Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999.

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METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1999
00261068

Review Article
RESCHERS METAPHILOSOPHY
TIMM TRIPLETT

Philosophical Standardism. By Nicholas Rescher. Pittsburgh: University

of Pittsburgh Press, 1994. Pp. ix + 214.
The Strife of Systems. By Nicholas Rescher. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 283.
A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. III, Metaphilosophical Inquiries. By
Nicholas Rescher. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xv +
269.
These three books discuss large- and small-scale metaphilosophical themes.
They include two substantive and detailed theoretical contributions to the
metaphilosophical literature: philosophical standardism and orientational
pluralism. These two theories will be the primary focus of the present review
article.
Although the small-scale themes are effectively used to illustrate the major
theories, they are often of independent interest. There are, for example,
enlightening surveys of the history of philosophical taxonomy classifications of the subdivisions of philosophy from Aristotles Alexandrian editors
to the philosophical profession circa 1980 (MI 13551), and of metaphysical
positions from Kant to Stephen Pepper (MI 18294).1 Many of Reschers
smaller-scale arguments especially critical ones work very well quite independently of his larger-scale theories. For example, there is a trenchant
critique of the view of Collingwood and others of historicist bent that there
can be no philosophical engagement across historical eras because philosophers of different eras are engaged in different debates (SS 3137; MI 7988).
Rescher approaches philosophy with a most valuable appreciation of its
diversity. If, as I will argue below, his theoretical explanations of this diversity
sometimes come to grief, the generous impulse to recognize philosophys most
analytic moments as well as its most systematizing to see philosophy whole
is to be commended. This breadth of perspective is apparent throughout these
1
In the parenthetical citations throughout the review, Philosophical Standardism is abbreviated as PS; The Strife of Systems is abbreviated as SS; and A System of Pragmatic Idealism, vol.
III: Metaphilosophical Inquiries, is abbreviated as MI.

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books. For a good specific example, see Some Important Forms of

Philosophical Inventiveness (SS 7577).
All three books could have been more tightly edited. Some repetition
across books is understandable, though there is quite a bit of it here. But there
is also too much repetition within a book. Points are made, and then some.
Such repetition is particularly annoying where some further development is
wanted, and we are treated instead to a minor variation restating the original
idea without further development.2
Philosophical Standardism
A Problem to Be Addressed
It is easy to get frustrated with the increasingly complex and often baroque
elaborations that occur in the development of philosophical theses, particularly in analytic philosophy. As philosophers rework their principles, the
epicycles within epicycles multiply, and the counterexamples would have us
imagine increasingly improbable situations. It is hard not to conclude that
something has gone wrong. One can feel more like an anthropologist than a
philosopher when confronting a member of some exotic philosophical tribe
who tells us that it is just obvious what we should say about some hyperdimensionally convoluted possible worlds scenario.
One way of reading Reschers development of philosophical standardism
is as an attempt to explain why this overcomplexity arises and how it can be
avoided. I dont believe, however, that his theory does this job.
What Is Philosophical Standardism?
Rescher intends philosophical standardism to correct what he sees as the
necessitarian errors of the traditional conception of philosophy (PS 177).
According to this conception, philosophical principles are presented as
universal and exceptionless necessary truths. But Rescher argues that the
history of philosophy indicates that such a conception is altogether unavailing (PS 177; see also PS 5). Instead, Rescher recommends that we interpret
philosophical generalizations as making standardistic rather than universalistic claims, that is, stating how matters stand normally or as a rule
(PS 3).
Even though standardistic generalizations focus on what happens
normally, they are not merely descriptive statistical statements. They are
normative and have explanatory force (PS 10). In this way, standardistic uses
extend a guarantee of the explicability of exceptions (PS 19). By contrast, on
the traditional, universalistic interpretation, when an exception to a philosophical generalization is encountered, the only alternatives are to abandon
the generalization and search for an altogether different one or to dismiss
the exception as somehow inapplicable (PS 15).
2

An example is Rescher on cognitive values, discussed below.

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On Reschers standardistic account, philosophical inquiry is significantly

different from scientific inquiry. Rescher sees science as able to strive for and
achieve universal and exceptionless laws because the reality it studies offers
strong empirical checks and confirmations. It can thus afford to move beyond
our commonsense, prescientific understandings of the world. And in many
cases it can abandon ordinary concepts as unscientific. There are not such
strong empirical guides in philosophy, which therefore cannot simply abandon the concepts of our presystematic discourse (PS 34).
Several chapters of Philosophical Standardism are devoted to illustrating
how the approach is intended to work in the case of specific philosophical
theses. In epistemology, Rescher would avoid Gettier-type counterexamples
that result from interpreting the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge as
a failed attempt at a universalistic definition. Instead, that analysis should be
construed as the standardistic generalization: Standardly, knowledge is true
justified belief (PS 72). The empiricist criterion of meaningfulness, which
the logical positivists used in the 1930s to terrorize the rest of the philosophical world, fell victim to its own universalistic excess. Given Reschers standardistic treatment, it becomes the tamer but more plausible: Meaningful
factual statements can normally be confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of
observational evidence (PS 75).
In ethics, Rescher notes that our moral rules like Do not deceive people
and principles such as A person who is responsible for an action is also
responsible for its consequences have exceptions. The recognition of exceptions is generally a matter of the exercise of common sense and good judgment acquired through experience (PS 96). Moral rules cannot be overly
complex if they are to be applicable. One way the requisite simplicity can be
achieved is to formulate these rules standardistically (PS 108).
Philosophical standardism can be used to clarify the debate between free
will and determinism. We must understand freedom to mean freedom from
external control and from abnormal internal conditions (brain abnormalities,
irrational cravings, and the like [PS 115]). So people act freely, and therefore
are morally responsible for their actions, in the normal and ordinary course of
things (PS 11415). This standardistic understanding of freedom appears to
entail the compatibilist option in the free-will debate.
Rescher devotes a chapter to the critique of far-fetched hypotheses in
philosophy (PS 15573). Since philosophical concepts are geared to our
normal experience, they cannot survive in situations where the belief in
normalcy is suspended. But it is just such suspension of belief that prevails in
much contemporary hypothesis formation in philosophy. Therefore, such
philosophical activity is incapable of providing the conceptual clarification
intended (PS 157). For example, it is fashionable for philosophers to imagine
robots with remarkably humanlike communications skills and to declare (or
deny) that, given such behaviors, these robots would be conscious. Or again
there are scenarios imagined in which brains or behaviors are by some means
switched from one body to another, and various declarations are made
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concerning what this tells us about personal identity. But according to

