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[A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC.

July 29, 2002]

IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN


THE PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

On December 11, 2001, the court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent
Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering
some allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) which was then pending resolution:
[1]

Quoted hereunder are newspaper articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty.
Leonard De Vera concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending
before the Court. The statements are italicized for ready identification:
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition
filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed
vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court
insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said
Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.
We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices
---considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that Maywill most likely result in pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either
unconstitutional or vague, the group said.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER


Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
xxx
people are getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged. Said lawyer Leonard
de Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada
Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II.
xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II
if the rumor turned out to be true.
People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically
wrong. Sovereignty must prevail.
WHEREFORE, the court resolved to direct Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for contempt
of court.
SO ORDERED.

[2]

In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the Inquirer that
he suggested that the Court must take steps to dispel once and for all these ugly rumors and reports
that the Court would vote in favor of or against the validity of the Plunder Law to protect the
credibility of the Court. He explained therein:
[3]

(4) In short, the integrity of the Court, including the names of the Honorable Members who
were being unfairly dragged and maliciously rumored to be in favor or against one side of
the issue, was being viciously attacked. To remain silent at this time when the Honorable
Court was under siege by what appeared to be an organized effort to influence the court in
their decision would and could lend credence to these reports coming from anonymous
sources.
[4]

Respondent admitted further to having appealed to the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it
would vote in favor of a petition by [former President Joseph] Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder
[law] unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness because he and his group were greatly disturbed
by such rumors.
[5]

Anent the November 19, 2001 report in the Inquirer quoting respondent as having said that the
people were getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged, pending the courts resolution
on the petition filed by former President Estrada assailing the validity of the Plunder Law, respondent
claimed that such statement was factually accurate. He also argued that he was merely exercising
his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court
declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than
those that led to People Power II.
[6]

[7]

Furthermore, respondent justified his statement and said that the people wouldnt just swallow
any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong as an expression of his opinion and as
historically correct, citing the ouster of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos through people power
in 1986, and the resignation of former President Estrada from office as a result of pressure from the
people who gathered at EDSA to demand the impeachment process be stopped for being a farce,
and that Estrada step down because he no longer had the mandate of the Filipino people.
[8]

While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made
the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.
[9]

After a careful consideration of respondents arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed
at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of
wrongs for the violation of said rights must be allowed to decide cases independently, free of outside
influence or pressure. An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of democracy, as well
as of peace and order in society. Further, maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of
citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice.
[10]

[11]

Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for
criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of the
court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute
or disrespect.
[12]

Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the Court to dispel rumors that it
would declare the Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such was
basically wrong and would not be accepted by the peopleas utterances protected by his right to
freedom of speech.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authority, and

interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
[13]

Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein. It is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should be immune from every
extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before them. The court has previously
held that-[14]

[15]

xxx As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. xxx This
Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right
will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced
tribunal.
[16]

In People vs. Godoy, this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the
proceedings and decisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and even express his opinions
on the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the
important public trusts reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade the court, destroy
public confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught its orders, judgments
and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty of speech and of the press, for
they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and well-being in society by obstructing the
course of justice.
[17]

[18]

Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law or risk another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as falling within
the ambit of constitutionally-protected speech, because such statements are not fair criticisms of any
decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made against it to force the Court to decide the issue
in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. Such statements show disrespect not only
for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to promote distrust and undermine
public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to
resolve cases impartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case tried fairly by an
independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences.
[19]

It is respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts
and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last
bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondents utterances as quoted above, while the case
of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by this Court, belies his protestation of
good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on the Court.
[20]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days
from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND
NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner,
vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA


ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro
Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for
Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had
been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of theSupreme
Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme
Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and
offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the
sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter
disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards
with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud
speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L.
Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending,
and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in
order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately
for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain
their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the
Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw
graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante
Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro
Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and
Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of
petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and NationalismOlalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and
then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty.
Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel
of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the
Court for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be
repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers
why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty
as may be warranted under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket
was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about
seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union.

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the
resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the
Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the
Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for
the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated,
the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which
respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition
of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance
taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES
EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No.
73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an
acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a longrepressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full
force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into
acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be
ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or
other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of
justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free
from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free
governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been
invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is
a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that

facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of
such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice
administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside
coercion or interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity
of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in
her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the
rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to
pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an
abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize
that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The
duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the
untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession
that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude
toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED.


Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of
justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity
and/or within the premises of any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-90-580. April 27, 1993.


EDUARDO R. BALAOING, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LEOPOLDO CALDERON, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-676. April 27, 1993.
EDUARDO R. BALAOING, complainant,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO MALIWANAG, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; COUNSEL'S WANTON DISREGARD OF COURT'S STERN
WARNING NOT TO AGAIN FILE BASELESS AND FRIVOLOUS ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS AND HIS ADAMANT REFUSAL TO ABIDE BY CANON 11, RULE 11.03
AND RULE 11.04, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS GROUND FOR
DISBARMENT. Complainant Balaoing went out of bounds when he filed his baseless
and frivolous administrative complaints against respondent Judges Calderon and
Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and
thus, exact vengeance on them for rendering adverse judgments against him and his
clients. These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS . . . Rule 11.03 A lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts. Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case. We have painstakingly reviewed the records of
these cases and find the present administrative complaints of Atty. Balaoing against
Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as
frivolous and baseless as the previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are
based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on material allegations of fact,
substantiated by solid evidence. This We cannot countenance. Complainant Balaoing's
wanton disregard of Our stern warning not to again file baseless and frivolous complaints
which only clog the already full dockets of this Court instead of serve the ends of justice,
and his adamant refusal to abide by the above-quoted provisions of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a lawyer's conduct in this jurisdiction,


have shown complainant Balaoing's unfitness to hold the license to practice law.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
This is the latest of the several administrative complaints filed by Atty. Eduardo R.
Balaoing against different judges of Olongapo City and Zambales.
The first complaint was dated February 17, 1989, entitled "Atty. Balaoing vs. Hon. Jaime
Dojillo as Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo City, et al." Said complaint
was dismissed for lack of merit through this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 1990.
Further, Atty. Balaoing was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with for having suppressed certain material facts of which he was charged with
knowledge, and for having engaged in forum shopping. On September 26, 1990, Atty.
Balaoing submitted his "Explanation and Motion for Reconsideration." In a Resolution 1 of
the Court En Banc, said motion for reconsideration was DENIED, his explanation was
DECLARED UNSATISFACTORY and he was SEVERELY CENSURED for having
instituted a patently unfounded and frivolous administrative action, and WARNED that the
commission by him of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
The second administrative complaint filed by Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing was against Judge
Santiago Maliwanag, RTC, Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, charging them with grave
misconduct for their alleged failure and refusal to issue the corresponding writ of
execution (pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his motion filed in Civil Case No.
983-1 (CA-G.R. No. 01234), entitled "TEOFILO ZABALA, et al. vs. EUGENIO BUENO".
The Court was disturbed by complainant Balaoing's unrestrained use of unsavory, even
defamatory and offensive language against respondent Judge. One glaring example
narrates: ". . . It is well to advise Judge Maliwanag not to be wearing his brief (short) while
in his chamber during office hours; it is downright undignified, especially so when his body
has traces of fungus, which was have been afflicted during his 26 years as Assistant City
Fiscal of Olongapo City, a dirty city." (This was vehemently denied by respondent Judge.)
The Court, in a Resolution 2 En Banc, dated December 4, 1990, resolved to:
(1) DISMISS the complaint;
(2) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for one (1) year; and
(3) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), for
Violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning
that subsequent similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.
Notwithstanding the above warnings, censure and suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing is again before this Court with more administrative
complaints filed against not only one, but two judges, the Honorable Leopoldo T.

Calderon, Jr. and the Honorable Santiago Maliwanag, of Olongapo City and Zambales,
respectively.
On September 25, 1990, Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing filed a sworn letter-complaint 3 against
Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, Olongapo City, for
misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in the administration of justice,
allegedly committed as follows:
"Complainant alleges that in the matter of implementing the Supreme Court Circular
mandating continuous trial, there is no way for it to succeed in so far as respondent Judge
is concerned since the latter does not follow the Circular and merely treats it as directory;
that at the start of court sessions, it has been the practice of respondent Judge to
automatically grant postponements and deferments of the hearing of cases to a later hour
whenever his OIC, Leonor Maniago, makes a manifestation in open court that a certain
lawyer or party called up requesting that his/her case be postponed or be called later in
the day; that respondent Judge drinks a lot with lawyers close to Mayor Gordon and
fraternizes with them openly; that with respect to respondent's personal driver, the latter
receives his salary both from Mayor Gordon as a casual employee and from the Supreme
Court as a judicial aide; and, that respondent Judge sanctions the set up of having his
legal researcher, Jaime Dojildo, Jr., to work under the supervision of an OIC who,
according to complainant, is grossly inefficient and a notorious swindler with no
background in law.
Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge has been maliciously delaying the
disposition of several cases pending in his sala.
a. Civil Case No. 418-0-88, where complainant is the counsel for the plaintiff, was filed in
1988. Since the respondent Judge allowed the defendants to keep on postponing the
hearings, to date, the case remains pending, without any hearing, for more than one (1)
year;
b. Sp. Proc. No. 285, where complainant is the counsel for the Petitioner, the case was
submitted for decision on (sic) September 1989. To date, no decision has yet been
rendered on the case to the prejudice of the petitioner who is now very old and sickly;
c. In Civil Case No. 157-0-89, where complainant is the plaintiff, respondent Judge in
cahoots with his Deputy Sheriff, unlawfully prevented the implementation of the Writ of
Possession;
d. In Civil Case No. 253-0-90, where complainant is the Petitioner, the application for the
immediate issuance of mandatory injunction was filed on April 27, 1990. To date the same
has not yet been acted upon by the respondent Judge." 4
A second letter-complaint 5 dated October 5, 1990, was again filed by Atty. Eduardo R.
Balaoing against the same Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. and his Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) Leonor Maniago charging them both with misconduct, grave abuse of authority and
malicious delay in the administration of justice relative to Civil Case No. 201-0-89, entitled

"Eduardo R. Balaoing vs. Santiago Maliwanag and Romeo Enriquez." Complainant


Balaoing, who is the plaintiff in both cases, alleges that respondent Judge abused his
authority by refusing to declare in default the defendants in the above-entitled cases
despite their repeated failure to attend the pre-trial conferences and to submit their pretrial briefs. Complainant further avers that at the scheduled hearing, on October 5, 1990,
respondent Judge did not call complainant's case, and was told only three (3) hours later
that the reason was because of the motion filed by him for respondent Judge's inhibition,
which the latter allegedly refused to resolve.
With respect to the other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago, complainant Balaoing alleges
that when he came out of the courtroom, he was castigated by the former for allegedly
calling her notorious, swindler, insane, etc.
Respondent Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. filed his Comment 6 on November 13, 1991.
He asserts that the present administrative complaint filed against him by complainant
Balaoing was precipitated by incidents in Civil Case No. 190-0-89 entitled "Atty. Eduardo
R. Balaoing vs. Eliseo Gavilan, et al." for Damages, wherein defendant Gavilan defaulted.
All the other cases mentioned in the letter-complaint were allegedly included to merely
embellish the charges.
The factual backdrop of the Gavilan case shows that complainant Balaoing won in a
foreclosure case against one Eliseo Gavilan. After the foreclosed properties (a house and
lot) were sold in a public auction, where complainant Balaoing was the highest bidder, a
Certificate of Sale was issued and the same was registered. Respondent Judge, however,
allegedly prevented the implementation of the writ of possession, to the prejudice of
complainant Balaoing. In his Comment, respondent Judge explained that the reason why
he quashed the writ of possession he earlier issued in favor of complainant Balaoing was
due to the fact that Gavilan's widow, Alice, and her children, were residing in the
foreclosed properties and, more importantly, the period to redeem the said properties had
not yet expired. This action of respondent Judge allegedly infuriated complainant
Balaoing, hence, his filing of several suits, one after the other, against respondent Judge,
namely:
"a) a Motion for Inhibition of respondent Judge in the Gavilan case and in the other cases
mentioned in his present administrative complaint, alleging, among other things, that
respondent Judge is guilty of "mental dishonesty" and "grossness of ignorance of the
laws;"
b) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, to prevent respondent Judge from further acting
in the Gavilan case and to nullify the Order of the Quashal of the Writ of Possession
rendered in his favor;
c) Civil Case No. 425-0-90, entitled "Balaoing vs. Judge Leopoldo Calderon, Jr.," for
Damages, the causes of action of which were anchored on the events that transpired in
the Gavilan case; and

d) a Petition to cite respondent Judge in contempt filed with the Court of Appeals for
expunging his motion for inhibition.
When the redemption period in the Gavilan case had expired without the heirs redeeming
the property, respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of complainant
Balaoing. But up to the present time, complainant Balaoing has not yet taken possession
of the same, showing thereby his apparent disinterest.
As to the application of complainant Balaoing for a writ of injunction and restraining order
in Civil Case No. 253-0-90, respondent Judge explains that before he could finish hearing
the evidence of the parties in support of and in opposition to the petition for issuance of
the ancillary writ prayed for, complainant Balaoing filed another Motion for Inhibition of
respondent Judge to hear his cases. Nevertheless, respondent Judge denied the motion
for the issuance of the writ prayed for failure of complainant Balaoing to show a clear right
over the property and that irreparable injury would visit him if the writ would not be issued.
With regard to the charge of grave misconduct, respondent Judge vehemently denies the
same. Thus,
"7.1 The charge that the undersigned drinks "whisky like water" is a canard. The
undersigned is not a habitual imbiber of liquor as he suffers from an occasional high blood
pressure and migraine. Since undersigned became a judge, he never "patronized" with
any lawyer.
7.2 The undersigned applies the Mandatory Continuous Trial Scheme in his cases. If there
were occasional lapses, it was because of the abnormal case load which is now more
than 500 cases.
7.3 Court Aide Antonio Faustino does not receive any compensation from the City
Government. He was, before being appointed by the Supreme Court to such a position,
a casual employee of the City government. Upon his assumption to his present duty, he
ceased to receive compensation from any other source.
xxx xxx xxx
7.5 Atty. Jaime Dojillo was the duly appointed researcher in my sala. When he was
promoted as Assistant Clerk of Court, upon his request, the Executive Judge allowed him
to do researches for me. He is now a Trial Attorney in the PAO.
8. The undersigned has conducted the trial of cases and had disposed of the same
consistent with the Rules of Court and various Supreme Court rulings and circulars . . ." 7
Other respondent OIC Leonor Maniago adopted the allegations in respondent Judge's
Comment, and alleged further that she has "faithfully performed her duties and obligations
under the law to administer justice in accordance with her authority and without any
impartiality, (sic) whatsoever." 8

Consolidated with this administrative case is A.M. No. R-676-RTJ, entitled "Atty. Eduardo
R. Balaoing vs. Hon. Santiago Maliwanag," wherein the former charges the latter with
gross ignorance of the law for allegedly issuing a patently unjust order.
Respondent Judge Maliwanag, in his Comment dated September 2, 1986, denied the
charge and alleged among others, that his order was issued based on jurisprudence,
equity and justice, in order to prevent an unjust and inequitable execution of the judgment
and an injustice perpetrated by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple from the barrio.
In a Memorandum to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, dated September 12, 1990,
the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of Atty. Balaoing's
complaint against Judge Maliwanag on the ground that the same failed "to specifically
show and prove the facts constituting the charge of gross ignorance of the law. The
allegation of the complainant are not only laconic and general but they are also based on
mere and personal, interpretations of the complainant on the law instead of material
allegations of facts." 9
As shown above, complainant Balaoing has a penchant for filing administrative charges
against judges, in whose sala he has pending cases, whenever the latter render decisions
or issue orders adverse to him and/or his clients. In Bagamasbad vs. Judge de Guzman,
Jr., 10 We have already admonished lawyers to be more prudent in filing administrative
charges against members of the judiciary. It is true that "The lawyer owes 'entire devotion
to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and
the exertion of his utmost learning and ability . . . No fear of judicial disfavor or public
unpopularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty . . . But it is steadfastly
to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not
without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it
demand for him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He
must obey his own conscience and not that of his client. 11 Here, complainant Balaoing
went out of bounds when he filed his baseless and frivolous administrative complaints
against respondent Judges Calderon and Maliwanag, with no other plain and clear
purpose than to harass respondent Judges, and thus, exact vengeance on them for
rendering adverse judgments against him and his clients.
These acts of complainant Balaoing run counter to the explicit mandate of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSISTS ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records of these cases and find the present
administrative complaints of Atty. Balaoing against Judge Calderon, Jr. and his OIC
Leonor Maniago, and against Judge Maliwanag, just as frivolous and baseless as the
previous ones. Like before, his present complaints are based on his personal
interpretation of the law and not on material allegations of fact, substantiated by solid
evidence. This We cannot countenance.
Complainant Balaoing's wanton disregard of Our stern warning not to again file baseless
and frivolous complaints which only clog the already full dockets of this Court instead of
serve the ends of justice, and his adamant refusal to abide by the above-quoted
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which serve to regulate a lawyer's
conduct in this jurisdiction, have shown complainant Balaoing's unfitness to hold the
license to practice law. The Philippines abounds in lawyers. But as Justice Malcolm puts
it, "the Philippines do not need so-called lawyers who . . . have no ethical standards, and
who are a disgrace to a great and noble profession . . . (F)or what is needed in the
Philippines is not a greater quantity, but a finer quality, of professional men and
women, . . . who have a sincere understanding of the high requirements of the legal
profession . . ." 12 Complainant Balaoing has utterly failed to live up to the duties and
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaints are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Eduardo R. Balaoing is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on
the personal records of complainant. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152072

