Social Compass 37(4), 1990, 455-469

Grace DAVIE

Believing without Belonging: Is This the

Future of Religion in Britain?
Les statistiques concernant rappartenance aux institutions religieuses et
celles qui, d autre part, sont relatives aux modeles de croyance nous
o f f rent deux indicateurs distincts, mais lies, de la religiosite. Chacun
d eux pose des problem es au chercheur mais, consideres conjointem ent, Us peuvent nous orienter vers des questions centrales. On peut
m em e dire que c'est la combinaison exacte de ces deux variables qui
caracterise la religion britannique a la fin du 20eme siecle. II semble
que la croyance persiste alors m em e que rappartenance continue a
baisser ou, plus exactement, que la croyance dim inue (a diminue) moins
vite que rappartenance. II en resulte un desequilibre marque entre les
deux indicateurs. Les deux premieres parties de rarticle ont po u r but de
faire ressortir les implications de ce desequilibre p o u r une analyse de la
religion dans la societe britannique contemporaine. D eux perspectives
particulieres focalisent notre attention: la premiere pose la question des
changements profonds entre generations, la seconde examine quelques
aspects de la religion de la classe ouvriere. La troisieme par tie analyse les
memes donnees mais d un point de vue un peu different. On y considere certains types de croyance religieuse dans la societe britannique et
la fagon dont ils sont lies a des contextes particuliers.

Introduction and Outline

Membership figures for religious institutions and statistics relating to pat
terns of religious belief provide us with two distinct, though related,
indicators of religiosity. Each poses some problems for the social investi
gator, but taken together they can point us to some crucial questions.
Indeed, the precise com bination between these two variables is, surely, what
characterizes British1 religion in the late 20th century. Believing, it seems,
persists while belonging continues to decline or, to be more accurate,
believing is declining (has declined) at a slower rate than belonging
resulting in a marked imbalance between the two variables; this imbalance
pervades a very great deal of our religious life. It characterizes what might be
termed the implicit religion of the British people in the last decades of the
20th century.
We need, however, to look at the relationship between these two vari
ables believing and belonging from more than one perspective. Not
only does the relationship between the two change over time it was
different in the past and may well differ in the future it also reflects the
pressures of particular contexts within contem porary Britain. To start with,

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Believing without Belonging

the relationship between believing and belonging varies considerably

between the different countries that make up the United Kingdom. The
proportion of the population claiming religious membership is more than six
times greater in Northern Ireland than in England (see Table 1). The impli
cations of this marked variation are considerable. But even within England,
the relationship alters in response both to regional (even local) factors, and
to different types of existence, contrasting, say, urban or rural ways of life.
Secondly, there are marked variations in religious behaviour (once again
both in believing and belonging) between different social environments in
Britain. We need, for example, to examine the ways in which these variables
interact in one social class rather than another, in one racial group rather
than another and bearing in mind the divergent behaviour of men and
women with respect to religious life.
The first two sections of this article aim to draw out the implications of
this kind of approach for an analysis of religion in contem porary Britain.
Since the article is relatively short, two particular perspectives provide a
focus: the first raises the question of profound generational changes; the
second looks at some aspects of working-class religion (not least the reli
gious patterns prevalent in the inner city, or to use a more technical
phrase in our urban priority areas).
In adopting this necessarily limited approach, we need, however, to bear
in mind a whole series of underlying questions concerning the way in which
religious institutions relate to the broader currents of religious belief in
contemporary society. These relationships raise some very fundamental
issues for the sociologist of religion, indeed for the sociologist in general;
they concern, for example, the changing nature of social institutions, their
role in the creation and dissemination of belief systems, and the individuals
intricate and continually evolving relationship to such systems.2 The follow
ing questions are central to this kind of analysis:
W hat, precisely, is the relationship between the active religious minority in a society and
the inactive religious majority? H ow far is one dependent on the other? Why is the
former so often predom inantly middle class? Does a believing majority make the work
o f a minority harder or easier? D o the former, for exam ple, constitute a pool from which
the latter can fish, or do they becom e a rival set-up, an alternative religious focus for
society? If so, what is the nature o f this alternative belief? Is there a minimum size
beyond which the active minority is no longer effective in a society? What factors, apart
from size, might determine this effectiveness? Through which institutional mechanisms
can church members work outside o f the church itself? W ho has access to these institu
tions? W hat, in this connection, is the role o f religious education or o f religious broad
casting? (D avie, 1989: 85-6)

The third part of the article uses the same material, but looks at it from a
slightly different angle. It considers certain types of religious belief
within contem porary Britain and the way that these types relate to particular
contexts. For example suburban, middle-class belief is, for the most part,
articulate ; it is expressed in a predictable range of consciously chosen
activities and leads to a distinctive kind of church life. On the other hand
traditional rural patterns of belief are rarely expressed; they are, primarily,
experiential and do not necessarily connect with specifically religious

Davie

457

behaviour. Religious membership becomes a question of being rather than

doing. We shall see that very real problems emerge when the two types of
behaviour become focused on a single church.
All three sections of the article depend upon a framework of statistics.
These are summarized in Tables 1-4.3 Much o f this material is self-evident.
On the other hand, it is, perhaps, worth underlining one or two features that
are central to the argument.
The most obvious of these underpins the whole approach and concerns
the profound imbalance between any statistics of church membership and
those concerned with religious belief. In short, a large m ajority of people in
contemporary Britain continue to believe but have ceased to belong to their
religious institutions in any meaningful sense (compare Tables 1 and 3).
Given that this group of people forms a m ajority within the population, it is
ironic that sociologists appear to know very little indeed about their religious
beliefs and the way that these impinge on daily life. W hat, exactly, is the
nature of British implicit religion ?
Alongside this mismatch, it is, however, im portant to note the relatively
large latent membership of the Church of England (see Table 2). This conti
nues to be the church from which a m ajority of English4 people choose to
stay away, except, that is, to m ark the turning points in life: birth, marriage
and most of all death. Despite a lack of regular attendance, it is to the
Church of England that most English people turn when the services of a reli
gious institution are required. Understanding the implications of such resi
dual allegiance and its relationship both to the practising religious minority
and to the wider culture seem to me, therefore, of crucial significance for the
study of contemporary British society.

Generational Shifts in Religious Behaviour

Older people have always been more religious than the young. W hether the
elderly have regarded God as judgemental (the source of all their troubles)
or as a father figure (the rock in the storm of life), they have always taken
him more seriously than the young. This kind of generational difference has
been reflected in church membership statistics for some time, and it is,
increasingly, supported by studies of religious belief. Table 4, for example,
demonstrates the strong correlation between age and religious commitment
that emerged from the European Values survey. It seems that belief in God
(and specifically belief in a personal God) declines with each step down the
age scale, as, indeed, does practice, prayer and moral conservatism. In
short, a religiously and morally conservative m ajority among the retired
becomes a religiously conservative minority in the 18-24 age-group. We
should, moreover, note that these correlations hold for many other E uro
pean countries besides Britain (Stoetzel, 1983; Harding and Phillips, 1985).
Clearly there are a great many differences within the category young
people .5 We need, for example, to know whether there are denom inational
differences in belief and behaviour for the actively religious young; we need,
in addition, to know the significance of social class and gender. Nonetheless,

C/

oo

Members
N . Ireland

England

W ales

Scotland N. Ireland

England

W ales

Scotland

N . Ireland

157,000
61,099a
8,000
274,737
26,078
526,914

12,762a
3,312
1,948a
l,1 5 9 a
8,341a
27,522

698
193
245
268
420
1,824

240
34
175
1,513
418
2,380

364
244
70
532
182
1,392

16,632
7,405a
2,310
l,8 7 9 a
6,731a
34,948

1,521
415
785
1,212
1,144
5,077

315
73
190
2,142
723
3,443

440
126
85
595
409
1,655

285,554 353,019
1,480a
179a

4,380a
165a

200
5

1,111
2

549

3,034a
150a

324
6

478
6

420
2

2,029

3,493

1,941

5,407

3,927

2,077

England

W ales

Anglican
Methodist
Baptist
Presbyterian
Other Churches
Total Protestant

l,675,471a
435,764a
167,940a
127,197
406,55l a
2,812,923

115,896
37,000
22,561
7,008
45,611
17,666
79,216a 901,914
84,248
56,027
347,532 1,019,615

Roman Catholic
Orthodox
Total
Christian
Percentage o f
adult
population:

1,342,547 146,673
216,235a
2,142a
4,371,705

11

aRevised figure.
Source : Brierley (1988, p. 150).

496,347

22

Churches

Ministers

Scotland

1,306,649

32

880,112

75

32,067

38,132

Believing without Belonging

TABLE 1
Church membership: 1985 summary figures by individual country

Davie

459

the underlying question remains the same whatever the internal patterns
within this group. Are we, in the late 20th century, experiencing a massive
generational shift with respect to religious behaviour, rather than a m ani
festation of the normal life-cycle? If we conclude, as many comm entators
do, that the former is the case, the implications for the future o f religious life
in this country are very considerable indeed. The point at issue can be
summarized quite simply: just how far can familiar patterns of religious life
(both structures and culture) m aintain themselves if more and more young
people not only opt out of the system tem porarily but stay out of it perm a
nently? This is one of the most crucial questions facing the contem porary
churches. It cannot, moreover, be answered within the religious institutions
themselves, but concerns the relationship that those institutions have with
the wider society.
We need, however, to remember in commenting upon the possibilities
of a new situation that there has already been an im portant (though
rarely perceived) generational shift in British religion. And, in the short term
at least, the churches have been able to adapt to this change, though they are
TABLE 2
Total community figures (millions)3
Religion

1970

1975

1980

1983

1985

1987

Church of England*5
Other Anglicans
Baptists
Methodists
Presbyterians
Roman Catholics'5
Orthodox
Other Trinitarian Churches

27.8
1.6
0.6
1.7
2.1
5.2
0.3
1.1

27.5
1.5
0.6
1.6
1.9
5.2
0.4
1.1

26.6
1.4C
0.6
1.5
1.7
5.2
0.4
1.0

26.1
1.3
0.6
1.4
1.7
5.2
0.4
1.1

25.7
1.3
0.6
1.3
1.7
5.2
0.4
1.2

25.6
1.3
0.6
1.3
1.7
5.2
0.5
1.3

Total Trinitarian Churches

40.4

39.8

38.4C

37.8

37.4C

37.5

0.1
0.6
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.1

0.3
0.7
0.4
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.1

0.5
0.7
0.4
0.3
1.2
0.4
0.2

0.5
0.7
0.4
0.3
1.3
0.4
0.2

0.5
0.8
0.3
0.3
1.5
0.5
0.3

0.6
0.8
0.3
0.3
1.5
0.5
0.3

Church of Scientology
Other non-Trinitarian Churches
Jews
Hindus
Muslims
Sikhs
Other religions
Total non-Trinitarian Churches
and other religions
Total all religions
Percentage total Christian
Churches of population
Percentage total all religions of
population

1.7

2.4

3.7

3.8

4.2

42.1

42.2

42. l c

41.6

41. 6C

4.3
41.8

72

71

68

67

66

65

75

75

75

74

73

73

aEstimate. bBaptised membership. cRevised figure.

Source: Brierley (1988, p. 151).

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Believing without Belonging

TABLE 3
Indicators of religious commitment, Great Britain compared with the European
average (percentages)

Indicators o f religious disposition

Often think about meaning and
purposes of life
Never think life meaningless
Often think about death
Often regret doing wrong
Need moments of prayer, etc.
Define self as a religious person
Draw com fort/strength from
religion
God is im portant in my life
Have had a spiritual experience
Indicators o f orthodox belief
Believe in personal God
(Believe in a spirit or life force)
Believe in:
God
Sin
Soul
Heaven
Life after death
The Devil
Hell
Personally fully accept
Com mandm ents demanding:
No other gods
Reverence of G ods name
Holy Sabbath

