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"Another Insistence of Man": Prolegomena to the Question of the Animal in Derrida's Reading

of Heidegger
Author(s): Matthew Calarco
Source: Human Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Nov., 2005), pp. 317-334
Published by: Springer
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Human Studies (2005) 28: 317-334

"Another

Insistence

in Derrida's

Animal

?Springer

of Man":

Prolegomena

Reading

of Heidegger

to the Question

2005

of the

MATTHEW CALARCO
and Religion,

of Classics,
Philosophy,
E-mail:
mcalarco@sbc.edu

Department
VA 24595,

Sweet

Briar

College,

Sweet

Briar,

a considerable
of writings
number
to address
has devoted
years Derrida
than not, this question
arises
in a reading
the animal,"
often
and, more
more
texts. In order to appreciate
fully the stakes of Derrida's
posing
to Heidegger,
in this essay
I offer some prefatory
to the
remarks
in relation

In recent

Abstract

of
ing "the question
of one of Heidegger's
of

this question
of the animal

question

analysis
manism'"

of Derrida's
is read

in Derrida's
"The

early essay
in terms of the motif

this Derridean

of Heidegger's
reading
in which Heidegger
the manner

uncover

This
namely,
animality.
the limits of metaphysical
inforcing
rethinking

reveals

distinguishes
that, while

man's

"proper"

offers
Heidegger
account
nevertheless

from what

is "improper,"
a convincing
account
of
re
ends up uncritically

this critical
humanism,
is that Derrida's
of this same tradition. My closing
the anthropocentrism
suggestion
conse
on the various
as an extended meditation
of animality
should be understood

and effects

quences

reading

a careful
of Heidegger.
The essay opens with
on 'Hu
in which
"Letter
of Man,"
Heidegger's
from
of man's
"proper." Taking my point of departure
I return to Heidegger's
"Letter"
in order to
humanism,

reading
Ends

of this dogmatic

anthropocentrism

in Heideggerian

and post-Heideggerian

thought.

1. The Logic

of the Proper

in Heidegger's

Humanism

In Of Grammatology,
Derrida writes of the name of "man,"1 how it is given,
is not confounded
and what must be excluded from this name so that man
with

his other:

his other from


limits excluding
Man calls himself man only by drawing
the purity of nature, of animality, primitivism,
the play of supplementarity:
infancy, madness,
divinity. The approach to these limits is at once feared
as a threat of death, and desired as access to life without
The
differance.
man
man
limits
of
all
these
is
the
articulation
of
history
calling himself
among themselves.
(1974: 244-5)
a certain provocation,
to
I want
but not without
justification,
the inscription of one of these limits, viz., the boundary drawn in
of man from his animal other. In doing so, I am setting out
the delimitation
in Derrida's
to approach "the question of the animal" as it is posed
reading
Without

isolate here

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318

M.

CALARCO

it a considerable
contains within
Since this question
number
of Heidegger.
are each in turn rather intricate and complicated,
of tasks for thought which
my task in the present essay is simply to sketch out the barest preface to this
question.2
I shall begin with a reading of Derrida's
1968 essay, "The Ends of Man,"3
in which
the question
of the name and limits of man in Heidegger's
thought
is raised explicitly. Readers
of Derrida will no doubt recall the remarkable
to this essay in which
link between
the essential
the philo
preface
with
and
the
Derrida's
is
discussed,
sophical
along
political
specific dating of
and
his
the writing of the essay (April-May
1968)
outspoken
political protest
the Vietnam war. The essay's governing
surrounding
against certain policies
in France, is
of Hegel, Husserl,
and Heidegger
theme, the (mis)appropriation
not
to
with
also well known and does
need
be rehearsed here. But
the ques

opening

to
tion of the animal in mind, I want to reread the handful of pages devoted
humanism
and the role that the motif of the proper of man plays in
Heidegger's
this humanism. Of course, Derrida's
explicit concern in "The Ends of Man" is
not with the distinction
between humanity and animality as such; his interest
rather to what remains of humanism
and the name of man inHeideg
belongs
if my aim is to understand
the
ger. So why begin with "The Ends of Man"
of
the
of
the
animal
in
Derrida's
work?
What
I
shall
place
question
attempt
to argue here is that Derrida's
humanism
opens the
reading of Heidegger's
an often overlooked
of disclosing
thematic concern
space for the possibility
text
in
or rather
and it is this very conjunction,
ing animality
Heidegger's
and animality
that Derrida will later interrogate at
?/??junction, of humanism
more
length in the name of the question of the animal. By carefully
locating
the role and status of animality
in Heidegger's
thus be better prepared to understand what

will

re-thinking
is at stake

of humanism, we
in those later texts

where Derrida explicitly


raises the question of the animal.
can be developed
Before
at more
this argument
length, we need first to
turn our attention
to the letter of the text of "The Ends of Man." Opening
to the middle
of the essay, under the section entitled "Reading Us
[Nous
we
find
ourselves
confronted
with
the question
of
Lisant]"
straightaway
man.

the "we," the humanity


of "we" men
in
to
no
As
Derrida
is
this
is
Heidegger's
123).
quick
point out,
by
means a simple question
text, it can only be raised
since, within Heidegger's
one in which
of humanism,
the
against the backdrop of a prior delimitation
Derrida

asks: What

about

text? (1982:

of humanism
essential complicity
and metaphysics
has been disclosed.
If the
of the "we" is to be raised within Heidegger's
text, it cannot be a
question
matter of accusing Heidegger
of simply falling back into the metaphysical
that he, better than anyone else, has called into question.
form of humanism
In his "Letter on 'Humanism,'" Heidegger
in both its
argues that humanism
traditional and classical
forms
in a determination
of the Being

is metaphysical
of man without

insofar as it grounds
itself
ever raising the question of

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ANOTHER

INSISTENCE

OF MAN

319

either with respect to man or the beings over and against which man is
Being,
of man's Being
if there is in fact a new determination
defined. Consequently,
a
mere
than
be
other
it
will
in Heidegger's
text,
repetition
something
likely
definitions.
of one of the traditional metaphysical
text with the rigor
In order to locate the question of man in Heidegger's
one
must
think
humanism
with which he himself pursues
otherwise,
i.e.,
it,
is perhaps the first
in relation to the thinking of the truth of Being. Derrida
on this terrain. His
to pursue the consequences
of Heidegger's
humanism
means
humanism
is through an examina
of gaining access to Heidegger's
a
in which man and the thinking of Being maintain
tion of the various ways
no longer allows himself
hold on one another (1982: 123-4). As Heidegger
in terms of standard metaphysical
determinations
(e.g.,
must
in terms of
the
"we"
be
constitutes
re-thought
rationale),
the question of Being. This other thinking of man that finds its place along
of Being
side the question
(Derrida will go so far as to call it a thinking
to define

the "we"

what

animal

of the proper of man [le propre


by way of "a kind of magnetic
124).
With

to Derrida,
de I 'homme]) occurs, according
sorte
attraction
d'aimantation]"
(1982:
[un

requisite for a project as large and involved as interro


limits
inHeidegger's
text, Derrida
gating the relation between man and Being
These
to indicating some of the effects of this magnetization.
himself merely
sec
indications are drawn from close readings of two key texts: the opening
the modesty

