *s+uch
pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and
family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the
development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. As such,
there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred.
In Tucay v. Tucay,[23] respondent contracted marriage with another married

woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty
years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession, warranting respondents disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] respondent married complainant while his first

wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that the act
of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the
Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,[25] respondent lured an innocent woman into a

simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent
failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is
expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of
law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.[26]
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on

the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,[27] forms of greetings,
casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However,
such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took

advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations
with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and
she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof,[28] disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power.[29] Thus, the adage that he who
asserts not he who denies, must prove.[30] As a basic rule in evidence, the burden
of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui
decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla
sit.[31] In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden
of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not
suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[32]
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the

lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because
right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the
respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately
extended an apology to complainant alsovia cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were
several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney
route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he
could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could
freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not
grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a
lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of
factors.[33] When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider
that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to
foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and
to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.[34] Disciplinary proceedings are
means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out
this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.[35] While it is discretionary upon the
Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the
lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in
the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the
most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit
disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral
character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such
nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in
the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated
before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be
considered.[36]
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct
of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty
to the court or the client.[37] In the Matter of Darell Adams,[38] a lawyer was
publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her
blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct
which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this
is respondents first offense, reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed
to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to
come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However,
her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely
needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However,
respondent is herebyREPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his
dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction
will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
Rollo, pp. 1-2.

Id.
Id. at 13-20.
Id. at 149-155.
Id. at 148.
Mortel v. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586, 592 (1956); Cordova v. Cordova, A.C. No. 3249, 29 November 1989,
179 SCRA 680, 683.
A.C. No. 5082, 17 February 2004, 423 SCRA 135, 140-141.
Ui v. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 708 (2000).
A.C. No. 1512, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 30, 40.
Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001).
In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and
for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Sharia Bar, B.M. No. 1154, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA
146.
Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582, 589.
Rollo, pp. 27, 35.
TSN, 26 July 2005, pp.18-24.
Ui v. Bonifacio, supra note 8.
446 Phil. 861, 867 (2003).
117 Phil. 768, 776 (1963).
213 Phil. 437, 440 (1984).
Supra note 12 at 588.
A.C. No. 1334, 28 November 1989, 179 SCRA 653, 659.
A.C. No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 315.
A.C. No. 6148, 27 February 2004, 424 SCRA 42, 54-55.
A.C. No. 5170, 17 November 1999, 318 SCRA 229, 231.
101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).
106 Phil. 256, 259 (1960).
Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr., 375 Phil. 1, 17 (1999); Alfonso v. Juanson, A.M. No. RTJ-92-904, 7 December
1993, 228 SCRA 239, 255-256, citing Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990), p. 751.
Atty. Aquino v. Judge Acosta, 429 Phil. 498, 510 (2002).
Angeles v. Figueroa, A.C. No. 5050, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA 186, 195.
Reyes v. Wong, Adm. Case No. 547, 29 January 1975, 63 SCRA 667, 673.
Angeles v. Figueroa, supra note 28.
Uytengsu III v. Baduel, Adm. Case No. 5134, 14 December 2005, 477 SCRA 621, 632.
Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr., A.C. No. 5225, 29 April 2003,401 SCRA 622, 627.
Agpalo, LEGAL ETHICS (4th Ed., 1989), p. 445.
In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware Joel D. Tenenbaum, 6 February
2007.
Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 108, 119.
Id. at 445-446.
Id.
428 N.E. 2 d 786 (Ind. 1981).
THIRD DIVISION
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO,
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1655

(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-1814-MTJ)
Complainant,
Present:
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -
CALLEJO, SR.,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.**
HONORABLE GINA M. BIBATPALAMOS, PRESIDING JUDGE,

METROPOLITAN
TRIAL
COURT, PASAY CITY, BRANCH
47,
Promulgated:
March 6, 2007
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution dated 30 August 2006, which censured respondent Judge Gina M.
Bibat-Palamos, for her delay in issuing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 75495 entitled, Leonardo R. Ocampo v. Leonora Tirona, an ejectment case on
which the decision has already become final and executory.
On 26 July 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its
report and recommendation. It recommended that:
1.
That the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2.
That respondent Executive Judge Gina M. Bibat-Palamos be CENSURED with

a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severely.[1]
The report ratiocinated thus:
The Motion for Execution was filed by herein complainant way back 26
September 2005, after the ejectment case was finally resolved by the Supreme Court
last 10 August 2005. Respondent Judge resolved the said Motion only on 11 January
2006 and the same was received by the complainant only on 11 February 2006 after
almost five (5) months from the time it was filed. Notably, the resolution of the motion
came a week after Mr. Ocampo filed this complaint and was mailed almost a month
thereafter.
It is an elementary rule that in ejectment proceedings the decision in favor of

the plaintiff is immediately executory. The plaintiff is entitled to reacquire possession of
the subject property, after judgment is ruled in his favor, in order to prevent further
damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. (Hualam
Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85466, 16
October 1992, 214 SCRA 612). While we give respondent credit for finally issuing the
order for a Writ of Execution, we cannot but observe that the same could have been
issued at the outset when the motion for execution was filed in accordance with the
law. The fact that she finally complied with the requirements of the law is of no
moment. Respondent cannot now be allowed to evade the effects of her inaction or
ignorance of procedural law that give rise to this administrative complaint.
Her failure to comprehend the basic purpose of resolving the Motion for
Execution in Ejectment cases promptly and expeditiously albeit one already resolved
and decided by the Supreme Court constitutes gross ignorance of the law, for which she
may be held administratively liable. It must be emphasized that the adoption of the Rule
on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the judiciary to enforce the
constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. It was promulgated
for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.
Any member of the Judiciary who causes delay sought to be prevented by the Rule is
sanctionable. (Velez v. Flores, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1366, 7 February 2003).[2]
Deliberating on the case, the First Division (now Third Division) adopted the
findings and conclusion of the OCA.[3]
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied in a
Resolution[4] dated 29 November 2006.
In her second motion for reconsideration, respondent explained there was

no delay in her acting on the complainants motion for execution, thus:
5. x x x [T]he Motion for Execution was filed by the complainant on September 27,
2005 (Annex A). It was set for hearing on September 30, 2005. An Order was issued
by the undersigned dated October 3, 2005 (Annex B) requiring the defendant to file
their comment/opposition to the Motion for Execution within ten (10) days from the
date of the issuance of the said Order. On October 10, 2005, the defendant filed an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment (Annex C). An Order
dated October 14, 2005 was issued by the undersigned granting the defendants motion
and giving her until October 20, 2005 (Annex D) to file her comment to herein
complainants Motion for Execution. Defendant did not comply with the Order
dated October 14, 2005. Hence, the period to resolve the Motion for Execution of the
herein complainant commenced to run from the time that the period given to the
defendant has lapsed which was on October 20, 2005 and not on September 27, 2005 or
the time of the filing of the Motion for Execution. The Motion for Execution was
resolved and granted on January 11, 2006 (Annex E) or eighty three (83) days after it
was deemed submitted for resolution. Paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Article VIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution states: All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty four (24) months from date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
(12) months for all lower collegiate courts, and three (3) months for all other lower
courts. The Constitution further states in Paragraph 2 of the said Section that: A case
or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
and that therefore, the motion for execution was resolved within the
reglementary period. The respondent further explained:
6. That the alleged delay between the issuance of the Order dated January 11, 2006 and
its subsequent mailing on February 17, 2006 can be explained by the fact that the
Court during that said period was conducting a Physical Inventory of all its cases as
required (sic) Administrative Circular No. 1, January 28, 1988, and all records of the
Court has to be sorted out and filed by the Courts staff and Orders that (sic) required to
be sent to mail likewise needs to be sorted out.
7. That while the undersigned agrees with the complainants claim that the resolution
of the motion is a matter of duty on his part- it is not a complicated matter as he could
not anymore revised or modify the judgment, it is equally the undersigneds

duty, taking note that case may still be compromised notwithstanding the finality of the
decision therein, to exhaust every means to shift the attitudes of the parties from
adversarial to a problem-solving opportunity to resolve their differences in ways that
are productive for their lives. This principle is inculcated in the minds of todays judges
by no other than our Supreme Court. Furthermore, the undersigned has to
check if there is any supervening event that may render the issuance of a Writ of
Execution moot and academic taking note that a considerable length of time has lapsed
between the promulgation of Petition for Review and the filing of the Motion for
Execution. Prudence dictates and justice requires that a judge should hear both parties
and not rely on the one-sided allegation of another.[5]
Article VIII, Section 15, par. 1 of the 1987 Constitution states:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or
resolved within twenty four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,
and, twelve (12) months for all lower collegiate courts, and three (3) months for all other
lower courts.
Further, Paragraph 2 of the said Section further states:
A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court
itself.
As may be gleaned above, lower court judges are to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within three (3) months or ninety (90) days
from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum.
As a rule, the prescribed periods for the performance of certain acts must
be followed with fealty as they are designed primarily to speed up the final
disposition of the case. Such reglementary periods are indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business.
Deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. More importantly, its observance
cannot be left to the whims and caprices of the parties.[6]
Applying the foregoing discussion in the case at bar, we are persuaded that
the resolution of the subject motion for execution filed by complainant
sufficiently complied with the period provided. As a matter of fact, complainant
had seven (7) days left when the motion was decided within eighty three (83)
days from the time it was submitted for decision. The period to resolve the
Motion for Execution of herein complainant commenced to run from the time
that the period given to the defendant in the ejectment case has lapsed which
was on 20 October 2005, and ended at the time the Motion for Execution was
resolved and granted by the respondent on 11 January 2006. From 20 October
2005to 11 January 2006, eighty three (83) days lapsed. Thus, the allegation of
delay has no leg to stand on. It is of no moment that complainant had to wait for
the resolution of his motion for execution. When faced with an accusation of
delay and claim of injustice, this Court shall be guided by the period allowed by
law. It cannot be expected that every time a pleading is filed, courts will be able to
take notice and act on it at once. Reglementary periods are fixed by law and the
various issuances of this Court are designed not only to protect the rights of all
the parties to due process but also to achieve efficiency and order in the conduct
of judicial business. Unless these periods have been arbitrarily disregarded by
judges, there is no reason to hold them liable for undue delay.
Furthermore, the allegations in the complaint do not evince any malice, bad
faith, or corrupt motives on the part of respondent. In fact, she should be lauded
for exerting best efforts to afford due process to all parties by setting the motion
for execution for hearing and giving defendant the opportunity to comment on
the motion. This, to our mind, justifies the dismissal[7] of the charges of gross
ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty filed against her.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not
only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but also motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious
accusation, and a person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be
sure of the grounds for the accusation.[8] Good faith and absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a
judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.[9]
We scrutinized closely respondents record and found no trace of

wrongdoing on her part. This is the first time that she has been administratively
charged.
While indeed a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading

under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, we have allowed it in certain
cases. Besides, in administrative cases involving the discipline of judges and court
personnel, we have allowed second or even third motions for reconsideration
whenever justified by the circumstances.[10] In the case at bar, and considering
the foregoing observations, we have resolved to give due course to the second
motion for reconsideration and grant the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Second Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The penalty of censure is hereby SET
ASIDE and the complaintDISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
On leave
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
No part
Associate Justice
*
**
*
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
On leave.
No part.
On leave.
Rollo, p. 40.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 96-97.
LTS Philippines Corporation v. Maliwat, G.R. No. 159024, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 254, 258.
Salvador v. Limsiaco, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-06-1626, 17 March 2006, 485 SCRA 1, 6; Roxas v. Eugenio,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2008, 17 July 2006, 495 SCRA 188, 191.
Suarez-De leon v. Judge Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1935, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 37, 44.
Sps. Chan v. Judge Lantion, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1945, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 37, 44.
Soria v. Judge Villegas, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1812, 18 November 2004, 443 SCRA 13, 20.

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PASTORA DELA CRUZ,

AMELIA DELA CRUZ-
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1531

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 02-1216-MTJ]
GUMABON, ANALITA DELA

CRUZ and LEONARDO DELA
CRUZ,
Present:
Complainants,
YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
JUDGE PLACIDO B. VALLARTA,

Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Cabiao-San Isidro, Nueva Ecija,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
March 6, 2007
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated March 1, 2002

of Pastora dela Cruz, et al. (complainants) charging Judge Placido B. Vallarta
(respondent),
Presiding
Judge,
Municipal
Circuit
Trial
Court
(MCTC), Cabiao, Nueva Ecija with Gross Inefficiency, Gross Negligence and
Gross Ignorance of the Law, relative to Civil Case No. 2000-36, entitled Heirs of
the Late David G. dela Cruz v. Spouses Virgilio and Carmen Bunag for
Unlawful Detainer with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order.
Complainants allege: On July 13, 2000, they filed a case for
Unlawful Detainer with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order against Spouses Virgilio and Carmen Bunag over a
certain parcel of land situated at Barangay Entablado, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija with an
area of eight thousand (8,000) square meters, more or less, covered by Certificate
of Land Transfer No. O-069485. The application for a writ of preliminary

injunction was set for hearing on August 21, 2000. The summons and a copy of
the Complaint were served upon defendants Spouses Bunag but they failed to file
an answer. On August 21, 2000, complainants filed a Motion to Render Judgment
pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for failure of
defendants to file any Answer. The Motion was set for hearing on August 25,
2000 but defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss dated August 21,
2000. On September 4, 2000, complainants filed a Comment/Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the said Motion was filed out of time,
manifestly for delay, and that it flagrantly violates Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Rules. They prayed that the Motion to Dismiss be denied for utter lack of merit
and that their Motion to Render Judgment dated August 21, 2000 be
granted. On November 10, 2000, the court denied defendants' Motion to Dismiss
for utter lack of merit. Defendants filed their Answer dated December 4,
2000 on November 23, 2000. On December 8, 2000, complainants filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion to Strike-Out Answer and to reiterate the Motion to
Render Judgment. Said Motion was set for hearing on December 26, 2000. On the
same day, respondent issued an Order giving defendants fifteen (15) days from
receipt to file comment and/or opposition to the Motion to Render Judgment
dated August 21, 2000 and the Urgent Omnibus Motion dated December 8,
2000. No comment and/or opposition was filed by defendants. On August 7,
2001, they filed a Motion for Early Resolution dated August 5, 2001 but the same
has not yet been resolved. On November 19, 2001, their counsel received a Notice
of Hearing setting the case for hearing on January 8, 2002. The said incidents
remained pending for one (1) year and five (5) months, in violation of the Supreme
Court Circular which mandates that a decision should be rendered within the
period fixed by the Rules. They received another Notice of Hearing dated January
5, 2002 setting the case for hearing on March 12, 2002. The incidents remained
pending for one (1) year and nine (9) months. All ejectment cases are now
covered by the Summary Procedure regardless of whether they involve questions

of ownership.
In its 1st Indorsement,[2] dated April 18, 2002 the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) directed respondent to comment on the complaint.
For failure of respondent to comply with the said directive, the OCA sent a
1st Tracer[3] dated September 20, 2002 reiterating its directive of April 18,
2002. Still, respondent failed to comply. Hence, the OCA submitted its report and
recommendation to the Court, to wit:
EVALUATION: x x x
During the Barangay Elections in 2002, respondent filed his

certificate of candidacy and he was considered to have automatically resigned
from the service effective June 10, 2002.
The 1st Tracer dated September 20, 2002 was sent to respondent
judge requiring him to file his comment within five (5) days from receipt
thereof. The 1st Tracer was received by respondent judge on October 15, 2002 as
shown in the Registry Return Receipt. Respondent again failed to file his
comment. Respondent's failure to file his comment despite receipt of the two (2)
basic communications from the Court Administrator requiring him to file his
comment can be interpreted to mean that he has waived his right to file his
comment and submitcontroverting evidence. Respondent cannot claim otherwise.
Respondent's resignation during the pendency of the case did not

divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to pronounce whether he is innocent
or guilty of the charges.
The charges are:
1. Respondent judge failed to render judgment despite the motion

filed by the complainants who were plaintiff[s] in Civil Case No.
2000-36 for Unlawful Detainer for failure of the defendants to file
answer; and,
2. Respondent gave judicial cognizance to a Motion to Dismiss filed

by the defendants which is a prohibitive pleading.
The charges are meritorious.
Under the law, if the defendant in a case of Unlawful Detainer fails

to file an answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from the service of
summons, the court motu proprioor on motion of the plaintiff, render judgment as
may
be
warranted. (Section
7,
Rule
70,
1997
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure). Defendants were served with summons on August 7, 2000. For

failure of defendants to file their answer within the reglementary period, counsel
for the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Render Judgment dated August 21,
2000 (Annex D). Counsel for the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction also on August 21, 2000 (Annex E). Respondent judge denied
the Motion to Dismiss only on November 10, 2000 but he did not resolve the
Motion to Render Judgment filed by the counsel for the plaintiff. Respondent
judge should have decided the case within thirty (30) days from the date of the
receipt of the motion to render judgment.
1. The penalty for administrative offenses are either fine, suspension from
office without pay, censure, reprimand, and in grave offenses, dismissal
from service. Under Rule 140 of [the]Rules of Court the penalty for the
offense of undue delay in rendering decision or order is suspension from
office without pay for one (1) to two (2) months or a fine of not less
thanP10,000.00. Considering that respondent is no longer in the service,
the penalty of suspension cannot be imposed. The alternative penalty is to
pay a fine.
RECOMMENDATION:
Respectfully
submitted
for
the
consideration of the Honorable Court the recommendations that:
1. The instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative

matter and, respondent be penalized to pay a FINE of P10,000.00 to be
deducted from the monetary benefits he may receive from the court; and
2. The Court Management Office be DIRECTED to conduct a Judicial

Audit to determine the actual cases disposed of by respondent Judge
Vallarta prior to his resignation.[4]
The Court, in its Resolution[5] of April 12, 2004, required respondent to

comment and to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held
in contempt for failure to comply with the directives of the OCA. The Resolution
was returned to this Court with the postmaster's notation RTS, Addressee
Resigned.[6]
In its Resolution[7] of September 15, 2004, the Court required the OCA to
report the present address of respondent.
In compliance, the OCA, in its Memorandum[8] of October 7, 2004,
submitted the provincial as well as the city addresses of respondent. Thus, the
Court, in its Resolution[9] of December 1, 2004, resolved to furnish respondent
with a copy of the April 12, 2004 Resolution at his provincial and city
addresses. However, the said Resolution was returned to the Court with the
postmaster's notation RTS, Unclaimed.[10]
On July 22, 2005, the Postmaster of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija issued a
certification[11] stating that Judge Placido B. Vallarta has resigned his post and said
addressee is not a resident of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. Thus, in the Resolution
of October 3, 2005, the Court resolved to resend the Resolution of April 12,
2004 to respondent at his address inCaloocan City.
Again, the Resolution addressed to Judge Vallarta was returned to sender
with the notation Unclaimed.[12] Hence, the Court, in its Resolution of February
27, 2006, resolved to resend a copy of the resolution of April 12, 2004 to
respondent at No. 46, Macabagdal Street, Caloocan City.
To date, respondent has not complied with the said Resolution of April 12,
2004 despite receipt of the copy thereof on April 17, 2006, as shown in the
Registry Return Receipt.[13]
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA with slight
modification as to the penalty recommended.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if the defendant in a case of Unlawful Detainer fails to file an answer to the
complaint within ten (10) days from the service of summons, the
court motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted.
Records show that the defendants in Civil Case No. 2000-36 failed to file
their answer within the reglementary period and for such failure, the complainants
filed a Motion to Render Judgment. However, even after the lapse of time within
which to comply, respondent still allowed and accepted the Motion to Dismiss
filed by the defendants. And even after denying the Motion to Dismiss, still
respondent failed to resolve the Motion to Render Judgment filed by the
complainants. Thus, the complainants filed a Motion for Early Resolution
which was not acted upon by the respondent until his resignation.
Clearly, respondent was remiss in his duty to dispose of the cases with
deliberate dispatch thus, warranting administrative sanction from this Court.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution mandates lower court judges
to decide a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days. Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise enunciates that judges should
administer justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the courts
business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless
delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the ninety-day period
is mandatory.[14]
This mandate applies even to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents
pending before a magistrate.[15]
Records show that up to the time of the filing of herein complaint on March
1, 2002, respondent has yet to resolve the Motions filed by complainants, i.e.,
Motion to Render Judgment dated August 21, 2000 and Motion for Early
Resolution dated August 7, 2001. A delay of one (1) year and seven (7) months in
resolving the aforecitedMotions certainly erodes the people's faith in the judiciary,
thus, tarnishing the image of the judiciary which respondent represents in general,
and the name of the judge, in particular.
Records also show that respondent was considered to have automatically

