Tolentino vs.

Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS: RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate
thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD: No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient that
the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing but
also of reading the bill on separate days.
ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA
G.R. NO. 118303 January 31, 1996
Facts: On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a
counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
Issue: Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senates own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said
to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?
Held: Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of
the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817
was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene
the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975
EUSEBIO B. GARCIA vs. HON. ERNESTO S. MATA,
Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for
mandamus to compel the Department of National Defense and Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate him to
active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.
Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of Republic Act. 1600 which prohibits the reversion of
officers with at least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the
budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).
Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?
Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any
appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a
fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in
the AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision
attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act.
When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title,
such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

DEMETRIA V. ALBA
Facts: Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from
disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of
Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
Issue: W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
Held: No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department to any program of any department
included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught. Such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the
General Appropriations Act of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution
Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only
allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the
function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of
congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against the respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by
the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional.
In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965
Facts: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective
officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the
Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class legislation
because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a
gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement
or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least
twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the
highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic
Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within the
meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class
legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of
a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase
their salary.
Issue: whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads as follows:

Held: Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the
amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the
National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of
such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation
other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as
provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other emoluments.

TIO vs. VRB

151 SCRA 208
GR No. L-75697, June 18, 1987
FACTS: The petitioner assails the validity of PD 1987 entitled an "Act creating the Videogram Regulatory Board," citing
especially Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government.
Petitioner contends that aside from its being a rider and not germane to the subject matter thereof, and such
imposition was being harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or unlawfully restraints trade in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Is PD 1987 a valid exercise of taxing power of the state?
HELD: Yes. It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and
so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except
such as those rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its
constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video
industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie
industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was
to favor one industry over another.
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. PETE PRADO
FACTS: Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as
implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme
Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them.
In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law.
Issue: WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.
- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
- Violative of the Equal protection clause
Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within
the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to
be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.
However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees
of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.
G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990
FACTS: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec
16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited

to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89)
and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she
cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for
by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put,
has the President the power to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and
rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89)
and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions
that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.
Bengzon vs. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524

15 April 1992

FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General
Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired
justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to
Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither
does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in
the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said
item.
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan
[G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988]
Facts: These four (4) petitions seek to nullify Executive Order No. 273 issued by the President of the Philippines, and
which amended certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code and adopted the value-added tax, for being
unconstitutional in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the President; that the VAT is oppressive,
discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and services. It is a tax on the value, added by every seller, with
aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or services, exceeding P200,00.00, to his purchase of goods and services,
unless exempt. VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10% of the gross selling price of goods or gross receipts realized
from the sale of services.
The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege taxes, multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and producers, advance
sales tax, and compensating tax on importations. The framers of EO 273 that it is principally aimed to rationalize the
system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax administration; and make the tax system more equitable, to enable
the country to attain economic recovery.
The VAT is not entirely new. It was already in force, in a modified form, before EO 273 was issued. As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, the Philippine sales tax system, prior to the issuance of EO 273, was essentially a single stage
value added tax system computed under the "cost subtraction method" or "cost deduction method" and was imposed
only on original sale, barter or exchange of articles by manufacturers, producers, or importers. Subsequent sales of
such articles were not subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD 1991 on 31 October 1985, a 3% tax was
imposed on a second sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the issuance of PD 2006 on 31 December 1985, to take
effect 1 January 1986. Reduced sales taxes were imposed not only on the second sale, but on every subsequent sale,
as well. EO 273 merely increased the VAT on every sale to 10%, unless zero-rated or exempt.
Issue: Whether or not EO 273 is unconstitutional
Held: No. Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a comprehensive study of the VAT had been
extensively discussed by this framers and other government agencies involved in its implementation, even under the
past administration. As the Solicitor General correctly sated. "The signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in the
exercise of her legislative powers. The legislative process started long before the signing when the data were
gathered, proposals were weighed and the final wordings of the measure were drafted, revised and finalized. Certainly,
it cannot be said that the President made a jump, so to speak, on the Congress, two days before it convened."