(1942), two
(1927) and the "Letter on 'Humanism'"
texts.
While
Derrida
substantive
and
several
many
years
separated by
occur
that
be
the
and
multiplications
complications
readily acknowledges
insists that there is no
tween these two texts and beyond them, he nonetheless
in Heidegger's
work in the years between
simple turning from man to Being
tions of Being

and Time

works

in 1927, the existential


and Time and the "Letter." Already
analytic
Being
to
itself from the "man," or
distance
in
and
Time
of Dasein
attempts
Being
And the "Letter," for all of its professed
humanist
subject, of metaphysics.
is still
to humanism
in favor of a thought of the truth of Being,
opposition
of
another,
thought
non-metaphysical
throughout by
(supposedly)
governed
the proper of man. Thus, rather than a break or a turning, Derrida will attempt
attrac
inHeidegger's
text, the constancy of amagnetic
needs to be read in terms of the concept of proximity
the proximity
of
in question concerns
124). The proximity

to point up a continuity
tion which he suggests

(1982:
(proximit?)
man, both in nearness to himself and to Being. It is in the play of this proximity
other thought of man, of "we
that Derrida will attempt to locate Heidegger's
- in
humanism.
short, Heidegger's
men,"
thinking of proximity,
Heidegger's
a thought directed against a metaphysical
that has forgotten what
humanism
to Derrida "another insistence of man
is closest to man, constitutes
according
even as
(1982: 124), another humanism,
[une autre insistance de l'homme]"
it resists

the name

of humanism.

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320

M.

CALARCO

the opening
sections of Being and Time, Derrida attempts to
Concerning
out as the exemplary
that marks Dasein
flesh out the proximity
entity for the
of
the
existential
For
the
starting-point
analytic.
Heidegger,
primary concern
in these opening pages
is to work out the formal structure of the question
to
the question's
ontical and ontological
and
determine
priority.
as
such, Heidegger
argues that every inquiry is guided in
Regarding
inquiry
advance by that which
is sought out, which consequently
implies that beings
with the ability to inquire always already have some minimal
of
understanding
of Being

of Being
iswhat characterizes
"us," those who
Being. This pre-understanding
are inquiring into the meaning
of Being. We, the inquirers, will turn out to be
the exemplary beings for the starting-point
of the existential
analytic based in
on
to
this
of
and
the
part
ability
pre-understanding
Being
inquire. But Derrida
that
this
minimal
determination
who
"we"
of
are, as simple
very
suspects
as itmight appear, nonetheless
and unassuming
draws the existential
analytic
back within
To understand
the horizon of metaphysics.
let
this supposition,
us look more closely at the three structural elements of the question of Being:
is asked about, that which
is interrogated, and
every question has that which
that which
is to be found out through the asking. Concerning
the question
of Being, what is asked about is Being,
and that which
is to be found out by
the asking is the meaning
of Being
what, then, is to be interrogated here?
never
but
exists
Clearly Being,
apart from a being, an entity; hence it
Being
the Being of a particular being. But which being
is a matter of interrogating
to interrogate? Heidegger
if the starting-point
wonders
is optional, or might
it be that some particular being has a priority here?
Derrida argues, in amove that appears rather forced upon first glance, that
the answer to this question
is governed by the phenomenological
principle of
As we

is the exemplary
already know, Dasein
entity chosen for the
of
the
existential
but is Dasein
chosen based on pres
starting point
analytic
a
ence! Derrida's
is that it is indeed
certain form of self-presence,
argument
as the
of principles,"
that determines
Dasein
phenomenology's
"principle

presence.

takes the form of self


entity to be interrogated. This self-presence
to
the
of
the
In support of this
itself.
proximity,
proximity
questioning
being
cites the key passage from Being and Time where Heidegger
claim, Derrida
specific

makes

text for the working


his argument
for Dasein
being the exemplary
out of the question
in this passage does Heidegger
of Being.4 But nowhere
or presence
mention
to self- at least not by name. This
any kind of proximity
is not lost on Derrida,
notes that the remains of
who
however,
immediately
self-presence
points need

in the choice
to be made

of Dasein

are at work

in a more

subtle way. Two


in this regard. First, Heidegger
says that the task
is to make the inquirer, Dasein,
in its
"transparent"
in the form of a hermeneutics
unfold
of unveiling

here

of the existential
analytic
Being. This reading will
as Derrida
resembles
which,
notes,
(which
communicates
with the classical metaphysical

is not

to say reproduces)
and
of
gesture
bringing something

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ANOTHER

INSISTENCE

321

OF MAN

- in
to knowledge
to light, to consciousness,
short, to self-presence.
Secondly,
- the
name
"man"
of
retains
sometimes
the
being who has always
Heidegger
- when
been characterized
speaking
by one form or another of self-presence
is the
to Derrida,
this reliance on the name of man,
of Dasein.5 According
to the totality
thread which
ties the analytic of Dasein
"paleonymic
guiding
Of
traditional
of metaphysics'
discourse"
course, Heidegger
(1982:
127).
is not unaware of this risk of falling back into the closure of metaphysics;
so
he knows he must avoid using the name "man" when
speaking of Dasein
or
with a traditional metaphysics
is
nevertheless
forced
this
he
by
yet, despite
cognizance,
anthropology.
the language of metaphysics
and, more importantly, by his own determination
of being capable of making
'sproper being (viz., the characteristics
of Dasein
a
that Heidegger
and
of
Being, capacities
having
pre-understanding
inquiries
that the existential