July 12, 2007

ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners,


vs.
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER,
ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES,
TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 152104
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER,
ELIZABETH R. GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES,
TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and ANTONIO REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. PEDROSA, ROMEO G. ROXAS
and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Self-approbation, pride and self-esteem should not erode and dim the luster and dignity of
this Court. Against overweening bluster and superciliousness, nay, lordly claim, this Court
must stand steadfast, unmoved and uncompromising in upholding what is right and
proper. In such posture, the mandate of affording every man theequal protection of the law
cannot dwindle. Strict adherence to ethical conduct and righteousness without veering
away from responsibility will foster an impregnable respect, deference and even reverence
to this Courts decisions and pronouncements.
In a Resolution1 dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered Atty. Romeo G.
Roxas to explain in writing why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected
to disciplinary action when he, in a letter2 dated 13 September 2006 addressed
to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario with copies thereof furnished the Chief
Justice and all the other Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R.

No. 152072 and No. 152104 on considerations other than the pure merits of the case, and
called the Supreme Court a "dispenser of injustice."
The letter of Atty. Roxas reads in part:
As an officer of the court, I am shocked beyond my senses to realize that such a wrongful
and unjust decision has been rendered with you no less as the ponente. This terrible
decision will go down in the annals of jurisprudence as an egregious example of how
the Supreme Court, supposedly the last vanguard and bulwark of justice is itself made,
wittingly or unwittingly, as a party to the wrongdoing by giving official and judicial sanction
and conformity to the unjust claims of the Zuzuarreguis. We cannot fathom how such a
decision could have been arrived at except through considerations other than the pure
merits of the case. Every law student reading through the case can see clearly how a
brother lawyer in the profession had been so short-changed by, ironically, the most sacred
and highest institution in the administration and dispensation of justice.
xxxx
This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that
such an impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate
administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an administrator of
justice, the Supreme Court is ironically a dispenser of injustice.
Under the circumstances, we hope you will forgive us in expressing our sentiment in this
manner as we are utterly frustrated and dismayed by the elementary injustice being
foisted upon us by the Supreme Court, no less. Given the facts of the case, we will never
understand what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as she did and what forces and
influences caused her to reason out her decision in such an unfair and unjust manner as
to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the Supreme Court, as a
venerable institution of justice.
As lawyers, we are officers of the Court so that, while we are being underservedly pained
by the seething injustice of the decision, we will submit to the authority of Highest Court of
the Land, even as our reverence for it has been irreversibly eroded, thanks to your
Honors Judgment.
xxxx
As for Your Honor, sleep well if you still can. In the end, those we address as Honorable
Justice in this earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme Dispenser of Justice where
only the merits of Your Honors life will be relevant and material and where technicalities
can shield no one from his or her wrongdoings.

Good day to you, Madame Justice!


