Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
In July 1990, Roberto sold the 4,512 sq. m. property in Baccuit to the spouses Mario and Julia Campos for
THIRD DIVISION
P23,000.00. 9 Then in August 1992, he sold the 1,986 sq. m. and 3,454 sq. m. lots in Paringao,
respectively, to Marilou for P100,000.00 and to Pedro for P40,000.00. 10 Allegedly, these sales were not
known to Margarita and her other children. 11 EHTIcD
himself. 12 In February 1996, Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted the instant
complaint for the annulment of said sales and for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
subject properties as well as for the cancellation of Ricardo's tax declarations. Margarita admitted having
accommodated Roberto's request for the transfer of the properties to his name, but pointed out that the
arrangement was only for the specific purpose of supporting his U.S. visa application. She emphasized
that she never intended to divest herself of ownership over the subject lands and, hence, Roberto had
DECISION
no right to sell them to respondents and the Spouses Campos. She likewise alleged that the sales, which
were fictitious and simulated considering the gross inadequacy of the stipulated price, were fraudulently
entered into by Roberto. She imputed bad faith to Pedro, Marilou and the Spouses Campos as buyers of
PERALTA, J p:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 13, 2006 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72371. The assailed decision affirmed the July 2, 2001
the lots, as they supposedly knew all along that Roberto was not the rightful owner of the
properties. 13 Hence, she principally prayed that the sales be annulled; that Roberto's tax declarations
be cancelled; and that the subject properties be reconveyed to her. 14
judgment 2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of La Union, Branch 33 in Civil Case No. 1031-BG a
The Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, and had
complaint for annulment of sale of real property, recovery of ownership and possession, cancellation of
merely relied on Roberto's representation that he had the right to sell the property; and that, hence,
tax declarations and damages filed by Margarita Cabacungan, 3 represented by her daughter, Luz Laigo-
they were not bound by whatever agreement entered by Margarita with her son. They posited that the
Ali against Marilou Laigo and Pedro Roy Laigo, respondents herein, and against Estella Balagot, 4and the
alleged gross inadequacy of the price would not invalidate the sale absent a vitiation of consent or proof
of any other agreement. Further, they noted that Margarita's claim was already barred by prescription
and laches owing to her long inaction in recovering the subject properties. Finally, they believed that
inasmuch as Roberto had already passed away, Margarita must have, instead, directed her claim against
his estate. 15
In much the same way, Marilou and Pedro, 16 who likewise professed themselves to be buyers in good
faith and for value, believed that Margarita's cause of action had already been barred by laches, and that
even assuming the contrary, the cause of action was nevertheless barred by prescription as the same
had accrued way back in 1968 upon the execution of the affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an
implied trust had been created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed only a period of ten
(10) years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to enforce an implied trust
thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass. 17
On February 3, 1999, prior to pre-trial, Margarita and the Spouses Campos amicably entered into a
Margarita because her cause of action had accrued way back in 1968; and that while laches and
settlement whereby they waived their respective claims against each other. 18 Margarita died two days
prescription as defenses could have availed against Roberto, the same would be unavailing against Pedro
later and was forthwith substituted by her estate. 19 On February 8, 1999, the trial court rendered a
and Marilou because the latter were supposedly buyers in good faith and for value. 27 It disposed of the
Partial Decision 20 approving the compromise agreement and dismissing the complaint against the
Spouses Campos. Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued with respect to Pedro and Marilou.
On July 2, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint as follows: TaCEHA
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the complaint is
DISMISSED. 21
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 2 July
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 28
Hence, the instant recourse imputing error to the Court of Appeals in holding: (a) that the complaint is
The trial court ruled that the 1968 Affidavit of Transfer operated as a simple transfer of the subject
barred by laches and prescription; (b) that the rule on innocent purchaser for value applies in this case of
properties from Margarita to Roberto. It found no express trust created between Roberto and Margarita
sale of unregistered land; and (c) that there is no evidence to support the finding that there is an implied
by virtue merely of the said document as there was no evidence of another document showing Roberto's
undertaking to return the subject properties. Interestingly, it concluded that, instead, an "implied or
constructive trust" was created between the parties, as if affirming that there was indeed an agreement
albeit unwritten to have the properties returned to Margarita in due time. 22
Petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals should not have haphazardly applied the doctrine of laches
and failed to see that the parties in this case are bound by familial ties. They assert that laches must not
be applied when an injustice would result from it. Petitioner believes that the existence of such
Moreover, the trial court surmised how Margarita could have failed to recover the subject properties
confidential relationship precludes a finding of unreasonable delay on Margarita's part in enforcing her
from Roberto at any time between 1968, following the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer, and
claim, especially in the face of Luz's testimony that she and Margarita had placed trust and confidence in
Roberto's return from the United States shortly thereafter. Finding Margarita guilty of laches by such
Roberto. Petitioner also refutes the Court of Appeals' finding that there was a donation of the properties
inaction, the trial court barred recovery from respondents who were found to have acquired the
to Roberto when the truth is that the subject properties were all that Margarita possessed and that she
properties supposedly in good faith and for value. 23 It also pointed out that recovery could no longer be
could not have failed to provide for her other children nor for means by which to support herself. It
pursued in this case because Margarita had likewise exhausted the ten-year prescriptive period for
reiterates that the transfer to Roberto was only an accommodation so that he could submit proof to
reconveyance based on an implied trust which had commenced to run in 1968 upon the execution of the
Affidavit of Transfer. 24 Finally, it emphasized that mere inadequacy of the price as alleged would not be
a sufficient ground to annul the sales in favor of Pedro and Marilou absent any defect in consent. 25
On the issue of prescription, petitioner advances that it runs from the time Roberto, as trustee, has
repudiated the trust by selling the properties to respondents in August 15, 1992; that hence, the filing of
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on October 13, 2006, affirmed the trial
the instant complaint in 1996 was well within the prescriptive period. Finally, petitioner states that
court's disposition. The appellate court dismissed petitioner's claim that Roberto was merely a trustee of
whether a buyer is in good or bad faith is a matter that attains relevance in sales of registered land, as
the subject properties as there was no evidence on record supportive of the allegation that Roberto
corollary to the rule that a purchaser of unregistered land uninformed of the seller's defective title
merely borrowed the properties from Margarita upon his promise to return the same on his arrival from
the United States. Further, it hypothesized that granting the existence of an implied trust, still
Margarita's action thereunder had already been circumscribed by laches. 26
Respondents stand by the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In their Comment, they theorize that if indeed
Margarita and Roberto had agreed to have the subject properties returned following the execution of
Curiously, while the appellate court had found no implied trust relation in the transaction between
the Affidavit of Transfer, then there should have been a written agreement evincing such intention of the
Margarita and Roberto, nevertheless, it held that the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144 of
parties. They note that petitioner's reliance on the Affidavit of Transfer as well as on the alleged
the Civil Code, in relation to an implied trust created under Article 1456, had already been exhausted by
unwritten agreement for the return of the properties must fail, simply because they are not even parties
to it. Be that as it may, the said document had effectively transferred the properties to Roberto who, in
demands of justice 38 and to defeat or prevent the wrongful act of one of the parties. 39 Constructive
turn, had acquired the full capacity to sell them, especially since these properties could well be
considered as Roberto's inheritance from Margarita who, on the contrary, did have other existing
properties in her name. Moreover, they believe that the liberal application of the rule on laches between
family members does not apply in the instant case because there is no fiduciary relationship and privity
between them and Margarita. TAacIE
There is merit in the petition.
