Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 4497

September 26, 2001

MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO,

complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROO,1 respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint2 for
disbarment of respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroo
filed by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino.
Complainants allege that respondent has been
harassing them by filing numerous complaints
against them, in addition to committing acts of
dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of
the Philippine National Police stationed at
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia
is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former
judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants
also filed three separate administrative cases against
respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano
Saburnido filed charges of grave threats and acts
unbecoming a member of the judiciary against
respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of
pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who
was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation.
Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the
service with prejudice to reemployment in
government but without forfeiture of retirement
benefits.

Respondent was again administratively charged in

the consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge
Madroo, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps.
Saburnido v. Judge Madroo, A.M. No. MTJ-90486.4 In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent
granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without
prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case,
the spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in
whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods
were deposited, allowed other persons to take the
goods but did not issue the corresponding
memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost
while others were substituted with damaged goods.
Respondent was found guilty of both charges and his
retirement benefits were forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that
respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity,
filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.
Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service
firearm to an acquaintance who thereafter extorted
money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a
member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by
respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two
others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the
help of his co-respondents in the case, inserted an
entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of
Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through
negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano
Saburnido, without permission from his superior,
took into custody a prisoner by final Judgment who
thereafter escaped.

4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by respondent against

Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia
Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board of
Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite
being related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three
actions filed against Venustiano Saburnido had been
dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido
was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases
against them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed
administrative cases against him that resulted in his
dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants assert that
due to the complaints filed against them, they
suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial
damage. They claim that their children had to stop
going to school since the family funds were used up
in attending to their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds
mentioned in the administrative cases in which he
was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not
constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he could not be
disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the
complaints he filed against complainants was
manufactured. He adds that he "was so unlucky that
Saburnido was not convicted."9 He claims that the
complaint for serious irregularity against Venustiano
Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was
able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating
that his service firearm was lost. He also points out
that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner
escaped during his watch. As for his complaint
against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that
by mentioning this case in the present complaint,
Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the
attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the
Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that
the cases against them were meant only to harass
them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she
served in the BEI in 1995 only because the supposed

chairperson was indisposed. She stated that she told

the other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she
was related to one candidate and that she would
desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody
objected, she proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI
chairperson. She added that her relative lost in that
election while respondent's son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,10 we referred this
matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16,
2000, the IBP noted that respondent and his counsel
failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing
of the case set for January 26, 2000, despite notice.
Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his
right to present evidence in his behalf during said
hearing. Neither did respondent submit his
memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP
concluded that complainants submitted convincing
proof that respondent indeed committed acts
constituting gross misconduct that warrant the
imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP
recommends that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find
no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, that renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 11 Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession.
Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall be whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints

against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to
be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces
vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether
in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants
were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from the
judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing
several cases against complainants not the persistence
of one who has been grievously wronged but the
obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances
public perception of the legal profession. It
constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect

the public and the legal profession.14
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E.
Madroo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent's suspension is effective upon his receipt
of notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision
be spread in respondent's record as an attorney in this
Court, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of

attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do.x x
x
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred.
However, we find that suspension from the practice
of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court.12 While we will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also
not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.13 In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against
respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,

concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6672 : September 4, 2009]
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, v. ATTY.
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RE S O LUTI ON
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro
Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan
Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised
them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection
on their claims.4 To induce them to hire his services,
he persistently called them and sent them text
messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the
sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyerclient relations with complainant and utilize
respondent's services instead, in exchange for a loan
of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent's"
calling card:6
Front

NICOMEDES
TOLENTINO

, 2nd
Flr. Rm.
M-01
6th Ave.,
cor
M.H.
Del Pilar
Grace
Park,
Calooca
n City

7820
Fax:
(632)
3627821
Cel.:
(0926)
270171
9

Back

SERVICES
OFFERED:
CONSULTATION
AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS
SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE
TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS,
SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE
BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
rbl rl l
lbrr

LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY &
MARITIME
SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI
Mansion

Tel:
362-

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano
and authorizing the printing and circulation of the
said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the

CBD, in its report and recommendation,9 found that
respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and
other canons11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the
rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or
through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section
27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that any repetition would merit a
heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical
conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged
intrusion by respondent into complainant's
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the
CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers
must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyer's services are to be made known. Thus, Canon
3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the
practice of law is a profession and not a business;
lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer
to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public's
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render
that high character of service to which every member
of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be
done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through

paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes

malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule
1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man's cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the
solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to
gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19
(consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent's office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals' suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing
Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice
was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labiano's
word that respondent could produce a more favorable
result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.rbl rl l lbrr
With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of
the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not
steal another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labiano's "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano's connection to his office.21 Respondent
committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another's legal practice. He cannot escape liability
under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture

with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated
Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his
client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such
as filing fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's
independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to
the client's cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the client's case, the lawyer
in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of
the case or an additional stake in its outcome. 23 Either
of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his
client, or to accept a settlement which may take care
of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to
the client's cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation
constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise
of the Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of antisolicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of
the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent
(including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the
IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist.

The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to

its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in
evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best advertisement
is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and
conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed
to announce their services by publication in reputable
law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the
following details:
(a) lawyer's name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with
financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional
vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal
profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution
of Labiano's calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one year effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his
records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme

Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104599. March 11, 1994.]
JON DE YSASI III, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH
DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI,
Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously
stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding the
vinculum of paternity and filiation between the
parties. It would indeed have been the better part of
reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial
atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of
reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead
for judicial intervention despite the inevitable
acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste,
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their
dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded
any judicial proceeding before it.cralawnad
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was
employed by his father, herein private respondent, as
farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April,
1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc.
and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm
administrator was on a fixed salary, with other
allowances covering housing, food, light, power,
telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for
the supervision of daily activities and operations of
the sugarcane farm such as land preparation,
planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing
with third persons in all matters relating to the
hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be
assigned to him by private Respondent. For this
purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper

floor

of

the

house

there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner

moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted
to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and
August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which
lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute
gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis
from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioners illnesses,
private respondent took care of his medical expenses
and petitioner continued to receive compensation.
However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
respondent ceased to pay the latters salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for
the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty.
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondents auditor
and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his
salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City,
on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case
No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and payment of full back wages,
thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal
was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner
abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering
private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of
P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of
said termination of employment to the Department of
Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Courts
ruling in Wenphil Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, Et. Al. 2 On appeal to the
Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said
decision
was
affirmed
in
toto.
3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision
having been denied for lack of merit, 5 petitioner
filed this petition presenting the following issues for

resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was

illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled
to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth
month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not
he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees because of illegal
dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions
presented by private respondent, such as the exact
date when petitioner ceased to function as farm
administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts
received by petitioner from private respondent, that
is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or
pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment
by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the
Solicitor General recommended a modification of the
decision of herein public respondent sustaining the
findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor
Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which
reason the NLRC was required to submit its own
comment on the petition. In compliance with the
Courts resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC
filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely
reiterating its earlier position in support of the
findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the
observation of the labor arbiter is worth
noting:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This case is truly unique. What makes this case
unique is the fact that because of the special
relationship of the parties and the nature of the action
involved, this case could very well go down (in) the
annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its
kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son,
his fathers namesake, the only child and therefore
the only heir against his own father. 9
Additionally,
the
Solicitor
remarked:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

General

". . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two

(2) observations were noted that may justify why this
labor case deserves special considerations. First, most
of the complaints that petitioner and private
respondent had with each other, were personal
matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their
work, they allow their personal relationship to come

in

the

way.

10

I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from

employment was illegal because of want of just cause
therefor and non-observance of the requirements of
due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave
abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did
not conduct the hearings thereof.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm
administrator, thereby arming private respondent
with a ground to terminate his employment at
Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is
wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings
of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only
questions of law may be appealed for resolution by
this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of
the instant petition, private respondent faults herein
petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding
pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44
(should be Section 16[c] and [d], Rule 46 and Section
1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide
that want of page references to the records is a
ground
for
dismissal
of
an
appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of
Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall
not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable
means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts
in each case shall be availed of, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of
due
process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable
for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge,
or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one
who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge
who heard the case was not the judge who penned the
decision does not impair the validity of the judgment,
11 provided that he draws up his decision and
resolution with due care and makes certain that they
truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
submitted
in
the
case.
12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially
assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who

conducted the hearings therein from December 5,

1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to
Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually
decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity,
especially considering that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of a public officers
functions, 13 which petitioner has not successfully
rebutted.

continued employment of the employee is prohibited

by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employees
health, is also a ground for termination of his services
provided he receives the prescribed separation pay.
16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that
abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes
the employer to effect the formers dismissal from
employment.
17

We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in

the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical
rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal
precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to
help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we
cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to
nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his
arguments. The strength of ones position cannot be
hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases
in
law
and
jurisprudence.

After a careful review of the records of this case, we

find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming
the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding
that petitioner abandoned his employment and was
not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or in law, we cannot
give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness
normally accorded to the factual findings of an
administrative agency, such as herein public
respondent NLRC, 18 as even decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared "final" by
law are not exempt from judicial review when so
warranted.
19

The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and

due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just and authorized cause provided by law
and after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor
Code enumerates the causes for which an employer
may validly terminate an employment, to wit: (a)
serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime
or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.chanrobles.com :
virtual
law
library
The employer may also terminate the services of any
employee due to the installation of labor saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions
of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.
15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the

The following perceptive disquisitions of the

Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his
work from October 1982 to December 1982, cannot
be construed as abandonment of work because he has
a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from
perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and
fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan
of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn,
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
"This fact (was) duly communicated to private
respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda
Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at
49-50).
"During the period of his illness and recovery,
petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate
thereat and to handle only administrative matters of
the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is
not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day
inside Hacienda Manucao.
x
x
x
After evaluating the evidence within the context of
the special circumstances involved and basic human

experience, petitioners illness and strained family

relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be
considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de
Ysasi IIIs absence from work during the period of
October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without
notice and hearing.
x
x
x
"The elements of abandonment as a ground for
dismissal of an employee are as follows:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever
the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara,
Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, 1989
edition,
p.
133).
"This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates
what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus
Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules
that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some
overt act from which it may be inferred that the
employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in
Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC
(184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a
valid cause for termination of employment, there
must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. . . . Mere
absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by
overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore.
"There are significant indications in this case, that
there is no abandonment. First, petitioners absence
and his decision to leave his residence inside
Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and
strained family relations. Second he has some
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third,
once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex
J) informing private respondent of his intention to
assume again his employment. Last, but not the least,
he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal
when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these
are indications that petitioner had no intention to
abandon
his
employment.
20
The record show that the parties herein do not dispute
the fact of petitioners confinement in the hospital for
his various afflictions which required medical

treatment. Neither can it be denied that private

respondent was well aware of petitioners state of
health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the
medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter
to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again.
The disagreement as to whether or not petitioners
ailments were so serious as to necessitate
hospitalization and corresponding periods for
recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that
on account of said illnesses, the details of which were
amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21
and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of
malingering on the part of petitioner, there was
justifiable cause for petitioners absence from work.
We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified
refusal to resume employment and not mere absence
that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid
ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified
as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants
an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties.
This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned
myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being
candid about what he could do within the sphere of
his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at
the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to
specific control from his employer in every aspect of
his work. What is essential only is that he runs the
farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model
employee, in this regard he proved to be quite
successful, as there was at least a showing of
increased production during the time that petitioner
was
in
charge
of
farm
operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control
over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is
because that was the period when petitioner was
recuperating from illness and on account of which his
attendance and direct involvement in farm operations
were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision
and control exercisable by private respondent as
employer was necessarily limited. It goes without
saying that the control contemplated refers only to
matters relating to his functions as farm administrator
and could not extend to petitioners personal affairs
and
activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of

discharging his duties as farm administrator,

petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm,
there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as
there was no formal employment contract to begin
with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of
his employment or that any transfer of residence
would justify the termination of his employment.
That petitioner changed his residence should not be
taken against him, as this is undeniably among his
basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence
per se be a valid ground to terminate an employeremployee relationship.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as
he was yet uncertain of his sons intention of
returning to work after his confinement in the
hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported
him as an employee of the hacienda for social
security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits
with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end
of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983
when he became convinced that petitioner would no
longer return to work that he considered the latter to
have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no
longer listed him as an employee. According to
private respondent, whatever amount of money was
given to petitioner from that time until April, 1984
was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or
mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not
salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that
private respondent completely stopped giving said
pension or allowance when he was angered by what
he heard petitioner had been saying about sending
him
to
jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of
one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition
regarding petitioners alleged statement to him," (h)e
quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have
burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
petitioners intention to abandon his job. In addition
to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of
petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter
abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his
objectives, private respondent takes the novel
position that the agreement to support his son after
the latter abandoned the administration of the farm
legally converts the initial abandonment to implied
voluntary
resignation.25cralaw:red
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private

respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioners

illness and even paid for his hospital and other
medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment
of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to
the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his
fathers accountant and legal adviser about the reason
why his pension or allowance was discontinued since
April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered
and his willingness and capability to resume his work
at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September
14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner contends that it is
immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance,
with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto
in view of his continued service as farm
administrator.
27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a
finding of abandonment may justly be made there
must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the
failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
dismally
wanting
in
this
case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself
admitted being unsure of his sons plans of returning
to work. The absence of petitioner from work since
mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was
not without valid causes of which private respondent
had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him
to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to
work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived
at
such
a
conclusion.
Moreover,
private
respondents
claim
of
abandonment cannot be given credence as even after
January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly
"became convinced" that petitioner would no longer
work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm
administrator. These are duly and correspondingly
evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,
28 claiming and paying for additional farm
equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from
Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29

getting the payment of the additional cash advances

for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex
Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private
respondent through Atty. Sumbingco the sums
collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which
petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities
and operations of the farm. True, it is a fathers
prerogative to request or even command his child to
run errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well
as the property values and monetary sums involved,
it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the
matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these
matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or
at least be held accountable therefor, and who is
familiar with the terms, specifications and other
details relative thereto, such as an employee. If
indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was
considered to have done so by private respondent, it
would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or
to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters
relating to or expected of him with respect to what
would then be his past and terminated employment. It
is hard to imagine what further authority an employer
can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel
him to continue to perform work-related
tasks:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
It is also significant that the special power of attorney
32 executed by private respondent on June 26, 1980
in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
x
x
x
"That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age,
married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter
called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a
sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly
accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGANISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have
check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all
checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as
such
planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by
these presents I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND
CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEYIN-FACT