Great Britain

European average

34
50
15
8
50
58

30
44
18
10
57
62

46
50
19

48
51
12

31
39

32
36

76
69
59
57
45
30
27

73
57
57
40
43
25
23

48
43
25

48
46
32

Source : Abrams et al. (1985, p. 60).

not always conscious of so doing. Prewar generations in Britain, to a greater

extent than is often appreciated, grew up under the influence of the
churches, or, at least, under the influence of a wide network of para-church
organizations. They may not have practised their faith very regularly but
they possessed, nonetheless, a degree of religious knowledge that had at least
some sort of connection with orthodox Christianity. Since the war the
pattern has altered radically. Nominal belief in God persists, so too does a
relatively friendly attitude towards the churches. In contrast, not only is
practice minimal, so too is religious knowledge. When and if the postwar
generations of the population approach their churches for example, for
baptism or for marriage those who receive them can assume very little
indeed in the way of credal awareness. Orthodox Christianity and popular
belief have, inevitably, been drifting apart.
Are we now (as we enter the last decade of the 20th century) experiencing a

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461

TABLE 4
Socio-demographic profile of religious commitment
Overall religious commitment:
combined scale (%)

Variable

Low M edium Low Medium Medium

High
High
(%)
%
%
%
w

Age:
18-24
25-44
45-64
65 +

Total
sample
(N = 100%)

27
31
21
11

15
16
19
18

11
16
20
28

9
14
27
28

193
446
335
202

Sex/em ploym ent status o f wom en:

Male
27
25
W orking female
18
23
Non-working F
15
23

18
17
14

14
23
22

15
20
26

576
311
314

39
24
14
14

Significance = 0.000
Gamma 0.29

Significance 0.000
Gamma 0.21

Terminal education age:

14 yrs or under
15-17 yrs
18 yrs +

15
24
26

15
29
23

18
17
14

25
16
15

28
14
22

361
628
208

17
24
22

22
23
27

19
17
14

21
19
16

21
17
21

322
547
330

22
25
23
17

23
24
24
24

17
16
19
15

18
14
18
23

20
21
17
21

192
263
387
353

cases):
15
20
26
19
27
28

15
16
18

25
17
13

26
21
15

250
307
322

24

17

19

19

1201 (max)

Significance 0.000
Gamma 0.14

Locality:
Village
Small town
Large town
Significance 0.13
Gamma 0.05

Socio-economic group:
AB

Cl
C2
DE
Significance 0.21
Gamma 0.05

Incom e level (327 missing

Under 3840
3840-7199
7200 +
Significance 0.0001
Gamma 0.15

Missing cases 32
Total (%)

22

Source: Abrams et al. (1985, pp. 70-71).

462

Believing without Belonging

further generational shift in religious behaviour? The sociological evidence

seems to indicate that this might be the case, not least the European Values
study: significant numbers of their 18-24 age-group are rejecting even
nominal belief. In short, for many young people, disconnected belief is,
increasingly, giving way to no belief at all.6
There is, however, another way of looking at things. If we widen the
definition of religion to include questions about the meaning of life, the
purpose o f m ankinds existence, the future of the planet and m ans respon
sibilities to his fellow man and to the E arth itself, we may find a very
different pattern of religious behaviour among the young. The evidence
remains largely impressionistic but it seems likely that the 18-24 age-group
may respond to these profound ecological, moral, ethical (and surely
religious) issues much more positively than they do to traditional religious
instruction.
O f course, this line of argument begs many questions which cannot be
ignored, even if a full discussion of their implications is impossible in a short
article. Have we, for example, shifted ground so completely that we are no
longer talking about the same phenomenon? And even if we agree that the
approach itself is legitimate, it is clear that we need to know a great deal
more about the elusive and changing links between religion and social
morality, or between religion and ethical behaviour. Just how far is it
possible to talk in any meaningful sense about one without the other? The
issue becomes, moreover, more urgent rather than less, in that contem po
rary society almost by its very nature throws up issue after issue
which lie, precisely, on this boundary.7
Bearing this in mind, we might suggest the following rather tentative
conclusion: religion and religious values are not so much disappearing
among young people as being redirected. This redirection is, nonetheless,
altering (very profoundly) the relationship between popular belief and the
institutional churches, that is surely the relationship between believing
and belonging.