is not confused

analytic

And

recourse
to
to make
argues are open only to those beings called "human")
the name of man. This is perhaps the point at which we can begin to see that
in mind when he
clearly has nothing other than "human beings"
Heidegger
to the "man" of
not
that Dasein
is simply equivalent
It is
speaks of Dasein.
it is rather the case that, for Heidegger,
only the being that re
metaphysics;
There is, for
the human being, is capable of Dasein.
this determination,
on
name
man gives
or
no
of
the
This
reliance
animal
Dasein.
plant
example,
"We can see
lines of commentary:
rise to one of Derrida's more memorable
then that Dasein,
nothing other than man [On
though not man, is nevertheless
voit donc que le Dasein,
s'il n 'est pas / 'homme, n 'estpourtant pas autre chose
ceives

in amore explicit but


this passage
que l'homme]"
(1982: 127). To reformulate
is not the man of metaphysics
less elegant syntax, we could say that Dasein
Dasein cannot be found anywhere else than with human
but that, nevertheless,
beings.
If Derrida's

as the or
of presence
qua proximity
a
bit strained or even
structure of Heidegger's
discourse
still seems
ganizing
artificial, we need only read through a few more pages of Being and Time in
to be at stake in
himself understands
order to see that Heidegger
proximity
as the exemplary
In Section 5,
for
the
the choice of Dasein
entity
Seinsfrage.
insistence

on the motif

to itself is explained
in terms of what is close, indeed
of Dasein
the proximity
are
is close to us, so close that we ourselves
is closest. Dasein
that which
the
Dasein. This proximity, however, remains on an ontic level. Ontologically,
us.
our
that
Derrida
is
farthest
remains
what
from
Dasein
of
suggests
Being
the
Heidegger's
thinking, both within and beyond Being and Time, occupies
an
in
distance
and
this
attempt
space between
(ontological)
(ontic) proximity
attraction that
the magnetic
to reduce the distance,
i.e., in order to re-establish
binds the essence of man to the thinking of Being.
of
the exemplary
If in formulating
and choosing
entity for the question
on
name
to
the
is unable
avoid relying
in Being and Time Heidegger
Being
of man

and his proper, what

occurs when

the question

of Being

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is actually

322

M. CALARCO

and humanism
raised against metaphysics
in the "Letter
itself for example
on 'Humanism'"? Does the thought of the truth of Being brought forth in that
text displace the name of man, or does it instead insist on a restoration of what
is proper

to man?

Heidegger's
circumscription
and metaphysics
in the "Letter"
of humanism
For Heidegger,
such a displacement.
metaphysics
ask the question
the
truth
of Being
concerning
truth and man's essence
1998:
246).
(Heidegger,

of the essential co-belonging


seem to promise
would
just
is defined by its inability to
and the relation between
this

Humanism
thereby remains
as
an
it
of
metaphysical
"presupposes
interpretation
beings without
about
the
truth
of
..."
the
asking
(1998: 245). Thus,
being
posing of the
to
truth
of
seem
of
the
humanism
and
would
question
Being
metaphysics
to give rise to a different kind of thinking beyond or prior to metaphysical
one that gives a priority and privilege
to Being
humanism,
itself, i.e., to (the)
rather than Man.
(of beings),
Being
insofar

But contrary to this rather customary


"Letter," Der
reading of Heidegger's
rida argues that the thinking of the truth of Being
is still related to man,
is
in the question of Be
of man. "Man and the name of man are not displaced
Even less do they disappear"
ing such as it is put to metaphysics.
(Derrida,
1982: 128). Instead, what we find in the "Letter" according
to Derrida
is a
or revalorization
"r??valuation
of the essence
and dignity of man"
(ibid.).
Let us break this citation into two parts and consider
in turn the r??valuation
of man's essence and then his dignity. Heidegger's
"Letter" contests
the ex
tension of metaphysics
and the technical understanding
of thought inasmuch
as it threatens the essence of man (Heidegger,
1998: 242-3).
This threat is
marked

of language" and
by the "widely and rapidly spreading devastation
in which
"not only man but the essence of man stum
homelessness,
bles aimlessly
about" (1998: 258). Only a reinstatement
of man's essence can

man's

counter

this threat and homelessness.


This occurs when man gains another
to language and speaking: "Before he speaks the human being must
first let himself be claimed again by Being
..." (1998: 243). In listening to
this claim, man's essence and home will once more be bestowed upon him.
Even though this is a thinking that gives a priority to Being and not man,
relation

Heidegger
readily
and his humanity.

concedes

that it is at the same

time concerned

with man

But in the claim upon human beings,


in the attempt to make humans ready
for this claim, is there not implied a concern about human beings? Where
else does 'care' tend but in the direction of bringing the human back to his
essence? What else does that in turn betoken but that man (homo) become
human (humanus)! Thus humanitas
really does remain the concern of such
and caring, that human beings
thinking. For this is humanism: meditating
be human and not inhumane,
the 'inhuman,' that is outside their essence.
But in what does the humanity
of the human being consist?
It lies in his
essence.
(1998: 243-4).

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ANOTHER

INSISTENCE

OF MAN

323

as Derrida goes on to explain, coincides


to Being. This
in
the form of a proximity
with
dignity
or
in the
inherence
ecstatic
is found inman's eksistence,
dignity and proximity
distance from Being
In eksistence, man closes the ontological
truth of Being.
ontic proximity
that characterizes
by finding his way "once again into the
of man's

The

restoration
a restoration

essence,

of man's

is not a being, man's saying


of being" (1998: 243). And since Being
terms - hence we find "in
can be accomplished
in
only
metaphoric
of proximity,
of an entire metaphorics
the dominance
discourse,
Heidegger's
the
of simple and immediate presence, ametaphorics
proximity of
associating
values
with
the
of
shelter, house, service, guard, voice, and
neighboring,
Being
of proximity
The
1982:
130).
upshot of this metaphorics
listening" (Derrida,
man
to
to
and
the
of
is another thought of
man, one in
Being
Being
proximity
nearer
to man
and
is
than
all
farther
which
yet
beings
"Being is essentially6
as
the
nearest"
or
is
also phrases it, "Being
..."
than every being
Heidegger
in
of man and Being
reads this nearness
1998: 252). Derrida
(Heidegger,
nearness

