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THAKUR*
388
RAMESH
THAKUR
THE
UN
OPERATION
IN
SOMALIA
389
COERCIVE
COLLECTIVE
SECURITY
Although the League of Nations was killed by World War II, its
legacy of international organisation lives on in the United Nations,
notably the concept, by now firmly entrenched, yet revolutionary in
that the community of nations has both the moral right and the
i919,
legal competence to discuss and judge the international conduct of
its members. In particular, both the League and the UN embodied
the idea that aggressive war is a crime against humanity, which every
state has the interest, right, and duty to collaborate in preventing and
defeating.
The closeness with which the UN was modelled upon the League was
testimony to the fact that people still had faith in the idea of an
umbrella international organisation to oversee world peace and cooperation. The UN incorporated the League proscription on the use of
force for national objectives, but inserted the additional prescription to
use force in support of international, that is UN, authority. As proof of
the added potency of the new organisation, the Security Council was
given the power to decide whether international peace was threatened,
whether sanctions were to be imposed, and, if so, then their nature.
Force, it was argued, would henceforth be put to the service of law, for
the Security Council was being established as the equivalent of a
supreme war-making organisation of the world community.
The primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace
and security. The Charter specifies two chief means to this end:
namely, pacific settlement of disputes in Chapter VI, and collective
enforcement against threats to or breaches of the peace in Chapter VII.
The trend towards narrowing the permissible range of any unilateral
resort to force by nation-states has been matched by the historical
movement to broaden the range of instruments available to states to
settle their disputes by means short of war. Even though the normative
principle of the primacy of peaceful over forceful means has become
firmly entrenched, the Security Council cannot compel member-states
to implement resolutions adopted under Chapter VI.
RAMESH
390
THAKUR
COLLECTIVE
SECURITY
AFTER
THE
COLD WAR
THE
UN
OPERATION
IN
SOMALIA
39I
frequency of war may decline as its cost goes up, and the dangers posed
to humanity as a whole may diminish as the overlay of superpower
rivalry is removed from regional conflicts. Human societies will still be
divided by disputes over beliefs and interests, and as long as there are
organised polities prepared to support rival groups, armed aggression
cannot be ruled out. Indeed, as the shroud of the cold war lifts from the
world, the multitude of national and ethnic fault lines will stand out
with sharper clarity. The need for a collective security system therefore
remains.
Nevertheless, the new promptness and near-unanimity of the
Security Council do not herald a sudden feasibility of collective
security.3 For example, third-world states are not likely to relinquish
their control of the General Assembly and the UN agenda, and return
the organisation to the world of I 945. Far from buttressing the
international status quo, they are intent on challenging it. To them,
equity is as important as order, and the UN is their principal instrument
by which to re-order global relations with new political and economic
legitimizing principles. How relevant will be the concept of collective
security - which elevates order above justice - if the fault lines of
international conflict are going to develop along the ridges of the
world's major civilisations?4
It is only a matter of time before China - committed to the principle
of state sovereignty, and suspicious of foreign encroachments into its
internal affairs - becomes the new champion of the Third World in the
Security Council. There are already signs of China, India, and others
coalescing into a developing 'Asian bloc' to counter Western pressures
on human rights. If the Council's permanent membership is not
changed, then the chief executive organ will progressively lose
legitimacy. If it is changed so that only Germany and Japan are made
permanent members, then three of the seven will be European, with a
fourth being the United States. Then too the lack of representational
legitimacy will become a serious handicap, especially if the Council
commits errors of judgement.
The will to design and construct a collective security system is strong
in the immediate aftermath of a major war. Initially, leaders as well as
people act in the consciousness that appeasement of aggressors is
counter-productive. With the passage of time, they begin to believe
3 See Inis Claude, 'Collective Security After the Cold War', in Gary L. Guertner (ed.),
CollectiveSecurityin EuropeandAsia (Carlisle, PA, U.S. Army War College, I992), pp. 7-28.
4 See Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', in ForeignAffairs(New York), 72,
Summer I993, pp. 22-49.
392
RAMESH
THAKUR
that the existing peace should not be lightly risked, that the rigid
requirements of collective security are risk-inviting rather than
problem-solving. According to Inis Claude, 'It may well be that the
termination of the Cold War will produce a similar peak-and-valley
pattern in the graph of support for the notion of collective security'.5
To be successful, collective security must rest on the certainty of
response from the world community to an act of aggression anywhere
by any power. In practice, the individual and collective responses will
rarely be clear-cut. People and governments will differ on the timing in
regard to initiating (were sanctions given enough time to work against
Iraq?) as well as terminating military action (should the Gulf war have
been continued for another one or two weeks?), the choice of means
(was Iraq hammered into submission by a technological bully?), and
interpretations of the outcome (who was the long-term victor in the
Gulf war? should the Kurdish problem have been solved as part of the
campaign? what about human rights in Kuwait?).
Collective security is a system designed to deter and defeat inter-state
aggression, as of Kuwait by Iraq. It fails to match the requirements
of civil strife, which is the more common type of conflict to confront
the UN. Collective security requires multilateralism, and successful
military operations require centralised command and control. Given
that collective security is predicated on decisive leadership, it seems
that this can only come in today's world from the United States. But
Washington has given no indication that its global leadership role will
be free of calculations of national interest. The Gulf war did not
increase the probability, for example, that America would seek to check
any Israeli resort to force by organising a UN-sanctioned military
coalition. Selective opposition to aggression is unpredictable, and so
may promote instability. There is also likely to be a world-wide trend
towards the primacy of the domestic over the international in agendasetting by the public.
CONSENSUAL
PEACEKEEPING
THE
UN OPERATION
IN SOMALIA
393
AS A NEGATION
OF UN PEACEKEEPING
i987), p. 293.
Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, the former Canadian head of UN forces in Sarajevo, made
the memorable comment that a UN commander in the field should not get into trouble 'after 5 p.m.
in New York, or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one to answer the phone'. In I993 the UN
established a 24-hour, seven days a week Situation Room that provides a direct link to its
peacekeeping operations.
8
394
RAMESH
THAKUR
THE UN OPERATION
IN SOMALIA
395
The remaining three options involved the use of force. Unosom could
become forceful in Mogadishu, hoping that such a show of strength in
the capital would be sufficient to convince lawless elements to stop
abusing international relief efforts. Alternatively, the UN could launch
a country-wide enforcement operation under its own command and
control, albeit almost certainly beyond the world body's existing
logistical capability. Finally, the Security Council could authorise a
group of member-states to carry out such an operation. The United
States had informed Boutros-Ghali that it would be prepared to take
the lead in organising a UN-sanctioned forceful mission to establish a
secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia. Whether
the Security Council entrusted the command and control to a UN force
or to an authorised multinational force, the objective of the operation,
Boutros-Ghali said, should be precisely defined and limited in time in
order to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict
peace-building.
On 3 December I 992 the Security Council, acting under the
collective enforcement Chapter VII, authorised the use of' all necessary
means' to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of
Somalia. Sanctioning the use of force, for the first time in such a
context, resulted from a growing conviction that the existing course of
Unosom would not be an adequate response to the tragedy. The
uniqueness of the deteriorating and complex challenge of mass
starvation amidst total anarchy required an immediate and exceptional
response. Resolution 794 promised to open up the possibility of joint,
determined, and innovative action by the UN in order to alleviate and
end the hardship of an entire nation.
In a message to the people of Somalia -on 8 December, Boutros-Ghali
said that the Unified Task Force (Unitaf) would 'feed the starving,
protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic and
social reconstruction'.
The following day, 'Operation Restore Hope'
began with the seizure of the airfield and port in Mogadishu by
US marines. The transfer of responsibility to a 2iooo-strong
UN
peacekeeping force drawn from 29 countries was to be achieved as soon
as possible. However, the Secretary-General noted that it would be 'a
tragedy if the premature departure, or remodelling, of the Unified Task
Force were to plunge Somalia back into anarchy and starvation and
destroy the fragile political progress of recent weeks '.2
On 26 March I993 the Security Council adopted Resolution 8I4
11 UN Chronicle (New York), March I993,
p. i6.
12
Ibid. p. I3.
396
RAMESH
THAKUR
THE UN OPERATION
IN SOMALIA
397
conditions. These were met in the Gulf war, but proved more difficult
to satisfy in Somalia.
Once the US troops are effectively engaged in hostilities, they
become a prisoner of great/small power asymmetries. US itinerant
stakes in the outcome of the struggle in Somalia were substantially
different from those of the local clans and warlords. The latter's
commitment to victory (or to avoiding defeat) was accordingly greater
than the American capacity for perseverance. This was especially so in
light of the unsuitability of the US national security apparatus to
conduct small wars because of institutional inadequacies, foreign
pressures, and the vagaries of public opinion."4
The use of force also raises questions about the appropriate balance
between an impossibly long chain of command and the operational
flexibility of the field commanders in being able to respond quickly to
swiftly changing circumstances. The permissive environment of I992
had undergone drastic transformation in a year's time, becoming
increasingly hostile to the presence of US and other outside forces in
Mogadishu. The rules of engagement may not correspond to the
realities of the environment in which they are to be implemented. The
chain of command can fail to develop rules of engagement in pace with
the changing threat. Should the guidelines forbid reprisals and punitive
measures? While a 'hostile act' or 'force' can be easily defined, a
'hostile threat' cannot. Confused understandings by different units of
Unosom as to what force was permitted, under what circumstances, and
at which locations, did not help matters either.
From the UN point of view, peacekeeping operations face the danger
that their conception of the international interest can be so abstract as
not to coincide with the interest of any group of UN members. Nations
are unwilling to authorise and arm international soldiers unless assured
that they will fight their battle. In restricting the use of force by
peacekeeping units to a very limited concept of self-defence, the UN
tries to ensure that it is maintaining a neutral stance between the
disputants, not serving the political interest of any faction in the conflict
or at the UN, and not imposing the will of a UN majority upon any
party.
There was sufficient international agreement for a peacekeeping
force to be emplaced in Somalia. But the circle of consensus was narrow
rather than broad, its scope restricted rather than expansive, and its
14
See Eliot A. Cohen, 'Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars', in International
Security(Cambridge, MA), 9' Fall i984, PP. I5i-8i.
398
RAMESH
THAKUR
THE
UN
OPERATION
IN
SOMALIA
399
Maclean's, 26 July
I 993,
p.
20.
15
MOA 32
400
RAMESH
THAKUR
THE
UN
OPERATION
IN
SOMALIA
40I
troops seem to have been victims of the use of lethal force in breach of
human rights and international humanitarian law obligations',
according to Amnesty. In addition, hundreds of Somalis have been
held in 'administrative detention'.20 This has been the result in part of
military units being given essentially civilian law enforcement and
policing tasks. If the UN is to maintain its human rights credibility,
then soldiers committing abuses in its name must face investigation and
prosecution by effective international machinery. A good beginning
would be an unambiguous affirmation by the Secretary-General, the
Security Council, and the General Assembly that forces acting under
UN authority are bound by international human rights standards and
humanitarian law.
Another long-term cost of converting peacekeepers into peace
enforcers, and thence into targets for attack by rival armed groups, is
that countries will become more reluctant to contribute troops for such
missions. National public opinion is unlikely to support high-risk
ventures in far-off lands for the sake of quarrelling foreigners. The
French, Italians, Germans, Belgians, Norwegians, Greeks, and Turks
had decided to pull out from Somalia ahead of, or by, the 3I March
deadline set by Washington for the withdrawal of US troops.21
I994
PEACEMAKING
I993
that of the
$I,500
million
15-2
402
RAMESH
THAKUR
24
i87-9I27
I4.
THE
UN
OPERATION
IN
SOMALIA
403
supplies had become the basis of the only functioning economy that
existed in Somalia.
Security issues had to be addressed effectively, Boutros-Ghali argued,
because only so could the UN and voluntary agencies provide the relief
assistance that was still so desperately needed.28 But this is a doubleedged argument. For it acknowledges implicitly that the environment
of banditry was a symptom, with the underlying cause being the lack
of effective government. A solution therefore has to be the establishment
and maintenance of a stable regime. But whose power and authority is
going to be restored in Somalia? The restoration and maintenance of
law and order has to be that of a foreign entity. Will it be that of the
United Nations or America? The state is a Western juridical concept
that bears little resemblance to the reality on the ground since the
country is deeply divided, fragmented on clan and family lines, with no
recognised channels for political action. By targeting only Aidid, but
one of the I4 or so warlords fighting for control of Somalia, the UN
'virtually declared war on the Haber Gedr subclan' which he leads.29
More importantly, there is no assurance that a political order grafted
on Somalia by international forces will not crumble as the country
reverts to pre-intervention clan warfare.
If the tensions and divisions in Somalia are clan and family based,
then no government will endure without genuine national reconciliation. This cannot take place through coercion, but must rest instead
on compromise and give-and-take. Nor will eliminating any individual
warlord bridge clan divisions. Any military 'solution' will reflect the
temporary inability of dissatisfied groups to challenge the status quo. It
will be neither a satisfactory nor an enduring outcome. For all their
known odiousness, the Khmer Rouge had been tolerated as a possible
participant in the reconciliation process in Cambodia precisely on such
an understanding of the politics of peace negotiations.
The United Nations has argued from the start that the Somalis
should assume progressively greater responsibility for establishing
conditions and arrangements for the distribution of humanitarian
assistance. In August I992, for example, Boutros-Ghali said that a
stronger UN role in securing access, transport, and distribution of relief
supplies had to be paralleled by an effort to involve Somali entities fully
in all aspects of that process.30 The United Nations is indeed the
Ibid. p. I5.
Andrew S. Natsios (Vice-President of World Vision), 'Food through Force: humanitarian
intervention and U.S. policy', in WashingtonQuarterly,I7, Winter I994, p. I38.
30 UN Chronicle,
December I 992, p. 8.
28
29
404
RAMESH
THAKUR
THE
UN
OPERATION
IN
405
SOMALIA
THE
UNITED
NATIONS
AND
THE
UNITED
STATES
Given that there is now only one superpower as well as one general
international organisation, the United Nations cannot embark upon
any substantial venture against the wishes of the United States. The
peace of the world may well depend upon the latter's political wisdom
and military power. Experience suggests that the US would be best
advised to channel its efforts through the authoritative framework of
406
RAMESH
THAKUR
the UN, not least because there is wisdom and virtue in imposing the
organisation's international discipline and moderating influence upon
the exercise of American power. The greatest strength of the United
Nations is that it is the only universal forum for international cooperation and management. UN involvement mutes domestic opposition, eases international concern about goals, facilitates political
management of allies, and lessens the risk of counter-intervention by
adversaries.
Nevertheless, there are two problems arising from too close an
identification of US interests with those of the United Nations. There
is danger in permitting American power calculations to be cloaked
uncritically in the UN flag. Collective security under the League was
a conscious substitute for systems of alliances and balance of power
policies that were 'forever discredited' by World War I. Progress
towards a world order based on justice and law requires that American
power be harnessed to UN authority. The mobilization of the world
community under the United Nations in the Gulf crisis was an example
of international propriety; the unilateral missile strikes on Baghdad
in punishment for the alleged Iraqi attempt to assassinate former
President George Bush serves as a counter-example. The latter does
not represent progress towards a world where force is ruled by law.
Instead, it is a reversion to a world where law is put to the service of the
mighty.
Will the General Assembly continue to support using the United
Nations for a Western crusade? Indeed, given the validity of Samuel
Huntington's claim that 'the West in effect is using international
institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in
ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western
interests and promote Western political and economic values', 3 is it
not likely that some member-states, perhaps even a majority, might
decide sooner or later to reimpose checks and limits on UN actions?
From an American point of view, conversely, the case of Somalia
shows yet again that the commitment of a multinational force to UN
peacekeeping is not definable in concrete military or political terms, for
its legitimising principle calls for loyalty to a general conception of
international order. Unosom generated perceptions of a pledge to keep
the peace in Somalia regardless of existing limitations of the capacity,
other commitments, or specific national interests of the contributing
countries. But when the force failed to discharge its perceived
responsibility, then inferences were inevitably drawn about their
37
40.
THE
UN
OPERATION
IN
SOMALIA
407
408
RAMESH
THAKUR
gangs, fan out from Mogadishu into the countryside, and stay for an
unlimited period. With much less military capability than the
Americans, the UN undertook the far more ambitious task of nationbuilding, a formidably complex challenge even under non-combat
conditions. On the other hand Bill Clinton, the new US President,
endorsed this particular goal as part of his shift to 'assertive
multilateralism'.41 The error was compounded with the corollary goal
of pacifying General Aidid, a combat mission that could be attempted
only at great risk.
Those who were involved in setting up the operation from the UN
end insist that their initial lack of enthusiasm was overcome because of
the prospect of having US forces under UN command. US combat
units had never before formed part of a blue helmet force.42Their
experience in Somalia may ensure that they do not again serve under a
non-American UN commander. Relations were strained even with the
Secretary-General personally. By I994, US officials were expressing
rising irritation with Boutros-Ghali, describing him as egocentric,
lacking in political and management skills, effective neither as a leader
nor as a bureaucrat.43For their part, UN officials were irritated that
when i8 US army rangers were killed in Somalia in October I993,
Clinton, without consulting Boutros-Ghali, announced that American
troops would be withdrawn by 31 March I994.
Again, the broader, more important argument here is that in the
post-cold war order, the UN and the US need each other too much to
risk their relationship becoming a predictable casualty of a resort to
muscular force by American units wearing blue helmets. There is a
further consideration which reinforcesthis caution. If the UN moves to
institute mechanisms and procedures to monitor, investigate, and
prosecute human rights violations by troops under its authority, and
they happen to be American soldiers, then the relationship between the
UN and the US will be strained to beyond breaking point. The
Pentagon is unlikely to permit its troops serving in the cause of global
peace to be investigated by international machinery.
41 For a good account of the deliberate shift from the Bush to the Clinton Administration, see
John R. Bolton (Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation in the Bush
Administration), 'Wrong Turn in Somalia', in ForeignAffairs,73, January-February 1994, pp.
56-66.
42 Based on confidential discussions with officials who were involved in the decision to set up
the UN Operation in Somalia.
(Bombay), 3 February 1994.
4 Peter Pringle, 'Ghali: wrong man at the top', in Independent
THE
UN OPERATION
IN SOMALIA
409
CONCLUSION
This was recognised by Boutros-Ghali on op. cit. paras 55-9. See also various contributions
p.
200.
41O
RAMESH
THAKUR