Rescher, all such proceedings are intrinsically defective (PS 158). In the
above examples, the imagined scenarios sever concepts that normally go
together. Our concepts are predicated on a background assumption that
normal conditions prevail, and so, in imagining abnormal conditions, we
destroy the underlying structure that is essential to the application of our
concepts.
Rescher concedes that it would go too far to say that science-fiction-style
hypotheses serve no useful purpose in philosophy: For example, a sciencefiction style hypothesis can effectively bring to light the significant fact that
certain of our concepts are indeed multicriterial and rest on certain empirical
presuppositions (PS 161). But this is a useful purpose for such hypotheses
only in a negative sense, for they only help us see that they cannot make our
concepts more precise. Instead, they in effect change the subject: The
supposedly superior conception that results in these circumstances will not
and in the nature of the case cannot qualify any longer as a version of the
concept with which we began (PS 161; cf. also PS 60).
The concluding chapter of Philosophical Standardism notes that the
conception of what is normal will itself vary according to the differing experiences of different individuals. So this key concept is itself contextual and
experience-based. The resulting contextualism is an aspect of the orientational pluralism discussed below.
Difficulties with Standardism
Reschers discussion of philosophical standardism raises several important
problems. Rescher appears to move between distinct positions that are in
tension. One position seems uninteresting in the sense that it does not offer a
genuine alternative to a universalistic conception of philosophy. The other is
indeed a genuine alternative, but it rests upon an implausible conceptual
conservatism.
Is Standardism a Disguised Universalism?
Rescher claims that his standardism offers an unorthodox approach to philosophical doctrines that amounts to a rational reconceptualization of the
field (PS 34). The intended contrast is to a universalism that construes
philosophical doctrines as exceptionless and necessary truths. But given
Reschers development of standardism, it is far from clear that it offers a
distinct alternative. The difference appears to be attitudinal rather than
substantive.
Rescher rightly recognizes that standardism could be misunderstood in a
way that would make it trivial and explanatorily useless. A useful standardism cannot rest content with the statement Normally, deceiving people is
wrong if this statement is understood as a statistical generalization with no
further explanation of what might constitute an exception. Nor would it do
simply to list the exceptions to the standard rule. Suppose its true that last
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Tuesday Arnie deceptively told his wife that they would go out to dinner on
Saturday night and that his telling her this was not morally wrong. In addition
to noting this as an exception, the philosopher needs to provide explanations
why the rule can be violated and to provide general exception categories into
which such individual instances can fit. If Arnies ruse allowed friends to
arrange a surprise birthday party for his wife, the philosopher would look at
general features of this situation that would explain its morality and that
would allow other specific actions to be similarly categorized. And naturally,
as the philosopher encounters more situations and dilemmas, she will add
more exception cases and refine her explanation of what counts as an exception case. This is, as Rescher often seems eager to acknowledge, a dynamic
enterprise.
But its striking that these results look very much like philosophy as done
under the traditional universalistic conception. In the above example, the standardistic claim becomes explanatorily informed and refined by apparent
counterexamples and explanations that allow us to retain the standardistic
claim by categorizing and justifying the exceptions. Suppose now that,
instead of retaining the standardistic claim as formulated, a philosopher
chooses to reformulate it so that the explanations and qualifications are built
right in to the claim about deception. At this point, the distinction between
Reschers standardism and universalism appears to become merely typographical.
In discussing standardistic moral rules, Rescher does pose the question:
Why not simply build the exception cases into the statement of the rule? One
reason he suggests for not doing so is that the rule becomes so complicated
that it is difficult to apply in practical contexts (PS 1089). But the alleged
problem of applying a complex moral principle has been adequately
addressed at least since John Stuart Mill. A principle in normative ethics stating necessary and sufficient conditions for morally right action would not
itself have to be an easily remembered guide to action. Its own conditions
might indeed entail that an agent not begin every morally significant course
of action by consulting and puzzling through the complex conditions of the
principle. Principles of normative ethics can help justify or modify the rules
of thumb that people certainly do need to be conscious of and apply in everyday life.3
If we take seriously the need for cogent explanations for exception cases,
then I believe that Reschers standardism offers us, not a substantive difference between genuinely distinct metaphilosophical perspectives, but only a
difference in psychological attitude. It is the difference between a rather arrogant presumption that ones own pronouncements represent the final (true)
3
Rescher makes a second attempt to explain why we should not build exception cases into
the statement of a moral principle (PS 10910), but I find the argument too enthymematic to evaluate here. Note that neither of these replies by Rescher supports the case for standardistic formulations in areas other than ethical theory.

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word on the matter and an approach with more humility that is nonetheless
open to the possibility of articulating exceptionless, necessarily true substantive philosophical principles. Imagine a philosopher who treats substantive
philosophical theses as ideally exceptionless, but who has this attitude toward
her formulation of them:
Heres my best shot at a universal and exceptionless principle. Ive tried to
take account of all the possible counterexamples. I well know that it could
turn out to need further revision, in which case of course its not the final
truth after all. But Ill regard my principle as innocent until proven guilty.
Unless you come up with something better, or a telling counterexample, I
have a right to hold it at least tentatively as true, and you have no right to
assume that it must fail sooner or later. And although I might also be
required to abandon the principle because of its reliance on hitherto unarticulated assumptions or other systemic considerations, I will not be moved
by the abstract fact that such discoveries are possible. The unarticulated
assumptions would need to be not just unearthed but shown to be unreasonable or questionable; the systemic tensions within my overall philosophical perspective would have to be shown to be greater than the
tensions within the perspectives that compete with mine, for there are
tensions within every philosophical system.
This is still universalism, since the intent is to interpret philosophical claims
as universal and to accept them as such if counterexamples or other specific
substantive difficulties cannot be found. But its hard to see how anything in
Reschers standardism challenges it. One might object that the above account
incorrectly assumes that its reasonable to think one might achieve some final
truth in philosophy. But Rescher himself explicitly allows the possibility of
this sort of closure. Standardism, he says, should itself be read standardistically, which is in effect to allow that there will be some necessary and exceptionless philosophical theories (PS 78, 14850).4
Even the difference in psychological attitude between standardisms
modesty and the traditions overconfidence may be pretty old news these
days. Reschers warnings about the dangers of claiming to have achieved
universal truths could perhaps with profit have been directed to Descartes,
Spinoza, or Kant. But to whom among recent philosophers? One of the most
consistent defenders of philosophical principles as necessary truths was
Roderick Chisholm. He constantly strove to formulate exceptionless
4
Isnt there sufficient inductive evidence to make it reasonable that our humble universalists specific principle will fail? There is clear inductive evidence that there are few substantive
philosophical principles that have been generally accepted as true. The different claim that few
actually true substantive principles have been articulated would need a different sort of evidence.
The universalist might claim that there are many true, previously articulated principles upon
which her own work is based, that too few philosophers are willing to attend to the often tedious
philosophical spadework that can unearth such truths and expand on them, and so on. From our
present metaphilosophical perspective, it is perhaps best to note the two opposing takes on philosophys past success in articulating truths, without endorsing either one.

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principles and definitions. But when his colleagues or students pointed out
counterexamples, he regarded this as a helpful means to further refine his
views. Or if the point required wholesale rejection of the thesis he had been
defending, he was glad to be apprised of this so he might try a more promising path. It seems unlikely that any contemporary philosopher will need to be
informed that exceptionless necessary truths do not come easy.
The real challenge to the traditional conception of philosophical activity
on this score is not standardism as Rescher usually articulates it, but the radical view that there are no philosophical facts of the matter for Chisholm or
others to approach asymptotically via their refinements. Such a view sees
such philosophers as engaged in a hopeless quest from the very start. But most
of what Rescher says entails the rejection of this sort of philosophical
nihilism.
When I refer to most of what Rescher says or to standardism as he
usually articulates it, I am suggesting tensions in what he says that occasionally appear to push him in the direction of the more radical position.
Rescher seems to be of two minds with respect to his standardism.
On the one hand, at one point he goes so far as to say that standardized
generalizations can generally be reconstructed universalistically (PS 11).
This seems correct for reasons I have indicated, but it takes all the wind out
of standardisms sails. Rescher never pursues this matter and seems not to
recognize that his claim raises the obvious question of how standardism can
then amount to a significant metaphilosophical reconceptualization that offers
a genuine alternative to universalism. On the other hand, Reschers discussion
of concept change and far-fetched hypotheses suggests a more radical kind of
standardism that would deny the existence of philosophical facts beyond our
normal experiences and the concepts that we have developed to understand
these experiences. To this I now turn.
Standardism and Reschers Conceptual Conservatism
As noted, Rescher suggests a kind of conceptual conservatism in philosophy:
In doing philosophy, we cannot stray from the ordinary understanding of
concepts. And because of this, philosophy is unlike science and cannot aspire
to its methods. When philosophers attempt to emulate science by constructing
new concepts or specialized languages intended to clarify philosophical problems, they immediately fall into error. For the original concepts in which these
philosophical problems are formulated are those derived from our ordinary
experience, and they are such that their viability is linked indissolubly to the
experiential realities of this actual world (PS 156). The philosophical clarifiers attempt to improve on these concepts, but everyday concepts do not
admit of this improvement without total revision and thus without abandonment (PS 157). Implicitly criticized here are Russell, Carnap, and the many
philosophers in their wake who attempted to work within the broad framework of constructive conceptual and linguistic analysis.
I find several problems with Reschers discussion. First, it seems to rely on
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an overly simple either/or conception of concept development and change.

Rescher doesnt defend his stark alternatives of either leaving ordinary
concepts exactly as we find them or totally revising and thus abandoning
them. He offers us no reason to deny the plausible idea that concepts can be
modified partially and gradually.
Second, given the acceptance of this either/or conception, the tension
between this view and Reschers most developed version of standardism is
very strong indeed. If we cant move away from ordinary experience without
abandoning our concepts, then there is just no fact of the matter concerning
whether a concept is to be applied to any situation outside our experience.
Rescher has said that it is essential to standardism that exceptions to the
normal cases be not merely statistically enumerated but explained. But in
order for any such explanation to move beyond enumeration, it would have to
provide general guidelines for the conceptual classification of experiences
heretofore not encountered, contrary to Reschers conceptual conservatism.
It should be noted, however, that in several passages Rescher does take a
more relaxed stand on the possibility of ordinary concept extension (e.g., PS
162, 170). It may therefore be that, confronted with the above problem, he
would move to an unambiguous rejection of the strong claim that to attempt
to apply a concept beyond ordinary experience is to abandon that concept. But
once he rejects that claim, his main point against counterfactual hypothesis
formation in philosophy seems to be seriously weakened. If we can extend our
concepts after all, some such counterfactual work is permissible. The only
question is how much of it is legitimate. Here Rescher provides no general
guidelines, and so does not weigh in with any position on this matter.
A third problem is that, even if Rescher were to allow some moderate
amount of concept extension, while still holding to an account where much
hypothesis formation is illegitimate, his account seems to hinge on a confusion
between the issue of conceptual change and that of degree of epistemic confirmation. It is significant that the actual reasons Rescher gives why philosophy
cannot adopt scientific methods have to do with epistemological considerations
philosophy just doesnt allow for the empirical checks that can confirm or
disconfirm scientific hypotheses. But why should mere lack of strong confirmation disallow genuine conceptual development in philosophy? The lack of
strong empirical checks may mean we cannot know or at least not know as
easily which of competing extended conceptual schemes in philosophy is the
most adequate to reality. But that epistemic limitation should not be confused
with the conceptual limitations Rescher is claiming exist. One might respond
that if we cant know what to say about some far-fetched scenario, it is just a
waste of time to speculate on it. Suppose thats right. Still, the conclusion that
we shouldnt bother speculating is arrived at by two very different sets of
premises: those claiming illegitimate concept extensions versus those claiming
only epistemic limitations with respect to legitimate concept extensions. This
could have a significant bearing on any guidelines one might develop in order
to demarcate legitimate from illegitimate counterfactual speculations. In
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particular, the important question whether there is any fact of the matter to
speculate about depends on the position one adopts here. And adopting the
position that there are only epistemic limitations allows the possibility that we
might find some hypotheses more reasonable than others even if this evidence
does not amount to knowledge.
A fourth problem with Reschers account is that at least two of his central
examples of useless speculation exhibit, in different ways, unreasonable
constraints. When Rescher claims that debates about personal identity generate useless speculations that illegitimately attempt to sever personhood or
mind from body (PS 42, 158; SS 46; MI 90), he has to confront the fact that
most ordinary individuals do believe, or at least believe that they believe, that
mind and body are separable, insofar as there is a common, religious-based
view about the immortality of the soul. Rescher would have to say, not that
such beliefs are false, but that they are cognitively meaningless, since they
illegitimately extend the concept of mind beyond its experienced coexistence
with body. This seems doubtful to me, but perhaps more to the point, Rescher
here seems forced to go beyond criticizing outlandish speculations of professional philosophers to delegitimizing beliefs that are common and deeply
held.
In the case of robot consciousness, I dont see that extending the concept
of consciousness to certain types of artificial machines is any more intrinsically problematic than extending the concept from my own case to yours, or
from humans to certain kinds of animals. Here I think the easy divide Rescher
assumes between scientific and nonscientific domains becomes problematic.
Surely there are complex interactions between these domains, in particular
where developments in science arguably call for the extension of ordinary
nonscientific concepts such as the concepts of consciousness or personhood
to entities we have no previous experience of. I do not mean that we will or
should extend these concepts, only that one can imagine scenarios where it
seems reasonable that we should.
Rescher could attempt to parry this charge by noting that once a robot of
specific sorts of capacities became part of our experience, we could begin to
make decisions about its consciousness or lack thereof. But this response will
not justify his claim that it is currently inappropriate for us to speculate about
its consciousness. If our current concepts cannot now be extended, if any
application to conditions outside our present experience abandons rather than
develops our concepts, then any future talk of conscious robots is not talk that
we can relate to, since our concept of consciousness has been abandoned the
topic has changed. Conversely, if our concept can be employed in the future,
then why cant we employ it now to discuss the hypothetical conditions under
which future machines might or might not be conscious?
In sum, Reschers arguments do not offer compelling grounds for the
conclusion that the philosophical use of hypothetical scenarios that go beyond
present experience is generally illegitimate. And while there may be a version
of philosophical standardism that is substantively distinct from universalism
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and yet does not implausibly constrain philosophers development and extension of concepts, the clear articulation of such a theory is work yet to be done.
Orientational Pluralism
Some philosophers might use philosophical standardism as a way of trying to
achieve consensus in philosophy: Perhaps it is the elaborations the attempts
to achieve universality that go wrong and foment discord. Perhaps if we
confined philosophy to standardistic generalizations, we could all agree on
them. But Rescher will have none of that. Standardistic generalizations are
based on judgments of normality, and Rescher maintains that the concept of
normality is contextual. What counts as normal will vary with the varying
experiences of different individuals, different historical eras. So there is no
hope for consensus in philosophy. What to make of this is the major theme of
The Strife of Systems and is also much discussed in Metaphilosophical
Inquiries.
The lack of consensus in philosophy has been perhaps the crucial datum
from which much contemporary philosophy has developed, particularly in the
postmodern tradition. A natural, if not inevitable, response to this datum has
been the turn to relativism. As Rescher understands it, relativism is the
doctrine that all alternatives are equally good (PS 200).5 The following is
perhaps his most developed account of relativism:
When construed in terms of an orientation to particular theses, this doctrine
of relativism stands roughly as follows: There are no absolute truths: we
are never in a position to claim with adequate rational warrant that any
substantive thesis p is actually true. . . . All one can ever say is that some
particular group thinks the substantive thesis p to be true. . . . Such a
doctrine [more generally construed in terms of the denial of the validity of
norms] maintains that no general standards are ever cogent; all acceptability determinations are simply a matter of the established preferences of
particular groups. (MI 224)
Relativism in this sense leads directly to the end of philosophy doctrines
that Rescher associates with, for example, Richard Rorty and the French
deconstructionists. All three of Reschers books considered here can be seen
as sustained attacks, from several different directions, on relativism thus
understood and on the end-of-philosophy scenario.
In this, I think Rescher is kin to many if not most contemporary philosophers.
5
Actually, Reschers use of the term relativism varies. In The Strife of Systems he
describes himself as a relativist and distinguishes his position from doctrines of indifferentism,
scepticism, and nihilism (e.g., SS 146). In Philosophical Standardism, Rescher calls his own
position not relativistic but contextualistic (PS 199). The differences among the books are
terminological, not substantive. Here I will use relativism as Rescher does in Philosophical
Standardism and Metaphilosophical Inquiries, to refer to a position Rescher opposes.

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Many accept the datum that consensus in philosophy has not been achieved,
and they believe that it is historically naive to think that it will ever be
achieved. But they do not accept the relativism of Rorty and other drive-by
philosophers.
But what is left of philosophy given the strife of systems it has bred?
What, in particular, of the notion of philosophical truth? Reschers orientational pluralism attempts to find a middle road that rejects relativism and yet
accepts the strife of systems and the critique of traditional philosophys selfconception as having achieved (or at least moved us closer to) the articulation
of absolute and universal substantive truths.
Unfortunately, I dont believe that Reschers program succeeds. However,
his articulation of possible metaphilosophical stances does allow us to see
how a more traditional conception of philosophy can avoid the errors Rescher
thinks it is prone to while decisively avoiding the morass of relativism.
What Is Orientational Pluralism?
In The Strife of Systems, Rescher presents An Inventory of Possible
Approaches to a Choice among Rival Philosophical Positions, developed
from a tripartite division proposed by World War IIera philosopher Eberhard
Rogge (SS 223, Table 4; cf. MI 197). According to Rescher, these several
approaches exhaust the possibilities (SS 222). Of course, one could refuse to
accept any genuine alternatives at all. This is dogmatism. Presumably the
idea is that one does accept some one position, but in an unthinking way that
completely rules out of court any consideration of alternatives to that position.
By contrast, pluralism is the quite broad view that there are viable alternatives, and the options that most concern Rescher are the various ways in
which, under this broad rubric, a philosopher can respond to the fact of so
many competing and viable philosophical positions.
Within pluralism, there is a tripartite division: scepticism adopts none of
the possible alternative philosophical positions, syncretism adopts them all,
and doctrinalism selects one. The sceptic may be an agnostic who sees
the issues as beyond the powers of human reason to resolve, or a nihilist
who sees the issues as inherently meaningless and the conflict between positions as a mere sham (SS 223). The interesting options lie within the doctrinalist division. According to doctrinalism, one position is selected from
among rival philosophical theories. But what is the basis for the selection?
Arationalist doctrinalists say that the basis for selection is rationally indifferent. Indeed there can be no rational grounds for choice. Arationalists
further divide into those who maintain that this nonrational choice is made on
the basis of (1) the individuals psychological profile his temperament or
disposition (psychologism), (2) the social and intellectual context of the
time in which the choice is made (historicism), or (3) the general course of
historical tendencies (historical convergentism) (SS 223).
Reschers own preferred approach is to be found within rationalist
doctrinalism. But a further division is yet to be made before we get to
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Reschers position. Rationalism as understood here sees the choice among

rival positions as a rational one: one particular theory within the range of
alternatives can be shown by considerations of reason to be superior to all the
rest (SS 223). But there is a kind of rationalism Rescher rejects: absolutism, which maintains that the choice can be made on the basis of considerations of evidential reason alone (SS 223). We come at last to Reschers
orientational pluralism.6 Here the choice is rational, but only within a particular perspective. One position is superior to all its rivals by virtue of considerations of axiological (normative or evaluative) reason relative to the value
orientation of the individual (SS 223).
What this means is that different philosophers will invariably be rationally
led to different and incompatible choices among competing philosophical
theories. Their cognitive values will differ, and it is the cognitive values that
determine what will count as an acceptable philosophical theory. But since the
philosopher reasons toward that theory from the given cognitive values, the
choice of theory is rational.
This orientational pluralism is, according to Rescher, not a form of relativism. In terms of the above categories, relativisms are either forms of scepticism or of arational doctrinalism. Relativisms either reject all choices as
equally unworthy or insist that while it is perfectly acceptable and appropriate to adopt a stand, any choice is as rationally acceptable as any other.
Rescher sometimes calls this indifferentist relativism (e.g., PS 176). But
equally, orientational pluralism is not a version of absolutism or of dogmatism. Thus Rescher claims to have threaded the needle and found a viable
middle way.
Rescher on Cognitive Values
When philosophers debate theory choice, argument by analogy is often essential, because the issues generally dont have the direct connection to experience that can allow for resolution by, say, experimental method in science.
For example, when philosophers debate a claim such as An agent has no
moral responsibility for acts done involuntarily, the typical procedure is to
claim that certain problematic cases are analogous to clear-cut cases. But
Rescher notes that philosophers will almost invariably disagree about whether
a case claimed to be analogous really is close enough to the clear-cut example to count as an instance of the behavior in question. This is an example of
difference in cognitive values: whether one thinks a situation relevantly analogous to another depends on what one takes the relevant similarities to be.
These are not factual judgments but evaluative ones employed in typical
reasoning and argumentation in philosophy. And philosophers who have
6
Reschers actual phrase here is value-orientational monism (SS 223). But this is a
confusing locution given that the view is subsumed under pluralism in Table 4. And because the
view is a specific application of the position Rescher elsewhere calls orientational pluralism
(SS Chapter 7; see in particular SS 136), I have for consistency adopted the latter terminology
throughout my discussion.

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different values in this arena who, for example, make different sorts of similarity judgments or who differently prioritize how important similarity judgments should be relative to, say, judgments of degree of complexity will
often arrive at diametrically opposed answers to the question of which among
competing theories is the best. Other examples of conflicting cognitive values
are the disagreements about the role that intuition should play, how relevant
or weighty certain evidential categories are compared with other such categories, and so on.
Rescher claims that these conflicting values lead inevitably to irresolution,
for different philosophers are bound to adopt different cognitive-value orientations (SS 125). Rescher does allow (SS 126) that there can be debate about
cognitive values, but given his overall position on cognitive values, it is
debate empty of any rationally compelling factors. For any debate will itself
rely on evaluative presuppositions (SS 126). And for Rescher this entails that
different value orientations will inevitably remain out of rational reach of one
another. Inhabitants of these different orientations live in different worlds
inaccessible to one another. Diverse cognitive-value orientations just dont
admit of combination or compromise or sublimation to a higher level (SS
125; see also SS 108). While a shift to a different value orientation can occur,
it is more like a religious conversion experience than anything of rational
provenance (SS 125).
Reschers orientational pluralism results in an interestingly bifurcated situation (SS 136). On the one hand, we have the individual philosopher with her
substantive philosophical commitments. These commitments are rational
according to the orientational pluralist, for reasons noted above. Rescher even
claims that its fine for the philosopher lets identify her as philosopher A
to adopt a dogmatic tone of voice regarding the correctness of her stand (SS
124, 265). Within her perspective, it can be appropriate to treat a specific
philosophical theory arrived at via her cognitive values as being the only
correct theory. But from another perspective, Rescher and perhaps even
philosopher A too, if she adopts orientational pluralism as the best metaphilosophical account7 understand that the claim of rationality and final truth is
dependent upon As cognitive values. From the perspective of philosopher B,
who has different cognitive values, As views are at best skewed in their
assumptions about how to argue philosophically and at worst not rational. In
either case they lead to false substantive claims. And because A and B differ
on cognitive values, there is no prospect for agreement or resolution, indeed
no rational way to resolve them, for there can be no rational preferences
among perspectives when one steps outside ones favored perspective to
survey the strife of systems.

7
See SS 18086, 23840, 265, and PS 13953 for Reschers arguments that he can rank
his metaphilosophial perspectives above competing alternatives without succumbing to self-refutation.

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Doubts about Orientational Pluralism

As an answer to relativism, this result seems to me highly unsatisfying.
Relativists themselves are generally happy enough to say that within a given
perspective a given cultural milieu, say one can speak of rationality and
truth. Each culture, presumably, makes truth claims and has standards for
determining what counts as true. But relativists claim that there are no
grounds for rational choice among perspectives. And this seems to be exactly
the situation Reschers orientational pluralism would leave us in: truth and
rationality within a perspective, but no grounds for rational choice among
perspectives. If one considers again Reschers own account of relativism
quoted above, it is difficult to see how it would not apply to the situation that
results for philosophy if one adopts his orientational pluralism.
Can Rescher Salvage Any Standards for Acceptable and Unacceptable
Claims?
It seems to me then that Rescher has simply adopted a standard relativism
with respect to cognitive values. He might well accept this assessment, but
argue that this is a limited relativism because it applies only to adjudication
among competing cognitive values, whereas pure relativists see every position
as rationally indifferent with respect to every other. But this does not in fact
mark a difference between Rescher and the relativists in terms of the results
achieved. Cognitive values are such fundamental features of a persons or
cultures world view that it is difficult to see how Rescher could avoid the
most implausible implications of relativism, according to which one has to
concede that even the most seemingly intellectually outrageous or ethically
monstrous beliefs are outrageous or monstrous only from certain perspectives.
For Rescher offers no clear and useful criteria regarding cognitive values that
would allow us to reject some sets of values. Thus, there are no grounds for
rejecting that set of cognitive values which regards the literal statements of the
Bible, or the words of a guru, as (to select from among Reschers Sampler of
Cognitive Values [SS 102]) significant, central, illuminating, weighty,
fundamental, and urgent and everything that is in disagreement as insignificant, peripheral, unhelpful, trivial, surface and negligible. God is my
measure of truth, some say. And for others, it is the words of a Jim Jones or
the leader of the disastrous Heavens Gate cult.8
In several places in all three books, Rescher does respond to the challenge
But isnt orientational pluralism just a form of relativism?9 But his answer
is invariably that relativism espouses rational indifferentism with respect to
all theory choices while his orientational pluralism does not. This response is
subject to the objection Ive raised above. When Rescher responds, he
8
Rescher does offer some attempts to adjudicate among cognitive values, but I will argue
below that these are unsatisfactory.
9
Keeping in mind, again, the terminological variations among the three books, see PS
193204; SS 16872, 17778, 18086, 191201, 26567; MI 13132, 24448.

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answers from within a specific perspective when characterizing and defending orientational pluralism: from that perspective, a choice is rational. But
then he answers from outside any such perspective when characterizing and
criticizing relativism: there are no grounds for rational choice among perspectives. However, it is only this perspectival jumping that allows the seemingly different answers. In fact, the orientational pluralists answers exactly
track the relativists answers when care is taken to keep constant the frameworks from which the questions are asked.
Only in Metaphilosophical Inquiries does Rescher offer two hints and one
developed point concerning the crucial question whether there can be any
constraints at all regarding the sorts of attitudes and norms that can count as
legitimate cognitive values.10 But the hints are at cross-purposes and the
developed point is quite problematic.
In one passage answering the question Why shouldnt philosophers agree
on the same set of cognitive values? Rescher emphasizes the different experiences which will, he says, shape different values. In the formation of these
values, he claims that some trust to human instrumentalities (shamans and
gurus), others put their faith in the conjunctions of planets (MI 125). The
apparently uncritical acceptance of such cognitive values suggests relativism
of the strongest sort. But in a later discussion of the flaws of relativism,
Rescher writes: It is hard for sensible people to persuade themselves that any
cognitive standard is as good as any other that tea-leaf reading or the use of
bird auguries yields as reliable information as the methods of science (MI
227). Unless Rescher is merely reporting a psychological fact here, this
passage suggests that there can be standards sorting acceptable from unacceptable cognitive values. But Rescher says nothing to develop this idea, and
it is at odds with his previous suggestion that there just are different values.
(Or does he intend to make his division between perfectly acceptable astrology and unacceptable tea-leaf reading?!)
A more developed reflection on this question comes in a discussion of the
claims of some philosophers that other cultures have radically different
conceptions of reasoning than ours. Thus the Azande are alleged (e.g., by
Peter Winch) to reason in ways that are in clear violation of the evidential
canons of modern Western culture (MI 235). Or Evans-Pritchard suggests
that the Nuer have a different logic of identity from ours when they affirm
that swamp light is identical with spirit but deny that spirit is identical with
swamp light (MI 23536).
Rescher responds that we cannot accept these claims of a radical nonWestern conception of reason or logic. When we encounter such claims, we
must conclude that, whatever these non-Westerners have in mind, it is not
10
In The Strife of Systems, the only comment he makes concerning this question is the odd
claim that it would be strange indeed to deem clouds more important than atoms (SS 103). But
surely what counts as important on this score depends on whether one is a physicist or a meteorologist!

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some alternative conception of rationality or logic, for if they do not have

our concept of rationality, they do not have the concept (MI 236). To have
the concept of rationality at all is to have it the way we do (MI 236).
Whether one accepts this striking imperiousness on Reschers part or not,
it is clear that for Rescher the realm of rationality in the sense of principles of
reasoning and logic is significantly narrower than the realm of cognitive
values, or else his central claim about the acceptability of a range of cognitive
values would be in complete contradiction with the passages just quoted.11
Therefore, the problem remains of how to avoid a complete relativism given
Reschers stance on the relativity of cognitive values. The religious fundamentalist who advocates a flat Earth need not deny the law of noncontradiction or the commutativity of identity statements. She can claim to adhere to
all such basic laws of reason, while insisting that according to her cognitive
values regarding salience, relevance, urgency, and so on, the word of God as
given in the Bible ranks far higher in her truth-determinations than the claims
of scientists and other suspect members of the secular powers that be.
Reschers Criticisms Directed against His Own Position
One of the central claims Rescher makes in his criticism of relativism can be
applied to his own position on cognitive values. In response to Rortys claim
that philosophy as an attempt to answer the traditional questions has come to
an end, Rescher says that it is our nature as inquiring beings to ask such questions (SS 248, 252). To abandon the search for answers is to abandon our
chance to make sense of things, and that is a lot to lose.
But if Rorty can be criticized on this score, so can Rescher himself. Rorty
would have us just accept that disagreements in philosophy are irreconcilable.
But this is parallel to Reschers own claim that we must just accept that
disagreements about cognitive values are irreconcilable. Why isnt it in our
nature as philosophers to look into the possible reasons for the difference in
cognitive values and to try to make sense of them? Given these cognitive
conflicts, isnt it unphilosophical simply to declare an irreconcilable set of
differences? That doesnt mean we assume blithely that the disagreements can
be resolved, but why preclude this a priori? Even if we never resolve them,
the philosopher will want to understand them to better understand the nature
of the disagreement.
11
The real problem here is not, I think, how to deal with the supposedly exotic logical
conceptual schemes of other cultures. Rather, it is taking at face value the interpretations of
Western anthropologists or philosophers who attribute these exotic schemes in the first place. In
the case of the Azande, I have argued that attributing an alternative logic to them rests on tendentious interpretations of some confusing and inconsistent passages from Evans-Pritchard and that
the actual statements of Evans-Pritchards Zande informants suggest that they reason just as we
do. See Timm Triplett, Is There Anthropological Evidence That Logic Is Culturally Relative?:
Remarks on Bloor, Jennings, and Evans-Pritchard, British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, vol. 45 (1995), and Azande Logic Versus Western Logic? British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, vol. 39 (1988).