To begin with, the rule is that the latitude of judicial review under Rule 45 generally excludes factual and
evidentiary reevaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform conclusions of the trial court
and the appellate court. Yet, in the case at bar, while the courts below have both arrived at the dismissal
On the other hand, resulting trusts arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved
in a transaction whereby one person becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold
his title for the benefit of another. This is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration
and not legal title is determinative of equitable title or interest and is always presumed to have been
contemplated by the parties. 41 Such intent is presumed as it is not expressed in the instrument or deed
of conveyance and is to be found in the nature of their transaction. 42 Implied trusts of this nature are
hence describable as "intention-enforcing trusts." 43 Specific examples of resulting trusts may be found
in the Civil Code, particularly Articles 1448, 1449, 1451, 1452 and 1453. 44 EHACcT
of petitioner's complaint, there still remains unsettled the ostensible incongruence in their respective
Articles 1448 to 1456 of the Civil Code enumerate cases of implied trust, but the list according to Article
factual findings. It thus behooves us to be thorough both in reviewing the records and in appraising the
1447 is not exclusive of others which may be established by the general law on trusts so long as the
evidence, especially since an opposite conclusion is warranted and, as will be shown, justified.
limitations laid down in Article 1442 are observed, 45 that is, that they be not in conflict with the New
A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership of property and
Civil Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws. 46
another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling
While resulting trusts generally arise on failure of an express trust or of the purpose thereof, or on a
him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. 30 Trusts are
conveyance to one person upon a consideration from another (sometimes referred to as a "purchase-
either express or implied. 31 Express or direct trusts are created by the direct and positive acts of the
money resulting trust"), they may also be imposed in other circumstances such that the court, shaping
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by oral declaration in words evincing an intention to create a
judgment in its most efficient form and preventing a failure of justice, must decree the existence of such
trust. 32 Implied trusts also called "trusts by operation of law," "indirect trusts" and "involuntary
a trust. 47 A resulting trust, for instance, arises where, there being no fraud or violation of the trust, the
trusts" arise by legal implication based on the presumed intention of the parties or on equitable
circumstances indicate intent of the parties that legal title in one be held for the benefit of another.48 It
principles independent of the particular intention of the parties. 33 They are those which, without being
also arises in some instances where the underlying transaction is without consideration, such as that
expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently of the
contemplated in Article 1449 49 of the Civil Code. Where property, for example, is gratuitously conveyed
particular intention of the parties, as being inferred from the transaction by operation of law basically by
for a particular purpose and that purpose is either fulfilled or frustrated, the court may affirm the
reason of equity. 34
resulting trust in favor of the grantor or transferor, 50 where the beneficial interest in property was not
Implied trusts are further classified into constructive trusts and resulting trusts. Constructive trusts, on
the one hand, come about in the main by operation of law and not by agreement or intention. They arise
Intention although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of the transaction or
not by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but
from the facts and circumstances accompanying the transaction, particularly the source of the
one which arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. 35 Also known as trusts ex maleficio, trusts ex
consideration is always an element of a resulting trust 52 and may be inferred from the acts or
delicto and trusts de son tort, they are construed against one who by actual or constructive fraud,
conduct of the parties rather than from direct expression of conduct. 53 Certainly, intent as an
duress, abuse of confidence, commission of a wrong or any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice,
indispensable element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even
concealment of questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience has
circumstantial, of statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes. 54 Because an
obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold
implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be evidenced by
and enjoy. 36 They are aptly characterized as "fraud-rectifying trust," 37 imposed by equity to satisfy the
writing, 55 Article 1457 56 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole evidence to prove their
existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish the existence of an implied trust necessarily has
familiarity with the properties involved because one of them was actually sitting close to her own
property. 62
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that there was no evidence on record showing that an
While indeed at one point at the stand both of Luz's and Hilaria's presence at the execution of the
implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto, we find that petitioner before the trial
affidavit had been put to test in subtle interjections by respondents' counsel to the effect that their
court, had actually adduced evidence to prove the intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only the
names and signatures did not appear in the Affidavit of Transfer as witnesses, this, to our mind, is of no
legal title to the properties in question, with attendant expectation that Roberto would return the same
moment inasmuch as they had not been called to testify on the fact of, or on the contents of, the
to her on accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction was entered into. The
Affidavit of Transfer or its due execution. Rather, their testimony was offered to prove the circumstances
surrounding its execution the circumstances from which could be derived the unwritten
We recall that the complaint before the trial court alleged that the 1968 Affidavit of Transfer was
executed merely to accommodate Roberto's request to have the properties in his name and thereby
produce proof of ownership of certain real properties in the Philippines to support his U.S. visa
application. The agreement, the complaint further stated, was for Margarita to transfer the tax
understanding between Roberto and Margarita that by their act, no absolute transfer of ownership
would be effected. Besides, it would be highly unlikely for Margarita to institute the instant complaint if
it were indeed her intention to vest in Roberto, by virtue of the Affidavit of Transfer, absolute ownership
over the covered properties.
declarations of the subject properties to Roberto for the said purpose and without the intention to divest
It is deducible from the foregoing that the inscription of Roberto's name in the Affidavit of Transfer as
her of the rights of ownership and dominion. 58 Margarita, however, died before trial on the merits
Margarita's transferee is not for the purpose of transferring ownership to him but only to enable him to
ensued; 59 yet the allegation was substantiated by the open-court statements of her daughter, Luz, and
hold the property in trust for Margarita. Indeed, in the face of the credible and straightforward
testimony of the two witnesses, Luz and Hilaria, the probative value of the ownership record forms in
In her testimony, Luz, who affirmed under oath her own presence at the execution of the Affidavit of
Transfer, described the circumstances under which Margarita and Roberto entered into the agreement.
She narrated that Roberto had wanted to travel to the U.S and to show the embassy proof of his
financial capacity, he asked to "borrow" from Margarita the properties involved but upon the condition
the names of respondents, together with the testimony of their witness from the municipal assessor's
office who authenticated said forms, are utterly minimal to show Roberto's ownership. It suffices to say
that respondents did not bother to offer evidence that would directly refute the statements made by Luz
and Hilaria in open court on the circumstances underlying the 1968 Affidavit of Transfer. SAHEIc
that he would give them back to her upon his arrival from the United States. She admitted that Roberto's
As a trustee of a resulting trust, therefore, Roberto, like the trustee of an express passive trust, is merely
commitment to return the properties was not put in writing because they placed trust and confidence in
a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management, control or disposition of the property
him, and that while she had spent most of her time in Mindanao since she married in 1956, she would
except to make a conveyance when called upon by the cestui que trust. 63 Hence, the sales he entered
sometimes come to La Union to see her mother but she never really knew whether at one point or
into with respondents are a wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the trust. The
another her mother had demanded the return of the properties from Roberto. 60 She further asserted
question is: May respondents now be compelled to reconvey the subject properties to petitioner? We
that even after Roberto's arrival from the United States, it was Margarita who paid off the taxes on the
subject properties and that it was only when her health started to deteriorate that Roberto had taken up
those obligations. 61 Hilaria's testimony ran along the same line. Like Luz, she was admittedly present at
the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer which took place at the house she shared with Jacinto Costales,
the notarizing officer who was her own brother. She told that Roberto at the time had wanted to travel
to the U.S. but did not have properties in the Philippines which he could use to back up his visa
application; as accommodation, Margarita "lent" him the tax declarations covering the properties but
with the understanding that upon his return he would give them back to Margarita. She professed
Respondents posit that petitioner's claim may never be enforced against them as they had purchased
the properties from Roberto for value and in good faith. They also claim that, at any rate, petitioner's
cause of action has accrued way back in 1968 upon the execution of the Affidavit of Transfer and, hence,
with the 28 long years that since passed, petitioner's claim had long become stale not only on account of
laches, but also under the rules on extinctive prescription governing a resulting trust. We do not agree.
First, fundamental is the rule in land registration law that the issue of whether the buyer of realty is in
good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchase was
made from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean, in which case the purchaser who relies
Third, there is a fundamental principle in agency that where certain property entrusted to an agent and
on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith and for
impressed by law with a trust in favor of the principal is wrongfully diverted, such trust follows the
value. 64 Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, respondents purchased the same at
property in the hands of a third person and the principal is ordinarily entitled to pursue and recover it so
their own peril. Their claim of having bought the properties in good faith, i.e., without notice that there is
long as the property can be traced and identified, and no superior equities have intervened. This
some other person with a right to or interest therein, would not protect them should it turn out, as it in
principle is actually one of trusts, since the wrongful conversion gives rise to a constructive trust which
fact did in this case, that their seller, Roberto, had no right to sell them.
pursues the property, its product or proceeds, and permits the beneficiary to recover the property or
Second, the invocation of the rules on limitation of actions relative to a resulting trust is not on point
because the resulting trust relation between Margarita and Roberto had been extinguished by the
latter's death. A trust, it is said, terminates upon the death of the trustee, particularly where the trust is
obtain damages for the wrongful conversion of the property. Aptly called the "trust pursuit rule," it
applies when a constructive or resulting trust has once affixed itself to property in a certain state or
form. 74
personal to him. 65 Besides, prescription and laches, in respect of this resulting trust relation, hardly can
Hence, a trust will follow the property through all changes in its state and form as long as such
impair petitioner's cause of action. On the one hand, in accordance with Article 1144 66 of the Civil
property, its products or its proceeds, are capable of identification, even into the hands of a transferee
Code, an action for reconveyance to enforce an implied trust in one's favor prescribes in ten (10) years
other than a bona fide purchaser for value, or restitution will be enforced at the election of the
from the time the right of action accrues, as it is based upon an obligation created by law. 67 It sets in
beneficiary through recourse against the trustee or the transferee personally. This is grounded on the
from the time the trustee performs unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
principle in property law that ownership continues and can be asserted by the true owner against any
que trust which are made known to the latter. 68 In this case, it was the 1992 sale of the properties to
withholding of the object to which the ownership pertains, whether such object of the ownership is
respondents that comprised the act of repudiation which, however, was made known to Margarita only
found in the hands of an original owner or a transferee, or in a different form, as long as it can be
in 1995 but nevertheless impelled her to institute the action in 1996 still well within the prescriptive
identified. 75 Accordingly, the person to whom is made a transfer of trust property constituting a
period. Hardly can be considered as act of repudiation Roberto's open court declaration which he made
wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the trust, when not protected as a bona
in the 1979 adoption proceedings involving respondents to the effect that he owned the subject
fide purchaser for value, is himself liable and accountable as a constructive trustee. The liability attaches
properties, 69 nor even the fact that he in 1977 had entered into a lease contract on one of the disputed
at the moment of the transfer of trust property and continues until there is full restoration to the
properties which contract had been subject of a 1996 decision of the Court of Appeals. 70 These do not
beneficiary. Thus, the transferee is charged with, and can be held to the performance of the trust,
equally with the original trustee, and he can be compelled to execute a reconveyance. 76
On the other hand, laches, being rooted in equity, is not always to be applied strictly in a way that would
This scenario is characteristic of a constructive trust imposed by Article 1456 77 of the Civil Code, which
obliterate an otherwise valid claim especially between blood relatives. The existence of a confidential
impresses upon a person obtaining property through mistake or fraud the status of an implied trustee
relationship based upon consanguinity is an important circumstance for consideration; hence, the
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Petitioner, in laying claim against
respondents who are concededly transferees who professed having validly derived their ownership from
Appeals 72 held that the relationship between the parties therein, who were siblings, was sufficient to
Roberto, is in effect enforcing against respondents a constructive trust relation that arose by virtue of
explain and excuse what would otherwise have been a long delay in enforcing the claim and the delay in
the wrongful and fraudulent transfer to them of the subject properties by Roberto. SCDaET
such situation should not be as strictly construed as where the parties are complete strangers vis-avis each other; thus, reliance by one party upon his blood relationship with the other and the trust and
confidence normally connoted in our culture by that relationship should not be taken against him.
Aznar Brother Realty Co. v. Aying, 78 citing Buan Vda. de Esconde v. Court of Appeals, 79 explained this
form of implied trust as follows:
Too, Sotto v. Teves 73 ruled that the doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical
the fact that the parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise
sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a
unreasonable delay.
trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting
property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of thecestui que trust. A
affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the land and
constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate
operates constructive notice to the world. 84 In the present case, however, the lands involved are
concededly unregistered lands; hence, there is no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be
notified of the furtive and fraudulent sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by
neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called
actual notice from Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription began to
trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the
toll. The filing of the complaint in February 1996 is well within the prescriptive period. Finally, such delay
beneficiary.
of only six (6) months in instituting the present action hardly suffices to justify a finding of inexcusable
xxx xxx xxx
delay or to create an inference that Margarita has allowed her claim to stale by laches. cSTHAC
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72371, affirming the July 2, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Union, Branch 33 in
Civil Case No. 1031-BG, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered (a) directing the
cancellation of the tax declarations covering the subject properties in the name of Roberto D. Laigo and
his transferees; (b) nullifying the deeds of sale executed by Roberto D. Laigo in favor of respondents
Pedro Roy Laigo and Marilou Laigo; and (c) directing said respondents to execute reconveyance in favor
of petitioner.
FIRST DIVISION
On December 27, 1989, the RTC, Branch 19, of Digos City, Davao del Sur, rendered a Decision 5 in Civil
Case No. 2514 (a case for Reconveyance and Damages), ordering the exclusion of 2.5002 hectares from
Lot 13521. The trial court found that said 2.5002 hectares which is part of Lot 13521, a 13,752-square
meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4952 6 registered in the name of
Antonio Go Pace (Antonio) on July 19, 1971 actually pertains to Sesinando Jumamoy (Sesinando),
Ciriaco's predecessor-in-interest. The RTC found that said 2.5002-hectare lot was erroneously included in
Antonio's free patent application which became the basis for the issuance of his OCT. It then ordered the
heirs of Antonio (the Paces [represented by Rosalia Pace (Rosalia)]) to reconvey said portion to Ciriaco. In
DECISION
so ruling, the RTC acknowledged Ciriaco's actual and exclusive possession, cultivation, and claim of
ownership over the subject lot which he acquired from his father Sesinando, who occupied and
improved the lot way back in the early 1950s. 7
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
The December 27, 1989 RTC Decision became final and executory but the Deed of Conveyance 8 issued
in favor of Ciriaco could not be annotated on OCT No. P-4952 since said title was already cancelled.
Apparently, Antonio and his wife Rosalia mortgaged Lot 13521 to PNB as security for a series of loans
dated February 25, 1971, April 26, 1972, and May 11, 1973. 9 After Antonio and Rosalia failed to pay
likewise assumes that the agreement would be advantageous to him. But just
their obligation, PNB foreclosed the mortgage on July 14, 1986 10 and title to Lot 13521 was transferred
like in any other human undertaking, the end-result may not be as sweet as
to PNB under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-23063. Moreover, the Deed of Conveyance could
expected. DCcHIS
not be annotated at the back of OCT No. P-4952 because PNB was not impleaded as a defendant in Civil
The problem could not be resolved by any other means but to litigate.
