INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

DURING OFFSHORE PIPELINE LIFETIME

F.M. Titti, S. Dafne, L. Del Baldo, M. Pasini, Saipem Energy Services.

th

This paper was presented at the 10 Offshore Mediterranean Conference and Exhibition in Ravenna, Italy, March 23-25, 2011.
It was selected for presentation by OMC 2011 Programme Committee following review of information contained in the abstract
submitted by the author(s). The Paper as presented at OMC 2011 has not been reviewed by the Programme Committee.

ABSTRACT
Pipelines operators need to ensure that the safety level specified in the design phase is
maintained throughout the operating lifetime. The management of pipelines integrity is a
primary goal for pipeline operators, both from a technical and economical point of view.
This paper describes the pipeline integrity management approach adopted by Saipem
Energy Services (SES), an engineering consultant for offshore pipelines Companies.
The past experiences have proven that the cooperation between pipelines operators and
SES has given several benefits, like the continuous revision of inspection techniques and
frequencies in order to maintain or improve the results optimising the costs, the fast reaction
to inspection outcomes or to unexpected events through an accurate assessment of the
pipeline integrity, the capability to evaluate if maintenance or repair are necessary and
whether such remedial actions must be done immediately or can be postponed.

INTRODUCTION
Pipelines operators must manage their assets achieving the design safety level; at this
purpose an effective approach to Pipeline Integrity Management is an essential part of
successful operation.
Integrity is defined by DNV-RP-F116 as the submarine pipelines system ability to operate
safely and withstands the loads imposed during the pipeline lifecycle.
Pipeline Integrity Management (PIM) means ensuring that all the activities required to
maintain the pipeline integrity will be in place over the whole lifecycle, which includes design,
construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance and decommissioning. The Integrity
Management Process begins during the design phase and is carried out iteratively
throughout the design life until abandonment of the pipe.
An initial risk assessment has the purpose to identify the threats that may reduce pipeline
integrity (e.g. the presence of wet gas may lead to internal corrosion, whose consequence is
a metal loss damage) and to introduce different protective means at design stage.
At the end of construction and pre-commissioning, documentation shall be provided to define
the integrity status of the pipeline system, which has to be maintained during operation by
adequate inspection and maintenance activities.
When a pipeline system approaches the end of its design life and there is a need to operate
it for more years, an Integrity Management approach should be adopted to certify the lifetime
extension with reference to international codes and standards.

According to DNV-RP-F116 scheme, SES integrated approach to Integrity Management

consists of four main steps:
Step 1: Risk Based Inspection and Monitoring Planning;
Step 2: Inspection Execution and Database Updating;
Step 3: Integrity Assessment;
Step 4: Remedial Actions & Repair.
PIM process is illustrated in Figure 1.

Risk Based
Inspection &
Monitoring
Planning

Inspection
Execution &
Database
Updating

Remedial
Actions &
Repair

Integrity
Assessment

Fig 1: PIM process

INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT IN SES

Saipem Energy Services (SES) is an engineering consultant for offshore pipelines
companies which has developed a four step Pipeline Integrity Management approach on the
basis of offshore codes and practices (see Figure 1).
The first step is the definition of the pipeline integrity management philosophy, which is
developed in cooperation with the pipeline operator and includes the guidelines for inspection
and maintenance strategies, together with the definition of Risk Based Inspection and
Monitoring Plan.
It starts from the identification of the threats which could jeopardise the pipeline integrity,
followed by the definition of possible inspection typologies for each threat and the evaluation
of inspection frequency considering the effective risk category. These results are then
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reviewed, determining the optimum combination of inspection equipment, methods, scopes

and frequencies.
The Risk Based Inspection and Monitoring Plan shall consider all the pipeline system and the
safety philosophy adopted in the design. A safe pipeline operation means that the safety
acceptance criteria (as established in design and updated through the project phases and
service life) are met. The output of the Risk Based Inspection and Monitoring Plan will be:
what to inspect, monitor,
how to inspect, monitor,
when to inspect, monitor.
The next step is Inspection Execution and Database Updating. SES can supervise the
activities carried out by the survey contractor, verifying that all data are collected according to
project specifications.
Dedicated software tools have been developed along the years to manage the data collected
during the external and internal inspections, allowing accurate assessments and fast reaction
in case of unexpected event.
Then the Integrity Assessment is performed through the evaluation of the pipeline layout
changes (in-service buckling), the pipeline-seabed configuration (free spans evolution
analysis) and the damage evaluation (anchor hooking, lateral buckling, internal and external
corrosion, etc.).
When damage is observed, the details of the damage shall be quantified taking
measurements uncertainties into consideration. The data from the inspection survey shall be
elaborated to identify the causes of damage and to give recommendations for more detailed
inspection if necessary.
To evaluate the pipeline integrity in presence of damage, the safety philosophy adopted in
design shall be applied; however, the original safety philosophy may be modified as a result
of company/operator requirements and improved knowledge of the pipeline system.
Acceptance criteria used in design phase shall therefore be identified prior to start of
operation and revised during the service life if necessary.
The output of an Integrity Assessment should be one of the following options:
The pipeline is safe as is;
The pipeline will be safe after the execution of the recommended mitigation,
intervention and repair activities;
More data has to be collected to evaluate pipeline integrity.
The last step includes Remedial Actions activities that are necessary in case the integrity
assessment shows that pipeline safety has been compromised.
SES is able to provide basic engineering for mitigation, intervention and repair activities and
to recommend the proper subcontractor activities.
The development of a repair strategy is highly recommended for a trunk line at design phase,
because damage during operative life may lead to long time shut down and loss of
production. Within repair strategy, the damage scenarios that can occur along the pipeline
are outlined and the most promising repair systems for each relevant damage/location are
determined, with the aim to minimize the repair time.
The documentation related to PIM shall be updated during the pipeline lifecycle; for example
the risk based inspection and monitoring documentation need to be updated if inspections
have shown that pipeline requires an higher or lower inspection frequency, the integrity
assessment documentation in case new damages are identified or measured with better
resolution, repair strategy in case of new repair technologies have been developed.
Each of the previous four steps will be described in detail in the following chapters.

RISK BASED INSPECTION AND MONITORING PLANNING

The definition of a Risk Based Inspection and Monitoring Plan (RBIMP) starts from a risk
review that covers the whole pipeline system.
The risk review activity includes:
Review of the system threats, mapping and quantitative/qualitative analysis of the
associated risk;
Confirm the effectiveness of design criteria and protective means concerning the
identified threats;
Provision of the guidelines for the Inspection and Monitoring (IM) activities.
Threats affecting the pipeline are identified by a brainstorming attended by a multidisciplinary team composed by project specialists and pipeline operator representatives. This
activity is based on a checklist whose items can be revised with the contribution of all
attendants and that will include all the possible pipeline threats and hazards. The check list is
developed on the basis of DNV-RP-F116, ASME B31.8S and ISO 17776, as well as SES
experience. Threats are then agreed providing justification for those not significant.
Then the pipeline system is subdivided in several sections so that, although detailed
information is given, the overall set of threats is not too much fragmented.
For each section the pertinent threats are identified and the potential cause and effect
(damage/anomaly) are considered. The application of the design criteria and the protective
means are evaluated. Than the probability of failure, the consequence of failure and the risk
level for each identified threat are estimated by means of suitable models in order to
establish the minimum requirements (type and frequency) for the IM strategy and to verify
the need of additional mitigation measures.
The method is based on the application of a risk matrix similar to the one showed in Figure 2.
The matrix provides an estimation of the risk level as intersection of annual failure probability
(horizontal axis) and severity of the consequences (vertical axis). The pipeline system
integrity column describes the potential impact on safety, environment and asset. The
asset column quantifies the consequences from an economical point of view.
RISK MATRIX
Increasing probability

Increasing Consequences

Consequences
Descriptive

Asset
(106 eur)

Pipeline Integrity

1. Extensive

> 10

Large size leak with gas

release
Possible bursting or line
Collapse.

2. Severe

1 - 10

Small size leak with gas

release.

3. Moderate

0.1 1

Damages (possible
propagation).
No gas release.

4. Minor

0.01 0.1

Local damages
No gas release.

Negligible

Remote

Unlikely

Likely

Frequent

Risk Level legend:

LOW

Acceptable Risk. No additional Mitigation measures are required. IM frequency low

MEDIUM

Acceptable Risk. No additional Mitigation measures are required. IM frequency medium

HIGH

Unacceptable Risk, reduction is required with additional mitigation measure or higher IM frequency.

VERY HIGH Unacceptable Risk. Immediate mitigation measure/action shall be performed.

Fig 2: Example of Risk Matrix

The inspection and monitoring plan documents and justifies what to inspect and monitor, how
to inspect and monitor and when to inspect and monitor. A typical plan covers a period of 8-

10 years and it can include the first inspection after construction as well as the subsequent
ordinary inspections.
The development of an inspection and monitoring plan based on the risk assessment starts
with the identification of the inspections and monitoring typologies. For each threat the
applicable inspection and/or monitoring method is identified.
RBIMP considers the pipeline system between the battery limits including items as valves,
tees and other mechanical connections, pig traps, flanges, clamps anodes, coatings, etc.
The RBIMP activities cover external inspections (pipeline layouts, seabed configuration,
cathodic protection system, location and dimension of found areas of damage, etc.), internal
inspections (pipeline geometry condition, metal loss detection, route mapping and relevant
curvature/bending strain) and monitoring (inlet/outlet operating conditions, environment
conditions, valve position, etc.).
In addition to the typical inspection and monitoring activities, depending on the project
requirements, SES proposes and assists the pipeline operator in planning and establishment
of services as ship traffic monitoring based on AIS data (Automated Identification System).
Ship traffic monitoring is useful to identify and elude possible situations which could lead to
an emergency state. For instance, a prompt alert following the identification of anomalous
ship movements could avoid the interaction between dropped/dragged anchors and the
pipeline system or, in the worst case, reduce the response time after an accidental damage.
The final IM frequencies are the result of:
The system risk review result (i.e. risk level associated to the threat and the applicable
inspection and/or monitoring methods);
The integrity assessment after installation;
Pipeline operator specific general risk matrix;
Authority requirements.
Reviews could be considered and performed on the basis of:
The results from Inspection and Monitoring activities;
The results from any integrity assessment;
Possible interventions and repairs on the pipeline system;
Changes in operating conditions or any other changes affecting the threats;
Changes of risks levels;
Changes occurring in the authority requirements.
The update of the long term inspection plan and the risk assessment is performed at regular
intervals or when required due to inspection and monitoring activities results, threats
variations, integrity assessment results, changes in operating parameters.
As engineering consultant, SES gives assistance to pipeline operators in the preparation of
the documents relevant to RBIMP and the planned inspections (inspection plans, scope of
work for internal/external inspections, technical specification for internal/external inspections,
etc.). Other documentation under survey contractor responsibility (as procedures for internal
and external inspections) is carefully examined to verify the accordance with the pipeline
system requirements.
Modern standards, codes and recommended practices for Integrity Management of pipeline
systems are more and more recognizing the value of the risk based approach to the pipeline
inspection (the last approach demand coming from pipeline operator market).
The results obtained at the end of recent engineering projects prove that SES has fully
understood this market evolution and the engineering approach followed by SES has been
widely shared and appreciated.
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INSPECTION EXECUTION AND DATABASE UPDATING

SES provides technical assistance to different companies during pipeline system operating
lifetime. Technical support is essentially related to the pipelines integrity and to the
verification/assurance that integrity is maintained.
An accurate engineering evaluation of the pipeline integrity requires:
As-Built data;
External survey data;
Internal survey data.
In conformity with the inspection frequency, the inspection typologies and the relevant
required equipment defined in the Risk Based Inspection and Monitoring Planning,
external/internal surveys will be planned and performed.
The external inspection is carried out by means of a support vessel and an underwater
vehicle (ROV) while the internal inspection by means of an intelligent pig.
The typical data collected during these inspections are:
External Survey

Pipe-seabed configuration, with particular care to the presence of free spans;

Pipeline layout, paying attention to remarkable horizontal and/or vertical
displacements (especially when not encountered in the previous inspections);
External condition of the pipeline and pipeline coating, with particular attention to the
presence of local damages like dent, dent and gouge, circumferential or longitudinal
graze on pipe steel or global damages like anchor hooking or upheaval buckling;
Status of intervention works to support/stabilise the pipeline;
Anodes condition (consumption, oxidation, etc.);
Cathodic protection measurements along the pipeline.

The gathered data are both visual data (TV-cameras ROV mounted) and instrumental data
(dedicated equipment, ROV installed).
Internal Survey

Detection of features/defects (i.e. metal loss geometry, dent geometry, etc);

Pipeline geometry (X,Y,Z layout);
Pipeline curvature.

In this case only an instrumental data is collected.

SES has developed dedicated software applications with the purpose to manage the data
necessary for an appropriate pipeline integrity assessment.
These applications are based on a data warehouse to store all data relevant to the offshore
pipelines necessary or useful for the engineering services provided by SES.
In order to make easier the external/internal survey activity, pre-defined standard formats
have been set-up for all types of collected data. The survey contractor shall provide all data
according to format specifications. Furthermore, the data controls to verify the quality and the
consistency of data might be properly performed by means of suitable tools.
Figure 3 shows the typical data processing flow for an external survey.
In this way, during the on board activity it will be possible to highlight critical and/or
anomalous features (i.e. remarkable curvature, free span greater than the expected length,
considerable damage, etc.) and also compare the current survey data with data of previous
inspections.
Sometimes the gathered information is not sufficient for an adequate evaluation (for instance,
an intervention work or a steel damage not properly observed and checked). A new specific
and detailed investigation could be then immediately planned and performed on the section
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affected by the feature. This operation might not involve extra cost and time if the required
survey equipment is already mounted on the ROV (usual condition) or if is present on board
(in case of required deep analysis on a damage).
Moreover, if any features (i.e. critical pipeline curvature, showed in Figure 4) needs to be
analysed in detail, SES personnel on board can contact the specialised office department for
accurate analyses. If required, additional investigations might be planned and executed with
little extra cost and short schedule delay.

Fig 3: Typical Data Processing Flow

At the end of the survey all gathered data will be loaded into the main archive data
warehouse in terms of tables linked each other by appropriate key fields and based on the
Entity/Relationship (E/R) Model in order to guarantee the consistency of data.
This archive database will store a huge amount of different data due to the fact that the
warehouse tables will be progressively populated with the collected data/information from
different surveys, in a way that it will include the history of the whole pipeline system since
manufacturing.
All this data will be made available, as basic and reference information, for the next
external/internal surveys to be executed in the future.
Finally, a deep analysis on this data will allow the evaluation of keeping the planned
inspection frequency (together with the most appropriate kind of survey to be performed) or,
if critical o potentially dangerous elements for the pipeline safety arise, to plan an
extraordinary inspection before the planned ones.

Fig 4: Typical Layout Graph showing a remarkable Bending Strain

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INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT
The assessment of damage to the pipeline is an important task, since it allows operators to
determine whether the pipeline will be safe for the duration of its design life, or it will require a
reduction of operating conditions, or it must be repaired.
Inspection data acquired according to the Risk Based Inspection and Monitoring Plan shall
form the basis for any integrity assessment. When damage is observed, its dimensions shall
be quantified by a measurement system with adequate uncertainties.
If the damage is evaluated to be unacceptable, the information shall be included in an
updated risk assessment and the proper mitigation, intervention and repairs activities shall
be addressed.
Pipeline systems with unacceptable damage may be operated temporarily under actual
conditions or reduced operational conditions until the defect has been removed or repair has
been carried out. It must be documented that the pipeline safety level is maintained to
perform the inspection and repair activities.
The damage assessment should pay special attention to the risk of a sudden pipe failure. In
particular, the possibility of personal injury, for example during diver inspections, may require
the pressure to be reduced to a level which will not lead to pipe rupture. Following a repair,
system pressure test should be performed or waived according to design codes.
SES approach to integrity assessment is based on the identification of two categories of
investigation:
corrosion assessment covering internal and external corrosion;
mechanical assessment covering e.g. fatigue in freespan, displacement causing
overstress, third party damage causing extreme strains.
The assessment respect to internal and external corrosion requires the measurement of
residual pipe wall thickness along the line. The internal inspection using an intelligent pig with
adequate accuracy is highly recommended.
Once the defects depth and length have been measured, damage assessment can be
performed according to criteria and codes established in design phase. The most critical
defects will be identified and decision regarding pipeline safety can be provided; in case the
pipeline is judged not safe, a derating of the pipeline or a repair is required. A probabilistic
approach can be used to estimate pipeline failure probability, considering the measurement
uncertainties and assuming a proper corrosion rate for defect evolution.
Figure 5 shows the results of an internal inspection and an example to show how pipeline
failure probability increases over time.
Internal Inspection Data

1.E+00

70%

Target for Safety Class Normal

Pipeline Failure Probability (Failure/Year)

Metal Loss

Defect Depth (%t)

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

1.E-01
Target for Safety Class High
1.E-02

1.E-03

1.E-04

1.E-05

1.E-06

0%
0

5000

10000

15000

20000

KP (m)

1.E-07
2010

2015

2020

2025
Year

Fig 5: Corrosion Assessment example

2030

2035

Regarding mechanical assessment related to fatigue in free spans, SES reference for fatigue
life calculation is DNV-RP-F105. The inputs are free span length and depth and meteocean
data; if fatigue life is shorter than design life interventions are required. If data from previous
inspections are not available, assumptions have to be made on the year when the free span
has been generated and calculation on potential corrosion rate has to be performed.
External or internal inspection data can be elaborated by a smoothing process to obtain the
bending strain along the route and compare it with allowable value from reference codes.
The bending strains obtained by external survey data are affected by uncertainties due to the
inaccuracy of the pipeline profile and to the approximation introduced by the fitting tool used
to interpolate the survey data. For this reason, these strains have to be considered as
indicative values; more accurate results can be obtained by survey methodologies dedicated
for curvature measurements, e.g. by the internal geopig survey.
Field incidents may occur due to unexpected external loads applied to pipeline such as
fishing gear interaction, dropped objects, vessel interaction, collision of an iceberg, etc. This
may reduce the pipeline integrity and generate problems for the operation of the pipeline
over its design life. Potential pipeline damage include dent, gouge, dent and gouge, lateral
and upheaval buckling, etc Mechanical integrity assessment can be difficult because of the
many unknown parameters and pressing project schedule.
Damages must be correctly evaluated in order to make an appropriate decision for the future
service of the pipeline. A possible methodology includes the following phases:
Identification of failure modes and associated parameters;
Reconstruction of event;
Data collection;
Definition of analysis model: analytical or/and FEA;
Results evaluation and sensitivity studies;
Definition of a management plan for future service of the pipeline.
SES track record in integrity assessment includes pressure containment capacity evaluation
in presence of damage (dent, dent & gouge, etc), evaluation of pipeline status after anchor
dragging (see Figure 6) and buckling.

Fig 6: Mechanical Assessment example

REMEDIAL ACTIONS AND REPAIR

In case the Integrity Assessment has shown that pipeline safety has been compromised,
proper Remedial Actions should be addressed; they include mitigation, intervention and
repair activities.
Mitigation activities are necessary to prevent/reduce some potential dangerous phenomena.
Typical recommendations for mitigation activities are:
Use of chemicals in order to reduce the corrosion rate;
Variation in operational parameters (operating pressure, inlet temperature, flow rate,
fluid composition);
Maintenance pigging with the aim of removing scale, deposits and liquid
accumulated.
Pipeline intervention activities are those necessary to stabilize and support the pipeline on
the seabed. Typical interventions that can be engineered are:
pipeline protection against third party interference by mattresses (see Figure 7), grout
bags, protection structures, gravel cover;
rock dumping to reduce free span length and gaps, for on bottom stability or to control
lateral buckling;
trenching for pipeline protection or upheaval buckling prevention.
Pipeline repair includes the actions necessary to restore the pipeline structural integrity and
to assure that safety level is compliant with the target recommended by design code.
Damage to a submarine pipeline can be repaired in different ways depending on the water
depth and on the type and extent of the damage.
Typical damage scenarios and possible repair technologies are as follows:
Local Damage: damage which requires a local repair without pipe cutting and
replacement (e.g. pinhole or dent which do not affect pipe structural integrity); the
related repair technology may be a repair clamp;
Short Damage: damage which requires pipeline repair of at maximum 2 pipe joints
(e.g. dent and/or gouge which affect pipe structural integrity); this type of damage can
be repaired by hyperbaric welding, mechanical connectors or above-water tie-in,
depending on water depth and soil properties;
Long Damage: damage which requires pipeline repair of a long section (e.g. rupture
that can reach a length of a few hundreds meters caused by large dragged anchor
hooking the pipeline); in this situation the re-construction of the damaged section by
pipelay vessel may be required.

Fig 7: Intervention by mattresses

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With the aim to be ready in case of damage during construction or operation, it is

recommended the definition of a Repair Strategy at design stage.
The objectives of a Repair Strategy are:
Study the possible damage scenarios that can occur at the pipeline;
Definition of the most promising repair systems vs. relevant damage/location, with the
aim to minimize the repair time;
Identification of relevant technological developments to be pursued;
Definition of contract strategy and organisation models for repair.
As illustrated in Figure 8, the analysis methodology for the selection of a repair strategy
starts from a throughout assessment of the overall pipeline conditions, including:
Pipeline geometry (steel and concrete thickness, buckle arrestors);
Operating conditions (pressure and temperature profiles);
Environmental data (water depth, soil strength, longitudinal and lateral slope);
Pipeline configuration (free span, trenching, distance between two routes, long radius
curves, crossings);
Hazards (ship traffic, anchors, fishing activities, environment).
These data provide relevant information to identify specific features along the route that can
impact on the repairing activities/methods. Then the expected damage scenarios for the
pipeline can be identified, together with the most promising repair technologies. The
constraints for the applicability of each repair technology can be defined in term of water
depth, maximum soil slope, bearing soil capacity, presence of free spans and trenching; then
the range of applicability of each repair technology can be defined as a percentage of the
overall pipeline route. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of each repair
technology for different pipeline section, a repair strategy is elaborated selecting the best
repair technology along the route.
A list of typical activities to be performed in case of damage and of possible organisation to
put in place to manage an accident are useful as basic for more detailed analyses by repair
contractor.
Basic Data
Environment
- Bathymetry
- Morphology
- Soil Strength
- Longitudinal and
lateral slopes

Operating
Conditions
- Flow rates
- Pressure
- Temperature

Pipeline Geometry
- Diameter,
- Steel wall
thickness
- Concrete
thickness
- Buckle Arrestors
- Valves location

P/L Configuration
- Curves
- Trenches and
other intervention
works
- Free spans
- Crossings
- Distance
between P/Ls

Hazards
- Ship Traffic
(anchor
interference and
drop objects)
- Fishing activities
- Environment

Damage scenarios and Repair Technologies

DAMAGE SCENARIO
- Point (Dent Gouge Pin Hole)
- Local Damage ( length < 20 m)
- Long Damage (length >20 m)

LOCAL FEATURES
- Pipeline configuration and
geometry combined with
requirements and constraints of
repair system

REPAIR TECHNOLOGIES
- Hyperbaric Welding (HW)
- Above Water Tie- in (AWT)
- Mechanical Connectors (MC)
- Repair Clamp (RC)

OPERATIONS & ORGANISATION

- General sequence of activities
- Organisation

REPAIR STRATEGY
- Feasibility-Flexibility
- Schedule
- Technological Gap

Repair Scenarios and Strategy

DAMAGE REPAIR SCENARIOS
- Local Repair
- Cut and Short Repair
- Cut and Long Repair

Fig 8: Repair Strategy definition

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CONCLUSIONS
Pipelines operators must manage their assets achieving the design safety level; at this
purpose an effective approach to Pipeline Integrity Management is an essential part of
successful operation.
Saipem Energy Services (SES) is an engineering consultant for offshore pipelines
companies able to provide Pipeline Integrity Management Services; SES approach follows
the four main steps addessed in DNV-RP-F116:
Step 1: Risk Based Inspection and Monitoring Planning;
Step 2: Inspection Execution and Database Updating;
Step 3: Integrity Assessment;
Step 4: Remedial Actions & Repair.
Each step can be addressed at design stage, and then the Integrity Management Process is
carried out iteratively throughout the pipeline design life.
The past experiences have proven that the cooperation between pipelines operators and
SES has given several benefits, like the continuous revision of inspection techniques and
frequencies, in order to maintain or improve the results optimising the costs, the fast reaction
to inspection outcomes or to unexpected events through an accurate assessment of the
pipeline integrity, the capability to evaluate if maintenance or repair are necessary and
whether such remedial actions must be done immediately or can be postponed.

REFERENCES
Det Norske Veritas, DNV-RP-F116, Integrity Management of Submarine Pipeline Systems,
2009.
Det Norske Veritas, DNV-OS-F101, Submarine Pipeline Systems, 2007.
Det Norske Veritas, DNV-RP-F101, Corroded Pipeline, 2004.
Det Norske Veritas, DNV-RP-F105, Free Spanning Pipelines, 2006.
ASME B31.8S, Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines, 2010.
ISO 17776, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Offshore Production Installations Guidelines on Tools and Techniques for Identification and Assessment of Hazardous Events
2000.
Saipem Energy Services, Integrity Management Process for Nord Stream Pipelines
System, 2010.

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