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And surely there is valuable work to be done here. In fact, there is as yet
very little (meta)philosophical work on the reasonableness of various strategies in specifically philosophical argumentation (as opposed to science or
ordinary informal reasoning), such as the roles of analogies and intuition, the
prioritization of such desiderata as simplicity versus explanatory breadth,
analogies versus proofs, and so on. Since so little has been done, how can
Rescher be so sure that it is beyond rational systematization? Perhaps we will
not find a convergence of approaches toward one ideal for cognitive values in
philosophical argumentation (or perhaps we will), but just as significantly
for the avoidance of relativism we might find a winnowing down into a
couple of competing poles or a triad of alternatives which would all entail the
exclusion of certain outlandish cognitive values.
Reschers Classification Problem, and an Alternative to His Orientational
Pluralism
Philosophical (and metaphilosophical) stances cannot be challenged in a
vacuum. If there were no better alternative to Reschers orientational pluralism, we might still want to accept it in spite of its specific tensions, for it can
only be accepted or rejected in comparison to alternative accounts and an
examination of their own tensions.
But I believe that a more plausible stance can be articulated. Consider
again the Rescher-Rogge list of supposedly exhaustive alternative ways to
respond when confronted with choices among rival philosophical positions.
Rescher offers the three basic options of adopting none of the choices, one, or
all scepticism, doctrinalism, and syncretism.12 But there is an unrealistic
underlying assumption behind the axis of division generating the RescherRogge catalogue, and because of its unrealism, the allegedly exhaustive
choices are skewed.
The unrealistic assumption is that one must adopt (none or one or all of)
the alternatives wholesale. But this is not how philosophers really work. The
Rescher-Rogge system presupposes an unrealistic cafeteria-style model of
choice among rival positions in philosophy: Here we see the sceptics moving
through the cafeteria line, trays empty, noses disdainfully in the air (but
undoubtedly scarfing up some desserts later when they think no one is looking), the syncretists gluttonously piling their trays high, the doctrinalists
following the course of Aristotelian moderation and selecting just one dish.
But that picture is inaccurate. In real philosophical life, doctrines arent found
ready-made and simply accepted or rejected in a definitely-yes or definitelyno manner. One finds oneself more or less tentatively or provisionally affirming a position as being more reasonable than some rival position, but not
necessarily willing to rule that rival approach utterly out of contention. Indeed
there may be a whole hierarchy according to which one ranks rivals by degree
12
Rescher rightly dismisses the logical possibility of accepting some but not all rival positions as of no additional theoretical interest (SS 224, notes to Table 4).

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of plausibility. For example, a philosopher of mind may believe some form of

materialism to be the most plausible account of mind, and yet still be troubled
by difficulties her preferred perspective has in accounting for qualia. Hopeful
the difficulties can be resolved, she remains a materialist, but one who is willing to grant that some form of epiphenomenalism or even, at a further remove,
some kind of dualism might turn out to be true, while ruling utterly out of
court something like Berkeleian idealism or occasionalism. This epistemically
graduated, evidentialist feature of position adoption in philosophy suggests an
important alternative to Reschers orientational pluralism.
Our epistemological stance toward rival philosophical positions (and even
toward our own) is not all or nothing. There are varying degrees of evidence,
tensions to be addressed, bullets to be bitten. As working philosophers at the
transition to the twenty-first century, we are, I think, well aware that no one
position has all the arguments in its favor with nothing standing in opposition
to it, and that each position depends on underlying assumptions not yet fully
brought to light and systematically defended. With this in mind, I recommend
a stance toward the strife of systems and the problem of choice among rival
systems I will call metaphilosophical evidentialism.
Consider the traditional conception of philosophical truth. This conception
is perhaps a stereotype. Maybe the overly optimistic statements of one or two
rationalists have been made inaccurately to represent an entire era. Perhaps
eager to declare themselves harbingers of a new era some recent philosophers have oversimplified the so-called modernist conception of philosophy
to which postmodernism becomes the needed antidote. At any rate, according
to this traditional idea, there are substantive, objective philosophical truths,
and these can be known with certainty through the careful avoidance of prejudice and via presuppositionless, intuitively self-evident axioms and methodical attention to their rational consequences. All philosophers should come to
agree about these truths, which can then ground the sciences. Philosophers
who fail to agree have simply been unable to overcome prejudice and error.
Sources of error are understood to be religious dogmatism, personal arrogance
or animus, and other extraphilosophical factors.
Metaphilosophical evidentialism is essentially a modification of this view
that injects a significant amount of tentativeness into the epistemological
status that can be claimed for the results of philosophical inquiry. It recognizes that propositions can have other positive epistemic statuses besides
certainty and knowledge that evidence can accumulate in favor of a proposition that is not yet known and that perhaps will never be known. A key idea
behind metaphilosophical evidentialism is that there is evidence that can favor
some philosophical claims and positions over others, but this evidence is not
generally sufficient to allow us to claim knowledge of substantive philosophical truths, let alone certainty. The concept of objective philosophical truths is
a reasonable one (though the philosophical thesis that there is such a realm
must itself be held tentatively). The reasons for the tenativeness regarding our
epistemic grasp of such truths are (1) that philosophy lacks the empirical
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checks that, in the sciences, can channel hypothesis formation and allow
inductive confirmation of many hypotheses and (2) that canons of deductive
reason and general rules of inference are too permissive by themselves to
direct philosophical inquiry to unique rational solutions. But such tentativeness and permissiveness do not preclude means of philosophical argumentation by which some philosophical positions can achieve a great deal of
plausibility and, in some circumstances, be reasonably held to be superior to
all rivals.
Even though evidentialism13 claims that one does not generally know a
complex philosophical doctrine or system of thought to be true, this is not any
form of scepticism in the senses Rescher has discussed. Reschers agnostic
and nihilistic forms of scepticism both reject any positive epistemological
favoritism toward one position over others. ( A plague on all your houses
[SS 223].) Evidentialism allows for the rational if tentative acceptance of a
position where scepticism does not. And unlike scepticism, it does not
preclude the achievement of philosophical knowledge in individual cases. Nor
is evidentialism to be equated with Reschers absolutism, which requires,
according to Rescher, the rational incontestable demonstration of a philosophical positions correctness over its rivals.14 And evidentialisms difference from orientational pluralism is clear: in addition to its emphasis on
tentativeness and evidential gradations in theory choice, evidentialism is
unwilling to assert the ultimate relativity of cognitive values and regards as
reasonable the view that cognitive values like ethical values are interperspectivally susceptible to rational discussion, deliberation, and choice.
A Rescherian Objection to Metaphilosophical Evidentialism
So evidentialism is a distinct alternative from any listed in the Rescher-Rogge
catalogue. Therefore, that catalogue was not exhaustive as claimed. But is
there any positive reason to accept evidentialism? It would appear to avoid the
relativistic implications of Reschers orientational pluralism and Reschers
unphilosophical refusal to put cognitive values on the table for reasoned
13
I refer to the doctrine as evidentialism for short, but it should be distinguished from the
evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee in Evidentialism, Philosophical Studies, vol.
48, (1985).
14
See, for example, SS 239. Rescher also calls this absolutist position evidential monism
(SS 223), but it cannot be equated with metaphilosophical evidentialism. Evidential for
Rescher refers not to the epistemic tentativeness and the emphasis on varying degrees of justification that are key to metaphilosophical evidentialism, but to truth determination by means of
rational evidence alone: considerations of objective evidential rationality will decide in favor of
one position (SS 235). Earlier in The Strife of Systems Rescher sketchily notes a position that
may be closer to metaphilosophical evidentialism, but this plausibilistic absolutism (SS 124)
also lacks the crucial awareness that in many or most cases there will be no single most-plausible answer to our philosophical questions. In any case, Rescher drops further mention of plausibilistic absolutism without evaluating it. Rescher also notes early on the value of holding
philosophical theories tentatively (SS 43; repeated at MI 14), but this value is not properly appreciated in his developed position, which encourages dogmatism within a perspective (SS 124, 265)
and amounts to relativism when confronted with the disagreements among perspectives.