The decision referred to in the letter is the Courts decision3 in these consolidated cases
where Attys. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor were ordered to return, among others, to
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. the amount ofP17,073,224.84.
Roxas and Pastor filed their Motion for Reconsideration4 on 8 March 2006 which they
followed with an Executive Summary5 the day after. In a resolution dated 22 March 2006,
the Court noted the Executive Summary and deferred action on the Motion for
Reconsideration.6
On 27 March 2006, the Court denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration as the
basic issues have already been passed upon and there being no substantial argument to
warrant the modification of the Courts decision.7
On 30 March 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, together with the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.8
The following day, they filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion to Set the Case for Oral
Argument, together with the Motion to Set the Case for Oral Argument (on the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto).9 In a Manifestation dated 3 April 2006,
Roxas and Pastor asked that a typographical error appearing in the affidavits of service
attached to the motions be corrected and that the Motion to Set Case for Oral Argument
be granted.10
On 7 April 2006, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al., filed a Motion for Leave to File
Comment on/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.11
On 7 June 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an Urgent and Compelling Motion for
Reconsideration (with Motion to Refer the Case to the En Banc).12
On 7 June 2006, the Office of then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban received from
Roxas a letter (with enclosures)13 dated 6 June 2006 which contained, inter alia, the
following:
This is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that
such an impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate
administrator and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an administrative of
justice, the Supreme Court will ironically be a dispenser of injustice.

Under the circumstances, we cannot avoid to suspect the bias and partiality of the
ponente of the case who we surmise must have been moved by considerations, other
than noble.
In this regard, Mr. Chief Justice, we implore Your Honor, as steward of the Highest Court
of the land, to take appropriate steps to forthwith correct this anomalous decision by first,
referring the case to the Supreme Court En Banc, and then, after allowing us the
opportunity to be heard orally En Banc and after judiciously considering our "Urgent and
Compelling Motion for Reconsideration", thereafter reversing the decision of this
Honorable Courts First Division.
Finally, in order to cleanse the Supreme Court of the blot caused by this case, we most
ardently implore upon Your Honor to immediately direct the conduct of an investigation of
how such an impossible decision was rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators
thereon.
As the Chief Justice, we have faith in you, Sir, to rectify a grievous wrong inflicted upon a
member of the Bar and to restore the good image and reputation of the Court by causing
the High Court to reverse such an inconceivable decision that is unfair, unjust and illegal,
being an [impairment] of the obligation of contracts and against the principle of estoppel.
Said letter was indorsed to the Clerk of Court of the First Division for its inclusion in the
agenda.14
On 12 July 2006, the Court resolved to (a) Note Without Action (1) the motion of
petitioners Roxas and Pastor for leave to file supplemental motion for reconsideration of
the decision dated January 31, 2006; (2) the aforesaid supplemental motion for
reconsideration; and (3) respondents Zuzuarreguis motion for leave of court to file
comment/opposition to motion for reconsideration, said motion for reconsideration having
been denied with finality in the resolution of 27 March 2006; (b) Deny for lack of merit said
petitioners (1) motion for leave to file motion to set case for oral argument; and (2) motion
to set the case for oral argument [on the motion for reconsideration and the supplement
thereto]; (c) Note petitioners manifestation regarding the correction of typographical error
in the affidavit of service of their motion for leave to file motion to set case for oral
argument and said motion to set case for oral arguments; (d) Deny the urgent and
compelling second motion for reconsideration of petitioners Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor of the decision dated 31 January 2006 [with motion to refer the case to
the Court En Banc], considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading under Sec. 2, Rule 52, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended; (e) Deny said petitioners motion to refer the cases to the Court
En Banc, the latter not being an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the

Divisions may be appealed, pursuant to SC Circular 2-89 dated 7 February 1989, as


amended by the resolution of 18 November 1993; and (f) Note the First Indorsement
dated 9 June 2006 of the Hon. Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban referring for inclusion
in the agenda the thereto attached letter [with enclosures] of Atty. Romeo G. Roxas,
relative to these cases.15
On 13 September 2006, on motion by the Zuzuarreguis for the issuance of entry of
judgment, the Court ordered that entry of judgment in these cases be made in due
course.16
On 14 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification of
Judgment.17 On even date, the letter subject of this contempt proceeding dated 13
September 2006 was received by Justice Nazario with copies thereof furnished the Chief
Justice and all the other Associate Justices.18
On 18 September 2006, Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion to Withdraw said motion and
instead prayed that their Urgent and Compelling Motion for Clarification of Judgment
dated 15 September 2006 be admitted.19
On 20 September 2006, the Court, treating petitioners Roxas and Pastors Urgent Motion
for Clarification of Judgment as a second motion for reconsideration, denied the same for
lack of merit. We also noted without action the motion to withdraw said motion for
clarification with intention to re-file the same with the necessary corrections, and referred
to the Court En Banc the letter dated 13 September 2006.20
In a resolution dated 26 September 2006, this Court ordered Atty. Roxas to explain in
writing why he should not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action
on account of the letter he sent to Justice Nazario with copies thereof furnished the Chief
Justice and all the other Associate Justices.
On 22 November 2006, the Court noted without action petitioner Roxas and Pastors
Urgent and Compelling Motion for Clarification of Judgment in light of the denial of their
Urgent Motion for Clarification of Judgment on 20 September 2006 which the Court
treated as a second motion for reconsideration.21
On 16 November 2006, by way of compliance with the 26 September 2006 resolution,
Atty. Roxas submitted his written explanation. His letter stated:
With all due respect to this Honorable Court, and beyond my personal grievances, I
submit that the ruling in the subject consolidated cases may not have met the standards or
adhered to the basic characteristics of fair and just decision, such as objectivity, neutrality
and conformity to the laws and the constitution. x x x

xxxx
Aside from the fact that the aforesaid ruling appears to be seriously flawed, it also casts
grave aspersions on my personal and professional integrity and honor as a lawyer, officer
of the court and advocate of justice.
xxxx
These implications, Your Honors, which I find hard to accept, have caused me severe
anxiety, distress and depredation and have impelled me to exercise my right to express a
legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Courts
ruling.
While certain statements, averments and/or declarations in my 13 September 2006 letter
may have been strongly-worded and construed by this Honorable Court as tending to
ascribe aspersions on the person of the Honorable Associate Justice Minita V. ChicoNazario, may I assure Your Honors that no such ascription was ever intended by the
undersigned.
Quite notably, despite my aggrieved sentiments and exasperated state, I chose to
ventilate my criticisms of the assailed ruling in a very discreet and private manner.
Accordingly, instead of resorting to public criticism through media exposure, I chose to
write a personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the highest tribunal of the land and
within the bounds of decency and propriety. This was done in good faith with no intention
whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of this Honorable Court.
Nonetheless, it is with humble heart and a repentant soul that I express my sincerest
apologies not only to the individual members of this Honorable Court but also to the
Supreme Court as a revered institution and ultimate dispenser of justice.
As earlier explained, I was merely exercising my right to express a legitimate grievance or
articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Courts ruling. If the nature of my
criticism/comment or the manner in which it was carried out was perceived to have
transgressed the permissible parameters of free speech and expression, I am willing to
submit myself to the sound and judicious discretion of this Honorable Court. x x x
After reviewing the records of these cases, We firmly stand by our decision which Atty.
Roxas described to be unjust, unfair and impossible, and arrived at through considerations
other than the pure merits of the case. Atty. Roxass insistence that said decision did not
meet the standards or adhered to the basic characteristics of fair and just decision, such
as objectivity, neutrality and conformity to the laws and the Constitution, is simply without

basis. The fact that the decision was not in his favor does not mean that the same was
contrary to our laws and was not rendered in a fair and impartial manner.
In one case,22 we had this to say when a lawyer challenged the integrity not only of the
Court of Appeals but also of this Court by claiming that the courts knowingly rendered an
unjust judgment:
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming
that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode
the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice.
He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his
contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, he
is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to
comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others.
He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or
erroneous from the viewpoint of another. x x x.
It is to be noted that prior to his letter dated 13 September 2006, Atty. Roxas wrote then
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban asking for an immediate investigation of "how such
an impossible decision was rendered at all and to sanction the perpetrators thereon." It is
to be stressed that then Chief Justice Panganiban was a member of the Division who
concurred in the ponencia written by Justice Nazario. The former and the other three
members23 of the Division did not find anything illegal, unjust or unfair about the decision;
otherwise, they would have registered their dissents. There was none. The decision was
arrived at after a thorough deliberation of the members of the Court.
Atty. Roxas faulted the Supreme Court when "(o)ur two Motions for Reconsiderations were
unceremoniously denied via Minute Resolutions without addressing at all the merits of our
very solid arguments. We cannot help but observe the High Courts resort to technicalities
(that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading) if only for it to avoid
meeting the merits and arguments directly."
It is settled that the Court is not duty-bound to render signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis
is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.24 In the case before us, after going over
the motion for reconsideration filed by Roxas and Pastor, we did not find any substantial
argument that would merit the modification of our decision and that would require an
extended resolution since the basic issues had already been passed upon.

In his letter subject of this contempt proceeding, Atty. Roxas accused Justice Nazario of
deciding the case through "considerations other than the pure merits of the case." He
averred that "we will never understand what moved the Honorable Justice to decide as
she did and what forces and influences caused her to reason out her decision in such an
unfair and unjust manner as to compromise the reputation, integrity and dignity itself of the
Supreme Court, as a venerable institution of justice." He then ended by mocking her when
he said "sleep well if you still can" and that her "earthly life will [be] judged by the Supreme
Dispenser of Justice where only the merits of Your Honors life will be relevant and
material and where technicalities can shield no one from his or her wrongdoings."
As to the Court, supposedly the last vanguard and bulwark of justice, he likewise accuses
it of making itself, wittingly or unwittingly, a party to the wrongdoing by giving official and
judicial sanction and conformity to the unjust claims of the adverse party. He added: "This
is an unjust and unfair decision, to say the least. x x x We cry out in disbelief that such an
impossible decision could spring forth from the Supreme Court, the ultimate administrator
and last bulwark of justice. As it stands, instead of being an administrator of justice, the
Supreme Court is ironically a dispenser of injustice."
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario, to the other
members of the High Court and to the High Court itself as a revered institution and
ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he was merely exercising his right to express a
legitimate grievance or articulate a bona fide and fair criticism of the Honorable Courts
ruling. He explained that his criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith with no
intention whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of the Court.
Instead of resorting to public criticism through media exposure, he chose to ventilate his
criticism in a very discreet and private manner by writing a personal letter confined to the
hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds of decency and propriety.
We find the explanations of Atty. Roxas unsatisfactory. The accusation against Justice
Nazario is clearly without basis. The attack on the person of Justice Nazario has caused
her pain and embarrassment. His letter is full of contemptuous remarks tending to
degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded it.
To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free
speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however,
free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that
impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous
statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an
abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised
as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence
and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein.25 Free

expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.26
This Court does not curtail the right of a lawyer, or any person for that matter, to be critical
of courts and judges as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels. This Court in In re: Almacen27 said:
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority, or that is it articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are
thrown open to public consumption. x x x
xxxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. x x x
xxxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.
xxxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism,
on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
In the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have been made mala
fides and exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By his unfair and unfounded

accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking of the Court for allegedly being part
of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he abused his liberty of speech.
In In re: Wenceslao Laureta,28 cited in United BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez,29 we
ruled:
To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim that the members acted
"with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of
the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment
of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of
such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular
performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of
powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
xxxx
In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters
addressed to the individual Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this court en
banc, particularly the under lined portions thereof; in the language of the charges she filed
before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the same Resolution; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official
actions of the justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in
her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that
said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted
after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the
contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy
cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.
Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to privacy. It must be
disclosed that prior to his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty. Roxas first wrote then
Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an investigation as to how the assailed decision was
rendered and to sanction the perpetrators. The accusations contained therein are similar
to those in his letter to Justice Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely addressed to
the Justices of this Court and were not disseminated to the media is of no moment. Letters
addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial
functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.30 As can be gathered from the records, the letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban
was merely noted and no show-cause order was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas would
stop his assault on the Court. However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the

Court via his second letter, it behooved the Court to order him to explain why he should
not be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Romeo G. Roxas guilty of indirect contempt of
court under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Said
section reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice; x x x.
xxxx
Section 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides the
penalty for indirect contempt as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank,
he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months or both. x x x.
The disrespect caused to the Court by Atty. Roxas merits a fine of P30,000.00 with a
warning that a repetition of a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.
With his contemptuous and defamatory statements, Atty. Roxas likewise violated Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canons 11.03 and 11.04. These
provisions read:
1avvphi1

CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO


THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS
xxxx
Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive and menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
It is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme
Court as the last bulwark of justice and democracy.31 Respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.32 When confronted with actions and statements, from
lawyers and non-lawyers alike, that tend to promote distrust and undermine public
confidence in the judiciary, this Court will not hesitate to wield its inherent power to cite
any person in contempt. In so doing, it preserves its honor and dignity and safeguards the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.33
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is found GUILTY of indirect
contempt of court. He is hereby FINED the amount of P30,000.00 to be paid within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of a similar act will
warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Roxas personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

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