Next, the petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive.
The petitioners" assertions in this regard are not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant their conclusions.
They have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory or unjust. Petitioners merely rely upon
newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. A tax is considered uniform when
it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." The sales tax adopted in
EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of
0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engage in business
with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt
from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, spared as they are from the
incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.
The Court likewise finds no merit in the contention of the petitioner Integrated Customs Brokers Association of the
Philippines that EO 273, more particularly the new Sec. 103 (r) of the National Internal Revenue Code, unduly
discriminates against customs brokers.
At any rate, the distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax
under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in that the activities of customs brokers (like those of
stock, real estate and immigration brokers) partake more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus
subjected to the percentage tax under Sec. 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code prior to its amendment by EO
273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT.
Province of Abra v. Hernando
G.R. No. L-49336 August 31, 1981
FACTS: The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge
Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there is no question that the
real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued, Inc. Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly and
exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes. The proper
remedy of the petitioner is appeal and not this special civil action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: The Constitution provides that charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries and required that
for the exemption of lands, buildings, and improvements, they should not only be exclusively but also actually
and directly used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never
presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. In this case, there is no showing that
the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses. Further, there is no merit in Abras
contention that the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
and not with a court.
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS AQUINO
JUNE 15 1988 G.R. No. L-39086
FACTS: Abra Valley College, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the
SEC filed a complaint to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. Paterno Millare filed through counsel
a motion to dismiss the complaint. The provincial fiscal filed a memorandum for the government wherein they opined
hat based on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school
building and the school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College are exempted from payment
of taxes. Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of the said
school for residential purpose. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes?
HELD: NO. It must be stressed that while the court allows a more liberal and nonrestrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educationalpurposes as provided for in the Article VI,
Section 22, Paragraph 3 of the
1935Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made thatexemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose. Otherwise stated, the use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the
use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family,
may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose
educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the

Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination beconsidered incidental to the purposes of
education. Under the 1935 Constitution, the rial court correctly arrived at theconclusion that the school building as well
as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the director and
his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However,
since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be return to the
school involved.
PASCUAL vs. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
110 PHIL 331
GR No. L-10405, December 29, 1960
FACTS: In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of
the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a member
of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress
the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to
the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional
defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In
accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation
can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on
which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation
sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Aglipay v. Ruiz - A case digest

GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member
of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold.
The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held / Ruling: There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps
with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a
poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177,
entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and
by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines
on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher
than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to
assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.

HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to assign the
highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an
amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
Diaz v. CA
G.R. No. L-109698 December 5, 1994
Facts: On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service.
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at One
Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the
decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for proper disposition to the
Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review
with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of
Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received notice of the ERB
decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently
alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.
On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our resolution of 8
September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular.

In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issue: whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
Held: Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this
provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of
Energy, now ERB, remains.
Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the
provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court
may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right
to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters the
conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the state
and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive actions against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the
essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the
return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Disierto
G.R. No. 146710-15
April 3, 2001
FACTS: After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and members of the Presidents
administration started resigning one by one. In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the
Senate. The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the President,
which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally. On January 20, the President submitted two letters one signifying his
leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of
the Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioner resigned as President; and
Whether the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning
RULING: For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts
of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the resignation is clear. In the press
release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President; he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability and intent of reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the
people; he assured will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country.
This is of high grade evidence of his intent to resign.
Petitioners contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of
RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is
debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at
the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted
against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in
effect, no impeachment case pending against the petitioner when he resigned.
Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto
G.R. No. 146738
April 3, 2001
FACTS: Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on
air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the
Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after
taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the
pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office
of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang.
In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President
of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of
the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt,
he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estradas reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters
to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable
to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
G.R. No. 83896
February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: In July 1987, the President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission
that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution. CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment
in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta

A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998
Facts: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The
said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Issue: Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution,
the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term the President is neither required to make appointments to
the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to
fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This
prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come
within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacanciesin the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the ban