The Urban W orking C lass

The discrepancy between believing and belonging is at its sharpest in urban

working-class areas, and above all in those parts of our cities designated as
urban priority areas. Belief persists, but the expected reluctance to practise
religion is, in this part of our society, compounded by a further factor; that
is, a mistrust of any kind of institutional life. David Sheppard puts this as
follows:
It d oesn t take long to discover that the great majority o f urban working class people in
Europe and Britain are alienated from the institution o f the church whatever
church as they are from all institutions (Foreword to Ahern and Davie, 1987: 7 -8).

A second point is equally significant; this situation of alienation is nothing

new. Indeed some sections of the urban working class in Britain have been

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463

without any real contact with their churches for several generations.
How, then, has working-class belief been able to maintain itself despite a
prolonged divorce from institutional Christianity? And what effect has this
divorce had on the nature o f working-class belief?
Part of the explanation lies in what might appear a self-contradictory
statement. It is at one and the same time true that higher social groupings are
on average more inclined to belief and practice than lower ones, and that
increased educational levels (normally associated with higher social class)
have a negative effect on religious belief. In other words the nature of the
relationship between belief and practice varies depending upon the social
class in question. In a middle-class environment people are more likely to
make conscious choices about both belief and practice; if they do one they
do the other. In contrast, in a working-class environment (where levels of
education are lower), there is, apparently, no perceived need to put belief
into institutional or liturgical practice. Indeed it could be argued that the
reverse is true; in many urban areas church-going is seen as at best unneces
sary and at worst hypocritical.8
A further point is also im portant. Not only is working-class belief largely
unrelated to religious practice, it is, very often, not articulated at all.
Working-class religious views frequently take the form o f unexamined
assumptions; they exist almost unconsciously and remain in a latent form
until needed . W hat triggers the need varies, but it is very often the crises,
or the turning-points in life, that bring religious ideas to the fore. It is this
kind of situation (abnorm al almost by definition) that continues, despite
everything, to bring the urban working class into contact with its churches,
and most o f all with the Church of England.
So far these needs can be met, just. The institutional churches are able,
though sometimes with great difficulty, to m aintain a structure even in those
parts of society where the going is hardest. The overall pattern of religious life
is, however, changing. More and more people within British society are, it
appears, wanting to believe but without putting this belief into practice. In
other words, some aspects of working-class religious behaviour (notably the
lack of regular church attendance) traditionally thought of as exceptions
to the rule are becoming, increasingly, the norm al patterns of our society.
It is easy to slip into value judgements about different types of religious
behaviour and to conclude that things are, therefore, not only changing, but
getting worse . This is not necessarily the case; working-class modes of
behaviour may be different, but they are just as valid as middle-class ones.
We need, nonetheless, to acknowledge the shifts that are taking place and to
ask questions about them. This section raises one question in particular: just
how far can our present structures of religious life m aintain themselves if
increasing numbers o f people in our society prefer a passive rather than
active relationship to these structures?9 We have, in fact, returned to
the sociological issues outlined in the introductory section; in particular
to considering:
Is there a minimum size beyond which the active minority is no longer effective in
society? What factors, apart from size, might determine this effectiveness? Through

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Believing without Belonging

which institutional m echanism s can church members work outside o f the church itself?
W ho has access to these institutions? W hat, in this connection, is the role o f religious
education or o f religious broadcasting?

Clear-cut answers are, however, less easy to supply than the questions. We
can, nevertheless, begin to explore some of these connections within the
following, rather tentative, typology of belief.
A Suggested Typology of Belief
The Typology
The
The
The
The

inner city
suburb
city centre
countryside

Belief depressed
Belief articulated
Civic belief
Belief assumed

The Roman Catholic churches

The black churches

Belief expressed
Communal belief

Religious broadcasting

Believing without belonging,

par excellence

Religious education

Belief: injected or rejected

The examples of belief proposed in the typology given here are by no means
exhaustive. The typology could, for example, include many more denomi
national illustrations. Nor is it possible, let alone desirable, to discuss each
one of these types in turn as if it were a closely defined phenomenon peculiar
to a discrete social situation. Rather, the labels are intended to evoke a
distinctive characteristic, a particular flavour even, that differentiates belief
in one part of our society from another, and the way that this particular type
of belief relates (or fails to relate) to religious practice. In practice, of
course, the types are almost always mixed.
The first four examples are, for the most part, found in distinct geo
graphical locations. On the other hand it is undeniable that within the urban
context, inner city and suburb are inevitably associated with identi
fiable social classes and any further analysis must take account of these
connections.
We have already looked in some detail at the depressed nature of much
inner-city (working-class) belief. Indeed there are some commentators who
might suggest that belief has, in any meaningful sense, disappeared alto
gether from large parts of our cities. This view seems to me mistaken (Ahern
and Davie, 1987). Nonetheless the nature of working-class religious behav
iour undoubtedly contrasts very sharply with the articulate belief of the
middle-class suburbs. We need, moreover, to underline a further contrast:
these divergent patterns of belief result in very different types of churches.
This is not a question of denom inational differences; the contrasting types
can, for example, be seen very clearly within the Church of England.
If we look first at the inner city, it is clear that in this part of society most
churches rely for their very existence on the parochial system .10 If the

Davie

465

Church of England were not obliged to meet its parochial obligations, here
as in every other part of English society, it would have disappeared long ago,
for inner-city churches enjoy little success by conventional standards;
congregations are small and, very frequently, they struggle for financial
survival. On the other hand any proposed closure of a church will be met by
a chorus of disapproval from non-members as well as members. The services
of that church are more widely appreciated than is often realized.
In contrast the suburban church flourishes. We should, in addition, note
its tendency to operate on a market (as opposed to a parish) principle,
attracting worshippers from a wide geographical area. These are, very often,
articulate individuals who choose, very consciously, the type of church to
which they wish to belong. Their churches are characterized by high levels of
activity, endless committees and a much clearer distinction between
members and non-members than is found elsewhere in society. In other
words middle-class organizational patterns reflect middle-class ways of
believing.
If we turn now to the rural church, we find that it is different again. It is,
moreover, a rapidly changing church; or, more precisely, it is a church that
is struggling (hard) to come to terms with a rapidly changing situation.
Traditionally the rural church has been the focus of largely unspoken cor
porate belief. Village people assume that they are members of this church
unless proved otherwise; they see no need to indicate this membership
through specifically religious activity. Their belief is essentially experiential.
This long-standing, unquestioned, indeed unquestioning, arrangement has,
however, been overtaken by events. Profound (and seemingly irreversible)
economic changes have resulted in an ever-increasing stream of newcomers
who arrive, daily, in our small towns and villages. A large proportion of
these new arrivals come from the suburbs, bringing with them suburban
ways of believing and suburban habits of church life. The resulting clash
between the two styles of belief (rural and suburban) very frequently
centred on one Anglican church (the traditional village church) can be
very painful indeed.
The second group within the typology illustrates patterns of believing and
belonging for two religious minorities in this country (this part of the analy
sis could be extended much further). Indeed it is im portant to remember that
religious minorities always behave differently from majorities with respect
to both believing and belonging. For example, Roman Catholic practice in
this country is markedly higher than in Latin countries, even in workingclass areas. This kind of difference has to be explained sociologically. But
quite apart from the context, Roman Catholic obligation requires a degree
of practice absent from the Protestant churches. In consequence, the rela
tionship between believing and belonging is bound to be different for
Catholics whether they are a minority or not. The typology needs to reflect
such differences.
If we turn now to the black churches, they, to some extent at least, illus
trate a broader category the immigrant churches.11 These churches not
only draw people together for a particular type of worship, but, in addition,
provide a focus for a whole range of support mechanisms for the immigrant

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community. They are, moreover, remarkably successful in this undertaking.

