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Philippines Veterans Bank vs.

CA
322 SCRA 139
Facts: Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao,
which are covered by TCT Nos. T-38666, T-38667, T-6236, and T-27591. The lands
were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the R.A. No.
6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents LBP and the
DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its
property. The petition was filed on January 26, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which on February 23, 1995, dismissed the petition on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB.
Issue: Whether or not the primary jurisdiction vested to DAR to adjudicate agrarian
related matters is in contrary to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Held: There is nothing contradictory between the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. The first
refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In
accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in
the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such
determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon
by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative
determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final
and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory
that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day
period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court
correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of
dismissal.

Cario vs. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)


204 SCRA 483 (G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as
"mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again

been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake
said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging
at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. Among those who took part in
the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at
the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political
demands of the MPSTA.
However, the Secretary of Department of Education Culture and Sport (DECS) were
administratively charged them on the basis of the principal's report and had given them
five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety
(90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807".They filed correspondingly to the
Commission on Human Rights for the DECS violation of their peaceful assembly and
replacement of them by the other teachers without validly informing them. The CHR
summons the DECS personnel but the latter declared that the complaint states no cause
of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency, which has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power
to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged
human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

International Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) vs. Jalandoon


G.R. No. 148152, November 18, 2005
FACTS: Jose Jalandoon filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission a petition to
make his claim of twenty percent (20%) of share stocks of IBC.

However, the SEC refused to render decision because its jurisdiction to decide the case
was now transferred to RTC by virtue of R.A. 8799. The herein petitioner filed an appeal
to the CA which has acquired a favorable decision enjoining the SEC to render decision
of the petitioners claimed. The SEC and IBC eventually have filed a petition for judicial
review or a review on certiorari on the case at bar by this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC has the jurisdiction to decide on the issue of the share
of 20% stocks claimed by the petitioner to the IBC
HELD: NO. the supreme court ruled that as of August 9, 2000 which is the effectivity of
RA 8799, the case was not considered pending because the SEC had not decided
whether the Republic who by virtue of the sequestration of the PCGG of the IBC will now
be the new party to be impleaded as party of interest.
In other words, the case will fall within the circumstances described in RA 8799 and thus,
a controversy considered as intra-corporate issues shall now lodge at the RTC pursuant
to the mandate under RA 8799.

RCPI vs. Board of Communications


80 SCRA 471
Facts: The case at bar is about two petitions from private respondent Diego Morales
and Pacifico Innocencio that prays for damages to petitioner RCPI for the non-delivery of
telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives which allegedly caused them
inconveniences, mental anguish and additional expenses. After hearing, the Board of
Communications in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was
inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a
disciplinary fine pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146. Petitioner contest
that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints
for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence and injury
caused by quasi delict which accordingly, it should be ventilated in the proper courts and
not in the Board of Communications.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for
damages allegedly suffered by private respondent for failure to receive telegrams sent
thru the petitioner RCPI.
Held: The Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of
Communication being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only
such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred
upon it by statute. The functions of Public Service Commission are limited and
administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. As successor in interest of the Public
Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers,
jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public
Service Commission.

5. DARAB V. Lubrica (p. 105)


FACTS: This case is an appeal for certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, granting the respondents petition for prohibition and
the Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Federico Suntay filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation
against the DAR, DAR Region IV Director and the Land Bank of the Philippines
for his land which was valuated by the land Bank as P4,251,141.68, which,
according to Suntay was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of
land without due process of law.
The RARAD ruled in favor of Suntay and ordered that Land Bank pay the
P157,541,951.30 as just compensation. Consequently, Land Bank filed a
petition to the RTC praying that just compensation be declared at
P4,251,141.68. The Court dismissed the petition for failure to pay the docket
fees within the reglementary period.
While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special
agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order declaring
its Decision as final and executory after noting that Land Banks petition for
just compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the
fifteen-day reglementary period in violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the
DARAB Rules of Procedure. The RARAD issued a Writ of Execution, directing
the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its Decision.
Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Prohibition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as
respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No.
0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which confers
adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over
special civil actions for certiorari. The Court of Appeals granted Lubricas
prayer for a temporary restraining order. This notwithstanding, DARAB issued
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, directing RARAD not to implement its
Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of
Execution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a
comment on Lubricas petition for prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals
because DARAB was a mere formal party and could file a comment only when
specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court also ruled
that DARABs exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no
constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARABs contention that the
issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional
supervision over the RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that
DARAB was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and
issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding
with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal.
Issue: WON the DARAB has jurisdiction over DSCA No. 0252.

Held: This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB
does not have jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for certiorari.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of
action, must exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.
It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of
certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or
statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power
are expressly designated.
The quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative
agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other
words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering
such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not
implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers
upon the DAR is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the
authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DARs
competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and
functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a
regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers
inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial
body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for
certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229
and E.O. No. 129-A.
The Supreme Court explained that the power of administrative agencies to
promulgate rules of procedure dies it or cannot be construed as allowing it to
grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred by the Constitution or by law.
Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which power or
authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put not action.
Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover
only rules on pleadings and practice.

6. Ang Tibay v. CIR (p.114)


FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that
Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor
unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is
dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new
trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they
were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not
able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC
ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing
to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
7. Civil Aeronautics Board v. Philippine Airlines (p.133)
FACTS:

PAL is granted a legislative franchise to provide domestic and international flights. In 1970, it
required Flight 213 (Tug-Mla) to pass Baguio to pick up 20 passengers. No airline was affected by
the flagstop.

Thereafter, the CAB Chairman filed a complaint against PAL contending that the latter should
have first obtained permission from CAB. The Board then resolved to impose a fine against PAL.
PAL filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the power and authority to impose fines is a
judicial function and does not belong to the CAB. Subsequently, the Board resolved to reduce the
fine imposed upon PAL.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAB has the power to impose fine against PAL.

HELD: YES. RA 776 provides that the CAB has the power to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on
matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any
provision of the said Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder. In the case at bar, the fine
imposed on PAL is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the relevant provision of RA 776 and
not a fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the RPC. It is an administrative
penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution.