Bartleby The Scrivener A Parabble of Pessimism

Bartleby the Scrivener: A Parable of Pessimism
Author(s): Daniel Stempel and Bruce M. Stillians

Source: Nineteenth-Century Fiction, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Dec., 1972), pp. 268-282
Published by: University of California Press
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Bartlebythe
Scrivener:
A Parable
of Pessimism
DANIEL
BRUCE
STEMPEL
M.
AND
STILLIANS
IN
OCTOBER 1853 a troubled Matthew Arnold explained why he

had chosen to drop Empedocles on Etna fromhis new collection of
poems. Certain situations, Arnold suggested, are intrinsically devoid of the power to provide "poetical enjoyment": "those in
which the sufferingfindsno vent in action; in which a continuous
state of mental distressis prolonged, unrelieved by incident, hope,
or resistance; in which there is everythingto be endured, nothing
to be done. In such situations there is inevitablysomethingmorbid,
in the description of them something monotonous." 1 And so, Empedocles, having chosen to leap into the crater of Etna in a fitof
weltschmerz,was banished by the sternVictorian conscience of his
creator. But the romantic pessimism which is as much a part of
nineteenth-centuryliteratureas the optimisticfaithin progresswas
not to be exorcised so easily, either fromArnold's poetry or from
the work of his contemporaries.
Shortly after Arnold wrote this condemnation of the literature
of futility,Bartleby the Scrivener appeared in two installments
in Putnam's Monthly Magazine (November-December, 1853).
Through one of the ironic coincidences of literary history,Melville's storyexemplifies every one of the gloomy traits which Ar1 Poetical Works,ed. C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry (New York/London: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1950), p. xviii.
[2681

Bartleby the Scrivener
269
nold had listed as fatal to "poetic enjoyment,"but nevertheless

survivesas a masterpieceof what Unamuno has called "the tragic
senseof life." It remainsan enigmaticfable,an allegorywith inlike one of Kafka's disturbinglymatter-offinitereverberations,
factnightmares.
And, like a Kafkanarrative,it seemsto elude all
efforts
to isolatethe hidden framesof referenceto whichthe play
allusions.But the task,if diffiof symbolsis linkedby fragmentary
cult,is not hopeless;one can at leastbegin withthemostrelevant
data of sources,milieu,and biography,and chartthe structureof
theallegorybyworkingfromtheknownto the unknown.The historicalapproachcannotprovidean "explanation"but it can give
us a pointofdeparturefora meaningfuland focuseddiscussion.In
thisinstance,thefactthatsomemonthsbeforethewritingofBartlebythe firstsummaryof Schopenhauer'sphilosophyin Englishwas
publishedin a periodicalwhichwas readilyavailable to Melville
forcesus to considerthe possibilitythat his acquaintance with
Schopenhauer'spessimismbegan long beforehe boughtSchopenhauer'sworksin thelastyearsofhislife.2
Review and Foreign QuarOn 1 April 1853, the Westminster
terlyReview publisheda surveyof Schopenhauer'sworksunder
thetitleof "Iconoclasmin GermanPhilosophy."This article,written by John Oxenford,was destinedto become one of the landNot only did it
intellectualhistory.3
marksof nineteenth-century
world,it also cataintroduceSchopenhauerto theEnglish-speaking
pulted the hithertoobscure philosopherinto fame in his own
country.Withina monththe articlewas translatedinto German
and published in the VossischeZeitung (Berlin). Schopenhauer,
whosecommandofEnglishwas excellent,praisedOxenfordforthe
2 See Merton M. Sealts, Jr.,Melville's Reading: A Check-listof Books Owned and
Borrowed (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 26. References to Schopenhauer and his philosophy have been frequent in Melville criticismsince the publication of Raymond M. Weaver's biography,particularlyin studies of Billy Budd,
where evidence of his reading can be demonstrated.To our knowledge, this article
presentsthe only evidence that a summaryof Schopenhauer's thoughtwas available
to Melville shortlybeforehe wroteBartlebyand that the storyis shaped by his reading
of that summary.There have been perceptive critics who have noted the parallel
with Schopenhauer's denial of the will, but only in passing (Walter Sutton, "Melville and the Great God Budd," Prairie Schooner, 34 [1960], 129).
3 John Oxenford, "Iconoclasm in German Philosophy," WestminsterReview and
Foreign QuarterlyReview, 60 (1853), 388407. The New York Society Library,which
Melville frequentlyused, lists the magazine in its 1850 catalogue.

270
Nineteenth-CenturyFiction
fidelity
ofhis translations
ofexcerptsfromhisworksand in general
was delightedby thearticle,whichattackedthe Germanacademicians forfailingto recognizethe geniusof a philosopherwho was
not a professor.4
The WestminsterReview, as Hugh W. Hetheringtonhas
pointedout,was one ofa numberof Britishmagazineswhichwere
widely circulated in the United States, often arrivingby fast
steameraftera two-weekcrossing.5
Melville was an avid readerof
the periodicalpress,and it is likelythathe read the Westminster
Review,if onlyto see whetherhis bookshad been includedin the
regularsurveyof Americanwriting.The Review had printeda
briefbut favorablereferenceto Melville'sworkin 1852.6It is not
possibleto determineexactlywhereand when Melville pickedup
the April issue because the opportunitieswere omnipresent.In
May he was in New Yorkto see his father-in-law
offto Europe and
it washiscustomto go to thereadingroomoftheNew YorkSociety
Libraryand scanthelatestperiodicals.7
Further,he could haveread
theAprilissuein Bostonat theAthenaeumor even in Pittsfield.
Grantedtheopportunity,
whatabout the interest?Here theevidence is so strongas to rule out the possibilitythathe mighthave
simplyignoredthearticle.On his tripto Europe in 1849 Melville
traveledwithGeorgeJ. Adler,professor
of Germanat New York
University.
Adler,whomMelvilledescribedas "Coleridgean,"was
an enthusiasticstudentof Germanphilosophyand lostno timein
of transceninitiatinghis travelingcompanioninto the mysteries
dental metaphysics,
"Hegel, Schlegel,Kant, 8Cc." 8 And Melville
was a farfromunwillinglisteneras theystrolledthe deck talking
absoof his favoritetopics,"Fixed Fate, Free will, foreknowledge
9
lute." Nor did thisinterestwane whenhe returnedand settledat
Arrowhead.J. E. A. Smithof Pittsfieldnoted thatafterhis day's
12 (1923-25), v.
4 "Vorwort,"Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft,
5 Melville's Reviewers (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 5-6.
There was an American edition of WestminsterReview, published in New York at
this time. See F. L. Mott, A History of American Magazines (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1938), 2:129-30.
6 See Jay Leyda, The Melville Log (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951), 1:442.
7 Sealts, p. 15.
8 Herman Melville, Journal of a Visit to London and the Continent,ed. E. M. Metcalf (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948),p. 12.
9 Ibid., p. 5.

271
workwas finishedMelvillewouldjoin his familyfor"lightreading

-which was not so verylight;as it includedmuchless of whatwe
commonlycall 'lightliterature'than it did of profoundreviews,
abstrusephilosophyin proseor verse,and thelike." 10
In the springand summerof 1853 Melville's personalcircurnstancesperhapsmade himmorethanusuallyreceptiveto anypessimisticevaluationof life.He was seekingdesperatelyforan escape
fromthe pressuresof a careeras a professionalwriterand finding
it almostimpossibleto continuebecauseoffailingsightand mental
strain.We can imagine,then,the strongimpressionwhichOxenford'sarticlemusthave made as Melville found his own intimationsofa malignityinherentin thefabricofcreationsupportedby
Schopenhauer'smetaphysics
ofan evil will as Kant'sthing-in-itself.
Even more important,Schopenhauerleft one gate open in the
gloomyprisonof hissystem-hetaughtan ethicof totaldisengagement fromlife and its obligations,similarto thatwhich Ishmael
had soughtat sea, but in Schopenhauer'sphilosophycarriedto its
ultimateand logicalextreme.
Everyreaderof BartlebytheScriveneris immediatelystruckby
the obvious factthat Bartlebyconsistently
avoids the use of the
verb"to will" and substitutes"prefer."This eccentricity
of speech
firstexcitesthecuriosityof his employerand his fellowscriveners,
thentheirwrath,and, finally,like an insidiouscontagion,infects
theirspeechas well. It is theverbalsymbolofthatcalmnegationof
whichhis employersagelyremarks,"nothingso aggravatesan earnest personas a passiveresistance."11When the narrator,testing
thisstrangephenomenonofdenial,whichis totallyat odds withhis
own experienceof the relationshipbetweenmasterand man, asks
him to go to the postoffice,Bartlebyreplies,"I would prefernot
to." His employerprobes for the exact meaningof this baffling
statement:"You willnot?"and receivestheequallyemphaticreply,
"I prefernot" (29-30). Bartlebywills nothing-he merelyprefers
and thisis thekeyto his enigmaticcharacter.
10
Quoted by Sealts, p. 20.
11 The Piazza Tales, ed. Egbert S. Oliver (New York: Hendricks House, 1948), p.
28. Citations in my text to Bartleby are to this edition.

272
In his discussionof Schopenhauer'sethical systemOxenford

pointsout thathisscaleofvaluesculminatesin an ideal individual,
higherthanthejust or good man:
Justas ignorant
persons,
whohavea smattering
knowledge
ofBerkeley,thinkthatthegoodbishopregardedthewholeworldas a creation
of thefancy,
and thattheycan refutehis disciplesbygivingtheman
actual(notmetaphorical)
rap on theknuckles,
so doubtlesstheremay
be wiseacres,
whowillfancythatas Schopenhauer
hasdeclaredthewill
to be therealessenceoftheworld,and everyhumanbeinga manifestationof thatwill,everyhumanbeingis in a stateof themostperfect
freedom.
Quite thereverse!Withrespectto theindividualwill,Schopenhaueris an absolutenecessitarian,
holdingthattheactionofa certain motiveon a certaincharacteris as sureof producinga certain
result,
as an operation
ofagentuponpatientin thesphereofmechanics.
Whatmaybe a motiveto one personmaynotbe a motiveto another,
forthecharacters
maybe different;
but giventhecharacter
and the
motive,theresultis infallible.
The absolutewill,whichlaybeyondthe
jurisdiction
ofcausality,
has forceditselfintotheworldofphenomena
in an individualshape,and it musttaketheconsequences,
thatis to
say,a subjugationto thatlaw of causeand effect
bywhichthewhole
worldof phenomenais governed,
and whichis equallypotentin the
dischargeof a pistoland theperformance
of a virtuousaction.The
"character,"
whichis theIdea ofthehumanindividual,
justas gravitationis one of the Ideas of matter,
is bornwithhim,and cannotbe
altered.The knowledge
of theindividualmaybe enlarged,and consequently
he maybe put in a bettertrack,bylearningthathis natural
desireswillbe moregratified
ifhe obeysthelawsofsociety,
thanifhe
risesagainstthem;but thecharacter
remainsthesame,althoughthe
cupiditywhichwouldhave made a gamester
or a highwayman,
may
becomea constituent
elementin an honesttradesman.
Thus everyman
bringshisowndepravity
intotheworldwithhim,and thisis thegreat
doctrine
oforiginalsin,as setforth
byAugustine,
expoundedbyLuther
and Calvin,and applauded by Schopenhauer,
who, thougha freethinker
in themostcompletesenseof theword,is absolutely
delighted
withthefathers
and thereformers,
whentheybear witnessto human
degradation.
The worldof phenomenais a delusion-a mockery;
and
thefactofbeingbornintosucha worldis in itselfan evil.
And nowwe mayintroduce
Schopenhauer's
ideal. The artistcomes
in fora largeshareof his respect,forhe, withoutregardto selfish
motives,
contemplates
theideaswhichformthesubstrata
of theworld
ofphenomena,
and reproduces
themas thebeautifuland thesublime.
The goodman,withhishugesympathy,
is anotherestimable
being;but
higherstillis he,who,convinced
oftheillusionoftheworld,is resolved
todestroy
it,as faras he is concerned,
byextinguishing
thewillto live.

273
Suicide will not answerthispurpose.Suicide is a dislikeof a particular

chain of circumstances,
whichit endeavoursto break through,but it is
no alienation of the individual desiresfromlifein general.Asceticism,
thatgradual extinctionof all feelingsthat connectus with the visible
world-the lifeof the anchoritein the Egyptiandesert-ofthe Quietist
of the time of Louis XIV,-of the Indian Fakeer, who goes through
yearsof self-torture,-this
is the perfectionof Schopenhauer.The particular theological creed under which these saints performedtheir
austeritiesis a matterof trivialimportance,-theyare all alike in the
one grandqualificationof holiness;theyrecededfromthe visibleworld
and graduallyextinguishedthe "will to live," till death, commonlyso
called, came as the completionof theirwishes.
In thisasceticismconsiststheonlypossiblefreedomof thewill. While
actingin theworldofphenomenathewill becomesentangledin thelau
of causality,but now it recedes back to a region where that law can
operateno more,and whereit is consequentlyfree.The freedomof the
will is, in a word,annihilation,and thisis thegreatestboon thatcan be
desired.12
When Bartleby firstappears, he already exhibits the stigmata of