It is worth pointing out that in so doing, the black churches appear to reverse
the traditional or English connections between church and community. For
many black congregations, the community grows out of the church which is
its principal reason for existence. In contrast, an English church, and the
Church o f England is the most obvious example, forms a religious focus
within a given community for those who choose to take up its services.
(There are, as we have seen, many different ways in which this take-up may
be effected.) Indeed, the relationships between a community and its church,
or churches, are as diverse and elusive as those between believing and
belonging.
The final examples in the typology introduce a different dimension
altogether. They do not concern churches as such at all, at least not in any
direct sense. Religious broadcasting is, surely, an almost pure case of
believing without belonging. It is, moreover, significant that it is one of the
few religious activities in our society which is increasing in popularity
(Winter, 1988). Given this popularity, it is hardly surprising that the
religious broadcasters have an uneasy relationship with the churches. In
many ways they do the churches job better than they can, demonstrating
considerable professional expertise and ensuring performances of a consist
ently high quality so much so that the local churches are, rightly, fearful
of the competition. On the other hand, the local churches know perfectly
well that religious broadcasting makes good a number of their own deficien
cies, and in a way that is helpful to both parties. To a considerable extent,
religious broadcasters bolster the religious values within society on which
both they and the churches depend for their survival. In short, religious
broadcasting is both friend and foe to the institutional churches. Either way,
however, it is an activity which disturbs the conventional relationship
between believing and belonging.
To some extent religious education is similar; once again it both helps and
hinders the churches, though not necessarily in the same way as religious
broadcasting. In order to understand some of the ambivalence between the
churches and religious education, we need to remember that the latter comes
with an element of compulsion (an element considerably strengthened by the
1988 Education Act). Moreover, it seems though there is a very great deal
of debate about the precise connections in this area that compulsion has,
to some extent at least, led to rejection, and not least among the young. On
the other hand, we should not lose sight of the fact that schools remain one
o f the most im portant sources of religious knowledge, if not of religious
belief, in this country. Indeed, they are, very often, the only source.
In view of this, it seems pertinent to ask whether the little knowledge that
is passed on by this route may not, in fact, be a dangerous thing. Injections
of religious instruction through the school system do not always have the
desired effect; they may be counterproductive. Indeed this possibility affects
not only the life of the churches, but also for very different reasons
that of the government. From the perspective of the churches and their
future, it is unlikely that religious education in schools however
imaginative will produce a nation of church-goers (always assuming, of

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course, that this is what we are after); from the perspective of the govern
ment, it is far from clear that compulsory religious education will, neces
sarily, result in an upturn in public morality.
The final point returns us to a crucial area of debate that we have already
mentioned and one that is central to the work of sociologists of religion. Just
how do religious beliefs and practice relate not only to each other but to the
moral and ethical issues that confront, and will continue to confront,
contem porary society?
We can finish with a topical example. Contem porary medical science
(very often associated with secularization) is increasingly able to offer
treatment which is beneficial both to childless couples and to those whose
children are likely to be at risk from hereditary disease. However, the
medical techniques in question depend heavily upon research on human
embryos: research which is, plainly, unacceptable to certain sections of the
population, not least to some (though by no means all) of its church-goers.
An article such as this is not concerned with the moral rightness of any
particular party in this ongoing debate. It does, however, need to underline
the fact that this kind of controversy is likely to become more rather than
less common in modern society (Hervieu-Leger, 1986). And, if this is the
case, who, exactly, is going to create an acceptable framework in which the
necessary decisions can be made? W hether this discussion is primarily moral
or religious is a moot point. W hat is abundantly clear is that the issues raised
will concern both belief and practice (the manner in which belief is given
practical expression) within modern society, but it will connect these two
variables in a way quite distinct from the links that have associated them in
the past. On the other hand, it seems to me unlikely that any committee
assembled to work out some guidelines in this difficult and rapidly
changing area will, even in our supposedly secular society, be complete
without considerable representation from the institutional churches. Indeed
in this respect the churches which remain, despite everything, our
most significant doctrinal resource may become more rather than less
influential.12
Working out the implications of these changes, both long- and short-term
is central to the study o f implicit religion.13

