PHILIPPINES PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP.

V. TORRES
The PhilPhos Movement for Progress
(PMPI), a labor organization composed of
supervisory employees of the Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation, filed a
certification election on July 7, 1989 with
the
Department
of
Labor
and
Employment. The move was not contested
by the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation management and in fact was
supported by a position paper submitted
to the Mediator-Arbiter on August 11,
1989. The management hailed the
creation of a supervisors union provided
that they meet all the necessary legal
requirements.
On October 13, 1989 the Mediator-Arbiter
Milado issued an order for the holding of
the elections excluding the technical,
professional and confidential employees.
Then on November15, 1989 respondent
PMPI prayed for the inclusion of technical,
professional and confidential employees.
On December 14, 1989 both parties
submitted their position papers on the
said subject matter. Mr. Milado, allowing
the membership of other employees as
stated, granted the petition of PMPI.
Petitioner then moved to have the
technical, professional and confidential
employees removed from the membership
of the PMPI on April 16, 1990 to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment and a
decision was made on August 7, 1990
dismissing the appeal and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Then on July 8,
1991 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order against the holding of
the certification election scheduled on July
12, 1991 pending judicial review.
Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was
denied due process when respondent
Mediator-Arbiter granted the amended
petition of respondent PMPI without

according PHILPHOS a new opportunity to

be heard.

Held:
THE RIGHT TO HEARING AS AN ELEMENT
OF DUE PROCESS DOES NOT CALL FOR A
TRIAL TYPE HEARING. We do not see it the
way PHILPHOS does here. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek
areconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Where, as in the instant
case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
and to consider the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement
of due process, as petitioner was afforded
reasonable opportunity to present its
side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it
so desired, insisted on a hearing to
confront and examine the witnesses of the
other party. But it did not; instead, it opted
to submit its position paper with the
Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had
all the opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of
Labor.

ALONTE v. SAVELLANO
Facts: On December 5, 1996, an
information for rape was filed against
petitioners
Bayani
M.
Alonte,
an
incumbent Mayor of Bian Laguna and
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a
complaint filed by Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan.

On
December
13,
1996,
Punongbayan,
through
her

Juvie-lyn
counsel

Attorney
Remedios
C.
Balbin,
and
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator a petition for a change of
venue and to have the case transferred
and tried by any of the Regional Trial
Courts in Metro Manila.

During the pendency of the petition for

change of venue, or on 25 June 1997,
Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her
parents and counsel, executed an affidavit
of desistance.

On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C.Casano

on behalf of petitioners, moved to have
the petition for change of venue dismissed
on the ground that it had become moot in
view
of
complainants
affidavit
of
desistance.

On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed his

comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiab
asserted that he was not aware of the
desistance of private complainant and
opined that the desistance, in any case,
would not produce any legal effect since it
was the public prosecutor who had
direction and control of the prosecution of
the criminal action. He prayed for the
denial of the motion to dismiss. The court
granted the motion to change venue.

On September 17, 1997, the case was

assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC
Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A.
Savellano, Jr.,presiding.
On
October
7,
1997,
Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan,
through
Atty.
Balbin,
submitted to the Manila court, a
compliance where she reiterated her

decision to abide by her Affidavit of

Desistance.
However, in an Order, dated 09 October
1997, Judge Savellano found probable
cause for the issuance of warrants for the
arrest
of
petitioners
Alonte
and
Concepcion without prejudice to, and
independent of, this Courts separate
determination as the trier of facts, of the
voluntariness and validity of the [private
complainant's] desistance in the light of
the opposition of the public prosecutor,
Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiyab.
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily
surrendered himself to Director Santiago
Toledo of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), while Concepcion, in
his case, posted the recommended bail of
P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were
arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to
the charge. The parties manifested that
they
were
waiving
pre-trial.
The
proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge
Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed
with the trial of the case on the merits.4
According to Alonte, however, Judge
Savellano allowed the prosecution to
present evidence relative only to the
question of the voluntariness and validity
of the affidavit of desistance
It would appear that immediately following
the
arraignment,
the
prosecution
presented private complainant Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan followed by her parents.
During
this
hearing,
Punongbayan
affirmed the validity and voluntariness of
her affidavit of desistance. She stated that
she had no intention of giving positive
testimony in support of the charges
against Alonte and had no interest in
further
prosecuting
the
action.
Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was
compelled to desist because of the

harassment she was experiencing from

the media, (ii) that no pressures nor
influence were exerted upon her to sign
the affidavit of desistance, and (iii) that
neither she nor her parents received a
single centavo from anybody to secure the
affidavit of desistance.

not attend the promulgation of the

decision because he was suffering from
mild hypertension and was confined at the
NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand,
petitioner Concepcion and his counsel
would appear not to have been notified of
the
proceedings.
The
promulgation,
nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in
absentia; the reading concluded:

Assistant
State
Prosecutor
Marilyn
Campomanes
then
presented,
in
sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who
affirmed their signatures on the affidavit
of desistance and their consent to their
daughters decision to desist from the
case,
and
(ii)
Assistant
Provincial
Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested
that the affidavit of desistance was signed
by Punongbayan and her parents in his
presence and that he was satisfied that
the same was executed freely and
voluntarily.
Finally,
Campomanes
manifested that in light of the decision of
private complainant and her parents not
to pursue the case, the State had no
further evidence against the accused to
prove the guilt of the accused. She, then,
moved for the "dismissal of the case"
against both Alonte and Concepcion.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani
Alonte
and
Buenaventura
`Wella
Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE,

Thereupon, respondent judge said that

"the case was submitted for decision."
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte
filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail."
During the pendency thereof, Attorney
Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel
for petitioner Alonte received a notice
from the RTC Manila, Branch 53, notifying
him of the schedule of promulgation, on
18 December 1997, of the decision on the
case. The counsel for accused Concepcion
denied having received any notice of the
scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was
called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose
Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could

Issue:
Was
petitioner
deprived
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?

of

HELD:
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL
DUE PROCESS. It does seem to the Court
that there has been undue precipitancy in
the conduct of the proceedings.Perhaps
the problem could have well been avoided
had not the basic procedures been, to the
Court's perception taken lightly. And in this
shortcoming, looking at the records of the
case, the trial court certainly is not alone
to blame.

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of

Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals. "(1) No person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law. "(2) In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have

compulsory process to secure

the
attendance
of
witnesses
and
the
production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due

process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused; (c) that the accused is given
an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.

The
above
constitutional
and
jurisprudential
postulates,
by
now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our
own
criminal
justice
system,
are
mandatory
and
indispensable.
The
principles find universal acceptance and
are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted
statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a "law
which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial."

ANIAG v. COMELEC

Facts: In preparation for the synchronized

national and local elections scheduled on
11 May 1992, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution
2323 (Gun Ban), promulgating rules and

regulations on bearing, carrying and

transporting of firearms or other deadly
weapons, on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members
of
security
agencies
or
police
organizations,
and
organization
or
maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period. Pursuant to the Gun
Ban, Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-atArms, House of Representatives, wrote
Congressman Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who
was then Congressman of the 1st District
of Bulacan requesting the return of the 2
firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives.
Aniag
immediately
instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to
pick up the firearms from his house at
Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
The policemen manning the outpost
flagged down the car driven by Arellano as
it approached the checkpoint. They
searched the car and found the firearms
neatly packed in their gun cases and
placed in a bag in the trunk of the car.
Arellano was then apprehended and
detained. Thereafter, the police referred
Arellanos case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not
include Aniag as among those charged
with an election offense. The City
Prosecutor invited Aniag to shed light on
the circumstances mentioned in Arellanos
sworn explanation. Aniag explained that
Arellano did not violate the firearms ban
as he in fact was complying with it when
apprehended by returning the firearms to
Congress. The Office of the City Prosecutor
issued a resolution recommending that the
case against Arellano be dismissed and
that the unofficial charge against Aniag
be also dismissed. Nevertheless, the
COMELEC
directing
the
filing
of
information against Aniag and Arellano for
violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of BP 881
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA 7166

Issue: Whether or not the manner by

which
COMELEC
proceeded
against
petitioner runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution

substantive
and
procedural
rights,
whatever the source of such rights, be it
the Constitution itself or only a statute or
a rule of court.
In Go v. Court of Appeals, we held that

HELD:

THE
RIGHT
TO
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION, ALTHOUGH DOES NOT
EMANATE FROM THE CONSTITUTION IS AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL DUE
PROCESS.

Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC

proceeded against petitioner runs counter
to the due process clause of the
Constitution.
The
facts
show
that
petitioner was not among those charged
by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Nor was he subjected by
the City Prosecutor to a preliminary
investigation for such offense. The nondisclosure by the City Prosecutor to the
petitioner that he was a respondent in the
preliminary investigation is violative of
due process which requires that the
procedure established by law should be
obeyed.

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given

the chance to be heard because he was
invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor
regarding the circumstances leading to
the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner
in fact submitted a sworn letter of
explanation regarding the incident. This
does not satisfy the requirement of due
process the essence of which is the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in
support of his defense. Due process
guarantees the observance of both

While the right to preliminary investigation

is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundamental, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component
part of due process in criminal justice. The
right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial
for a criminal offense and hence formally
at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right . . . .

[T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a

process painful to anyone save, perhaps,
to hardened criminals is a valuable right.
To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of
the full measure of his right to due
process. Apparently, petitioner was merely
invited
during
the
preliminary
investigation of Arellano to corroborate
the latter's explanation. Petitioner then
was made to believe that he was not a
party respondent in the case, so that his
written explanation on the incident was
only intended to exculpate Arellano, not
petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be
seriously contended that petitioner was
fully given the opportunity to meet the
accusation against him as he was not
apprised that he was himself a respondent
when he appeared before the City
Prosecutor.

ROMUALDEZ v. MARCOS
FACTS:

Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that

petitioners made false and untruthful
representations in violation of Section
10[11] of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by
indicating therein that they are residents
of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte,
when in truth and in fact, they were and
still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop,
Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, Quezon City.
The petitioners contended, inter alia that
Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration
Act was void for being vague as it did not
refer to a definite provision of the law, the
violation of which would constitute an
election offense ; hence, it ran contrary to
Section 14(1) and section 14 (2) , Article III
of the 1987 Constitution ( due process
clause)
Nevertheless, the Commission on
Election
(COMELEC)
Charged
the
petitioners with violations of Section 10 (g)
and (j) , in relation to Section 45 (J) of the
Voters Registration Act.
1. Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189, provides that a
qualified voter shall be registered in the
permanent list of voters in a precinct of
the city or municipality wherein he resides
to be able to vote in any election. To
register as a voter, he shall personally
accomplish an application form for
registration
as
prescribed
by
the
Commission in three (3) copies before the
Election Officer on any date during office
hours
after
having
acquired
the
qualifications of a voter. The application
shall, inter alia, contain the following data:
Periods of residence in the Philippines and
in the place of registration and a
statement that the application is not a
registered voter of any precinct.
2. Section 45(j) of the same Act
provides, inter alia, that the following shall
be considered election offenses under this

Act: Violation of any of the provisions of

this Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of its jurisdiction when it
premised
its
resolution
on
a
misapprehension of facts and failed to
consider certain relevant facts that would
justify a different conclusion.
HELD:
NO. The Comelec did not commit grave
abuse
of
discretion. The void-forvagueness doctrineholds that a law is
facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.
However, this Court has imposed certain
limitations by which a criminal statute, as
in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. This Court has declared that
facial invalidation or an on-its-face
invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate.
Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation
of criminal statutes would result in a mass
acquittal of parties whose cases may not
have even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a departure
from the usual requirement of actual case
and controversy and permit decisions to
be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness.The rule
established in our jurisdiction is, only
statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle
of legal hermeneutics that words of a
statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the

legislature intended a technical or special

legal meaning to those words.It is succinct
that courts will not substitute the finding
of probable cause by the COMELEC in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to

perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act

at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.