one of Schopenhauer's ascetic saints: "I can see that figurenowpallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn!It was Bartleby" (23). There is an aura of holiness about him which impresses
his employer, if not his fellow clerks. And it is precisely because
there is no "particular theological creed" to provide an external
frameof values that the storybecomes an absurd parable. The passion of Bartleby is played out against a background of comic Dickensian clerks,pompous lawyers,and all the money changersof Wall
Street. His passing affectsno one except himself and the narrator.
The world goes on, pursuing its illusions, but Bartleby is no longer
part of it, and his employer,shaken by his briefglimpse of the real
nature of things,is left a much sadder and a somewhat wiser man.
Thus, the structureof the tale is developed fromthe interactionof
the narrator,the smug and comfortableattorney,and the "forlorn"
Bartleby.
In the opening paragraph the narratormakes it clear that all that
we can know of Bartleby is what he knows: "What my own astonished eyes saw of Bartleby,thatis all I know of him, except, indeed,
one vague report,which will appear in the sequel" (16). As a result
of this'deliberate restrictionof viewpoint, if Bartleby is a Schopen12
Oxenford,PP. 405-7.

274
hauerian saint, we must rememberthat we are looking at him

throughthewrongend of the telescope,throughtheeyesof a man
to whomhe is a strangely
magneticriddleofobscuremotivationsat best,eccentric;at worst,mad; in any event,incomprehensible.
The complacentstoryteller
beginsbycongratulating
himselfon his
estimablecharacterand circumstancesand unknowinglyreveals
thathe is certainlythe oppositeof an ascetic.He has alwaysacted
on thebeliefthat"the easiestwayof lifeis the best."Withouttoo
mucheffort,
he has managedto do a "snugbusiness"and is known
as a "safe"man,prudentand methodical.He is interestedonlyin
questionsof legality,not morality,as he revealswhenhe bemoans
theabolitionoftheoffice
ofMasterin Chancery,whichhe has held:
"It wasnota veryarduousoffice,
but verypleasantlyremunerative"
(17). He makes no mention of the fact that the remuneration
usuallycomes fromthe propertyleftto widowsand orphans.In
short,at the beginningof his story,the lawyeris what Oxenford
describesas Schopenhauer'sjust man: "The just man,who is just,
and nothingmore,standshigherin the moral scale than the bad
man,but he has not reachedSchopenhauer'sidea of virtue.He so
farshowsa sympathy
withhis fellow-creatures
thathe does not encroachupon theirrights,but he is equally unwillingto go out of
his wayto do themany substantialgood. He is a sortof man who
payshis taxesand his church-rates,
keepsclear of the Courtof Requests and is only charitablewhen he has an equivalent in the
shape of an honourable place in a subscriptionlist." 13
he is assigneda place in his emWhen Bartlebyenterstheoffice,

ployer'sroom behind a foldingscreen.His desk is close to a small
windowwhichopens on a brickwall threefeetaway.In thisconfinedspace,Bartlebydoes "an extraordinary
quantityof writing,"
with
dayand night,but he does it "silently,palely,mechanically,"
or vitality.In contrast,the copyistsin
no evidenceof cheerfulness
theouteroffice
are bothso energeticin theirown eccentricwaythat
theyseem to be drivenby some demonicinner force-as indeed
theyare, fromSchopenhauer'sstandpoint.Afterhis noon meal,
Turkey the Englishmanbecomes "altogethertoo energetic,"is
noisy,blots his pages,and exhibits"a strange,inflamed,flurried,
flightyrecklessnessof activity"(18). Nippers, his Americancol13
Ibid., P. 405.

275
league, is the "victimof two evil powers-ambitionand indigestion" (20). He is possessedby anotherformof generalizedviolence
grindshis teeth,constantly
adjustshisdesk,and muttersmaledictionsunderhis breath.
But Bartlebycopiesdocuments-and thatis all he will do. When
he is askedtoverify
hiscopies,he refusesin "a singularlymild,firm
voice": "I would prefernot to." He repeats this formulathree
times,withoutoffering
anyreasons,yetmaintaininghiscomposure.
His employeris at a loss: "Had therebeen the least uneasiness,
anger,impatienceor impertinencein his manner;in otherwords,
had therebeen anythingordinarilyhumanabout him,doubtlessI
should have dismissedhim fromthe premises.But as it was, I
should have as soon thoughtof turningmy pale plaster-of-paris
bustofCiceroout ofdoors"(25). He sensesthatBartlebyis notlike
other men, that there is somethingunmoved and unmovingin
Bartleby,like the pallid bust of the old Roman. In a second encounterhe receivesthesameanswer,and againthestrangecharisma
of Bartlebyrestrainshis employer:"With anyotherman I should
have flownoutrightinto a dreadfulpassion,scornedall further
words,and thrusthim ignominiously
frommypresence.But there
was somethingabout Bartlebythatnotonlystrangely
disarmedme,
in
a
but,
wonderfulmanner,touchedand disconcertedme" (26).
The lawyergraspsthe factthatthisis not some arbitrarycaprice,
thatwhile Bartlebyfeelsthe request is quite reasonable,he has
some "paramountconsideration"thattakesprecedence.Although
he appealstocommonsensebyenlistingthesupportofotherclerks,
thishas no moreeffectthanhis appeal to reason.Bartlebyreturns
to his littleniche,his "hermitage,"as his employernow has unconsciouslyfalleninto the habit of referringto it. He is, to use
Oxenford'sdescriptivephrase,like "the anchoritein the Egyptian
the span of his acdesert,"an asceticwho is graduallycontracting
tivity,
withdrawing
fromthevisibleworld.
Unable to cope with the remarkablebehaviorof Bartleby,the
narratoris forcedto rationalizehis own inexplicablereactionin
termsofhisquid proquo philosophy,
theethicofthejust man. He
pities Bartlebyas an involuntaryeccentricand consoles himself
withthethoughtthathisgenerosity
will be rewardedby"layingup
in mysoul whatwill eventuallyproveto be a sweetmorselformy
conscience"(28). The conditionslaid down by Bartlebyare tacitly

276
accepted: he copies documents,but he prefersnot to do anything

else,even thesmallesterrand.And so, forthe moment,he remains
securein his hermitage.
The next crucial incidentin the relationshipbetweenmaster
and clerkcomes on a Sunday morning,when the lawyer,on his
wayto TrinityChurch,stopsat his officeand findshimselflocked
out by Bartleby.The lockingout is symbolicas well as literalwhat the lawyerdiscoversin his officewill markhis passagefrom
self-satisfaction
and unconcernto a new compassion.In his usual
mild-mannered
way Bartlebyasks his masterto returnafterwalkingaroundtheblocktwoor threetimes,sincehe is busyand prefers
not to admithim.When he returns,he discoversthatBartlebyhas
gone,and, investigating
his hermitage,he concludesthatBartleby
has been living in his littlecorner.It is not Bartleby'sapparent
povertythatstrikeshim withsudden horror,it is the thoughtof
the dreadfulsolitudeof Wall Streeton a Sunday morningor at
night-"an emptiness."
At thispoint,thejust man beginsto experiencethe unfamiliar
pangsthatmarkthebirthofa new consciousness
of suffering:
"For
the firsttimein mylifea feelingof overpoweringstingingmelancholyseizedme." The sourceof thisnew awarenessis simplycompassion: "The bonds of a commonhumanitydrewme irresistibly
to gloom.A fraternalmelancholy!For both I and Bartlebywere
sons of Adam" (33). The just man has now reachedthatstageof
enlightenment
wherehe can broadenhis sensibilityto include all
mankind-he has becomea good man,in thesensein whichOxenforddescribeshim: "The good man ... is he whoseheartbeatswith
forall creaturesaround him, practicallyif not theoretsympathy
themas manifestations
of thesamegreatWill
icallyacknowledging
as himself.He loves everylivingbeing,fromhis neighbourdown
to a turtle-dove....14 The lawyernow sees thatthereis as much
of strange
miseryas happinessin theworldand has "presentiments
discoveries."He seemsto see Bartlebydead, "laid out, amonguncaringstrangers."Much as he maywishto pass offthisnew mood
as "sad fancyings"
of a "sickand sillybrain,"the factremainsthat
he, at least,can no longerplay therole of an "uncaringstranger."
Opening Bartleby'sdesk,he findsa savingsbank,knottedup in
14
Oxenford,P. 405.

277
a handkerchief.
This removestheone motivethat,to his methodical mind,mighthave justifiedBartleby'sbehavior-poverty.And
the lawyerreviewsthatbehavior':Bartleby'ssilence,nevervoluntarilybroken;his long reveriesbeforethe blank wall oppositehis
window; his self-imprisonment
in his hermitage;and his "pallid
haughtiness,"thattotallyself-possessed
and deliberatewithdrawal
fromlifewhichnot merelydisarmsbut "awes" his employerinto
"a tamecompliancewithhis eccentricities"
(34). The resultof this
meditationis what the narratorcalls "a prudentialfeeling"-we
rememberthathe has boastedthathis first"grandpoint" is prudence.Melville'slawyerinstinctively
reactsas Arnoldreactedin his
preface to the contemplation of a situation "in which a continuous

state of mental distressis prolonged, unrelieved by incident, hope,
or resistance." Like Arnold, he feels that the absolute "forlornness"
of Bartleby is simply painful, not tragic:
So trueit is, and so terrible,too, thatup to a certainpoint the thought

or sightof miseryenlistsour bestaffections;
but,in certainspecial cases,
beyond that point it does not. They err who would assertthat this is
owingto theinherentselfishness
of the human heart.It ratherproceeds
froma certainhopelessnessof remedyingexcessiveand organic ill. To
a sensitivebeing, pity is not seldom pain. And when at last it is perceived thatsuchpitycannotlead to effectualsuccor,commonsensebids
the soul be rid of it. What I saw that morningconvincedme that the
scrivenerwas the victimof innate and incurabledisorder.I mightgive
alms to his body; but his body did not pain him; it was his soul that
and his soul I could not reach. (35)
suffered,
While this passage is an acute and perceptive intuition of the
nature of Bartleby's malady, which is metaphysical, not physical,
we must keep in mind the fact that it is Bartleby who is enlightened, not his master. He has had a brief glimpse of the unbearable
truth which, for the protection of ordinary men like himself, is
veiled by the illusions that are necessary for the conduct of daily
living. As John Oxenford remarks,
All that the liberal mind looks forwardto with hope, if not with confidence-theextensionof political rights,the spread of education, the
brotherhoodof nations,the discoveryof new means of stubduingstubborn nature-mustbe given up as a vain dream,if ever Schopenhauler's
doctrinebe accepted.In a word,he is a professed"Pessimist";it is his

278
grandresult,thatthisis the worstof all possibleworlds;nay,so utterly

unsusceptibleof improvement,that the best thingwe can do is to get
rid of it altogether,by a processwhichhe veryclearlysetsforth.'5
Bartleby has already made the choice which initiates this process, the single free act of which man is capable, and then only
through the refiningprocess of great suffering:the denial of the
will to live. This is the incurable and innate "disorder" which reflectsthe unspoken "paramount consideration" that inspires Bartleby's negative preferences.It opposes and negates everyvalue which
the Master in Chancery, that cheerful lover of life,cherishes.Thus,
even the mere contemplation of Bartleby's passive but unfaltering
withdrawal fromthe world stuns and repels him; it points toward a
conclusion which, for him, is literally unthinkable, like the "horror" of Conrad's dying Kurtz. That morning the lawyer does not go
to church: "Somehow the things I had seen disqualified me for the
time forchurch-going."
Bartleby remains in the office,preferringto do nothing but his
copying, and his employer continues to seek for new methods of
drawing him back into the stream of life. But it is Bartleby who
dominates the office,not his employer,who, to his dismay,findsthat
he and his staffare falling into the habit of using "prefer."
The lawyer resolves once more to dismiss Bartleby, but a new
development offers him an opportunity to diagnose Bartleby's
malady as a physical disorder, causally explicable, and therefore
quite forgivable. Bartleby announces that he has "given up copying" and the lawyer,seeing that his eyes appear "dull and glazed,"
jumps to the conclusion that he has impaired his vision by working
in poor light. Now Bartleby does nothing at all, and his presence
becomes even more irritating,especially since it soon becomes obvious that his reason for giving up copying has nothing to do with
his health. He is given six days notice, but mutely rejects all proposals, threats,or bribes, and remains "like the last column of some
ruined temple ... standing mute and solitaryin the middle of the
otherwisedeserted room" (40).
The narrator,becoming more and more disturbed, is at the same
time experiencing an expansion of knowledge which opens up new
15 Ibid., p. 394.

279
vistasof his own characteras well as Bartleby's.He has lived in a

worldofreassuringly
predictablecauseand effect.
His clerkschange
theirmoodsregularlyaccordingto the clockwhichmeasurestheir
workingday. He seeksforexplanationsthatwill fitthisfamiliar
patternof causalityand is drivento metaphysical
musingson predestinationand freewill,ponderingtherelationshipbetweenguilt
and responsibility.
He feelsthatl1kethe "haplessColt," he is capable of murderinghis tormentor."6
"But," he goes on, "when this
old Adam of resentmentrose in me and temptedme concerning
Bartleby,I grappledand threwhim. How? Why,by simplyrecalling the divineinjunction:'A new commandment
give I unto you,
thatye love one another.'Yes, it was thisthatsaved me" (43). His
motivemaybe thesameas Colt's but his characteris different.
Althoughhe stillcomforts
himselfwiththejust man'smaximsof enlightenedself-interest,
it is clear thathe is, at heart,a good man,
and thatBartleby's"holiness"has touchedhim deeply,bringingto
the surfacethatdeep love forotherswhichis characteristic
of this
ethicalgenotype.
Nevertheless,
as an "eminently
safeman,"thenarratorfindscomfortin readingexplanationsthat stressstrictcausalityand deny
human freedom,"Edwardson the Will" and "Priestleyon Necessity,"and comesto theconclusionthatall of thishas been fatedby
an "all-wiseProvidence"and thatto shelterBartlebyis "the predestinedpurposeof my life." Betweenthe narratorand Bartleby
lies the insurmountablebarrierthat divides necessityfromfreedom,illusionfromreality.Edwardsspecifically
refutesLocke's distinctionbetween "prefer"and "will"; JosephPriestleyuses the
two wordswithoutnotingany difference.
Both insiston absolute
determinism;theydenythatthe chain of cause and effectcan be
broken by any act of the will.17Schopenhauer, however, as Oxen-
fordpointsout, teachesthatthereis one freedecision,limitedto

16 The issues of freedomand fatalityin the Colt murder case had been noted by
an anonymous editorial contributorto Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 6 (185253), 127. Perhaps Oxenford's comment that the will is suibjtugatedto "that law of
cause and effectby which the whole world of phenomena is governed,and which is
action"
equally potent in the dischargeof a pistol and the performanceof a virttuouis
(p. 406) broughtthiscase to mind as Melville workedon Bartleby.
17 See Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, e(l. Patil Ramsey (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 138-39, and Priestley's Writingson Philosophy, Scien7ce,
and Politics, ed. John A. Passmore (New York: Collier Books, 1965), p. 76.

280
thosefewwho can understandthe natureof life and renounceit:

"In thisasceticismconsiststhe onlypossiblefreedomof the will."
Bartleby'snegativepreferencesare not acts of willing-they are
actsofnot-willing.
As in a medievalmoralityplay,thenarratoris tornbetweengood
and evil impulses;his compassionfor Bartlebyconflictswith his
attachmentto the world of illusion,Wall Street.He cannotoust
Bartleby,forthatis a crueltythathe will not inflicton a "helpless
creature,"and yethe cannotlet him remainin his officeand ruin
his professional
reputation.He resolvesto leave Bartlebywherehe
is and movehis officeelsewhere,but,curiously,he findsit difficult
to partfromtheman whomhe is fleeing.
Having shiftedthe responsibility
forBartleby'sshelterto someone less tenderhearted,
he findsthat Bartlebyhas indeed been
evictedfromhis hermitage,
but hauntsthebuildingdayand night.
Finally confronting
Bartlebyhe reduces the situationto its bare
logicalbones: "Now one of twothingsmusttakeplace. Eitheryou
mustdo somethingor somethingmustbe done to you" (48). He
suggestsa numberof possibleoccupationsto all of whichBartleby
is indifferent.
Baffled,
he even offersto take Bartlebyto his home
until he can arriveat some decision,but Bartlebyreplies,"No, at
presentI would prefernot to makeanychangeat all." This answer,
whichdefiesall thelogicof law and hardheadedfinance,thecourts
and Wall Street,causesthenarratorto fleeagain,fearingtheanger
of thelandlordand thenew tenants.But Bartlebyin his own fashion is quite consistent;he is narrowingdown the circleof his actions until he reachesthe center,the "still point of the turning
world,"and ceasesto exist.
Melville's parable of the Schopenhaueriansaint in a depraved
worldreachesitsclimaxin theTombs, the prisonin whichBartleby is confinedafterbeing arrestedforvagrancy.His formeremployer,who has not desertedhim afterall, findshim in his usual
position,his face turnedtowarda high wall in completeindifference,"whileall around,fromthe narrowslitsof thejail windows,
I thoughtI saw peeringout upon him the eyesof murderersand
thieves"(51). It is in thissymbolicisolationthatBartlebystateshis
last negativepreference,"I prefernot to dine today,"and slips
awayquietlyfromlife into "annihilation,"freeof all will and all
pain.

281
The epilogueto the tale is that"vaguereport"whichthenarrator mentionsin his opening paragraph.Bartleby,it seems,was a
clerkin the Dead LetterOffice,and his employermusesover the
possibilitythat,given Bartleby'scharacter,"by natureand misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness,"nothingcould have been
worseforhim than the openingand destructionof letterswhich
havenotbeen deliveredbut "on errandsoflife.. . speedto death."
But this epilogue, supplied as an "explanation" of Bartleby's
by
tragicdecline,failslike everyotherrationalexplanationoffered
thenarrator.It tellsus nothingof real importanceabout Bartleby,
changehas taken
but it does indicatethata deep and irreversible
place in thenarrator.Actually,thesafeman,thesuccessfullawyer,
is farmorecomplexthantheenigmaticBartleby.When one grasps
the significance
of the end towardwhich Bartlebyis moving,his
linear.Havingmade theone freedecision
courseappearsruthlessly
ofwhichanyman is capable,thechoiceof theextinctionof thewill
to live,he allowsnothingto turnhim aside. In contrast,the narratorwavers,tornby an innerconflict.For him Bartlebyrepresents
a negationof values whichhe has neverquestioned,the values of
thevalue of existenceitself.
his socialgroup,and, moreimportant,
and a prudentselfishness
counOn theone side,nativeshrewdness
sel thattheremustbe a reasonableexplanationforBartleby'smartyrdom;on the other,a stillsmallvoice criesout fromthe depths
thatsuffering
and existenceare one and thesame,thatall menshare
Bartleby'spain,ifnothiswisdom.
The symbolof thedead lettersis ambivalentpreciselybecause it
servesas the focusforthisinnerconflictin theclosingparagraphs.
What can be moredepressing,the narratorwonders,than to open
theseletterswhichbringhope and reliefand have neverreached
This seemsreasonableuntilthereaderaskswhy,
theirdestinations?
to be completelyrationalabout the matter,the narratordoes not
seemto be awarethatdead lettersmaycontainbad newsas well as
good and thata clerkin theDead LetterOfficemightspendmuch
ofhis timedisposingofunpaid bills! It is evidentthatMelvillehas
deliberatelyemphasizedone aspectof his analogyand suppressed
theotherin orderto movethesymbolof thedead letterout of the
realmof normaleverydayprobabilityand into the realmof theology-or atheology.These letters,like the long-awaitedblessingof
gracewhichreleasesman fromthe slaveryof his owii will, never

282
arrive.'8 And so, despite his turning up of a "reason" for Bartleby's

defection fromlife, the narrator concludes his storywith a double
sigh, "Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity!" That deep intuitive compassion which Bartleby has stirred in him testifiesagainst all reason
that Bartleby's fate is man's fate.
In 1856 Melville visited Hawthorne in England and spent several days with him at Southport. "Melville," Hawthorne noted in
his journal, "as he always does, began to reason of Providence and
futurity,and of everythingthat lies beyond human ken, and informedme that he had 'prettymuch made up his mind to be annihilated'; but still he does not seem to rest in that anticipation; and,
I think,will never rest until he gets hold of a definitebelief." Hawthorne also noted that Melville had been afflictedwith neuralgic
complaints in the head and limbs and that "his writings,fora long
while past, have indicated a morbid state of mind." He seemed to
Hawthorne "a little paler and a little sadder." 19
Perhaps Bartleby the Scrivener was the journal of a descent into
that valley of the shadow which Schopenhauer had charted for the
nineteenth century,a metaphysical desert in which so many perished. "It is strange how he persists,"Hawthorne mused, "and has
persisted ever since I knew him, and probably long before-in
wandering to-and-froover these deserts as dismal and monotonous
as the sand hills amid which we were sitting."20
18 Richard Tuerk makes an interestingconjecture on the source of the dead-letter
metaphor in "Melville's 'Bartleby' and Isaac D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature,"
SSF, 7 (1970), 647-49. However, there is no reason why the dead letter should not
have seemed to Melville, as it did later to Gerard Manley Hopkins, an appropriate
symbol for the failure of communication between man and God: "cries like dead
letterssent / To dearest him that lives alas! away."
19 The English Notebooks of Nathaniel Hawthorne, ed. Randall Stewart (New
York: MLA, 1941; London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941), p. 432.
20 Ibid., pp. 432-33


Bartleby The Scrivener A Parabble of Pessimism

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Bartleby the Scrivener: A Parable of Pessimism

Author(s): Daniel Stempel and Bruce M. Stillians

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OCTOBER 1853 a troubled Matthew Arnold explained why he

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