Courts, however, are not defenders of bad bargains. At most, they only declare
the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract in order to preserve
sanctity of the same.
We are confronted in this case with this legal predicament. 1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the February 28, 2005 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
2514. He claimed that PNB is not an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value because prior to the
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73743 which dismissed petitioner Philippine National Bank's (PNB's) appeal from
execution and registration of PNB's deed of sale with the Register of Deeds, the bank had prior notice
the July 30, 2001 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Digos City, Davao del Sur. Said
that the disputed lot is subject of a litigation. It would appear that during the pendency of Civil Case No.
Decision of the RTC ordered PNB to reconvey to respondent Ciriaco Jumamoy (Ciriaco) a portion of the
2514, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of OCT No. P-4952 as Entry No. 165547 12 on
Likewise assailed in this petition is the September 28, 2005 Resolution 4 of the CA denying PNB's Motion
The Paces did not file any answer and were declared in default. 13 Meanwhile PNB filed its Amended
for Reconsideration.
Answer 14 denying for lack of knowledge and information Ciriaco's claim of ownership and reliance on
Factual Antecedents
the judgment in Civil Case No. 2514. It argued that it is a mortgagee and a buyer in good faith since at
the time of the mortgage, Antonio's certificate of title was 'clean' and 'devoid of any adverse
annotations.' PNB also filed a cross-claim against the Paces. ATHCac
Instead of having a full-blown trial, Ciriaco and PNB opted to submit the case for decision based on their
respective memoranda.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its July 30, 2001 Decision, 15 the RTC ordered the partial nullification of the mortgage and the
reconveyance of the subject lot claimed by Ciriaco. The RTC found that PNB was not a
mortgagee/purchaser in good faith because it failed to take the necessary steps to protect its interest
such as sending a field inspector to the area to determine the real owner, its occupants, its
improvements and its boundaries.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
Anent PNB's cross-claim against the Paces, the CA gave due course thereto and ordered the records
may rely on the face of the Torrens title. As for its cross-claim against the heirs of Antonio, PNB prayed
Issues
first granted Antonio's loan application, the subject property was still untitled and unregistered.
interest in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase or before he
has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property." 25 An "innocent purchaser for
Here, we agree with the disposition of the RTC and the CA that PNB is not an innocent purchaser for
THE MATTER.
FRANCISCA TOMAS VS. PNB (98 SCRA 280) INSTEAD OF THE LANDMARK CASE
OF LILIA Y. GONZALES VS. IAC AND RURAL BANK OF PAVIA, INC. (157 SCRA
587)WHICH IS THE ONE APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE.
PNB's contention that Ciriaco failed to allege in his complaint that PNB failed to take the necessary
precautions before accepting the mortgage is of no moment. It is undisputed that the 2.5002-hectare
portion of the mortgaged property has been adjudged in favor of Ciriaco's predecessor-in-interest in Civil
Case No. 2514. Hence, PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in good faith from the time the land
was offered as collateral. However, PNB miserably failed to overcome this burden. There was no showing
at all that it conducted an investigation; that it observed due diligence and prudence by checking for
JUMAMOY'S
flaws in the title; that it verified the identity of the true owner and possessor of the land; and, that it
ACTION
FOR
RECONVEYANCE
IS
ALREADY
BARRED
BY
PRESCRIPTION. 24
visited subject premises to determine its actual condition before accepting the same as collateral.
In essence, PNB contends that the lower courts grievously erred in declaring that it is not an innocent
Both the CA and the trial court correctly observed that PNB could not validly raise the defense that it
mortgagee/purchaser for value. PNB also argues that Ciriaco's complaint is barred by prescription. TCT
relied on Antonio's clean title. The land, when it was first mortgaged, was then unregistered under our
No. T-23063 was issued on March 23, 1990, while Ciriaco filed his complaint only six years thereafter.
Torrens system. The first mortgage was on February 25, 1971 28 while OCT No. P-4952 was issued on
Thus, the one-year period to nullify PNB's certificate of title had lapsed, making PNB's title indefeasible.
July 19, 1971. Since the Paces offered as collateral an unregistered land, with more reason PNB should
Moreover, PNB claims that an action for reconveyance prescribes in four years if based on fraud, or, 10
have proven before the RTC that it had verified the status of the property by conducting an ocular
years if based on an implied trust, both to be counted from the issuance of OCT No. P-4952 in July 1971
inspection before granting Antonio his first loan. Good faith which is a question of fact could have been
which constitutes as a constructive notice to the whole world. Either way, Ciriaco's action had already
proven in the proceedings before the RTC, but PNB dispensed with the trial proper and let its
prescribed since it took him 17 years to file his first complaint for reconveyance in Civil Case No. 2514
opportunity to dispute factual allegations pass. Had PNB really taken the necessary precautions, it would
and around 23 years to file his second complaint in Civil Case No. 3313. aAEIHC
Our Ruling
Ciriaco's
is
action
for
reconveyance
is
inprescriptible.
not
an
innocent
purchaser/
Also, the incontrovertibility of a title does not preclude a rightful claimant to a property from seeking
other remedies because it was never the intention of the Torrens system to perpetuate fraud. As
explained in Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong: 29
10
The mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not
In Ciriaco's case, as it has been judicially established that he is in actual possession of the property he
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described
claims as his and that he has a better right to the disputed portion, his suit for reconveyance is in effect
therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of
an action for quieting of title. Hence, petitioner's defense of prescription against Ciriaco does not lie.
the land illegally included. It is evident from the records that the petitioner
owns the portion in question and therefore the area should be conveyed to
her. The remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of
the decree, not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. (Emphasis
supplied.)
"If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes." 30 An action
for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years as it is an obligation created by law,31 to
be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 32 This rule, however,
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the
property. cADaIH
In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 33 we said that there is no prescription when in an action for
reconveyance, the claimant is in actual possession of the property because this in effect is an action for
quieting of title:
[S]ince if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of
the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece
of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the
reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 28, 2005 Decision and September 28, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73743 are hereby AFFIRMED.
11
SECOND DIVISION
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE REVOKED AT WILL. The agency that we hereby declare to be compatible
with the intent of the parties, cannot be revoked at will. The reason is that it is one coupled with an
interest, the agency having been created for the mutual interest of the agent and the principal.
5. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF PROPER IN BREACH OF CONTRACT. We rule that for its
unwarranted revocation of the contract of agency, the private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc.,
should be sentenced to pay damages. Under the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded for
"breaches of contract where the defendant acted . . . in bad faith." We likewise condemn Tourist World
Service, Inc. to pay further damages for the moral injury done to Lina Sevilla arising from its brazen
conduct subsequent to the cancellation of the power of attorney granted to her on the authority of
Article 21 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2219 (10) thereof. The Court considers the sums of
Felipe Magat for respondents-appellees.
P25,000.00 as and for moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 as nominal
and/or temperate damages, to be just, fair, and reasonable under the circumstances.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J p:
The petitioners invoke the provisions on human relations of the Civil Code in this appeal by certiorari.
The facts are beyond dispute:
prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; AGENCY; CONSTRUED. When the petitioner, Lina
On the strength of a contract (Exhibit A for the appellants Exhibit 2 for the
Sevilla, agreed to (wo)man the private respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc.'s Ermita office, she must
appellees) entered into on Oct. 19, 1960 by and between Mrs. Segundina
have done so pursuant to a contract of agency. It is the essence of this contract that the agent renders
Noguera, party of the first part; the Tourist World Service, Inc., represented by
Mr. Eliseo Canilao as party of the second part, and hereinafter referred to as
appellants, the Tourist World Service, Inc. leased the premises belonging to the
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, Sevilla solicited airline fares, but she did so for and on
behalf of her principal, Tourist World Service, Inc. As compensation, she received 4% of the proceeds in
the concept of commissions. And as we said, Sevilla herself, based on her letter of November 28, 1961,
presumed her principal's authority as owner of the business undertaking. We are convinced, considering
the circumstances and from the respondent Court's recital of facts, that the parties had contemplated a
principal-agent relationship, rather than a joint management or a partnership.
party of the first part at Mabini St., Manila for the former's use as a branch
office. In the said contract the party of the third part held herself solidarily liable
with the party of the second part for the prompt payment of the monthly rental
agreed on. When the branch office was opened, the same was run by the herein
appellant Lina O. Sevilla payable to Tourist World Service Inc. by any airline for
any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Lina Sevilla, 4% was to go to Lina
Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the Tourist World Service, Inc. Cdpr
12
On or about November 24, 1961 (Exhibit 16) the Tourist World Service, Inc.
"II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT MRS. LINA O.
appears to have been informed that Lina Sevilla was connected with a rival firm,
the Philippine Travel Bureau, and, since the branch office was anyhow losing,
the Tourist World Service considered closing down its office. This was firmed up
HOLD THAT THE SAID ARRANGEMENT WAS ONE OF JOINT BUSINESS VENTURE.
by two resolutions of the board of directors of Tourist World Service, Inc. dated
Dec. 2, 1961 (Exhibits 12 and 13), the first abolishing the office of the manager
and vice-president of the Tourist World Service, Inc., Ermita Branch, and the
second, authorizing the corporate secretary to receive the properties of the
Tourist World Service then located at the said branch office. It further appears
that on Jan. 3, 1962, the contract with the appellees for the use of the Branch
"IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLEES HAD NO
Office premises was terminated and while the effectivity thereof was Jan. 31,
RIGHT TO EVICT APPELLANT MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA FROM THE A. MABINI OFFICE
1962, the appellees no longer used it. As a matter of fact appellants used it
since Nov. 1961. Because of this, and to comply with the mandate of the Tourist
World Service, the corporate secretary Gabino Canilao went over to the branch
office, and, finding the premises locked, and, being unable to contact Lina
Sevilla, he padlocked the premises on June 4, 1962 to protect the interests of
the Tourist World Service. When neither the appellant Lina Sevilla nor any of
"VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT MRS. LINA O.
her employees could enter the locked premises, a complaint was filed by the
herein appellants against the appellees with a prayer for the issuance of
mandatory
preliminary
injunction.
Both
appellees
answered
with
counterclaims. For apparent lack of interest of the parties therein, the trial
court ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice.
The appellee Segundina Noguera sought reconsideration of the order dismissing
On the foregoing facts and in the light of the errors assigned the issues to be
resolved are:
1. Whether the appellee Tourist World Service unilaterally disconnected the
telephone line at the branch office on Ermita;
her counterclaim which the court a quo, in an order dated June 8, 1963, granted
2. Whether or not the padlocking of the office by the Tourist World Service was
On June 17, 1963, appellant Lina Sevilla refiled her case against the herein
3. Whether or not the lessee to the office premises belonging to the appellee
appellees and after the issues were joined, the reinstated counterclaim of
Segundina Noguera and the new complaint of appellant Lina Sevilla were jointly
heard following which the court a quo ordered both cases dismissed for lack of
merit, on the basis of which was elevated the instant appeal on the following
assignment of errors:
"I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED EVEN IN APPRECIATING THE NATURE OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA'S COMPLAINT.
In this appeal, appellant Lina Sevilla claims that a joint business venture was
entered into by and between her and appellee TWS with offices at the Ermita
branch office and that she was not an employee of the TWS to the end that her
relationship with TWS was one of a joint business venture appellant made
declarations showing:
13
"1. Appellant Mrs. Lina O. Sevilla, a prominent social figure and wife of an
June 18, 1965 - testimony of appellee Eliseo Canilao; pp. 38-39 tsn. April 6, 1966
eminent eye, ear and nose specialist as well as a society columnist, had been in
the travel business prior to the establishment of the joint business venture with
Brief)
appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. and appellee Eliseo Canilao, her compadre,
Upon the other hand, appellee TWS contend that the appellant was an
she being the godmother of one of his children, with her own clientele, coming
employee of the appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. and as such was
mostly from her own social circle (pp. 3-6 tsn. February 16, 1965).
designated manager." 1
"2. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla was signatory to a lease agreement dated 19 October
1960 (Exh. "A") covering the premises at A. Mabini St., she expressly warranting
and holding [sic] herself 'solidarily' liable with appellee Tourist World Service,
The trial court 2 held for the private respondents on the premise that the private respondent, Tourist
Inc. for the prompt payment of the monthly rentals thereof to other appellee
World Service, Inc., being the true lessee, it was within its prerogative to terminate the lease and padlock
the premises. 3 It likewise found the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to be a mere employee of said Tourist World
"3. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla did not receive any salary from appellee Tourist World
Service, Inc., which had its own separate office located at the Trade &
Service, Inc. and as such, she was bound by the acts of her employer. 4 The respondent Court of
Appeals 5 rendered an affirmance. prLL
The petitioners now claim that the respondent Court, in sustaining the lower court, erred. Specifically,
in nor connection with said business at the Trade & Commerce Building (pp. 16-
they state:
18 tsn. id.).
"4. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla earned commissions for her own passengers, her own
bookings, her own business (and not for any of the business of appellee Tourist
World Service, Inc.) obtained from the airline companies. She shared the 7%
commissions given by the airline companies, giving appellee Tourist World
Service, Inc. 3% thereof and retaining 4% for herself (pp. 18 tsn. id.)
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THE PADLOCKING OF THE PREMISES BY
TOURIST WORLD SERVICE INC. WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF
THE APPELLANT LINA SEVILLA . . . WITHOUT NOTIFYING MRS. LINA O. SEVILLA
OR ANY OF HER EMPLOYEES AND WITHOUT INFORMING COUNSEL FOR THE
APPELLANT (SEVILLA), WHO IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE PADLOCKING INCIDENT,
"5. Appellant Mrs. Sevilla likewise shared in the expenses of maintaining the A.
Mabini St. office, paying for the salary of an office secretary, Miss Obieta, and
other sundry expenses, aside from designing the office furniture and supplying
some office furnishings (pp. 15, 18 tsn. April 6, 1965), appellee Tourist World
Service, Inc. shouldering the rental and other expenses in consideration for the
3% split in the commissions procured by appellant Mrs. Sevilla (p. 35 tsn. Feb.
16, 1965).
"6. It was the understanding between them that appellant Mrs. Sevilla would be
given the title of branch manager for appearance's sake only (p. 31 tsn. id.),
appellee Eliseo Canilao admitting that it was just a title for dignity (p. 36 tsn
14
exclusive domain of the Court of Industrial Relations, later, the Bureau of Labor Relations, pursuant to
"A" P. 8)
In this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to determine the existence of an employer-employee
III.
relation. In general, we have relied on the so-called right of control test, "where the person for whom
the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the
means to be used in reaching such end." 10 Subsequently, however, we have considered, in addition to
the standard of right-of-control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the
inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. 11
The records will show that the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private
respondent Tourist World Service, Inc., either as to the result of the enterprise or as to the means used
in connection therewith. In the first place, under the contract of lease covering the Tourist World's
HER CLAIM THAT SHE WAS IN JOINT VENTURE WITH TOURIST WORLD SERVICE
Ermita office, she had bound herself in solidum as and for rental payments, an arrangement that would
INC. OR AT LEAST ITS AGENT COUPLED WITH AN INTEREST WHICH COULD NOT
belie claims of a master-servant relationship. True, the respondent Court would later minimize her
participation in the lease as one of mere guaranty, 12 that does not make her an employee of Tourist
INC. 6
World, since in any case, a true employee cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of
As a preliminary inquiry, the Court is asked to declare the true nature of the relation between Lina Sevilla
and Tourist World Service, Inc. The respondent Court of Appeals did not see fit to rule on the question,
his employer's business, or otherwise, assume any liability thereof. In that event, the parties must be
bound by some other relation, but certainly not employment.
the crucial issue, in its opinion being "whether or not the padlocking of the premises by the Tourist
In the second place, and as found by the Appellate Court, "[w]hen the branch office was opened, the
World Service, Inc. without the knowledge and consent of the appellant Lina Sevilla entitled the latter to
same was run by the herein appellant Lina O. Sevilla payable to Tourist World Service, Inc. by any airline
the relief of damages prayed for and whether or not the evidence for the said appellant supports the
for any fare brought in on the effort of Mrs. Lina Sevilla." 13 Under these circumstances, it cannot be said
contention that the appellee Tourist World Service, Inc. unilaterally and without the consent of the
that Sevilla was under the control of Tourist World Service, Inc. "as to the means used." Sevilla in
appellant disconnected the telephone lines of the Ermita branch office of the appellee Tourist World
pursuing the business, obviously relied on her own gifts and capabilities.
Service, Inc." 7 Tourist World Service, Inc., insists, on the other hand, that Lina Sevilla was a mere
employee, being "branch manager" of its Ermita "branch" office and that inferentially, she had no say on
the lease executed with the private respondent, Segundina Noguera. The petitioners contend, however,
that relation between the parties was one of joint venture, but concede that "whatever might have been
the true relationship between Sevilla and Tourist World Service," the Rule of Law enjoined Tourist World
It is further admitted that Sevilla was not in the company's payroll. For her efforts, she retained 4% in
commissions from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to Tourist World. Unlike an employee then,
who earns a fixed salary usually, she earned compensation in fluctuating amounts depending on her
booking successes.
Service and Canilao from taking the law into their own hands," 8 in reference to the padlocking now
The fact that Sevilla had been designated "branch manager" does not make her, ergo, Tourist World's
questioned. cdphil
employee. As we said, employment is determined by the right-of-control test and certain economic
The Court finds the resolution of the issue material, for if, as the private respondent, Tourist World
Service, Inc., maintains, that the relation between the parties was in the character of employer and
In rejecting Tourist World Service, Inc.'s arguments however, we are not, as a consequence, accepting
employee, the courts would have been without jurisdiction to try the case, labor disputes being the
Lina Sevilla's own, that is, that the parties had embarked on a joint venture or otherwise, a partnership.
15
And apparently, Sevilla herself did not recognize the existence of such a relation. In her letter of
telephone lines at the branch office." 20 Yet, what cannot be denied is the fact that Tourist World
November 28, 1961, she expressly "concedes your [Tourist World Service, Inc.'s] right to stop the
Service, Inc. did not take pains to have them reconnected. Assuming, therefore, that it had no hand in
operation of your branch office," 14 in effect, accepting Tourist World Service, Inc.'s control over the
the disconnection now complained of, it had clearly condoned it, and as owner of the telephone lines, it
manner in which the business was run. A joint venture, including a partnership, presupposes generally a
parity of standing between the joint co-venturers or partners, in which each party has an equal
proprietary interest in the capital or property contributed 15and where each party exercises equal rights
in the conduct of the business. 16 Furthermore, the parties did not hold themselves out as partners, and
the building itself was embellished with the electric sign "Tourist World Service, Inc.," 17 in lieu of a
distinct partnership name.
The Court of Appeals must likewise be held to be in error with respect to the padlocking incident. For the
fact that Tourist World Service, Inc. was the lessee named in the lease contract did not accord it any
authority to terminate that contract without notice to its actual occupant, and to padlock the premises in
such blitzkrieg fashion. As this Court has ruled, the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, had acquired a personal stake
in the business itself, and necessarily, in the equipment pertaining thereto. Furthermore, Sevilla was not
It is the Court's considered opinion, that when the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, agreed to (wo)man the private
a stranger to that contract having been explicitly named therein as a third party in charge of rental
respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc.'s Ermita office, she must have done so pursuant to a contract of
payments (solidarily with Tourist World, Inc.). She could not be ousted from possession as summarily as
agency. It is the essence of this contract that the agent renders services "in representation or on behalf
of another." 18 In the case at bar, Sevilla solicited airline fares, but she did so for and on behalf of her
principal, Tourist World Service, Inc. As compensation, she received 4% of the proceeds in the concept of
commissions. And as we said, Sevilla herself, based on her letter of November 28, 1961, presumed her
principal's authority as owner of the business undertaking. We are convinced, considering the
circumstances and from the respondent Court's recital of facts, that the parties had contemplated a
principal-agent relationship, rather than a joint management or a partnership.
The Court is satisfied that from the chronicle of events, there was indeed some malevolent design to put
the petitioner, Lina Sevilla, in a bad light following disclosures that she had worked for a rival firm. To be
sure, the respondent court speaks of alleged business losses to justify the closure, 21 but there is no
clear showing that Tourist World Ermita Branch had in fact sustained such reverses, let alone, the fact
that Sevilla had moonlit for another company. What the evidence discloses, on the other hand, is that
following such an information (that Sevilla was working for another company), Tourist World's board of
But unlike simple grants of a power of attorney, the agency that we hereby declare to be compatible
directors adopted two resolutions abolishing the office of "manager" and authorizing the corporate
with the intent of the parties, cannot be revoked at will. The reason is that it is one coupled with an
secretary, the respondent Eliseo Canilao, to effect the takeover of its branch office properties. On
interest, the agency having been created for the mutual interest of the agent and the principal. 19 It
January 3, 1962, the private respondents ended the lease over the branch office premises, incidentally,
appears that Lina Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and as such, she had acquired an interest in
the business entrusted to her. Moreover, she had assumed a personal obligation for the operation
thereof, holding herself solidarily liable for the payment of rentals. She continued the business, using her
own name, after Tourist World had stopped further operations. Her interest, obviously, is not limited to
the commissions she earned as a result of her business transactions, but one that extends to the very
subject matter of the power of management delegated to her. It is an agency that, as we said, cannot be
revoked at the pleasure of the principal. Accordingly, the revocation complained of should entitle the
petitioner, Lina Sevilla, to damages. cdll
It was only on June 4, 1962, and after office hours significantly, that the Ermita office was padlocked,
personally by the respondent Canilao, on the pretext that it was necessary "to protect the interests of
the Tourist World Service." 22 It is strange indeed that Tourist World Service, Inc. did not find such a
need when it cancelled the lease five months earlier. While Tourist World Service, Inc. would not
pretend that it sought to locate Sevilla to inform her of the closure, but surely, it was aware that after
office hours, she could not have been anywhere near the premises. Capping these series of "offensives,"
it cut the office's telephone lines, paralyzing completely its business operations, and in the process,
depriving Sevilla of her participation therein.