of Being

a Latin-based
that translates and
terms of the proper (le propre),
vocabulary
terms (eigen, eigentlich,
transfers a series of German
etc.)
eignen, Ereignis,
into the French idiom: "The near is the proper; the proper is the nearest
[Le
c
c
le
'est
le
le
'est
propre,
propre;
(propre, proprius).
plus proche]
proche,
Man
is the proper of being [L'homme est le propre de l'?tre], which right near
is the proper of man, such is the truth that
in his ear; Being
to him whispers
which
is
the
such
gives the there of the truth of Being
proposition
speaks,
that man
1982:
man"
truth
and the
of
133). It is thus in ek-sistence
(Derrida,
writes: "Such standing in the clearing
proper being. Heidegger
is proper
of human beings. This way of Being
I call the ek-sistence
of Being
1998:
to
the
human
247).
(Heidegger,
being"
only
Derrida
closes his reading of the "Letter" by citing this passage from
on the "near, the proper, and the
his own writing
and footnoting
Heidegger
in "La parole souffl?" and OfGrammatol
erection of the 'standing upright'"
and these
this passage from Heidegger
1982: 133, n. 37). With
ogy (Derrida,
finds his most

to suggest the
in mind, we might
take this footnote
is not simply
at
in
humanism
issue
what
is
for
Derrida,
Heidegger's
following:
but also the manner
inEreignis,
a thought of the co-propriety
of man and Being
of what is proper to man functions to exclude man's
in which
the delimitation
could not have failed to notice
others from this propriety. Certainly, Derrida
is amode of being proper only
eksistence
that
insistence
repeated
Heidegger's
has
been concerned with such
the
to human beings. His thinking of
proper
name
who
the
of
all along: "Proper is the
exclusions
subject close to himself- and
name
of the object, the work, that has deviated
is what he is
abject the
latter texts from Derrida

this
1978: 173).7 And although he does not foreground
the fact that Heidegger's
in "The Ends of Man,"
limiting
of man from his animal
is carried out in a distinguishing
if we
to have escaped Derrida's
attention either, especially

from me" (Derrida,


as an explicit theme
to man
of eksistence
other

is not

likely

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324

M. CALARCO

recall

this essay's opening citation from OfGrammatology.


We shall return to
this limit between man and animal momentarily.
Now
if we concern ourselves with both of these senses of the proper (the
to self and Being,
and the proper of man as a
proper of man as a proximity
we could imagine at least two sorts of responses
to Der
logic of exclusion),
rida's reading of Heidegger's
One response might be to question
humanism.
Derrida's
reductive reading of man's proximity
to self and Being
in Ereignis
in terms of the proper. On this point most readers would readily concede
that
in "The Ends of Man"
of Heidegger
is to a certain ex
presented
as
and reductive. It is undoubtedly
Lacoue-Labarthe
true,
among
others points out, that Derrida does not pay enough attention
to the play of
on Ereignis
and the uncanny
in Heidegger's
discourse
and the
//?propriety
man
of
(Lacoue-Labarthe,
question
1997). In this vein, one could criticize
the reading
tent violent

Derrida

for completely
in the "Letter" which

neglecting
Heidegger's
discloses man's proper

reading

of Heraclitean
ethos
site as anything but

dwelling
man's relation to being should be understood
proper. From this perspective,
not in terms of proximity or propriety but as radically ex-propriating,
unheim
on another reading one
lich. Yet even if these limitations were acknowledged,
could still maintain
that Derrida's
is absolutely
and has to
necessary
analysis
reasons
be followed
as
The
for
this
be
understood
necessity might
through.8
follows. On the one hand, underscoring
the dominant
and continuous
traits
of Heidegger's
discourse
(e.g., the proper of man) allows the minor and dis
ruptive elements
(the uncanny,
improper, etc.) to stand forth in a new light.
on
more
And
the other hand, and
importantly for our present task of raising
the question
of the animal,
it demonstrates
that Heidegger's
thinking of the
or equivocal - remains a
truth of Being - no matter how nuanced, ambiguous,
thinking of man and what is proper toman. In short, it is an anthropocentrism
even a hyper-humanism.9
and a humanism, perhaps
Important consequences
follow from this hyper-humanistic
delimitation
of metaphysical
humanism.
In the next section, I am going to track but one of them, the one alluded to in
the opening paragraph of this essay: the problematic
inscription of the limit
between humanity and animality as it appears in the "Letter on 'Humanism'"
- for it
is precisely
this limit that is at issue for Heidegger
when he insists that
only man eksists.10
2. The Animal

Without

Eksistence

As those familiar with


the "Letter on 'Humanism'"
will recall, Heidegger
traces the concept of humanitas
back to the age of the Roman Republic
in
which homo humanus was opposed
to homo barbarus. He tells us that homo
humanus is the name given to Romans who embodied
the paideia of the Greeks
of the Hellenistic
the Roman
translation
age. Humanitas,
came to mean scholarship
and training in good conduct.

of the Greokpaideia,
versions
Subsequent

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ANOTHER

INSISTENCE

325

OF MAN

to eighteenth
humanism,
century German
(from Renaissance
we
more
to
in
the
versions
find
Marx
humanism,
and,
recently, in Sartre) differ
in
the
modes
in
which
actualize
this humanitas.
significantly
respective
they
one
at
in
But Heidegger
that
all
coincide
least
essential
argues
aspect:
they
the humanitas
of man is "determined with regard to an already established
of humanism

that is of
of nature, history, world, and the ground of world,
interpretation
as
a
we
seen
whole"
have
while reading "The Ends of
(1998: 245). As
beings
this pre-established
is
Man,"
interpretation of the Being of beings as a whole
as being metaphysical;
what typifies all previous humanisms
and the posing
to metaphysics
of the question
of the truth of Being
and humanism
is what
their common ground.
is the
this interpretation
of beings as a whole, what exactly
Yet, within
man
of
the
that
humanism
of
Being
interpretation
metaphysical
presupposes?

discloses

in Rome,
the first humanism
every
argues that, beginning with
man
to
humanism
has
the
"essence"
of
be
obvious: man
subsequent
supposed
finds this determina
is understood
always as an animal rationale. Heidegger
in several respects. To begin with, animal rationale
is not
tion questionable

Heidegger

a translation

of the Greek definition


of man, z?on logon echon (the
or language), but a metaphysical
of it
interpretation
having discourse
in which ratio is problematically
for logos. But even beyond this
substituted
all subsequent humanisms
have failed to inquire into
contentious
substitution,
the ground of ratio. The various definitions
of ratio (as reason, a faculty of
simply
animal

a cer
or categories,
and arise from within
etc.) thus presuppose
principles
of
tain pre-established
of
the
thereby covering
interpretation
Being
beings,
over the question of the truth of Being
itself (the question of the ontological
is given to man, and their essen
i.e., the question of how Being
difference),
The same goes for the animal of animal rationale, which
tial co-belonging.
in terms of a pre-determined
of the Being
is always interpreted
conception
in which what is living comes to presence.
of "life," and the zo? andphusis
it is these two
When Heidegger
criticizes humanism
for being metaphysical,
limitations
that are being addressed.
and metaphysics,
But beyond
this penetrating
delimitation
of humanism
will devote a consider
there is something else at stake here towhich Heidegger
able amount of effort in the remainder of the "Letter." It involves a contestation
of man's humanitas
of the confusion
man as animal rationale. Heidegger's

with

his animalitas

in the definition

of

point here is that not only ismetaphysics


of Being regarding ratio and animalitas,
on the basis of animalitas
than his hu

guilty of failing to raise the question


it is at fault for thinking man more
what
manitas. He wonders
if this is the most effective means
of uncovering
to man: "...
it finally remains to ask whether
the essence of the
is essential
of ani
and most decisively
lies in the dimension
human being primordially
at all" (1998: 246). Should man be thought of in terms of life, as one
malitas
"living being" among others, among "plants, beasts, and God," as Heidegger

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326

M. CALARCO

and in so doing, itwill of course


proceeds,
about
human
however,
beings; ultimately,
important things
to
the essence
of man. According
the biologistic
approach fails to uncover
we
other living beings,
"abandon"
when man is placed alongside
Heidegger,
phrases
be able

is how biologism

it? This

to state

to the realm of animalitas.


This occurs even if (as is the case
man
different
from the animal
is considered
attribute, e.g., having a spirit or soul, or being
or personhood.
An analysis of man that starts from the
of subjectivity

essence

man's

with metaphysical
humanism)
on the basis of some essential
capable
realm of animalitas

and then locates the human being's essential difference


from the animal by tacking on a soul or mind still falls short of thinking man's
humanitas
(1998: 246-7).
finds
As Derrida
recalls for us in "The Ends of Man," what Heidegger
essence
man
to
and dignity. Man's
in this approach
is his proper
missing
that man finds his dignity
and it is in ek-sisting
is not just trying to restore man's essence and
and propriety. But Heidegger
the context of trying to separate
revalorize his dignity; he is doing so within
man
essence
essence
from
the
the
of other "living creatures,"
of
decisively
not once or twice but
In
insists
the
animal.
this
context, Heidegger
especially
essence

lies in his ek-sistence

is not only man's proper, but his proper alone.


in
the clearing of being I call the ek-sistence
of
standing
human beings. This way of being is proper only to the human being [Nur dem
Menschen
later,
eignet dieses Art zu sein]" (1998: 247). And one sentence
three times

He writes:

that ek-sistence

"Such

times that only human beings are characterized


can be said only of the essence of the human be
that is, only of the human way 'to be' [nur von
ing [vom Wesen des Menschen],
Weise zu 'sein '].For as far as our experience
der menschlichen
shows, only the

asserts two more


Heidegger
"Ek-sistence
by ek-sistence:

allein ist] admitted to the destiny of ek-sistence


being is [derMensch
this insistence of/on man?
das
der
Ek-sistenz
Geshick
[in
Why
eingelassen]''
to
the
has
Does Heidegger
wish
drive
home
merely
point that metaphysics
time and again overlooked man's essence as ek-sistence?
but
that
is
Certainly,
reason.
on
not
Derrida's
remarks
the
the
exclusionary
perhaps
only
Recalling
human

aspect of the logic of the proper, it should not surprise us to find Heidegger
to separate decisively man's proper from that which
also working
is improper.
to man's essence
what does not belong properly
is ani
And, for Heidegger,
The metaphysical
definition of man as animal rationale has allowed
malitas.
to become blurred, and this is another reason why
this essential distinction
it has come under criticism
in the "Letter." Thus, Heidegger's
restoration of
a
as
matter
man's essence and dignity
of bringing
I
would
much
is,
suggest,
man

into a thinking relation with Being as it is of driving a wedge


(or,
shall see, an abyss) between
the essence of man and the essence of the
animal based on this relation.
turns to a dis
This suggestion
further support when Heidegger
receives
back

as we

cussion

of embodiment

(1998:

247ff).

Heidegger

argues here that the human

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ANOTHERINSISTENCE
OFMAN 327
in its essence, must be viewed as something
other than the body of a
on
it
He
this
because
is human bodies
insists
living organism.
point
(which
inmany ways are so similar to other living being's bodies - especially
animal
that encourage us to understand man's Being
in terms of animalitas.
bodies)
body,

to Heidegger,
According
certain
anatomical
spite
"The human body
Leib des Menschen

the human body and the animal body, de


however,
are different in essence:
and physiological
similarities,
an
is something essentially
other than
animal organism
[Der
ist etwas wesentlich
anderes als ein tierischer Organis

can study the human body as an animal


(1998: 247). That physiology
and even give us a number of interesting
and useful facts in the
organism
no guarantee
that the essence of the human being
is, for Heidegger,
process
has been properly explained. For this to come about, the human body needs to
inman's ek-sistence. Man's bodily inter
in light of its grounding
be examined

mus]"

to Heidegger,
action with other entities around him is, according
essentially
embodied
different from the way non-human
beings relate to other entities,
to beings
about in a "world" which grants him access
in
since man moves
to man
their Being. Because
what
is essential
is ek-sistence,
because
i.e.,
in the clearing of Being,
the human body can be understood
properly starting only from this essential ground.
uses the term "ek-sistence"
to highlight
the ecstatic
As we know, Heidegger
that
'sBeing, as well as to avoid the metaphysical
element of Dasein
baggage
he stands-out

in contrast to
the concept of existentia which
signifies actuality
a
term
the
thus
establishes
essentia.
ek-sistence,
Using
Heidegger
possibility,
certain distance between himself and the various metaphysical
interpretations
accompanies

all
offered by medieval
Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche,
philosophers,
to characterize man's Being. At this point in the text,
fail accurately
or not the Being of beings other than
he leaves it an open question whether
man are adequately
conveyed with the concept of existentia. What Heidegger
is able to determine with apparent certainty is that, unlike human beings,
living
are plants and animals,
creatures (Heidegger's
the stone being his
examples
of existentia

of whom

being) do not ek-sist. It is at this point that we can


example of a non-living
see
more
nature of the logic of the proper as
to
begin
clearly the exclusionary
text. If ek-sistence
it functions
in Heidegger's
is proper to man alone, then it
those
follows
that no being other than man can have a share in it, especially
beings we suspect of being the most akin to us. The logic of the proper has to
cuts where the possibility
of contamination
make clean, decisive
creeps in:
..
.living creatures are as they are without
standing outside of their being as
in such standing the essential
such and within the truth of being, preserving
nature of their being. Of all the beings that are, presumably
the most difficult
to think about are living creatures [Lebe-wesen],
because on the one hand
they are in a certain way most closely akin to us [Heidegger will speak a few
lines later on of our 'abysmal bodily kinship with the beast'], and on the
essence by an
other they are at the same time separated from our ek-sistent