NOTES
* Com parisons can, of course, be made with other countries in this respect. It
may well be that a large part of West Europe displays a similar imbalance between
these variables though the precise way in which this is formulated may vary
considerably. In the Scandinavian countries, for example, there is almost a
situation of belonging without believing. Nominal attachm ent to the State Churches
persists, but such attachm ent implies neither particular beliefs nor regular practice.
2 For these ideas, I am to a large extent indebted to R. Campiche, who has
examined similar connections in Switzerland as part o f a research project entitled
Pluralite confessionnelle, religiosite diffuse, identite culturelle en Suisse . This
project is, in turn, associated with a national research initiative: Pluralisme culturel
et identite nationale .

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3 The tables on religious practice are taken from Brierley (1988); those on belief
from the European Values Project (see Abrams et al., 1985; Harding and Phillips,
1985; Stoetzel, 1983). The precise use of terms in both these areas is problematic.
Close reference to the source of this material is essential in order to understand
exactly how the terminology has been applied in these particular cases.
4 English people choose to stay away from the Church o f England. Scottish (or
Welsh, or Northern Irish) people have very different patterns of religious loyalty.
These differences are closely related to their national identity. In view of space, the
discussion concentrates with one or two exceptions on the indigenous popu
lation of England. The statistical material, however, covers a wider perspective in
order to place the English pattern within its proper context.
5- Indeed the category young people is, in itself, problematic. This has fol
lowed the age groupings of the European Values study.
6 This evidence can be found in a variety of sources. In addition to the European
Values study, there are extensive references to work on children and young people in
Barley (1987) and Field (1987). These literature reviews underline Leslie Francis very
detailed work on young people, religious education and the churches, for example L.
Francis (1982, 1984 and 1985). More indirectly, we should also note W adsworth and
Freeman (1983).
7- The argument here and in subsequent sections o f the article is close to that
advanced by D. Hervieu-Leger (1986: 224-7). Hervieu-Leger argues that modern
society is, in many ways, destructive of religion; at the same time, however, m odern
ity creates and will continue to create a moral space within society that reli
gion, alongside other agencies, cannot but be called upon to fill. Secularization is not
a question of religion confronted by rationality: cest le processus de reorganisa
tion permanente du travail de la religion dans une societe structurellement impuissante a combler les attentes q u il faut susciter pour exister comme telle (p. 227). For
an English summary of Hervieu-Legers work, see his Religion and Modernity in
the French Context: For a New A pproach to Secularization , Sociological Analysis
(forthcoming).
8- This point is discussed in some detail in Ahern and Davie (1987). It also reflects
the findings of the Leeds Study on Conventional and Common Religion (Leeds,
Religious Research Paper, no. 12), and R. H oggarts classic study o f the uses of
literacy (Hoggart, 1957).
9 In many ways, this parallels the question asked in the previous section about
the religious behaviour of young people. In both cases and the two should be
taken together the central issue at stake is the future o f our religious institutions
and their capacity to be effective in contem porary Britain.
,0* That is, a system that networks the entire country. This does not mean that
particular parish boundaries are immutable. It does imply that everyone belongs
somewhere, whether they choose to acknowledge this or not.
11 Immigrant churches include, of course, members of other faiths. The argu
ment of this paper has been restricted to Western Christianity, but there is no reason
why the approach could not be extended to other religions. Indeed within different
faith communities, a variety of patterns may emerge with respect to the relationship
between institutionalized practice and more diffused beliefs. The comparative per
spective is important.
I2- Once again, this point was brought to my attention by Campiche, see Note 2.
13 One of the fora for such a debate is provided by the Network for the Study of
Implicit Religion. Further inform ation about this particular network can be
obtained from: Canon Dr Edward Bailey, W interbourne Rectory, Bristol BS17 1JQ,
UK.

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Grace DAVIE. G raduated in Sociology from the University of Exeter.

PhD in the Sociology of Religion from the London School of Econom
ics. Publication: Inner City God: The Nature o f B elief in the Inner C ity,
London, 1987. ADDRESS: Department o f Sociology, Armory Build
ing, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK.