REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FIRST JUDICIAL REGION

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 3
DAGUPAN CITY, PANGASINAN

CARYL CLAVERIA

Plaintiff,

Civil Case No. 12345

GARY ORDOEZ

For: EJECTMENT

Respondent.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PLAINTIFF

COMES NOW, Plaintiff by its counsel, to this Honorable Court submits this position
paper.
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a Civil Case for EJECTMENT commenced by the Plaintiff, Caryl Claveria
against the Defendant, Gary Ordoez.
The subject matter of this action is a parcel of the land with an area of 250 square meters
located at Tapuac, Dagupan City, Pangasinan.

PARTIES OF THE CASE

Plaintiff, CARYL CLAVERIA is a Filipino,of legal age,single and resides at 16 Rivera

St. Dagupan City, Pangasinan, where she may be served with legal processes and notices issued
by this Honorable Court; and

Defendant, GARY ORDOEZ is a Filipino, of legal, age, married and resides at 33

Tapuac, Dagupan City, Pangasinan, where she may be served with legal rocesses and notice
issued by this Honorable Court.

STATEMENTS OF FACTS
1. Ted, is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tapuac City. He authorized Carl Claveria
(father of Caryl) to use the said land with the undertaking to use the same.
2. In 1979, Carl Claveria by mere tolerance allowed Vincent to use the property with condition
that he surrender and vacate the land when asked to do so.
a. During such authority Vincent called Gary, (Vincents son) to live with him.
This is with knowledge of Carl.
3. Gary has been in possession of land: a.) more than 30 years
(i)

Since 1979-1990 (death of Vincent)

(ii)

1991 (death of Registered owner Ted)

(iii) 1992 (death of Carl)

4. In January 2014, Caryl Claveria, as a predecessor in interest of Carl, demanded from Gary
Ordonez and his family to vacate the land.
5. The Defendant, refused to comply with the said demand to vacate the property, with the
contention that through prescription his family and predecessors in interest has acquired
ownership through actual, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the said property.
6. This matter is brought to Lupon ng Barangay for possible conciliation but none was
reached. Hence, the petition for ejectment case.

ISSUES
1. Does Caryl, the plaintiff, have a cause of action against the defendant?
2. Who is entitled to the physical possession of premises?

DISCUSSION
Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful detainerare summary proceedings
designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of
the property involved (Barrientos v. Rapal, G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011). The only question
that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of
the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even
matter if a partys title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.

The statement in the complaint that respondents possession of the land was by mere
tolerance of Carl (Caryls father), clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful
detainer involves the persons withholding from another of the possession of the real property to
which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.

Caryl Claveria has a cause of action against Gary Ordoez.

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must
be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of
the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of
such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is
by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Carbonilla v. Abiera)

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment (Ruben C. Copuz, rep. by Atty.-in-fact
Wenifreda C. Agullana Vs. Sps. Hilarion Agustin and Justa Agustin, G.R. No. 183822.
January 18, 2012).

From the forgoing requisites enumerated, it suffice that the Plaintiff has a cause of action,
since the Defendant never disputed the fact that their stay in the land was by just mere tolerance
of Carl (Plaintiffs father) who is the authorized person that the registered owner acknowledged.
Following such, they were requested by the heir of Carl, Caryl to vacate the land which they did
not comply with. Thus, their plea that they be ejected from the said property.

Plaintiff is entitled for the possession of the property.

Settled is the rule that the defendants claim of ownership of the disputed property will
not divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

(Dizon v. Court of

Appeals, 332 Phil. 429) Even if the pleadings raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass on
such issue to determine only the question of possession, especially if the ownership is
inseparably linked with the possession The adjudication on the issue of ownership is only
provisional and will not bar an action between the same parties involving title to the land. (De
Luna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94490, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 276) This doctrine is a
necessary consequence of the nature of the two summary actions of ejectment, forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, where the only issue for adjudication is the physical or material possession
over the real property.

In Pajuyo vs. Gueverra, G.R. No. 146364 June 3, 2004, when the plaintiff allowed the
defendant to use his property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand, failing which, an action for
unlawful detainer will lie. The defendants refusal to comply with the demand makes his
continued possession of the property unlawful. The status of the defendant in such a case is
similar to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continues by tolerance of the owner.
Base in the satements given, a condition was given to Vincent (now deceased) before
being allowed to occupy the land and build a house and that is to surrender and vacate the land
when asked to do so. Thus, withdrawal of the permission by Caryl (Carls daughter) and refusal
of Gary, being the heir of Vincent to vacate the said premises consituted their stay unlawful. And
being unlawful one, it is the right to seek relief in all bounds of the law have provided for.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that instant ejectment suit
be decided in favor of the Plaintiff, Caryl Claveria and against the defendant, ordering the
defendant and his family to VACATE and SURRENDER the de facto/material possession
of the subject property to the plaintiff or her duly authorized legal representative/s.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, November 14, 2014.
ATTY. IRENE QUIMSON
Counsel for the Plaintiff
Dagupan City, Pangasinan
PTR No.:4444
IBP No.:123
Rolls of Attorney:346
MCLE:23489