JON

de

YSASI

III

whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO

GET FOR ME and in my name, place and stead, my
check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-INFACT being herein given the power and authority to
sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the
receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my
said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said
check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper
disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts
of my Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said
check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be
made a CROSSED CHECK."cralaw virtua1aw
library
x
x
x
remained in force even after petitioners employment
was supposed to have been terminated by reason of
abandonment. Furthermore, petitioners numerous
requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of
his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence
reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back
to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the
complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of
one
who
has
abandoned
his
work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of
Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent,
ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly
indicative of the latters intention to abandon his
work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
such deposition without the presence of petitioners
counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve
reasonably advance notice of its taking to said
counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to crossexamine the deponent. Private respondent also failed
to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by
Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said
office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important
stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking
of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal
opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to

petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension,

allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question
as to petitioners entitlement thereto inasmuch as he
continued to perform services in his capacity as farm
administrator. The change in description of said
amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts
prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to
be determinative of petitioners employment status in
view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his
childs welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts
therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if
they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondents
theory that petitioners alleged abandonment was
converted into an implied voluntary resignation on
account of the fathers agreement to support his son
after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this
case, the monthly sums received by petitioner,
regardless of designation, were in consideration for
services rendered emanating from an employeremployee relationship and were not of a character
that can qualify them as mere civil support given out
of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put
to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly
converted into a voluntary resignation without any
positive act on the part of the employee conveying a
desire to terminate his employment. The very concept
of resignation as a ground for termination by the
employee of his employment 38 does not square with
the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that
there was a violation by private respondent of the due
process requirements under the Labor Code for want
of notice and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in
opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
applies only to cases where the employer seeks to
terminate the services of an employee on any of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case
where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner
on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned
his
employment.
40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing
applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the

Labor Code in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who
seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the
workers last known address.
x
x
x
"Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may
answer the allegations as stated against him in the
notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so
desires.
"Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall
immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision
to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
"Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision
taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to
the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the Regional Branch of the Commission.
x
x
x
"Sec. 11. Report of Dismissal. The employer shall
submit a monthly report to the Regional Office
having jurisdiction over the place of work at all
dismissals effected by him during the month,
specifying therein the names of the dismissed
workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the
positions last held by them and such other
information as may be required by the Ministry for
policy guidance and statistical purposes." chanrobles
virtual
lawlibrary
Private respondents argument is without merit as
there can be no question that petitioner was denied
his right to due process since he was never given any
notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds
therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the
mandatory twin requirements of procedural due
process in this particular case, he in effect admits that
no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact
is corroborated by the certification issued on
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for

Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice

of termination of the employment of petitioner was
submitted
thereto.
41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in
this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice
still had to be served upon the employee sought to be
dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the
pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires
service thereof at the employees last known address,
by way of substantial compliance. While it is
conceded that it is the employers prerogative to
terminate an employee, especially when there is just
cause therefor, the requirements of due process
cannot be lightly taken. The law does not
countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the
fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor
of
the
employee.
42
On the executive labor arbiters misplaced reliance
on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Labor Arbiter held thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
While we are in full agreement with the respondent
as to his defense of implied resignation and/or
abandonment, records somehow showed that he
failed to notify the Department of Labor and
Employment for his sons (sic)/complainants (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this
failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by
an employer was not complied with. This however,
would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic)
existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity
of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on
the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on
due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12,
Annex
C
Petition),
.
.
.
"This is thus a very different case from Wenphil
Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the
rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded reemployment and backwages for failure of his
employer to observe procedural due process. The
public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the
employee to do even worse and render a mockery of

the rules of discipline required to be observed.

However, the employer must be penalized for his
infraction of due process. In the present case,
however, not only was petitioner dismissed without
due process, but his dismissal is without just cause.
Petitioner did not abandon his employment because
he
has
a
justifiable
excuse."
43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter
erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of
Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an
illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and
back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of
the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for
violation of the due process requirements. Private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was
error in imposing the fine because that penalty
contemplates the failure to submit the employers
report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional
office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11),
Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to
be
dismissed
by
the
employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate
in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to
security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this
constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor
Code spells out the relief available to an employee in
case
of
its
denial:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits of their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of actual reinstatement." chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of
just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on
numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
application of said provision of the Labor Code,
recognizing that in some cases certain events may
have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder

provided, and declares that where there are strained

relations between the employer and the employee,
payment of back wages and severance pay may be
awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more
particularly when managerial employees are
concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed
employee be given his fair and just share of what the
law
accords
him.
48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the
Solicitor
Generals
ratiocination,
to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales v. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. v. NLRC, 173
SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it
comes to reinstatement, differences should be made
between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
Court concluded that a company which no longer
trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC
should know the difference between managers and
ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order
the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and
liberality as that of rank and file workers who had
been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not
be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or
antagonism between the parties (Morales, v. NLRC,
188
SCRA
295).
"In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner
should not be reinstated as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of
petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that
a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship
is
hardly
possible."
49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral
damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. He further prays for
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against
similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil

Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse

injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation,
provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful
act or omission of the defendant which was the
proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary damages,
under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of
right, it being left to the court to decide whether or
not
they
should
be
adjudicated.
51
We are well aware of the Courts rulings in a number
of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral
damages where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of
exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do
not feel, however, that an award of the damages
prayed for in this petition would be proper even if,
seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal
dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were
awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely
without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the
erring
employers
capricious
exercise
of
power.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and
private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning
the flames which gave rise to and ultimately
aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely
negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations
seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable
enmity between them negates the likelihood that
either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that
each one has a cause for damages against the other.
For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the
validity of the following recommendation of the
Solicitor
General:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Labor Arbiters decision in RAB Case No.
0452-84 should be modified. There was no voluntary
abandonment in this case because petitioner has a
justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence

does not warrant outright dismissal without notice

and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty
of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay
backwages for a period not exceeding three years
from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month(s) salary for every year of service, a
fraction of six months being considered as one (1)
year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr.
v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for
damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally
at
fault."
54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties,
as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the
Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be
reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal 55 goes beyond
merely presenting their clients respective causes in
court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not
more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to
smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court
and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.
Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it
whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for
dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in
every phase of life. He should be a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.
56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that" (a) lawyer shall encourage
his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it
will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find
that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as
officers of the court. The records do not show that
they took pains to initiate steps geared toward
effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On
the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges
could not but have exacerbated the situation even as
they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes
of their respective clients.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter
who handled this regrettable case has been less than
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code

mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts

towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at
least entertained the thought, the copious records of
the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any
reflection
of
the
same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not
particularly relish having been obliged to make. The
task of resolving cases involving disputes among
members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth
and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such
situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the
bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality,
we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father
and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and
that our adherence here to law and duty may
unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the
strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of
the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is
the Courts earnest hope, therefore, that with the
impartial exposition and extended explanation of
their respective rights in this decision, the parties
may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate
resolution of their differences on more convivial
terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner
back wages for a period not exceeding three (3)
years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of
six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole
year.
SO

ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-28546. July 30, 1975.]
VENANCIO CASTAEDA and NICETAS
HENSON, Petitioners, v. PASTOR D. AGO,
LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
Quijano & Arroyo, for Petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In a decision of the Supreme Court affirming a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in a
replevin case, Pastor Ago was ordered to deliver
personal properties or pay sums of money to the
plaintiffs therein. The case was consequently
remanded to the trial court for execution, levy was
made on Agos house and lots, and auction was
scheduled. Ago moved to stop the sale, failing in
which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals which dismissed it. This dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Efforts to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction having failed, the
sheriff sold the house and lots and awarded them to
herein petitioners as highest bidders. As Ago failed to
redeem, a final deed of sale was executed in favor of
the vendee in whose favor the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued writ of possession to the properties.
Subsequently, Ago, joined by his wife, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, an action to
annul the sheriffs sale on the ground that the
obligation upon which judgment had been rendered
against Ago was his personal obligation that could
not legally affect his wifes half-share in their
conjugal house and lots levied upon and sold for the
satisfaction of the judgment. The Quezon City court
issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the registration of the final deeds of sale
and the carrying out of any writ of possession. For a
couple of times this was lifted and then restored,
before the said court finally lifted the restraining
order. While these processes were being pursued,
Ago filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from

enforcing the writ of possession. The same was

dismissed for lack of merit and so with a similar
petition in the Court of Appeals. The dismissal by the
Court of Appeals was the subject of another petition
in the Supreme Court which was likewise dismissed.
Finally, the spouses succeeded in having another
petition of the same nature given due course by the
Court of Appeals which granted, and later made
permanent, the preliminary injunction from
enforcement of the writ of possession on and
ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to the wife. This decision of the
Court of Appeals is the subject of the instant petition.
The Supreme Court ruled that an injunction cannot be
availed of to protect a wifes half-share in the
conjugal properties for her share is merely an
inchoate interest, not a right in esse. It likewise
condemned respondents and their counsels misuse of
legal remedies and maneuver of tactics for fourteen
years to resist satisfaction of judgment. It motu
proprio examined the records of Civil Case Q-7986
(the mother case of the present action) and found that
the alleged causes of action in the complaint,
supplemented and amended, are all untenable.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed; the civil
case, in which Ago was joined by his wife ordered
dismissed without prejudice to the re-filing of
petitioners counterclaim in a new and independent
action; treble costs against respondents to be paid by
their lawyer.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; ORDERS; INTERFERENCE WITH
ORDERS OF A CO-EQUAL COURT NOT
ALLOWED; DOCTRINE INAPPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. The CFI of Manila, in Civil Case
No. 27251, issued a writ of possession to the
properties sold to enforce a writ of execution. The
CFI of Quezon City, in Civil Case Q-7986,
countermanded this order by issuing an ex parte writ
of preliminary injunction restraining the registration
of the final deeds of sale and carrying out of any writ
of possession. Subsequently, the latter court lifted the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued. The
Court of Appeals, in another petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA GR-

39438-R) granted preliminary injunction against the

enforcement of the writ of possession on and
ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved. HELD: The doctrine that a court may not
interfere with the orders of a co-equal court cannot
apply in the case at bar. The CFI of Manila, which
issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not
interfered with by its co-equal court, the CFI of
Quezon City, as the latter lifted the restraining order
it had previously issued against the enforcement of
the Manila courts writ of possession. It is the Court
of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of
the
writ.
2. JUDGMENTS; EXECUTION; ISSUANCE OF
WRIT OF POSSESSION; RIGHTS OF THIRD
PARTIES, EFFECT; RULING IN THE CASE OF
OMNAS v. RIVERA. The ruling in the case of
Omnas v. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third
person is adversely determined, but that the writ of
possession being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter
also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the
interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of
a writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened. This ruling is
inapplicable to the present case for here, there has
been no change in the ownership of the properties or
any interest therein from the time the writ of
execution was issued up to the time the writ of
possession was issued, and even up to the present.
3. ID.; ID.; LEVY ON PROPERTY OF JUDGMENT
DEBTOR; CLAIM FOR EXCLUSION FROM
LEVY OF SPOUSES CONJUGAL SHARE
BARRED BY LACHES. It is much too late in the
day for the respondents to raise the question that part
of the property is unleviable because it belongs to the
wife who was not a party to her husbands business
venture which failed and resulted in the replevin suit
and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership,
considering that (1) a wife is normally privy to her
husbands activities; (2) the levy was made and the
properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she
lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the
properties were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her
husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary
injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the
writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of
final sale on April 17, 1964, when Pastor Ago failed

to redeem; (8) the husband had impliedly admitted

that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by
his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his
efforts to prevent execution and; (9) it was only on
May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the
complaint for annulment of the sheriffs sale upon the
issue that the wifes share in the properties cannot be
levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to
the logging business and not a party to the replevin
suit. The spouses had every opportunity to raise the
issue in the various proceedings but did not; laches
now effectively bars them from raising it.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WIFES HALF-SHARE IN THE
PROPERTY LEVIED A MERE EXPECTANCY;
INJUNCTION NOT AVAILABLE TO PROTECT A
RIGHT NOT IN ESSE. The Court of Appeals
decision enjoined the enforcement of the writ of
possession to and ejectment from the one-half share
in the properties involved belonging to the wife of
the judgment debtor. HELD: That half-share is not in
esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere
expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable
estate, and will ripen into title only when upon
liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets
of the community. The decision sets at naught the
well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to
protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MISUSE OF LEGAL REMEDIES
TO THWART SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT,
CONDEMNABLE. The attitude of respondents
and their counsel of maneuvering for fourteen years
to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another is to
be condemned because far from viewing courts as
sanctuaries for those who seek justice, they tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
6.
ATTORNEYS;
CONDUCT;
LAWYERS
INSISTENCE DESPITE PATENT FUTILITY OF
HIS CLIENTS POSITION, A DISREGARD OF
HIS MISSION AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT.
Where counsel has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict
instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator
for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice, he has forgotten
his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court.

DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have
been commuting to this Court for more than a
decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and
Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor
Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover certain machineries (civil case 27251). In
1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or
pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on
June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago v. Castaeda, L14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial
court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution
for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of
execution but his motion was denied, and levy was
made on Agos house and lots located in Quezon
City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale
on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction
sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January
31, 1966 this Court, in Ago v. Court of Appeals, Et
Al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice
attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution "to save his family house and lot;" his
motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house
and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the
petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to
redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed
the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees
Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court
of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of
possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by
his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the sheriffs sale on
the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the
replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that
Lourdes Yu Agos one-half share in their conjugal
residential house and lots which were levied upon
and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached
for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in
their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in

the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and

the writ of execution was issued only against husband
Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her
husbands venture in the logging business which
failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did
not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an
ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from registering the latters final deed
of sale, from cancelling the respondents certificates
of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners are
from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation
thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered
to be done, the Quezon City court countermanded.
On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted
the preliminary injunction it had previously issued,
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled
the respondents certificates of title and issued new
ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of
the writ of possession was again thwarted as the
Quezon City court again issued a temporary
restraining order which it later lifted but then rerestored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for
the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and
restoring of the restraining order was being fought in
the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with this Court under date
of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court
found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a
minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration
was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then
filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also
dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed
to this Court (L-27140). We dismissed the petition in
a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of
Appeals where they filed another petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
(CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due course
to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from

enforcement of the writ of possession and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is
made permanent pending decision on the merits in
Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent
Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No
pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners
Castaeda and Henson filed the present petition for
review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may
not interfere with the orders of a co-equal court can
apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, which issued the writ of possession,
ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal
court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as
the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously
issued against the enforcement of the Manila courts
writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals that
enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang v. Buendia, Et Al., 1 where the
wife was a party in one case and the husband was a
party in another case and a levy on their conjugal
properties was upheld, the petitioners would have
Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin
judgment against her husband for which their
conjugal properties would be answerable. The case
invoked is not at par with the present case. In
Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for
the protection of the common interest of the spouses;
in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal
partnership benefited from the husbands business
venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas v. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the
Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may
not issue until the claim of a third person to halfinterest in the property is adversely determined, the
said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago
was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband.
The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for,
besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not
claim ignorance of his business that failed, of the
relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the
auction sale made by. the sheriff of their conjugal
properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that

a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a

third person is adversely determined, but that the writ
of possession being a complement of the writ of
execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter
also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the
interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of
the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to
the property sold have supervened. The ruling in
Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for,
here, there has been no change in the ownership of
the properties or of any interest therein from the time
the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ
of possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by
Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is much too late
in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the
question that part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering
that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husbands
activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in
the very properties in question; (4) her husband had
moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties
were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had
thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to
restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final
sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem;
(8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal
properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save
his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent
execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when
he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of
the sheriffs sale upon the issue that the wifes share
in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground
that she was not a party to the logging business and
not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had
every opportunity to raise the issue in the various
proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not;
laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
"Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it." 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review

suffers from two fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of
possession to and ejectment from the one-half share
in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu
Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is merely an
inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting
neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into
title when only upon liquidation and settlement there
appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision
sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction
does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or
even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago
spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5
which is conjugal property. By the Manila courts
writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the
house, but the decision under review would prevent
the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the
house would be vacated by Pastor and which part
would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity
does not stop here; the decision would actually
separate husband and wife, prevent them from living
together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties
during coverture and before the dissolution of the
conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale
(civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that
the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory
in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted
the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of
counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to
doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5
times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their
counsel who,

servant and his exalted position as an officer of the

court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict
instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator
for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice.
"A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candour
and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged
and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the
patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at
bar.
"It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of
the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he
finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A
lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is
superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable." 7
7. In view of the private respondents propensity to
use the courts for purposes other than to seek justice,
and in order to obviate further delay in the
disposition of the case below which might again
come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the
end, we have motu proprio examined the record of
civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present
case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more
than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits has not even
started;
(b) after the defendants Castanedas had filed their
answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed
a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new
parties-defendants;

"far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who

seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the
very ends of justice." 6

(c) after the admission of the supplemental

complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an
amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an
additional new party-defendant (no action has yet
been taken on this motion);

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public

(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the

admitted supplemental complaint; and

(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated
April 20, 1974, grants an extension to the suspension
of time to file answer.
(Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the
complaint, supplemental complaint and amended
supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the
reasons hereunder stated.
The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the
sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spouses
Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied
was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business
venture that he entered into, which resulted in the
replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is
whether or not the wifes inchoate share in the
conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that
we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in
striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals
granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive
portion of which was herein-before quoted. This
ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of
the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that
on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas and the sheriff,
pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos
of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of
P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of
action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails
to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the
sheriffs sale of the conjugal properties was irregular,
illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not
require the Castaeda spouses to pay or liquidate the
sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought
the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that
there was annotated at the back of the certificates of
title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine
National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the
properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of
P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37

in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the

Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under
no obligation to require payment of the purchase
price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser
is the judgment creditor, and no third-party claim has
been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it
does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec.
23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the
concern of the vendees Castaedas but did not affect
the sheriffs sale; the cancellation of the annotation is
of no moment to the Agos.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of
P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was
dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states
no valid cause of action and is moreover barred by
prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages
allegedly suffered by the Agos on account of the acts
complained of in the preceding causes of action. As
the fourth cause of action derives its life from the
preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must
necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas
aver that the action was unfounded and as a
consequence of its filing they were compelled to
retain the services of counsel for not less than
P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary
injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and
possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they
were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties
from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use
being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the
filing of the unfounded action besmirched their
feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court
to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after
the filing of the complaint, the defendants, taking

advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary

injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad faith and
evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs,
caused the registration of the sheriffs final deed of
sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold
to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land
in question; that the purchasers acquired the
properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged
the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation while the defendants lawyer
and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by
them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the
bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation
of additional damages caused by the defendants bad
faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and
transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint, which is, the
inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause
damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs.
Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of
land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo
who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio
Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the
two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy
Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and
with knowledge that the properties are the subject of
a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the
first cause of action of the supplemental complaint
and the amended supplemental complaint, the
validity of the cause of action would depend upon the
validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no
transgression upon their rights of ownership and
possession of the properties by reason of the
agreements subsequently entered into by the
Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriffs levy and
sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriffs
levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the

conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the

transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but,
we have already indicated that the issue in the first
cause of action of the original complaint is barred by
laches, and it must therefore follow that the first
cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the
amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the
remaining cause of action in the supplemental
complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of
Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered
dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitioners counterclaim in a new and independent.
action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses
Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid
by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of
this decision be made a part of the personal file of
Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6252 : October 5, 2004]
JONAR SANTIAGO, Complainant, v. Atty.
EDISON V. RAFANAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in
the performance of their duties, which are impressed
with public interest. They are enjoined to comply
faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of
the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete
out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or
neglect observance thereof.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar
Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the
disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The
Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged
Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 1382
of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01,
1.02 and 1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and
12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations
of the complainant in this wise:
"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged,
among others, that Respondent in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed and/or refused to:
a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the

details of the notarized documents in the notarial

register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents
he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent
executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he
was actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain date,
Respondent accompanied by several persons waited
for Complainant after the hearing and after
confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled
threats."6
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001
Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
Answer.8 He admitted having administered the oath
to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the
verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the
non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the
Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates
applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary
public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to
cases pending before courts and other government
offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the
affidavits, which were sworn to before government
prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence
certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries
public in Nueva Ecija - - some of whom were older
practitioners - - indicate the affiants' residence
certificates on the documents they notarized, or have
entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the
certification required by Section 3 of Rule 1129 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained
that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to
comply or not with the certification. To nullify the
Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound
to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of

the prosecutor conducting the preliminary

investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR,
respondent argued that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases
where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of
justice." Complainant charged respondent's clients
with attempted murder. Respondent averred that
since they were in his house when the alleged crime
occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends
of justice."
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had
threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing
of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January
4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the
Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5,
2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid
a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of
his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and
the Joint Affidavit11 of the two police officers who
had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated
for no other purpose than to harass him, because he
was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos
in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman
and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondent's Answer, the CBD,
through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the
case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the
afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were sent to the
parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and
time of the hearing, only complainant appeared.
Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because
he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.13
The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o'clock
in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his
Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent. The
latter's Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July
13, 2001.15 It also received complainant's Letter-

Request16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly,

it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24,
2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It
thereby directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the
Order, after which the case was to be deemed
submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainant's Memorandum18 on
September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBP's Recommendation
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving
and adopting the Investigating Commissioner's
Report that respondent had violated specific
requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of
a certification, the entry of such certification in the
notarial register, and the indication of the affiant's
residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors
found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It
modified, however, the recommendation20 of the
investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to
"P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the
violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."
The other charges - - violation of Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03,
12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR - - were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Respondent's Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and
duties of notaries public. They are required to certify
that the party to every document acknowledged
before them has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and

to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of

such certification.21 They are also required to
maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein
all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before [them] a number corresponding to the one in
[their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages
of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22
Failure to perform these duties would result in the
revocation of their commission as notaries public.23
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to
notarized documents. Notaries public entering into
their commissions are presumed to be aware of these
elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained
the value and meaning of notarization as follows:
"The importance attached to the act of notarization
cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a
public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by
a notary public and appended to a private
instrument."
For this reason, notaries public should not take for
granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.
Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial
act are never to be countenanced. They are expected
to exert utmost care in the performance of their
duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are
impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us - - and
respondent has readily admitted - - that he violated

the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents

notations of the residence certificate, as well as the
entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance
with those requirements is not mandatory for
affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts
and government agencies. He points to similar
practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his
claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply
to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses
with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law
makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling
and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of
notarial procedure allegedly because others were
doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others
is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the
verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondent's clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey
Geronimo, as well as their witnesses' Affidavits
relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted
murder, filed by complainant's brother against the
aforementioned clients. These documents became the
basis of the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating
commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as
notary - - in the absence of any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer the oath - - to "certify that he has
personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do
so with respect to the subject Affidavits and CounterAffidavits in the belief that - - as counsel for the
affiants - - he was not required to comply with the
certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of
lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.26 They are

expected to be in the forefront in the observance and

maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with
it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence.27 It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently
and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver
responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their
solemn oath to obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old
practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for
their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In
this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited
his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office
as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea
to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30
Considering the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we
believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary
measure in this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing
before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by
respondent's clients, allegedly in violation of Rule
12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in
behalf of his client."

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in
behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument and the
like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial
of the case to another counsel."
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not
disqualified from being a witness,31 except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communication
arising from an attorney-client relationship.32
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed
upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation
to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates.
Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall
them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans - those who actively plead and defend the cause of
others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal
of an advocate. The question is one of propriety
rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify
for their clients.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of
lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind
criticism and leave many people to suspect the
truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot
believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will
have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their
sympathies are against the lawyer's client, they will
have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for
charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own
testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes
doubted and is looked upon as partial and
untruthful."33
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from
being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a

cause, the preference is for them to refrain from

testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have
to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active
management of the case.34
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of
the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of
his clients, we cannot hastily make him
administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert
every remedy and defense that is authorized by law
for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal
action in which the latter's life and liberty are at
stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to
be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges
against them. They are entitled to suggest all those
reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence
as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are
convicted, such conviction is according to law.

persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive

prosecutions; protecting them from open and public
accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as
expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting
the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.38
The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as
it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and
remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has
reason to believe that he may be an essential witness
for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future
cases in which his testimony may become essential to
serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the
profession require him to withdraw from the active
prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment

Having undertaken the defense of the accused,

respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to
spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong
conviction. He had the duty to present - - by all fair
and honorable means - - every defense and mitigating
circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that
his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law.36

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and

uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not
supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent
to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with
liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of
complainant but the version of respondent that is
more credible, considering that the latter's allegations
are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police
officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City
Police.

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly

necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time
of the incident, his clients were at his residence and
could not have possibly committed the crime charged
against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant
does not dispute the statements of respondent or
suggest the falsity of its contents.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found

guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar
infractions in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a

situation in which lawyers give their testimonies
during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was
submitted during the preliminary investigation which,
as such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial
of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation
has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio

Morales*, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Complainant, v. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner, v.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents.
R ES OLUTIO N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue
of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which
reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist
532-4333/521-2667." 1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the
Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and
pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs.
Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not
involve separation of property or custody of children.
Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a
fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the

time of filing of the case and the other half after a

decision thereon has been rendered.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Further research by the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published
in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine
Star. 2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in
his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed
to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation
per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come
to change our views about the prohibition on
advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the
public is not served by the absolute prohibition on
lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on
lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus,
he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges
against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and
public order as long as it is dignified. 4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306, 6 finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the
practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that
a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002. 7chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration, 8 which was denied by the IBP
in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19,

2002 9
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents." This petition was consolidated with
A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated
March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties
were required to manifest whether or not they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings. 10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is
submitting the case for its early resolution on the
basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11
Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of

law is not a business. 12 It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be
a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits. 13 The gaining
of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. 15
The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument
is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients. 16
There is no question that respondent committed the
acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused
the publication of the advertisements. While he
professes repentance and begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering
the fact that he advertised his legal services again
after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming
that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his
legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy
& Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement to be published in the
October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. 18 Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the Courts authority.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that
in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of
Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly

erodes and undermines not only the stability but also

the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring
prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the
filing of the case, 19 he in fact encourages people,
who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer and to the bar. 20 Thus, the use of simple
signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable. 21 Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal
Clinic, Inc.: 22
Such data must not be misleading and may include
only a statement of the lawyers name and the names
of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinctions; public or quasipublic offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of
listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer not
properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct,

management, or contents of which are calculated or

likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower dignity or standing of the profession.cralaw :
red
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is
also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. (emphasis and Italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record
as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., abroad, on official business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar
to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and
"B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other
than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein
petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,
5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on

Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL
Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the
fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the

controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The

said bar associations readily responded and extended
their valuable services and cooperation of which this
Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms

its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the
same through newspaper publications.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court

are whether or not the services offered by respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same
can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative

supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the

merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar
matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms,
i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that
the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign
visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not
wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the
view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today
it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives

the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers
legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for
medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal
Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in
the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still remain
as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is

merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between
"legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims,
the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation
during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it

is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can
be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for
the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of
the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper
and seems to address those planning a "secret
marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is
how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously
to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive
of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be
reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements
in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas)
with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where
the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the

advertisements in question give the impression that

respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes
of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and
like services will greatly benefit the legal profession
and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by nonmembers of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of
law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case
at bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of
their having devoted time and effort exclusively to
such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of

law in any form, not only for the protection of

members of the Bar but also, and more importantly,
for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of
illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members
of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be
offering technical assistance, not legal services.
Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered
to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous
or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it
must be required to include, in the information given,
a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law,
that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular
lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar,
with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and

without any adequate and effective means of

regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a
corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such
practice may be considered, the corporation's Article
of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This
is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of
holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a
practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say
that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its
pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services
through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that
the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage
in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the
scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious

vehicle for deception, especially so when the public

cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice
against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation
of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and
the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession
open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a
personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for
its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the
practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause
of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services,
as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show

that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit

outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a fouryear bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to
take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a
lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to protect the general

public from being exploited by those who may be

dealing with the general public in the guise of being
"paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought
about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present
Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising,
it appears in the instant case that legal services are
being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity
staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the
legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression
that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when
only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the
very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law,

(are) illegal and against the Code of Professional

Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify

permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it

is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in
that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic,
Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is
certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an
agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and

other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers
to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for
their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the
petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by
whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has
yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that
seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about
how they could go about having a secret marriage
here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted,
and seek advice on divorce, where in this country
there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against
good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by
our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the
Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the
practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant
can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not
to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids.
It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge
of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor
in determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a
fact that most men have considerable acquaintance
with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves,
but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the
architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement
house statutes, and who draws plans and specification
in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit
a fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute.
Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of
some measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing

law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no

separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building
on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and business agents
of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been
the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill
in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking
or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates
in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client along the path charted by law. This, of course,

would be the practice of the law. But such is not the

fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines.
The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the architect
may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities
into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the
bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or
without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal
role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite
party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute,
it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since
the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer
before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without power to interfere

with such determination or to forbid representation

before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give
to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel,
or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative'
one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant
may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v.
Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice
of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to
a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work
for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and nonlawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to
render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is
as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal

Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby ConcepcionRichard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as
the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that
of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on
the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside
from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal
text which publication of a legal text which purports
to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And
the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the
text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is
sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.
THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific problem

peculiar to a designated or readily identified person

in a particular situation in their publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for
the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant
having an interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might
arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment
of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services
are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve
giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry
may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in
that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the

wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all

the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails
to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?"
or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase
"practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at
bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of
law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid
down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we
now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract
by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney
at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to
clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property

according to law, in order to assist in proper

interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and
advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as
to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of
another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after
citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the
test to determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of
all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any

court, commissioner, referee, board, body,

committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of
their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers
Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust

relations and other affairs. Although these

transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under
the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon
all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree
with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied
by respondent's own description of the services it has
been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving
ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of

information and communication, such as

computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by
laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage,
property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or
foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail
of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation
of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and
non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign
laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish
a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him
or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it

will consequently charge and be paid. That activity

falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as
the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an

affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if
this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We
can take care of these matters on a while you wait
basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold
or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by

an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its
own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

Those cases which requires more extensive

"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives
will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case. 21

This is the kind of business that is transacted

everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984.
Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to

carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients.

"when they come, we start by analyzing the problem.
That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and
so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it's referred to
one of our specialists.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by

the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law. 22

There are cases which do not, in medical terms,

require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services

being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.

Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar,

or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be

aware that this should first be a matter for judicial
rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.

Public policy requires that the practice of law be

limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

Paralegals in the United States are trained

professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none
in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards
or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval
of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in
the United States with their own code of professional
ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29

The same rule is observed in the american

jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also
stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to,
the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed
to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them
to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to
the construction, interpretation, operation and effect
of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found,
not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department
can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from
the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept

and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by
the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial
policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered
by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and
unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned

advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34
Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of,
or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35
Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession.
advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to
a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that
the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to
those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question
was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the

practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of

gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service
to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation
are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising
or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied
from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must

not be misleading and may include only a statement

of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasipublic offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of
listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented."
42

The law list must be a reputable law list published

primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is
also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which respondent
is being taken to task, which even includes a

quotation of the fees charged by said respondent

corporation for services rendered, we find and so
hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively
cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements
by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of
a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics
or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can
be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates,
on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that
public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is

already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal

profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of
the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise
his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid
a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49
Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor
of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to
the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed
upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is
clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law
and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized
for or engage in the practice of law in this country.
This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some
so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged
support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this
prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute
the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for
the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of

the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the

instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General
for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN
and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in

translation, reads as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal
Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising
attorney and a member of the provincial board of
Isabela, admits that previous to the last general
elections he made use of a card written in Spanish
and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you
a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by
the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of
your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any
kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect
your loans although long overdue, as well as any
complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in
his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the
poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of
a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform
you of the approaching date for our induction into
office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on
the 16th of next month. Before my induction into
office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions
or recommendations for the good of the province in
general and for your barrio in particular. You can
come to my house at any time here in Echague, to
submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the
Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I
will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will
come back home on the following day here in
Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and
notary public. Despite my election as member of the
Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession
as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see
me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
can always find me there on every Sunday. I also
inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and
affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public
even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this
matter for the reason that some people are in
the belief that my residence as member of the
Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then
be disqualified to exercise my profession as
lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the
case and I would make it clear that I am free
to exercise my profession as formerly and that
I will have my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit
this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that
they may be informed of my desire to live and
to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer

and notary public. If the people in your

locality have not as yet contracted the
services of other lawyers in connection with
the registration of their land titles, I would be
willing to handle the work in court and would
charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write
down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived
related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919
at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association,
said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by
adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the
Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the
Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and
28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT.
The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially
with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be
the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple business
cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se
improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or
interview not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to
procure business by indirection through touters of
any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust

companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds

or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the
lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation,
defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high
calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR
THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except
in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt
up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit,
or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims
for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients,
or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or
to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who
bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his
office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison
officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested
friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick
and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his
professional services. A duty to the public and to the
profession devolves upon every member of the bar
having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the
end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up
suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at
the common law, and one of the penalties for this
offense when committed by an attorney was
disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil
have been provided in a number of jurisdictions
usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been
upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes

of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a

profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through
others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State
vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R.
C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain
terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by
lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great
profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in
needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be
distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of
Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands
convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the
law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action
which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of
Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the
Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case,
suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We
think that our action should go further than this if
only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is
only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the
bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in
favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation
that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and,
third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in
the future. A modest period of suspension would
seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it
should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have
influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this

particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken

as indicating that future convictions of practice of
this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the
judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice
as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month
from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

office." Not having received any reply, he filed the

instant complaint.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS
JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR.,
ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law
Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in
1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin
Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie,
a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent
Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker &
McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten
lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87
shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7,
1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He
requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is
your purpose in using the letterhead of another law

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law

firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the
respondents in their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in
1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and
associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of
Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of
Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents'
use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes
a representation that being associated with the firm
they could "render legal services of the highest
quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker
& McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.
(See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p.
115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from
practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Plana, J., took no part.
Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

as she was never notified of the application for

preliminary injunction.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-99-1292. February 26, 1999.]
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE,
Complainant, v. ATTY. ROLANDO R.
GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, Respondent.
RE S O LUTI ON
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte
charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220,
Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the
alleged engaging in the private practice of law which
is in conflict with his official functions as Branch
Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized
representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon,
the plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for
ejectment, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical error was
committed in the complaint which stated that the
address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P.
Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake was
rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which
was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered
in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a
motion for execution. Complainant, however, was
surprised to receive a temporary restraining order
signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220,
RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is
the Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Complainant alleges that the issuance of the
temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular

Complainant further alleges that when she went to

Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the
reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining
order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her
lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint
for ejectment, and told her that if she wanted the
execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer
and retain the law office of respondent, at the same
time giving his calling card with the name "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office
at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able
to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told
respondent that she could not decide because she was
only representing her sister. To her consternation, the
RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the
preliminary injunction as threatened by respondent
despite the fact that the MTC, Branch 37 had issued
an Order directing the execution of the Decision in
Civil Case No. 37-14552.
Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited
the antecedents in the ejectment case and the issuance
of the restraining order by the Regional Trial Court,
and claimed that contrary to complainant Samontes
allegation that she was not notified of the raffle and
the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on the motion for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order was
duly served upon the parties, and that the application
for injunctive relief was heard before the temporary
restraining order was issued. The preliminary
injunction was also set for hearing on August 7,
1996.
The respondents version of the incident is that
sometime before the hearing of the motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order,
complainant Samonte went to court "very mad"
because of the issuance of the order stopping the
execution of the decision in the ejectment case.
Respondent tried to calm her down, and assured her
that the restraining order was only temporary and that
the application for preliminary injunction would still
be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
complainant went back to court "fuming mad"
because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court
in issuing the injunction.

Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter

complainant returned to his office, and informed him
that she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of
hers recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same
time showing a calling card, and asking if he could
handle her case. Respondent refused as he was not
connected with the law firm, although he was invited
to join but he chose to remain in the judiciary.
Complainant returned to court a few days later and
told him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall
the writ of preliminary injunction, she will file an
administrative case against respondent and the judge.
The threat was repeated but the respondent refused to
be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainants Motion
to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the
complainant must have filed this administrative
charge because of her frustration in procuring the
ejectment of the defendant lessee from the premises.
Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint
against him
The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella
Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was
set for hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on
September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but
neither complainant nor her counsel appeared,
despite due notice. The return of service of the Order
setting the last hearing stated that complainant is still
abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the
court for the return of the complainant, the
investigating Judge proceeded with the investigation
by "conducting searching questions" upon respondent
based on the allegations in the complaint, and asked
for the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for
evaluation. The case was set for hearing for the last
time on October 22, 1997, to give complainant a last
chance to appear, but there was again no appearance
despite notice.
The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm
the statements in his Comment, and submitted
documentary evidence consisting mainly of the
pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in
RTC Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 to show that the
questioned orders of the court were not improperly
issued.

The investigating judge made the following

findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For failure of the complainant to appear at the
several hearings despite notice, she failed to
substantiate her allegations in the complaint,
particularly that herein respondent gave her his
calling card and tried to convince her to change her
lawyer. This being the case, it cannot be established
with certainty that respondent indeed gave her his
calling card and even convinced her to change her
lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the records of Civil
Case No. Q-96-28187, complainant was duly notified
of all the proceedings leading to the issuance of the
TRO and the subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio
Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220. Complainants
lack of interest in prosecuting this administrative case
could be an indication that her filing of the charge
against the respondent is only intended to harass the
respondent for her failure to obtain a favorable
decision from the Court
However, based on the record of this administrative
case, the calling card attached as Annex "B" of
complainants affidavit dated September 25, 1996
allegedly given by respondent to complainant would
show that the name of herein respondent was indeed
included in the BALIGOD, GATDULA,
TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW
OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed
any position in said office, the fact remains that his
name is included therein which may therefore tend to
show that he has dealings with said office. Thus,
while he may not be actually and directly employed
with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the
calling card as a partner in the Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the
impression that he is connected therein and may
constitute an act of solicitation and private practice
which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No.
6713. It is to be noted, however, that complainant
failed to establish by convincing evidence that
respondent actually offered to her the services of
their law office. Thus, the violation committed by
respondent in having his name included/retained in
the calling card may only be considered as a minor
infraction for which he must also be administratively
sanctioned."cralaw virtua1aw library
and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished
and censured for the minor infraction he has
committed.

Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that

the respondent is guilty of an infraction. The
complainant, by her failure to appear at the hearings,
failed to substantiate her allegation that it was the
respondent who gave her the calling card of
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera
Law Offices" and that he tried to convince her to
change counsels. We find however, that while the
respondent vehemently denies the complainants
allegations, he does not deny that his name appears
on the calling card attached to the complaint, which
admittedly came into the hands of the complainant.
The respondent testified before the Investigating
Judge as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: How about your statement that you even gave her
a calling card of the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo,
Dimailig and Celera law Offices at Room 220
Mariwasa building?
A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the
complainant that I gave her a calling card. I was
surprised when she presented (it) to me during one of
her follow-ups of the case before the court. She told
me that a friend of hers recommended such firm and
she found out that my name is included in that firm. I
told her that I have not assumed any position in that
law firm. And I am with the Judiciary since I passed
the bar. It is impossible for me to enter an appearance
as her counsel in the very same court where I am the
Branch Clerk of Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is
an admission that it is his name which appears on the
calling card, a permissible form of advertising or
solicitation of legal services. 1 Respondent does not
claim that the calling card was printed without his
knowledge or consent, and the calling card 2 carries
his name primarily and the name of "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address

at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,

Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly
gives the impression that he is connected with the
said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in
the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation
which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public
official or employee to, among
others:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with official functions."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct
and behavior of every one connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only
be characterized by propriety and decorum but above
all else must be above suspicion. 3
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula,
Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon
City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the
private practice of law with the warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more
severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion
of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in
the private practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ.,
concur.