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debate. But it also avoids some major difficulties that attend to the traditional
picture of the philosophical enterprise. It is sensitive to the complexity of
philosophy and its distance from the empirical checks that can settle many
debates in the sciences. It cautions the philosopher to approach the formulation of theories with humility. And it does not insist that there is one correct,
knowable rational answer to a philosophical question, while at the same time
it allows the dismissal of outlandish options as knowably wrong answers.
It may be that Rescher did not see evidentialism as a viable option because,
insofar as it rejects relativism with respect to cognitive values, it seems open
to the following criticism: Any argument for one set of cognitive values over
others, or for the dismissal of some set of cognitive values that leads to
outlandish results, can only proceed on the basis of already existing cognitive
values. It would take a distinct and more basic argument to defend those
values, but that more basic argument would itself depend on its own prior
cognitive values, and so on. So it looks as though we have an infinite regress
and cannot therefore offer a closed, rational defense of any set of cognitive
values.
In discussing such a regress, Rescher notes that absolutism sees the
regress as terminating in self-evident principles that need no validation,
while orientational pluralism sees it as terminating locally in a way thats
convincing to those (but only those) who hold a particular set of cognitive
values (SS 142). But these are not the only options for addressing the regress.
For the cognitive values Rescher discusses are used not only in philosophical
reasoning; they are also employed in the sciences and in our everyday reasoning. Therefore, the problem of philosophys distance from empirical checks is
not a problem for cognitive values as such. They can be tested for their truthconduciveness, and hence grounded in a way that philosophical arguments per
se cannot be. Consider, for example, the cognitive value of assigning weight
to the various kinds of evidence for an ordinary empirical claim such as
Theres a table in the kitchen. We assign greater weight to direct observation than to second-hand reports, we assign such reports more weight than
inductive extrapolation from similar cases, and we assign all of these more
weight than tea-leaf reading. We can also acquire some general understanding of reasonable constraints on what count as similar cases or relevant analogies once the truth conditions of similarity judgments in everyday life are
determined by observation or other independent means.15
This is not, of course, enough to provide an ultimate defense of these
cognitive values, for the thoroughgoing sceptic who rejects commonsense
knowledge-claims will object that the claimed determination even of Theres
a table in the kitchen as true is itself a truth determination only according to
some set of cognitive values. Obviously, this is no place for the defense of
15
This is to cite ways in which ordinary experience can provide support for some cognitive
values over others; similar points could be made about the cognitive values employed in adjudicating among scientific theories and in mathematical reasoning.

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commonsense knowledge against generalized scepticism. But it is enough for

our purposes to note that all those who reject such scepticism have available
the means described above for avoiding Reschers relativism regarding cognitive values in philosophical reasoning, and that Rescher himself rejects such
scepticism.
I believe that evidentialism offers a more realistic appraisal of philosophical activity and a more plausible explanation of its diversity than does
Reschers orientational pluralism. With Reschers (over)emphasis on the
clash of cognitive values, he underemphasizes sociological and other less
fundamental explanations of diversity. At the very least, we ought to consider
such descriptive and more local explanations of diversity first, before
concluding that clashing cognitive values are at work, just as scientists look
for local explanations of anomalies (e.g., defective instruments or experimental procedures) before concluding that more fundamental theoretical assumptions must be altered. (This is not to deny that clashing cognitive values will
play some role in the explanation of diversity.)
By local factors, I have in mind, for example, that published philosophical work varies greatly in quality. Some of it is just plain bad careless,
insufficiently researched, poorly thought through. More frequently, published
work is conceived and written in more haste and with less thorough research
than the author would have liked. The result isnt bad philosophy, but work
which, the author herself is all too aware, could have been better. Too busy to
read all the ramifying literature, a philosopher may fail to fully appreciate new
insights from an opposing perspective. Mistakes or weak arguments within
the perspective she supports may go unnoticed.16 And even if philosophers
were ideally perspicacious and thorough, it appears that there are so many
multiply branching paths available in the substantive development of a philosophical theory, and so few (if any) empirical constraints, that philosophers
with the same basic cognitive values would still have many acceptable yet
mutually incompatible options to choose among, and would most likely end
up in different places.
Perhaps more important than these individualized explanations of philosophical diversity are sociological ones. Many Kuhnian points about the
progress of science could be made more aptly about progress in philosophy.
Philosophical revolutions may take place, not because the traditional paradigm
has been decisively refuted, but because a new generation of philosophers feels
its time for a change. When a charismatic philosopher declares that the old
approaches are irrelevant or bankrupt and a fresh start is needed, this can
generate tremendous appeal. Positions harden, and debates between friends
and foes of the revolution take on political overtones. Such noncognitive
16
In one passage Rescher briefly notes the existence of such procedural failings and
research gaps in philosophy (MI 5051). But he seems not to recognize that these elements of
philosophy as it is actually practiced provide an alternative explanation for philosophical diversity that challenges his focus on incompatible cognitive values.

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factors can cloud realistic awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of both
the new approach and the one it seeks to replace, particularly in the revolutions early stages. To the extent that these noncognitive factors can be identified and their distorting influences mitigated, there is room for the eventual
elimination from contention of some approaches and the emergence of one or
a few others as most plausible.17
In sum, Reschers orientational pluralism implies relativism, makes use of
an unrealistic cafeteria model of theory choice, and does not take full account
of the noncognitive causes of philosophical diversity. Metaphilosophical
evidentialism suggests itself as an alternative without these unhappy consequences and as one that can answer the regress problem posed by Rescher or
any other nonsceptic. By these sorts of accountings, one may (tentatively, of
course) affirm evidentialism as a more plausible approach than Reschers
orientational pluralism.18
Department of Philosophy
University of New Hampshire
Durham, NH 03824
USA
tat@cisunix.unh.edu

17
Some philosophers will challenge the cognitive values that are here used to demarcate
these sociological and political factors as noncognitive and distorting. Evidentialism can
acknowledge this without acceding to cognitive-value relativism, for reasons noted above in
response to the alleged infinite regress of cognitive values.
18
I am very grateful to my colleagues at the University of New Hampshire Philosophy
Department for the interest they have taken in this paper and their help in improving it. Particular
thanks go to Drew Christie, Bill deVries, Bob Scharff, and Ken Westphal for detailed written
comments on an earlier draft.

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