Fallen

The UN Security Council's Response to Terrorism: Before and after September 11, 2001
Author(s): Hilde Haaland Kramer and Steve A. Yetiv

Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 3 (Fall, 2007), pp. 409-432
Published by: The Academy of Political Science
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The UN
Security Council's Response
to Terrorism: Before and After
September 11, 2001
HILDE HAALAND KRAMER

STEVE
A. YETIV
The horrific terroristattacks of September 11 shocked not only
the United
but also many
States
other actors
around
the world.
September
11
representedperhaps the firsttime inhistory that the action of a transnational
actor so altered
the course
of international
only did it spawn the

inAfghanistan
and Iraq, it
the future of the world, about unrestrained
war on terrorism and associated
American
also raised
and elusive
relations. Not
conflicts
serious questions
about
transnational
terrorism, and about
how
the terrorist threat to the
global communitycould be contained. Not surprisingly,overwhelming public

and
academic
attention
has
focused
on
the attacks.
Scholars,
policymakers,
and laymen have asked a variety of probing questions: What motivated the
terrorists? Did
between
the attacks
the Judeo-Christian
a broader clash of civilizations

suggest or presage
To what extent was
and Muslim
worlds?
the
to the attacks sensible?

response
attention has been
focused on these questions,
other
Yet, while much
critical questions have received less scrutiny. Indeed, while the UN's
role in ad
11 than it had before
dressing terrorism drew more attention after September
American
the attacks,1
relatively
little work
has
explored
the UN
Security
Council's
1
Prior to September 11, theUN SecurityCouncil and itswork drew significantattention from
the international
Council's
Council's
and from scholars, but the issue of global

terrorism and the Security
community
was
to
note that the
it
Jane
Boulden
and
Thomas
G. Weiss
response
largely ignored.
to terrorism was "largely peripheral
to mainstream
of
UN
affairs
either
response
analysis
HAALAND KRAMER
is a doctoral student in InternationalStudies at Old Dominion
University. STEVE A. YETIV is a professorof political science at Old Dominion University.His
recent books are Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy (Cornell
UniversityPress, 2004), Explaining Foreign Policy (JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 2004), and The
Absence of Grand Strategy(Forthcoming,JohnsHopkins University Press, 2008).
HILDE
Political Science Quarterly
Volume
122 Number 3
2007
409

I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
410
its re
explored
of the periods
to the attacks of September

ll.2 And no work has
a
use
to
11
of
sponse
systematic comparison
by
September
immediately before and after the attacks.
response
The Argument
Evidence stronglysuggests that September 11 was a critical event in theUN
Council's
Security
to global
response
terrorism.
Its response
post-September
11 has been more forcefuland comprehensive than itwas prior to September

some new
ground. When
to the events
response
11 and has broken
past record, the UN's

by a number of significant
against global terrorism.
outcome
This
elaborate
upon
by the standards of its

of September
11, while plagued
assessed
an improvement
represents
challenges,
in the fight
as we
Indeed,
foreign policy.
of this article, the importance of the United
to American
is important
in the conclusion
Nations to theUnited States has been in doubt among American elites and
the American
bureaucracy
public,
reason.
and not without
to an organization
as sclerotic;
Detractors
ethical
with
point
to the UN
including
problems,
the oil-for-foodproblem and a questionable Human Rights Council; and to
an anti-American
and
anti-Israeli
the UN
and
remains
has been
Yet, while
Assembly.
in the United
States, this study
in the General
bias
controversial
suggeststhat
Washington largelybenefited fromtheUN's response to terrorism
11 period,
in the post-September
as imperfect as it has been.

Method
The
to terrorism from
of the Security Council
the response
paper explores
the late 1980s to the present time, but with a particular emphasis on the periods
11. To the extent that
immediately before and after the attacks of September
to exam
of comparison
the subject allows, we employ the diachronic method
This
11. Scholars use

ine the behavior of the UN prior to and then after September
or diachronically.
latter
The
either cross-nationally
method
the comparative
than
do
a
variables
offers
better solution to the problem of controlling
method
as Arend Lijphart pointed out some time ago,
studies because,
cross-national
or U.S.
Nations?"
and Thomas
Jane Boulden
foreign policy."
G. Weiss,
and Thomas
in Jane Boulden
"Whither
G. Weiss,
eds.,
Terrorism
and
Terrorism
the UN,
September II (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 2004), 5.

2
See
Security
"Tackling
Boulden
and Weiss,
Council"
"Whither
in David
Terrorism"
Terrorism";
and Weiss,
in Boulden
M. Malone,
eds.,
de
Chantal
Terrorism
ed., The UN
and
Security
Jonge Oudraat,
the UN,
151-172;
Council,
From
and
the United
and After
Before
"The
Role
Edward
the Cold
C.
War
of the
Luck,
to the
21stCentury (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); and Nicholas Rostow,
"Before
and After:
The
Changed
UN
Response
national Law Journal 35 (2002): 475-490.
to Terrorism
since September

11th," Cornell
Inter
THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM
it involves more
| 411
constants
and fewer variables,

since fewer variables
change
time and place.3
the UN
response, this paper will look at the resolutions
time than over both
over
In order
to gauge
passed by the SecurityCouncil, because theyare the official and legal expres
sion of the Council's
intent, power,
In particular,
and jurisdiction.
we will com
pare fivedifferentfactorsbefore and after the attacks: first,the general thrust

of major UN resolutions; second, the number of UN resolutions adopted
to terrorism;
in response
third, the gravity, content
and
of these
importance
resolutions; fourth,the toolsmade available and used by theUN to deal with

terrorism;and fifth,compliance by UN member stateswith UN resolutions
dealing with terrorism.This combination of indicatorsprovides a good sense
of how theUN SecurityCouncil responded to the attacks of September 11.
Background
and General Thrust ofMajor
This
offers
section
rorism and
on
ter
the UN's
role in addressing
on ter
thrust of major UN
resolutions
11. The international
and after September
efforts
community's
are
fails
against terrorism
long-standing. Yet, the UN Charter
also
rorism before
some
Resolutions on Terrorism
sketches
background
the general
at cooperation
to mention
terrorism directly, "either as one of itsmany diverse concerns or
as a threat to international peace and security."4 What
it does state, in chap
tersV and VII, is that it is the duty of the SecurityCouncil "to maintain in
ternational peace and security in accordance

with the principles and purposes
to determine
of the United Nations;...
the existence of a threat to the peace
or act of aggression
and to recommend
what action should be taken;...to
call on Members
to
apply
economic
sanctions
and
other measures
not
in
volving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression; [and] to takemilitary
a threat to in
terrorism has presented
against an aggressor."5 Though
most
ternational peace
and security for centuries,
for
of the history of the
states have treated terrorism as a matter of national and local
United Nations,
action
concern and have decided not to bring it to the attention of theUN.6 This
started to change in the late 1980s and 1990s.
3
Arend
Lijphart,
"Comparative
Politics
and
the Comparative
Method,"
American
Political
Sci
enceReview 65 (September 1971): 689. On the general challenges of such an approach, see Donald
T. Campbell, Methodology and Epistemology for theSocial Sciences (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 226-227.
4
Edward C. Luck, "Another Belligerent: The United Nations and theWar on Terrorism" in
Richard
M.
Price
and Mark
W.
Zacher,
eds., The
United
Nations
and Global
Security
PalgraveMacmillian, 2004), 97.

5
UN
"Functions
accessed
and Powers,"
Security Council,
at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html,
1 February
on
the website
(New York:
of the United
Nations
2006.
6
Edward C. Luck, "Global Terrorism and theUnited Nations: A Challenge inSearch of a Policy,"
accessed
Foundation,
on the website
at
of United
Nations
and Global
Security, An
Initiative
of the United
http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Luck_paper_terrorism.pdf,

15 March
Nations
2006,1.
412
The Security Council did not deal with questions of global terrorism
until 1989. Before that (as well as later), the broad subject of terrorismwas
mostly considered by theGeneral Assembly, more specificallyby the Sixth
(Legal) Committee of theGeneral Assembly.7 The Assembly sought to encour
of an international
among states in the development
age cooperation
legal
of the General
framework for dealing with terrorism. The main contribution
Assembly has been inwriting and adopting several conventions thatdeal with
in all.8 These
conventions
address,
aspects of acts of terrorism?13
other
areas,
among
taking, the
airplane hijacking, protected persons, hostage
and
maritime
navi
nuclear
of
material,
aviation,
plastic explosives,
handling
of the Assembly
is the Global
Counter
gation. The most recent achievement
different
Terrorism Strategy,which was adopted on 8 September 2006.9 The Plan of

the root causes of terrorism, measures
measures
to build the individual
state's ca
to prevent and fight terrorism,
to ensure respect for human rights and
pacity to fight terrorism, and measures
the rule of law.10
includes measures
Action
to address
In 1989, the SecurityCouncil passed its firstresolution on terrorismwhen
Resolution
635,
on plastic
or
sheet
explosives,
was
adopted
unanimously.
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argues that the Security Council's attention to

global terrorism in the 1990s was motivated by new developments in the
activities
of international
ties and
citizens;
became
global,
terrorism: more
the number
attacks were
of casualties
aimed
at U.S.
facili
terrorism
incident
increased;
per
the threat of terrorists using
networks;
or nuclear weapons
seemed more
real; and the role of
chemical,
biological,
more
635 was adopted
Resolution
became
visible.11
terrorism
state-supported
with
transnational
in reaction to theLockerbie tragedy (Pan Am Flight 103) on 21 December

1988 and states that
The Security Council, Conscious of the implications of acts of terrorism for inter
in
of the important role of the United Nations
national security,...Mindful
and
efforts
all
States
and
intergovernmental organiza
by
encouraging
supporting
tions in preventing and eliminating all acts of terrorism, including those involving
to encourage the promotion of effective mea
the use of explosives, Determined
7
Rostow,
8
Twelve
signed
"Before
treaties
the thirteenth,
and After,"
have
been
479.
ratified
the International
and
are
in force. One
Convention
hundred
for the Suppression
and
of Acts
fifteen
countries
of Nuclear
have
Terrorism,
New York, 13April 2005, but only 21 countrieshave ratifieditas of 30May, 2007. The convention
will enter into forcewhen 22 countrieshave ratified it; accessed at theUN Treaty Collection web
site at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISii/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treatyl9.asp,
5 June 2007.
9
General Assembly, A/RES/60/288, accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at http://
5 June 2007.
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement,
10
For more
information
on A/RES/60/288
and
the annexed
Plan
of Action
at http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy/.
Counter
Terrorism,"
11
151-152.
"The
Role
of the Security Council,"
Oudraat,

see
"UN
Action
to
| 413
sures to prevent acts of terrorism,... Calls upon all States to co-operate in devis
to prevent all acts of terrorism, including those
ing and implementing measures
Urges all States, and in particular the producers

involving explosives,...[and]
of plastic or sheet explosives, to intensify research into means of making such
explosives more easily detectable, and to co-operate in this endeavour.12
Resolution 635 established theUnited Nations and the SecurityCouncil
as a venue
for dealing
to international
peace
with
and
terrorism.
security,
It asserted
the main
area
that terrorism
of concern
is a threat
for the Secu
rityCouncil, and laid the groundwork for the SecurityCouncil's futurework
on terrorism.
For theUnited States as well as the international community at large,

of September
11 were
true of the United Nations'
the attacks
also
national
and security. With
peace
a watershed
event inmany respects. This is

of terrorism as a threat to inter
handling
a swiftness and decisiveness
unprecedented
inUN history, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368
within
24 hours
of the attacks.13 The
terms, the terrorist attacks
resolution
on the United
condemned,
in no uncertain
States:
Security Council, Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter

of theUnited Nations, Determined to combat by all means threats to international
the inherent right of in
peace and security caused by terrorist acts, Recognizing
dividual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter,... Unequivo
cally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took
place on 11 September 2001 inNew York, Washington
(D.C.) and Pennsylvania
and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to inter
The
national peace
and security.14
The resolution, furthermore, "calls on all States to work together urgently

to bring to justice the perpetrators,
and sponsors of these terrorist
organizers
on
the international
to redouble
attacks" and "calls also
their ef
community
forts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts."15 This resolution
laid the founda
on international
tion for the new, more assertive focus of the Security Council
significantly, it "reaffirmed the inherent right of self-defense

with Article
51 of the UN Charter,"
and represented
the first
as
a legit
time that self-defense was acknowledged
the
Council
by
Security
terrorism. Most
in accordance
imate response
by explicitly
to terrorism.16 Jane Boulden
confirming
a member
state's
and Thomas
G. Weiss
right to self-defense,
argue that
the Security
12
UN SecurityCouncil, S/RES 635 (1989), accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/557/72/IMG/NR055772.pdf7OpenElement,
15March 2006.
13
See Luck,
"Tackling
Terrorism,"
85.
14
UN SecurityCouncil, S/RES/1368 (2001), accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at http://
15March 2006,1.
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement,
15
Ibid.
16Rostow,
"Before
and After,"
481.

414
would
Council
"effectively
opt out of subsequent
leave
and
decision-making
themilitary response to theUnited States."17 In fact,while Resolution 1368

enhanced American leverage by affirming the right of self-defense, the
SecurityCouncil member states also largelyrejected that argument as a legal
justification for invading Iraq in 2003. This is importantbecause it shows
that the Security Council had become a forum for debating self-defense
issues, even though

states.
member
The
adopted
attacks.
its imprimatur
was
not needed
for the use
of force by
resolution was Resolution

1373, which was
groundbreaking
on
three
28
less
than
weeks
after the
2001,
unanimously
September
on all member
states
It imposed a number of binding commitments
second
of theUnited Nations.18These obligations required states to prohibit both ac
tive and passive support for terrorists, to deny terrorists financing, and to freeze
states were required
the assets of terrorists and their supporters. Moreover,
to deny safe haven to terrorists, to increase their vigilance against passport and
forgery, to tighten their border controls, and to work toward en

international
against terrorism. This was an unprecedented
hancing
cooperation
that are
and far-reaching resolution, which
imposed on all states obligations
identification
contained
usually
only
in treaties.19 In contrast
to the 13 conventions
on
ter
rorism,which are binding only on those states thatratifythem,Resolution 1373

for the first time uniform obligations
established
for all 191 member
states.20
Not only did Resolution 1373 impose far-reaching legal obligations on
member
ment
As
states,
it also
established
a mechanism
for monitoring
the commit
Counter-Terrorism
Committee
(CTC).
the "principal
innovation of the post
of themembers?the
points out, this was
and progress
Luck
Edward
September 11 period."21The CTC serves threepurposes. The key functionis to
states.22 The Com

capacity of UN member
to states
the delivery of technical assistance
it is also in
Furthermore,
trying to carry out counter-terrorism mandates.23
in coordinating
efforts of international, regional,
the counter-terrorism
volved
on all states to report to
and subregional
organizations.24 The resolution calls
are
on
out
the
of the resolution no
the CTC
how they
carrying
implementation
strengthen the counter-terrorism

mittee
also serves to facilitate
17
Boulden
18
Oudraat
and Weiss,
argues
"Whither
Terrorism,"
that "Resolution
7.
1373 would
not have
been
adopted
were
it not
for the pre
cedents setwith the sanctions regimes in the 1990s" in "The Role of the SecurityCouncil," 158.
and After,"
482.
19Rostow, "Before
20
11.
"Whither Terrorism,"
Boulden
and Weiss,
21
99.
"Another Belligerent,"
Luck,
22
For
Alistair Millar,
David
A. Lopez,
and Linda Gerber, An Action Agenda
Cortright, George
on
Dame
and
Fourth
Nations
Counter-Terrorism
Goshen:
the
United
Program
(Notre
Enhancing
Peace
of Notre
Studies at the University
Institute for International
Freedom
Forum
and Joan B. Kroc
Dame,
2004),
accessed
at Kroc
Institute
at http://kroc.nd.edu/polbriefs/Action_Agenda.pdf,
2006, 3-4.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.

22 May
of adoption,
later than 90 days from the date

timetable.
CTC-mandated
afterward
and
| 415
to a
according
Quantitative Changes
a clear
there was
While
rorism
against ter
the finding
responded strongly to terrorismafter September 11. First, as
that theUN
in the previous
thrust of
section, before September
11, the main
in the form of interna
counter-terrorism
work came
Nations'
mentioned
the United
tional
in the prominence
of action
data
also
11, more-particular
support
difference
after September
two most
The
conventions.
important
are
conventions
the Interna
tionalConvention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the

International Convention for the Suppression of theFinancing of Terrorism
There
(1999).
a clear
was
increase
of countries
in the number
that ratified
these two conventions after 11 September 2001. As of June 2001, 59 states
had
signed
on terrorist
bombings.25 Moreover,
the convention
11 Sep
before
tember 2001, a total of 27 countries had ratified the convention; afterward,

an additional 118 states ratified the convention, bringing the total to 145 as
of December 2005 (Table l).26As of June 2001, 43 states had signed the
on
convention
terrorist
financing.27
In addition,
11 September
before
2001,
only 4 countries had ratified the convention,while 147 countries have done
so since
see
the attacks.28
it comes to the work of the Security Council, we can also

Second, when
a
in the number of terrorism-related
is
difference
resolutions
that there
passed before and after 11 September 2001. Before September 11, theSecurity
Council had passed a total of 13 resolutions classified as dealing with ter
to the United
rorism, according
year.29 However,
an average of about
in terrorism-related
Nations
there has been
(Table 2),
a marked
increase
one a
reso
lutionspassed by the SecurityCouncil since 11 September 2001; by the end
of 2005,
it had passed
(Table 2).
another
Third,
before
and
passed
the 13 resolutions
25
UN
Association
siteofUNA-USA
26
Through
20 resolutions,
an average
of 4 to 5 resolutions
a year
of the terrorism-related
resolutions
interesting aspect
2001 is the voting record. Eight of
after 11 September
11 were passed
before September
unanimously,
passed
of the United
States of America,
"Informs, Peace
&
Security,"
accessed
at the web
at http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=379693,14
March 2006.
e-mail
correspondence,
the UN
Treaty
Section
provided
the dates
that all 145 coun
triesratifiedthe InternationalConvention for the Suppression of TerroristBombings (1997).

27
UN Association
28
e-mail
Through
of the United
correspondence,
States
of America,
the UN
Treaty
"Informs,
Section
Peace
provided
&
Security."
the dates that all
151 coun
triesratifiedthe InternationalConvention for theSuppression of theFinancing ofTerrorism (1999).

29
As
Council,"
"UN Action
Action
Terrorism,
Nations,
Against
by the Security
reported by the United
on the website
at http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm,
of the United
Nations
accessed
6 February 2006.

416
TABLE 1
Number of Countries thatRatified the InternationalConvention for the Suppression of
TerroristBombings (1997) and the InternationalConvention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (1999)
for the Suppression

Year
of Terrorist Bombings
Convention
Convention
1998
1999
2000
2001 10 2
1/1-9/11
9/12-12/312001
9
19
12
2002
2003
2004
2005
? 2
1/1-3/13 2006
for the Suppression
of the
of Terrorism
Financing
?
?
32 48
37 43
17 25
13 17
Total 145 151

and e-mail correspondence
Source: UN Treaty Collection website, http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp
(11 April 2006) from the UN Treaty Section, providing information on when countries ratified the International
Convention
for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings
for the Sup
(1997) and the International Convention
pression
of the Financing of Terrorism
(1999).
while fivehad no-votes or countries abstaining fromvoting (Resolution 687

on Kuwait
and
to implementing
The
relating
sanctions).
resistance
abstained:
(five
Cape Verde,
was Resolution
and Zimbabwe)
748 (1992)
imple
four resolutions
the most
resolution
encountering
India, Morocco,
on Libya. After
11 September
sanctions
2001, 19 of 20 resolu
menting
no
on Resolution
1450
tions were passed
voted
unanimously.
Only
Syria
the
in
terrorist
attack
bomb
and
Kikambala,
condemning
Kenya
(2002),
the attempted missile
attack on the airliner departing Mombasa,
28
Kenya,
China,
2002.
November
Qualitative Changes
The
general
particular
thrust of action
data,
supports
as well as more
Security Council,
to
that the Security Council's
response
at the UN
the notion
September 11 was significant,but it is also important to explore the gravity
of evaluating
taken at the UN.
For the purpose
and quality of actions
the
them into four types: general/
quality of the resolutions, we have classified
to
to
terror
terror act and imposing sanc
act;
technical;
response
response
a
minor
The
and
terrorism
in
issue.
first
tions;
group, general/technical,
cludes
resolutions
do not necessarily
before
September
that deal with
terrorism
in broad
or technical
terms and
refer to a specific event. Two of the 13 resolutions

11 deal with terrorism in more-general/technical
passed
terms
(Table 3): Resolution 635, and Resolution 1269 (1999) on international co

| 417
TABLE2
Comparison of UN Security Council Resolutions on TerrorismPassed
11 September 2001
Security Council Resolutions
on Terrorism
Before September
Total
Terrorism a minor
issue
Response
to terror
Response
to terror act and sanctions
(15,5%)
(15,5%)
3
act
11
20
vote
11
(55%)a
11
(23%)
(55%)a
1(5%)a
6 (46%)
vote
Unanimous
or abstained
After September
4-5
General/technical
No-vote
11
13
~1
per year
Average
Before and After
8 (62%)
19
(95%)
1 (38%)
(5%)
Source: The United Nations, "UN Action Against Terrorism, Action by the Security Council," accessed
at
http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm, 6 February 2006.
11 resolutions have been classified as more than one type (see Table 4). This
aSome of the post-September
the
classification
of
the post-September
11 resolutions adds up to more than 100%.
explains why
operation in the fightagainst terrorism.InResolution 1269 (1999), the Secu

rityCouncil
condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal
Unequivocally
and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation,
in all their forms and mani
festations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those which would
threaten international peace and security; [and]... Calls upon all States to im
plement fully the international anti-terrorist conventions to which they are par
ties, encourages all States to consider as a matter of priority adhering to those to
which they are not parties, and encourages also the speedy adoption of the pend
in
mg
conventions.
Of
the post-September
we
11 resolutions,
classified
over half of the reso
lutions (11 of 20) as dealing with terrorismin general terms (Table 4).31These
includeResolution 1373 (2001), which established theCTC, Resolution 1535
(2004) which revitalized theCTC, Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,

cerning the incitement of terrorist acts.
and Resolution
1624 (2005)
con
The second and third types include resolutions that condemn specific
terrorist attacks.
cludes
to terror acts and sanctions,

third type, response
in
that impose sanctions on countries or regimes found
terrorist networks. Most
of the resolutions passed before 11
The
those resolutions
to have
assisted
September 2001 (9 of 13) fit into these two groups (Table 3), dealing with and
reacting to internationalterroristactions such as thePan Am Flight 103 bomb
30
UN SecurityCouncil, S/RES 1269 (1999), accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at
16March
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/303/92/PDF/N9930392.pdf7OpenElement,
2006,2.
31
Some
because
11 resolutions
post-September
of the content of the resolution.
have
been
classified
as belonging
to two different

groups
418
TABLE3
UN Security Council Resolutions on Terrorism before 11 September 2001
Year
Resolution
Content
Type
Vote
1989
635
On making of plastic or sheet explosives

purpose of detection
1991
687
On
1992
731
for the
Technical
Unanimously
restoration of the sovereignty, independence,

and territorial integrityof Kuwait
On the destruction of Pan American flight 103
12 to 1 (Cuba)3
and Union des

1992
748
On sanctions
1993
883
On sanctions
1996
1044
against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

inconnection with Libyan non-compliance
with
Security Council Resolutions 731 (1992) and
issue
to
Response
terror act
Unanimously
transports a?riens flight772

against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Terrorism minor
10to0b
to terror
Response
act, sanctions
11 to 0C
to terror
Response
act, sanctions
748(1992)
Calling upon Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia the

three suspects wanted
inconnection with the
to
Response
terror act
Unanimously
assassination
attempt against President

of Egypt
inconnection with
On sanctions against Sudan
Mubarak
1996
1054
non-compliance
to terror
Response
act, sanctions
13to0d
with Security Council
Resolution1044 (1996)
1998
1189
Concerning
7 August
the terrorist bomb attacks
of
to
Response
terror act
Unanimously
1998
1214
1999
1267
inKenya and Tanzania

On the situation inAfghanistan
Unanimously
On measures
against the Taliban
1999
1269
On
2000
1333
against terrorism
On measures
against
2001
1363
On
1998
international cooperation
the establishment
Terrorism minor
in the fight
to terror
Response
act, sanctions
Unanimously
General
to terror
Response
act, sanctions
the Taliban 13toOe

of a mechanism
the implementation of measures
to monitor
to terror
Response
act, sanctions
Unanimously
imposed by
Resolutions1267 (1999)and 1333 (2000)

Source:
The United Nations,
issue
Unanimously
"UN Action Against Terrorism, Action by the Security Council," accessed

at
6 February 2006. S/RES/883 was not on the website, but has been added
http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm,
by the authors.
aTwo abstaining
bFive abstaining
(Ecuador, Yemen).
(Cape Verde, China,
cFour abstaining
dTwo abstaining
(China, USSR).
eTwo abstaining
(China, Malaysia).
India, Morocco,
(China, Djibouti, Morocco,
Zimbabwe).
Pakistan).
ing in 1988 and the terroristattacks inKenya and Tanzania in 1996.When

countries supportingor harboring terroristsand theirorganizations have failed
to comply with internationalpressure, the Security Council has taken the
next step and enforced
sanctions;
are classified
six resolutions
as the third type
(Table 3). Since September 11, about half (11 of 20 resolutions) have been
in response to specific terroracts (Table 4), including the bomb attacks in
Kenya, Madrid,
and London.
Only
one
resolution
passed since 11 September 2001?Resolution
involving
sanctions
has been
1526 (2004), which extends and

| 419
TABLE4
UN Security Council Resolutions on Terrorism after 11 September 2001
Year
2001
Resolution
1368
Content
the terrorist attacks of
Condemning
11 September
2001 inNew York,
Washington DC, and Pennsylvania,
States of America
1373
2001
1377
On the adoption of declaration

effort to combat terrorism
2002
2002
1438
1440
On the bomb attacks inBali (Indonesia)

On condemning the act of taking hostages
Russian Federation, on
Moscow,
2002
1450
the terrorist bomb attack

Condemning
inKikambala, Kenya, and the attempted
missile attack on the airliner departing
2002
1452
2003
1455
2003
2003
2003
1456
1465
1516
1526
On threats to international peace

caused by terrorist acts
Response
and security
Unanimously
General/response
terror act
to
on the global
Unanimously
General/response
terror act
to
in
Unanimously
Response
to terror act
Unanimously
Response
to terror act
14 to 1 (Syria) Response
to terror act
23 October 2002
Mombasa,
Kenya, 28 November 2002
On the implementation of measures
imposed
by para. 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 (1999) and
1390 (2002)
para. 1 and 2 (a) of Resolution
On
improving of implementation of measures

imposed by para. 4(b) of Resolution 1267
(1999), para. 8(c) of resolution 1333 (2000), and
1390 (2002)
para. 1 and 2 of Resolution
On combating terrorism
On the bomb attack inBogota,
Unanimously
General
Unanimously
General
Unanimously
General
Unanimously
Response
to terror act
Unanimously
Response
to terror act
Unanimously
to
General/response
terror act, sanctions
on
Unanimously
Response
On the revitalization of the Security Council
On the bomb attacks
Colombia
in Istanbul, Turkey, on
15 and 20 November2003
to international peace and security

by terrorist acts and measures
against
and the Taliban
al Qaeda
Threats
caused
2004
1530
On the bomb attacks

11 March
2004
1535
2004
inMadrid, Spain,
2004
to terror act
Unanimously
General
1540
pursuant to Resolution
1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism
On non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
Unanimously
General
1566
biological weapons
On international cooperation
in the fight
Unanimously
General
on 7 July 2005
in the fight
Unanimously
Response
General
to terror act
Unanimously
Response
General
to terror act
Committee
2004
to terror act
Unanimously
United
2001
2004
Type
Vote
established
against terrorism
On bomb attacks inLondon
2005
2005
1611
1617
On
2005
2005
1618
1624
On threats to international peace
international cooperation
against terrorism
On continued
terrorist attacks
in Iraq
and security
Unanimously
Unanimously
Source: The United Nations, "UN Action Against Terrorism, Action by the Security Council," accessed
at
has classified as
http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc.htm, 6 February 2006. S/RES/1625, which the UN website
dealing with terrorism but which, in fact, deals with the general situation inAfrica, has not been included by
the authors.

420
and al Qaeda
organizations
expands the sanctions against the Taliban
(Table
in which
The fourth type involves resolutions
terrorism is only a minor
sue. There were
two such resolutions
before and none after September
4).
is
11
(Table 3): Resolution 687 (1991), which dealt with the aftermathof the first
Gulf war, and Resolution 1214 (1998), which related to the general situation
in Afghanistan.
sum up,
To
it can be
argued
that the "quality"
of the resolutions
has
changed as well. Prior to September 11, only 2 of 13 resolutions (15 percent)
dealt with
terrorism
inmore
general
terms. Since
11, over half of
September
the resolutions (11 of 20) have dealt with terrorismin general terms (Table 2).
This suggests that the fightagainst terrorismhas had a much more central role
on the agenda of the SecurityCouncil since September 11,while terrorism
was
fashion prior to the attacks on the United
States.
one may, at first glance, argue that themajority of the resolutions
Furthermore,
11 have been reactive
in nature
before and after September
(69 percent of
dealt with
in a more
resolutions
before
ad-hoc
11 and 55 percent
September
specific terroristacts (Table 2).

there are major
However,
terrorist attacks were actually
almost
member
states were
in response
to
before September
11, only a few
to the Council.
In the last five years,
have been referred to and condemned
by
differences:
referred
all terrorist attacks
however,
of those after),
theCouncil (Bali, Kenya, Bogota, Istanbul,Madrid, and London). While the
Council
prior
rather
to September
selective
about which
11, it seems
cases were
that the Council
handled
has been more
by the
even
handed and inclusive since September 11.Another distinct difference is the

apparent
consensus
in the Council.
Prior
to September
11, only 8 of 13 reso
lutions (62 percent) were adopted unanimously. After September 11, 19 of
How
long this con
unanimously.
(95 percent) were adopted
sensus will endure is an open question, but the efforts of the Security Council
and promi
11 have been much more organized,
since September
concerted,
can say that while the early efforts were
nent than they were
in the past. We
20 resolutions
more
and dealt with
as a low-level
issue, since Sep

11 they have been much more comprehensive
and central. The post
and clout, frame the work
11 resolutions
carry more
significance
September
a
on
and
framework
and guide for action
of the UN organs
terrorism,
provide
event-driven
terrorism
tember
for most
of the member
states of the UN.32
Tools
Not
only has
the nature
of the response
to terrorism
changed
as a result of
11 September 2001, the tools available in the fightagainst terrorismhave

changed
as well.
Before
September
11, sanctions
remained,
in practice,
the
ultimate tool available to the Security Council. The Security Council used
32
Rostow,
"Before
and After,"
487.

sanctions
terrorism
against
and Afghanistan.
tember 11, except
members
Laden,
three
It has not used
421
in the 1990s, against Libya,

Sudan,
sanctions in response to terrorism since Sep
times
for the continuing

sanction
Bin
regime against Osama
of the al Qaeda
and Taliban
and
associated
organizations,
individuals and groups.33The United States was the driving force in all three
instances in the 1990s.The improved climate after the end of theCold War, as
as the changes
in transnational
made
it possible
Council
and
Security
well
supporting
in the
terrorism, created an "opening"
to use sanctions as a tool against states
terrorism networks. As Oudraat
points out, "The sanctions regimes
of the 1990s helped to consolidate a growing internationalconsensus that saw

terrorismas an illegitimateactivity thatneeded to be countered throughcol
lective internationalactions. Sanctions thereforehelped to change the public
of states toward
attitudes
terrorism."34
While it isknown that sanctionsmay not significantlychange thebehavior
of the target state, Luck maintains
that the "expectation,
rather, was
that such
unprecedented steps by theCouncil would help furtherdelegitimize the state

sponsoring terrorist groups and activities. The sanctions were seen, moreover,
as a deterrent, as a means
of signaling the Council's
newfound determination
to take a firm stand against terrorism."35 In the three cases in which sanctions
have
been
the results have
used,
been
uneven,
and
in the cases
in which
we
may deem the sanctions a success (Libya and Sudan), it is very hard to tell
actually worked or whether other factors played a role.

to
the
which a state values what it has to give up also makes
Moreover,
degree
a significant difference when
it comes to the success of sanctions. Libya and
were
not asked to relinquish anything central to their power; by con
Sudan
the sanctions
whether
trast,theTaliban depended on Bin Laden formilitary, financial,and political
support to retain power inAfghanistan.36

Sanctions have not been used in response
to terrorism since 11 September

and
and al Qaeda,
against the Taliban
2001, except for the continuing sanctions

there are several reasons for this. First, after the attacks
on the United
States,
new form and
the fight against transnational
terrorism took on a completely
the "war on terrorism," involving various forms of the use of force.
became
Resolution
1368 "reaffirmed
the inherent right of self-defense
in accordance
withArticle 51 of theUN Charter" and gave theU.S. operations inAfghani

stan
legitimacy
military action
Second,
33
The
and broader
in Afghanistan
sanctions
work
international
and
best when
Iraq
unilateral
and
support. The U.S.
some
measure.
in
sanctions
eclipsed
applied
against
a state,
thereby
allowing
oversees
the implementation
of these sanctions
and is assisted by a moni
set up by Resolution
countries'
field visits,
1526, which analyzes
reports and conducts
of the sanctions.
any gaps in implementation
identifying for the Committee
157-158.
"The Role
34Oudraat,
35
94.
Luck,
"Tackling Terrorism,"
36
"Economic
and Political
Ibid., 95; R. Harrison
Power,
Wagner,
Interdependence,
Bargaining,
42 (Summer
International
Influence,"
Organization
1988): 461-483.
toring
1267 Committee
team,

422
states to sever diplomatic,

economic, military, and other links. Sanctions
transnational
terrorist
such as al Qaeda,
tend to be less
networks,
against
or
is
the "target"
in this
effective, because
constantly moving
hiding. Third,
other
new world
of
transnational
efforts aimed
terrorism,
at strengthening
each
state'smeans to fightterrorism(such as thework of theCTC) may be more
effective
than sanctions.
of the military
in achieving consensus
and Iraq, the general difficulty

and the work of the CTC have made
Afghanistan
of sanctions,
less beneficial
since
and useful
nificant
the use
In other words,
in
option
on the use
of sanctions
the employment
11.
sanctions
could
still
be a sig
However,
September
tool in the future.37 Oudraat
points out that "sanctions
to terrorism."38 It is therefore
the way for a military approach
regimes paved
trans
difficult to say how effective sanctions will be in the future against
national
terrorism. What
is certain is that the international
community, post
September
military
tools
11, has utilized
force as well as general
in addition
and
financial
monitored by theCTC.
to sanctions, namely
the use of
counter-terrorism
obligations
Compliance
factor to compare
is compliance
with UN mandates
com
states. Unfortunately,
there is no easy comparison,
because
was
not
to
11.
No
resolution
demanded
that
pliance
September
requested prior
states take action to address
but
terrorism, except for sanctions resolutions,
was a minor
that is the rub. Prior to September
issue. After
11, compliance
Another
before/after
by member
11, this clearly changed. The sweeping and binding commitment

Resolution
1373 on the member
states, and the monitoring mech
imposed by
a
creative and unique, and some may say intrusive,
anism (the CTC),
represent
September
to fight terrorism. By early 2004,
way
a consensus
had developed
in the Secu
rityCouncil on the need to strengthenthe CTC by providing additional re

sources and authority.That led the SecurityCouncil to adopt Resolution 1535
2004. Resolution
inMarch
1535 established
a new Counter-Terrorism
Executive
Directorate (CTED), which greatlyincreased theCommittee's professional staff

ing and
improved
to support member
its capacity
state
implementation.
The
CTED has been fullystaffedsince September 2005, and was confirmedoper

ational inDecember 2005.39In 2005, theCommittee began a series of visits to
37
Daniel
non-state
"Terrorism
Security,
notes
Benjamin
the ability
and International
actors,
An
Initiative
one of
the problem
of the new terrorism is principally
that "although
to condemn
and sanction
could be an important one in the future" in
on the website
accessed
of United Nations
and Global
Organizations,"
of the United
Nations
16 March
Foundation
at http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/
4.
2006,
Benjamin_paper_terrorism.pdf,
38
"The Role
158.
Oudraat,
39
UN
Counter-Terrorism
Committee,
Security Council
ods,"
accessed
shtml, 14 March
on
the website
of the United
Nations
"About Us, Working

Committee
Meth
at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/workingmethods.
2006.

| 423
member states in order towork directlywith officials in the capitals and pro
vide better technical assistance for the implementationof Resolutions 1373
(2001) and 1624 (2005). In 2005, theCommittee and CTED visitedMorocco,
Kenya, Albania, Thailand, and Algeria; in2006, visits includedTanzania, the
Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, and thePhilippines.40
The CTC/CTED is theUN's firstinstitutionalizedattemptat a coordinated
and global counter-terrorism
conventions
scheme.41 The 13 counter-terrorism
serve as legal platforms
to harmonize
national
but
carry no com
practices,
or
cannot
the
enforcement
mechanism.
CTC
Though
pliance
punish member
states, the transparency
of the process
encourages
compliance
with Resolution
1373.According to the reportAn Action Agenda For Enhancing theUnited
Nations
Program
on Counter-Terrorism,
the CTC
has been
successful
because
it "has established legitimacyand political authority for the global counter
terrorism
effort,...it
has
promoted
the creation
of specialized
systems
for
coordinating global effortsto combat terroristthreats... [and it]has helped to

develop and strengthen internationalnorms. The CTC has played a role in
and sustaining
creating
terrorism efforts."42
international
momentum
to
strengthen
counter
All 191member states submitted first-roundreports to theCTC, inwhich

they laid out their compliance with Resolution 1373.A state's report is first
considered by one of the three subcommittees, and later by thewhole CTC.
The CTED
can advise
the Committee
on "technical
aspects of States' reports,

law and
customs,
criminal,
financial,
including
immigration and extradition
arms
and
law
enforcement
and
issues;
practice;
police
illegal
trafficking."43
can send a letter requesting further
After analyzing the report, the Committee
information. The state then has 90 days to respond with a new report. As
of January 2005, "the CTC
has received more
than 550 reports from states,
one
it
the
of
what
observer
termed 'probably the largest
making
depository
of
counterterrorism
information about worldwide
body
capacity.'"44 While
there is no easy basis for comparison
record on terrorism, the post-September
to David
Cortright, only a few dozen
lution 1373, and most
to the pre-September
11 compliance
11 record has been mixed. According
states have fully complied with Reso
of these are advanced
industrialized
nations
that have
40
Ibid.
41
The CTC draws itsmandate fromResolution 1373 (2001). However, Resolution 1624 (2005),
which
deals
with
the issue
of incitement
to commit
acts of terrorism,
extended
the Committee's
mandate to include themonitoring of its implementationaccording to theUN SecurityCouncil
on the website
Counter-Terrorism
at http://
accessed
of the United Nations
Committee,
"Mandate,"
25 June 2006.
www.un.org/sc/ctc/mandate.shtml,
42
and Gerber, An Action Agenda,
8,12.
Cortright, Lopez, Millar,
43
UN Security Council
Counter-Terrorism
accessed
"Documents,
Committee,
Country Reports,"
on the website
at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports.shtml,
14March
2006.
44
David
"Can
the
UN
Battle
Terrorism
USA
Cortright,
Today Magazine,
Effectively?"
January
2005, 2.

j POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
424
to deal effectively with the financing, travel, and

the capacity and resources
About
60 states are in transition; "these
supply of terrorist organizations.45
countries are in the process of introducing the necessary
legislative, adminis
for countering
trative, and regularity changes
international
terrorism."46 About
70 states are "sympathetic to theCTC but face difficultiesranging fromarmed

conflict
but has
to prioritize
counter-terrorism
poverty and are unable
to comply
last group, of about 20 states, has some capacity
are
on the front lines of the
not to; "some of these countries
to extreme
The
concerns."47
chosen
the overall UN effort."48

terrorism, and their inaction weakens
comes
to
of the Security Coun
it
when
another
Moreover,
compliance,
on
the 1540 Committee
cil's committees
counter-terrorism,
(on nuclear non
battle
against
proliferation) reports thatas of 30May 2006, "129 States and one organization
had submitted firstnational reports to theCommittee; and 62Member States
yet to submit
had
In response
their first report.
to the Committee's
exami
nation of the firstnational reports,83 States had provided additional informa

tion. Facilitating
reporting
reporting remained among
The
third Security
the conduct
and
of outreach
to promote
future work."49
activities
of the Committee's
the top priorities

counter-terrorism
Council
the 1267 Com
committee,
mittee (dealing with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated individuals and
groups) was established in 1999 and is theonly one that lends itselfto a before
The
comparison.
several reports,
and-after
published
national reports until 2002.50 As
45
David
"Terrorism
Cortright,
has a monitoring
group that has
states were not required
to submit
states
not
had
2006,45
yet reported.51
1267 Committee
but member
ofMarch
the State: Dilemmas
Beyond
and Solutions,"
on the web
accessed
siteofUnited Nations andGlobal Security,An Initiativeof theUnited Nations Foundation at http://

16 March
www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/cortright.pdf,
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Nations
United
Security Council,
On Nuclear
Committees
Discussed
Include
May
Release
Sc/8730,
Counter-Terrorism,
Non-Proliferation,
Reporting
gional Organizations,
"Press
4.
2006,
Security
Al-Qaida
Council
And
Reviews
Taliban:
Work
Main
Of
Issues
With Re
Committees,
Systems, Coordination
Among
Cooperation
on the website
at http://www.un.
accessed
30,2006,"
1 July 2006.
org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8730.doc.htm,
50
United Nations SecurityCouncil, "Letter dated 14 February 2005 from theChairman of the
SecurityCouncil Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerningAl-Qaida
the Taliban
and
and
associated
individuals
and
entities
addressed
to the President
of the Security
TEAM pursuant to resolution

Council containing the SECOND REPORT of theMONITORING
1526 (2004)," accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N05/240/73/PDF/N0524073.pdf?OpenElement,25 June 2006,14.
51
United
Nations
Security
Council,
"S/2006/154,
Letter
dated
8 March
2006
from the Chairman
of
theSecurityCouncil Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerningAl-Qaida

and
the Taliban
and
associated
individuals
Council containing theFOURTH REPORT

1526
(2004),"
accessed
on the website
and
entities
addressed
of theMONITORING
of the United
Nations
to the President
of the Security
TEAM pursuant to resolution
at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N06/230/45/PDF/N0623045.pdf?OpenElement,25 June 2006, 37.

| 425
However, themonitoring team asserted thatwhile it is difficultto make a

assessment
of compliance
by all 191 Member
"thorough
independent
assessment
of their sanction
aging news
the compliance
about
implementation."52
States"
and while many states "failed to include sufficientdetail to permit a through

regimes,"
the status of global
so far provides
"encour
Challenges
The foregoingdiscussion argues that theUN SecurityCouncil's response to

terrorism became
much stronger after September

11. However,
the work of the
as a whole, and of the Security Council
in particular, has been
include the lack of a universal definition of
hampered
by several issues. These
concerns about American
domi
terrorism, lack of enforcement mechanisms,
causes.
root
human
the
of
and
nance,
rights issues,
importance
United
Nations
First, one of the foremost issues related to the United Nations'

response
to terrorism is the inability of the member
states to agree on a definition of
states seem quite content to live with the ambiguity,
terrorism. The member
which allows them to define terrorism inways that suit theirpolicy objec
tives. Indeed, the main struggle has been over whether terrorism should some
times be defined as a political movement.
Some are in favor of exempting
from the definition of terrorism "all activities done in resistance
to 'foreign
and activities by those 'engaged

occupation'
the lack of a definition
ation.'"53 However,
in the struggle for national

liber
does not seem to have signifi
cantly inhibited the SecurityCouncil or theCTC
work
of the General
in theirpractical work. The
toward a single comprehensive
Assembly
convention
on
terrorismin place of the existing conventions and protocols will most likely
necessitate
national
The
fore more
a consensus
states as to what
the member
among
constitutes
inter
terrorism.
concern
about
a normative,
the lack of a universal

and human
moral,
definition
is there
of terrorism
rights concern:
In his 2006
report,
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental
Freedoms
while
Terrorism
writes that "calls
Countering
to combat
terrorism, without
by the international
community
defining the
as leaving it to individual States to define what
is
term, can be understood
meant
term.
the
for
This
carries
the
unintended
human
by
potential
rights
of the term."54 The closest the Council
abuses and even the deliberate misuse
comes to a definitionmay be the wording in Resolution 1269 (1999): the

Security
Council
"unequivocally
condemns
all acts, methods
and
practices
52
SecurityCouncil, "Letter dated 14 February 2005," 14.
480.
and After,"
53Rostow, "Before
54
on
the
Promotion
and Protection
of Human
and Fundamental
Special
Rapporteur
Rights
on
Freedoms
While
Promotion
and
Protection
of
Human
Terrorism,
Countering
"Report
Rights,"
E/CN.4/2006/98,28
December
2005, accessed
on the website
of the United
Nations
at http://daccessdds.
16March 2006, 9.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/168/84/PDF/G0516884.pdf?OpenElement,

426
as criminal
of their motivation,
and unjustifiable,
in
regardless
their forms and manifestations,
wherever
and by whomever
committed,
of terrorism
all
in particular
those which could threaten international
and security,"
peace
which
still leaves plenty of leeway for national
interpretations.55 The prac
as a
"use
that
has
been
is
the
of
counter-terrorism
tice
conventions
employed
triggerfor determiningwhat conduct is to be proscribed in the fightagainst

to agree on
and
rights
develop
a "lack of agreement
the United Nations

terrorism."56 Nevertheless,
community
definition of terrorism in order to protect human
a universal
needs
a comprehensive
counter-terrorism
strategy, and because
on a clear and well-known definition undermines
the normative
against
terrorism and has stained
the United
and moral
stance
Nations
image."57
is central to the success of the Secu
the issue of enforcement
Second,
to transnational
terrorism. The
of
response
rity Council's
implementation
lack of resources and capa
Resolution 1373 is partly hampered by theCTC's

bilities
to undertake
it does not have

comprehensive
monitoring.58 Moreover,
to "punish"
mechanisms
with which
those countries
that
enforcement
any
are not complyingwith the obligations of 1373. Some of these countriesmay

to divert scarce
not be able
resources
may not want to; the latter are

rorist networks.
to counter-terrorism
the states most
efforts, while others

or assist ter
to
harbor
likely
Third, theUnited States has been the driving force in getting the Security
to play a more active role in combating global terrorism. For the other
of the Council,
the preponderance
of American
power may lead to
Council
members
difficultchoices ofwhether tomaximize the fightagainst terrorismor attempt

to balance
reflected,
against U.S. power and dominance.59 This problem may have been
to use
in some measure,
in the Security Council
split over whether
force in Iraq in 2003.
that if the Security Council

is to be effec
Fourth, many experts believe
as a whole,
tive in its counter-terrorism
efforts, either the Security Council
or powerful
states such as the United
States, will have to take an active role
in solving
some
long-standing
regional
conflicts.
"The
conventional
wisdom
55
UN SecurityCouncil, S/RES 1269 (1999), 2.
56
Special
Rapporteur,
"Report
on Promotion
and Protection
of Human
Rights,"
10.
57
United Nations, "A More SecureWorld: Our Shared Responsibility,Report of theHigh-level
on the website
on Threats, Challenges
and Changes,
2004," accessed
15 November
2006, 51.
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf,
58
and
Eric Rosand,
Resolution
1373, the Counter-Terrorism
Committee,
"Security Council
at
Panel
the
Fight against Terrorism," The American Journal of InternationalLaw 97 (April 2003): 338-340.
Rosand
direct
suggests
assistance,
that the issue of financial
and human
of an agreed-upon
definition
still difficult areas for the CTC.
the absence
resources,
the lack of resources
of terrorism, and
to provide
the issue of the protection
of human rights are

59
is used by other states to balance
The position
that the UN
Security Council
"The Political Origins
of the UN
is argued by, among others, Erik Voeten,
power
to Legitimize
the Use
of Force,"
International
59 (Summer
Organization
Ability

against
the super
Security Council's
527-557.
2005):
that
concludes
the
international
not
will
community
succeed
| 427
in this area
[terrorism]until the conflicts in theMiddle East and over Kashmir come to
and end."60
Fifth, the possibility of theUnited Nations taking on a larger and more
such as
forceful role in the fight against terrorism worries some communities,
and disarmament
advocates.
human rights groups, humanitarian
organizations,
The fear is that counter-terrorism
efforts can be used by states to clamp down
re
on dissidents. Counter-terrorism
authoritarian
may provide
cooperation
gimes with
cover
for repressing
their already-limited
to human
commitments
rightsand the rule of law. Since 11 September 2001, theGeneral Assembly has
three resolutions
regarding "protecting human rights and fundamental
passed
freedoms while countering
terrorism," in 2002, 2003, and 2004.61 In Resolu
tion 59/191, theGeneral Assembly "reaffirmsthat States must ensure that
any measure
international
manitarian
to combat
terrorism complies with their obligations

under
international
human
law, in particular
rights, refugee and hu
has
submitted
three reports on
law."62 The
Secretary-General
taken
human
freedoms
rights and fundamental
"protecting
In
his latest report,
rorism," in 2003, 2004, and 2005.
while
countering
ter
the Secretary-General
points out that the Commission on Human Rights appointed a special rap
porteur
on
"digest
of jurisprudence
the promotion
and protection
of human
rights and
fundamental
freedomswhile countering terrorismin July2005. The Office of theUnited

Nations High Commissioner forHuman Rights (OHCHR) has also printed a
of the UN
and
regional
organizations
on
the pro
and theOHCHR will

tection of human rightswhile countering terrorism,"63
continue and deepen its contact with the CTC and CTED.64 In conclusion,
writes that he, "the High Commissioner

for Human
the Secretary-General
concern
to
human
continue
that
and
other
many
express
Rights,
rights experts
measures
are
on
human rights and funda
many counter-terrorism
infringing
mental
freedoms."65
Sixth, thispaper has mainly dealt with the tactical response of the Security
Council
to the terrorist
"Before
^Rostow,
threat, but many
and After,"
experts,
as well
as world
leaders,
489.
61
These resolutions are A/RES/57/219,A/RES/58/187, and A/RES/59/191, accessed at http://
www.un.org/terrorism/res.htm,
7 June 2007.
62
General Assembly,A/RES/59/191 (2005), accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at http://
17 March2006,2.
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOOGEN/N04^
63
"Its aim
terrorism
a vision
is to assist policy makers
and other concerned
parties in developing
are fully respectful of human
to
that
OHCHR,
strategies
rights," according
of counter
"Digest
of
Jurisprudenceof theUN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human RightsWhile

Countering
accessed
Terrorism,"
publications/docs/digest.doc,
64
UN
Secretary-General,
Countering
Terrorism,"
on
15 March
the OHCHR
2006,
website
"Report:
Protecting Human
on the website
accessed
A/60/374,
at http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/
3.
and Fundamental
Freedoms
while
Rights
at http://daccessdds.
16March 2006, 3.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/520/75/PDF/N0552075.pdf?OpenElement,
65
Ibid.,
8.

428
as long as the root causes

that this response will not be successful
on economic
to the emphasis
of terrorism are not tackled. "Analogous
de
as
to
to
and
armed
the
desire
conflict,
ways
prevent
democracy
velopment
believe
deal with root causes is based on the assumption that if specificparts of the
were
world
General
better
Kofi Annan
not take root."66 Secretary

then terrorism would
places,
stated in 2002 that terrorism is "a weapon
for alienated,
If human beings every
and often a product of despair.
people,
desperate
where are given real hope of achieving
self-respect
ful methods,
terrorists will become much harder
pointed
sistance,
out
and a decent
life by peace
to recruit."67 Others
have
as
of human
promotion
rights, humanitarian
can
a
be major UN contribution
to elim
development
that "continued
and economic
inating terrorism."68
Reflecting some broadly held views, Daniel Benjamin lists the following
root causes
of public
to be addressed:
that have
authoritarian
rule, the disintegration
of incitement, economic
stagnation, and the
concern
Another
is that violent internal and inter
the culture
education,
demographic
explosion.69
national
conflicts can constitute
for international
fertile ground
terrorism:
often create conditions
in particular
condu
as
must
not
to
such
be
terrorists
and
allowed
fester,
by
has an exten
they might seem."70 The United Nations
conflicts
unresolved
"Prolonged
cive to exploitation
however
intractable
and resolving armed conflicts through its peace

sive history of preventing
for example,
and
the special representatives
building
peacekeeping
capacities;
have been
instrumental
in facilitating
and envoys of the Secretary-General
in 13 conflicts since 2001.71 Furthermore,

"Human
agreements
a
40
in
2005
identified
dramatic
reduction
armed
percent
Report
in part to increased United
since 1992 and attributed the achievement
peace
prevention
Council
and
peacekeeping,
the Security
and peacebuilding
activities."
While
Security
conflicts
Nations
it is true that
can
and peacekeeping
peacebuilding
operations
one
in
the
be
mindful
should
terrorism,
fight against
important
play
of the fact that preventing
terrorism is, at best, only a positive by-product
of these operations;
should always be the
the peace
building and sustaining
an
main
role
priority.
^Boulden
"Whither
and Weiss,
Terrorism,"
12-13.
67
United Nations, "PressRelease SG/SM/8105,SC/7277,18 January2002," accessed on thewebsite

68
James Sutterlin,
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8105.doc.htm,
and theMaintenance
The United Nations
of International
toBe Met (Westport,CT and London: Praeger, 2003), 112.

69
"Terrorism
Benjamin,
70
UN
Secretary-General,
and
International
"United
Against
2.
Organizations,"
Terrorism:
Recommendation
17 March
2006.
Security, A Challenge
for a Global
Counter
terrorismStrategy,"A/60/825,27April 2006, accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at http://

www.un.org/unitingagainstterrorism/sg-terrorism-2may06.pdf,
71
to Counter
"UN Action
United
Terrorism,
Nations,
Terrorism,"
accessed
forthepress.html,
on
the website
15 November
of the United
15 November
2006,
6.
to Counter
UN Measures
Taking Action:
at http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy/
Nations
2006.

| 429
Conclusion
The SecurityCouncil's response to terrorismsince 11 September 2001 has been

ina differentleague than itsresponseprior to theattacks.The acknowledgement
as a state's
of self-defense
legitimate
to terrorism,
response
the sweeping
ob
ligationsput on allmember statesbyResolution 1373, and the formationof and

response to theCTC are all firstsinUN history.The importanceof counter
terrorism is also manifested
by the sheer volume of resolutions passed: 20 in all

an
2001,
average of 4 to 5 a year. There is also a new sense of
since 11 September
consensus and determination in the SecurityCouncil when itcomes to tackling

the issueof terrorism(the lackof a definitionnotwithstanding),illustratedby the
fact that all but one of the resolutions
the resolutions
has
also
changed;
were passed unanimously. The nature of

there is now much more attention given to
how to fightterrorismin general than to condemning specific acts. One may

argue that the SecurityCouncil post-September 11 has had more of a strategy
or concerted
of most major
approach, which includes political condemnation
and monitoring
terrorist attacks, collective counter-terrorism
and
obligations,
in improving states' counter-terrorism
Yet
the
assistance
persis
capabilities.72
tence of the serious conceptual,
and political
constraints
de
institutional,
scribed in this article suggests thatprogress will only be made incrementally

and within limits.73
Indeed, as theUN Working Group on theUnited Nations
and Terrorism pointed out, theUN's political and institutionalcapacity to con
to counter-terrorism
tribute
but theUN
has
progressed
in positive
and
innovative
ways,
is also limited in that it isnot "well placed to play an active oper
role in efforts to suppress terrorist groups, to preempt specific terrorist

strikes, or to develop dedicated
intelligence-gathering
capacities."74
At the outset, we noted
that we would
elaborate
of
upon the question
ational
to the United
the importance
States
of the United
Nations.
On
that score,
opinion has been stronglydivided in theUnited States. In fact, in the year

had a favorable view of
following the Iraq war, just 55 percent of Americans
in 14 years of Pew Research
the UN, which was the lowest recorded
surveys.75
Some detractors argue that the UN
is ineffective and expensive,76 that it is an
of countries
that seek to undermine
U.S.
anti-American
vessel, composed
72
This is partly argued by Eric Rosand in "The Security Council's Efforts toMonitor the
Implementationof AI Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions," The American Journal of InternationalLaw 98
(October 2004): 745.
73
Luck,
74
United
"Another
Nations,
106.
Belligerent,"
of
the
"Report
Policy Working
Group
on the United
Nations
and Terrorism,"
A/57/273,S/2002/875,6
August 2002, accessed on thewebsite of theUnited Nations at http://documents
18March 2006, 5.
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOOGEN/N02/512/97/img/N0251297.pdf70penElement,
75
The
of America
Research
76
On
the United
Pew Research
in Europe
Center
Center
Even
for the People

and the Press,
Muslim
Persists,"
Higher,
Anger
"A Year
16 March
After
the Iraq War: Mistrust

on the Pew
2004, accessed
at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/206.pdf,
15 May
2006, 3.
see Kim R. Holmes,
and on why it does matter,
"Why
on Foreign
to U.S. Foreign Policy, Remarks
Matters
before the Baltimore
Council
website
the criticisms
Nations

430
to contain American
interests and
power,
and
that it is used
for purposes
of
"soft balancing" against theUnited States in lieu of balancing by military

power.77 In this view,Washington should not support theUN significantly,
should view it in a wary light, should remove funding from certain organs
within it (such as the highly controversialHuman Rights Council), or should
withdraw
from the UN
altogether.
At
a minimum,
detractors
would
counsel
that theUnited States should steadfastlypursue itsnational interestswithin the
context
to circumscribe
of the UN,
rather than allow the organization
as
and
The
of
John
Bolton
U.S.
Ambassador
power.
autonomy
appointment
its
to
theUnited Nations pleased these detractors because of his frequentcriticisms

of theworld body and reflected theGeorge W. Bush administration'sview that
the United
Nations
was
problematic
for U.S.
interests.78 Indeed,
in serious
too
reform, and was
of
State
Condoleezza
Secretary
need
of
often
Rice
pointed to the need to reform the UN, whose efficacy she viewed with
controversial
skepticism, in defending Bolton's
appointment.79
of
the
United
Nations, with respect to the Ameri
By contrast, proponents
can role, believe
that it furthers the interests of the United
States. In this view,
it provides,
States can
among other things, a forum within which the United
a variety of functions across
cultivate and benefit from allies. It performs
issue areas that add predictability to world politics, fromwhich a hegemon
can gain. Moreover,

unabashed
American
it adds
credibility
unilateralism.
to what
otherwise
might
be viewed
as
This debate obviously will not be settled here. It certainly is true that
some serious problems

Nations
has posed
for American
interests.
numerous problems, as laid out in this paper, have arisen in the UN's
Moreover,
effort to deal with terrorism, which have been problematic
fromWashington's
the United
standpoint.
This
ing compliance
Affairs World
Trade
the case with regard to the challenges

is especially
on UN actions on terrorism.80 However,
on the whole,
of seek
the UN
on the website
of the
December
accessed
Baltimore, Maryland
6,2004,"
7 June 2007.
at http://www.state.gOv/p/io/rls/rm/2004/39496.htm,
see Robert A. Pape,
"Soft Balancing
States," International
against the United
Center,
of State
U.S.
Department
77
On soft balancing,
Security 30 (Summer
2005).
Also,
T.V.
Paul,
national Security30 (Summer 2005): 58-59.

78
On
the American
perception
of the need
in the Age
"Soft Balancing
for reform,
see United
of U.S.
States
Primacy,"
Congress,
House
Inter
Com
mittee on InternationalRelations, Henry J.Hyde, UnitedNations ReformAct of 2005 (Washington

DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 2005). On the clash between theUnited States and theUnited
on a range
Nations
of issues,
see
org/publication/7541/feinstein.html,
79
"Remarks
Condoleezza
Rice,
paper
ment
DC,
Editors,
the website
accessed
to the Annual
15, 2005,"
Terrorism,"
on
the website
7 June
see Congressional
"The United
hearings,
on the website
of the House
of Representatives
these difficulties,
accessed
Relations
at http://www.cfr.
of the American
Convention
accessed
Washington,
April
at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/44728.htm,
The Washington
Post, 10 April 2005, A5.
U.N.,"
80
On
on Foreign
of the Council
7 June 2007.
30May 2007.
committees/intlrel/hfa20061.000/hfa20061_0f.htm,
2007;
of News
Society
of the U.S.
State Depart
at
"Rice Urges
Changes
Nations
and the Fight Against

at http://commdocs.house.gov/

| 431
SecurityCouncil's response to September 11 has benefited theUnited States

in several ways, as imperfect as this response has been. First, at the broadest
terrorists have targeted the United
States more
than any
level, transnational
other state and itwould likelybe the targetof any future,major attack by
The
al Qaeda.
the number
greater
of countries
that are enlisted
in the war
on
terrorism,thebetter off is theUnited States.The UN allowed theUnited States
to enlist the support of many states in a forum that these states considered
le
gitimate. The UN offered the institutional apparatus, the political cover for states
that were sensitive to being seen as too pro-American,
and the credibility that
facilitated such efforts. It conferred legitimacy on anti-terrorist efforts in a man
ner that the United
could not have done on its own, because
States
as at least attempting
saw the UN
to represent broader
many states
international views.
Second, theUN allowed theUnited States an institutionalforum inwhich

to gain adherents. Illuminating this point, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice identifiedtheUN as a place thatenhanced the abilityof theUnited States
to mobilize
other
actors,
such as
in the war
on
terrorism,
for UN
despite
her calls
reform in general.81
1368 created the basis for a new, more
involved Secu
Third, Resolution
on
an
Council
terrorism
and
focused
reflected
assertion
rity
unprecedented
by the Council
that self-defense
is a legitimate
response
to terrorism. This
is
exactlywhat theUnited States wanted in thewake of September 11 when it

sought
to communicate
the importance
tuallymanifested itself.
of dealing
with
terrorism before
it ac
for its part, Resolution

1373 imposed far-reaching, creative, and
on
to
states
in a variety of different arenas.
terrorism,
unique obligations
fight
Such broad action would have been very hard for the United
States to spear
Fourth,
and
head
would
coordinate
have
outside
the confines
of the UN.
The
transaction
more
far higher at the bilateral
level, the coordination
the ability to gain such commitments
in the first place more
been
costs
dif
lim
ficult, and
ited. Fifth, the quantity and quality of resolutions passed by the Council
against
terrorism increased
11. In virtually all cases,
significantly after September
theUnited States supported and sought such a heightened stand. Sixth,UN
sent a message
to state sponsors of
action, including sanctions, has probably
terrorism. The chance
that they will be punished
for such support has in
a consensus
creased. The Council
has developed
that such action is unaccept
able,
even as it debates
Seventh,
the UN
to respond to these provocations.

in counter-terrorism
has been important
how
role
in another
respect as well. Even before September 11, the Bush administrationhad a
which was heightened

reputation for unilateralism,
by the invasion of Iraq. It
to
is fair to say that the multilateral
terrorism
within the context of
response
theUN contrasted sharplyand positivelywith such perceived unilateralism. It

81
Condoleezza
Editors,"
accessed
Rice,
"Remarks
30 May
to the Annual
Convention
of the American
Society
2007.

of Newspaper
432
made
military
it unfair
to label
response.
the war
Indeed,
on terrorism as simply an American

unilateral
"Whatever
the
unilateral
im
points out,
as Luck
pulses of theGeorge W. Bush administration, its effortsto linkmultilateral

exer
and regional
institutions with the unilateral
through the UN
diplomacy
events
the
cise of U.S.
of
since
if
11, 2001, represent,
power
any
September
more vigorous
attempts to involve the Security
thing, one of Washington's
Council
in counterterrorism."82*
82
93.
Terrorism,"
Luck,
"Tackling
*We
are thankful for the useful and
reviewers
and
the editors. Any
mistakes
insightful comments
are the responsibility
and
from the anonymous

suggestions
of the authors alone.


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The UN Security Council's Response to Terrorism: Before and after September 11, 2001

Author(s): Hilde Haaland Kramer and Steve A. Yetiv

This content downloaded from 210.48.219.5 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 20:57:26 PM

Security Council's Response

to Terrorism: Before and After

September 11, 2001

HILDE HAALAND KRAMER

The horrific terroristattacks of September 11 shocked not only

but also many

representedperhaps the firsttime inhistory that the action of a transnational

only did it spawn the

war on terrorism and associated

the terrorist threat to the

global communitycould be contained. Not surprisingly,overwhelming public

a broader clash of civilizations

to the attacks sensible?

and from scholars, but the issue of global

Political Science Quarterly

This content downloaded from 210.48.219.5 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 20:57:26 PM

I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

to the attacks of September

11 has been more forcefuland comprehensive than itwas prior to September

11 and has broken

past record, the UN's

by the standards of its

and not without

the oil-for-foodproblem and a questionable Human Rights Council; and to

as imperfect as it has been.

11. Scholars use

September II (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 2004), 5.

national Law Journal 35 (2002): 475-490.

This content downloaded from 210.48.219.5 on Mon, 12 Jan 2015 20:57:26 PM

THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

and fewer variables,

time than over both

pare fivedifferentfactorsbefore and after the attacks: first,the general thrust

third, the gravity, content

resolutions; fourth,the toolsmade available and used by theUN to deal with

and General Thrust ofMajor

ternational peace and security in accordance

volving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression; [and] to takemilitary

PalgraveMacmillian, 2004), 97.

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I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Terrorism Strategy,which was adopted on 8 September 2006.9 The Plan of

In 1989, the SecurityCouncil passed its firstresolution on terrorismwhen

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat argues that the Security Council's attention to

in reaction to theLockerbie tragedy (Pan Am Flight 103) on 21 December

for the Suppression

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THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Urges all States, and in particular the producers

Resolution 635 established theUnited Nations and the SecurityCouncil

for the Secu

rityCouncil, and laid the groundwork for the SecurityCouncil's futurework

For theUnited States as well as the international community at large,

and security. With

event inmany respects. This is

inUN history, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368

of the attacks.13 The

terms, the terrorist attacks

Security Council, Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter

The resolution, furthermore, "calls on all States to work together urgently

significantly, it "reaffirmed the inherent right of self-defense