Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Sleeper cell redirects here. For other uses, see Sleeper passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking
cell (disambiguation).
and technology.[1]
Ocially, the PIRA is hierarchical, but, especially as
British security forces became more eective, changed
to a semiautonomous model for its operational and certain of its support cells (e.g., transportation, intelligence,
cover and security).[2] Its leadership sees itself as guiding and consensus-building. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2-5 people, tend to be built by people with an
existing personal relationship. British counterinsurgents
could fairly easily understand the command structure, but
not the workings of the operational cells.
Especially through the French member, they would contact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask
them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (i.e., a subcell). If the team mission were sabotage, reconnaissance,
or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units.
If the team was to carry out direct action, often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals
A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of had military experience, it would be necessary to assemsleeper agents that lies dormant until it receives orders ble into units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the
or decides to act.
leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known afliation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more
appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations.
1.1
History
and, indirectly, from the Soviet Union. It had parallel External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups
political and military structures, often overlapping. See in Iraq, for example, do receive assistance from Iran, but
Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics.
this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and
may even be limited to factions of that government. Early
US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the
Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA and
United States Army Special Forces. As the latter conict
escalated, the US participation became overt.
Note that both unconventional warfare (UW) (guerrilla
operations) and foreign internal defense (FID) (counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization.
In a covert FID mission, only selected host nation (HN)
leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under Operation White Star, US personnel gave covert FID
assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, became overt in 1961, and ceased operations in 1962.
A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure
was top-down
The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who opated cell characteristics
erated quite closely, and engaging in the sort of selfcriticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist
While dierent kinds of insurgency dier in where they
organizations.
place clandestine or covert cells, when certain types of insurgency grow in power, the cell system is deemphasized.
Cells still may be used for leadership security, but, if overt
2 Parallel organizations
violence by organized units becomes signicant, cells are
less important. In Maos three-stage doctrine,[7] cells are
The NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas,
chosen to have parallel political and military organiza- but, as the insurgency creates full-time military units in
tions. In the case of the NLF, other than some individuals Phase III, the main units are the focus, not the cells. The
with sanctuary in North Vietnam, the political organiza- Eighth Route Army did not run on a cell model.
tion could not be overt during the Vietnam War. After When considering where cells exist with respect to the
the war ended, surviving NLF ocials held high oce.
existing government, the type of insurgency needs to be
considered. One US Army reference was Field Manual
100-20, which has been superseded by FM3-07.[8] Drawing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps
ocer) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell
system, although his descriptions also encompass types of
The overt political-covert military split avoided the inexinsurgencies that the cell system supports.[9] At present,
ibility of a completely secret organization. Once an active
there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist
insurgency began, the secrecy could limited freedom of
insurgencies.
action, distort information about goals and ideals, and restrict communication within the insurgency.[6] In a split
1. Traditional: the slowest to form, this reects a prinorganization the public issues can be addressed overtly,
cipally indigenous insurgency, initially with limited
while military actions were kept covert and intelligence
goals. It is more secure than others, as it tends to
functions stay clandestine.
grow from people with social, cultural or family ties.
The insurgents resent a government that has failed to
recognize tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups
3 External support
who perceive that the government has denied their
rights and interests and work to establish or restore
Many cell systems still receive, with due attention to sethem. They seldom seek to overthrow the governcurity, support from the outside. This can range from
ment or control the whole society; however, they freleaders, trainers and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assisquently attempt to withdraw from government contance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt
trol through autonomy or semiautonomy. The Muactivities (such as the NLF spokesmen in Hanoi).
jahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in
In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Fin, became increasingly overt, and then a full participant in politics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt
political/social service and covert military wings.
3
Iraq illustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency.
al-Qaeda generally operates in this mode, but if they
become strong enough in a given area, they may
change to the mass-oriented form.
5.2
Clandestine presence
5.3
Osama, in this model, has the main responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on
propaganda video and audio messages distributed by the
propaganda cell. The other members of the core each
command one or more infrastructure cells.
While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit
exibility and the ability to scale the organization. This
in-group, while sharing tight cultural and ideological values, is not committed to a bureaucratic process.
Members of the core group are under what could be
termed 'positive control'long relationships and similar
mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there
are distinct roles, and position (structural, nancial, spiritual) determines authority, thus making the core group a
hierarchy topologically.[13]
If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While dierent members have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all
members, the core would reconstitute itself with Richard
as most respected.
Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached
directly only by members of the core group. Members of
outer cells and support systems might know him only as
the Commander, or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda,
Osama bin Ladens face is recognizable worldwide, but
only a very few people know where he is or even how to
contact it.
Core group and infrastructure cells; military cells in training
6.1
Infrastructure cells
Any clandestine or covert service, especially a non- These cells are socially embedded (less so than the
national one, needs a variety of technical and adminis- core group, however), structurally embedded, functionally embedded (they are specialized into a domain), and
trative functions. Some of these services include:[13]
knowledge base-specic (there does not seem to be a
great deal of cross-training, or lateral mobility in the orga1. Forged documents and counterfeit currency
nization). Such cells are probably subjected to a mixture
of positive and negative control (do this, do these sorts
2. Apartments and hiding places
of things, dont do that).[13]
3. Communication means
4. Transportation means
5. Information
6. Arms and ammunition
7. Transport
Other functions include psychological operations, trainNote that Anton does not have a direct connection to
ing, and nance.
Kim. Under normal circumstances, he sacrices eA national intelligence service[14] has a support organi- ciency for security, by passing communications requests
zation to deal with services such as nance, logistics, fa- through Hassan. The security structure also means that
cilities (e.g., safehouses), information technology, com- Hassan does not know the members of Antons cells, and
munications, training, weapons and explosives, medical Kim may know only ways to communicate with them but
services, etc. Transportation alone is a huge function, in- not their identity.
cluding the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion,
Kim operates two systems of cells, one for secure comand, where appropriate, using private vehicles. Finance
includes the need to transfer money without coming un- munications and one for propaganda. To send out a propaganda message, Osama must pass it to Kim. If Kim
der the suspicion of nancial security organizations.
were compromised, the core group might have signicant
Some of these functions, such as nance, are far harder to problems with any sort of outside communications.
operate in remote areas, such as the FATA of Pakistan,
than in cities with large numbers of ocial and unocial Terrorist networks do not match cleanly to other cell sysnancial institutions, and the communications to support tems that regularly report to a headquarters. The apparent
them. If the nancial oce is distant from the remote al-Qaeda methodology of letting operational cells decide
headquarters, there is a need for couriers, who must be on their nal dates and means of attack exhibit an opertrusted to some extent, but they may not know the con- ational pattern, but not a periodicity that could easily be
tents of their messages or the actual identity of sender used for an indications checklist appropriate for a warnon seeing a local pattern to
and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance ing center. Such lists depend
[15]
give
a
specic
warning.
among type and size of message, security, and technology
available, may memorize messages, carry audio or video Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet
established operational cells. These subordinates can be
recordings, or hand-carry computer media.
6.3
6.2
Operational cells
Cells are coordinated, not under command & controlthis autonomy and local control makes them exible, and enhances security
Trust and comcon internally to the cell
provide redundancy of potential command (a failure of Palestinian operations
in the past), and well as a shared knowledgebase (which may mean, over time,
that cross training emerges inside a cell,
providing redundancy of most critical
skills and knowledge).[13]
See also
Leaderless resistance
Lone wolf (terrorism)
References
EXTERNAL LINKS
[9] Nyberg, Eric N. (1991). Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery. US Marine Corps University Command and Sta
College.
[10] Luttwak, Edward (1968). Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook. Harvard University Press.
[11] Guevara, Ernesto Che (1961). On Guerilla Warfare.
Praeger.
[12] al-Qaeda training manual (PDF). US Southern District
Court, US New York City Attorneys Oce, entered as
evidence in Africa embassy bombings.
[13] Decision Support Systems, Inc. (2001-12-31). Hunting
the Sleepers: Tracking al-Qaidas Covert Operatives
(PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-17.
[14] US Central Intelligence Agency. Support to Mission:
Who We Are. Retrieved 2007-11-19.
[15] Fellman, Philip Vos; Wright, Roxana. Modeling Terrorist Networks - Complex Systems at the Mid-Range
(PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-02.
[16] Kaplan, David E. (22 September 2002). Run and Gun:
Al Qaeda arrests and intelligence hauls bring new energy
to the war on terrorism. U.S. News & World Report.
[17] Pendall, David W. (JanuaryFebruary 2004). EectsBased Operations and the Exercise of National Power.
Military Review (United States Army Combined Arms
Center). Find the article by going through the Military
Review directories
9 External links
An Introduction To Terrorist Organisational Structures
10
10.1
10.2
Images
10.3
Content license