resigned from the service effective June 10, 2002. However, respondent's
resignation during thependency of the case did not divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to pronounce whether he is innocent or guilty of the charges.[16]
Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court has constantly reminded judges to decide
cases promptly. Delay not only results in undermining the peoples faith in the
judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and
expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the
wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, and worse, it invites suspicion of ulterior
motives on the part of the judge.[17] Failure to decide cases on time constitutes
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.[18]
Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should
administer justice impartially and without delay. He should be imbued with a
high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation
to promptly administer justice. It need not be overemphasized that any delay in
the determination or resolution of a case no matter how insignificant is, at the
bottom line, delay in the administration of justice in general.[19]
Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within
the reglementary period of 90-days fixed by the constitution and the law is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[20] We cannot countenance such
undue delay by a judge, especially at a time when clogging of court dockets is still
the bane of the judiciary, whose present leadership has launched an all out program
to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the
disposition of cases.[21] Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through
the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess these traits,
delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable, to the prejudice of
litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice.[22]
A judges failure to resolve motions and other pending incidents within the
prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency. Undue delay in the disposition of
cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary
and unnecessarily blemishes its stature.[23]
No less than the Constitution mandates judges to decide cases with
deliberate dispatch. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. For it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice
denied. Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering decisions
and acting upon cases before them not only causes great injustice to the parties
involved but also invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the
judge.[24] If public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved, judges must
perform their official duties with utmost diligence.[25] There is no excuse for delay
or negligence in the performance of judicial functions.
For failure of respondent to resolve motions and pending incidents relative to
Civil Case No. 2000-36, he is found guilty thereof and should be penalized
accordingly.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
classifies gross inefficiency or undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a
less serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Since respondent was already considered automatically resigned from the

service on June 10, 2002 by reason of his filing of his certificate of candidacy in
the 2002Barangay Elections, we deem it appropriate to impose a fine
of P11,000.00.
Anent respondent's failure to comply with the Court directives.
In Re: Audit Report in Attendance of Court Personnel of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 32, Manila,[26] citing the case of Imbang v. Del Rosario,[27] the
Court held that the office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of
his superiors. It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for
respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him to
comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and substantially. After
all, a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request,
and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply
accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect
for the Court's lawful order and directive.[28]
As held in Soria v. Villegas,[29] citing the case of Alonto-Frayna v. Astih,[30] a
judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the
resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. It is
gross misconduct and even outright disrespect to this Court for respondent to
exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on the accusations
contained in the complaint against him.
And in Sabado v. Cajigal,[31] the Court held that in failing to comment on
the letter-complaint against him despite repeated directives to do so, respondent
judge neglected his duty, as a member of the court, to defend himself against an
administrative charge.
Judges are called upon to comply with the directives of the OCA which
under Presidential Decree No. 828,[32] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842,
are mandated to assist this Court in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision over all courts. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of
the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary
itself.[33]
Records reveal that respondent received on April 17, 2006, the Resolution
of April 12, 2004 requiring him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for his failure to comply with the directives of the
Court Administrator dated April 18, 2002 and September 20, 2002,
respectively.[34]
The contumacious act of respondent in ignoring all communications coming
from the Court, by not claiming his mail matters from the Postal Office, shows
utter disrespect and contempt of Court. Respondent's blatant disregard and
repeated failure to comply with the directives of the Court Administrator and the
Resolutions of this Court demonstrated not merely indifference, but disobedience
to, disrespect for and contempt of this Court, the highest tribunal of the land to
which he owes fealty, which merits a penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.[35]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Placido B. Vallarta, MCTC, CabiaoSan Isidro, Nueva Ecija, GUILTY of gross negligence and is FINED in the
amount ofP11,000.00. Moreover, he is likewise found guilty of contempt of court
and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
(On Leave)
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
and
[20]
[21]
[22]
On Leave.
Rollo, pp. 1-7.
Rollo, p. 53.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 57-60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 85.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1914, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 186,
191.
Pesayco v. Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450, 463.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA
81, 83; Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533-534 (1998).
Report on the On-The-Spot Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 45 and
53, Bacolod City, A.M. No. 00-2-65-RTC, February 15, 2005, 451 SCRA 303, 315; Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, A.M.
No. 06-4-219-RTC, November 2, 2006.
Re: Report of DCA Ponferada Re Judicial Audit Conducted in Branch 21, RTC, Cebu City,
Judge Genis B. Balbuena, Presiding, 434 Phil. 731, 739 (2002); Re: Report on the Monitoring of Cases in
the RTC, Br. 64, Labo, CamarinesNorte, 444 SCRA 4, 11 (2003).
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 3, 5, 7, 60
61, Baguio City, A.M. No. 02-9-568-RTC, February 11, 2004, 422 SCRA 408, 419.
Guintu v. Lucero, 329 Phil. 704, 711 (1996).
Sy Bang v. Mendez case, supra note 16, at 530.
Omaa v. Yulde, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1345, August 26, 2002, 436 SCRA 549, 557.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
Gonzales v. Hidalgo, 449 Phil. 336, 340 (2003).

Office of the Court Administrator v. Quizon, 427 Phil. 63, 79 (2002).
Office of the Court Administrator v. Ulibarri, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1869, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 135,
141.
A.M. No. P-04-1838, August 31, 2006.
A.M. No. 03-1515-MTJ, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 79, 83.
Imbang v. Del Rosario case, supra note 27, at 83.
461 Phil. 665, 670 (2003) citing Alonto-Frayna v. Astih, 360 Phil. 385 (1998).
Alonto-Frayna v. Astih case, id.
A.M. No. RTJ-91-666, March 12, 1993, 219 SCRA 800, 805.
Creating the Office of the Court Administrator in the Supreme Court and Providing Funds Therefor and
for Other Purposes, November 18, 1975.
Soria v. Villegas case, see note 29, id. at 670.
Received by respondent on May 7, 2002 and October 15, 2002, respectively, as shown by the Registry
Return Receipts.
Lagatic v. Peas, Jr., 342 Phil. 12, 20-21 (1997); Martinez v. Zoleta, 326 Phil. 841, 847 (1996).

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Complainant,

ATTY. REYNALDO A. PINEDA,

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

complying with such duty as dictated by the Code of Professional Responsibility

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

A.M. No. P-06-2154

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1217-P)

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

ATTY. ANGEL P. BELTRAN, CLERK OF

According to Pascua, Atty. Beltran could not have arrived at an objective,

Atty. Beltran also averred he no longer played mahjong, denied involvement

As to the affidavit and testimony of one witness, a certain Cesar

Upon evaluation of the investigation, report and recommendation of Judge

However, since Atty. Beltran had compulsorily retired, the OCA

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE

A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S.

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J

The first, docketed as A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, stems from an unsigned

Subsequently, on August 29, 2006, the Court also referred to

The second administrative case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is based on a

On March 1, 2007, Justice Pardo submitted to this Court his Report

Justice Pardo reports that he conducted an investigation of the cases

Justice Asuncions Antecedents

From the record, it appears that respondent Justice Elvi John S.

A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA

To the foregoing complaint, respondent Justice Asuncion filed his

of deliberate inaction on pending motions for reconsideration in cases

In this connection, the Investigating Justice reports that after making

Meanwhile, in the August 31, 2006 investigation, Atty. Tessie L.

The Investigating Justice also required the respondent to submit a

Subsequently, on October 4, 2006, the respondent submitted a report

This, and earlier reports on the status of cases assigned to

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J

Asuncion with culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the

Respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated November 15,

The Findings of the Investigating Justice

In the first administrative case, A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, the Investigating

What is more, there are several cases assigned to respondent

As of September 30, 2006, the following eighty-two cases remain

As excuses or justification, respondent Justice stated that the

Consequently, respondent Justice Asuncion must be reminded

In the second case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, the findings of the

no indication in the July 24, 2001resolution that a TRO was ever

temporary restraining order or a status quo order effective indefinitely

THE COURTS RULING

The Constitution mandates lower collegiate courts to decide or

In Arap v. Judge Amir Mustafa,[27] We held that:

The record shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent

Notably, of the seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration pending

caused by the reorganization of the CA, his assignment to the CA Cebu

This intolerable inaction is aggravated by misrepresentation. Upon

The excuse that respondent was burdened by a heavy caseload,

The delay incurred by respondent Justice Asuncion in deciding or

We have already ruled that the failure of a judge to decide a case

In the case of respondent Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in

In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, We agree with the Investigating Justice that

As correctly put by Investigating Justice Pardo, Eternal Gardens is

The October 30, 2001 resolution, which ordered the maintenance of