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328

M. CALARCO

[durch einen Abgrund

abyss

von underem

ek-sistenten

Wesen

geschieden

ist]. (1998: 248)


then, not only are "living creatures" different from "us," they
so essentially
different that a gulf opens up wide
in their essence,
an
not
will insist
the only time Heidegger
to
This
is
be
labeled
"abyss."
enough
*
on an abyss between ek-sistent man and creatures that merely
live.1 But why
Ultimately,
are different

and essential differences?


the text, it is clear that at the very least Heidegger
of the Being
of
wants
to distance his own project from the determination
man made by previous metaphysical
The definition
humanisms.
of man as
takes for granted is not altogether false, but it
that humanism
animal rationale
this rhetoric
On

of abysses
the surface of

remains metaphysical.
in order to think man

humanism
this metaphysical
thus opposes
Heidegger
on a non-metaphysical
terms
in
the
of
basis,
question
to humanism
does not come down then
This opposition
some form of anti-humanism,
but rather is intended to

of the truth of Being.


to merely
advocating
bring about a more rigorous
called a "hyperhumanism":

humanism,

what

I (following

David

Krell)

have

.. .the
in hu
of the essence
of the human being
highest determinations
manism
still do not realize the proper dignity of the human being. To that
extent the thinking
But this op
in Being and Time is against humanism.
position does not mean that such thinking aligns itself against the humane
the inhumane and deprecates
and advocates
the inhuman, that it promotes
it does not
the dignity of the human being. Humanism
is opposed because
set the humanitas
of the human being high enough. (1998: 251)
his unique relation to
goes on to argue that man's humanitas,
Heidegger
or
for a kind of mastery
the saying and truth of Being,
should not be mistaken
in which man deigns "to release the beingness
of beings
tyranny over Being
into an all too loudly glorified
Instead, the recovery
(1998:252).
'objectivity'"
of man's humanitas
ismeant to recall the essential finitude of the human being,
man's being-thrown
into the truth of Being so that he may guard and
by Being
shepherd it.
if one reads "The Ends
Now

of Man" and other pieces by Derrida where he


it is difficult
humanism
takes up Heidegger's
(such as the Geschlecht
essays),
in "criticizing"
to understand why Derrida would be at all interested
(if this
we
it is,
should read these texts) Heidegger's
is indeed how
thinking when
so close to his own. The stakes of this critique become
in many
respects,

the
ifHeidegger's
is placed alongside
clearer, however,
recovery of humanism
Derridean
and
the
animal.
from
this
double
of
the
proper
Beginning
questions
one could in a Derridean
vein subscribe almost without
site of questioning,
reservation

to the questions Heidegger


poses
offers his own determination

when Heidegger

to metaphysical
of man's

but
humanism;
adherence
proper, any

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ANOTHER

INSISTENCE

OF MAN

329

into
and subsequently
to his path of thought must be circumscribed
brought
most
minimal
Even
the
determination
delimitation,
presupposes
question.
this is one of the chief lessons of
inscriptions of propriety and impropriety
Derrida's
analyses of the logic of the proper. And even when the determination
as "man's essence
where
is ek-sistence,"
and indeterminate
is as equivocal
a
can be
are
in
that
neither
such
and
intertwined
way
impropriety
propriety
said to dominate,
of lines are being
of man

we

about what kinds


need to remain vigilant
nevertheless
drawn. Of course, Heidegger's
definition
non-metaphysical
Ek
to be so broad as to pose no concerns
about exclusion.

appears
lines that
is not parceled out unequally
along any of the traditional
have separated one group of human beings from another (class, race, sexuality,
But it does institute,
gender, etc.); it finds its place anterior to such distinctions.
line
and is itself instituted, along a questionable
separating man from
dividing
sistence

of
text from the perspective
of the question
Reading Heidegger's
line as well as to track the
the animal enables us to uncover this oppositional
rhetoric of abysses and essential differences.
axioms that underlie Heidegger's
we
line between animal
find that the dividing
this thought further,
Pursuing
animal.

text when he shifts to an analysis of


in Heidegger's
re-appears
definition
the metaphysical
calls into question
language. When Heidegger
of man as animal rationale, he is of course doing so with an eye toward the
more primordial Greek understanding
of man as z?on logon echon, the animal
and human

humanism
the logos as ratio, metaphysical
language. By interpreting
As mentioned
the essential
role that language plays in being-human.
is not simply a translation
animal rationale
earlier, this is why for Heidegger
a
of it, one in which
of zoon logon echon but a metaphysical
interpretation
a
more
for
ratio
of
is
substituted
experience
primordial
groundless
experience

having
misses

But a simple return to the Greek definition of man will not suffice
either since in labeling man "the animal possessing
language" we run the risk
that arises out of, or is added on to,
of understanding
language as something
man's animal existence. To understand man's proper relation to language, we
of the word.

and not his animal nature since animals,


from man's humanitas
not
have
do
language.
strictly speaking,
to Heidegger
Animals
lack man's specific relation to language according
or the
mean
not
here
does
World
lack
"world."
because
"nature,"
simply
they
of
in
the
which
instead
the
but
beings
"environment,"
Being
place
signifies

must

begin

the capacity
to unconcealment.
"World" thus understood
presupposes
for standing in the clearing of Being where Being comes into
for ek-sistence,
and departs, a possibility
presence
(as we have seen) reserved for man alone.
in the clearing of being,
Plants and animals do not ek-sist outside of themselves
"Because
environments:
within
their
live
but simply
plants and
surrounding
are never
are
but
environments
animals
[Umgebung]
lodged in their respective
comes

placed freely into the clearing of being


is 'world,' they lack language"
(1998:

[die Lichtung des Seins] which alone


248). We should not infer from this

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330

M. CALARCO

is arguing that plants and animals have no access to


lecture course in
As is clear from his Freiburg
beings beyond
believe
that plants and
semester of 1929-1930,
does
the winter
Heidegger
that
to other beings around them; he denies, however,
animals have access
or
as
access
are
or
in
to
entities
their
these
other
able
animals
Being,
plants
that Heidegger

passage

themselves.

such, in the way that human beings with language and world are able to do.
distances man from his surrounding
Without
language, which simultaneously
and brings him into proximity with being, plants and animals
environment
and continue "merely" to live without
remain lodged in their environments
access to the being of other beings or their own being.
of man's
The metaphysical-animal
explanation
and
relation between
language posited
being
essence. The essence of language
man's ek-sistent
as the "clearing-concealing
to Heidegger,
according
close

essence

covers

here much

over the
as it misses

to be understood,
advent of being itself"
(1998: 249); or, as he says later in the text, the bringing near of being "oc
curs essentially
as language itself [west als die Sprache selbst]" (1998: 253).
This conception
of language finds its contrast in the traditional conception
soul (melody
of language as a unity of body (phoneme or written character),
needs

and spirit (meaning). The definition of man as animal rationale


to
insofar as man's
this traditional understanding
of language
corresponds
constitution
is read in terms of body, soul, and spirit. Man's body on this ac
to the realm of animalitas
count iswhat belongs
and his capacity for language
The definition
of man's
and reason are the specific marks of his humanitas.
and rhythm),

as animal rationale
thus sets man apart as the single and sole living
creature with the capacity for language. Heidegger
insists however
that lan
as
cannot
be understood
guage
arising from man's animal nature; language
in order to distinguish
him
added on to man's essence
is not just something
essence

from

other

living creatures:

"... the human being is not only a living creature [nicht nur ein Lebewesen]
who possesses
is
language along with other capacities. Rather,
language
in that
the house of being in which
the human being ek-sists by dwelling,
to the truth of being, guarding
it" (1998: 254).
he belongs
As

this passage
contestation
of the metaphysical
illustrates, Heidegger's
man
as
in order to re
of
animal rationale
is indeed undertaken
as
store the privilege
cannot
of being
the matter of thought; but this privilege
be separated from a logic of the proper that functions on another level - a
definition

that grants man, and man


to being.
It is from

alone, a certain
this perspective

in his ex-propriated
dignity
that we can appreciate
the
name
man
are
not
statement
that
and
the
"man
of
Derrida's
of
implications
in the question of being such as it is put tometaphysics"
displaced
(1998:128).
of metaphysical
Heidegger's
thought of the truth of being is a displacement
logic

proximity

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ANOTHER

humanism,

but one that occurs

INSISTENCE

in the name

331

OF MAN

of a more

exacting

and rigorous

humanism.

- as
to rejoin for quite a while now
But
you no doubt have been wanting
- does not such
of homo humanus!
the
humanitas
think
thinking
precisely
has
in a decisive
Does
it not think humanitas
sense, as no metaphysics
a
extreme
or
in
sense?
can
not
the
it?
Is
this
'humanism'
it
think
thought
of the human being
that thinks the humanity
It is a humanism
Certainly.
inwhich not
to being. But at the same time it is a humanism
from nearness
essence
is at stake in its
the human being but the human being's historical
of
from the truth of being. But then does not the ek-sistence
provenance
the human being also stand or fall in this game of stakes? Indeed it does.

(1998:261)
of the animal
raises the question
explicitly
a
the
matter
of
be
almost
discourse,
contesting
always
more
and
of
this
subtle
effects
and
manifold
various manifestations
rigor
the question of the animal as it posed
ous form of humanism.
Consequently,
as an attempt to assimilate Heidegger
should not be understood
by Derrida
human
to
forms of metaphysical
the
less
and
rigorous
unthinkingly
simply
In those

texts where

Derrida

itwill

in Heidegger's

himself has delimited. To place Heidegger


facilely within
from that tradition. Where
be to overlook his difference
in light of
have been content to determine man's Being
classical humanisms
has boldly
a presupposed
of nature and humanity, Heidegger
determination
ism that Heidegger
this closure would

raised the question of the ground of these determinations,


thereby exposing
of
and offering a new determination
humanism's
complicity with metaphysics
and conception
this critique of humanism
man's essence as ek-sistence. With
for a clearer understanding
of ek-sistence we are given not only the possibility
but also the pos
of value theory and its attendant nihilism,
of the collapse
sibility

for an alternative

"ethics,"

another

thought

of responsibility

itself

of

or ex-posure.12
qua responsivity
responsibility
of the
of the question
The problem arises, at least from the perspective
to man alone.
limits ek-sistence
raises it, when Heidegger
animal as Derrida
offers no analysis or argu
And the issue here is not simply that Heidegger
does pose certain
in support of this claim (although this deficiency
is anything
nor
ek-sistence
this
claim
about
that
the
is
difficulties);
problem
that
ek-sistence
but certain (is anyone certain, including Heidegger
himself,
is the status of his constant d?n?ga
cannot be found beyond man? What

mentation

lies instead with


The problem
ek-sistence?).
a
hu
in differentiating
reliance on
uncritical
logic of opposition
Heidegger's
man
alone
man beings from animals. Why does Heidegger
have to insist that
without drawing
ek-sists? Could one not just as easily speak of ek-sistence
lines between man and animal? Of course a less anthro
single, insuperable
tions and disavowals

of animal

still eventually
of eksistence might
and more nuanced discussion
pocentric
"human
between
and
boundaries
to
distinctions
rise
certain
beings" and
give

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332

M. CALARCO

"animals"

but would

these differences

necessarily

be essential,

simple,

op

positional,
binary, and abyssal?
offers
Heidegger
ultimately

in the way of critique concerning


nothing
of the oppositional
line between human beings and
drawing
this oppositional
line
animals; he is concerned,
rather, with the way inwhich
has been determined
and understood. Heidegger
thus says the "Same" as the
humanist
tradition - he too insists on an oppositional
logic separating hu
man from animal. The difference
in Heidegger's
repetition of the Same lies
the tradition's

in his shifting of the opposition


difference
ister. The essential

between human and animal onto another reg


between man and animal for Heidegger
lies
or
not merely
in having
but
in
the
of
these
reason,
capac
language
ground
ities: ek-sistence,
which
is reserved for man alone. Thus, what we find in
text when read from the perspective
of the question of the animal
Heidegger's
an
tometaphysical
effective challenge
is
humanism
(where man is determined
to a pre-established
according
interpretation of the Being of beings) but, at the
same time, a further sedimentation
and reinforcement
of the anthropocentrism
of this same humanist
tradition (in which
the animal's Being
is determined
in
strict binary opposition
to and against the measure
of man's Being).13
The force of the question of the animal in Derrida
is to be found at this
where
with
communicates
level,
Heidegger's
anthropocentrism
uncritically
the anthropocentrism
of the humanist
tradition. In contrast to Heidegger's
insistence on man's oppositional
relation to the animal, Derrida will persist
in thinking the contamination,
and dijf?rance of
complication,
multiplication,
the differences
between and among man and animal. In place of a thinking of
man's essence and proper, Derrida will offer us a thought of the effects of these
a tracking of the reductive consequences
determinations,
as such and Man as such. Derrida will ask:
the Animal

of this thinking of
in what ways does
limits between man and animal

of single, absolute
Heidegger's
inscription
create homogeneities
and flatten out differences,
both between
and among
human beings and animals?
Is there a way to think the differences
between
are
and among human beings and animals
in non-oppositional
terms? What
the possible consequences
of a non-oppositional
thinking of such differences?
serve
as
These and other such questions
the preface to the task of reading the
question

of the animal

in Derrida.

Notes
1. Throughout
Heidegger's
of Western

2.

this
texts,

essay
and

I retain
also

the

term

to underscore

"man"

as

that what

it is a citation

of both

is at issue

in this essay
that has been typically

a conception
of the human
metaphysics,
to
those
deemed
only
beings
fully human but also masculine.
will be explored
This question
at more
in a forthcoming
length
Animal
After Derrida.

monograph

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Derrida's

and

is the "man"
restricted

not

entitled

The

OFMAN 333
ANOTHERINSISTENCE
3.

See

also Lacoue-Labarthe

and Nancy,

for a series

1981

of essays

to Derrida's

in response

text.
4.

"If the question


in such a
about Being
is to be explicitly
formulated
and carried
through
as to be completely
to itself, then any treatment
of it in line with
the
transparent
we have given
us to explain
is to be looked
elucidations
how Being
its
at, how
requires
it requires us to prepare
is to be understood
and conceptually
the way for
meaning
grasped;
manner

to it.
the right entity for our example,
and to work out the genuine
way of access
access
at
to
it
and
all
these
it,
Looking
something,
understanding
conceiving
choosing,
are modes
are constitutive
for our inquiry, and therefore
of Being
for those
ways ofbehaving
are ourselves.
the inquirers,
Thus
to work
out the question
entities which
we,
particular
we must make
an entity - the inquirer
of Being
[des fragenden]
transparent
adequately,
an
own
in his
The very asking
and as
of this question
is
of Being',
entity's mode
Being.
such it gets its essential
character from what
is inquired about
This
namely, Being.
entity
as one of the possibilities
which
each of us is himself
and which
includes
of its
inquiring
choosing

das wir selbst je sind und das unter anderem


die Seinsm?glichkeit
Being
[Dieses Seiende,
we
the
term
wir
des Fragens
Dasein
shall
denote
als
hat],
[fassen
by
terminologisch
we must first give
our question
If we are to formulate
and transparently,
Dasein].
explicitly
a proper
with
to its Being"
of an entity
1962:
explication
(Dasein),
regard
(Heidegger,
5.

26-7).
See Derrida's

citations

of Heidegger's

use

the name

of

"man"

to describe

Dasein

(1982:

127).
6.
1.

8.
9.
10.

in the Gesamtausgabe
is added
edition
of Wegmarken.
"Essentially"
the citation
in the opening
Cf. also the lines immediately
from OfGrammatology
preceding
as "not the
man's
of
this
where
Derrida
defines
proper
paradoxically
paragraph
chapter
it is the very dislocation
of the proper
in general:
the dislocation
of man:
of the
proper
in general..."
(1974: 244).
concedes
such a necessity.
See Lacoue-Labarthe,
the term "hyperhumanism"
from David
Farrell Krell.
See Krell,
the proper
himself

characteristic,
Lacoue-Labarthe
I borrow

60.

1997:

323, n. 23.
in "The Ends of Man,".

Lacoue-Labarthe

1992:

asks Derrida,
his reading of Heidegger
concerning
of what must one do this?"; that is to say, how does one decide, what obliges
one to decide, which weaknesses
to focus upon "in a text subject to the abyssal
'logic' of the
I certainly
to answer
of being?"
do not wish
1997: 77). While
(Lacoue-Labarthe,
question
"..

.in the name

for Derrida
following
least, / feel
reinforce
subject,
axioms

obliged

problematic
Heidegger
of another,

Derrida's
focus

(he offers his


Lacoue-Labarthe's

on

question
another

own

non-answer,

to focus

paper),
on those weaknesses

delimitations.
still
more

his

I would

Despite

response
nonetheless

intact, "sheltered
humanism
profound

displacement
in obscurity,"

and

in the discussion

response,

that one

respond

in Heidegger's

his

leaves

sans

must,

or at

text
of

that reproduce
and
the classical
humanist

as Derrida

say, the
might
(see section VI of
me
to
that obliges
from the perspective
of the
as the name of the animal ?

anthropocentrism
and dogmatic
limit

It is this problematic
Of Spirit,
1989).
the limits and weaknesses
humanism
of Heidegger's
is perhaps
not the same thing
of the animal
(which

sans response).
response
see Heidegger,
11. Among
1995: 264.
other places,
12. And we
should bear in mind
that this conception

can be read in terms


of responsibility
to all
to beings
to "animals"
and other
man,
entities,
e.g.,
beyond
in which
there is a sense
be under
Heideggerian
responsibility
might
con
in a manner
that supplements
and goes well
infinite
Levinas's
beyond

a responsibility
Others.
Indeed,
of

stood

as

of infinite
For Levinas,
ception
responsibility.
responsibility
or accomplished
never be fully assumed
good conscience
Yet responsibility
finite within
remains
Levinas's
possible.

is infinite
from
text

insofar

as

it can

this perspective
is im
as it is limited
insofar

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334
to man

alone.

to bear

on

this

Heidegger's
limitation

M. CALARCO
of

conception
in Levinas'

work.

could

responsibility
For more

on

be brought
see Llewelyn,

conceivably
a project

such

1991.
13.

It should

be noted

determined
oppositionally
which
remains
in place
senses
central

sense of anthropocentrism
specific
over
to man,
in relation
and measured

that it is this

in Heidegger's

of anthropocentrism,
and dominating
role

It is clear

thinking.

e.g., an anthropocentrism
to the Being
in relation

where

the animal

and against man's


contests
that he openly

in which
of all other

human

occupy

beings

is

Being
other
a

entities.

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Trans
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