As we have stated, the respondent Court avoided this issue, confining itself to the telephone
This conduct on the part of Tourist World Service, Inc. betrays a sinister effort to punish Sevilla for what
disconnection and padlocking incidents. Anent the disconnection issue, it is the holding of the Court of
it had perceived to be disloyalty on her part. It is offensive, in any event, to elementary norms of justice
Appeals that there is "no evidence showing that the Tourist World Service, Inc. disconnected the
16
We rule, therefore, that for its unwarranted revocation of the contract of agency, the private
FIRST DIVISION
respondent, Tourist World Service, Inc., should be sentenced to pay damages. Under the Civil Code,
moral damages may be awarded for "breaches of contract where the defendant acted . . . in bad
faith." 23
We likewise condemn Tourist World Service, Inc. to pay further damages for the moral injury done to
Lina Sevilla arising from its brazen conduct subsequent to the cancellation of the power of attorney
JR., respondent.
granted to her on the authority of Article 21 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2219 (10) thereof:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
DECISION
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage. prcd
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
CARPIO, J p:
cases:
The Case
xxx xxx xxx
This petition for review 1 assails the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
No. 52068. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of Wheelers Club International, Inc. ("Wheelers")
The respondent, Eliseo Canilao, as a joint tortfeasor, is likewise hereby ordered to respond for the same
questioning the Decision 3 dated 11 March 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
214 ("RTC"). The RTC Decision reversed on appeal the Decision 4 dated 5 June 1998 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59 ("MTC"), which dismissed the complaint for unlawful
Insofar, however, as the private respondent, Segundina Noguera is concerned, no evidence has been
shown that she had connived with Tourist World Service, Inc. in the disconnection and padlocking
The Antecedents
Rosario, Romeo, Virgilio, Generoso, Andres, Jovito, Jose (all surnamed Bonifacio), Zenaida B. Lafiguera,
Corazon B. Calub, and Ma. Cristina B. De Guzman are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land with
improvement 5 situated at No. 83 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 5350 ("Property"). 6
WHEREFORE, the Decision promulgated on January 23, 1975 as well as the Resolution issued on July 31,
1975, by the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondent,
Tourist World Service, Inc., and Eliseo Canilao, are ORDERED jointly and severally to indemnify the
The co-owners comprised the Board of Directors of J & R Bonifacio Development Corporation
("JRBDC"). 7
petitioner, Lina Sevilla, the sum of P25,000.00 as and for moral damages, the sum of P10,000.00, as and
On 5 May 1994, Bonifacio Development Associates, Inc. ("BDAI"), represented by Jaime C. Bonifacio, Sr.
for exemplary damages, and the sum of P5,000.00, as and for nominal and/or temperate damages. llcd
("Jaime") as President and Chairman of its Board of Directors, entered into a Contract of Lease 8 with
Wheelers for a term of five years from 1 June 1994 to 31 May 1999. Under the Contract of Lease,
Wheelers undertook to pay BDAI a monthly rental of P108,750 for the lease of the Property.
17
On 31 May 1994, JRBDC, represented by the co-owners as members of the Board of Directors and lessors
On 9 October 1997, Jovito and the other co-owners, through counsel, sent a letter to Wheelers
of the Property, entered into a Lease Development Agreement 9 with BDAI. Under the Lease
demanding payment of rentals in arrears from February to October 1997. The letter also demanded that
Development Agreement, BDAI was authorized to renovate, manage, develop, and sublease the
Wheelers vacate the Property within five days from receipt of the letter. 16
Property. The term of the agreement was also for five years from 31 May 1994 to 31 May 1999. The
monthly rental was based on the actual income derived from the lease, management and development
of the Property to be shared by the co-owners and BDAI. 10
On the same day, the co-owners executed a General Power of Attorney 11 ("power of attorney") in favor
of Jaime granting him the authority to administer the Property, renovate the building, introduce
improvements and lease the Property to any person.
On 16 June 1996, the co-owners demanded that BDAI submit accounting records of all income from the
Property.
BDAI, in turn, demanded that the co-owners furnish it with receipts and records of cash and check
advances made by BDAI to the co-owners.
On 21 October 1997, Jovito, as a co-owner of the Property, filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Wheelers, docketed as Civil Case No. 15760. 17
Jovito claimed that Wheelers refused to pay him, as the new administrator of the Property, the rentals
due from February to October 1997.
In its Answer dated 19 November 1997, 18 Wheelers countered that it paid to BDAI the rentals from
February to September 1997. Wheelers, however, held in abeyance payment of the rental for October
1997 because of Jovito's demand letter and Wheelers plan to consign the rental in Court.
The MTC ruled that while JRBDC does not own the Property, the co-owners who comprised JRBDC's
Board of Directors signed the Lease Development Agreement signifying the co-owners' consent to the
act of JRBDC. The MTC found that since the signing of the Lease Development Agreement, none of the
On 18 August 1996, the co-owners, as directors of JRBDC, approved a Resolution 12 terminating the
co-owners questioned the execution of the agreement. The co-owners did not adduce any evidence to
authority of "Jaime C. Bonifacio" to manage and administer the Property for BDAI's failure to submit an
The MTC further ruled that one who is not a party to a contract has no personality to assail the validity of
such contract, following Jovito's claim that he did not consent to the Lease Development Agreement.
In its Joint Decision dated 5 June 1998, the MTC disposed of the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, these two ejectment cases for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer against herein defendants are hereby dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
SO ORDERED. 19
Respondent appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC decision.
reason for the termination of BDAI or Jaime's management of the Property. BDAI claimed that Rosario's
The RTC held that upon the termination of Jaime's management of the Property, Wheelers could not
simply rely on its lease contract with BDAI and deny Jovito and the other co-owners their right to collect
On 4 March 1997, Jovito wrote to Wheelers claiming that the co-owners did not authorize the Contract
of Lease between BDAI and Wheelers. Jovito gave Wheelers ten days to vacate the Property. 15
Meanwhile, Wheelers continued to pay BDAI the monthly rentals from February to September
1997. CaEATI
rentals. The RTC ruled that Wheelers paid the rentals at its own risk since it knew Jaime no longer had
authority to receive the rentals. Citing Araas v. Tutaan, 20 the RTC held that payment to one without
authority to receive the payment is void. HCTEDa
The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision dated 11 March 1999 reads:
18
SO ORDERED. 21
Wheelers filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 30 March 1999. The Court of Appeals
The Issue
The core issue in this case is:
SO ORDERED. 22
Meanwhile, Jovito filed a motion for execution 23 of the RTC decision, which the RTC granted in its Order
dated 23 April 1999. 24
Hence, this petition.
19
In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal because
to BDAI as lessee-sublessor. Wheelers was, therefore, under no obligation to pay Jovito or the co-owners
of the termination of his right to possess the property under his contract with the plaintiff. 27 Hence, by
the rentals.
instituting the unlawful detainer action, Jovito and the other co-owners admit that Wheelers' possession
of the Property was lawful at the beginning. In other words, Jovito and the other co-owners recognize
the legality of Wheelers' occupation of the Property beginning 1 June 1994 by virtue of the Contract of
Lease it had with BDAI. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, such recognition necessarily debunks
Jovito's claim that the co-owners did not authorize BDAI to lease the Property to Wheelers. This fact
Moreover, although Article 1652 of the Civil Code 31 permits the lessor to proceed against the sublessee
for rent due from the lessee, this is only on asubsidiary liability basis. 32 There must be a judgment
cancelling the lessee's principal lease contract or ousting the lessee from the premises before the sublessee becomes subsidiarily liable. As this Court explained in Duellome v. Gotico 33 :
likewise negates Jovito's contention that the Contract of Lease between BDAI and Wheelers is void and
In the case of Sipin, et al. vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., 74 Phil.
inexistent. CacEID
649, We have explained that by virtue of the above provision, [Article 1652 of
the Civil Code], "the sublessee, therefore, can invoke no right superior to that of
his sublessor and the moment the latter is duly ousted from the premises the
The question now is, when did Wheelers' possession of the Property become without legal basis to
former has no leg to stand on. The sublessee's right if any, is to demand
reparation for damages from his sublessor, should the latter be at fault." And, in
In his complaint for unlawful detainer, Jovito claimed that Wheelers disregarded its obligation to pay
rentals to the co-owners from February to October 1997. However, Wheelers' obligation to pay the
rentals arose from its Contract of Lease with BDAI. Wheelers did not have a separate lease agreement
with Jovito or the other co-owners. Wheelers' continued possession of the Property was by virtue of the
another case, We interpreted the same article to mean that "the sublessees can
only assert such right of possession as could have been granted them by their
sublessors, their right of possession depending entirely upon that of the latter."
(Madrigal vs. Ang Sam To, et al., 46 O.G. 2173). (Emphasis supplied)
Contract of Lease it executed with BDAI. There is no privity of contract between Wheelers and Jovito or
The sub-lessee is not liable to the lessor under Article 1652 upon mere demand by the lessor on the sub-
the other co-owners. Since there was neither a written nor verbal lease agreement between the co-
lessee. The sub-lessee is primarily liable to his sub-lessor and only a court order can extinguish or modify
owners and Wheelers, Jovito is mistaken in claiming that the lease contract between the co-owners and
this primary liability if the sub-lessor contests the pre-termination of the principal lease by the lessor. In
the present case, there is no judgment cancelling BDAI's Lease Development Contract or ousting BDAI
What is clear from the records is that the present case involves a sublease arrangement. In a sublease
arrangement, there are two distinct leases: the principal lease and the sublease. These two juridical
A sub-lessor is not an agent of the lessor. 34 Hence, BDAI is not an agent of the co-owners. Even
relationships co-exist and are intimately related to each other but nonetheless distinct from one
assuming that BDAI is an agent of the co-owners, BDAI would have an interest in such agency sufficient
another. The lessee's rights and obligations vis--vis the lessor are not passed on to the sublessee.
to deprive the co-owners the power to revoke the agency at will. Under the Lease Development
A careful review of the Lease Development Agreement between JRBDC and BDAI reveals that the coowners are the actual lessors of the Property, not JRBDC. 29 In addition, the co-owners are the
registered owners of Property. BDAI, in turn, subleased the Property to Wheelers. Therefore, the co-
Agreement, BDAI had the authority to construct, and BDAI did construct, improvements on the Property
at its expense. The Court of Appeals found that BDAI "was also the developer of the vacant space of the
parcel of land for the construction of permanent improvements thereon at the cost of BDAI." 35
owners, except only in the instances specified in the Civil Code, are strangers to the Contract of Lease
As developer of the permanent improvement on the Property, BDAI has an interest in the Property that
is the subject matter of the agency, assuming such agency exists. An agency coupled with interest is not
Since the co-owners are strangers to the Contract of Lease between BDAI and Wheelers, Wheelers has
no right or authority to pay the sublease rentals to the co-owners as lessors since the rentals are payable
revocable at the will of the principal. In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 36 this Court held:
But unlike simple grants of a power of attorney, the agency that we hereby
declare to be compatible with the intent of the parties, cannot be revoked at
20
will. The reason is that it is one coupled with an interest, the agency having
that BDAI should pay the co-owners the rentals and fees due them. In case BDAI refuses to pay the
been created for the mutual interest of the agent and the principal. It appears
rentals and other fees due them, the co-owners' remedy is against BDAI and not against Wheelers, in the
that Lina Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and as such, she had
absence of a judgment cancelling the Lease Development Agreement or ousting BDAI from the
premises. ITSacC
In sum, the Lease Development Agreement between the co-owners and BDAI, and the Contract of Lease
between BDAI and Wheelers, remain valid, in the absence of any judicial declaration of their nullity.
Jovito and the other co-owners cannot merely assume and allege that these agreements are void.
her business transactions, but one that extends to the very subject matter of
The Contract of Lease between BDAI and Wheelers had a term running from 1 June 1994 to 31 May
1999. This term is within the five-year period of BDAI's Lease Development Agreement with the co-
owners. Jovito filed the unlawful detainer case against Wheelers on 21 October 1997. Clearly, the
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the co-owners had the right to revoke at will their
Lease Development Agreement with BDAI.
Contract of Lease between BDAI and Wheelers was still valid and subsisting when Jovito filed the
unlawful detainer case. Thus, at the time of filing of the unlawful detainer complaint, Jovito and the
other co-owners did not have a cause of action to eject Wheelers from the Property.
On the other hand, whether Jaime in his personal capacity was an agent of the co-owners is immaterial
because Wheelers entered into the Contract of Lease with BDAI and not with Jaime. There is no showing
that BDAI and Jaime comprise a single entity. The parties in this case confused Jaime with BDAI and
erroneously considered Jaime's acts as those of BDAI's. Following well-settled principles in Corporation
Law, 38 Jaime and BDAI are distinct persons. Since Jaime acted as the President of BDAI when the latter
entered into the Contract of Lease with Wheelers, such contract is binding between BDAI and Wheelers.
Consequently, the revocation by the co-owners of Jaime's authority to administer the Property did not
automatically cancel or terminate the Contract of Lease between BDAI and Wheelers.
The Court rejects Jovito's argument that the Lease Development Agreement between the co-owners and
BDAI is void. Jovito maintains that a lease of the Property involves an act of alteration requiring the
unanimous consent of the co-owners pursuant to Article 491 of the Civil Code, which consent is allegedly
absent in this case. 39
A lease over the common property without the consent of all the co-owners is not void. Just as a sale of
the whole common property without the consent of the other co-owners affects only the share or
interest of the selling co-owner, 40 a lease of the entire property does not affect the interests of the
non-consenting co-owners. Therefore, a lease over the entire Property is valid insofar as the interests of
the consenting co-owners are concerned. 41
However, the Court is not denying the co-owners rentals due from the lease of the Property. As owners
of the Property, they are entitled to the fruits or income of the Property. 42 Considering that BDAI
undeniably received the monthly rentals paid by Wheelers, 43 the Court deems it proper and equitable
As things stand, BDAI is the sub-lessor of the Property. BDAI's sub-lease agreement with Wheelers is
within the five-year term of BDAI's principal lease with the co-owners. Until the expiration of the fiveyear term of BDAI's principal lease, the sub-lease agreement between BDAI and Wheeler remains valid,
unless the sub-lease agreement is judicially annulled in the proper case, 44 or unless there is a judgment
cancelling BDAI's principal lease with the co-owners or ousting BDAI from the Property. 45 Moreover, no
lease agreement exists between the co-owners and Wheelers. Therefore, Jovitos claim that the term of
the alleged lease agreement between the co-owners and Wheelers has expired has no legal basis.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
July 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52068 and REINSTATE the Decision dated 5 June 1998 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 59, dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer of
respondent Jovito Bonifacio, Jr. against petitioner Wheelers Club International, Inc. T